The Micro of Sciences in Thomas Kuhn and The Macro of Sciences in Karl Popper 1

Term Paper by Amarjeet Singh for the partial fulfilment for the partial fulfilment of the
course ‘Research Methods in Social Sciences’ under guidance of Course Instructor- Shefali Jha

The work “The Structure of Scientific Revolution”, by Thomas Kuhn published in 1962, marks an
interesting episode in the Philosophy of Sciences where an attempt has been made to not just clarify the
embedded, often not-known, hidden, history2 in science but also resolve the anomalies in the
understanding of What exactly “is” science and How does it progress? Such a Historical Undertaking
for Science can offer us with interesting insights of growth of science. This assumption of Kuhn 3 runs
throughout his book and it is this only which comes in confrontation of Sir Karl Popper’s view on
Science and its growth. Such an attempt on one side tries to resolve already persisting problems in the
understanding of progression of science and on the other opens up larger avenues in understanding of
the nuances in the progression and growth of science. In doing so, Kuhn advanced the idea that scientists
in a particular field share an existing set of practices—a paradigm—that allows them to labour away
using common methods on like research problems—what he labelled "normal science." Eventually,
experimental anomalies accrue that foment revolutionary change—the ballyhooed paradigm shift that
overturns the existing order and ushers in a new era that may differ radically from the old. The central
epistemic we have in Kuhn are the notion of Paradigm, Normal science, Puzzle-solving exercise,
Testing, Incommensurability, Anomalies, Scientific Revolutions and so on. While reading a gamut
philosopher on philosophy of science one would find that a number of those are sceptical about some
aspects in “Paradigm-made Normal Science” and Extraordinary Science. Despite of all this debates and
disagreements one peculiar thing which largely makes our project worth is “it shows something about
nature of Science”.
This artice has been broadly divided into two parts, Part one takes a nuanced picture of important
conceptions in Kuhn’s “The Structure of Scientific Revolutions” and the problems with them. Part two
engages and analyses the views of scholars who have been trying to understand Kuhn’s seminal work,
often critically and through problematizing it. Main among them are Karl Popper, Imre Lakatos, John
Watkins along with this the responses of Thomas Kuhn. Last part reflects on how far such an
understanding adheres to reality and how revolutionary science can give rise to newer paradigms.

(I)
In sciences any theory, hypothesis, assumption or even research project has to begin from certain
already known and accepted gamut of ideas, whose achievement was sufficiently unprecedented to
attract an enduring group of adherents away from competing modes of scientific activity, also, at the
same time it was open ended to leave all sorts of problems for the redefined group of practitioners to
resolve4. This as Kuhn calls are- Paradigms, which closely relate to “Normal Science”. Normal science
thus offers a tradition which can called as Euclid’s Geometry, Hilbert’s Space, Newtonian Mechanics
and so on. The understanding of Paradigm is so important, and at the core in Kuhn that he devoted a

1 By Micro and Macro, I do not mean as it is used in Economics, rather my usages restrict it to simple (small
and often esoteric) and bold (bigger, concretely visible) respectively.
2 Kuhn, Thomas, Introduction: A role of history in The Structure of Scientific Revolution, p.1, 1962, Chicago

University Press.
3 Through this I mean most of the example in Kuhn, from Newton to Einstein; from Ptolemy to Lavoisier, take

the progression of science in the form of certain paradigms and overthrow of them(a sense of history is
attached to them), as a result a shift in them (we would discuss about it in detail later).
4 ibid. P.10
whole section on “The priority of Paradigms”, which simply suggest that it is only in the paradigm that
we get “possibility” and scope of problem-solving. The need of Paradigm thus fundamentally brings us
to rules of game under which the whole research project has to lay itself 5. This provides a specific
common ground in the corresponding area. For Kuhn in the same vein Normal Science can be
determined in part by the direct inspection of paradigms a process that is often aided by but does not
depend upon formulations of rules and assumptions. So, paradigm simply lay out the ways within which
the work has to be fostered, in so far as it is so, can simply be said, of what Kuhn calls- paradigms could
determine normal science without the intervention of discoverable rules. This becomes clear with a
simple example- A student of Newtonian Dynamics often working on concepts of ‘mass’ ‘force’ ‘space’
is okay with half laid definitions and theories of these so long as he occupies herself in ‘problem-
solution'. For him thus, the questions like is this conception of mass accurate doesn't matter to the extent,
in Normal science, the problems are solved. Paradigms have a special place as they guide research by
direct modelling as well as abstracted rules. Thus, so far understood we can simply state that in Normal
Science any problem solving simply begins with a coherence of already existing ideas which a
community of practitioners put faith upon.

Can Normal Science be called- ‘Simple’ Progression through modest Incrementalism or

Dogmatism Defensive Metaphysics?
The nature of Normal Sciences which Kuhn envisages very precisely deals with How paradigm relates
to Normal science. Paradigms in Normal Sciences pertains to force the scientist to investigate the nature
in detail and depth that would otherwise be unimaginable. In doing so, Paradigm makes sure that there
is an ‘incremental’ and constant flowing research problem for the Normal Science to build upon. In this
various researcher and often a community of them compete with each other by virtue of problem
solving. The role of factual determinacy as Kuhn argues also lies pertinently in the vocation in Normal
Science which adds up or bring accuracy in paradigm6. Such canvass of experimental and observational
research attempts to increase the already existing knowledge domain. Efforts to articulate paradigm,
thus, so far does not say lead to in just certain Universal constant which underpin as well help some
prevailing gamut of ideas rather form a permanent thing in the discipline. Another interesting example
of incrementalism through paradigm in Normal Science as Kuhn argues how certain phenomena of
heating by compression has been established and all other were paradigm dependent 7. Now, turning
towards the theoretical problems in Normal Sciences, it seems suggests or rather illustrates in a normal
theoretical work in science a potency is there, though only in part, to use the existing theory to predict
the factual information of intrinsic value 8. This also holds true for Social Sciences, for instance, certain
theoretical accounts have always been trying explain some social reality- Marxism for that matter. That
factual, observation explanation which that theory offers build itself from the paradigm. The purpose
of such an enterprise is no more that to display the application of paradigm or to increase the precision
of an explanation which has already been made.
The puzzle solving activity in Normal Science pertains to an exercise which the individual in the
community has to do so as to bring a Normal Research problem to conclusion and this requires the
solution of complex instrumental, conceptual and mathematical puzzle. Now what does Puzzle mean in
Kuhn and can all problems in Kuhn’s Normal Science be solved in terms of Puzzle. Puzzle by definition
in Kuhn and even in general dictionary often, can be seen as a problem which already pre-supposes a
solution. This becomes clear as Kuhn offers an Example wherein, he says that why cure for cancer or a

5 Ibid.p.44
6 ibid.p.28
7 ibid.p.30
8 ibid.p.30
design of lasting peace cannot be called as puzzle, largely 9 because they may not have any solution.
Since the ‘problem’ is largely to defy thus the possibility of puzzle solving is terminated. In so far as
we have been discussing the puzzle solving business in Thomas Kuhn in Normal, we must now turn to
what he calls- How Paradigms provide a ground for puzzle solving enterprise. Let's spend some time
on it. In Sciences as Kuhn says Puzzles form interesting characterisation of carrying forward of research,
because they form certain coherent knowledge base to operate with. Now, it is only these paradigms
which often prevents from building up of puzzle in other sectors in the knowledge domain. Such
problems can be referred to, as Kuhn says distraction in the progression of Normal Science through
puzzle solving.
In the same light, it is important to understand the interesting debate that incurs here in the Nature of
Normal Science by Popper. For Popper Normal Science is a phase where a not-to-critical professional
of scientist confirms himself with accepting the ruling dogma10. Popper says the whole business of
Normal Sciences is nothing but a kind of dogmatism, and what he stresses that a need and assumption
of such dogmatic entity may be permissible in the routine Normal science. In that one may say that the
applied scientist works upon paradigm in the normal science and the pure scientist always defies from
it. Thus, for Popper there lies dangers in Normal Science for the fact that it would only slip in carrying
out some dogmatic manoeuvre under the yoke of “Paradigm” or Dominant Theory. What Normal
Science thus entails for Popper it can be death trap for Science itself so much so that the very part which
distinguishes it from other ventures will be lost. Here my these or perhaps slight prototype of it lies and
which is in Kuhn there is even while the project of Normal Science flows there is a “Micro of science”
in it, which simply represents that while working in/under the yoke of Paradigm what one actually does
is accumulate certain of scientific enterprise philosophically, those micro constituent of it later reach at
a level where lays the crossing of thresh hold and thus emergence of “Abnormal Science” or in Kuhnian
Term- Revolutionary Science. While in Popper the bold hypothesis often only talks about certain points
which actually represent Science through conjecture and refutations. So, Normal Science without
critical entity in it is no more than some pseudo-science and metaphysical speculation.
Another critique which Popper offers quite vehemently is about Kuhn’s argumentation which is not
Psychological or Historical but rather logical, for Kuhn the rationality of science presupposes the
acceptance of “common framework”, for Popper this is widely and indeed a fashionable thesis- the
relativism and it is logical thesis11. The problem which Popper sees here is quite interesting- while it is
easier to discuss puzzle in certain common framework than to discuss fundamentals, that is the very
framework of our assumption, he further argues that this framework can be critically discussed and
which does not stand up to criticism. While Popper is in agreement that we are at any moment prisoners
caught in the framework of our theories, our expectations, our past experiences, our language, but this
is only in Pickwickian sense – if we try, we can break out of our framework at any time. This
differentiation attempts to demarcate the problem with the existing paradigm.

(II)

From the Einsteinian upturning of glory of Newtonian Physics, it makes an ample case of How scientific
knowledge cannot trusted to be proven knowledge (see the case of Mercury perihelion which was not
explained by Newton’s universal theory of Gravitation). The debate between ‘probabilifying’ and
giving up one’s condition lies here, while the former refers to Thomas Kuhn and the later to Karl Popper,

9 ibid.p.37
10 Popper, Karl, Normal Science and its Dangers in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, p.55, Cambridge
University Press, 1970., Bentley House London.
11 Ibid.p.56
as Imre Lakatos argues 12. For him the clash between Popper and Kuhn is not just about epistemology
in Sciences but also for underdeveloped social sciences and even moral and political philosophy.
In the attempt of, emergence for, scientific knowledge began from Justificationists, then to
Falsificationist and in the mid were sceptics. While the former was interested in ‘proven’ justification
and later argued about criticism and refutation as the criteria. Such a type of understanding even
questioned the synthetical a priori which were unproven to be non-scientific13.

The Sciences in Social Sciences:

If scientific progress as it entails, in so far as, repeated overthrow of theories with the help of hard facts
then it very much lays in social Sciences in the form of ‘Critiques’. In sciences we see Descartes notion
of gravity was overthrown by Newtonian and that by Einsteinian, this very much hold true for Social
Sciences and even Philosophy for that matter. How Marxist’s 14 understanding of State and Base Super
structure model has been thoroughly critiqued Antonio Gramsci, at first and then by Louis Althusser. 15
In such Comparison, for obvious terms, a sense of differentiation will emerge. We see in pure sciences
it is the experimentation and testing however in Social Sciences, it is the social reality. In the same light
Cannot there be a scientific explanation far better than floody populist ones of How Narendra Modi
came in power as Prime Minister in India16. Does Populist analysis to that sharp extent holds water?

The Responses from Kuhn:

Of the many questions raised pertaining to the method that Kuhn applies which is assumed to vary from
Logic vs History and Psychology to normative descriptive duo. Not only this, even in his
‘incommensurability’ proposal Kuhn is very particular about as he says- partial communication that is,
we cannot as a matter of fact do away from the framework and at the same time have a room for breaking
away from it17. And that is what even Popper agrees on that part. On the point of method, Kuhn’s
method as per my reading goes can be formulated, or said as, “normative”, in so far as it deals with a
community of practitioners solving the puzzle together. Rather, more crudely, Kuhn argues what we all
(philosophers of science) differ in is substance and not in methods 18. Among the many, most interesting
which as read forward has been by Kuhn simply represents about his commitment in Normal Science,
while for other it may be rhetoric but for him- existence of Normal science is a corollary of the existence
of revolution. For Kuhn Revolutions through criticism demand normal science no less than revolutions
through crisis. A sense of intervention, though of slight importance I gather here in recollecting my

12 Lakatos, Imre, Methodology of Scientific Research Programme in Criticism and Growth of Knowledge,p.92,
Cambridge University Press, 1970, London.
13 For a detailed discussion on Justificationist, Classical Empiricist, Probabilism, Neojustificationism, Classical

Rationalism, Falsificationism and so on See Imre Lakatos, Ibid.pp.93-97.

14 See G.A. Cohen Karl Marx ‘s Theory of History: A Defence, 1978, Princeton University Press.
15 See Organic Intellectuals and Philosophy of Praxis in Selections from Prison Notebooks and Ideology and

Ideological State Apparatus in Lenin and Philosophy and other essays in Antonio Gramsci and Louis Althusser
respectively.
16 This issue should strike upon certain more scientific explanation of Right-wing upsurge than mere death of

Democracies as many authors like Steven Levitsky & Daniel Ziblatt in the American academics are arguing. This
notice comes to my mind from a Lecture Pratap Bhanu Mehta gave in JNU where he argued how Modi’s
coming to power has almost demolished important conception in Political Theory in general and Politics in
particular.
17 Kuhn, Thoms, Reflections on my critique, p.233 in Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, Cambridge

University Press, 1970, London.

18 Ibid.p.233
reading of Introduction of Heidegger’s Being and Time, which would fundamental refute the very ontic
understanding which Popper holds. This is what Heidegger’s call a mistaken Science. Perhaps he would
even call Popperian Science to be much pseudo. As if objective reality only, existed in Testing and
experimentation. This thus in the same tone goes back to Analytical Continental divide which brought
sharp differences between Heidegger and Carnap. Though our concern is not that here, still it
(Heidegger's attempt) offers ample opportunity of methodological fallacy in the so-called Philosophy
of Sciences19.
Kuhn has been accused of Irrationalism, Relativism, and defence of mob rule this is responded by him
as- the observational consequences of both theories are first stated in shared basic vocabulary. For
Popper and his school canons of rationality thus derives from “logical and linguistic syntax”. Simply,
this does represent a problem as in Sciences no process essential to it can be labelled as “irrational until
it does a gross violence to the term. And thus, it is fortunate that conclusions re unnecessary in scientific
developments. Here lies the point where we require, to achieve the goal a number of philosophers from
generation to generation continue with the language in term. This, I argue, leaves some room for
“hermeneutical tendencies” in sciences with exploratory tools both within and outside the framework.
For when Popper calls out for an ahistorical and non-sociological pursuit of sciences, he is
fundamentally self-defeated if not mistaken. As for that matter his work itself carries a “consistent
interest in Historical Problems 20”. Then does it not make a good case for Sciences to be Historical and
Sociological?

What Sciences, then Finally entail for Both?

Simply, as we see, for Kuhn it is historical and progresses through accumulation of anomalies and a
time comes when evidences itself dis associates from the prevailing theory which was acting as
paradigm for the puzzle solver. But for Popper, it is Revolution in permanence, so much so that Normal
Sciences, if not subject to criticism, is nothing but “defensive metaphysics, in Watkins words and “rule
of dogma” prevails therein. While both formulations, substantially speaking, differs in many respects.
In Kuhn we see a deep sense of “community of scholar”, “incommensurability” and History to be prime
characterising feature for revolutions in sciences which shifts the Paradigm. However, In Popper, sharp
Refutation, Criticism, discordances precisely shape Sciences and thus it grows and progresses.
Concludingly, one can despite their disagreements both offers ample scope of further opening up in
Philosophy of Sciences, probably, in substantive terms, their debate and elaborations have enriched
philosophy of science remarkably.

19 Heidegger martin, Being and Time, p.30, Wiley Blackwell, 1962, Oxford.
20 Ibid.p.263
References:

1. Kuhn Thomas, The structure of scientific Revolutions, 1962, Chicago University Press,
Chicago.
2. Lakatos Imre and Musgrave Alan, Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge, 1970, Cambridge
University Press, London.
3. Popper, Karl, The Logic of Scientific Discovery, (first published in English 1959), 1992,
Routledge, London.
4. Heidegger Martin, translated in English by John Macquarrie and Edward Robinson, 1962,
Wiley Blackwell.