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The Person in Between Moods and Affects

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The Person in Between Moods and Affects
René Rosfort
Giovanni Stanghellini

Philosophy, Psychiatry, & Psychology, Volume 16, Number 3,

September 2009, pp. 251-266 (Article)

Published by The Johns Hopkins University Press

DOI: 10.1353/ppp.0.0257

For additional information about this article

http://muse.jhu.edu/journals/ppp/summary/v016/16.3.rosfort.html

Access Provided by Tsinghua University Library at 05/15/11 3:09PM GMT

The Person in
Between Moods
and Affects
René Rosfort and
Giovanni Stanghellini

Abstract: In this paper, we consider the nature of two the condition of human existence in that they trig-
aspects of human emotional experience—moods and ger questions, doubts, and interest about the way
affects—in their relation to the concept of the person. we, as human beings, go about in our interaction
We argue for the importance of the concept of the with the world. We are not simply cogs in the
person in an approach to human emotional experi-
machine of evolution, and yet if we actually are,
ence. This paper differentiates between the concepts of
minimal self, extended self, and person. Furthermore, then we certainly do not feel so.
it offers a phenomenological proposal to understand The uses of the word ‘emotion’ vary enor-
the feeling dimension of moods and affects as critical mously and it seems that the perspectives on the
for the differentiation of human emotional experience, phenomenon are, unlimited. Therefore, any in-
and hence an understanding of that experience. By quiry into the phenomenon first has to restrict its
way of conclusion, we opt for a narrative approach to field of interest. As the title indicates, this article
the question of the normative dimension of emotional
is not a general survey of the concept of emotions,
experience to clarify the intricate relationship between
mood and personhood. but an inquiry into how we, as persons, relate to
our emotions. This is not to imply that emotions
Keywords: affects, character, emotions, minimal self, are a specific human feature, which recently has
moods, narrativity, person
been demonstrated to be an erroneous concep-
tion (Pankseep 2004, 52; 2005a, 56–57; 2005b,
168–170). Indeed, studies on animal emotion are

E
verybody has an intimate knowledge of critical for understanding emotional functions
emotions, and still no one seems able to in the mammalian brain, and therefore also in
give a satisfying explanation of what an humans (Ledoux 2000, 131; Shafe and Ledoux
emotion is. 2004, 987; Bekoff 2006, 44–47). Nevertheless,
Throughout the ages, emotions have had al- human emotional response is different from that
ternating destinies. They have been exulted as the of other animals; “[e]ven ignoring our intellectual
essence of humanity, abased as a lurking peril, abilities and cultural accretions, people are most
condemned as the road to perdition, or simply peculiar beasts” (Preuss 2004, 5). This difference
dismissed as an irrelevant and accidental part of is first of all due to the fact that human beings
man (Oatley 2004). One thing, however, seems are persons. This implies that whereas in other
undeniable: “emotions set the agenda for beliefs ‘beasts’ emotions are built-in response mecha-
and desires” (de Sousa 1987, 196). They expose nisms devised to cope with the environment and

© 2009 by The Johns Hopkins University Press

252  ■  PPP / Vol. 16, No. 3 / September 2009

prepare for action, in persons they also disclose The approach is interdisciplinary in the sense
the complexities and difficulties of one’s personal that we aim to deepen the concepts and their
identity. From the infant’s earliest sense of evalu- mutual relation by drawing on insights from dif-
ation and co-awareness (about 3 years; cf. Rochat ferent fields of knowledge: philosophy, clinical
2004, 12–13) to the last breath, humans struggle psychopathology, and cognitive neuroscience.
to find out what kind of persons they are. Emo- This paper, however, is intended as a conceptual
tions have a unique importance in this search for clarification of moods and affect in their relation
personal identity. Thus, emotions may be universal to the person and is, therefore, philosophical in
among most living creatures, but human experi- its theoretical grounding and arrangement. And
ence of emotions is drastically different from that yet, the arguments are unfolded with an attentive
of other animals. consideration of neuroscientific results and clinical
The concept of emotion and the concept of a observations. We begin with a rough presentation
person have to be considered as parts of the same of the concept of a person, then turn to the rela-
experience. Human emotional experience cannot tion between emotions and feelings, and thereafter
be understood without considering the nature of look at the phenomenological view on moods
the entity that has this particular experience. This and affects. Finally, we end with a consideration
means that the conception one has of the person of how the person lives the experience of moods
influences one’s view of emotions, and vice versa. and affects.
Although emotions occur in most animals, some
emotions are particularly human, such as shame, The Person: Damasio’s Core
resentment, delusion, pride, sadness, love, guilt, and Autobiographical Selves
hopelessness, and euphoria. As Taylor observes,
“The peculiarity of these emotions is that it is at
and Beyond
one and the same time the case that our formula- In this section, we briefly outline and criticize
tions are constitutive of the emotion, and that Damasio’s influential conception of the self as a
these formulations can be right or wrong” (1985, point of departure for an alternative description
101). Especially when ethical emotions (such as of the concept of a person and its relation to emo-
shame or guilt) are concerned, what they are to a tional experience. The minimal self (Gallagher and
person depends significantly on what the person Marcel 1999; Zahavi 2005) or core self (Damasio
takes them to be (Williams 1993, 91). Not only is 1994, 1999; Russell 2005) is a prereflective, bodily
our understanding of the emotions that we experi- self-awareness. The core self is the source of primi-
ence constitutive of the emotion itself, but also our tive self-awareness whose features are a sense of
understanding of ourselves is constitutive of the agency (the sense that it is me who is generating
emotion. Furthermore, if our understanding of an an action) and a sense of ownership (the sense
emotion can be right or wrong, then this entails that it is me who has an experience). This aspect
that emotions tell us something about ourselves of the self is evolutionarily prior to the extended
as persons, about our situation and our behavior or autobiographical self that Damasio defines
(and its motivations). as “[b]ased on autobiographical memory which
In this paper, we concentrate on two main is constituted by implicit memories of multiple
categories of emotional experience—moods and instances of individual experience of the past and
affects—without pretending to give an exhaustive of the anticipated future” (1999, 174). Damasio
account of the nature of emotional experience. emphasizes a conception of personal identity made
Moods and affects, as will become clear later, are up of past experiences and anticipations of the fu-
opposites in the spectrum of emotional experience. ture, and thereby he, in some way, presupposes an
The relation between the two is fundamental for identity on which we form ourselves as a person.
understanding how a person relates to his/her This identity is built on a core self that, throughout
emotional experience. our existence, develops into an autobiographical
self, shaped by education, culture, and unique and
Rosfort and Stanghellini / The Person  ■  253

contingent personal events. These factors create, A Person Is More Complicated

in a sort of orchestration, the person that we are. Than the Sum of Autobiographical
Naturally, he does not exclude our capacity to Memories
create imaginative variations on our actual being, Obviously, Damasio does not believe that the
but he seems certain that, in the end, we are the core self can account for who we are as extended
entities that we are constituted to be: “We can be selves, namely, reflective individuals and social be-
Hamlet for a week, or Falstaff for an evening, but ings. His account of how the prereflective core self
we tend to return to home base” (1999, 225). develops into an extended self is determined by his
conception of the autobiographical self. This self is
A Person Is More Than a Core Self developed under strict genomic and environmen-
Damasio’s use of the term core self is misleading tal control (1999, 229) and, as we have seen, if I
since it entails the idea that each of us has a ‘home should come to be at a loss about who I really am,
base’—a pre-given and firm shelter from which we then I should simply return to ‘home base.’ Now
can seek comfort and protection when we feel our what (or who) is this ‘home base’? It is (accord-
life growing opaque and fragmented. This core self ing to Damasio) who I really am: “[t]he tendency
as a ‘home base’ is like an interior statue that we towards one single self” (1999, 226). This ‘single
can discover via an archaeological expedition in self,’ the autobiographical self, is coined upon
the depth of our own self. Human identity, how- our core self and our autobiographical memories
ever, is more problematic than expressed in this that “[d]eliver to our extended consciousness the
account. Being a person cannot be separated from facts our physical, mental, and demographical
having a narrative identity, an active construction identity” (1999, 227). The autobiographical self
of my own self for which I am responsible. is, in this way, a product of the fact of its existence
in time (the core self and its extension through
A Person Is More Than a Prereflective past choices and anticipations of the future). This
Self self, when well-functioning, decides to act because
We may have a prereflective sense of a self, certain emotions (functioning as somatic markers)
involved in every action that we perform, but that highlight what to choose to promote the existence
is not the same as knowing who we are. Indeed, of the self. Damasio’s ‘somatic marker’ hypothesis
this sense, or feeling, of a self is sometimes that is a valuable contribution to the perpetual mind/
which confuses us and brings our understanding body problem in that it emphasizes, and gives
of ourselves to the brink of a crisis. Feeling that substantial empirical evidence for, the conception
it is indeed me who is now having an emotion of the mind as an embodied mind. We cannot omit
while performing a certain action is not at all the the body from our understanding of the human
same as acknowledging that action or this par- psyche because our body plays a fundamental role
ticular emotion is an essential part of my identity in every mental act that we perform. Nevertheless,
(as one of my characteristics). We are more than Damasio’s conception of the self is oversimplified
prereflective selves because we are persons situated (although he claims it not to be the case [Rudrauf
in a social context and endowed with a sense of and Damasio 2005, 239]) in the sense that it re-
freedom shaped not only by feelings, but also by duces the self to a living system in time and space
long-term desires, imagination, and values. There primarily controlled by what Frankfurt once called
are feelings that are egodystonic, as in the case ‘first-order desires’ or ‘wantons’ (1971). Our
of phobias, that is, they are prereflectively felt as mind is reduced to a complex survival machine,
one’s own by the person (the sense of ownership is intrinsically elaborated during evolution, wherein
there), but reflectively they are not acknowledged our body highlights the most favorable options
as part of one’s personal identity. in the process of our decision making. However,
there is more to the sense of self than just perse-
verance. Indeed, we have to want to be the self
that our organism or other people tell us that we
254  ■  PPP / Vol. 16, No. 3 / September 2009

are. Frankfurt points, once again, to the fact that self). The person is more than this, because person-
humans are peculiar beasts: “They are capable of al identity is more fragile than this account seems
wanting to be different, in their preferences and to indicate. Human beings have a will that makes
purposes, from what they are. . . . No animal other personhood a normative concept, which involves
than man, however, is capable to have the capacity more than just physiological and environmental
for reflective self-evaluation that is manifested in factors, namely an evaluative stance to being
the formation of second-order desires” (1971, 7). the person that we are. This, however, does not
To be a person involves the capability for evaluat- discredit the otherwise important empirical and
ing and deliberating on the facts that constitute theoretical research that Damasio’s works have
one’s autobiographical self. provided (e.g., the somatic-marker hypothesis with
regard to human decision making).
A Person Is More Than a Rational
Self On Being a Person:
In our reflective self-evaluation, we distance Ontological Ambiguity and
ourselves from our immediate desires and incli-
Position Taking
nations, and might perhaps choose something
even contrary to those because of another desire, A person is a contextualized self with inten-
shaped, for instance, by imagination or emanated tional attitudes, characterized by ontological
from a firm principle. Thereby, we create a second- ambiguity and capable of position taking, that
order desire that is completely personal and may is, evaluation and deliberation, as opposed to a
even appear idiotic in the eyes of other people. For minimal self (Gallagher and Marcel 1999; Zahavi
example, a person who commits suicide revolts 2005) or a core self (Damasio 1994, 1999; Rus-
against an organic inclination to live, against all sell 2005). The reason for this is that “man is as
possible rational arguments about the incompa- a person already a ‘homo duplex’” (Fuchs 2002,
rable value of life, and perhaps even against her 144). The term ‘homo duplex’ was originally
own desire to live. We can be angry, condemn the elaborated by Maine de Brian (1852) in a context
act, remain without an explanation (“she seemed wherein man is seen as a viewed nature in his vital
to have all the heart can desire”), but it would states of being but as a double (or complex) nature
never cross our minds to contest her personhood in belonging to humanity. We are passive in our
because of her decision. Then, to be a person is not, nature as sentient beings because we are shaped
essentially, to be rational, but to have a will (idem, by our physiological nature, by our environment,
11; see also Blackburn 1998, 65). We are persons and by our past history. Yet, we are active in virtue
because we are capable to choose to be what we of being persons. On the one hand, we are a part
want to be. Although this may seem an obscure of nature, and therefore nature sets a prereflective
reminiscence of existential philosophy that goes agenda for our behavior in the form of instincts
against intuition and the laws of biophysics (e.g., and emotions (a core sense of self, sexual and
a man who wants to be a woman because he feels survival instincts, fear of danger, etc.); in short,
that he is a woman captured in a man’s body), this an extremely complex machine set to solve the
capability still prevails, however, as a fundamental problems encountered during our lifetime in the
characteristic of being a person. ongoing interaction with the environment. On
These points are not meant as a refutation of the other hand,
Damasio’s account of neither emotions nor the [m]ore fundamentally man is a being who poses prob-
notion of core self. They are critical remarks that lems and raises questions—if only by bringing into
serve as a starting point for our own account. question the very foundations of that society that bids
We believe that Damasio reduces the question of him to adapt himself quietly to its systems of work,
human personhood to an evolutionary conglom- property, law, leisure and culture. (Ricoeur 1960, 117
erate of physiological constitution (core self) and [1986, 101]; cf. Ricoeur 1950, 213)
environmental factors (extended, autobiographical
Rosfort and Stanghellini / The Person  ■  255

Our being this ‘double’ person, endowed with Feelings are the primordial medium in which I
a specific physical constitution and situated in a encounter the world as a set of affordances: a set
certain historical, social, and cultural context, is of relevant possibilities that are my own possibili-
complicated even further when we consider our ties as a person situated in this particular world.
capacity to transcend our being this person by This being situated in a world of possibilities
questioning it. Not only do we question our being through a certain feeling is called Befindlichkeit
a part of nature and the social and cultural context by Heidegger (1927)—a term that combines the
wherein we are situated, we also question our own notion of location (finding oneself somewhere) and
identity as being this particular person, constituted that of being in a certain feeling-state (Stimmung).
by a certain physical constitution, past history, It is equally wrong to say that a certain thing
present environment, and character. in the world elicits a specific feeling-state (e.g.,
Being this specific person might be a problem that a wild animal causes fear) or that a certain
to me. I may feel that I am different from what I feeling-state colors my perception of the world
appear to be. This may begin with a feeling and (e.g., anxiety causes me to see a stick as a snake).
slowly develop into a conviction that the person There is not a causal relation between perception
that I really am is not expressed by the person I and feeling-state, or vice versa. Both feeling-state
appear to be. We can say that the person is situ- and perception find their explicative correlate in
ated in the dynamic dialectic of ‘being’ (Sein) and the actual and concrete situation of the person.
‘appearing-to-be’ (Schein). Because of the funda- We feel and perceive the world in a certain way
mental possibility of wanting to be different, we because of our being-in-world (in-der-Welt-sein).
always evaluate our being and our appearing-to- Whereas the internalist concept of ‘mood’1
be, and, in some way or another, position ourselves focuses on the (hypothetical) causes of a given vi-
in this dialectic. sion of the world (e.g., the world of a frightened
Another way to put it is the following: we, as person), the concept of Befindlichkeit focuses on
persons, are not simply situated in the world in the set of affordable actions of a person who is
a given way; we also have the privilege and re- located in a certain context and affected by a cer-
sponsibility to take a position with respect to our tain feeling-state that allows him to see the things
being-situated. Position taking (Plessner 1928) is that surrounds him as disclosing certain (and not
the metaphor that most precisely and vividly ex- other) possibilities. This view is aimed at putting
presses the essence of a person as a homo duplex person, body, and world together again.
and questioning being. Man is that being that The main force of the concept of Befindlichkeit
among his most important tasks has that to take might be that it emphasizes the work of feeling as
a position with respect to himself (Gehlen 1940); an uncovering (Erschlossenheit) of one’s situated-
that is, with respect to his instincts, emotions, past ness in the world, instead of an impediment to
history, social constraints, and so on. He also has objectively appreciate a certain state of things. The
the task to (metaphysically) define his nature and significance of an event or state of affairs is not
position in the Cosmos (Scheler 1928). merely a matter of its intrinsic properties, rather
of its relation to me and my current engagement.
Feeling-States Feeling-states reveal how the world is for me.
The concept of Befindlichkeit is closely tied to
The fundamental way of being situated in the that of ‘understanding.’ We can only understand
world is, before it becomes an explicit theme for ourselves and the world in which we are situated
rational thinking, being in a given feeling-state or through the context of our practical engagement,
emotional tonality. One essential way of taking a and, as we have seen, this engagement is primor-
position with respect to one’s situatedness is in- dially enveloped in a certain feeling-state. This
vestigating into this implicit ‘feeling’ or emotional way of looking at feeling-states has fundamental
tonality—this entails, as we will see, looking at the implications for the understanding of emotional
workings of moods and affects. experience that will be best appreciated if we first
256  ■  PPP / Vol. 16, No. 3 / September 2009

discuss the rapport between feelings and emotions embodied nature of emotions, but rejects its reduc-
and that between moods and affects. tion of the body to the object–body or physiologi-
cal mechanism (like visceral changes mediated by
Feeling and Emotion the autonomic nervous system). It obviously also
rejects the conceptualization of emotions as pure
In recent years, there has been a growing in- ‘mental’ phenomena because an emotion is not
terest in the concepts of emotion and feeling and a purely and primarily cognitive phenomenon
in the relation between them. There is, however, affecting the mind, but a phenomenon rooted in
much disagreement of both the nature of the single one’s lived body, and it can to a certain extent
concepts and their mutual relation. This disagree- be subconscious (Pankseep 2005a, 61–63; Prinz
ment is epitomized by two prominent and highly 2005, 15–18). We restrict ourselves to say that
contrasting views. Some take the view that emo- emotions are characterized by their connection
tion is due to bodily changes, and that feeling is to motivation and movement. Emotions are func-
simply our experience of those changes (Damasio tional states, which motivate and may produce
1994, 1999, 2003; James 1884; Prinz 2005). This movements. This view is held by contemporary
is the so-called feeling theories. The other view is evolutionary psychologists (Plutchik 1980), as
that emotions essentially involve cognitions (Nuss- well as by phenomenological analyses (Sheets-
baum 2001; Sartre 1939; Solomon 1977). These Johnstone 1999a, 1999b). As functional states that
positions are gathered under the name cognitive motivate movement, emotions are protentional
theories. We do not pretend to give anything even states in the sense that they project the person
close to an exhaustive answer to the nature of these into the future providing a felt readiness for action
concepts but, before going further, we sketch our (Gallagher 2005).
preliminary view on emotions and feelings. This Feelings make up a crucial part of emotional
will be of help to the following investigation into experience but, as we have seen, there is disagree-
moods and affects. ment about how they do so. James identifies feeling
Instead of combating one another, the feeling with emotion (1884, 190), and yet Solomon distin-
theories and the cognitive theories should come guishes the two by saying that we can experience
together in a dialog. Emotions are rooted in both an emotion “without feeling anything in particu-
physiological reactions and psychological phenom- lar.” Still, to detach feeling from emotion includes
ena. On the one hand, “emotions are bioregulatory the risk to overintellectualize emotion (Goldie
reactions that aim at promoting, directly or indi- 2000, 41). If we consider an emotion structured
rectly, the sort of physiological states that secure as a feelingless judgment about the world, then
not just survival but survival regulated into the we lose the criteria of distinction between actions
range that we, conscious and thinking creatures, done out of emotion and actions not done out of
identify with well-being.” (Damasio 2004, 50; emotion. For example, a judge should be able to
for similar accounts, see Pankseep 2005a, 2005b; treat a person regardless of how she feels about
Russell 2003, 2005). On the other hand, “[o]ne him. Only thereby can we say that it was a verdict
can be angry without feeling anything in particular, built on just causes and not on the personal feel-
without doing anything in particular and without ings of the judge. The feeling dimension of emotion
displaying any physiological symptoms of a unique is what permits to distinguish emotion among
syndrome for that emotion” (Solomon 1977, other cognitive functions (perception, deliberation,
44). Although it is uncertain if “one can be angry evaluation, judging etc.).
without feeling anything in particular,” Solomon However, the distinction between emotion
is right in pointing to the fact that an emotion is and other cognitive functions is often blurred by
not always bound to the ebbs and flows of the the fact that it is difficult to ascertain whether
bioregulatory reactions of our body. an action is done with or without an emotion.
Emotions are kinetic, dynamic forces that drive Emotions immerse the other cognitive functions
us in our ongoing interactions with the environ- in their nonrational movement whenever they
ment. This definition of ‘emotion’ focuses on the
Rosfort and Stanghellini / The Person  ■  257

appear. The judge is perhaps repudiated by the Furthermore, the constellation of feelings in-
appearance of the accused or by his word. Or she volved in an emotional experience may contain
may be in an irritable mood without being able more or less explicit cognitive elements. The feel-
to put her finger on what exactly it is due to. And ings involved in fear, for example, may tend to
both of these emotions might influence her final block our higher cognitive skills to promote the
verdict. Of course, a good judge is one who is able immediate instinct to flight from the object that
to set aside these personal aspects. Nonetheless, causes the emotion. In sadness, however, feelings
the fact that is difficult to be a good judge reveals and cognition are more intrinsically intertwined.
something important about the feelings of emo- The feelings are both subject and object for our
tions, namely that they tend to impose themselves reflections. We are sad because we feel sad, but the
on all our thoughts and actions. thought involved in our sadness may enhance or
Once again, we limit ourselves to an outline. diminish our feeling of sadness (Ledoux 2000).
Feelings are an inherent part of all emotional expe- And finally, time plays a fundamental role in
rience, although how an emotion feels may remain the feelings involved in an emotional experience.
vague to the subject. To differentiate among dif- Whereas some feelings are more or less instan-
ferent emotional experiences, we need to take a taneous (panic, joy, sexual arousal), others are
closer look on the feelings that they elicit. Feeling prolonged (grief, hatred, boredom).
is, perhaps, the best way to reveal that we are in To access these emotional states, we need to pay
a certain emotional state.2 attention to the diffuse and vague constellation of
One reason why the feeling dimension of emo- feelings involved in our interaction with the world.
tion is important is because emotions can be both This is indeed a difficult task. Nevertheless, we
conscious and subconscious. Conscious emotions believe that by sorting out the main characteris-
take up, by virtue of their intentional attitude, a tics of the different feelings involved in two main
substantial part of our attention in a given situa- emotional states—moods and affects—we gain
tion. For example, I choose not to undress myself an effective tool to close up on an understanding
in front of other people because I feel ashamed. of how the person lives, experiences and under-
Subconscious emotions, on the contrary, are not stands these emotional states. Both moods and
direct objects in our attentional field. They mani- affect are characterized by the constellation of
fest themselves through certain feelings. These feelings involved in the experience of them, and
feelings can be vague and opaque (as in the case an analysis of the phenomenology of these feelings
of moods; see below). However, the feelings that enables a better understanding of their influence
an emotion elicits are an essential component of on the person.
the emotion itself because we, as persons, need
to acknowledge these feelings to fully access the Moods and Affects:
emotion. For instance, our good judge may be in The Standard Psychiatric
a ‘bad mood’ the day of the trial. This is indeed
a very vague constellation of feelings. Her body
Definitions and the
feels heavier than usual and the sunlight is an- Phenomenological Views
noying. The coffee tastes strange, and even the The distinction between moods and affects may
smallest obstacle, such as a binding door, leaves seem a purely nominalistic querelle. It is, however,
her exasperated. But although the expression ‘bad important not to conflate the two; we need two
mood’ might seem innocent and insignificant, it is, different concepts to address two different sets of
however, wrong to say (as Ratcliffe does, 2005, phenomena.
55) that this is a rather superficial subjective state. According to current diagnostic manuals, mood
Indeed, being in a ‘bad mood’ often involves disorders include psychopathological disorders
profound feelings that reveal oneself as being in that have a disturbance in mood as the predomi-
a certain protentional state and readiness to a nant phenotypical feature. Akiskal (2005, 1560)
(although still implicit) given action. explains that the term ‘mood disorders’ is today
258  ■  PPP / Vol. 16, No. 3 / September 2009

preferred to ‘affective disorders’ because it refers (1939), and Ricoeur (1950, 1960): whereas affects
to sustained emotional states and not merely to are responses to a phenomenon that is grasped
the external expression of the present emotional as their motivation, moods do not possess such
state (i.e., affects). The same point is made by Bech directedness to a motivating object. Although their
(2000, 682): in both the DSM-IV and the ICD-10, terminology differs, and that often confusingly
the term ‘affective’ has been replaced by the term (Scheler, Affekten/Gefühlen; Heidegger, Affekten/
‘mood’ to emphasize the duration of the episodes Stimmungen; Sartre, affects/emotions; Ricœur,
of clinical depression or mania, because ‘affective’ sentiments schematisés/sentiments informes), their
refers to emotional states of briefer duration than analyses of the phenomena concur in the general
‘mood’ or to milder degrees of symptoms. Not- characteristics (Table 1). Affects are focused, inten-
withstanding the centrality attributed by many to tional, and possess directedness. Affects are felt as
mood alterations in manic–depressive spectrum motivated; they are more determinate than moods
disorders, an in-depth discussion of the concepts of and more articulated. Affects do not open up a
‘mood’ and ‘affect’ is scantily provided. Textbooks horizontal awareness, but occupy all my atten-
(Tasman, Kay, Lieberman 1997, 481; Kaplan and tional space (e.g., in fear I am completely absorbed
Sadock 2005, ch. 7.4; Hales and Yudofsky 1999, by the phenomenon that terrifies me). When I am
109-110; Stoudemire 1998, 30) primarily use two affected, a relevant feature of the world captivates
dimensions to define ‘mood’ and contrast it to ‘af- me, irrupts into my field of awareness without me
fect’: one is temporal, the other is internal versus having decided to turn my attention to it. I become
external or subjective versus. objective. Although spellbound to it and all my attention is captured
the definitions we find in different textbooks are by it. Typical examples of captivating affects are
not consistent, generally ‘mood’ is defined as grief (when the death of a beloved person occupies
sustained and internal, whereas ‘affect’ is momen- all my attentional space) or phobias.
tary and external (Hales, Yudofsky, and Tallbott Moods, on the contrary, are unfocused and
1999). For instance, Kaplan and Sadock (2005, nonintentional. They do not possess directedness
848) distinguish mood (“pervasive and sustained and aboutness. They are felt as unmotivated, and
feeling tone that is experienced internally and that, there are no ‘felt causes’ for them. They are more
in the extreme, can markedly influence virtually indefinite and indeterminate than affects and are
all aspects of a person’s behavior and perception often inarticulate. Moods have a horizontal ab-
of the world”) from affect (“the external expres- sorption in the sense that they attend to the world
sion of the internal feeling tone”). Also, in the as a whole, not focusing on any particular object
DSM-IV-TR, ‘mood’ is contrasted with ‘affect’ or situation. Moods often manifest themselves as
accordingly (although in a rather indirect man- prolonged feelings-states as opposed to the more
ner): affect is “a pattern of observable behaviors instantaneous nature of affect.3 Whereas most
that is the expression of subjectively experienced affects fill up the whole field of awareness for a
feeling state (emotion),” whereas mood is equated brief period (e.g., in fear or anger), moods convey
with ‘emotion.’ We can infer that, according to the a constellation of vague feelings that permeate my
DSM-IV-TR, mood is the experienced feeling-state whole field of awareness, and they often last for a
that entails a configuration of observable comport- longer period than affects.
ments (affects). It is also said that in contrast with Moods are global feeling-states that do not fo-
affect, which refers to more fluctuating changes cus on any specific object in my field of awareness.
in emotional ‘weather,’ mood refers to a more When we are in a certain mood we relate ourselves
pervasive and sustained emotional ‘climate.’ to the world and to ourselves through that mood.
Phenomenologists have contributed to explain- In euphoria, the perception of my body is feeble
ing this distinction in an explicit and systematic and may even vanish. I feel absorbed in my con-
way (Smith 1986). This distinction is merely in- cerns; my self-awareness, my body, and the world
cipient in Husserl’s writings and is made explicitly fuse together in perfect harmony. In sadness, the
by Scheler (1912, 1916), Heidegger (1927), Sartre perception of my body comes to the foreground;
Rosfort and Stanghellini / The Person  ■  259

Table 1. Mood and Affect

Mood Affect
Unfocused Focused
Nonintentional Intentional
Not motivated Motivated
Inarticulate Articulate
Horizontal absorption No horizontal absorption
Emanated from, not by Emanated from and by
No captivation Captivation
No ‘felt causes’ ‘Felt causes’
Indefinite and indeterminate Determinate
No directedness Directedness
Sustained Instantaneous
Adapted, with slight modifications, from the list found in Smith (1986, 109–111). Recently an interesting empiri-
cal investigation of how 106 nonacademic people distinguish between emotion and mood (here we would prefer
the term ‘affect’ to ‘mood,’ but the characteristics coincide), the result is very similar to the table presented here
(Beedie, Terry, and Lane 2005, 817).

I may feel my body as an obstacle, a hindrance Table 1 roughly resumes the main characteris-
separating me from the world and perhaps even tics of moods and affects in such a way that their
from myself. Thus, moods are atmospheric and oppositional nature becomes clear. Examples of
often corporeal in that they permeate my percep- moods as opposed to affects are anxiety as op-
tion of the environment. They can bring me closer posed to fear, sadness (as opposed to) grief, eupho-
to or distance me from the world in that they elicit ria/joy, dysphoria/anger, tedium/boredom.
a certain atmosphere that becomes the tonality There is little work done on moods in the
through which I perceive the world and myself. Anglo-Saxon philosophical tradition. The treat-
When I am feeling happy, the world and other ment of moods is often reduced to peripheral
persons appear in a soft light of possibility and mentioning in larger analyses of emotions. When
openness; I feel differently from when I am jealous. they are mentioned, though, their main character-
In this case, things appear as prowling perils; even istics concur with the phenomenological account,
the most sincere smile might be perceived as false namely an objectless phenomenon (for opposing
and dangerous to my person. views, see Kenny [1963], Crane [1998], and
An important aspect of moods is that in virtue Goldie 2000/2002). However, the fact remains
of being prolonged and pervasive feeling-states, that moods are often treated as opposed to emo-
they are dispositional in nature and may develop tion (e.g., Blackburn 1998; Goldie 2000/2002; de
into character traits: “our traits are shaped by Sousa 1987) so that the distinction is not mood
our emotions and moods, just as our emotions versus affect, but mood versus emotion. It is our
and moods are shaped by our traits” (Goldie opinion that if we treat both mood and affects as
2000/2002, 141). Goldie here puts forward an different constellations of feelings within the same
interesting dialectic that we develop further in emotional experience, then it enhances the possi-
the final section. bility to pursue an understanding of the dialectical
260  ■  PPP / Vol. 16, No. 3 / September 2009

transitions between the two phenomena and their me at all now fills me with an irresistible desire
significance for the person. to run away and look for protection. The feelings
Whereas affects seem to enjoy a firm definition involved in the intentional attitude of my affects
because of their object-directed nature, moods are indeed changed by my current mood. My
(owing to their disoriented and hazy phenom- mood is expressed by how perceptions or thoughts
enality) do not enjoy the same privilege. It can affect me. Moods materialize in affects in that I
therefore be of help to elaborate more thoroughly am affected through my mood. This may suggest
on the principal characteristics in the relation to a covert intentionality in moods. Whereas affects
the concept of a person. have a direct and clear intentional object (an object
of perception or a thought), moods are character-
The Person Between Moods ized by multiple objects (Siemer 2005). Whereas
and Affects affects point to an explicit experience such as a
dangerous situation, a happy smile, a beautiful
Moods and affects are oppositional extremes in landscape, a difficult task, and so on, moods, on
the person’s emotional experience and are charac- the contrary, point to my being the person I am in
terized by different constellations of feelings and a given situation. Moods can be compared with
by different temporal, intentional, and narrative what Ricoeur calls ‘ontological sentiments’ in that
patterns. In the foregoing section, we have tried to “[t]hey denote the fundamental feeling . . . namely,
enlist the principal phenomenological characteris- man’s very openness to being” (1960, 120 [1986,
tics of feelings involved in emotional experiences. 105]). We can say that whereas affects point for-
In this final section, we put these characteristics of ward toward a specific object, moods point inward
emotional experiences in a dialectic relation to the toward my being the person I am. More precisely,
concept of a person outlined in the beginning—a moods contain a bipolar intentionality in the sense
person is a contextualized self with intentional that they often materialize in a certain affect owing
attitudes, characterized by ontological ambiguity to an explicit object, but at the same time point
and capable of position-taking. This will be done to my being the person I am, and thereby awake
according to three fundamental aspects of the questions, doubts, considerations, evaluations and
concept of a person: intentionality, temporality, finally deliberations about my-being-this-person.
and narrativity. Moods and affects interact through the person
who has the emotional experiences. One way to
Intentionality ascertain a mood from an affect and, perhaps
Intentionality is the aspect of a psychic state even more important, to understand the dialectic
to be ‘of’ or ‘about’ something. The standard between them in relation to the person, is to con-
phenomenological view on moods and affects is sider temporality.
more or less clear on one fundamental difference:
moods are unintentional and affects intentional. Temporality
However, this view may be modified by relating the The concept of temporality is understood as
two feeling-states to the person. It is correct to say how the person experiences time and how the
that an affect such as fear is about the particular existence of the person is inevitably formed and
object of fear (e.g., the bear), and that an anxious developed in time. Temporality is, therefore, a
mood does not point to any specific intentional subjective modality of the concept of time; time
object, but manifests itself as an unarticulated is considered a constitutive part of both the be-
background tonality or atmosphere that contami- ing and the subjective experience of the person.
nates my whole field of awareness. Nevertheless, The person changes through time and experiences
my mood seems to contaminate the way I relate how the world, other people and herself change
to the world in the sense that it is accompanied in time. Temporality is not time as an exclusively
by a certain atmosphere in my perceptions. A private (solipsistic) or pure cosmological (objec-
situation that beforehand would not intimidate tive) phenomenon, but both time as experienced
Rosfort and Stanghellini / The Person  ■  261

and lived by the person and time as working on predispose my field of attention (thus my conscious
and with the person. experience) in a certain way.
Moods and affects display different temporal And, as we have seen, in the course of time,
patterns. Affects are often briefer than moods. moods may—in virtue of being dispositional—
They captivate me, occupy my whole field of transform themselves into an inherent and per-
awareness, and thereby move me to a determinate manent part of my self. An affect can develop
action within a restricted period of time. Moods, into a mood, and a mood can develop into a
on the contrary, may last for days, weeks, or even basic emotional tonality. For instance, a dysphoric
years in that they paralyze my thoughts and retain state can gain such a hold on my person that it
me from acting (sadness) or throw me into weird turns into a certain trait, for example an irritable,
actions without any thoughts of the past or the hostile, mean, polemic, misanthropic, or adverse
future (euphoria). The intensity of the feelings character.5 This basic emotional tonality is a per-
involved in affects demands a concrete action manent, implicit protention, or readiness to (re)
regarding our present situation such as to express act and be affected in a given way, and probably
our anger, escape the bear, return the happy smile, also to develop certain moods more than others.6
work on the difficult task, and so on. Obviously, In this way, emotions become an essential part of
we often do not act out of the affect but retain a person, of one’s sense of personal identity. This
ourselves from acting out of it. We can dominate feeling of sameness comes close to what Ricoeur
the affect by cognition.4 For example, the irresist- (1990) calls ‘character.’ This basic emotional to-
ible desire to insult or thump a malicious boss nality is usually tacit and I notice it only when it
may be suppressed by the fear of losing my job. is not there. It is important to notice that all these
The intensity of the affect then gradually subsides, transformations from affects to moods to charac-
and I turn my attention on other matters. This, ter occur prereflectively and without a deliberate
however, does not imply that the affect vanishes and thematic involvement of the person in the
altogether. It may remain as a bitter memory that process, whereas the transformation of a mood
brings forth unpleasant feelings every time it pops into an affect involves reflection.
up in my mind (Goldie 2000/2002, 149–151). This brings us to the final consideration, namely
The dialectic of moods and affects is complex. how the dialectic of moods and affects play a
Affects may transform themselves into moods and significant role in the process of the person’s nar-
finally become a permanent part of our ‘character’; rative identity.
moods may determine affects because they alter
the way we are affected by objects and thoughts. Narrativity
Last, but not least, a given mood may become an The theory of narrativity comes in endless varia-
affect when in reflection I can articulate it and find tions and influences a vast array of disciplines (e.g.,
its motivations and ‘felt causes,’ that is, the way philosophy, psychology, sociology, theology, econ-
it roots me in a given situation. omy). In the present context, we restrict ourselves
An affect may transform itself into a mood that to a narrow concept of narrativity to clarify how
imposes itself on me for days or longer (grief can the emotional experiences of moods and affects
transform into a general sadness; anger into dys- play a crucial role in the life and self-experience
phoria; boredom into tedium). Thus, a mood may of the person. Narrativity, here, indicates that a
develop out of an affect as the affect itself loses its significant part of a person’s self-experience and
instantaneous, focused, and motivated character. self-understanding is based on self-narratives—an
Also, a mood might not be the product of a single ongoing process of establishing coherent formula-
affect and the following action or suppression of tions about who I am, who I was, and where I am
action, but a constellation of feelings elicited in going. Through self-narratives I seek to under-
several episodes. Moods (e.g., irritability, sadness, stand my actions and experiences as a semanti-
tedium, euphoria) change the way I am affected cally coherent pattern of chronologically ordered
by the world (and my own thoughts) in that they elements, and to grasp the way I relate myself to
262  ■  PPP / Vol. 16, No. 3 / September 2009

that understanding and to the world. We do not norms.” It is still me who did that terrible thing in
claim that the narrative structure is the exclusive the past, even though it would not cross my mind
structure of our self-experience, but simply that to do anything like that today. Selfhood entails a
in virtue of being linguistic animals characterized kind of self-continuity that implies responsibility
by ontological ambiguity and position-taking we not as a contingent, but as an essential component
tend to constitute our experiences and our identity of personhood. This dimension of self-continuity
through self-narratives. The temporal aspect of is mainly shaped through self-narratives.
our being becomes emphasized in the narrative How, then, do moods and affects figure in the
approach to personhood. We are changing every dialectic of character and selfhood developed in
second of our life, and yet we remain the same the narrative structure of self-experience?
person. Our identity prevails through time, even As we have seen in the preceding paragraph,
though our body may alter and deform, and our a given mood can develop itself into a character
ideas may change drastically. Although our iden- trait, that is, a permanent part of one’s sense of
tity prevails, we may change as persons during our personal identity; this transformation occurs pre-
life span. Thus, identity—in the sense of personal reflectively and without a deliberate and thematic
identity—is not mere sameness. involvement of the person.
According to Ricoeur (1990), personal identity Through narratives, moods can also be incor-
is formed through a dialectic of two forms of iden- porated actively, reflectively, and thematically
tity: Being-the-Same (idem/sameness) and Being- into a person’s identity. Moods are connected to
Oneself (ipseity/selfhood). The fundamental trait self-understanding. I understand who I am in the
of Being-the-Same is permanence in time, which context of my practical engagement, as embed-
Ricoeur, as we have seen, also refers to as charac- ded in a certain world (private as social), and this
ter: “[t]he set of distinctive marks which permit engagement is primordially enveloped in a certain
the reidentification of a human individual as being feeling-state. My questioning about myself is often
the same” (1990, 144 [1992, 119]). My character elicited by my mood (and by disturbing affects that
is that in which my feeling of remaining the same disclose my mood) before my identity becomes an
in time and through changes is rooted, and that by explicit problem. Moods may disclose to me what
which other people identify and describe me. word and deeds do not. Feeling-states are no hin-
A person, however, does not coincide with drance to ‘cognitive’ knowledge, but the via regia
her character traits; being who she is involves to understand myself as embedded in the world.
another kind of identity: an identity constituted The possibility of self-disclosure, which belongs to
in Being-Oneself (selfhood). Whereas my charac- moods and affects, is fundamental for cognition
ter is formed involuntarily in the sense that it is in that a given mood can point to a breach in the
determined by my past actions, random events way I, reflectively, understand myself. I can be
and contingent factors that are now out of my locked up in my own way of thinking, chained to
control (Ricoeur 1950, 343), the identity of my my thoughts in such a way that my formulations
selfhood, on the contrary, depends on how I vol- about myself reflect a wrong or at least problem-
untarily relate my self to being a person with this atic understanding of my personhood.
particular character, constituted by a certain past, Although our capability to choose to be what
and situated in a world of other persons. My self- (who) we want to be is a constitutive feature of
hood is constituted by my active relation to the personhood, these choices (evaluations) are always
person I am (with all the ambiguity that person- tied to the involuntary aspect of my personhood:
hood entails); it is I who have the responsibility “The normative dimension thus pertains to the self
for my being this person. Here enters the ques- that one already is in relating to others, to a world
tion of responsibility involved in being a person. in between, and to oneself” (Grøn 2004, 151).
As Teichert (2004, 177–178) eloquently puts it, This complex dialectic between to be and
“Identity as selfhood is linked to a realm where appear to be (between character, selfhood, and
actions are ascribed to agents in the light of ethical world) exposes the fragile nature of personhood:
Rosfort and Stanghellini / The Person  ■  263

my narrative formulations about myself are con- cally different from that of other animals. Human
stitutive of my person, and yet (as Taylor observes) emotional experience cannot be understood without
these formulations can be right or wrong. I can considering the nature of the entities that have this
particular experience—namely, persons. A person is a
tell a wrong story about myself and therefore live
contextualized self with intentional attitudes capable
according to this story, but my mood (and its ex- of position-taking, i.e. evaluation and deliberation,
pression in certain affects) may disclose, through as opposed to a minimal self or a core self.
its bipolar intentionality, that something is wrong 2. The feeling that an emotion elicits is an essential com-
about this story. If we take our emotions seriously ponent of the emotion itself because we, as persons,
and seek to interpret them as disclosing something need to acknowledge this feeling to fully access the
about ourselves and our situation, then we may emotion. To differentiate among different emotional
experiences we need to pay attention to the diffuse
gain a tool to approach the problematic notion
and vague constellation of feelings involved in our
of personhood. interaction with the world.
This, however, presupposes that we understand 3. Feelings give a fundamental contribution to uncover
identity and personhood as essentially anchored a person’s situatedness in the world. We as persons
in a continuity that demands that we take respon- can understand ourselves and the world in which we
sibility for our choices, past as future, and that are situated through the awareness of our practical
we do not live our lives as ‘episodic creatures’ engagement, and this engagement is primordially
(as proposed by Strawson 2004). We cannot base enveloped in a certain feeling-state.
Emotions may display different phenomenal
our identity on Lord Shaftesbury’s dictum: “The
patterns. Therefore, we need different concepts for
now, the now. Mind this: in this is all” (quoted in moods and affects. Moods are unfocused, noninten-
Strawson 2004, 438). In fact, by emphasizing the tional, not motivated, and unarticulated, whereas
interconnection between emotions and the norma- affects are intentional, motivated, and articulated.
tive structure of narrativity we see that feeling- We suggest analyzing these differences according to
states may disclose the consequences of living as three fundamental aspects of the concept of a person
episodic creatures in the magical now. The feeling and of personal identity: intentionality, temporality,
and narrativity.
of hopelessness emerging when I earnestly try to
4. Personhood is anchored in a continuity that entails
convince others (and myself) that it was not me a demand for taking responsibility for one’s choices.
who stole the shirt that I am now wearing. It may This normative feature becomes emphasized in a
have been me, but not the me that I am now. narrative structure wherein we seek to connect past,
A thematic articulation of my emotions (moods present, and future. Emotions are fundamental in
as well as affects) in a narrative structure may this process since they may disclose problems in the
help to understand the emotions themselves and stories we formulate about ourselves. They disclose
the fact that our formulations can be right or wrong
thereby approach a fundamental feature of per-
according to our being this specific person. Emotions
sonhood: a person is constituted of both factual are bound to both the factual (being the person I
(a specific physical constitution, a given world, a already am) and normative aspect (wanting to be
certain past, and a particular character) and nor- or not to be that person) of personhood.
mative (I can choose to be identifying myself with
the factual or not, but I, somehow, have to relate
Notes
myself to these facts) features. Emotions open up
this dialectic and help us sort it out, if we, on the 1. The internalist concept of ‘mood’ sees it as a state
of mind entailing a given vision of the world. In this
other hand, try to understand (by thematic articu-
view, it is because of a ‘lowered’ mood that the world is
lation) the complexity of the nature of emotions. darkened (“As if you saw things through dark lenses”)
and action becomes impossible (“What you lack is the
Summary and Conclusion vital drive”). The externalist approach sees external
events as causes of moods as internal states of mind.
In this paper, we have argued the following. 2. Other ways include observing the behavioral
1. Emotions are universal among most living creatures, or visceral output of the emotion itself. For instance,
but the human experience of emotions is drasti- LeDoux (1998) is very skeptical about the reliability of
introspection for defining emotions. Subjective experi-
264  ■  PPP / Vol. 16, No. 3 / September 2009

ences, he holds, are not a reliable source for the clas- Cloninger, R. C. 1994. Temperament and personality.
sification of emotions, especially for research. Others, Current Opinion in Neurobiology 4:266–273.
such as Elster (1999), suggest a rather complex scheme Crane, T. 1998. Intentionality as the mark of the men-
to characterize emotions, including seven criteria: quali- tal. In Current issues in philosophy of mind, ed.
tative feel (the intrinsic feature of an emotional experi- A. O’Hear, 229–251. Oxford: Oxford University
ence), cognitive antecedents (beliefs that may trigger an Press.
emotion), intentional object (what an emotion is about), Damasio, A. 1994. Descartes’ error. Emotion, reason,
arousal (physiological, mainly visceral, changes), expres- and the human brain. New York: Grosset/Putnam.
sion (observable features, like bodily posture or voice ———. 1999. The feeling of what happens: Body and
pitch), valence (being pleasant or painful), and action emotion in the making of consciousness. New York:
tendency (states of readiness to execute an action). In Harcourt.
Elster’s schema, criterion 1 is experiential, criteria 2 and ———. 2003. Looking for Spinoza. Joy, sorrow, and
3 are cognitive, and all the others are “visceral” or physi- the feeling brain. New York: Harcourt.
ological attributes of emotions. We remind the reader ———. 2004. Emotions and feelings: A neurobio-
that at issue, in the present context, are the personal logical prespective. In Feelings and emotions. The
experience and understanding of emotions. Amsterdam symposium, ed. A. S. R. Manstead, N.
3. In fact, Russell’s neuropsychological account of Frijda, and A. Fischer, 49-57. Cambridge: Cambridge
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