ETHINIC CONFLICTS AND MECHANISMS OF THEIR RESOLUTION

BETWEEN AFAR AND OROMO IN THE NORTH-EAST ETHIOPIA:

From1991-2015

PhD dissertation in Political Science and International

Relations

By Kebede Yimam

Main Supervisor: - Dr. Hussein Jemma

Co-supervisor :- Dr. Solomon Mebrie

Addis Ababa University, DPSIR

October 2020
Addis Ababa University

ETHINIC CONFLICTS AND MECHANISMS OF THEIR RESOLUTION

BETWEEN AFAR AND OROMO IN THE NORTH -EAST ETHIOPIA:
From1991-2015

A Dissertation submitted to the Graduate School of Addis Ababa

University in the fulfillment of the requirements
for the degree of Doctor of Philosophy
in Political Science

by

Kebede Yimam

Addis Ababa University, DPSIR

May, 2020
Declaration
I, the undersigned, declare that this dissertation is my original work and has never been presented

for a degree in any other university, and that all sources of materials used for this dissertation

have been duly acknowledged.

Name: Kebede Yimam

Signature: _____________

Date: _______________

i
Confirmation for Defense

This is to certify that the dissertation prepared by Kebede Yimam Tadesse, entitled: “Ethinic
Conflicts and Mechanisms of their Resolution between Afar and Oromo in the North -East
Ethiopia: From1991-2015” submitted in fulfillment of the requirements for the Degree of Doctor
of Philosophy in Political Science complies with the regulations of the University and meets the
accepted standards with respect to originality and quality. Thus, this dissertation has been
submitted for examination with my approval as a dissertation advisor.

Main Supervisor's name: ……………..

Signature: ----------------------
Date: ----------------------------

Co- Supervisor's name: ……………..

Signature: ----------------------
Date: ----------------------------

ii
Approved by Board of Examiners:

This is to certify that this dissertation prepared by Kebede Yimam Tadesse, entitled “Ethinic

Conflicts and Mechanisms of their Resolution between Afar and Oromo in the North -East

Ethiopia: From1991-2015” submitted in the fulfillment of the requirements for doctoral degree

in Political Science complies with the regulations of the university and meets the accepted

standards with respect to originality and quality.

Name Signature Date

_________________ __________________ _________ ______________

Chairman of Defense Session

________________ ___________________ _________ ______________

Internal Examiner

_________________ ___________________ __________ _______________

External Examiner

____________________________________ ____________ ______________

Main Supervisor

___________________________________ ___________ ______________

Co- Supervisor

iii
Acknowledgements
Several people are creditable for their valuable contribution to this study.First and foremost my
heartfelt gratitude goes to my main supervisor, Dr. Hussein Jemma for his invaluable guidance,
comments and critical remarks from the preparation of the proposal to the completion of this
thesis. I am also deeply grateful to my co-supervisor Dr. Solomon Mebrie for his encouragement
and valuable comments on this study. I also wish to express my gratitude to all the professors of
Political Science and International Relations who gave me constructive comments to this
dissertation.

My indebtedness is very much to Dr. Ali Hassen at the College of Development Studies- Addis
Ababa University, for his support in editing the technical part of this study. At the core of my
acknowledgments are the people who I cannot disregard their contribution to my study. My
gratitude goes to w/ro Ayalnesh Kebede and w/ro Lemlem Belayneh for their tireless support and
encouragement.Baby girls Ilham Ali, Hanan Ali and Ablakat Kebede deserve credit as they
empowered me through their love when I was doing this thesis. I am also indebted to all my
informants who participated in this research. Though difficult to list the names of all my friends,
I would like to express my special gratitude to Degu Asres, Tadesse Aklog, Dr.Girmaw Aseme,
Dr.Teferi Hailemichael and Dr.Belachew Getnet. Many people have contributed to this study
whom I could not thank individually. However, I will like to thank the following individuals for
their most inspiring encouragement, friendship and help during my field work Ato Seid
Ahmed(Kile), Ato Shimelis Shiferaw, Ato Mega Fufa and Ato Mohammed Jude.The fieldwork
of this study could not have been undertaken without the help of my research assistant, Ato
Anuar Yesuf. I am grateful for his genuine and unreserved help during my stay in the field.

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Contents
Acknowledgements ........................................................................................................................ iv
List of Table ................................................................................................................................. viii
List of Figures .............................................................................................................................. viii
Acronyms and Abbreviations ........................................................................................................ ix
Abstract .......................................................................................................................................... xi
CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION............................................................................................. 1
1 Background .............................................................................................................................. 1
2 Statement of the Problem......................................................................................................... 4
3 Core Argument......................................................................................................................... 8
4 Objectives of the Study............................................................................................................ 8
5 Research Questions.................................................................................................................. 9
6 Significance of the Study ......................................................................................................... 9
7 Scope of the Study ................................................................................................................. 10
8 Limitations of the study ......................................................................................................... 10
9 Organization of the Study ...................................................................................................... 11
CHAPTER TWO: STUDY AREA, METHODOLOGY AND METHODS ............................... 13
2.1 Study Area Description ....................................................................................................... 13
2.2 Methodology ....................................................................................................................... 16
2.3Procedures and Phases of Field Visits ................................................................................. 19
2.4 Sources and Instruments of Data Collection ..................................................................... 21
2.4.1 Sources of Data ............................................................................................................ 21
2.4.2Instruments of Data Collection ..................................................................................... 22
2.5 Sampling Procedure ............................................................................................................ 25
2.6 Data Recording, Transcription, and Analysis ..................................................................... 26
2.6.1 Data Recording and Transcription ............................................................................... 26
2.6.2Data Analysis ................................................................................................................ 26
2.7 Ethical Considerations ........................................................................................................ 28
CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW ........................................................................... 29
3.1 Conceptual and Theoretical Perspectives ........................................................................... 29
3.1.1 Defining Concepts ....................................................................................................... 29
3.2 Theoretical Perspectives ..................................................................................................... 45
3.2.1 Primordialism............................................................................................................... 45
3.2.2 Constructivism ............................................................................................................. 46

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3.2.3 Instrumentalism............................................................................................................ 47
3.2.4 Contextualizing Primoridialist, Constructivism and Instrumentalist Perspectives ...... 49
3.3 Consociationalist and Pluralist Perspectives....................................................................... 52
3.4 Effects of Ethnic Conflict ................................................................................................... 54
3.5 Inter-Ethnic Conflicts in Ethiopia ....................................................................................... 56
3.6 Conflict Resolution Mechanisms in Ethiopia ..................................................................... 59
CHAPTER FOUR: SETTING THE CONTEXT OF THE STUDY AREA ................................ 68
4.1 Administrative Structure of Afar and Oromo Communities............................................... 68
4.1.1Administrative Structure of Afar .................................................................................. 69
4.1.2. Administrative Structure of the Oromo at the Study Area ......................................... 70
4.2 Social and Economic Features of Afar and Oromo at the Study Area: An Overview........ 71
4.3 Indigenous Institutions of Afar and Oromo in the Study Area ........................................... 72
4.3.1 Afar Indigenous Institutions of Conflict Resolution.................................................... 73
4.3.2 Oromo Indigenous Institutions of Conflict Resolution................................................ 80
4.4 Background to the Relation between Afar and Oromo Communities in the Study Area ... 82
4.4.1Cooperative Relations ................................................................................................... 83
4.4.2 Conflictual Relations ................................................................................................... 90
4.5 Afar-Oromo Relations with the Central Government ......................................................... 91
4.5.1 The Afar’s Relation with Central Government ............................................................ 91
4.5.2 Oromo’s Relation with the Central Government ......................................................... 94
CHAPTER FIVE: CAUSES OF AFAR- OROMO CONFLICT ................................................. 97
5.1 Root Causes of the Conflict ................................................................................................ 97
5.1.1 Contested Boundary ..................................................................................................... 97
5.1.2 Competition over Grazing Land and Water points .................................................... 106
5.1.3 Ethnic- based State Restructuring .............................................................................. 110
5.1.4 Environmental Degradation and Drought .................................................................. 113
5.2 Immediate Causes of the Conflict ..................................................................................... 115
5.2.1 Pressure from ISSA –Somalis .................................................................................... 116
5.2.2 Theft, Homicide, and Looting.................................................................................... 118
5.2.3 Government Development Policies and Schemes ..................................................... 121
5.2.4 Access to Illegal Arms and Light Weapons ............................................................... 122
5.2.5. Ethno- Political Parties and Groups .......................................................................... 124
5.2.6 Change of Afar Mode of Production and Life Style .................................................. 127
5.2.7 Conflict of interest between Peasants and Pastoralists .............................................. 129

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5.2.8 Summary .................................................................................................................... 130
CAPTER SIX: MAJOR EFFECTS OF AFAR –OROMO CONFLICT .................................... 132
6.1. Social Effects ................................................................................................................... 132
6.1.1 Deterioration of Ethnic Relations .............................................................................. 132
6.1.2 Insecurity.................................................................................................................... 134
6.1.3 Disruption of Social Services..................................................................................... 135
6.1.4 Unemployment ........................................................................................................... 136
6.2 Economic Effects .............................................................................................................. 138
6.3 Political Effects ................................................................................................................. 139
6.3 .1 Mistrust between Government and People ............................................................... 139
6. 3 .2 Public Grievances .................................................................................................... 140
6. 3 3 Obstacle to Consensus and Unity ............................................................................. 141
CHAPTER SEVEN: CONFLICT RESOLUTION MEHANISMS IN DAWA HARAWA
WOREDA OF AMAHARA NATIONAL REGIONAL STATE AND DAWE WOREDA OF
AFAR NATIONAL REGIONAL STATE ................................................................................. 145
7.1. Practice on Attitudes ........................................................................................................ 145
7.1.1 Public Conferences .................................................................................................... 145
7.1.2 Afar-Oromo Joint Peace Committee .......................................................................... 149
7.2. Practice on Behavioral Change ........................................................................................ 154
7.2.1 Exchange of Suspected Criminals ............................................................................. 154
7.2.2 Legalization and Confiscation of Small arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and Raising
Its Price ............................................................................................................................... 156
7.2.3 Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism ................................................... 157
7.3. Practice on Contradictions ............................................................................................... 158
7.3.1 Building of Infrastructural Developments ................................................................. 158
7.3.2 Inter- Woreda Cooperation ........................................................................................ 159
7.4 Actors in the Process of Conflict Resolution in the Study Area ....................................... 162
7.4.1 Government Bodies ................................................................................................... 162
7.4.2 Indigenous Institutions ............................................................................................... 167
7.5 Challenges to Conflict Resolution Practices in the Study Area ........................................ 173
CONCLUSION ........................................................................................................................... 176
References ................................................................................................................................... 181
ANNEXES .................................................................................................................................. 199

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List of Tables
Table 1: local leadership and titles................................................................................................ 77
Table 2: The Oromo Animals stolen by Afar from 1991-2006 E.C. .......................................... 120
Table 3: Human, animal and material loss conflict between Afar and Oromo........................... 138
Table 4: Sample Compensation Payment 2005 E.C ................................................................... 151
Table 5 : Compensation Payment from 1991-2000 E.C by Dawa Harawa ............................... 151
Table 6 : Compensation Payment from 1991-2000 E.C by Dawe .............................................. 151
Table 7 : SALW Confiscated by government in Dawa Harawa 2001-2006 E.C ...................... 156
Table 8: Inter- Woreda officials’ meeting, 2005 E.C ................................................................. 161
Table 9: Joint Peace Committees’ meetings. 2005 E.C ............................................................. 161

List of Figures
Figure 1: Location Map of the Study Area ................................................................................... 14
Figure 2: Conflicts between Afar and Highlanders ...................................................................... 16

viii
Acronyms and Abbreviations
ALF – Afar Liberation Front
ANDP – Afar National Democratic Party
ARDUF – Afar Revolutionary Democratic Union Front
APDO Afar People Democratic Organization
ANRS Amhara National Regional State
AVA – Awash Valley Authority
CSA Central Statistical Agency
EC – Ethiopian Calendar
EPLF – Eritrean Peoples Liberation Front
EPRDF – Ethiopian Peoples Revolutionary Democratic Front
EVDSA – Ethiopian Valleys Development Study Authority
FDRE Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
FGD Focus Group Discussion
FRUD – Front for Restoration of Unity and Democracy
HOF -House of Federation
HRCO- Human Rights Council
HPR – House of Peoples Representatives
IGAD – Inter-Governmental Authority on Development
IRIN – Integrated Regional Information Network
MFA -Ministry of Foreign Affairs
ND - No Date
NDRP -National Democratic Revolutionary Program
OLF -Oromo Libration Front
NEBE – National Electoral Board of Ethiopia
NGOS – Non-Governmental Organization
PDRE – Peoples Democratic Republic of Ethiopia
PMAC – Provisional Military Administrative Council (Derg)
TGE – Transitional Government of Ethiopia
TPLF – Tigrai People Liberation Front
TPSC – Tendeho Plantation Share Company

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Definition of Terms
Abagar Traditional dispute resolution mechanism mainly in Wollo
Balabat Individual or families with hereditary status of rulership and high social
acceptance
Dega Highland area in Ethiopia’s climatic zone
Dagu Traditional information exchange mechanism in Afar society
Kebele Lower administrative unit in Ethiopia’s local government structure
(below Woreda)
Kolla Low land area mainly with hot climatic condition
Mahiber An association organized for the feast of Saints and helping with each other
Shimglina Traditional conflict resolution mechanism in Amhara society
Shimagle Those (mainly elders) who participate in arbitrating conflicting parties through
shimglina
Teklay Gizat The name of provinces in Ethiopia during the period of imperial regime
Woreda Local administrative unit (below zone) which comprises a number of Kebeles
within it
Woynadega A climatic zone that have moderate climatic condition (lies between
Dega and Kolla)
Zone The highest level of local government in Ethiopian local government
administrative structure (above Woreda below region)

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Abstract
This study explores ethnic conflicts and mechanisms of their resolution between Afar and Oromo
in the adjacent woreda of Afar and Amhara National Regional States in the northeast Ethiopia.
Emperical data were gathered through key informant interviews, focus group discussions
supplemented by informal conversations. The findings of the study show that the post-1991
Oromo in Dawa Harawa and their neighboring Afar in Dawe interactions were characterized by
twofold relations, peaceful and conflicting. Peaceful interactions were spoiled by various factors
that have contributed to conflicts. Such pacific and friendly relations have gradually been
eroded after the introduction of ethnic- based federalism in Ethiopia. The study has identified
root causes and triggering factors of the conflict. The root causes of the conflict are attributed to
contested boundary, competition over natural resources, ethnic-based federalism, environmental
degradation and drought and violent cultural practices. The Afar -Oromo conflict has also been
triggered by Issa-Somali pressure, acts of homicide, theft and looting, government developments
schemes, illegal arms, ethno-political parties. Furthermore, the study found that public
grievances, distrust between the government and people, and hindrance to consensus and unity
are the political factorsthat have attributed to the effects of the conflict. Findings of the study
have also revealed that various conflict resolution mechanisms have been practiced among the
two groups. Public conferences and establishment of joint peace committees are major
accomplishments in changing attitudes. Exchange of criminals, legalization to control behavior
and addressing the underlying causes of the conflict, such as some infrastructural developments
are undertaken to redress contradictions of the communities. The study revealed that absence of
comprehensive and all-inclusive conflict resolution mechanisms, led to continuation and
escalation of conflicts between the Afar and Oromo ethnic groups in the borders of Afar and
Amhara Regional States in the northeast Ethiopia. Instead, the over- all efforts of all stake
holders refer to attempts on ad-hock approaches and elite perspective of ethnic conflict
management to minimize the consequences of ongoing crises. The absence of holistic approach
and proactive measures in the resolution mechanisms has left Afar-Oromo conflict far from
viable solution. It is commendable that the best practices of the two resolution styles (the
indigenous and the modern) be harmonized.

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CHAPTER ONE: INTRODUCTION
1 Background

During the period of the Cold War, as the world politics was dominated by East-West ideological
rivalry, ethnic conflicts did not receive much attention (Weiner, 1994; Ryan, 2001; Wallensteen,
2007). In the post-Cold War era, however, rivalry between East and West blocks had lost its
place for widespread ethnic conflicts that became one of the major new global realities. Many
scholars (Ryan, 2001; Callahan, 2002; Merera, 2003; Esman, 2004; Hussein, 2005; Osaghae,
2006; Jinadu, 2007; Asnake, 2009; Yasin, 2010) have expressed the growing political
significance of ethnic conflict around the world in general and in multi-ethnic countries such as
Ethiopia in particular.

In the post Cold War era, Africa has been experiencing an increase in the scope and intensity of
ethnic conflicts. Ethnic conflicts have been a major characteristic feature of African countries
(Irobi, 2005; Musau, 2009; Ngengong, 2007; Osinubi and Osinubi, 2006; Osaghae and
Robinson, 2005; Yasin, 2010). The continent of Africa is highly susceptible to inter/intra-state
war and conflict (Alemayehu, 2004; Aremu, 2010; Asnake, 2011). Millions have lost their lives
because of conflict and its atrocities (Kellas, 1998:43). Fuelled by the legacy of colonialism, it
has the highest number of ethnic antagonism and violent inter-ethnic conflicts even in the post
colonial era (Abbink, 1997; Yasin, 2010). The genocide of Rwanda, Darfur crisis (Straus, 2006,
2012), the failed state status of Somalia, Nigeria’s ethnic conflict (Osinubi and Osinubi, 2006)
and the current political crisis in South Sudan are few examples that prove the terrible
consequences of ethnic conflicts.

Above all, the Horn of Africa is more vulnerable and can be cited as the most disputed part of the
world whereby armed struggle, ethnic conflict, political instability and religious radicalism are
its hallmarks (Cascão, 2013; Gaim, 2012; Muhabie, 2015a). And all these have exacerbated
inter-ethnic conflicts and tensions. Hence, the Horn of Africa is the most violence stricken and
conflict ravaged region of Africa due to inter/intra state conflicts. In the post colonial era,

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African leaders politicized ethnicity for economic, social and political reasons; however, this caused
many violent ethnic conflicts (Azarya, 2003; Abbink, 1997).

In spite of proud history of independence, Ethiopia is not unique in terms of ethnic tension and
unrest from other multi-ethnic African countries. Inter-ethnic conflict is one of the persisting
problems in Ethiopia. Due to different factors, the idea of pan-Ethiopianism is deteriorated and
identity based conflicts become recurrent phenomena (Abbink, 2006, 2011; Daniel, 2003;
Muhabie, 2015b) Different ethnic groups engage in conflict while competing over scarce
resources and boundaries. Ethnic conflicts erupt frequently between Regional States especially
because of borders (Assefa, 2007; Alemayehu, 2009; Abbink, 2011).

Although the causes, magnitude, complexity and intensity of the violence nature of conflicts vary
from region to region, all Regional States of Ethiopia have witnessed some sort of violent ethnic
conflicts (Asnake, 2004; Dessalegn, 2007; ARPD, 2008). Abbink (2011:605), for instance,
discusses that ‘over the past 20 years, borders between regions, zones and districts have been the
recurring issue of dozens of ethnic conflicts’. According to Abbink (2011) the newly formed
ethnic federal arrangement generated ethnicity and ethnic tension in the country. In the year
2007/8 only, 28 ethnic conflicts were broke out in the country (Wondwosen and Záhořík,
2008:67). The conflict of Oromo-Somali, Afar-Amhara, Oromo-Harari, Somali-Afar, Amhara-
Oromo (Wondwosen and Záhořík, 2008:67) are few examples that resulted in severe loss of life
and displacement.

As a result, inter-ethnic relations have become more hostile and less peaceful. Regardless of
differences in extent, actors, causes and consequences, Afar-Issa conflict (Biniam, 2016; Mu’uz,
2009), conflicts between Afar and Kareyu Oromo (Asnake, 2011), Gedeo-Guji ethnic conflict
(Asebe, 2007, 2012) and the conflict between Alle and Konso (Bantayehu, 2016) are some clear
evidence that indicate the recurrence of ethnic conflicts in the post-1991 period. Despite the fact
that efforts have been made by the government (via the House of Federation or the Ministry of
Federal Affairs and Regional States) and traditional institutions to tackle or mitigate ethnic
conflicts, most of the conflicts have remained unresolved.

The conflict between the Oromo (in the Amhara National Regional State) and the neighbouring
Afar is one of the protracted small- scale inter-ethnic conflicts in the northeast Ethiopia. Afar and

2
Oromo communities share common boundary and they have economic, social and cultural
relations for centuries despite ethnic differences. However, ethnic relations are eroded and identity
based conflicts started to emerge particularly in the border areas. Put simply, Afar-Oromo conflict
is one among many conflicts that can be explained in terms of ethnicity.There have been small-
scale armed conflicts in the area (Seyoum and Yacob, 2000). Small-scale conflicts are, as
described by Dessalegn (2007:6), ‘…conflicts[that] involve individuals or small groups who attack
a settlement or other individuals or small groups in which there is the use of arms, arson and
stealing of livestock.’ The two ethnic groups dwell in adjacent woreda (districts) of Amhara and
Afar Regional States respectively, in the north-eastern part of Ethiopia.

In the past, the conflict between the two ethnic groups was mainly over water, pasture, access
routes, cultural values and tradition; a purely pastoralist and social cultural confrontation (Ahmed,
1994; Seyoum and Yacob, 2000; Dessalegn, 2007; Ali, 2008). However, as Yasin (2010:2) argues,
‘nowadays it turned to modern political disputes competing over territorial expansion as well as
politico-economic hegemony’. This is an element of the wider Ethiopian context, which Asnake
(2004: 68) notes that ‘the political changes since 1991 are changing the nature of conflicts and
their management among Ethiopia’s ethnic groups’. Ethnic conflicts gained salience and
proliferated frequently, and become common to ethnic groups that did not have records of violent
conflict (Asnake, 2010; Muhabie, 2015b). Ethnic tensions are multiplied (Siraw, 2015; Tsegaye,
2010) and dozens of ethnic conflicts have occurred in the past decades (Abbink, 2006; HRCO,
2017) which claimed the lives of 5000 to 6000 individuals (Abbink, 2011:605).Therefore,
attributing conflicts between Afar and Oromo merely to the competitions over natural resources
and social, cultural issues is simplistic that doesn’t reveal the nature, magnitude, and consequences
of current inter-ethnic conflict and lead to inappropriate resolution mechanisms.

Therefore, it can be fairly argued that Afar-Oromo relations in the north-east Ethiopia has been
changed in the past two decades, particularly after the adoption of the predominantly ethnic based
federal arrangement in the country. The conflict between the two ethnic groups has been
exacerbated in the post -1991period. The relationship between Afar and Oromo ethnic groups have
deteriorated and conflicts become more common than before. Especially, in the post-1991 era, the
conflict is increasing and resulted in dislocation and loss of life. The conflict ranges from killing to
cattle raiding and property destructions including counter retaliation for such activities. Tensions

3
and contradictions are rising even though the level of intensity varies in time and space. To settle
the conflict and normalize the condition, mostly traditional conflict resolution mechanisms were
employed. However, identity based clash becomes more frequent with increasing scale and
severity. Not only the degree but also the human and material cost of the conflict increased rapidly.
Therefore, the conflict impeded the socio-economic lives of the people, and created insecurity and
tension in the overall well being. This study intends to explore the dynamics of the Afar and
Oromo conflict and the current practice of conflict resolution mechanisms.

2 Statement of the Problem

Conflict is natural to human experience which will arises when individuals or groups hold
divergent values and interests. This leads to conflict and violence among different section of
societies and in country at large. Conflict has both destructive as well as constructive outcomes.
Destructively, conflict is a terrible phenomenon which results in displacement, devastation of
property and loss of life (Alemmaya and Hagmann, 2008; Muhabie, 2015a). However, what is
important is how to settle differences or the problems among disputing parties. Resolution of
conflict is crucial for day to day co-existence as human societies are in constant search of
resolution mechanisms, of conflicts (Pankhurst and Getachew, 2008). Conflict can be classified
as inter-ethnic, inter-state or intra-ethnic and intra-state.This study focuses on ethnic conflicts
amd their resolution mechanisms.

Ethnic conflicts, as one dimension of conflict, have existed since the beginning of humanity;
however, it is recently that scholars realize how extensive ethnic conflicts are around the world
(Isajiw, 1999:122). As a result, several scholars and researchers focused their attention on ethnic
conflict. Ethnic conflicts have occurred in different parts of the world in general and Africa in
particular. Conflicts in Rwanda, Burundi, Sudan, Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and the
like are some illustrative examples of ethnic conflicts that brought about adverse consequences
in Africa (Jinadu, 2007; Abrha, 2012).

Studies on ethnic conflict in Africa, (for example, Musau, 2009; Osinubi and Osinubi, 2006);
Irobi, 2005 and Jinadu, 2007) discuss that ethnic conflicts have been a major characteristic
feature of African countries and predominantly focus on the causes of ethnic conflict in Africa.

4
Other studies on ethnic conflict in Africa such as, Aapengnuo 2010; Osaghae, 1999, 2006; and
Isajiw, 2000) focus on causes of ethnic conflict.

Narrow focus of the elite perspective of ethnic conflict management (Osaghae, 2006:10-11), and
inadequate knowledge on ethnic conflict (Isajiw, 2000; Osaghae, 1999, 2006), are the major
predicaments of ethnic conflict resolution. According to Osaghae (1999:57) regardless of ‘new
expansion in the volume of research output, knowledge on the subject remains unsatisfactory
[and there is also]…much less strategies of resolution, management, and mediation…’. Interms
of policy measure, Ethnic conflict resolution in Africa is characterized by ‘reactive, ad hoc, and
emergency rather than proactive and comprehensive approaches to problem solving’ (Osaghae,
1999: 65). Osaghae (2006: 9) argues that ‘Beginning from the late 1980s, there was an
ascendancy of ethnic conflicts all over Africa …. The escalation of conflicts is perhaps the
clearest indicator of the underdevelopment of conflict resolution mechanisms’. This might be
the main reason why ethnic conflicts in Africa are often portrayed as little prospects for
resolution. In general, in Africa and elsewhere, a lot of researches have been done on ethnic
expressions, markers of ethnic identity and factors for ethnic conflict. Specially, there is
extensive literature on the roots of ethnic conflict in African countries by sideling resolution
mechanisms of ethnic conflict.

The Afar-Oromo conflict is a long standing inter-ethnic conflict between neighbours of the
eastern frontier line of the Amhara National Regional State (Oromo Zone) and the western part of
the Afar National Regional State in north- east Ethiopia. Recently, some researchers (for instance,
Dessalegn, 2007; Kebede, 2009; Yasin, 2010), have stressed the growing severity of such ethnic
conflict in the area. All these express the seriousness of the problem especially in relation to the
state restructuring in the post- 1991 period.

In the study area, the Oromo and Afar have lived side by side for long with mutual respect and in
peace (Ali, 2008; Yasin, 2010). However, as time goes, peaceful mutual coexistence appears to
have been deteriorating. The main factors for this include population growth, with shrinking land
and natural resources or dwindling pastoral resources, drought and impoverishment, adoption of
ethnic-based federal structure, lack of committed leadership at different levels in both regions,
and poor integration of indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms with modern skills (Asnake,
5
2004; Dessalegn, 2007; Kebede, 2009), like in many other areas in the country.

Studies on ethnic conflict in Ethiopia, for example, the Gedeo-Guji conflict (Assebe, 2007;
Asnake, 2004), the Borana-Gerri conflict (Asnake, 2004; Befikadu, 1999), the Afar-Issa conflict
(Asebe, 2007; Asnake, 2004; Markakis, 2003; Yasin, 2010), and Afar-Kerreyu conflict (Ayalew,
2001) are on conflicts between ethnic groups who reside in different regional states, which
denote inter-regional state ethnic conflict. However, these studies mainly focus on the causes of
conflicts. Although the causes identified by researchers are varied, the objectives of the studies
are mainly to identify causes of conflict between ethnic groups. In this case, some claim
competition over scarce resources (Markakis, 2003; Teka, 2004). There are also researchers who
claim, particularly in the post- 1991 period, the nature of state structure in Ethiopia, which
divides ethnic groups on language factor (Alemayehu, 2009; Asebe, 2007; Hizkias, 1996).
According to Luba (2012: 68), ‘the causes of the Gedeo-Guji conflict, the Borana-Gerri conflict,
and the Afar-Issa conflict were socio-cultural problems’. Currently, however, due to the
dynamics of the ethnic conflict in Ethiopia, it is misleading to take social and cultural issue as
mere cause of ethnic conflict. In short, all of the above studies are descriptions of the causes of
ethnic conflicts by understating conflict resolution mechanisms and without which explaining the
changing nature of conflict in the post-1991.

There is scarcity of literature on the ethnic conflict and resolution mechanisms between the
Afar and Oromo in the study area, while there have been few researches conducted regarding
Afar-Oromo conflict in other sites ( for, example, Ahmed ,1994; Anteneh ,2013 ; Asnake,2011 ;
Bekele ,2010; Kebede, 2009; Theodros, 2017). Different researchers have conducted studies at
different times. Bekele (2010) studied conflict between Afar pastoralists and their neighbors,
motivation and triggers. The study found that contemporary challenges like recurrent drought,
illicit trade and weak inter-clan conflict management mechanism are root causes. Asnake (2011)
also conducted study on Afar and Karrayu inter-group conflict in Awash valley. Using
qualitative approach, Asnake uncovered that the conflict is typically pastoral conflict and can be
explained in terms of resource competition. Anteneh (2013) studied the transformation of Afar-
Amhara inter-ethnic conflict in Kewot Woreda of Amhara Region and Semurobi Gela Alo
Woreda of Afar Region Using descriptive explanatory approach, Anteneh found out that the
transformation process is bottlenecked by lack of capacity and narrow space for participation.
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Similarly, Theodros (2017) studied inter-ethnic conflict transformation process in Habru Woreda
of Amhara National Regional state and Chifra Woreda of Afar National Regional state.
Employing qualitative approach and exploratory design, he found that the transformation
processes are too limited.

Besides, the influences of ethnic federalism, social and political repercussions, why the conflict
becomes recurrent and who are the actors behind it are less been investigated in Theodros’s
study, as well as, other studies mentioned above. In all the above studies, the resolution
mechanisms are not well treated. The issues that these studies focused on are only causes of the
conflicts. The studies also lack depth as they focused on a relatively large area. They also
relatively overstretched themselves by dealing with many ethnic groups; Oromo, Amhara,
Argoba and Afar. Furthermore, they didn’t provide in-depth analysis of the conflict between the
Afar and Oromo ethnic groups. Like in the above mentioned studies, these studies overlooked
conflict resolution mechanisms by focusing mainly on the causes of the conflicts.

Therefore, the contribution of this study in addressing the aforementioned issues is the following:
First, the study focused on conflict resolution mechanisms, which has not received much
attention by various studies. In this regard, Hussein (2005: 20) notes that ‘the bulk of the existing
literature appears to focus on describing the problem and its causes rather than suggesting
possible ways of resolving ethnic conflict by peaceful means’. Like wise, Isajiw (2000:122)
argues that ‘…while both scholars and practitioners have become more aware of inter-ethnic
conflicts, the approaches to their resolution have still remained not very effective.’ On the other
hand, Osaghae (2006:17) stresses that ‘the emphasis on reconciling and accommodating elite
interests in the name of managing ethnicity is the main obstacle’ to applying viable conflict
resolution mechanisms. In Ethiopia, conflict resolution efforts at the community, regional and
national remain less fruitfull. There is still a lack of strategy of harmonizing different conflict
resolution mechanisms. This study contributes to the endeavours to fill the gap in the literature
on the subject.

7
Secondly, this study intends to fill the gap in the literature by drawing attention to farmer-
pastoralist inter-ethnic conflict as an example of small- scale or low-intensity conflict 1 of intra-
state boundary conflict. High-intensity inter-ethnic conflicts associated with regional boundaries,
such as Afar and Issa, Borena and Gerri, Guji and Gedeo have obscured the equally important
low-intensity inter-ethnic conflicts such as conflicts between Afar and Oromo in the study area.
So far, a significant proportion of intellectual and policy energy has been channeled to the
former.

The purpose of this study is, therefore, to contribute new perspectives to the little literature on the
understanding and resolution of the inter-ethnic conflicts by considering the experience of the
frontiers of Afar and Amhara Regional States in the north-east Ethiopia. Assessing the study on
the Oromo of Dawa Harewa Woreda in Oromo Zone of the Amhara National Regional State and
its adjacent Dawe Woreda of the Afar National Regional State.

3 Core Argument

The central argument of this study is that absence of comprehensive and all-inclusive conflict
resolution mechanisms led to continuation and escalation of conflicts between the Afar and
Oromo ethnic groups in the borders of Afar and Amhara National Regional States in the
northeast Ethiopia. Instead, overall efforts of all governmental and non-governmental bodies
refer to attempts on ad-hock approaches and elite perspective of ethnic conflict management to
minimize the consequences of ongoing crises.

4 Objectives of the Study

The overall objective of this study is to explore ethnic conflicts and mechanisms of their
resolution between Afar and Oromo in two adjacent woreda of Afar and Amhara National
Regional States, from 1991-2015.

The study has the following specific objectives:

• To assess the dynamics of the Afar –Oromo conflict and cooperation in the study area,

1
According to the Uppsala Conflict Data Program(UCDP) minor armed conflicts are conflicts with more than 25 deaths
but fewer than 1000 for the year and for the durtion of conflict(Wallensteen,2007:22).

8
• To explore factors perpetuating conflict between the two ethnic groups,
• To identify effects of the conflict between the Afar and Oromo ethnic groups,
• To examine the conflict resolution mechanisms employed in the study area,

5 Research Questions
The core research question of this study is that, what are the major ethnic conflict resolution
mechanisms between Afar and Oromo in the study area.

The study will attempt to address the following specific research questions:

• What are the major changes exhibited in relationships of Afar and Oromo from 1991-
2015? How and why did the long period of mutual interdependence and co-existence
between Afar and Oromo ethnic groups change overtime?
• What are the major causes of conflicts between the Afar-Oromo ethnic groups in the
study area?
• What are the major effects of the conflict between the two ethnic groups?
• How do the Afar and Oromo ethnic groups resolve the conflicts in the study area?

6 Significance of the Study

This study is significant in terms of both the policy and academic perspectives. The study will
provide input to the policy makers and executers in their effort to look for amicable solutions to
the ethnic conflict in the country. They may find interest in this study as providing an
understanding into the ethnic conflicts in the study area which would further enhance them to
devise ways of resolving ethnic conflicts as a precondition to human and economic development.

It will have also significant academically because it provides insight into the nature, dynamic,
and resolution of mechanisms of ethnic conflict in the northeast Ethiopia in general and the study
area in particular. It tries to show how and why ethnic conflict came to the fore in the context of
the adoption of predominantly ethnic based federalism in Ethiopia, since 1991. It will also
provide the motive for further research on the resolution mechanisms of ethnic conflict. It is,
therefore, intended to contribute to the literature on ethnic conflict.

9
7 Scope of the Study
The study explores the conflict between the Oromo and Afar ethnic groups emphasizing on the
mechanisms of conflict resolution. It focuses on the methods of ethnic conflict resolution
mechanisms in building and maintaining peaceful interactions between the two ethnic groups in
Oromo of Dawa Herawa woreda and Dawe woreda of Afar from1991-2015.

The time period of the study is from1991-2015. The year marks the emphasis of the study
because Ethiopia has adopted ethnic-based federalism as a panacea for the recurring ethnic
conflicts elsewhere in the country. The period is chosen because the concept of predominantly
ethnic- based state restructuring has been introduced.

8 Limitations of the study

This study did not reach at this stage without any challenge. The researcher has been faced the
following considerable challenges: First in accessible to transportation which results from its ups
and down geographical landscape of the woreda. As a result, it is difficult for researcher to
collect data in such geographical setting going to it by foot.

The second challenge that encounters this study was that the written materials that explain the
historical relation between the two ethnic groups were scant. Specially, this is highly evident on
the Afar side.

The third challenge of this study was lack of willingness of some informants from study area to
provide information on the issue under investigation.Local elders primarily suspected me as
government spy. Government officials also saw me as private spy working for foreign Medias to
expose wrong doings of the government officials. Due to this reason, the researcher faced
challenges and rigorous checking by Woreda and Kebele officials while interviewing and
moving into different Kebele. Particularly, Kebele administrators had considered me as person of
special mission for collecting data deviated from the usual way. However, I convinced them with
the help of field assistants. After the field assistants told them, they became voluntary for the
interview. Furthermore, categorizing as an issue of security confidential, government officials
were reluctant to give reports and documents related to the conflict. To secure their willingness
and trust the researcher enlightened them to know purpose of the study with the help of field
10
assistants. Due to religious and cultural reasons, the researcher was unable to conduct face to
face interview with women with exception of two government officials.

Fourth, as conflicts are not resolved, there was fear on the researcher. While collecting data,
intermittently guns were fired and there were high tension of conflict. Especially, the researcher
felt insecured to go to Dawe Woreda and Kebele that the conflict existed. The active stage of the
conflict became obstacle to go to the area freely and to have more information from many
residents to better understand the scene. So, in some cases, the researcher relied on telephone
interview, and some personal interview in Semera city and Delfaga (Afar zone five center) with
those who are from Dawe woreda but lived there. However, the researcher tried all his best to
overcome the above limitations as much as possible.

Fifth, in many areas subjected to prolonged conflicts (e.g. Dire and Ocheru areas) both the
elders and other informants (government officials) were skeptical about the contribution of study
to the peaceful resolution of conflicts. Informants from communities affected by conflicts tend
to exaggerate their side of the story. In order to reduce the biases of those involved in the conflict
and keep them from influencing the output of the research, I employed a triangulation technique.
In addition to documentary sources and secondary literature, in undertaking the fieldwork itself,
this study used multiple sources of information, interviewing and organizing focus-group
discussions with individuals not related to the protagonists of local conflicts.

9 Organization of the Study

The study is organized into seven chapters. Chapter one the introductory part provides the
justification for the topic, statement of the problem, the objectives and research questions, scope,
significance, as well as, limitation of the research. Chapter two presents study area, methodology
and methods. Chapter three deals with literature review. Under this chapter, concepts, theories
and perspectives and debates on ethnic conflicts are discussed. Chapter four is about setting the
context of the study area. Geographical setting, social organization, and the origin of the Afar
and Oromo peoples, and their relation with the Ethiopian empire beginning from the turn of the
20th century are the themes dealt here. This chapter describes the relations between Afar and
Oromo ethnic groups which is intended to give insight about Afar and Oromo, what relations

11
they had (both cordial and hostile) in the pre and 1991-2015 period briefly. Chapter five
investigates the major factors that generated conflict between Afar and Oromo in the study area.
The root and immediate factors are assessed. Chapter six examines major effects of Afar -Oromo
conflict briefly. Chapter seven explores conflict resolution mechanisms in the study area. Under
this chapter, practices on attitude, behavior and contradiction as resolution mechanisms are
discussed. Furthermore, actors in the process of conflict resolution and challenges of conflict
resolution practice in the study area are assessed. Finally, the conclusion part illustrates major
findings and implications of the study.

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CHAPTER TWO: STUDY AREA, METHODOLOGY AND METHODS
2.1 Study Area Description

The study area is located in the borders of Afar and Amhara Regional States in the Northeast
Ethiopia. That is, Oromo Zone, in the Amhara National Regional State, and Zone Five( known
as Hari Rasu) in the Afar National Regional State in which the neighbouring Dawa Harawa and
Dewe Woreda are located, respectively.

Dewe is one of the thirty two woreda in the Afar Region. Part of the Administrative Zone Five,
Dewe is located near the base of the eastern escarpment of the Ethiopian highlands, and bordered
on the south by the Borkena River which separates it from Dalifage and Hadele Ela, on the west
by theAmhara Region, on the north by Telalak woreda, and on the east by Administrative zone
three. It has ten kebele(rural). Based on the 2007 Population and Housing Census, the woreda
has a total population of 42,397, of whom 24,865 are men and 17,532 women (CSA, 2007).

Dawa Harewa is one of the five Woreda in the Oromo Zone of Amhara Region of Ethiopia. The
Oromo Zone is one of the national zones in Amhara Region. Its administrative centre - Kemisie-
is found on the main road 325 Kilometers on the way from Addis Ababa to Dessie and 555
Kilometers of Bahir Dar, the capital of the Amhara Region. Part of the Oromo Zone, Dawa
Harewa, is 30 kilometers away from Kemisse. It is bordered in the south by Artuma Fursi
woreda, in the west by Dawa Cheffa, and in the northwest by the Argoba Special woreda, in the
northeast byBati, and in the east by the Afar Region. Bora is the main town of this woreda.
According to the 2007 Population census, the woreda has a total population of 41,359, of whom
20,431 are men and 20,928 women (CSA,2007).

13
Figure 1: Location Map of the Study Area

The study areas are located in the interface between pastoral (Afar) area and sedentary (Oromo)
area where they interact with each other. The Afar has their own traditional territory and
historical relation with the neighboring Oromo ethnic group. Now days, the relation of the two
ethnic groups is characterized by hostility and violent conflict. Especially the conflict has been
exacerbated mainly because of the adoption of predominantly ethnic based federalism. This has
given me an opportunity to explore the inter-ethnic conflict at the buffer zone. Like in the case of
the two woreda i.e Dawe woreda from Afar and Dawa Harawa woreda from Oromo, I also
selected the four kebele under study purposely, in consultation with community elders and
officials of woreda administrations. Among the four kebele selected (Gendawarina Eyelendi and
Kilentina Derseda from Afar and Direand Medine Kuniye from Orom)(see on figure 1 above).
Dire and Medine are typical examples where conflict of the two ethnic groups is severe.

14
In general, these sites have been selected for the following reasons: First,the conflict in the study
areas is small-scale herder-farmer violent ethnic conflict between Afar and Oromo who live in
the nieghbouring Regional States of Afar and Amhara, respectively.Seconly, it is a conflict
between Oromo who are minority in the Amhara National Regional State-enjoying Zonal Self-
administration status and their nieghbours, to the east are, the Afar enjoying regional state status,
self-administration. Thirdly, although studies on conflict involving the two communities are
available, studies of conflict resolution at the study area is inadequate. Fourthly, my acquaintance
to the Afar side in my previous studies (BA and MA studies). So, the study is different from
others in dealing with such instances.

15
N
Figure 2: Conflicts between Afar and Highlanders
Source: Ali, PhD Dissertation 2008, p.131.

2.2 Methodology

This study employed qualitative approach. Qualitative research provides insights into a research
conducted in a natural setting, and aims to gain an in-depth understanding of a phenomenon.
This study seeks to deeply understand the views of the Afar and Oromo ethnic groups on their
conflict and their conflict resolution mechanisms, which is the‘central phenomenon’of this study.
Accordingly to Creswell (Creswell, 2012:129) ‘the central phenomenon is the concept or a

16
process explored in qualitative research’, which is, in my case, conflict and conflict resolution
mechanisms between Afar and Oromo ethnic groups in the study area.

I selected the qualitative research methodology for this study for a variety of reasons. First, the
philosophical assumptions of the research rely on constructivism. Qualitative research
methodology is used more frequently within the constructivist paradigm, as it is considered to be
better suited to investigate the truth (Donaldson,et.al., 2009: 25).

Second, in a qualitative research, the researcher is central to the study, where he/she is the
primary agent of data collection. In qualitative research, the researcher plays a pivotal role in
constructing concepts, theories, and principles based on detailed discussions, interviews and
observations (Creswell, 2007). This means that a researcher does not rely on questionnaires,
telephone calls or e-mail. Unlike, the quantitative methodology, where data are collected through
inventories, telephone calls , e-mail, administration of questionnaires, in qualitative research data
collection is undertaken through the researcher or the ‘human instrument’ (Creswell,2007:129).
Furthermore, as Silverman (2006:30) notes, ‘unlike the quantitative methodology where
flexibility is limited, qualitative research enjoys much flexibility because of [face -to-face and
intensive] interaction between the researcher and the subjects studied’. Meanwhile, qualitative
approach has its own weakness, which is in relation to rigour that depends on words than
numbers. Many researchers often criticize qualitative methodology as ‘soft’ approach which
lacks academic rigour. However, in qualitative approach to make sure that the study follows a
rigorous approach, it uses procedures such as triangulating sources of data and feedbacks from
peers and individuals who are expertise in the area.

Third, qualitative methodology is exploratory (in-depth understanding of the phenomenon to be

studied). The motto of the researcher relies on the processes, perceptions, interpretive-meanings,
as well as, the insight to be gained through words. Qualitative approach, then, refers to ‘the
meanings, concepts, definitions, characteristics, metaphors, symbols, and descriptions of things’
(Berg, 2001: 3). Qualitative research is an in-depth exploration, and understanding of what
people think on a particular phenomenon, where as quantitative research seeks causal
determination, prediction, and generalization of findings.

17
Fourth, the other important reason why I employed the qualitative methodology is the very
nature of the research problem which is complex, which requires a ‘detailed understanding of the
issue’ (Berg, 2001:40). As the Afar –Oromo conflict in the study area is very complex, which
has been persisting for years and requires in-depth understanding to develop viable resolution
mechanisms. It is in line with this that I have been motivated to conduct this research using
qualitative methodology. Furthermore, the study employed inductive approach in synthesizing
knowledge. An important characteristic of qualitative research is that the process is inductive in
that researchers gather data to build concepts, theories rather than deductively testing theories or
hypotheses (Merriam, 2002:5), whichis appropriate to quantitative research.

To this effect, I used case study research strategy with exploratory and descriptive techniques.
There is no agreed definition of a case study among scholars. Gerring (2007:19) defines case
study in political science as ‘an intensive study of a single unit for the purpose of understanding
a larger class of (similar) units’. In this study, I have adopted Gerring’s definition of case study.

The reasons for choosing a case study strategy for the current study are the following: first, the
nature of phenomenon, which is complex requiring a detailed understanding. Case study is a
common research strategy in the field of political science, as well as, other social science
disciplines, for example, anthropology, which enables understand complex social phenomena by
allowing the researcher to have a ‘holistic’ and meaningful nature of real life events (Yin,
2003:1). Case study is thus, identified with ‘holistic’ analysis and with the ‘thick’ description of
events, as well as, ‘the depth of analysis that it offers’ (Gerring, 2007: 49).

Second, nature of research objective and question matters. The nature of the research objective
and question can also provide an important clue regarding the appropriate research strategy to be
used. Case study research is often said to be mainly suitable for research seeking to answer
‘how’ and ‘why’ questions (Yin, 2003: 5). According to Yin (2003), case studies are favorable
when ‘how’ or ‘why’ questions are being asked. In this regard, the nature of my research
objective and research question call for case study strategy.

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In general, case study is more useful to have deep understanding of a phenomenon. As Gerring
(2007: 1) notes, ‘… in-depth knowledge of an individual example is more helpful thanfleeting
knowledge about a larger number of examples. We gain better understanding of the whole by
focusing on a key part’. Eventually, what is inspirational in selecting case study strategy in the
study is that ‘ knowing more about less’ is better than knowing ‘less about more’ (Gerring,
2007: 49). This is not to deny the importance of knowledge about many things with extensive
coverage. What is meant here is that at this level of study, deep knowledge of an issue in-depth is
more important than shallow knowledge of many things with extensive coverage.

Hence, this study employed qualitative based case study in which data were collected using
semi-structured key informant interviews, focus group discussions (FGDs), and informal
discussions. These methods of qualitative data collection have been identified as appropriate
(Gerring, 2007; Yin 2003) and used to collect data on the perceptions of human beings, attitudes,
beliefs, and behaviors about the nexus between ethnic identity, territorial expansion, conflict and
governance.

2.3Procedures and Phases of Field Visits

The overall aim of the fieldwork was to gain an in-depth understanding of the perceptions,
opinions, and concepts of the local communities. Before I went to the field area for data
collection, I made all necessary preparations. Voice recorder devices and interview protocols
were made ready for the field. The key informant interviews and focus group discussions (FGDs)
guides were prepared in English. Then, it was translated into Amharic language (the language of
data collection).Then after, my supervisors and peer reviewers of the study commented and
corrected the guiding instruments. On date 20 December 2013, I made phone conversation with
gate-keepers for the study. On this basis, I conducted three rounds of fieldwork.

The first round of fieldwork was conducted between 1st -15th January 2014 in order to
familiarize myself with the two study areas and to collect information on the case studies that
examined ethnic conflict resolution mechanisms. It was preliminary visits to familiarize myself
with the study area and identify potential key informants and participants of group discussion.
Accordingly, I stayed in the Dawa Harawa Woreda of the Oromo Nationality Zone of the

19
Amhara Ntional Regional State (Bora) and Dawe Woreda Zone five of the Afar Ntional
Regional State(Woderage) for two weeks(1_15 January). In this visit, I interviewed some local
government officials and elders of the study area. It did not pose many problems to the
researcher in collecting data since the researcher has a letter from the Department of Political
Science and International Relations of Addis Ababa University. With the help of research
assistants, I travelled into different kebele of Dawa Harawa and Dawe Woreda. I went to Bora
(the administrative town of Dawa Hrawa Woreda) and Woderage (the administrative town of
Dawe Woreda) by asking permission from Oromo Zone and Afar Zone five administrations,
respectively

In the second round, I undertook major field study. The second round of fieldwork, conducted
from April to June 2014, was to collect data regarding Afar-Oromo ethnic conflict and resolution
mechanisms of the study area. The fieldwork for this round required extensive travel to some
localities affected by Afar-Oromo ethnic boundary conflicts. Hence, in the field for three months
in the remote Dawe and Dawa Harawa kebele, I collected data regarding to the problems
associated with the conflict and conflict resolution mechanisms of the Afar and Oromo areas. I
stayed in the woreda capital of the Dawe, Woderage for five weeks (1st April to 8 May2014),
and collected data through two focus-group discussions and fifteen interviews with elders and
officials and managed to conducted two focus-group discussions and fifteen individual
interviews about historical developments in the region and the state of ethnic conflicts and
resolution mechanisms. Since Woderage is the capital of the Dawe Woreda and almost all of the
elders of the Afar involved directly or indirectly in violent conflicts come regularly to Woderage,
it made it possible to conduct the interviews (Afar side). Similarly, I stayed in the woreda capital
of the Dawa Harawa, Bora for five weeks (16 May to 21 June 2014) and managed to conduct
two focus group discussions and fifteen interviews. The five weeks field visit in May and June
2014, was to gather data further on boundary disputes between the Afar and Oromo neighbors. I
visited number of localities affected by boundary conflicts and organized two focus-group
discussions and fifteen interviews (Oromo side). The data collected during this fieldwork
contributed a lot to the study.

20
I administered last round of the field visit to fill the gap identified. The last field visit was made
in February 2015 for fifteen days in the study areas to gather information on how the process of
conflict resolution mechanisms have undertaken when conflict between the Afar and the Oromo
has happened. In addition, visits to some of the conflict hotspots of Afar-Oromo territories such
as Dire and Ocheru, I conducted seven interviews

2.4 Sources and Instruments of Data Collection

2.4.1 Sources of Data

Regarding data, this study depended on three different kinds of sources– interviews, documents
and academic literature. First, data generated from interviewees and focus-group participants
constituted major sources of primary data. For political science research in developing countries
like Ethiopia, where the written culture is limited and most political activities occur in informal
ways, the significance of interviews cannot be underestimated. This study used focus-group
discussions and semi-structured and open -ended interviews with key informants. The key
informants were community elders, leaders of clans and villages; local and regional officials, and
others.

In this study, data were collected from both primary and secondary sources. Secondary sources
include books, journal articles, electronic publications, media reports and magazines,
government reports, correspondences, police records, political statements, and occasional
publications of political parties. There were systematic examinations of relevant documents -
both published and unpublished from the district, zone, and regional offices, which include
reports, peace agreements, joint collaborative works on peace- building and conflict prevention,
resolution and management. Documents in the national archives and libraries, as well as, in AAU
libraries- particularly Institute of Ethiopia Studies (IES) Library are used. The study employed a
wide array of documentary sources. Governmental statistical reports of both regional and federal
governments are used.

Primary sources of data include key informants and participants of focus group discussions
(FGDs). Key informants include, religious leaders, clan leaders(for Afar ), community elders,
police officers, high-ranking regional state security officials, and former woreda officials, current

21
woreda, zonal and regional administrators, woreda judges, as well as, House of Federation
Secretariat and, officials and experts in the Ministry of Federal Affairs and non-governmental
organization (workers of Kombolcha Catholic Church).

To minimize the weaknesses in each data collection technique and benefit from the strengths of
each technique, triangulation is vital. Triangulation entails using more than one source of
information, as reference to multiple sources provides more insight into the phenomena
investigated (Cooper & Schindler, 2008: 185). To a certain degree, triangulation limits biases
and limitations and allows one to have broader perspectives of the issues one is investigating
(Willis, 2007: 219). It enhances validity and makes the necessary look at issues from different
perspectives in terms of methods and analysis (Lee & Lings, 2008: 239). Triangulation, in this
study, is achieved through the use of comparison data obtained through key informant interviews
and FGDs, as well as, reports obtained from the above institutions.

2.4.2Instruments of Data Collection

Key Informant Interviews

Data collection for this study is mainly through interviews with the selected interviewees. Both
unstructured and semi-structured interview techniques widely used in qualitative approach
(Robson, 2002: 227). In this study, both unstructured and semi-structured interviews are used.
Unstructured (open-ended answers) interview is appropriate only for oral history and life history,
where responses to a question may generate a number of other questions on the spot, as the
interviewer asks for elaboration, explanation or remind the interviewee certain event.
Unstructured (open-ended answers) interview which can be done without interview guide/check
list, while semi-structured is guided by interview guides/checklist in order to address research
questions. In this study, it is more of semi-structured, as it is needed to be guided by interview
guide/checklist indicated in the organization of empirical chapters of the study. Semi-structured
interviews combine both features of structured and unstructured interviews. Therefore, I used
predominantly, semi-structured interviews, as I had interview guides/checklist for more the key
informants.

22
Interviews are conducted face-to-face with the informants. Face-to-face interviews are
considered appropriate because of their flexibility in letting interviewees feel motivated, the fact
that importance and credibility of the research is conveyed best by a face-to-face interviewer
who can show identification and credentials and, though it is not always, helpful particularly
with informants whose writing skills are weak or have none at all or who are less motivated to
make the effort to respond fully. Face-to-face interview is also one way empowering, as well as,
showing respect for the research participants.

Interviews are conducted with people who are believed to have experience and knowledge about
the issue, which is under study. Accordingly, in-depth interviews with key informants were
conducted and data generated in order to have thick description of the state of Afar-Oromo
ethnic conflict resolution mechanisms in the study area. Key informants were selected
purposively based on their age, level of education and awareness/ knowledge about their culture,
society and environment. Key informants were interviewed to share their knowledge regarding
the various aspects of Afar –Oromo conflict and its impact on the maintenance of peace and
stability in the study areas. Qualitative interviews are employed to record people’s description
and explanation of events and experiences in their own words (Berg, 2001:3). Using this tool, I
have recorded informants’ intimate knowledge of the subject matter.

Focus Group Discussions

One of the main data collection instruments I used was focus group discussions (FGDs). Focus
group discussions are useful when the researcher wishes to gain understanding on shared views,
perceptions, and opinions on current issues (Creswell, 2007; Silverman, 2006). It is a way,
participants’ responses can be explored in a real-time setting, dynamics within group behaviours
can be observed and put into perspective, and responses can be clarified.

In this study, selection of participants like key informant interviewees was purposeful, diverse,
and representative of the communities to be studied. This means both the Oromo and Afar ethnic
groups were represented. Focus group discussions were held at the kebele level, which are

23
located at the border areas between the two regions. I have four kebele, two from each woreda 2,
to conduct focus group discussions. There were four groups (two/one from each kebele). A total
of four focus group discussions (two/one focus group discussions in each kebele, two with men
and another two with youth) were conducted to generate data for the purpose of understanding
the various sources of conflicts and its related issues. The focus group discussion participants
were selected purposively based on their age, level of education and awareness about their
environment. Focus groups consisted of six to ten participants who shared common perceptions
about the issue. Group discussions were conducted in a separate schedule. To avoid boring of
participants, each discussion did not last more than one and half hours in duration.

I met with some of the community elders through kebele administration officials during my
preliminary field visit. This created an opportunity for me to locate and establish contacts with
some of the potential key informants. I also identified some of the oral historians before
travelling to the two woreda under study, as they were well known at the zonal level.
Subsequently, I identified many other community elders, especially oral historians, through the
elders with whom I had already established contacts, which constitutes a ‘snowball
sampling’(Bryman, 2004: 100). In fact, some oral historians recommended to me their
counterparts to participate with them in the interviews

Participants of FGD were categorized into two: elders and youth. Categorizing participants and
organizing separate forms was necessary to encourage elders and youth to air out their views
freely. Categorization is also useful to affirm representation of groups of the study sites. Elders
were selected based on age, wealth-ranking categorization, occupation like peasants/pastoralists
as locally understood, and on their knowledge about the subject. They were also selected with
the understanding that they best represent their all groups. The youth were also selected to
constitute focus group because they played active role in the conflict.

My role, as a researcher was changed under FGDs. I was more of moderator, facilitator of group
interactions. My role was to supply topics and questions to the participants to initiate and

2
The four kebele selected are Gendawarina Eyelendi and Kilentina Derseda from Afar Dawe Woreda while Dire and Medine
Kuniye from Oromo Dawa Harawa Woreda. (See on figure 1 on page 14).

24
provoke discussions and ask for clarifications. I also ensured that discussions are in line with the
research questions of the study. I developed FGD guide for group participants .The contents of
the guide used for all FGD was similar. The discussion was conducted in Afan Oromo, Afaraf,
and Amharic. Discussion with Amharic was with the consent of participants. In the selection
process, I attempted to make sure that participants were not only willing to use Amharic as a
medium of communication, but also have sound command of the language. In case where the
participants donot understand Amharic, I used interpreters. During the field visit, many re-
arrangements were made depending up on the situation on the ground as I obtained good
exposure to my research environment.

2.5 Sampling Procedure

Regarding sampling procedure, I used purposive or judgemental sampling. This is because in

qualitative research, purposive sampling is essential to identify knowledgeable informants for
interviews. I have chosen purposive sampling procedure based on the nature of the problem to be
studied and the type of data I required. The study sought to collect and analyze data mainly as
regards experiences, perceptions, and views of people who had been involved in or affected by
the conflict. This means interviewing resourceful persons gives more precision than doing it in a
random manner. Purposive sampling was applicable for both key informants and participants of
focus group discussions. According to Neuman (1997: 205), purposive sampling is based on the
researcher’s knowledge of the research area and the important opinion makers within that
research area. The social classes/groupings (ethnic groups, occupational groups, and others) were
identified purposively so as to ensure that they all have represented in the study. But, within the
groupings, purposive sampling (for identifying key respondents, especially for identifying
people’s perceptions with regard to ethnic conflict and resolution mechanisms) and snowball
(where some respondents lead me to many potential informants) is used.

Purposive sampling procedure were employed to select the key informants from each kebele.
The number of key informants was adjusted after factors and conditions became clear and while
the study was in operation. In the initial phase of interview, first, two woreda were identified
from a number of woreda in the two Zones. Potential interviewees in the selected woreda, in
turn, were classified into four kebele administrations selected, two from each woreda. Two

25
kebele (namely, the lowest administrative units) from each district were selected purposively
based on the severity of recurrent conflicts. The kebele were purposively selected on the basis of
their hosting the conflict at the boarders between Dawe and Herawa woreda of Afar and Amhara
Regional States, respectively. Eventually, some individuals, by virtue of possessing rich
knowledge about the subject under study, who were thought to reflect the views and attitudes of
the farmers and pastoralists in the study areas were selected for the interviews.

2.6 Data Recording, Transcription, and Analysis

2.6.1 Data Recording and Transcription

In a qualitative research, there are various means of recording data; such as taking notes,
photographing, and using electronic devices like tape recorder, video recorder or digital voice
recorder. In this study, to record interviews, I used mainly field notes. In addition to field notes, I
used electronic devices such as tape recording, to supplement my field notes.

Transcription is an interpretive process from oral speech to written texts (Duranti, 2007;
Barbour, 2008; Slembrouck, 2007). In conducting transcription, the issue of trustworthiness and
avoiding transcriber’s errors is central in qualitative research. This is mainly because irrelevant
information might obscure the research purpose. Transcription that encompasses translation from
one language to another presents complex and challenging situation. It requires the use of
interpreters, for example, and transcribers other than the researcher, if the researcher is not a
native speaker of the language of informants (Miles and Huberman,1994; Moerman, 1996).
Therefore, as my research participants have different mother tongue, I selected people from the
native speakers that would help me in transcribing the tape recorded data into written text.

2.6.2Data Analysis

This study used qualitative method of data analysis. Concerning with the analysis of qualitative
data, the research was based on the theoretical and methodological principles of subjective
interpretations. To this effect, a content analysis technique was employed to analyze the
qualitative data. Qualitative data analysis provides ways of discerning, examining, comparing
and contrasting, and interpreting meaningful patterns or themes. According to Miles and
Huberman (1994), qualitative data analysis involves three macro processes. These are data

26
reduction (extracting the essence), data display (organizing for meaning), and drawing
conclusions (explaining the findings). Meaningfulness is determined by the particular objectives
of the subject. Data analysis will generate answers to the research questions of a study. Willis
(2007: 310) states that ‘data analysis in qualitative research commences with a research
question’. In qualitative research, generation and analysis of data are often interwoven
(Hamersley and Atkinson, 1995: 21). The analysis technique targets at organizing and reducing
of the empirical data into themes or essences through analytical induction. Qualitative data
analysis is a process of making sense of data through uncovering themes, concepts, insights,
patterns, categories, perceptions and understandings. The analysis involves an iterative, inductive
and reductive process of formulating conceptual ordering for data is called coding that facilitates
conditions for the constructing themes, essences, descriptions and theories (Walker & Myrick
2006). Empirical data collected and analyzed thematically. Thematic categorizations were drawn
from the major points raised in the research questions. Data was categorized or classified into
themes. The themes were categorized into more manageable groups of sub-themes and codes.
Data was analyzed by using descriptions, explanations, understanding and interpretations.

The major challenge in qualitative research is data reduction or cleaning (Creswell, 2007:38).
Because for the analyst, especially the less experienced ones, everything looks important,
especially at the outset, and the analyst wants to get it all. Data reduction often forces choices
about which aspects of the data should be emphasized, minimized, or set aside completely in the
process of analysis. Accordingly, data was edited, which means separating the sheaf from the
grain. But, care was taken not to discard important points while editing.

In this study, I analyzed the qualitative data inductively from particulars to more general
perspectives by way of ‘establishing patterns and themes’ (Creswell, 2007: 38). Data analyzed
and generalizations drawn as to the relations among them. As my research process begins with
gathering data, which would be used to develop explanations /interpretations, it was vital to take
inductive strategy as an instrument of analysis. The analytical generalizations followed logically
from the data in the inductive strategy.

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Finally, all descriptions written in a narrative form to provide a ‘holistic’ picture and
interpretations followed in relation to the situation of the Afar and Oromo ethnic conflict and
resolution mechanisms in the study area. The study report comprises the ‘voices of
participants, the reflexivity of the researcher and a complex description and interpretation of the
problem and it extends the literature or signals a call for action’ (Creswell, 2007: 37). Hence, the
study, in addition to presenting some findings, seeks to inspire and motivate further research on
the subject.

To make sure that the study follows a rigorous approach to data analysis and reporting, I have
validated findings by using peers, staff and other individuals who are experts on the subject
(Creswell, 2007). It was both necessary and beneficial to discuss the analysis and interpretation
of the data with peers or other individuals who are expertise in the subject. It was significant
when there is opportunity to present the progress of the research to department staff and other
higher degree students, lecturers and colleagues either through individual presentations, student
seminars, or academic meetings. Feedback that obtained from these individuals on my data and
draft thesis through mid-term and final seminars organized by our department created
opportunities for reflection and consideration. Their perspectives provided an invaluable
opportunity to consider different approaches to analysis and interpretation of the data. So, I did
my best in presenting my work to peers and other pertinent individuals.

2.7 Ethical Considerations

Participants were clearly informed about the purpose of the study. That is, information were
solicited from informants voluntarily based on their informed consent. They voluntarily decided
whether to participate in the research or not. If they wish, informants were described
anonymously in the analysis and writing up of the research and every care has been taken not to
hurt the privacy and confidentiality of participants. Informants participated in the study without
their identity being revealed. Their names are kept anonymously for safety reasons, when they
demanded so. Because of the sensitivity of the subject that the study dealt, I obliged to withhold
the names of informants.

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CHAPTER THREE: LITERATURE REVIEW

Under this section, first, defining concepts that are relevant to the conceptualization of the
subject under study are dealt. These are ‘ethnic group’, ‘ethnicity’, ‘conflict’ and ‘ethnic
conflict’. Secondly, discussions are done on theoretical perspectives, such as ‘primordialism’,
‘constructivism’,‘instrumentalism’, ‘conflict theories’, ‘consociationaism’ and ‘pluralism’,
causes and nature of ethnic conflicts and review of empirical literature. These perspectives are
vital in analyzing ethnic conflicts and their resolution in the study area, the researcher used them
as frame-work of analysis.

3.1 Conceptual and Theoretical Perspectives

3.1.1 Defining Concepts

Since the study has a focus on inter-ethnic conflict, conceptualizing of terms such as ethnicity
and ethnic conflicts have paramount importance. Taking the actors involved in the conflict, the
study proposes that the conflict has ethnic element. Though, various causes which are not
directly attached to identity are identified, people in the study area enter in to conflict in the
name of their ethnic group. Taking this in to consideration, this study argued that competition of
resources along ethnic lines leads into conflict and the conflict in the area can be termed as
ethnic conflict. Hence, an analysis of concepts of ethnic group, ethnicity, conflict and ethnic
conflict are provided.

3.1.1.1 Ethnic Group

The terms ‘ethnicity’ and ‘ethnic group’ have been defined in many ways by different
researchers. As regards ethnic group, there is little consensus among scholars as to what
constitutes ‘ethnic group’ and what ‘ethnicity’ is all about. Hizkias (2001: 113), for instance,
states that ‘…it is not clear what is meant by the terms ethnic group, and ethnicity…it is very
difficult to distinguish between them’.

29
For some researchers, ethnic group entails that members of the group share certain beliefs,
values, habits, customs and norms because of their common myths of origin and territory, define
themselves as different and special because of cultural identities, and view and treat as if
identities are biological (Barth,1969; Geertz, 1996; Babatunde, 2004). For Osaghae (2006: 5),
ethnic group refers to ‘primary groups that are distinguished from others by name, language, and
core territory, myth of common origin, culture and social organization’. An ‘ethnic group’ has
been defined as a group that regards itself or regarded by others as a distinct community by
virtue of certain characteristics that will help to distinguish the group from the surrounding
community 3. Hizkias (2001: 113) states that ‘a commonly used definition is that an ethnic group
is a collectivity of people who share the same primordial characteristics such as common
ancestry, language and culture’. Babatunede (2004:35) also explains ethnic group as ‘group of
people classed together according to common traits and culture, as well, as common myths of
origin and territory, which differentiates it from other groups.’

According to Jenkins (1997:13) ‘Ethnic group is a group of people whose members belief that
they are of a common descent’. It is not enough for a group to have certain common features
because it is the interaction of various ethnic groups, which according to Eriksen, (1995:251)
creates group. He pointed out that ethnic groups are not isolated. Ethnic groups can only know
of their existence by being in contact with others. Similarly, as much as ethnic groups are
different, they need others so that they could have their own identity (Shale, 2004:1).

3.1.1.2 Ethnicity

According to Jenkins (1997:9) ‘ethnicity’ or the word ‘ethnic’ comes from the ancient Greek
word ‘ethos’, which is a condition in which a collectivity of humans live, in a place and interact
with others. Eriksen (1995:251) defines ethnicity as an aspect of relationship between people or
groups whose members believe that it is culturally distinctive. He indicates that ethnicity is
situational in that people can behave differently according to situations. It is possible to make a
distinction between ethnic groups that have different cultures. Ethnicity may not be adequately
defined by cultural groups because they are not identical to other ethnic groups. Cultural
groups can only be used to reinforce ethnic identity (Shale, 2004:1).

3
http://www.intercultural.ie.isses.accessed 12May2014.

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Ethnicity is an elusive concept. The meaning of ‘ethnicity’ tends to be elusive in that the term
invokes mixed feelings and subjective interpretations across different contexts or cultures.
Plentiful literature on the topic, scholars ‘…define and describe the term in various ways, such as
a modern cultural construct, a universal social phenomenon, a personal identity, a peculiar kind
of informal political organization or affective association’ (Berhanu, 2007:1). While many
researchers have attempted to define the term ‘ethnicity’, there is no agreement reached on its
meaning (Hutchinson and Smith, 1996; Merera, 2003; Luba, 2012: 65). With this characterizing
feature, there have been a number of definitions put forward at different points in time by
different researchers. ‘Ethnicity’ as a concept entails that identification and feeling as a member
of an ethnic group and exclusion from certain other groups because of this affiliation 4.
Similarly, Hizkias (2001: 113) defines ‘ethnicity’ as a ‘behavior and feeling about oneself and
others’.

According to Barth (1969: 75), ‘ethnicity’ refers to a group that is mostly ‘biologically self
perpetuating, shares fundamental cultural values and makes up a field of communication or
interaction, has a membership which identifies itself and is identified by others, as constituting a
category distinguishable from other categories of the same order’. However, Barth’s position
has been challenged by Eriksen (1997) and Cohen (1996) arguing that he relies on culture. For
Eriksen (1997: 39), ‘ethnicity is an aspect of social relationship between agents who consider
themselves as culturally distinct from members of other groups….’ Ethnicity, in this case, is
where ethnic groups are continually involved in dynamic relations and identity in the process
acquires a potent narrative (Young, 2003:14). Such notion of imagined kinship is a fertile input
in the political field where ethnicity appeals to its shared constitutive elements.

On the other hand, placing less emphasis to the centrality of culture in ethnicity, Cohen
(1996:84) argues that ‘ethnicity is a political phenomenon and traditions are only used as …
mechanisms for political alignment’. This implies that ethnicity is not necessarily genetic. It also
shows how ethnic groups might describe themselves by an ethnicity different to their birth
identity if they reside for a considerable time in a different area and they decide to adopt the

4
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culture, symbols, and relationships of their new community. Ethnicity, in this sense, is not
mainly for mere identification, but a force of group organization and taking position in the
political arena. In this regard, Osaghae (2006:5) affirms that “…ethnicity describes animosities
among members of different groups’. He further notes that ‘not only animosities among
members of different ethnic groups …but also the adversarial and conflictual relationships
between the state and aggrieved ethnic groups’.

The above discussions surrounding the definition of ‘ethnic group’ and ‘ethnicity’ show the
elusiveness of the terms and the absence of a common definition. All the above designations, in
defining ethnic group have made the notion even cloudy than one could imagine.

3.1.1.3 Conflict

The term ‘conflict’ requires clarification as that of ‘ethnicity’ and ‘ethnic group’. ‘Conflict’ is an
extremely vague and illusive area. It has many meanings. Different scholars perceive the concept
of conflict differently and come up with their own definitions and descriptions of the term
depending on their experiences as well as the contexts they consider. For instance, it can be
defined as a struggle between opponents over values and claims to scarce resources, status and
power (Coser et al, 2006). This definition is provided by having more focus on major causes
such as material resources, power, values or feelings. Conflict is a dynamic process in which
structure, attitudes and behaviors are constantly changing and influencing one another (Galtung,
1973). Galtung’s definition is based on the dynamic nature of conflict. According to
Romsbotham (2011), conflicts can be destructive (which should be avoided) and constructive
(which is a necessary and valuable aspect of human creativity).

Conflict is a natural aspect of any relationship. It may be positive (functional) or negative

(dysfunctional). Negative conflict threatens to erode the consensus needed for development.
Positive conflict, on the other hand, when it is managed creatively leads to creativity and
development (Grewal, 2003). Conflict is present when two or more parties perceive that their
interests are incompatible, express hostile attitudes, or take pursue their interests through actions
that damage the other parties (Galtung, 1973). These parties may be individuals, small or large
groups, and countries (Muhabie, 2015).

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Conflict is inevitable part of human existence. It is a phenomenon in all relationships of
individuals and groups. It prevails at international, regional, national, local, community, family
and even at interpersonal levels. Jemal (2012) define conflict as violent dispute or war between
combatant parties or armed forces. His definition revolves around the violent aspect of a conflict
and tends to equate conflict with war or armed struggles between various antagonistic groups.
Other scholars like Babatunde, 2004; Romsbotham et.al (2005) state that violence and conflict
are deeply inter-connected but not contingent on one another. For them conflict is much more
than a physical clash (which involves not only physical clash but also psychological, ideological,
value and other incompatibilities) between two or more groups with opposing goals or
ideologies. So many writers and organizations define conflict in different ways.

Although the various definitions of conflict can be found, yet the major role of conflict theories
and concept is to explain social conflict in general examining their sources and patterns of
escalation, de-escalation, consequences, and management (Salih, 2006; Fisher, 1990). Kriesberg
(1998: 35), for instance, views ‘conflict’ as a manifestation of incompatibility of goals or values
between two or more parties in a relationship combined with attempts to control each other and
antagonistic feelings toward each other. For him, incompatibility or difference may exist in
reality or may be perceived by the parties. Nonetheless, the opposing actions and the hostile
emotions are very real hall- marks of human conflict which have the potential for either a great
deal of distraction or much creativity and positive social change.

Conflict is defined as a fight over values or claims to status of power and limited resources. For
example, conflict over land and other natural resources, and among two more groups that
perceive incompatible self-interests or hostile attitudes (Castor and Ettenger, 1997:27). Conflict
happens among people in all kinds of human interactions and in all social settings. This is
because of the wide variety of differences among people. However, the absence of conflict
usually indicates the absence of meaningful interaction; the manner in which conflict is handled
whether it is constructive or destructive (Deutch and Coleman, 2000; Pia & Diez, 2007 ). This
means conflict in itself is neither good nor bad. Rather, it is one’s attitude and reaction to it that
makes it either constructive or destructive. The way of handling conflict has a crucial factor for
conflict being productive or destructive.

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In one way or another, conflict symbolizes notions of contention, struggle, divergence, and
disagreement. It involves a ‘struggle for mutually exclusive rewards or the use of incompatible
means to achieve a goal (Babatunde, 2004: 35). Conflict is ‘a struggle in which the aim is to gain
objectives and simultaneously neutralize, injure or eliminate rivals’ (Horowitz, 1998: 23).
According to the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK), conflicts are
‘clashes of interest (differences of positions) concerning values’ (Mildner et al, 2011:168).
Conflict can be also understood as an incompatible interaction between at least two actors,
whereby one of the actor’s experiences damage, and the other actor causes this damage
intentionally, or ignores it (Mason and Sandra, 2005:1). In human life, conflict involves at least
four factors (Deutsch 1991 cited in Babatunde, 2004: 35), involving the following formality.
First, is contact between the parties involved. Second, conflicting parties must
have perceived incompatible differences, in terms of values, beliefs, or goals.
Third, at least one of the parties involved must insist that existing
contradictions must be eliminated. Fourth, at least one of the parties involved
must believe that there is more to be gained or less to be lost by engaging in
conflict than in not so doing.

According to Galtung (1973), for a conflict to occur three elements have to fulfill. These are:
Contradiction (C)-the underlying conflict situation, which includes the actual or perceived
incompatibility of goals between the conflict parties; Attitude (A)-the parties’ perceptions and
misperceptions of each other and of themselves; Behavior (B)-which involves cooperation or
coercion, gestures signifying conciliation or hostility (threats, coercion and destructive attacks).
Galtung describes conflict as a dynamic process as explained so far. Wallensteen (2002), on his
part explained conflict as consisting of three components: action, incompatibility and actors.
Combining these three components gave a rise for a complete definition of a conflict as a social
situation in which a minimum of two actors (parties) compete each other to fulfill their resource
desires at the same moment in time.

Conflicts are so diversified and manifest themselves in different forms. Academic literatures
classified conflicts in to various categories taking in to consideration different criteria like the
conflict parties, the duration of the conflict, the conflict scale, context of the conflict, the
consequence a conflict brought, etc (Romsbotham, 2011). Of these various categories, types of

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conflict based on actors involved are discussed to explain the type of conflict this thesis focused.
As such, intra-personal, inter-personal, intra-state, and inter-state conflicts are some common
type of conflicts.

Intra-state conflict is a kind of conflict that occurs within a nation, involving different groups.
This could be inter-ethnic, inter-religious, or competition for resources within a given state.
Economic, social and political factors could cause a conflict within a state (Dereje, 2009). The
contention between Afar and Oromo in the study area of this Dissertation is a good example of
intra-state conflict between two ethnic groups. Therefore the study is categorized under this type
of conflict. The other one inter-state conflict is a conflict between two or more states or conflict
between nations. It could be for ideological reasons, territorial claims, and political competition
(Romsbotham, 2011).

As many scholars agree, conflict has a negative effect and leads to sufferings, but it can also
leads to the alleviation of people’s suffering and leads to sustainable peace (Deutch and
Coleman, 2000; Pia & Diez, 2007). This implies conflict in itself is neither good nor bad. Rather,
it is one’s attitude and reaction to it that makes it either constructive or destructive. That means
the way of handling conflict has a crucial factor for conflict being productive or destructive (Pia
& Diez, 2007; Muhabie , 2015). Relating to this, Yasin (2010:16) argued that:
Conflict is a normal, even healthy dynamic. A certain amount of conflict can be
constructive, inspiring creativity in thought, communication, and action. Even
violent revolutionary conflict, viewed from the longer perspective of history, may
be a force for progress. The American War of Independence and the Civil War,
India’s fight for independence from the British, and the struggle of the South
African blacks against apartheid fall into this category.

In general, the preceding discussion reveals that conflict is an ever present phenomenon in social
relations. It is inevitable in any social gathering, organization and society as a result of
divergence of interests on issues such as access to scarce resources, power, status and the like.
Therefore, in this research, the term conflict is broadly seen as a phenomenon where two or more
parties perceive that their interests are incompatible, express antagonistic attitudes, and pursue
their interests via violent actions that damage the other party. The parties may be individual,
small or large groups.

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3. 1.1.4 Major Concepts of Conflict

Though there are various approaches that deal with handling conflicts, the ideals of conflict
resolution is vital for this study. Many concepts of conflict exist among the practitioners and
academics studying, analyzing and dealing with conflict. Five concepts of conflict are identified
in this study. These are conflict management, conflict settlement, conflict prevention, conflict
resolution and conflict transformation. Since examining the processes and approaches of conflict
resolution is the major purpose of the research, theoretical exposition of the issue adds value on
the issue under investigation. Using the ideals of conflict resolution, the study unveils the various
practices the woreda undertake in order to bring positive relationships between the two groups.
Hence, the study discussed the issue of conflict resolution. There is a considerable contest among
scholars in the use of appropriate concepts in addressing conflict. There is persisted debate
among five important concepts employed by conflict experts to explain the process of handling
conflict. These are conflict management, conflict settlement, conflict prevention, conflict
resolution, and conflict transformation.

Conflict Management

Conflict management implies the process of handling conflict in a positive and constructive way
(Leaderach, 2003). It stresses that some conflicts are intractable, i.e. very difficult to resolve.
Thus, the conflicts in this context can only be controlled or managed. The intractability can come
from history, distribution of power, and differences in interests through conflict management.
The theory purports that conflict can be prevented from escalating or becoming more volatile and
violent. Finally, this theory sees conflict management as the best option for accommodating
difference (Leaderach, 2003; Harris and Reilly; 1998; Merga, 2012).

Some researchers argue that conflict management is a way of bringing opposite parties together
and, hence, get rid of hostilities by realizing cooperation between them. As Harris and Reilly
(1998: 18) have put it, ‘Conflict management, then, is the positive and constructive handling of
difference and divergence rather than advocating methods for removing conflict’. It addresses

36
the more realistic question of managing conflict; how to deal with it in a constructive way; and
how to bring opposing sides together in a cooperative process. It designs a practical achievable
cooperative system for the constructive system and for the constructive management of
differences. However, others criticize it as the word ‘management’ connotes manipulation of
human beings and the involvement is not the best way of addressing conflict ( Harris and Reilly
(1998: 18).

Conflict Settlement

Conflict settlement refers to all strategies that in one way or another seek to end violent conflict
through a cease fire or termination of hostility (Muhyadin, 2005; Merga, 2012). According to
Riemann (n.d.), conflict settlement is a comprehensive out-come oriented strategy for achieving
sustainable win- win solutions or putting an end to direct violence without necessarily addressing
the underlying causes of the conflict. It emphasizes short- term agreements. This approach
believes that mutually satisfactory solutions are possible between the contending parties. It does
not necessarily address the underlying cause of conflict, but, instead focuses on ending the
dispute through various methods like negotiation, conciliation, mediation, arbitration,
adjudication, or litigation to address the disputes ( Merga, 2012 ; Riemann (n.d.).

Conflict Prevention

Conflict prevention, on the other hand, is aimed at controlling the escalation or re-escalation of
violent conflict (Jeong, 2000:168). Preventing and resolving conflict before it ends into violence
is far less costly, both in human and financial terms, than reacting to it once it has occurred.
Action to address the fundamental causes of conflict include strengthening good governance,
improving the condition of human rights, economic and social development, demolition of
armaments and developing a culture of peace(Susan, 2008:26). Conflict prevention can be
described as actions, policies, procedures or institutions undertaken particularly in vulnerable
places and times so as to avoid the threat or use of armed forces and related forms of coercion by
state or groups. Conflict prevention can take place in two conditions: 1) when there is no violent
conflict in recent years, but significant signals of violence; and 2) when there has been a recent
violent but peace is being restored, conflict prevention in this case aims to avoid a relapse of
violence (Lund, 1997:34). A decade ago, conflict prevention was referred only to actions

37
undertaken in the short term to reduce manifest tensions and to prevent the outbreak of violence.
But these days it includes long and short term activities and responses. It addresses built in
capacities of societies to deal with conflicting interests without resort to violence. It also extends
to the management of conflicts with destabilizing potentials. Such work helps in delegitimizing
the belief that violence is an inevitable or acceptable way of resolving conflicts, making
nonviolent options known and more attractive, addressing structural and immediate causes and
reducing vulnerability to triggers. The goal is not to prevent all conflict. Some conflict is normal,
unavoidable and often leads to bring about positive change (OECD, 2008: 16).

Conflict Resolution

Another concept in the realm of conflict theory is ‘conflict resolution’. It refers to the processes,
actions, and activities exerted with the aim of addressing the underlying causes of conflict
(Burton, 1990; Jeong, 2000). The United States Institute of Peace (2011:17) defines conflict
resolution as ‘efforts to address the underlying causes of a conflict by finding common interests
and overarching goals’. Conflict resolution is a broad term, which implies that the deep-rooted
sources of conflict are addressed, resolved and, behaviour among the contending parties is no
longer violent, attitudes are no longer hostile, and the structure of the conflict has been changed
(Jeong, 2000:34; Khannas and Kueck Gert, 2003; Dagne, 2013: 21). Resolving a conflict means
avoiding disputes between individuals or groups of people through viable solutions that make
them refrain from violence and that attempt to harmonize the peoples involved in the conflict or
that attempt to restore amicable relations between the parties in the conflict(Dagne, 2013: 21;
Jeong, 2000; Merga, 2012). Conflict resolution is all about addressing the sources of conflict
and the restoration of former relationships between the disputants. Resolution prevents the
re-appearance of future conflict by fulfilling the needs of all parties. Notably, conflict seen as
inherent in the social system can be eliminated only through structural changes. ‘Conflict
resolution has been a central part of the work towards building peace, promoting development
and consolidating regional cooperation and democratic efforts/processes’ (Jeong, 2000).

One of the goals of conflict resolution approach is to bring relational change between conflicting
parties by minimizing misunderstandings and maximizing understanding (Burton, 1987;
Wallensteen, 2007). ‘Conflict resolution is more than the limited definition of peace. It is more

38
than the absence of [conflict]. The parties are agreeing to respect each other and prepare for
living together with one another’ (Wallensteen, 2007:9). According to Wallensteen (2007:8),
‘conflict resolution as a situation is where the conflict parties enter into agreement that solves
their central incompatibilities, accept each other’s continued existence as parties and cease all
violent action against each other’.

The essence of conflict resolution is building new and lasting relations between conflicting
parties by changing hostile attitudes and behaviors. It includes developing and enhancing
positive attitudes and generating trust through reconciliation, and building or strengthening the
institutions through which the parties interact with one another peacefully. In conflict resolution,
the primary goal is not just to end the strife, but also to solve the problem from its bottoms.
Conflict resolution is a sustainable multi-dimensional task of bottom up and holistic peace
building approach, aims at truly achieving positive peace (Lederach, 2003; Romsbotham, 2011).
In order to best find a solution and address the long standing inter-ethnic conflict through
conflict resolution approach, practitioners need to look at the structural (root) and triggering
(immediate) causes that brought the conflict into manifest stages. In this case, resolution means
to deal with conflict successfully to clear it up and to find an answer for it (Jeong, 2000; Merga,
2012; Ramsbotham, 2005).It is a multifaceted process of reframing conflict parties’ interests and
position so as to successfully restore peaceful relationships among them (Ramsbotham,
2005:35). During the conflict resolution, Ramsbotham underlines that, behaviors should not be
violent, attitudes should not be hostile, and the structure of the conflicts should have been
changed. Such approach prevents the recurrence of future conflict by addressing the needs of all
parties on equal footing.

Recognizing parties’ interest needs their continued existence and arriving at mutually acceptable
solutions are considered to be ingredients of effective conflict resolution mechanism. However,
this perspective is strongly criticized that the word ‘resolution’ contradicts the nature of conflicts
itself (Colson, 1995:80). The argument lies on the fact that conflict is part of human life,
therefore, it cannot be resolved once and for all (Colson, 1995; Jeong, 2000; Merga, 2012;
Ramsbotham, 2005, USIP, 2011). Colson (1995:80) criticized the assumption that conflicts are
resolved and led to harmony. As to him some societies focus upon the issue at stake rather than

39
the social relationship of the disputants in dealing with conflicts. They often resort to law for
they simply seek remedies for their ills rather than to restore lasting peace and harmony. Thus,
for Colson, though followed by rituals, negotiation and adjudication ‘have much less success in
convincing contenders that they are in the wrong and they do little or nothing to heal ruptured
social relationships or abate anger and contempt.’ The publication of the United States’ Institute
of Peace (2011:17) seems in favor of the above assertion. The writing states as follows:
‘…conflicts are a normal part of human interaction and are rarely completely resolved or
eliminated, but they can be managed by such measures as negotiation, mediation, conciliation,
and arbitration.’ Generally, conflict resolution is the process whereby the disputants attempt to
resolve their conflicts. It involves the end of violence, attitudinal changes to one another and
addressing the sources of conflicts.

Making a sharp distinction between conflict resolution and conflict management,

Osaghae(1996:173) states that, the notion of resolution implies a once and for all treatment of
conflicts, while management implies that conflicts cannot be disposed of in one fell swoop.
While resolution suggests that conflicts can be dealt with in a rational comprehensive way,
management presupposes that they are best approached from the incrementalist’s stand point.
Obviously, says Osaghe, the management approach is more discerning of the dynamic nature of
ethnic conflicts and conflict situations: the fact that conflicts are usually complex and that the
‘resolution’ of one conflict could result in emerging another, the actors and issues in conflict are
forever changing form and character, and that supposedly different conflicts (ethnic, religious or
class conflict) are linked in important ways. Moreover, the management approach presents a
more continuous strategy for dealing with conflicts and the hope is that if disagreements at the
level of basic competitions can be minimized, then the scope for conflicts will be reduced
(Osaghae, 1996:173). Conflict management also supports the longer-term development of
societal systems and institutions that enhance good governance, rule of law, security, economic
sustainability, and social well-being, which helps prevent future conflicts (USIP, 2011:17).

Conflict Transformation

Recently many authors employ the concept of conflict transformation, particularly to explain
process depicted in addressing protracted social conflict (Galtung, 2001; Leaderach, 2003;

40
Ramsbotham, 2005). Leaderach (2003) defines conflict transformation as dynamic and ongoing
process of changing relationships, attitudes, and social, economic and political structures from
negative to positive. It is a long- term process and involves several stake-holders. Ramsbotham
(2005) maintains that conflict transformation is the deepest level of conflict resolution. Conflict
transformation is long term and broad process of changing the social, economic and political
conditions of people, which could be the major causes of violent conflict; it involves
transformation of the context, the socio-economic and political make up, actors and underlying
issues (Ramsbotham, ibid.)

Conflict transformation is structural- oriented and long- term peace building effort, which aim at
overcoming revealed forms of direct cultural and structural violence (Lederach, 2003; Galtung,
2001). It moves beyond the aims of conflict management, settlement, and conflict resolution. It
means that efforts are made not to eliminate conflict as such; rather, it is believed that conflict
expressed in a non-violent manner is an essential for social change (Shide, 2003; Muhyadin,
2006). Thus, conflict transformation approach tries to change the social and political system in
which the conflict occurs (Shide, 2003:18). Below in the table, brief comparison is made by
Leaderach (2003.46) between conflict resolution and conflict transformation perspectives.

Conflict Resolution and Transformation: A Brief Comparison of Perspective

Conflict Resolution
Conflict Transformation Perspective
Perspective
The key How do we end something How to end something destructive and build
question not desired? something desired?
The focus It is content-centered. It is relationship-centered.
To achieve an agreement
To promote constructive change processes,
and solution to the present
The purpose inclusive but not limited to immediate
problem that has created
solutions.
the crisis.
It is embedded and built
It is concerned with responding to
Development of around the immediacy of the
symptoms and engaging the systems within
the process relationship where the
which relationships are embedded.
present problems appear.
Time frame The horizon is short-term. The horizon is mid- to long-term.
View of It envisions the need to de- It envisions conflict as a dynamic of ebb
conflict escalate conflict processes (conflict de-escalation to pursue constructive

41
change) and flow (conflict escalation to pursue
constructive change).

Adapted from Lederach, John Paul. October 2003 "Conflict Transformation." Beyond
Intractability. 5

To deal with behavior in conflict, it is important to distinguish conflict resolution from conflict
management and conflict transformation. Burton (1991) makes a distinction between conflict
resolution, conflict management, and conflict settlement. He suggests that ‘conflict resolution
means terminating conflict by methods that are analytical and enables to get the root cause of the
problem. Conflict resolution, as opposed to mere management or 'settlement', points to an
outcome that in the view of the parties involved is a permanent solution to a problem (1991: 72).
But, conflict transformation is structural- oriented and long- term peace building effort. This
approach tries to change the social and political system in which the conflict occurs (Shide,
2003:18). Thus, it moves beyond the aims of conflict management, settlement, and conflict
resolution.

According to Wallernsteen (2007:47) conflict resolution is ‘a social situation where the armed
conflicting parties in a (voluntary) agreement resolve to peacefully live with-and/or dissolve-
their basic incompatibilities and henceforth cease to use arms against one another’. This means
that conflict is transformed from violent to non-violent behavior by the parties themselves, not
somebody else, such as an outsider or third party. For Wallernsteen, conflict resolution focuses
on an agreement which marks the end point of the armed phase of the conflict (ibid.49). Conflict
transformation and peace building concern wider array of the importance of durability of
peaceful settlement of conflict. Conflict management typically focuses on the armed aspect of
the conflict: bringing the fighting to an end, limiting the spread of conflict and thus containing it.

On the basis of the concept of ‘conflict resolution’ and the nature of the conflict that I dealt with,
I preferred to use conflict resolution as a frame-work of analysis. The Afar- Oromo conflict is
one of the protracted social conflicts in north east Ethiopia. Therefore, I explored Afar-Oromo
conflict through the use of concepts of conflict resolution lens.
5
<http://www.beyond intractability.org/essay/transformation>.accessed in April 2014.

42
3.1.1.5 Ethnic Conflict

‘Ethnic conflict,’ as scholars agree, is clash among two or more ethnic groups due to demand for
power, resources, identity, social status and the like (Burton, 1990; Babatunde, 2004; Shale;
2004; Sisay, 2007). ‘ethnic conflict’ can be defined as a conflict between two or more ethnic
groups over resources, identity, borders or against national oppression. Burton (1990:137-138)
states that multi-ethnic conflicts are usually violent and destructive to the societal development.
Parties in conflict may get external military and financial support for strategic or ideological
reasons and these may result in costly and protracted conflict (Shale, 2004: 2).However, there is
a problem surrounding the definition of ‘ethnic conflict’. In spite of the fact that many cases of
violence have been referred to as ‘ethnic conflict’ in various parts of the world, controversies still
surround the term. As Hussein (2005: 8) notes ‘there is no single or uniform definition of ethnic
conflict.’

According to Smith (2000: 24) ‘ethnic conflict’ refers to ‘a continuum of events which range
from the articulation of discontent, protest, mobilization, confrontation, sporadic or sustained
violence, and civil war or insurrection, in which ethnicity plays a key role’. This entails that
ethnic conflict ranges from violent to non-violent interactions. To Brown (1997), in Hussein
(2005:8) ‘an ethnic conflict is a dispute about important political, economic, social, cultural, or
territorial issues between two or more ethnic communities’. This definition lacks clarity,
however it is not clear whether it is about the conflict between neighbouring ethnic groups or
between the government and excluded ethnic group. Babatunde (2004: 35) claims that ‘We have
ethnic conflict when two or more ethnic groups contend against one another, in order to achieve
objectives perceived as incompatible.’ On the other hand, he suggested that ‘positive inter-group
contact appears to provide more viable means of resolving ethnic conflict’. When two or more
ethnic groups have close settlement and share similar resources, conflict is likely to happen
(ibid.). Ethnic conflict refers to situation where people mobilize against others on the basis of
ethnic identity. Hence, ethnicity can be a factor in conflict, since parties in the conflict belong to
different ethnic groups. Markakis (1996) argues that inter-ethnic conflict is fought between and
within states. Inter-ethnic conflict is a conflict by which the primary line of confrontation is

43
ethnic markers. In ethnic conflict whatever the cause, ethnic groups confronted each other with
special emphasis to their ethnic identity (Fowkes, 2002). Moreover, for inter-ethnic conflict to
happen two or more ethnic groups must reside in close proximity. Thus, the existing literature
claimed that multi ethnic states are more vulnerable for ethnic conflicts than homogenous states
(Blagojevic, 2009). However, it does not mean that ethnic diversity by itself is a source of ethnic
conflict. Ethnic differences lead to ethnic conflict when ethnic differences are politicized for
personal or group benefits. In the contemporary world, ethnic diversity leads to ethnic conflict
when ethnic identities are constructed and instrumentalised by different actors (Young, 2000;
Romsbotham, 2011).

Sometimes ethnic conflict is often used loosely, to describe a wide range of intra-state conflicts
that are not, in fact, ethnic in character. The conflicts in Somalia, for example, are occasionally
referred to as an ethnic conflict even though Somalia is the most ethnically homogenous country
in Africa (Yasin, 2010; Admasu, 2016). In general, it is sound to recognize that ethnicity by itself
cannot be a source of conflict but can be used as tool to mobilize a certain group of entity
constructed through courses of socio political changes.

All in all, there is conceptual gap in perceiving ‘ethnicity’, ‘ethnic group’ and ‘ethnic conflict’
among researchers in the field. As Hussein (2005:24) summarizes the ‘Academics perceive
ethnic group, ethnicity, and ethnic conflict from different perspectives. The existence of ethnic
group and ethnicity is objective to some and circumstantial to others’. However, this study will
adopt Brown’s definition, which includes many factors, ethnic conflict to arise, and Smith’s
definitions which concentrates mainly on violent ethnic conflict. Furthermore, this study will
take up the clash between neighboring ethnic groups. Babatunde’s definition is appropriate to use
as a frame- work of analysis in this study, as he claims conflict is likely to happen, among other
things, when two or more ethnic groups have close settlement and share same resources. The
concept of ethnic conflict is, therefore, will be used in this study to refer to ethnic conflict with
so many complex factors, and that happens between neighbouring ethnic groups, the Afar and
Oromo.

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3.2 Theoretical Perspectives

There has been a proliferation of research on ethnic conflicts. Various social science theories
have been developed to explain the occurrence of ethnic conflicts. Three of these theories, which
explain the concept of ethnicity include, are primordialism, constructivism and instrumentalism.
The debate among ‘primordialists’, constructivists’ and ‘instrumentalists’ is at the heart of the
conceptual problem with ethnicity. The theoretical debate on ethnicity has largely rests within
the limit of the primordialist, constructivist and instrumentalist range.

3.2.1 Primordialism

Accordingly, primordialists looked at ethnicity as natural and innate to human identity based on
fixed deep primordial attachments, like blood and common ancestor, to a group or culture. This
approach regards blood ties, language, religion, and custom as given in featuring ethnic identity.
Primordialists argue that identity is shaped by deep-rooted history, common culture, language,
and religion and psychology and some would say, biological factors (Barth, 1969; Van den
Berghe, 1995; Geertz, 1996; Horowitz, 1998; Eller, 1999; Vaughan, 2003). According to
primordialists, ethnic conflicts occur as a result of persistent natural factors, which are often used
as basis for ethnic groupings and pursuance of a common goal. The symbols of ethnic identity
are believed to be proceeding to experience deep-rooted, innate and unchanging.

According to this perspective, individuals engage in conflicts due to the attachment that keeps
them together and they, therefore, risk their lives for the common good of the entire group.
Ethnic conflicts here are then carried out on the basis of identification of ‘us’ versus ‘them’,
which is the essence of ethnicity (Hale, 2004:460; Young: 2003:14). It holds ethnicity is an
ascribed identity, something inherited from one’s ancestors. Van den Berghe(1995:358) for
example, understands ethnicity as biological and genetic. Hence, ethnicity is static and ethnic
identification is determined by common ancestor (Isajiw, 1993; Williams, 2015). This approach
deeply relies on one’s biological hereditary and attachment which is fixed at birth and always
remains the most significant determinant of one’s identity throughout the life time and cannot be
subject to any alteration (Isajiw, 1993:2).

45
The main criticism against this approach has been that it argues that ethnic divisions are fixed,
static, and natural. The primordialist approach stresses too much on the irrationality of ethnic
members and inter-ethnic group relationships. It does not explain conflicts emerging from
perceived and actual discrimination, especially in the distribution of power and resources
(Hatchinson and Smith, 1996:8; Smith, 1994). In this view, primordial perspective looks at
ethnicity from a static and negative stance implicitly suggesting that ethnic rivalries can never be
addressed. However, ethnicity is never static since new forms of characteristics, such as, culture,
custom, language, and history are perpetually created over time (Poluha, 1998: 33). Moreover,
this theory claims the presence of ‘natural ties’ within a certain ethnic group and inevitability of
ethnic conflict, it fails to take in to account the impact of social, economic, and political factors
on ethnic conflict(Williams,2015:147).

3.2.2 Constructivism

Constructivists, on the other hand, see ethnicity as a constructed identity, which is created. For
them ethnicity is dynamic, a reaction to social environment and ethnic identification is
determined by society (Sisay, 2007; Yang, 2000). The basic notion in this approach is that
ethnicity is something constructed in everyday living. Ethnic identity is not something people
possess but something they construct in specific social and historical contexts (Isajiw, 1999). The
constructivist dimension sees ethnicity as something that is socially constructed through various
processes like migration, conquest, and colonization (Williams, 2015:147).This theory contends
that the socially constructed nature of ethnicity causes conflict not because of individual actors
(Yang, 2000).Since ethnicity is a social process and product rather than a cultural given, it can be
constructed, deconstructed and reconstructed (Wimmer, 2008; Williams, 2015). Unlike
primordialists, ethnicity is not something that is given at birth, rather it is chosen by the
individual actor. As such, the content and form of what constitutes an ethnic group changes as
people flow across boundaries, but ethnic boundaries tend to persist (Barth, 1969:9).In this
regard, modernization projects and officially state sponsored policies are taken to be one the
major responsible factors to the formation of ethnic groups where there was no prior collective
consciousness(Hale,2004;Young, 2003:14).Additionally, constructivist theory influences the
public arena of the political field, and the role of, what Young(2003) calls, ‘cultural
entrepreneurs’ is so vital in the politics of ethnicity. In the course of such an activity, a skillfully

46
created ethnic identity and group would be born. Furthermore, the constructivist dimension
shows the existence of asymmetric degree of ethnic mobilization in the political field. It follows
that all ethnic groups do not show equal mobilization behavior when they are, for instance,
wooed by elites.

Despite such strength, the constructivist theory has shortcomings. It disregards the role of
primoridial ‘ties’ for the construction of an identity of a certain ethnic group. Moreover, even if it
argues for the constructedness of ethnicity, like the primoridial theory, it does not sufficiently
address the impact of economic and political interests that are prevalent in the construction of
ethnic identity (Hale, 2004; Yang, 2000).

3.2.3 Instrumentalism

The instrumentalist school unlike the primordialists and the constructionist schools, views
ethnicity as an instrument or strategically tool for gaining resources. According to this theoretical
framework, people become ethnic and remain ethnic when their ethnicity yields significant
returns for them (Brass, 1991; Hale, 2004; Smith, 1994; Yang, 2000). Contrary to the above to
two theories, instrumentalism is not about, as Hale (2004:462) put it, ‘ancientness or
constructedness’, but rather this theory is all about ‘how strongly individuals are tied to the
ethnic identities’. The central theme in instrumentalism theory is that ethnic membership or
identification is based on rewards or cost benefit analysis. Individuals change or shift their ethnic
identities depending on the potential gain it brings. Ethnicity ‘exists and persists because it is
useful’ (Yang, 2000:39). Proponents advocate that the elites in the modern state use and
manipulate perceptions of ethnic identity to further their own ends and stay in power. It is
artificially created which is flexible, changeable and manipulated or framed based on the
advantages of the elite (Sisay, 2007; Muhabie, 2015). According to this theory, ethnicity is
susceptible to manipulation by elites who would use their ethnic members for their own benefits.
Ethnicity is employed as a weapon by elites in the fight for political power. This theory shows
how ethnicity might be politicized by elites just for the sake of elites themselves, not for the
group per se (Young, 2003:14). Instrumentalist perspective represents the view that ethnic
identity is a social, political, and cultural construct that can be used in competition over resources
or as a motivation for conflict. In this view, ethnic conflict as an outcome of mobilization of

47
ethnic identity by individuals or group of individuals for political and economic ends (Brass,
1991; Smith, 1994; Eller and Coughlan, 1996; Hutchison and Smith, 1996; Berman, 1998;
Merera, 2003, Asnake, 2009).

Instrumentalists view ethnic identity not as rigid, but rather, as fluid and constructed (Hechter,
1996; Horowitz, 2001). It requires only a ‘belief’ in common ancestry rather than the genetic
fact. Their view takes ethnic conflicts as political in nature and places more emphasis not on
cultural, but political and territorial appeals (Carment, 1993: 138-139). This approach is distinct
from primordialism, in so far as the discourse is considered to being socially constructed, rather
than, natural.

The instrumentalist view is criticized for its failure to identify that ethnic identity cannot be
‘decided…by individuals at will but is embedded within and controlled by the larger society’
(Lake and Rothchild, 1998a: 5). The drawback of instrumentalism theory is that while ethnicity
is limited, it gives huge emphasis on the rational choice of individuals vis-a-vis their ethnicity.
Individuals do not have many options to choose their ethnic group because it is hardly possible
to identify oneself with any other ethnic group as ethnic identification is socially sanctioned and
needs others recognition. Besides, not all ethnic choices are for material or political gains. For
instance, people choose a certain ethnicity because of its psychological satisfaction, (like
affection and attachment from other people). Ethnic choice might be based on its symbolic gains.
They also failed to recognize primordial elements as strategy to manipulate ethnic groups as a
response to oppression and suppression by a dominant group. To conclude, since ethnicity
concerns with ‘us’ and ‘them’ group mentality, it erodes togetherness, empathy and sympathy
among the people. This opened the way for political entrepreneurs to activate conflict between
ethnic groups.

Thus, in this study an integrated approach is applied because of the inherent limitations of
exhibited in the three theoretical lenses discussed above. The integrated approach presented here
is based on the work Yang (2000:39).Yang discussed the three major theories of ethnicity
(primordialism, constructivism and instrumentalism) and showed their relative strength and
limitations, and as well argued that an integrated approach is needed to fully understand

48
ethnicity. As such, the first central argument of integrated approach is that ethnicity is partly
cultural given and natural since there are some primordial elements that we cannot deny, for
example religion, territory, language, physical appearance, material culture, livelihood, and
history. Secondly, ethnicity is constructed. The construction of ethnicity, according to this
approach, takes place via various ways: ethnic categorization rules, social conditions, and
structural issues. Ethnicity is the work of society whereby societal standards and categorization
rules (like ancestor, physical appearance, or social class), which might be written or unwritten,
governs one’s ethnic affiliation. Ethnic categorization rules also are not uniform across societies;
they change from society to society. Consequently, the same person could be categorized into
different ethnic groups by different societies. Also social conditions (like migration) can craft
new ethnic groups and identities, as well as, can change the ethnic membership or identity of
individuals and groups. There might be ethnic switching (like religious conversion). Lastly,
structural conditions can increase and bring about ethnic consciousness. For example,
government policy of recognition or disintegration can lead to a group’s self-awareness and
organization. Thirdly, ethnicity is something that the decision of the individuals themselves who
would decide their ethnicity based on some calculations like material gains. Thus, an individual’s
interest to some extent shapes the ethnicity of one selects.

3.2.4 Contextualizing Primoridialist, Constructivism and Instrumentalist

Perspectives

Informed by the above debates, this study will consider all primordial, constructivist and
instrumentalist perspectives to explore inter-ethnic conflicts in the study area. Considering all
perspectives is apparently vital when seen from Ethiopia’s reality. Because, on the one hand, ‘in
the Ethiopian context primoridialism has been greatly influenced both popular perceptions of
ethnic identity and political discourses’ (Asnake, 2009: 38). This has been further reinforced
ethnic identity to become an organizing principle of Ethiopian federalism. In this regard, ethnic
groups uphold primordial elements of ethnic identity to strengthen their cohesiveness as a group
to maintain their ethnic identity in response to the historic domination and suppression by a
dominant ethnic group.

On the other hand, a sort of instrumentalist approach has its own significance in the political
discourse and institutionalization of predominantly ethnic- based federalism in Ethiopia.

49
Researchers argue that the current ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia are results of the EPRDF
Government’s political experiment (Hizkias, 1996; Teka, 1998; Zerihun, 2001). Hizkias (1996),
for instance, stresses that the current intended role played by ethnic elite and ethnic- based
political parties is instrumental in creating ethnic conflicts. His argument implies that ethnicity in
Ethiopia is a new political artifact constructed by the government since 1991. Ethno-nationalist
movements like Tigray Peoples Liberation Front (TPLF) and Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) use
the primordial elements of their ethnic group for political mobilization (Asnake, 2009:39). These
ethno-political groups are using the ethnicity card to win the minds and hearts of their respective
members. The formation of such ethno-regional political groups as a defiance to the state policy
that fosters the ‘oppression’ and ‘colonization’ and in defense of ‘their respective’ ethnic groups
is an act of ethnic identity construction by ‘ethnic entrepreneurs’, shows the constructivism link
to ethnicity, where ethnic identities are seen as something that can be constructed, deconstructed
and reconstructed through social process (Alem, 2003:10; Merera, 2006:120). To achieve their
political goal, the elites then used their respective ethnic group as a social base and
instrumentalized ethnic identity in their struggle for political power by invoking the constitutive
elements (primordial elements) of respective groups.

In relation to primoridial, constructivist and instrumental theoretical perspectives on ethnic

identity, Merera ( 2003: 26) notes that ‘ the most relevant in the Ethiopian situation is the
position that takes it as an ideology of mobilized collectivities that may be used both as a weapon
of resistance by the marginalized ethnic groups and as a political instrument for elites’. In line
with this argument( Asebe, 2007: 89) claims that ‘while ethnicity remained a critical medium for
the manipulation of power by the dominant class and constituencies, ethnic structures have also
emerged as a critical rallying point of resistance to oppressive and corrupt regimes’.

In Ethiopia, ethnicity is an enormously complex issue of concern. Inter-ethnic tensions and

conflicts over issues of identity, governance and competition over resources (mainly over
grazing land, over cattle, over water points and over cultivable land) are common phenomenon
(Sisay, 2007). However, all ethnic based conflicts in the country are not necessarily based on
primordial sentiments since many conflicts relate with social, political and economic reasons
(Asebe, 2007; Anteneh, 2013). However, the change in the political landscape of the country

50
since 1991 has its own role in increasing the ethnic line of thinking (Abbnik, 2011; Anteneh,
2013). Due to the restructuring of the Ethiopian state basically on the basis of ethnic identity, the
ethno-cultural differentiation of groups has been pronounced more loudly than ever.

One can conclude that ethnicity manifests itself in two forms: as a strategy to manipulate ethnic
groups for political mobilization and legitimacy, on the one hand, and as a response to
oppression and exploitation by the dominant ethnic group, on the other, the Ethiopian experience
represents both aspects. While the political entrepreneurs (elite in power and some opposition
politicians) use politicized ethnicity as an instrument to gain popular support, there are also
situations where ethnic politics emerges against oppression and in quest for self-rule and shared-
rule. This entails that all perspectives should be taken in to consideration, while analyzing ethnic
conflict in Ethiopia.

Scholars have been studying the phenomenon of ethnicity in Ethiopia by employing either of
these major theoretical frameworks (Asnake, 2009; Asebe, 2007; Berhanu, 2007; Clapham,1988;
Dereje,2003; Lincoln, 2000; Vaughan,2003). Asnake, 2009; Clapham, 1988; Vaughan, 2003;
adopted a constructivist approach while Asebe, 2007, and Dereje, 2003 used primordial and
constructivist approach. Berhanu(2007) also employed primordial and instrumentalist lenses. In
regard to constructivist approach, Clapham(1988:24 ), for instance, asserted that ‘it is essential to
emphasize the plasticity of Amhara-and hence ,in a sense, of Ethiopian –identity….Being
Amhara is much more a matter of how one can behave than of who one’s parents were…’. The
exception is Licoln the one who tried to combine the three theories, where the three theories are
‘understood as complimentary rather than mutually exclusive’ (2000:54). So, one can see how
primordial, constructivist, and instrumental elements of the integrated approach work in this
political struggle for power and resources both at the national and sub-national levels.

Despite such studies, scholars have largely failed to answer basic questions that are pertinent to
ethnicity mainly because they study ethnicity from a single perspective and such an isolated
study could not fully elaborate the phenomenon (Horowitz, 1998; Williams, 2015; Yang, 2000).
Explaining the inadequacy of any single perspective, Horowitz (1998: 23) stresses that ‘none of
the above perspectives can fully explain why people fight along ethnic lines’. Williams

51
(2015:147) also fittingly observed,’although each of these theories have significant contributions
to the understanding of the phenomenon, they are all limited in their explanatory, predictive and
perspective ability mainly as a result of their implicit bias regarding the origin of ethnic identity’.
Consequently, the failure to address fundamental questions urged scholars on the field to look for
a theoretical framework that goes beyond the primoridial-constructivist or primordial –
instrumentalist dichotomy. This has eventually led the emergence of the integrated
approach(Yang,2000:39). The integrated approach of ethnicity includes the central arguments of
primoridialism, constructivism, and instrumentalism and insists that the combination of these
theories is by far in better position to stand the test of ethnicity questions rather than a one-theory
explanation (Yang, 2000:40).

Like wise, none of the above perspectives can be generalized as the most fitting explanation for
the complex ethnic conflicts that arise in various parts of Ethiopia. Hence, this study
acknowledges the inadequacy of any single perspective to explain exclusively ethnic conflict.
And the study employs integrated approach of ethnic conflict and resolution mechanisms in the
northeast Ethiopia, which is the focus of this study. Ethnic conflict, in this research, refers to
inter-communal conflict that occurs between two or more ethnic groups who have or assumed to
have different language, culture, geographical setting and political, economic and historical
experiences. Ethnic conflicts here are to mean violence both at group and individual basis
between non-state groups mobilized along a shared communal identity with no professionally
trained army. It is against this background that the study explored the conflict between the Afar
and Oromo ethnic groups, as well as, conflict resolution mechanisms in the study area.

3.3 Consociationalist and Pluralist Perspectives

The other theoretical perspectives that are pertinent to conceptualizing ethnic conflict
management, settlement, resolution, prevention and transformation are 'consociationalist' and
'pluralist' perspectives. Of course, there is a deficiency in the theories/concepts of ethnic conflict
in connection with conflict resolution mechanisms. In this regard, Hussien (2005: 20)
emphasizes that ‘…one of the most important deficiencies in the theories of ethnic conflict is that
they tend to side-step the discussion of conflict resolution mechanisms’. However, despite this

52
limitation, the academic literature on ethnic conflict resolution is dominated by two competing
perspectives: the 'pluralist' or 'integrationist' approach and the 'consociational' or power-sharing
approach (Hussein, 2005; Lebamoff and Zolan, 2008).

With regard to the pluralist perspective (often referred as pessimistic view), on ethnic conflict
resolution, Hussein (2005: 21) has noted that ‘the pluralist society theory sees no solution to
ethnic conflict…. Because there is an incompatibility of interests between or among different
ethnic groups in a given country’ implying that ‘a multi-ethnic state is doomed to conflict and
disintegration….’ Similarly, Christopher (2006: 786) argues that because of ethno-political
competition, heterogeneity ‘breeds conflict that is difficult to resolve and, as a consequence,
political systems that are inherently more unstable’. This perspective goes even to the extent of
disconnection of ethnic groups as a panacea for their conflict. For example, Deutsch 1991 in
Babatunde (2004:36) suggests ‘isolation of ethnic groups as an effective means of resolving
[ethnic] conflicts.’ This means conflict occurs when there is contact between ethnic groups
involved and when these ethnic groups are remained apart, the likelihood of conflicts is resolved.
Nevertheless, when it comes to the context of Ethiopia in particular and, Africa in general, it is
difficult to materialize the pluralists’ solution. In support to this, Babatunde (2004:36) argues
that ‘ isolation [is] extremely difficult if not completely impossible’ because ‘with
modernization, ethnic groups are no longer self-sufficient and now need one another in order to
survive and develop’ and as ‘ethnic groups occupy contiguous locations, isolating them tends to
be counterproductive because it might aggravate hostilities’(Babatunde, 2004:36).For Babatunde
reducing contact between ethnic groups may aggravate conflict. This perspective is pessimistic
about the management and resolution of ethnic conflict in multi-ethnic society.

In contrast, Hussein (2005: 21-22) explains that ‘Consociationalist perspective assumes that it is
possible to resolve ethnic conflict and promote inter-ethnic solidarity under a democratic
environment’. This perspective insists on the possibility of resolution of ethnic conflict by a
peaceful means with the realization of democratic political system, which addresses the interests
of all ethnic groups in a given country. Against the pluralist theory, the consociationists (often
called optimistic theory) believe that it is possible to preserve peace and stability among multi-
ethnic states where various ethnic groups live in harmony. According to this perspective, inter-

53
ethnic problems could be resolved internally under a democratic political environment. In a
condition where by governments/policy makers avoid discriminatory course of action, one could
hope to see conflicts resolved genuinely (Hussien, ibid).

The above discussions indicate that there is no agreement among researchers on the possibility of
resolving ethnic conflict. Consociationalist may provide the best option for addressing ethnic
conflict resolution in societies with ethnic cleavages. All the theories have certain strength in
explaining ethnicity though they cannot sufficiently serve that purpose when employed
independently. Hence, in this study, I adopt consociational perspective as a frame-work of
analysis, as it is the most relevant to the current Ethiopian situation. Against this theoretical
background, this study sought to explore local conflict resolution mechanisms and identify their
relations with state mechanisms.

3.4 Effects of Ethnic Conflict

Ethnic conflicts are not limited to the generally conflict prone areas alone. It is a pervasive global
phenomenon cutting across cultures and societies, including those of the developed world, in
each case exhibiting its own specificity. To mention some, the intense nationalism that
disintegrated the multi ethnic state of Yugoslavia, the deep-rooted religious rivalry in Northern
Ireland and the peripheral nationalism of the Basques in Europe (Keating,1993; Malesevik,2000)
as well as the religious and ethnic nationalisms across Asia are all part of the global upsurge of
competing nationalisms (Merera, 2003).The intensity of the effects of an ethnic clash is
determined by the nature and scope of the conflict concerned. The adverse effects of violent
ethnic conflict could be categorized into political, economic and socio-cultural factors.

As experience has shown, the political effects of an ethnic conflict can be seen at two levels. The
first is the weakening and possible collapse of the central government. The deposing of the
military regime in Ethiopia, in May 1991, by the ethno-nationalist groups of TPLF/EPRDF
forces can be taken as a case in point. Another political effect of ethnic conflict could be the
disintegration of the ex-Soviet Union and federation of Yugoslavia might be an illustration. What
is hinted here is that ethnic conflict can play a crucial role both in the collapse of the central
government; and at the extreme cases, the disintegration of the country totally.

54
Seen from economic point of view, ethnic conflict destroys the very bases of development:
environmental resources, economic infrastructure, and the social and civic ties that permit and
sustain development. The damage of immense resource in Yugoslavian war among different
ethnic peoples, and the overall disintegration of the country’s infrastructure and other economic
resources in Somalia can be mentioned as illustrative in this case. When there is violent conflict
in a country resources that otherwise could have been invested for development endeavors,
would be shifted to cover the expense of the war. The productive labor force will be drained to
the war front and hence production and productivity decline in the countries engaged in the war.
In a country where there is violent conflict no tourism and incomes associated with tourism.
Trade and other social and civil institutions either completely or partially cease their services as a
result of which life become costly and terrible. Conflict also reported to be among the major
factors of vulnerability that destroy people’s social and private property and trigger
unemployment in the area.

The final and perhaps the harshest outcome of violent ethnic conflict is its social costs.
According to Jeong (2000), Nazi German killed six millions of European Jews, and other ethnic
minority groups. ‘The 1994 horrific war in the country of Rwanda in central Africa, among Hutu
(the majority) and the Tutsi (the minority) ethnic groups claimed the life of over half a million
Tutsi ethnic people within a few weeks’ (Scupin and Decoorse, 2004). Another outcome of inter
ethnic conflict concerns displacement of a large number of people as refugees. According to one
source, the following numbers of people were estimated to have fled their homes: 100,000
Hindus because of the war in Kashmir; 500,000 people following the war between Armenia and
Azerbaijan; three million people were displaced as a result of the war in the former Yugoslavian
federation (Brown, 1997:93). Ethnic conflict engenders, in addition to refugees, internal
displacement. For instance, in 1992-93, about 60,000 people were internally displaced owing to
the war in Tajikistan, ex-Soviet Union. This is other than the over 100,000 people who took
refuge in Afghanistan, Russia and elsewhere (Tishkov, 1999:583).

In general, ethnic conflict leads to the breakdown of law and order, the disruption of economic
activities, humanitarian crises and a state of uncertainty which deter long run investment and
development efforts and stability. Violent ethnic conflict leads to unprecedented out migration of
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people including vulnerable groups like women, children, and the old as well as the disabled.
Therefore, it is worthwhile to give due concern to interethnic relations and manage it cautiously
and systematically. Conflict is like contagious disease. Unwise handling of conflict gives it the
opportunity to widespread all of a sudden. If once occurred, conflict must be handled at its early
stages. If allowed to escalate, it would be changed to violence that cannot be easily remedied. In
connection to effects of Afar -Oromo ethnic conflict of the study area, more elaboration will be
made under chapter six.

3.5 Inter-Ethnic Conflicts in Ethiopia

Inter-ethnic conflicts were and are still intense and problematic in Ethiopia (Abbinik, 2011;
Anteneh, 2013). Researchers provide several causes for the outbreak of ethnic conflicts in
Ethiopia. Despite differences in degree, extent and actors, the country has encountered a lot of
inter-ethnic conflicts at different periods (Abrha, 2012). These conflicts include historical,
political, economic, social and cultural factors. Inter-ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia dates back to the
formation of the modern Ethiopian state at the turn of the 19th century, incorporating different
ethnic groups found at various levels of social and economic development through the use of
both forceful subjugation and peaceful persuasion (Markakis, 2003; Merera, 2011; Amare,
2013).

After the downfall of the Dergue, ethnic federalism was opted to manage the complex ethno
linguistic diversity of the country. However, since the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary
Democratic Front (EPRDF) took power in May 1991; there have been a number of inter-ethnic
conflicts in different parts of Ethiopia. Among others, the conflicts at the borders of Oromia and
Somali, Afar and Issa, Garre and Borena, Oromia and Gumuz, Guji and Gedeo, Anuak and Nuer,
Sidama and Guji, and Kereyu and Afar have occurred in the past couple of decades (Habtamu,
2013). As identified by Sisay (2007), claims and counter claims for land and water points,
exclusion from power at some levels, unmarked boundaries, blood feuds, proliferation of small
arms, feelings of insecurity by some groups, domination by a certain group and lack of good
governance are the main causes of conflicts in Ethiopia. The post 1991 political changes
witnessed inter-ethnic conflicts over grazing lands, water and other resources. These recurrent
violent conflicts have claimed the lives of thousands of people and accounted for the destruction
of public properties (ibid.).

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The post-1991 Ethiopian politics reveals politicization of ethnicity. With the construction of
identity from above, elites employ the ethnicity card during election and other political
campaigns. In fact, in Ethiopia the majority of the political parties are organized not along a
national and an all-inclusive platform, but along a narrow ethnic basis. As such, the politicization
of ethnicity is augmented and elites tap into this ‘gold mine’ for their own end. Thus, the elite
manipulation is unfolding against this background (Asnake, 2009; Berhanu, 2007; Vaughan,
2003).

The Ethiopian lowlands are potential areas of conflicts because all pastoralist communities have
possessed small arms and light weapons (Bekele, 2010; Teshome, 2010; Abrha, 2012; Atsibha,
2014). Unrestricted proliferation of small arms and light weapons and the arming of certain
communities intentionally without considering the security of others is a major threat to peace in
most of the Ethiopian pastoralist areas and it is an aggravating cause of conflict ( Sisay, 2007).
Nowadays, pastoralist communities provide the largest market for illicit arms from local
circulation and from neighboring countries in the Horn of Africa (Kenya, Somalia, The Sudan,
Djibouti and Eritrea) (Bekele, 2010). Easy availability and circulation of small arms and light
weapons in these communities have been aggravating protracted violent conflicts and social
disintegration within the pastoralists and other social groups for control of resources and power
(Abrha, 2010; Atsibha, 2014).

In addition to inter-ethnic conflict, inter-ethnic conflict transformation studies are conducted in

different parts of Ethiopia. One study conducted by Amare (2013) investigated inter-ethnic
conflict transformation in the post 1991 Ethiopian ethnic federalism in Asosa woreda,
Benishangul Gumuz regional state. As to the study, inappropriate development policies
particularly in the pre-1991 period; economic factors like land grabbing, resource competition
and political factors were the major causes of conflict between the Bertha and settler Amhara in
Asosa woreda (Amare, 2013). Besides, political or ideological differences and discriminatory
policy that made settler’s as second class citizenry were identified as triggering causes of conflict
(ibid.). The study also found out that both formal and traditional conflict transformative
mechanisms were used through identification of the structural conditions, actors, issues and the
general context of framing the conflict. The author argued the mechanisms applied were

57
successful in light of conflict transformation theory and brought constructive outcomes. Amare
(2013) claimed that the processes of conflict transformation brought the conflict in to non-violent
level and mend the people’s attitude to address their problems through peaceful means by
themselves. Clear manifestations of inter-ethnic integration and cohesion like growing inter-
ethnic marriage between the Bertha and settlers, participation in wedding and mourning
ceremonies, etc. were indicated in the findings of the study.

Another study conducted by Anteneh (2013) assessed the practice of inter-ethnic conflict
transformation in Ethiopia, taking the case of conflict between Amhara and Afar in Kewot and
Semurabi Gela Alo woreda. The study found out that conflict in the area was as a result of inter-
play variables that cut across economic, political, and socio-cultural factors. The study revealed
economic underdevelopment and competition for limited resources as major causes of conflict
between the two ethnic groups. Cattle raiding and proliferation of small arms and light weapons
were also identified as triggering causes of conflict. As to the study, peace committee
arrangement, promotion of inter-communal interaction, infrastructural undertakings, expansion
of education, deployment of security forces, cooperation on cultivation of disputed land,
improving agricultural productivity, and strengthening cooperation between the two woreda
administrations were the major approaches used to transform the conflict (Anteneh, 2013).

A different study entitled ethnic conflict management and transformation: the case of Derashe
and Konso in Southern Nations Nationalities and Peoples Region also explored transformative
peace building in ethnic conflict management. The study identified competition over natural
resources for reasons of scarcity of arable and pasture land, the motive to control benefits from
the public infrastructure, and attempt of boundary expansion as major causes of conflicts in the
area. It also revealed the role of reconciliation ceremonies and the potentials of local peace
committees for peace building (Yidnekachew, 2012). A further study investigated and described
the causes of conflict and conflict handing mechanisms to build stabilized society and
sustainable development in Raya Kobo and Golina woreda of Amhara and Afar regions
respectively. The study found traditional conflict resolution method as the preferred mechanism
of handling conflict in the study area (Jemal, 2012).

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The most important issue which is rampant in Ethiopia is the issue of ethnic boundary. The
federal system empowers ethno-lingustic groups and assumes that every ethno-linguistic entity in
the country resides in clearly demarcated territories although the opposite is true as individuals
have taken residence in different parts of the country either through migration (forced or
voluntary) or inter -ethnic marriage (Assefa, 2006:136).Consequently, one of the consequences
of this system happens to be change of ethnic boundary. As it has been articulated by the
integrated approach, ethnic boundaries are not fixed, but they change across time. Such ethnic
boundaries transformation might take different forms like expansion, contraction, fragmentation,
elevation, and dissolution. Some of these forms of boundary alteration have occurred in Ethiopia.
Some regional states (called Killil) have granted some groups in their territorial jurisdiction,
which are assumed to have a unique identity, special status so that they could run their own
affairs by themselves and fulfill the right to self determination as it is declared in the FDRE
constitution. The establishment of ‘special’ Zones of Wag- Himra,Awi and Oromo and ‘special’
Woreda of Argoba and Kimant of Amara region(The revised Amhara National Regional State
Constitution,2001; Argoba Ntionality Woreda establishment, 2006); the emergence of an
independent Siltie ethnicity by breaking away from the Gurage in the Southern Nations,
Nationalities and Peoples(SNNP)(Smith, 2005),the division and placement of ethnic groups
under two different regions like Boran and Dogdi groups into Oromia and Somali Regional
states(Mesfin,2006), as well as, Guji and Gedeo peoples, who were included into Oromia and
SNNPR, respectively(Asebe,2007); the conflict between Borena (located in Oromia) and
Gari(located in Somali region);finally, the Conflict between Afar(in Afar region) and Issa(in
Somali region) (Assefa,2006:136). These cases exhibit some of the mechanisms how ethnic
boundaries have changed or how ethnicity switching is taking place in Ethiopia.

3.6 Conflict Resolution Mechanisms in Ethiopia

Although the existence of various ethnic groups in a country could not explain the intensity of
conflict, once conflict occurred in such countries (particularly along ethnic lines), it is difficult or
challenging to handle it. The former Soviet Union and Yugoslavia are recent and living examples
in this case. Though arguable, several researchers still agree that under conducive political
circumstance where the root causes of conflict are identified and addressed properly, it is
possible to resolve a social conflict, which, of course, includes ethnic ones (Rugumamu, 2000;
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Gouden, 2000; Vanhanen, 1999). Wallenstein strongly argues that conflicts are solvable. He says
that if conflicts are exposed to early challenges, solutions may actually be found, even in
unexpected situations. Thus, conflicts are solvable and there are many and varied experiences of
such solution (Wallenstein, 2002: 13). Generally speaking conflict resolution is a comprehensive
term which entails tolerance, respect for other’s culture and way of life, appreciation of
differences, willingness to admit blunder and commitment to learn from past experiences, and
readiness to give and take i.e., not a ‘zero-sum-game’, where the gain of some becomes or felt to
be the loss of others.

The major conflict resolution mechanisms used in African continent is indigenous conflict
resolution systems. Customary conflict resolution mechanisms (CCRMs) in Africa are generally
closely bound with socio-political and economic realities of the life styles of the communities.
These mechanisms are rooted in the culture and history of the African people, and are in one way
or another unique to each community (Gebre et al., 2011:26). Unlike the formal justice sector
that principally targets at clear up conflicts between parties, customary conflict resolution
mechanisms are informal and aim at restoring severed relations and hence at durable community
peace. To be more specific, governmental efforts are limited to calming down the crisis without
addressing the root cause and without making sure that the inter-group conflict is transformed
from hostility to cooperation and smooth interaction. The formal conflict resolution mechanisms
often emphasize the resolution of the material causes of conflicts (resource and power are often
the focus) without dealing with the psychological and cultural traumas that often trigger
retribution. The formal system of conflict resolution mechanisms are alleged to be unsuccessful,
not confidential, time taking, not under the control of the groups in conflict, rigid, client-
unfriendly, costly, and inaccessible. It is only when potential and actual conflicts in Africa are
understood in their social contexts that they can be resolved. Values, beliefs, interests, needs,
attitudes, actions and relationships should be given due concern. Origins or the core causes of the
conflicts need to be explored so as to develop a shared understanding of the past and present.

The prevailing approach to deal with conflicts in Ethiopia since 1991 has been ethno-linguistic
federalism (Anteneh, 2013). Ideally, federalism is conceived as having the potential for resolving
conflicts. In the Ethiopian context, federalism is presumed to redirect conflicts to constructive
primes so as to rebuild the nation (Abbink, 2011; Anteneh, 2013). In the Ethiopian federalism,

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regional and local governments have been accorded the power to deal with conflicts in different
ways. The regional and local governments have the major responsibility to manage conflicts.
There are different joint forums between the federal and regional governments established in
pursuit of addressing conflicts. These include, among others, a Joint House Speakers Forum (for
speakers of the parliaments and regional councils), Educational Professionals Forum, Forum of
Dialogue between the House of Federation and each regional state, Prosecutors’ Joint Forum,
and the Council of Judges (Alemayehu, 2009). However, the roles of regional and local
governments in dealing with conflicts have been marked by some drawbacks. The understanding
of the principles of federalism by regional and local governments’ officials is one such a problem
(ibid.). Failure to develop a legal and institutional framework, the prevalence of parochial views
and localized interests and lack of capacity are the suspects for the problem (ibid.).

Different societies have developed various conflict resolution mechanisms for different kinds of
conflicts. This could range from a traditional mechanism to national and international laws and
agreements (Muderis, 2000). According to Yasin (2010), sophisticated socio-cultural, political
and economic problems that cause conflict among distinctive groups could somehow be resolved
using various mechanisms of conflict settlements so as to create a long-lasting peace and
harmony among societies through resolving the hostile attitude and achieving a respectful
coexistence. However, conflict resolution is not a process to eliminate conflict but to vastly
moderate its intensity and impacts (Muderis, 2000;Yasin, 2010).

Indigenous conflict resolution processes are part of well structured, time-proven, social systems
geared towards reconciliations, maintenance, and improvement of social relations. These
methods, processes and regulations are deeply rooted in the customs and traditions of peoples of
Africa (Hwedie & Rankopo, n.d). In the traditional African society, conflict may generally exist
whenever or wherever incompatible events occurred and may result in win-lose character.
However, the resolution, transformation and management of conflict may produce win-win
situation (Ajayi & Buhari, 2014).

As the case in somewhere else, different forms of conflicts exist in the continent of Africa too.
As Stedman (1991:369) maintains, conflict in Africa originates from problems basic to all

61
societies such as competition between different identities, the unreliable allocation of resources
and right of entry to power and differences on what is right, fair and just. In line with this,
according to Osaghae (2000:208) ‘conflict is triggered in individual, family and lineage level
among traditional ‘societies of Africa from various sources. Personal differences and
disagreement, material problems, rituals, constant competition for scarce resources like
agricultural land, grazing and settlement can be cause of dispute’. To regulate conflicts that
caused by different factors, Africans have built multitude of indigenous Mechanisms (Murthi,
2008; Osaghae, 2000; Stedman, 1991). Indigenous institutions are locally structured institutions
and functioning according to the custom and norm of the given societies (Murthi, 2008:34).
These mechanisms are used according to the specific culture of a particular community.

Exhaustive literature and studies agree about Ethiopia which is the museum of peoples with more
than 80 ethnic groups constituting and forming multinational state. Nation and Nationalities have
their own perspectives and unique cultural practice. As a result, every ethnic group as their
African counter parts have indigenous conflict resolution at grass root level to address different
types of conflict in the country. Alike other African societies, different ethnic groups of Ethiopia
had built and experienced diverse ways of indigenous conflict management mechanisms.
Ethiopia is believed to be the home for various ethnic groups. These diverse ethnic groups have
developed their own distinctive political, administrative, economic, social and judicial systems.

In Ethiopia, there are a number of indigenous institutions for conflict resolution that are deeply
rooted in different ethnic groups. These practices are serving to manage conflicts and maintain
peace and stability there by playing their role for transformation of conflicts. Indigenous conflict
resolution (ICR) mechanisms are widely used in all corners of the country, including in urban
areas where the formal justice system is strong. However, communities in rural areas prefer the
customary approaches to the formal justice system (Gebre et al., 2011: xii). ICR institutions have
served historically in the absence of the state justice system as well as where it exists in the past
and in the present. These institutions are localized and their constituency and jurisdiction are
generally limited to particular localities within ethnic groups. ICR institutions often function at
the community level, based on trust among people. They are connected with the cultural norms
and beliefs of the peoples and gain their legitimacy from the values of the concerned community
instead of the state (Assefa, 2001; Daniel, 2016; Dejene, 2002; Sisay, 2007).

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As Daniel (2016:1) stated ‘Almost all ethnic groups have developed indigenous mechanisms of
conflicts resolution’. For instance, ethnic groups like Oromo, Afar, Amhara, Benishangul-
Gumuz, Gambela, Hareri, Somali, Sidama, Walayeta, Gamo, Tigiray and others develop their
own indigenous mechanisms of conflict resolution with certain peculiar features. These features,
which comprise social traditions, values, norms, beliefs, rules, and laws, communicated and
accepted among the respective communities for peaceful coexistences. Assefa (2001:54)
described that different nationalities in Ethiopia have a developed and employed their own
indigenous mechanisms to solve different conflicts that arise due to divergence of interest and
other factors. Macfarlane (20012:88) affirms that ‘indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms in
Ethiopia are more persuasive and influence the lives of people than the formal justice system in
the country especially in remote areas from regional center’. Similarly, Tarekegn (2008:25)
explains that the ‘traditional conflict management mechanisms could help us to resolve conflicts,
reduce tensions and rebuild social relations’.

There are different indigenous institutions that play in resolving and managing conflicts in
Ethiopia(Ambaye,2008;Legesse,1973;Pankuhrst and Getachew,2008 ;Wondyrad, 2011; Zelalem
and Endalkachew ,2015; Jemal, 2012; Sisay, 2007; Tasew, 2016; Yaynshet, 2004). For instance,
Shimgilinna, (also known by other names among different ethnic groups) is a kind of arbitration
or reconciliation by elders which is widely practiced in different areas of the country. Like other
regions, the indigenous conflict resolution mechanism which practice in Amhara region is called
Shimigilna. It is the one among many ways of resolving conflicts and reconciling conflicting
parties in Ethiopia. Shemgelena is the most well known and widely practiced in different parts of
the Amhara region even possible to say in Ethiopia (Pankuhrst and Getachew, 2008).The concept
of Shemgelena denotes the process of mediation and reconciliation so as to resolve conflicts
between different parties (Wondyrad, 2011). Similarly, Pankhurst has described that ‘dispute
management mediation is often termed shimgilina a noun from the word ‘elder’ (Shimagele)
which one might translate as ‘eldering’ (Shemgelena)’(Pankhurst and Getachew, 2008:14). It
plays a substantial role in resolving and contains different conflicts which exist between
individuals, families, groups and communities in the region (Yohnnes, 2003; Zelalem and
Endalkachew, 2015). Further, Zelalem and Endalkachew (2015: 4) stated shimigilina as ‘Most

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eminent and traditional institution of the ritual Amhara in resolving conflict was shimiglina
(elder of the land) by which the service of third party is used as a means of helping the
conflicting parties to reduce the extent of their differences and disagreements to arrive at an
amicable settlement.’

Zewelde is a traditional conflict resolution institution functional for areas bordering the Afar and
Raya people (Jemal, 2012; Yaynshet, 2004). These traditional local institutions together with
formal legal machinery provide the mechanism for redressing conflict (Yaynshet, 2004). Since
conflict resolution encompasses multiple actors the role played by these traditional institutions is
vital for its goal of building positive relationships.

The Gada system could be mentioned as another indigenous conflict resolution mechanism
among the Oromo people. It is the first one in the regional state of Oromia in terms of a system
of class (Luba) that succeeded each other every eight years in assuming military, economic,
political and spiritual responsibilities in the leadership of Oromo society. There are divergent
views among scholars on the functions of Gadaa institutions. For Legesse (1973, 2000) the
Gadaa assumes military, economic, political and ritual responsibilities in the leadership of the
Oromo society. In contrast, others view the Gadaa as less politically relevant, playing ritualistic
roles only (Hinnant, 1978:234). However, Tache and Irwin (2003) argue that Gadaa is more in
line with the first assessment, although recent weakening of the institution, particularly post
1974, means that change in the influence of the Gadaa may increasingly be leading to its’
playing a more ritualistic function. Besides this, many studies explored about the socio-cultural
and political function of Gada institution which practiced in Oromia region.

In similar vein, according to Ambaye (2008), in his study of Sidama ethnic group indigenous
conflict resolution mechanism of Southern Ethiopia indicates four level of Sidama Songo, Mini
songo, Nafaru songo, Ayadu songo and Woma songo. According to these four structures of
Sidama council, a case that does not get decision at a primary council passes to the next council
and Omo songo is the final decision making structure. Yejoka is the most important traditional
conflict management institution of the Guraghe people (Sisay, 2007; Wondyrad,2010). For
instance Wondyrad (2010), in his studies on Indigenous Conflict Resolution Mechanism of

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Gurage of Southern Ethiopia, identified five structures of conflict resolution in the Gurage.
These are ye sera Dana, Ye Mura gengne Dana, Ye tib Dana, shengo and Yejoka. Yejoka is the
highest authority and provided binding and unappeasable decision on the Gurage people. The
Anyuaa community in Gambela has established a traditional conflict resolution mechanism
called Nyieya (Tasew, 2016:29). This has been established to realize indigenous knowledge for
their social interaction. Their indigenous knowledge encompasses the skills, experiences and
insights of people, applied to maintain or improve their livelihood, and handle conflicts like
homicide (ibid). This indigenous conflict resolution mechanism in general is centered on the
values of truth, justice, forgiveness, reconciliation, addressing the affected relationship,
voluntary participation and gives more emphasis for personal change above complaint behavior
(Daniel, 2016).

These indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms in general are centered on the values of truth,
justice, forgiveness, reconciliation, addressing the affected relationship, voluntary participation
and gives more emphasis for personal change above complaint behavior. Although indigenous
conflict management and resolution systems have profound roles for different aspects of human
life in different areas, they come across multiple challenges. Many literatures and studies argued
that indigenous conflict resolution mechanism in Ethiopia are neglecting by state institution and
peoples (Francis, 2013; Gebreyesus, 2012; Kelemework, 2006; Meron, 2010). In fact they are
practiced in different parts of the country. For instance, Francis (2013:43) stated the main
challenges as follows:

African traditional justice system regarded as inferior in comparison to formal

westernized judicial systems. This inferiority is resulted from subjugation of
customary law. The other is inadequate or unclear legal and policy frame-
work on traditional conflict resolution mechanisms poses a challenge to their
application in contemporary African societies including Ethiopia.

Similarly, as Gebreyesus (2012: 24) stated ‘Absence of policy direction and comprehensive laws
that deal with legislation, institutionalization and synchronization of popular customary dispute
resolution is the main challenges to their application in Ethiopia. The state neglects to support
indigenous mechanism to become popular in state institution. The references in the constitution
and the few provisions stated in civil code are limited to family and contractual relation. In

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similar vein, Meron( 2010 :63) stated ‘even if traditional mechanisms administer almost all kind
of disputes ranging from petty offences, civil cases such as financial, familial, and contractual
disputes to first degree murder cases and, they have no legal legitimacy and institutionalization’ .
Nowadays, as a result of internal and external factors, indigenous conflict resolution
institutions/mechanisms are made non functional in most parts of the continent. Formal or
government-run approaches and institutions replaced the customary systems. According to
Ofuho (1999), ‘for years the treatment of conflicts in Africa involving national armies revolved
around conventional mechanisms that have excluded the customary approaches’. But they have
little success in bringing sustainable peace and lasting security in the region.

Ethiopia has several indigenous conflict resolution institutions and mechanisms that have
survived the pressure of internal cultural domination and repressive political measures taken in
the name of modernization and nation building. There are various such institutions that have
curbed many unreported conflicts that could have otherwise damaged community bonds in that
country. However, the prevailing situation shows that there is loose collaboration, if any,
between indigenous institution and government in dealing issues in community affairs. The
governments bodies at different levels fail to appreciate collaboration and complement the
indigenous methods in any community affairs. The limited understanding of the roles played by
the indigenous institutions by the state and particularly by the new generation has diminished the
efficacy and relevance of these institutions in most parts of the country, despite their tangible and
fruitful contributions.

In sum, there are different indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms which practiced in
different parts of Ethiopia. Ultimately, besides resolving and managing the occurrences of
conflict, they build sustainable social capital in place of their birth. As many studies and
literature stated, indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms not received much consideration in
governments polices and legal laws especially in criminal matters despite they served in time
immemorial. The various indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms exist and being practiced in
different regional states of Ethiopia to resolve multifaceted or comprehensive social problems on
the ground, despite they have no legal recognition and authority to settle disputes regarding
criminal cases. The experience in different regions of Ethiopia shows that the people tend to use

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indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms for reconciliation and in order to control the acts of
revenge conflicts.

With this brief conceptual and theoretical understanding, now we will turn to a brief observation
on the setting on the context of the Afar- Oromo relation of the study area. This consideration
will enable us to have background information on the overall environs of the research. The
following chapter gives much emphasis to the political and economic setting of the study area in
the belief that it is this factor that becomes fertile ground for friendly relations as well as
incubator for conflicts.

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CHAPTER FOUR: SETTING THE CONTEXT OF THE STUDY AREA

This chapter focuses on the Afar and Oromo ethnic groups' social, political structures and
indigenous institutions; Afar- Oromo relations and their relations to the central government. The
information used in writing this chapter largely come from secondary sources. In some sections
of this chapter, whenever necessary, discussions are supported with primary data sources
generated from field work.

Firstly, a short description of the administrative structure of the study area is presented on the
basis of available information or empirical researches. Secondly, an overview of the social and
economic features of Afar and Oromo ethnic groups will be discussed. Third, major indigenous
institutions of both communities will be treated. Fourth, background to Afar –Oromo relation is
reviewed. Fifth, Afar-Oromo communities’ relation with the central government is elaborated.
And at the end, there is a brief summary. In doing so, this chapter is limited to assessing the
dynamics of the Afar –Oromo conflict and cooperation in the study area, which is in
consideration of the research objective of the study.

4.1 Administrative Structure of Afar and Oromo Communities

Afar, Somali, and Oromo belong to Cushitic language family. The Afar language - cafaraf- is
classified along with the Somali and Oromo languages within the Lowland East Cushitic
language family (Ali, 2008; Getachew, 2001a; Kebede, 1994; Kebede, 2005). Trimingham
(1976:8) also stated that ‘the Afar-Saho, Somali and Oromo belong to one of the waves of
Cushitic people […] who crossed the Bab-al Mandab 6 and the Gulf of Aden in early times into
the coastal regions of East Africa’. Another writers (Lewis, 1955; Thompson and Adolff ,1968;
and Thesiger, 1935 ) have similar views with Trimingham.

6
For the location of Bab-al Mandab (Balel-mandeb) see map 1 (Languages of North-East Africa) in Trimingham (1976:16).

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The Afar were first mentioned by IbnSa’id in the 13th century under the form or by the name
Dankal/Danakil (Trimingham,1976:171;Lewis,1955:155).The Afar call themselves cafara
umata, the Afar people, and they call their language cafar-af, and their country Afer-barro
(Getachew, 2001a:35, 49). The Afar are known by their neighbours and outsiders by various
names: Danakil by Europeans and Arabs; Adali by their Oromo neighbours; Oudali by the Issa-
Somali; Taltal by Tigre; and Adal by the Amhara and Argoba (Getachew, 2001a:49,
Trimingham, 1976:171).

In Ethiopia, with the change of government in 1991 came a new administrative structure
established on the basis of ethnic-based federalism. Prior to this period, both the Afar and Oromo
peoples in the study area were administered under Wollo province. The Oromo reside in Kalu
Awraja (sub-province), while the Afar reside in Awsa Awraja. In fact, prior to 1991, the 1987
Constitution of the People’s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia (PDRE) provided the Afar with
‘autonomous regional status’ under the name of ‘Assab Autonomous Region’, while the Oromo
remained under South Wollo ‘Administrative Region’, which was changed after 1991.

4.1.1Administrative Structure of Afar

During the Transitional Period (1991-1994) the Afar territory changed into two ways. The north-
eastern part, which is from Ethio-Djibouti border to the Buri peninsula has been incorporated
into the new state of Eritrea, and the territory extending from Berehale was made part of the
newly restructured territory of the Afar National Regional State of Ethiopia. Subsequently, the
Afar have been consolidated within one regional administration with its own powers of self-
administration in Ethiopia (ANRS, 2004b:1).

The Afar National Regional State (ANRS) territory covers some 95,266 km2 across the
northeastern part of Ethiopia (ANRS, 2004b:1). The Afar region shares international boundaries
with Djibouti and Eritrea, as well as regional boundaries with Tigray, Amhara, Oromo and
Somali National Regional States in Ethiopia. It is structured into 5 zones (sub-regions),

69
32woreda 7 (districts), and 358 kebele (villages) of which 326 are rural and 32 urban kebele 8
(ANRS, 2003:1).

Dewe is one of the woreda in the Afar Regon of Ethiopia. Part of Zone five, Dewe is located
near the base of the eastern escarpment of the Ethioian highlands, and bordered on the south by
the Borkena River, which separates it from Dalifage and Hadele Ele, on the west by the Amhara
Region of Oromo Zone Dawa Harawa District, on the north by Telalek, and on the east
by Administrative Zone three. The center of the woreda (district) is Wedarage. Dewe was the
seat of the Sultanate of Dewe, one of the Afar's traditional sultanates in the Afar Region.

4.1.2. Administrative Structure of the Oromo at the Study Area

Oromo Nationality Zone is one of the national zones in the Amhara National Regional State. It
was established in 1986 E.C.as a unit of local administration of the Oromo people, who settled
along the edge of the Ethiopian highlands that form this Zone. It is bordered on the southwest
by North Shewa Zone, on the northwest by South Wollo Zone and Argoba Special District, and
on the east by the Afar National Regional State. This is officially structured in March 1986 E.C
by splitting from South Wollo and North Shewa Zone, of the AmharaNational regional state. The
Oromo Nationality Zone was created in response to pressure from the Oromo Liberation
Front(OLF), which was actively agitating for autonomy for Afaan Oromo-speaking population
during late 1991 and early 1992 (Koti magazine,1992;Vaughan,2003:240). Four districts were
taken from South Wollo (Bati, Dewe, EsseyaGulla and Artuma) and two districts from North
Shewa (Fursi and Senbete). Currently, this Zone is re-structured into five rural administrative
woreda (Dawa Harawa, Dawa Cheffa, Artuma Fursi and Jille-Tumuga and Bati rural) and two
town administrations (Bati and Kemissie) (Oromo Nationality zone administrative and security
Department report,2006 E.C).

7
Woreda in Amharic means district. Under the current federal structure, a woreda is an administrative unit between a zone
and kebele, while a zone is an administrative unit between a regional state (next to federal state) and woreda.
8
Kebele is the lower government administrative unit in Ethiopia. Kebele peasant associations under the Derg were replaced
by kebele administrations in the post-1991 period, although, like in the past, the administrations are still run by the peasants
themselves.

70
Dawa Harawa is one of the seven woreda in Oromo Nationality Zone of Amhara National
Regional state, it is bordered on the south with Artuma Fursi Woreda, on the west Dawa Chafa
woreda of Oromo Zone, on the east Afar regional state of Dawe and Telalekworeda, on the north
with Argoba special woreda and Batiworeda and in the east bordered with Afar Regional state of
Telalek and Dawe districts. The Dawa Herawa woreda is organized into nine rural kebele and
one kebele town. The woreda was established in 1994 E.C.

4.2 Social and Economic Features of Afar and Oromo at the Study Area: An
Overview

The study area is largely arid and semi-arid with high temperatures and low precipitation. Given
the dominance of pastoralism and an ongoing shift towards settled agriculture, dependence on
rainfall is more obvious and stronger today than in the past. The region has suffered series of
recurrent conflicts, droughts and famines for the last four or more decades (UNDP, 2002; Ali,
2008). The 1984/85, 1999/2000 and2004 drought episodes in the area, described by some as the
worst in recent memory, led to numerous deaths both of human lives and livestock species
(ANRS, 2004b; UNDP, 2002).Such recurrent events in the area also led to the occurrence of
extensive poverty and displacement of many pastoralist families, which has affected all sections
of the community. The study area has also experienced a change in land use patterns i.e. from
communal grazing land use to privately use land for crop farming and grazing areas for drought
periods. The natural resource degradation is also accelerating due to the impact of population
pressure, climate change and variability, and the like. These in turn have aggravated the scarcity
of natural resources on which the pastoralists and agro- pastoralists primarily depend and such
acute scarcity of resources has led to stiff competition between pastoralists and agro- pastoralists
for access and use rights.

The Eastern Afar Region specially ‘Zone Five’ is one of the least developed and marginalized
territory of the Afar Regional State in Ethiopia, in terms of economic and social development
and basic infrastructure (PCDP,2005;Dessalegn,2007; Ali,2008;Hailu,2008). Overall, the Afar
Region is one of the least developed Regions of Ethiopia, neglected by national development
efforts (UNDP, 2002 Report). Development has usually taken the form of assimilation by the

71
central Ethiopian State and partial annexation into Ethiopia’s highland economy. Development
Scheme in the Afar Region has historically reflected the priorities of central government or
certain commercial and political interests, while the needs and aspirations of the Afar people
have been chiefly disregarded (Ayele, 1986; Kebede, 2005; Ali, 2008).

Although the Oromo in the Oromo nationality Zone of Amhara Region are predominantly
sedentary agriculturalists, they are one of the neglected peoples in the area. Like their
neighbouring Afar, their economic and social well- being is deteriorating from time to time. Both
natural calamities and governmental policies of successive regimes in Ethiopia have been
relegating the Oromo in the study area (PCDP, 2005; Dessalegn, 2007). This has exacerbated
conflict between the two communities and entangled conflict resolution mechanisms.

4.3 Indigenous Institutions of Afar and Oromo in the Study Area

The process of conflict resolution has to do with how indigenous structures and systems ensure
action in bringing peace at the individual and community level relationships. In this respect,
resolution procedures are generated from general cultural life and daily experiences of living. In
this context, the term indigenous refers to ‘the structures and units of organization in a
community and encompasses also the norms, values, beliefs and worldview that guide social
interaction’(Kendie and Guri, 2006:333). There are indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms at
grass root level to address different types of conflict in Ethiopia. Alike other African societies,
different ethnic groups of Ethiopia had built and experienced diverse ways of indigenous conflict
resolution mechanisms. Ethiopia is believed to be the home for various ethnic groups. These
diverse ethnic groups have developed their own distinctive political, administrative, economic,
social and judicial systems. As Daniel (2016:1) stated ‘almost all ethnic groups have developed
indigenous mechanisms of conflicts resolution’. For instance, ethnic groups like Oromo, Afar,
Amhara, Benishangul- Gumuz, Gambela, Hareri, Somale, Sidama, Walayeta, Gamo, Tigiray and
others developed their own indigenous mechanisms of conflict resolution with certain peculiar
features. These features, which comprise social traditions, values, norms, beliefs, rules, and laws,
communicated and accepted among the respective communities for peaceful coexistences.
Likewise, indigenous institutions do have significant role in resolving conflict whenever it
happens between/among Afar and Oromo peoples. I will elaborate this in the pages that follow.

72
4.3.1 Afar Indigenous Institutions of Conflict Resolution

4.3.1.1The clan system

Traditionally, the Afar were divided into four major sultanates, namely, Sultanate of Aussa;
Sultanate of Rahyata, 60 kms to the south of Assab; Sultanate of Biru in Tigray, nowadays found
in Afar Regional state; Sultanate of Tadjoura found in the Republic of Djibouti (Ayele, 1986;
Dahilon, 1985; Getachew, 2001a; Kebede, 1994). Each of these were again divided into many
chiefdoms. The main purpose of chiefs is to arbitrate in disputes that arise over such issues as
water and grazing resources and in return they used to receive remuneration for their service
(Ayele, 1986; Getachew; 2001a ).Historically, the Afar were divided into two groups: Asaimara
(reds, nobles) and Adoimara(whites, commoners). In turn, both comprise a variety of tribal
confederations and tribes but were not territorialy distinct groups (Lewis, 1955:54). According to
Lewis, sometimes Asaimara and Adomara clans existed as separate territorial groups but as he
further indicated most groups contain a mixture of both and the Asaimara-Adoimara cleavage
cuts across the total Afar society(Lewis,1955: Getachew, 2001a; Ali,2008).Many researchers
give different origins to the Adoimara and Asaimara where as some others trace the names of the
two groups to their respective habitats, since the names Adoimara and Asaimara mean ‘white’
people and ‘red’ people, respectively (Lewis, 1955;Trimingham, 1952).

The Afar society maintains a rigid hierarchy where each of the numerous Afar chieftaincies has
its recognized, established place in the social order; one that is based on seniority (Gamaledin,
1993: 45). All their clans or tribes are divided into sub-tribes and fractions, which are divided
and made up of related families. A clan belongs either to the Asaimara or the Adoimara or to
both 9.

Clan is the most cohesive group structure among the Afar. It is also the level at which the
strongest and most effective traditional leadership structures are to be found (Voelkner, 1974). In
Afar clan (Kedo) refers to a group of people related to each other by descent, living with shared
territory and shared common rituals and political leadership. It may comprise them ‘a few
hundred up to a thousand people and between ten and twenty lineages and sub-lineages

9
Nuru gaz Da’ato is a member of Afar-Oromo joint peace committee and resident of Gendawarina Eyeledi Kebele, Dawe
Woreda. The interview was held on May5,2014, Harawa.

73
(Dahla 10) whose number changes through time due to continuous fission and fusion (Getachew,
2001a:55). Clan leadership has legislative, executive and judiciary functions and it resolves
conflicts(Fekaduet al., 1984:22). Members of a clan cooperate in defense of their land, people
and property (Ali, 2008, Getachew, 2001a, Fekadu,et al., 1984;Ayele, 1986).

4.3.1.2 The Makaban

A makabantu is the clan chief while makaban is chiefs of various clans. The role of a Makabantu
and makaban is not that of an order-giving chief, but of an arbitrator of intra-clan disputes and
representative in inter-clan arguments and affairs (Voelkner, 1974; Kebede, 1994). The
makabantu is the representative of the clan towards everything outside the clan, be it the
government or groups of other clans, Afar or non-Afar. Clan leaders and lineage heads act as
mediators between the local government representative, the central government and the Afar.
They represent their people for everything outside their clans (Voelkner, 1974; Kebede, 1994;
Getachew, 2001a; Ali, 2008).So any affairs of the Afar will not be out of the involvement of clan
leaders. That is why the researcher wants to assess the Afar chiefdoms’ structure and working
modalities.

The position of Makabantu is hereditary in the male line; but sometimes could be appointed and
changed by an elderly elective-group (Ayele, 1986; Kebede, 1994). The criteria by which the
Makabantu is judged to be fit for a position are, for instance: one, who looks after his people,
protects his clan, who works for his people, who is a good speaker and who speaks the truth, one
who has a ‘good brain’ and is a good administrator (Voelkner, 1974; Fekadu et.al., 1984).

According to Mohammed Seid, chief of various clans is called ‘makaban.’ 11 Traditional Afar
leadership peaks at the tribal level in the position of a ‘makaban’ or chief whose powers are
relatively limited. Likewise to the makabantu, this position is hereditary in the male line. But
sometimes could be appointed and changed by an elder elective group. The role of a ‘makaban’

10
Dahla is used to refer to an extended family (Getachew, 2001a:55).
11
Mohammed Seid is member of Afar-Oromo joint peace committee and resident of Wahilona Gidale Kebele, Dawe Woreda.
The interview was held on April21,2014, Woderage.

74
is not that of order-giving chiefs but of arbitrators of internal tribal disputes and representatives
in tribal discussions (Kebede, 1994:12).

According to Mohammed Ahmed, ‘the functions of three clan leadership branches or structures
are significant in the Afar society. These include; clan leaders (Makaban), council of elders
(Daar-edola) and a sanction-executing unit (Fimaa/Finna).’ 12 Accordingly, different roles are
allocated to each lineage; a senior lineage of a clan provides political leadership of a clan and a
junior one provides ritual leadership and leadership of the sanction-executing unit (Fimaa). But
members of the council of elders (Daar-idola) andmembers of Finna are conscripted from all
lineages of a clan (Getachew, 2001a:61).

The Ethiopian successive governments have employed indirect rule to administer the Afar from
remote highlands (Ayele, 1986). A case in point is the use of Makaban as mediators between
local people and the government through promoting some of them to a status of, namely Balabat
or Chika-shum. Traditionally, Makaban are representatives of the clans towards everything
outside the clan during all Ethiopian governments. Makaban represent their clans, and contact
government, private groups and other clans (Ayele,1986; Getachew, 2001a).

During the Emperor and Derg regimes, the Afar clans, lineages and the Aussa Sultanate were
incorporated into the Ethiopian administrative structure. During the Imperial time, the Sultan of
Aussa was entitled to use the imperial title Bitwoded, and other clan and lineage heads were
given the title of Balabatand Chika-shum 13(village chief) respectively(Getachew, 2001a;
Ali,2008). After 1974, the Derg regime abolished the offices of the Sultan, Balabats, and Chika-
shum and their feudal privileges. And very similar offices replaced Imperial offices with similar
functions called representatives (Yegosa-teteri/Yegosa-tewekay), peasant associations
(GebereMahbar) 14and the position of Sultan was officially abolished. The following table

12
Mohammed Ahmed is resident of Gendawarina Eyeledi Kebele, Dawe Woreda. The interview was held on April15, 2014,
Woderage.
13
Bitwoded was the most senior title of the Imperial Government of Ethiopia, and it literally means ‘the
beloved’ in Amharic; Balabat was the title for the clan head (Kedo Abba) and it literally means ‘notable’ and
Chika-shumwas the title for the lineage head and it is equivalent to ‘village chief’.
14
Peasant association (geberemahbar) was a grassroots association of peasants mainly in settled areas. In Afar context such
association was established mainly in some agro-pastoral areas or in settled agriculture neighbourhoods during the Derg time.

75
summarizes the titles of traditional authority and titles or roles given to traditional leaders by the
previous and incumbent governments.

76
Table 1: local leadership and titles

Title given during Title/role given Current

Traditional Emperor Haile during title/role(1992 to
Title of local Silassie During the Derg present)
leaders period regime (1974-1991)
Bitwoded Sultanate was The Sultan is restored
Sultan abolished and became spiritual
leader
The Balabat was -Clan heads act as
Clan heads Balabat abolished and traditionalleaders 15
replaced by -Makabantu (some
Geberemahbar individual
leaders Mamakabans are
given advisory
position in the formal
structure)
The office of Chika- Lineage heads have
Lineage heads Chika-shum shum was replaced continued
by Yegosa-
teteri/yegosatewokay
Finaa-t-abba Yegobz-Alaka Finna-t-abba Finna-t-abba has
continued continued
Source: (i)Voelkner, 1974 ;Gamaledin 1993; Getachew, 2001a; Kebede, 2005; Ali,2008 and (ii)
Interviews with Afar key informants.

As can be seen from table 1 column 4 above, after the establishment of Afar National Regional
State (ANRS), there is an overlap of traditional authority and modern administration at the
community level. In recent years, the Kebele Administration (KA) established by the
Government represents the local community towards everything outside the clans. Most of the
‘elected KA leaders’ are not from clan leaders. In this connection some informants from my
study area reported that during the Transition Period (1991-1994) their clan leaders were to some
degree involved in local government administration when the Afar Liberation Front (ALF) led
by former Sultan Ali Mirah (the then Afar spiritual leader now replaced by his son Hanfre Ali
Mirah) was active in the Afar Region. 16 After the ALF withdrew from the Transitional
Government of Ethiopia, the informants said, office holders selected among traditional leaders

15
Kebele Administration through “elected leaders’ acts as formal grassroots government structure. On the other hand clan and
lineage heads and Finaa-t-abbacontinue their traditional function in parallel to Kebele administration. In fact some hand-picked
Makabanare given a status of “advisor on Afar culture’ (Yebahil-Amakari) in the formal structure.
16
Tefera Teshome is expert in the administrative and security Bureau of the Afar National Regional State. The interview was
held on May 11,2014. Sumera.

77
were gradually replaced by individuals affiliated to the Afar Peoples Democratic
Organization(APDO) 17. Currently, it seems that the role of Makabantu as intermediary between
the Afar and the state authorities is being taken over by ‘elected Kebele leaders’.

The traditional authorities also function at clan level without interfering into the activities of
Kebele Administration. Clan leaders and elders mainly manage and resolve conflicts through the
AfarAda (customary law). They handle mainly conflicts over resources (pasture, cultivable land,
watering points); conflicts resulting from adultery/rape, theft and robbery; clan rivalry,
andConflicts related to Absuma 18.

Although the formal government administration is set up at the grassroots level, the local people
still pay more attention to the traditional authorities (clan leaders, elders and religious leaders).
As Afar group participants affirmed that the source of authority for elected leaders in
government offices, is by chance (i.e. not inherited from traditional source of authority) and
leadership position is temporary, whereas the clan leadership is life-long’ 19. Nurgaz Daato
reported that ‘formal administrative posts are filled mainly with youths who give less weight to
the Afar Ada, namely Afar customary law.’ 20

Traditionally, the community members often put more trust into clan leaders and view them as
true representatives towards everything beyond their community. Obviously, the Afar heed to
clan leaders rather than to the elected kebele authorities. This suggests that the Afar want to
maintain thefull involvement of their traditional leaders in the modern administration and
particularly in conflict resolution. This issue is further elaborated in Chapter Five of this study.

As table 1 above shows, in spite of the integration of the Afar people into the Ethiopian
administrative structure for such a long time, traditional authority structures and the clan

17
APDO came into existence shortly after the fall of the military regime. It is supposedly supported by Afar who were formerly
part of Tigray province and is an EPRDF affiliate. Considering the close ties between APDO and EPRDF, it seems that APDO
largely represents the interests of the country’s ruling party, instead of the interests of the Afar (Ali, 1998:113).
18
It is cross-cousin marriage in the Afar community.
19
Group discussion with Afar, DaweWoreda, discussion was held onMay2, 2014.Woderage.
20
Nuru gaz Da’ato is a member of Afar-Oromo joint peace committee and resident of Gendawarina Eyeledi Kebele, Dawe
Woreda. The interview was held on May5,2014, Harawa.

78
authority of the pastoral clans have undergone little transformation. Although the authority of the
Sultanates was undermined during the military rule, 1974-1991, the authority of clan leadership
has been largely maintained. This owes partly due to the resistance of Afar and the policies of the
governments of Ethiopia that stressed the indirect rule through the traditional authority of clans
(Ali, 2008; Getachew, 2001a). After the downfall of the Durg, the Sultan is restored and became
spiritual leader of the Afar people.

Therefore, it can be said that traditional Afar leadership at grass-root level peaks at the clan level
in the position of Makabantu. Clan is still the most cohesive group structure among the pastoral
Afar. It is also the level at which the strongest and most effective leadership structures are to be
found. All clans are divided into sub-clans (lineages) which are made up of related families. A
clan belongs either to the Asahimara or the Adohimara or to both. Each clan is headed by a clan
chief (Makabantu) with over all prescribed functions and powers. However, his powers are
shared and controlled by the elders of the clan. Decisions are usually made by the elders together
with the clan chief (Voelkner, 1974; Kebede, 1994; Ali, 2008).

4.3.1.3 The Sultanates

The sultanate of Afar is a feudal –type political and territorial institution super imposed upon the
tribal hierarchy and the sultan shares his power with a ‘vizier’ 21 and a council composed of the
group of sub-tribes who make many of the major decisions (Thompson and Rechard, 1968:7).For
many centuries, the north-east part of the Ethiopian Afar land has been an area where a number
of big and small Sultanates evolved and declined (Getachew, 2001a:35).In the Afar society, there
exist foor major sultanates, namely sultanate of Tajura (the most senior), Aussa, Birru and
Rahayta (Thompson and Rechard, 1968:7). The first lies in Tajura within the territory of
Djibouti, while the sultanates of Aussa and Rahayta lie within the territory of Ethiopia and
Eritrea, respectively, and Birru in Ethiopia. Sultanate of Rahyata is located 60kms to the south of
Assab. But some writers including Dawe sultanate raise the number of major sultanates of Afar
to be eight (Dahilon,1985, Kebede,1994). The sultanates of Tajura and Rahyta passed under
European domination, but Aussa remained independent and its influence extended over all
southern Dankalia. There are also Dawe and Biru sultanates in the Afar Region. Biru sultanate

21
A high official or chief councilor in some Muslim countries, especially, in Turkey under Ottoman rule.

79
presides in the northern part of the Region while the Dawe sultanate is found Eastern part of Afar
region (Dahilon, 1985) where the study area is situated. The Sultanate of Dawe is one of the
existing Afar traditional authorities based in Zone Five of the Afar National Regional
State in Ethiopia. 22

4.3.2 Oromo Indigenous Institutions of Conflict Resolution

The indigenous systems of conflict resolution in Oromia of the Oromo people is the Gadaa
system, an institution developed for guiding the social ,political, economic and religious lives to
the Oromo people in Ethiopia and for managing resources , as well as, contribute to conflict
resolution among individuals and communities.

In the Oromo Administrative Zone of Amhara National Regional State, the culture of
indigenous conflict management institutions and rules have been existing for a long time. The
customary rules that exist in Oromo community are unwritten agreements that have evolved
within the Oromo community over generations. Although, it bears no formal institutional
structure the implementation of Abagar, Aba-Aga and Dubarti over seen by community elders.

4.3.2.1 Abagar

The first and foremost institution of conflict resolution in the Oromo community is Abagar.
Abagar is a person who knows many things in the Oromo community of Dawa Harawa. He is the
one who is trusted by the community, and has a lot of wisdom to resolve or manage conflicts.
Abagar tries to resolve conflicts or blood feuds by way of reconciliation using /Guma/
(compensation for the victim) during or after conflict takes place. Not only conciliation making
at the conflict, but also he is supposed to maintain sustainable peace in the area which he resides.
When conflict occurs in the area, Abagar intervenes to stop the conflict in collaboration with his
famous elders. Abagar with his elders’ converse the two conflicting parties and after conversed,
he delivers verdict. The person/group/ who is found guilty will be punish and make
compensation for the victim/victims. The intension of the punishment is teach a person who

22
Ahmed Ali is chairman of Gendawarina Eyeledi Kebele administration, Dawe Woreda. The interview was held on April15,
2014, Woderage.

80
made mistakes and also for others to refrain from such actions. Both compensation and
punishment made by Abagar upon the guilty, will not initiate the victim and culprit for revenge.

For sustainability of peace, the two parties take a promise and crossed on the Abagar Qotii
(Kotti) i.e Abagar’s stick, which is respected by the people. Mostly, the promised locally called
Balli; the person, who could not apply the Balli, culturally condemned and implicated, as well as,
ignored and sanctioned by the communities, and lives alone according to the culture. Then, the
Abagar has taken a great role to managed conflict (Qotii Magazine, 1992 E.C: 27).

4.3.2.2 Aba’Aga

Aba’Aga is particularly important in rural areas where the presences of modern political
institutions are weak. However, even in urban areas with local administration in the case of
Dawa Harawa, the traditional conflict management in the community’s clan locally called Aba-
aga and Abagar. Aba-aga, with his elders, is a person who punishes the one who made mistake
in the villagers, according to traditional rules existed in the communities. The authority of Aba-
aga, with his friend judges, play greater role to support in the process of reconciliation, mediate
or arbitrate communities who have disagreed. In the community, it exists as culture until
recognized nowadays by the Government (Qoti magazine, 1992).

4.3.2.3 The Dubarti

Dubeti are group of women who are respected and prestigious in the community. Dubarti are
elderly women in Wollo who have seized or handled stick like Qotii on their hand. They are the
one who are loved and spiritually respected by the people especially in Wollo culture. Their
Qotii/stick/ is highly respected among the communities. Dubarti qotii is instrumental and famous
in praying to God for the cases of individuals and common interest of communities. Not only
praying, but also, they have a great role in resolving and managing conflicts between
individuals, even communities or clans. They are culturally respected and known in the local
communities, the prayer of dubarti in Wollo locally called as wedaja or du’a. After entertained
food and coffee, in a wedaja/ Du’a, they will make different prayer to God spiritually. They pray
in unity with singing of anthem like. The role of dubarti in the study area has great role in order

81
to resolve or manage conflict between individuals, even between groups (Kotii magazine, 1992:
27).

In general, the contribution of Afar-Oromo indigenous conflict resolution institutions in conflict

resolution is very high. Traditionally, Afar and Oromo communities in the study area have elders
who are resolving disputes among the groups or individuals. They are tactics full and have
methods of following to solve the conflicts among the disputers. They have daily information
gathering systems in the community for what situations happened and dealing with each other
how to make a decision and resolve the problems. As a result, these indigenous conflict
resolution institutions such as Abagars, Aba-aga, clan’s leaders, religious leaders, and the
famous elders are towards indigenous conflict resolution have a great role to resolve Afar –
Oromo ethnic conflicts at the grass root level. They have acceptance in the community since they
are from their community, accessible and less costly compared to modern institutions’ way of
resolving conflicts. The common social values, use of marketing and marriage linkage between
Afar- Oromo communities of the study area help for resolving conflict smoothly between the two
communities, However, Afar- Oromo customary institutions are still facing with problems of
enforcement, lack of modern knowledge to adapt globalization; bring the guilty people to the law
and also women do not involve directly in mediation, reconciliation and arbitration of traditional
conflict.

4.4 Background to the Relation between Afar and Oromo Communities in the Study
Area

During earlier periods, Afar –Oromo relation in the study area is characterized by both
cooperative and conflictual relationships. Many of their relations were peaceful, with few
sporadic conflicts. As participants of focus group discussions of both Afar and Oromo narrated,
in the past, relationship between the Afar-Oromo was good. They love and like each other and
their relations were strong except some sporadic conflicts. During earlier times, there was
demarcated territory for both the Afar and Oromo even though they were residing in Wollo and
Dawe Rahmedo same province and woreda, respectively.

82
In support of the above sheik Ahmed Abaye 23 said that there was clear territory with a buffer
area that separates the two ethnic groups. Who owned a specific land when and how was known
during the Imperial and Derg periods. Afar as an Afar and Oromo as an Oromo do have their
own territory in which they were living, which was in line with their culture and traditions. With
this in mind, let us see some of the cooperative and conflictual relationships that have made
between the two ethnic communities.

4.4.1Cooperative Relations

4.4.1.1 The Incursion of the Issaa against the Afar

There are many issues that bring Afar and Oromo communities together in the study area.
Among those issues the major ones are; standing together against external foes that try to
encroach both of them, (namely standing together against Issaa and Wajjirat incursions and
central government), social- cultural ties, economic relations and common market places.

In the past, Afar and Oromo were standing together whenever attacked by neighbouring
communities. During the time of Hale Selassie, they fought together against the Issa-Somalis.
Mohammed Bodaya was the local governor of Dewa Harawa, Artuma Fursi, JilleTimuga, areas
up to Cheleka River in the north. In the past, there have been conflicts with Issa- Somalis to the
East. To stop the incursion of Issa-Somalis in Afar territory, Afar and Oromo fought together
against the Issaas. The Issas during Haile Selassie period were in conflict with the Afar. Both
Afar and Oromo went for war against Issa as their common enemy. When the Issas forces
became beyond the capacity of Afar in a fight, then Afar sought Oromo support. As key
informants explained ‘there was a traditional instrument known as Embilta 24 in which they
whistle to the neighbouring Oromo seeking support in the fight against the Issa, when the Oromo
heard the war signal i.e. whistling Embilta, they were running to rescue the Afar from Issa’s
incursion. Together they used to repel Issaas through their combined force’. 25 This shows that
Afar and Oromo did have cordial relation between them at the time. Nowadays, there is no, as

23
Shiek Ahmed Abaye is resident of Harawa town, Dawa Harawa Woreda. He is from respected family in that local area. The
interview was held on June 12, 2014, Harawa town .
24
Traditional Ethiopian whistling instrument that serves to call for gathering the local people around by producing big sound.
25
Mohammed Awol is administrator of Medine Kunyo Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on
June21,2014, Bora town.

83
such, standing together to withstand the Issaa incursion. However, this shows that the possibility
and chance to revitalize the Afar- Oromo cordial relation.

4.4.1.2The Incursion of Wajjirat against the Oromo and the Afar

The Afar and the Oromo were attacked by the Wajjirat from Tgray in the early 1920s (Ali, 2008;
Oromo informants).The incursion of Wajjirat was devastating on both the Afar and Oromo
communities. Mohammed Ahmed narrates as follows 26:
During our childhood looking after cows, we heard from our fathers about the issue of
Wajjirat. We had information from our fathers when we were child looking after cattle.
When we asked the cause of the conflict in history, Hiale Selassie had allowed
administration on self- autonomous basis for local provincial governors. Tigray was self-
autonomous,Wollo was self-autonomous Administration. These two provinces were
autonomous self- administration during Haile Selassie. Wajjirat were sent from Tigray to
punish Wollo. Many Afar and Oromo were killed by Wajjirat, who were under wollo
administration. Afar escaped and went to Cheffa around Kemissie fearing the attack of
Wajjirat. At that time, there was only one modern weapon i.e.firearm which was the
property of Mohammed Bodaya.

This also shows that they did have common enemy-the wajjirat that brought them together to
resist the incursion. They were mobilized by the local chief Mohammed Bodaya to fight not only
the Issaas but also the Wajjirat. And also this local chief was treating both Afar and Oromo
equally in serving justice.

On similar issue, Ahmed Ali recalled the several intrusions made by neighbouring groups in the
study area in the past five or more decades. 27 The intruders raided livestock and killed members
of the study communities i.e. both Oromo and Afar. The Wajirat from southern Tigray used to
come to the area and attacked both Afar and Oromo. Specially, various clashes occurred between
Afar and Wajirat in the locality. Around early 1920s E.C the Wajirat raided many livestock,
killed Afar and kidnapped children (Ali, 2008; Afar key informants). The Wajirat were able to
reach to the present zone three and Oromo nationality zone. The Mohammed Ali narrates that 28:
The intruders particularly the Wajjrat were involved in killing persons and raiding
livestock. The Wajjirat raided animals, killed persons, and cut males’ testicle in order to

26
Mohammed Ahmmed is ex-chairman of Medine Kunyo Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on June21,
2014, Bora Town. According to Mohammed, Mohammed Bodaya was the local governor of Dawa Harawa, ArtumaFursi,
JilleTimuga, up to Cheleka River in the north, within former Wollo province.
27
Ahmed Ali is chairman of Gendawarina Eyeledi Kebele administration, Dawe Woreda. The interview was held on April15,
2014, Woderage.
28
. Mohammed Ahmmed is ex-chairman of Medine Kunyo Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on June21,
2014, Bora Town.

84
impair males’ reproductive capacity. One time the Wajirat invaded large Afar area and
reached up to Bäadu located in the current zone three of the Afar region – near Gewane
town. At the same time the Wajirat also attacked Oromo.

Both the Afar and the Oromo cooperated to counter attack the Wajjirat’s incursion to their
territory, one reason is the Wajjirat are common enemies for both Afar and Oromo groups, who
come from far distant area of Christian community. Secondly, both the Afar and Oromo were
under same local administration and who follow similar religion, i.e Islam.

4.4.1.3 Afar- Oromo Social and Cultural ties

Marriage

During the older times, the Oromo females were married Afar males. The Oromo did this
believing that Oromo-Afar marriage will bring peace between the two groups, by strengthening
their relationship. This was aimed at to establish strong relations with the Afar neighbours. When
there was inter- marriage there could be peaceful relation between the two ethnic groups.
However, Afar did not allow their females to marry the Oromo. When they are asked their
females for marriage to Oromo, they were not volunteers because of the Afar culture- Absuma
(cross-cousin marriage).

However, living in peace as a result of inter- marriage with respecting each other is in jeopardy
after the taking power of EPRDF. There have been claims and counter claims of lands / farms/
between the two ethnic groups. As the Afar have been pastoralist they are demanding grazing
land by leaving lands unplowed for grazing purpose, turning farm land to grazing land. For
example, according to Mohammed Ali ‘at present time, two Oromo villages, Uchiru and Haro
which were lands of the Oromo before, have been taken by the Afar through their expansion into
the Oromo territory. These two places turned to forests/ grazing land/ from being Oromo farm
land’. 29 On the other side, the Afar claim these places as their own grazing areas. 30
Religion

Islam is a major convergence between Afar and Oromo communities. Both Afar and Oromo in
the study areas are entirely Muslims. In history, Islam had a profound base in the present day of

29
Mohammed Ahmmed is ex-chairman of Medine Kunyo Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on June21,
2014, Bora Town.
30
Ahmed Ali is chairman of Gendawarina Eyeledi Kebele administration, Dawe Woreda. The interview was held on April15,
2014, Woderage.

85
Oromo Nationality Zone in particular and Wollo in general (Bahru, 2002). Dawa Hrawa is a
place where many Islamic centers flourish during the Imperial periods. Even Sultan Ali Mirah,
the former Afar Sultan, had attended Kura’nic school in the former Dawe Rahmeto vicinity now
in the Oromo territory (Kebede, 2005:34).

In the Afar community, some 40 years back, Koranic students and Sheiks were very few,
although the clan members were followers of Islam. 31 There were only few Sheiks who learnt
Kuran in the neighbouring Oromo community -located in the present Woreda Dawa Hrawa of
Oromo Zone of Amhara National Regional State. According to the Adem Husssein the ‘Sheiks
who run the Koranic schools in the Afar territory came from the Oromo locality’(ibid.). The Afar
started strictly to follow the pillars of Islam some 50 years ago (Ali, 2008:134).

Perceived contribution of Koranic education helped to establish cooperation and close relation
with the neighbouring communities (Oromo) who were rivals prior to the Koranic teaching. The
informants felt that expansion of Koranic teaching brought harmony between Oromo and Afar. It
also has facilitated economic and social relations. In the past (i.e some 30-40 years ago) both of
them were involved in raiding animal and killing each other. One cannot move safely from one’s
locality to the other. As teachers of Koranic schools are expanded to Afar area to teach children
and the Afar’s children go to Oromo area to attend Koranic schools, the two ethnic groups came
into close ties through sheiks and students. The sheiks from Oromo locality went to Afar area to
teach children and to attend religious ceremonies. At this time they received animal gifts for their
religious services and as Zakat 32.This has enhanced cordial relation between the two
communities.

All these interactions and exchanges led to establishment of friendship, common attitudes, even
intermarriage among those who interact particularly, the Koranic teaching that disapproves
killing and animal raiding or stealing, has inculcated in the minds of clan members from both
groups taught to their group members(Ali 2008:134). This has reduced the killing and animal

31
Adem Hussein is resident of Gendawarina Eyelendi Kebele, Dawe Woreda. He is a member of Afar-Oromo joint peace
commitee. The interview was held on June 12, 2014, Harawa town .
32
zakat [Arab., purification], Islamic religious tax, one of the five basic requirements (arkan or “pillars’) of Islam.

86
raiding by the two groups. Before the full involvement of government, religion has played a
great role in reducing killing and animal raiding (Ali, 2008; Oromo and Afar key informants).

As a result of this, the two ethnic groups have formed complex social networks to support each
other both in good and bad times. First, during Haile Silassie time Sheiks were very few. Thus,
the Koranic School that started in Afar area had contributed to the increased number of sheiks.
Second, it helped to introduce principle of Islam and other obligations that the community
members to observe and fulfill (e.g. paying Zakat, praying five times a day, fasting during the
months of Ramadan).Third, it also helped learn Oromiffa, Afaraf and Amharic languages, which
helped the Afar and Oromo to communicate easily with each other while visiting markets,
moving stocks to each others’ area during drought and summer times. It helped some Afar and
Oromo to be tri-lingua. And fourth, at individual level Koranic education also created for
individuals to get job opportunities when they move to areas where Koranic teaching is valued
(Ali, 2008:139).

In general, the expansion of Koranic teaching into the area contributed for the establishment of
social capital that the local people mobilized to security and access to economic and social
services with their neighbouring communities. This shows how far the Afar and Oromo do have
ties in terms of religion that can serve for resolving their conflicts.

4.4.1.4 Afar- Oromo Economic Relations

Economic relations between the two communities take different forms including leaving
livestock in the Oromo community, Tekhisa (friendship), and common market places. These are
some of the major economic ties between Afar and Oromo communities. These economic
transactions had been established and functioning for years.

Leaving livestock in the Afar and Oromo communities

When the Oromo face shortage of grass, they send their stock to Afar and the Afar do the same.
They did this when they face shortage of grass and water. This animal trusting depends on
seasonal availability of grass in respective locality. During rainy season the Oromo send to Afar

87
and during dry season the Afar take their animals to the Oromo. Renting out oxen for grain in
neighbouring communities had been a common practice in the study area. Oromo, are the first,
compared to others, to rent in oxen for grain. This practice has been longstanding strategy used
by the herders to get access to grain produced by sedentary Oromo cultivators. However, the
magnitude has been decreased in the recent years, for two reasons: The Afar lost their oxen or
bulls due to drought. Thus they lack oxen to rent out for grain. The Oromo who seek oxen for
rent have been reduced since they are also affected by recurrent drought. Their crop cultivation is
affected by lack of rains and crop pests. Thus they refrain from renting in oxen. It can be through
neighborhood, marriage relation or other gave for exchange of grain (Ali, 2008, Oromo key
Informant interviewed April 2014).

Friendship (Tekahisa 33)

Afar-Oromo friendship (Tekahisa-in Afar language means friendship) is based on certain

economic and social advantages. The required characteristics of a person for being a candidate
for friendship include; trustworthiness, firm stand, reliability and non-hesitant. Thus establishing
of Tekahisa needs prior assessment of potential friend through asking other persons who know
closely about potential candidate. Friendship establishment is made in the presence of the elders.
There is friendship between Afar and Oromo. They support each other. The Afar give cattle and
the Oromo provide grazing access or grain. Afar can get access to secured place through his
Tekahisa in the Oromo territory. They also support each other by leaving cattle under the care of
each other. Friendship is inherited by children and inheritance of friendship is respected.
Through this mechanism, the Afar leave their stock under the care of the Oromo friends. This is
mainly facilitated through friends at the individual level. This is being practiced though it is
reduced in scope due to impact of drought in both communities. The Afar also get access to
grazing areas through their Oromo friendships in the Oromo areas. This had been an important
tradition, which has been practiced for years between the Afar and the Oromo communities in
the study area. This can be taken as one way to strengthen cordial relationship between the two
communities. It can boost Afar –Oromo ties by prevailing over conflictual relations between

33
In Afar af (Afar Language) Tekahisa mean friendship with non -Afar individuals.

88
them. Furthermore, this kind of friendship also serves as cover against external attack. For
example, according to Ali Hassen 34:
Oromo Liberation Front (OLF) had been active in the Oromo Zone of the Amhara
National Regional State. It had recruited youth from the Oromo Zone and tried to attack
the neighboring Afar who were suspected them of collaborating with government soldiers
who operated to remove OLF fighters from Oromo Zone in 1989EC. At this time, the Afar
who had friends from Oromo were protected. Because, they had prior information
through their networks and protection from their friends. Thus, such Afar did not even
leave their area while those without friends evacuated their area. Before the attack, the
Afar were opposing the construction of a house at the border areas of the two ethnic
groups. Because they suspected the construction as claiming land or expanding
settlement, though the OLF supporters claimed that the house is a mosque to be used by
both groups. But the Afar were not convinced about it. Thus they destroyed the house.
After this the OLF was not in good term with Federal government and the Afar. This is in
attempt to eliminate the OLF operation from the Oromo zone the government soldiers
came through the Afar side and opened an attack on the OLF soldiers. As a result, some
were killed and some were arrested and the remaining ones run away. Then after, the
government withdrew the soldiers, some remnants opened an attack on the neighboring
Afar, because they considered the Afar as collaborators with the Federal Government.

This entails that close friendship (Tekhesa) between Afar and Oromo individuals helped to
rescue hiding each other (Afar and Oromo) in the study area whenever there has been adverse
activities of dissent groups like OLF against the Federal Government. This meant Afar Oromo
friendship is more than anything else during awful times. This also can be taken as one
manifestation of Afar culture for having enhanced strong ties between their Oromo neighbors in
the study area.

Common Market places

The visit to the local and weekly markets in the neighboring communities depends on price
situation and specialization of the markets. The Afar prefer to visit markets which offer good
prices for livestock and cheap price for the grain. If one market is good for livestock as a whole
or one type of animal, they frequently visit such markets. They also follow the same criteria for
visiting market while they need to buy grain from neighbouring Oromo.

In the light of the above consideration, Afar often visits Bora, Harawa markets of Dawa Hrawa
woreda in the Oromo Nationality Zone. During my field visit, I have observed many Afar

34
Ali Hassen is chairman of Kilentina Derseda Kebele administration, Dawe Woreda. The interview was held on April26,2014,
Woderage.

89
marketing with the Oromo at Harawa and Bora towns in the Oromo territory. During peaceful
time, the Oromos also went to the Woderage market of Dawe Woreda.

In general, Afar –Oromo Relation is manifested in the study area first, exchanging economic
resources, for instance first, renting oxen; second, exchanging local products, e.g. Oromo
exchange traditionally woven cloth for goat or cattle. In fact, these days, these neighbours are
affected by recurrent drought and this has impact on the reciprocal relation and support since
resources are eroded in both communities. Third, intermarriage: it was rare in the past. They
started intermarriage because the highlanders move into the Afar community. Then intermarriage
between Afar and non-Afar began gradually. Fourth, Conflict: in the past they use forests and
water points communally. There is conflict on the use of such resources.

Above all, the Afar and Oromo are from Cushitic family that binds them together compared to
the Amhara and the Argoba in the area. So, in many ways, their links are higher compared to
their differences. This might create a fertile ground to resolve their conflicts.

4.4.2 Conflictual Relations

According to Oromo and Afar group discussants, in the past, the Afar and Oromos were killing
each other like acute enemies. During earlier times, they were killing each other not mainly on
land issue. Rather it was due to their culture. 35 Conflict occurred in some cases due to cultural
attributes (Dessalegn, 2007; Ali 2008). The high tendency of Afar and Oromo intruders for
killing persons was attributed to some belief systems of the past. In the past someone who killed
a person was appreciated, respected, considered as brave and given precedence in provision and
social occasions. Girls praised such persons while singing and dancing during social occasions.
On the other hand, persons who did not kill were rebuked through traditional songs, and given
lower status and disregard in social occasions. This cultural reward to killing encouraged
individuals for killing whenever they clashed with others for one reason or another. Thus, killing
was mainly geared to non-immediate members of their respective communities.

35
Group discussion with Afar, Dawe Woreda. The interview was held on April 19,2014, Woderage and, group discussion with
Oromos,DawaHarawa Woreda,. The interview was held on June 19,2014, Bora.

90
The other reason for conflict has been related to competition over grazing land and territorial
claim by other groups. The Oromo are predominantly sedentary cultivators taking animal raising
as secondary activity. The Oromo want to clear more land for farming, and need to make
enclosures for their animals. Besides, though a recent practice, some Oromo cut trees for
charcoal making. The Afar on their side, claim such land as their domain and do not want the
expanding of Oromo groups. Likewise, the Oromo complain that the neighboring Afar encroach
into their farm lands and enclosures. 36 Therefore, such competitions over resources lead to clash
between these neighbouring groups. In recent years, given the scarcity of resource in both
communities, competition over resources has been very tense (Ali, 2008; Bekele, 2010). In the
past good days, conflict related to use of resources was minimal, since there were enough for
both groups (ibid.).

The dynamic Afar-Oromo historical relation has been friendly except some sporadic conflicts.
As mentioned above, there are many similar social, economic and political issues that bind
together the two ethnic groups. These create a fertile ground for resolving conflicts easily when it
arises. However, as time goes on and the changing political and socio-economic dynamic of the
two ethnic groups in particular and the country in general, relation may not continue as before.
The gravity and magnitude of conflicts have been escalating depending on changing
circumstance on the ground. By and large the prime responsibility is left for the government.
This will be more elaborated in Chapter Five of the Thesis.

4.5 Afar-Oromo Relations with the Central Government

4.5.1 The Afar’s Relation with Central Government

In terms of political, cultural, and economic aspect of Ethiopia both the Afar and Oromo in the
study area have been at periphery. There was rivalry between the central government and people
in the periphery. This was due to, on the one hand, the motive of central government for effective
control of these populations, and on the other hand the resistance of the population in the
preservation of their culture and autonomy. Particularly Muslim Oromo in Wollo were rivals to
the Imperial Government of Ethiopia towards the end of the Nineteenth century (Bahru,

36
Yesuf Hussein is resident of Oromo elder Orene selama Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda . The interview was held on June 21,
2014, Bora town.

91
2002:48). Imperial forces who came from Shewa also attacked persons and slaughtered animals
for consumption and came rarely and did not tend to raid animals (Ali, 2008:141).

Historically, the Afar have had a complicated relationship with the central government and their
neighbors. Trimingham (1976:172) noted that ‘the Aussa Sultanate was comparatively free from
raids from the highlands and the Abyssinian power until the time of Emperor Menelik II when,
as a result of its Sultan having formed treaties with the Italians, it was invaded in 1895 by the
Shewan army and forced to pay tribute’. Another explorer (Thesiger,1935) has similar views
with Trimingham. He stated that "the Afar country has never been effectively conquered by the
Abyssinians, who are highlanders, unsuited by nature to operate in those hot and feverish
lowlands" (Thesiger, 1935, quoted in Kebede, 1994:29).Therefore, according to these sources,
the Sultanate of Aussa remained independent and unpenetrated by the central government of
Ethiopia until 1944 37 .

Since the early 1940’s (i.e. during Emperor Haile Silassie’s time) the relation between the
Imperial Government and the Aussa Sultante had changed. In 1944, an Ethiopian expedition was
sent against Aussa on the grounds of the insecurity of the trade-routes, and its Sultan
(Mohammed Yayo) was captured and brought to Addis Ababa where he died whilst in captivity.
One of his relations, Ali Mirah was appointed as the Sultan of Aussa. However, the Imperial
Government’s attempt to directly administer Aussa through centrally appointed governors was
challenged by Sultan Ali Mirah and his supporters. Thus, the central government resorted to
indirect rule through appointing local chiefs (Balabat). At that time, the relationship between the
Sultan of Aussa (Ali Mirah) and Emperor Haile Silassie was largely smooth. In relation to this
Kebede (1994:33) stated as follows:
…. after a little-known Boha Revolt by the Sultan in 1949 when he decided to exile
himself to Boha- a small village near the border of the Republic of Djibouti - an
agreement was made between the Ethiopian government and the Aussans. […] this
agreement served the interests of both the central government and the Aussans. The
Emperor was aiming to incorporate the then French territory of Afar and Issa. Hence,
to the central government the long-term objective of the agreement was to use the
Sultan as mediator to influence political conditions in that area. The Sultan was also
careful to normalize relations with the Emperor for the role the Emperor could play in

37
Clapham argued that “Ethiopia as a whole did not have a centralized administration until after the end of the Italian rule in
1941, when attempts were made to set up a civil and military bureaucracy’ (Clapham, 1988:24; Kebede, 1994:29).

92
influencing or determining who should take power when the opportunity presents itself.
This was a lesson the Sultan learnt from the Emperor's role in his coming to power in
1944. Both Sultan Ali Mirah and the Emperor needed to have smooth relations with
each other. The Sultan was practically a semi-independent Sultan, having a direct
access to the central government. For the Emperor, for anything to be done in Aussa
the Sultan's prior consensus was important.

Therefore, following the agreement between Emperor Haile Silassie and Sultan Ali Mirah, after
the brief revolt of the Sultan at a place called Boha, the Ethiopian governor was removed from
Asayita. Governors, henceforth, were to administer the Aussa district from their remote base at
Bati town in the highland. The Sultan who had complained about restriction of access to the
Emperor was given such access and he was promoted to the position of 'chief’(Balabat) and then
Bitwoded (the beloved). This later ushered the era of indirect rule, because other Afar leaders
were subject to this new overlord (Gamaledin, 1993:53).

Although exploitation was in its rudimentary stage and not widespread, there were some
dominant chiefs who were ‘first among equals’. In relation to this some authors stated that the
Afar had Sultanates resembling feudal kingdoms (Fekaduet al., 1984:18). According to the Afar
key informants from the study community, the Chiefs (Balabatoch) during the Emperor time
were ‘exploitative’. 38 At each level the Afar had to pay tax to their respective chiefs
(Balabatoch) and each chief to the higher level leadership.

On the other hand, during the Derg rule, Sultanate was officially abolished in 1974. This led to
the weakening of the political power of the Afar (Helland, 1980, Assefa, 1995; Kelemework,
2000; Gamaledin, 1993, Ali, 2008). After 1974, the Derg regime abolished the office of the
Sultan, clan leaders (Balabatoch) and the lineage heads (Chikashum) and their feudal privileges
(Getachew, 2001a:64). At the same time, the relationship between the Derg government and the
Afar society deteriorated and became very hostile as the central government pursued
aggressively expanding state farms in the Awash Valley and the militarization of the region on
the grounds of security and to suppress insurgent groups from Tigray, Eritrea and the Afar
Region as well.

38
Muheyta Mohammed is member of Afar –Oromo joint peace committee and resident of Kilentina Derseda Kebele, Dawe
Woreda. The interview was held on April125,2014, Woderage.

93
Following the coming to power of EPRDF in 1991, the Aussa Sultan was restored
(Getachew,2001a:35). The father of the current Sultan, Hanfre Ali Mirah (i.e. spiritual leader) of
the Afar is Sultan Ali Mirah reinstated. As stated earlier, subsequent to the 1991 political change
in the country, the Afar have their own Region covering a vast area in north-eastern part of
Ethiopia. The establishment of this self- administration, which was long-desired by the Afar, is
viewed as a positive measure. In fact, it has yet to yield fruit by bringing the entrenched
economic, political and ecological marginalization of the Afar society to an end.

4.5.2 Oromo’s Relation with the Central Government

In the study area, the Oromo relation with the central government had been hostile particularly
towards the end of the nineteenth century (Ahmed, 1994; Bahiru, 2002). This part of former
Wollo province was known as a centre of Islam, where the religion had strong base. Due to the
expansion of Islam in Wollo in the second half of the nineteenth century, Ethiopian Imperial
Government of Emperor Yohannes IV was not in good terms with the people in the area.
‘Muslims in Wollo were told [by Imperia Government] to renounce their faith and embrace
Christanity’ (Bahru, 2002:48). On the same issue, Oromo key informants expressed ‘Especially
Emperor YohannesIV waged several wars against Muslim Oromo in the area to convert [them]
to Christianity’. 39 There had been bloody wars waged by Imperial government against Muslim
Oromo, which were ‘characterized [as] devastation and massacre’ (Bahru, 2013:49). In this case,
Oromo tried to ally themselves with the Afar to withstand the pressure exerted from the central
government. For example, the renowned Muslim leader of the time in the area, Sheik Tolha
Jafar ambushed in the Afar territory as a result of strong force he had encountered him from
Emperor Yohannes and King Menelik(ibid.).

In the early twentieth century, both the Oromo and Afar were loyal peoples to Lij 40 Eyasu. As a
result, hostility between Emperor Haileselassie had continued. The hostile situation had been
augmented when Oromo attempt to kill Crown Prince Assfa wossen Haile Selassie when he was
returning from Dessie to Addis Ababa in 1958 waiting him in ambush on the road side at
Chaffa(Ahmed,1994:3).This attempt annoyed the Emperor and the Royal Prince, who then

39
Hussein Mohammed is resident of Dire Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on June 16, 2014,Harawa
town.
40
Lij(son) meant offspring of Royal family before having title rank in Ethiopia.

94
ordered punitive force to the area to retaliate the culprit. This military expedition was sent to the
area in the name of restoring law and order. The force was led by Colonel (later) General Abebe
Gemeda. At the time, the area had fallen under military administration in the sense of state of
emergency. General Abebe who was heading the administration had restructured different
districts taking from both Wollo and Shewa provinces in 1958 (Ahmed, 1994:3). Thus, the sub-
districts of Gemza and the Oromo section of Wagamma(Efrata) from Shewa and the Wollo sub-
districs of Arthuma, Daway Rahmado and EssoyeGula were brought together to form what was
called Ye Jarra Awrajja Ye Tor Aggezaz(Ye Jarra sub-province military administration) with
Qechicho 41 town as its centre. As a result of harsh suppression by the Military administration,
there had been many sufferings of the Oromo. Many were killed and tortured. As one Oromo key
informant in Kemissie town narrated, the situation in Amharic:
አርጡማ እና ፉርሲ ባመ ጣ ከዉ እዳ

አርጡማ አንጨት ስበር ፉርሲ ዉሃ ቅዳ

ባሳር አይለቅህም አበበ ገመዳ

This meant, as Artuma and Fursi Oromo made an attempt to kill the Crown Prince passing
though Cheffa from Dessie to Addis Ababa and revenge had come from the Imperial
Government of Haile Selassie, so no mercy at all unless Artuma gather fire-wood and Fursi fetch
water for the soldiers of General Abebe Gemeda. This entails more; how far was the Jarra
Awrajja military administration was suppressive. This sub-province (Awrajja) was dissolved in
1964 at the end of the state of emergency with the various sub districts going back to their
original administrative divisions.

It is apparent that the Oromo specially felt hemmed in between the Afar pressing on them from
the low land in the east and the Amhara from the western foothills of the Menz
plateau(Ibid,113). As Ahmed further noted ‘general lawlessness and various dimensions of
ethnic conflicts i.e.Amhara vesus Oromo; Oromo versus Afar; Afar versus Amhara; and internal
conflicts among the Oromo and the Afar themselves actually became chronic features of the
region throughout [ 1941-1974] the period.’ As informants from both Afar and Oromo revealed
‘the central government sides with the Issa when the two are in conflict’ it also ‘sides, with the

41
Qechicho town is found in Artuma which was a centre for Jarra sub province military Administration (Ye jarraAwrajjaYe tor
Agezaz) 1958-19640 (Ahmed, 1994:3).

95
Afar when Afar and Oromo are in conflict.’ The interest of the government is that securing the
Addis Ababa –Djibuti railway to the port of Djibouti which crossed the Issa territory and the
Awash valley big government projects which are found in the Afar Region. As the Oromo key
informants reported the government authorities are telling us ’the Afar are pastoralists while we
are farmers the one who are better than Afar in many ways’. The Afar key informants also blame
the central government as it sides with Issa when conflict arise between the two by saying that
‘the Issa are living in arid area without water points for their cattle while the Afar are living in
the Awash valley where there are many water points compared to the Issa -somali‘. This shows
that the Oromo were not heard by the government when they raise their grievances in relation to
the Afar. In the same token, the Afar issues are not properly addressed by the Federal and
Regional governments in relation to the Issa –Somalis.

The central point here is that the central government of Ethiopia in one way or another has been
affecting the relation between the Afar and Oromo communities through its policies in the study
area. In its policy at a time, it may side the Afar while disregarding the Oromo at another and
vice versa. So the particular local issue cannot be seen out of the wider political dynamism of
Ethiopia.

As it had happened elsewhere in the peripheral peoples of Ethiopia, the relation between the
central government and the Afar- Oromo in the study area had been characterized by conflictual,
though it is sporadically. Both the central and local authorities didn’t fully understand the exact
causes and forces behind these isolated cases of the two ethnic groups. They didn’t have the right
kind of administrative machinery, know-how, and wisdom to give appropriate and effective
response to the sensitive undercurrents of dissatisfaction between the two ethnic communities. It
is very clear that the seriousness of the explosive situation in the area had been understood but
the central government has given less attention. But, it was unable to get to the roots of the
problem and it couldn’t bring about a lasting solution to the almost to the continuous unrest in
the area. In the next chapter we will explore the major root and triggering causes of Afar-Oromo
conflict in the study areas.

96
CHAPTER FIVE: CAUSES OF AFAR- OROMO CONFLICT

This Chapter deals with the causes of Afar-Oromo ethnic conflict in the bordering Woreda of
Dawe of Afar Regional State and Dawa Hrawa of Amhara Regional State of Oromo Nationality
zone. Understanding the causes of ethnic conflict through scientific inquiry is indispensable to
ethnic conflict prevention, management, and resolution endeavors (Dejene, 2001:1). Causes of
conflict are so diverse and intertwined that they cannot be reduced to a single factor. Likewise,
the conflict in the study area is a result of various variables, including social, economic and
cultural factors. These factors can be dealt separately in two major categories, namely, root and
immediate causes of the conflict.

5.1 Root Causes of the Conflict

5.1.1 Contested Boundary

After the overthrow of the military regime (the Dergue) in 1991, Ethiopia was restructured into
new administrative units. Accordingly, the country was divided into essentially nine ethnically-
based regions. Before the redrawing of the new administrative map the country, Afar and Oromo
lived together in the same province (Ali, 1998; Yasin, 2008).Interviewees of both sides
unanimously explained that they are intermarried with each other, and lived together for years
sharing resources mutually. However, the post-1991 administrative structure split the people that
had lived together into different regions. Likewise, Wollo Province was divided into Amhara and
Afar regions. Consequently, intra-boundary is created and commonly shared resources are
divided between Afar and Oromo of Amhara region. After this restructuring, gradually, the
previous common lands become hot points of competition and conflict. In connection to this
Anuar Yesuf comments 42:
….both Afar and Oromo raise border claims; none of them agree on the border,
rather they came up with contradictory border. Oromo do not accept what the Afar
put as border. Similarly, Afar donot agree on what the Oromo accept as line of
delimitation. Both claim the same land but different boundary. There is
competition even among woreda officials and regions. Their competition is
reflected by the people, and now the competition is turned into conflict.

42
Anuar Yesuf is an expert of conflict prevention and resolution in the office of administration and security , Dawa Harawa
Woreda. The interview was held on June10, 2014,Bora.

97
According to interviewees and focus group discussants boundary is also used as a cover to
achieve economic and political goals. There is competition for power and fame in the name of
border. Furthermore, interviewees confessed that border is politicized and used for economic and
political benefits mainly by woreda and kebele administrators. Elites use border issue to mobilize
the people for different purposes and give political interpretation. ‘Protecting regional border is
equated with protecting national border. Expanding border and claiming new land becomes a
fashion; when you see the rivalry, it does not seem that we are living in one country.’ 43 In the
post-1991 Ethiopia, border rivalry becomes too stiff; regional boundary is seen as national
boundary. Ethnic elites politicize it and use it for both economic and political ends. In this
regard, Mohammed Ahmed stated as follows 44:
In the pre-1991 period, despite ordinary conflicts over water and pasture which
were resolved through traditional conflict resolution mechanisms, Oromo and Afar
used land commonly. No questions of border; no competition to control land just like
now; no politics of border at all. However, after the coming of the issue of border,
previous common lands become hot point of competition. This means politics of
border started and the conflict takes political shape.

Contested territorial boundary is the major cause of conflict in the study area. The main reason
for the Afar-Oromo conflict in the study area is absence of demarcated border. There is no clear
demarcation of boundaries between Dawa Harawa and Dawe Woreda. This unclearly defined
territorial boundary has been one of the sources of conflict between the two ethnic groups. Thus,
there is feeling by both communities that dispute is inevitable unless a clear boundary
demarcation is made to separate the two Woreda in general and Dire and Gendawarina Eyelendi
Kebele in particular. 45 This holds true with the argument of Sisay (2007:7), which denoted
‘Ethnic- based regional boundaries and non-clarity resulted in the separation of ethnic groups.’
Similarly, the absence of clear demarcation of boundary between Dawa Harawa and Dawe
Woreda, instigates conflict in Dire area. In the border of the two Woreda an area called Dire

43
Mohammed Awole administrator of Medine Kunyo Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on June21,2014,
Bora town.
44
Mohammed Ahmed is resident of Gendawarina Eyeledi Kebele, Dawe Woreda. The interview was held on April15, 2014,
Woderage.
45
Anuar Yesuf is an expert conflict prevention and resolution in the administration and security office , Dawa Harawa Woreda.
The interview was held on June10, 2014,Bora.

98
(specially, Uchiru, Mandibo and Haro villages) is a highly contested place because of its
potential for irrigation 46 .

During earlier times, though they were residing in same Woreda, which was named as Dawe
Rahmado, there was demarcated territory for both the Afar and Oromo. There was clear border
between Afar and Oromo, i.e., who owned what and how and the territory of each group was
known. Both of them had their own territory in which they were living in accordance with their
culture and traditions. Nowadays, however, there is no clear demarcated border between the two
communities.

As a historical border issue between Afar and Oromo in the area, narrated by Mohammed Awol
as follows 47:
During Haile Selassie period, provincial governor was Dejazmach 48Birru- whose
centre was at Rike( place found south of Kemissie town), and the then Governor of
Wollo Province. Subsequently, he was governor of both Afar and Oromo who reside
in the study area of the Province. During that period, Afar and Oromo were in
conflict. Once upon a time, all people living in districts of JilleTimuga, Artuma Fursi
and Dewe Harawa were called for meeting by Dejazmach Birru to resolve the
conflict arose between Afar and Oromo, resulting from border issue. He gathered all
these people together asked them one by one: the Afar were asked where their
border was visa-viz the Oromos? The Afar said that ‘starting Bati following the
Asphalt road to Kombolcha Town, then turning to south towards Shewa Robit,
Debresina and turn to the east up to Mejjit areas, and below this line is Afar
territory’. He also forwarded same question to the Oromo? The Oromo replied
‘starting from Terrena (a place near Mille) the road to Addis and from Geleha (a
place above Mille ) then stretches to north up to mountain Gurale (Worebabo, South
Wollo), then turns to west to the two lakes , i.e., Ligo Haik and Ardibo that extends
our territory. After they said these, Dejasmach Birru said that ‘both of you are liars.
I can confidently, tell you your border where is, as follows’. In a place where there
are trees, as trees can serve for building short fence, and also furrowed and terraced
lands, these places is Oromo territory. If it is Afar territory, we can see trees, which
are longer and dense, and no terracing or furrow lands as well. Then, he told both of
them ‘you have to limit yourself to this territory.’ after this authoritative decision, no
claim and counter claim, as the Governor decided their border. So, this shows where
had been the border of Afar and Oromo in history. During that period, government

46
Mohammed Ali is resident of Dire Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda. Relatively, Dire kebele is place where there is high intensity
conflict between the two ethnic group. The main reason for such acute conflict is that the area is irrigable land. The interview
was held on June12, 2014, Bora Town.
47
Mohammed Awole administrator of Medine Kunyo Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on June21,2014,
Bora town.
48
Ethiopian Imperial and traditional- feudal, military, and administrative rank below the rank of Ras.

99
authorities were giving decisions by punishing the violators of their orders. They
were responsive to any problem. Nowadays, though, the problem is known by
government authorities, there is problem of violating the decision of government
authorities on both sides and the government could not stop it.

This is because of failure of the local government authorities to take final and firm decision on
those who create problems on both sides. In regard to this Mohammed Ali claims that 49:
If government is determined, measures of punishment would be taken on both Afar
and Oromo, then problem would be stopped. But, what the EPRDF Government is
doing that begging the guilty. Simply, government officials beg the Afar who violate
the law. So the government is lenient in this case. This pleading of the government
has nothing to do for the maintenance of peace and stability in the area. It is a
counterproductive on the situation and it does not bring solution for both sides.

On the other side, Afar maintain that, after the taking over of power by EPRDF, there happen
claims and counter claims of lands between Afar and Oromo in the area. This is due to the
Oromo farmland expansion on the grass lands found between the two communities. 50 During the
Transition period the border conflict between the two communities was intense since the attempt
to delimit ethnical-based administration has raised awareness about border (Abinnk, 2012; Ali,
2008). Each group has coveted to include some key resource areas into their domain. Areas,
which were used jointly prior to 1991 political change in Ethiopia, were equally coveted by both
traditional users. Muheyta Mohammed said that the conflict was all along the border stretching
from Semu-robi to Raya i.e., along the hillsides and escarpments 51 (See the map on page 16).
Muheyta also further remarked that the Oromo leaders were involved and claimed land up to the
Awash River. In the past, some individuals from the neighboring Oromo used to go to Afar
territory to look after their livestock and then received animal in exchange for their labor. But,
nowadays such practices have been rare. This show how far labor migration, let alone
relationship between the communities in the study area, has been negatively affected as a result
of the new political dynamic of Ethiopia.

49
Mohammed Ali is resident of Dire Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda. Relatively, Dire kebele is place where there is high intensity
conflict between the two ethnic group. The main reason for such acute conflict is that the area is irrigable land. The interview
was held on June12, 2014, Bora Town.
50
Ahmed Yayo is head of administration and security office of Dawe Woreda. The interview was held on April 14, 2014,
Woderage.
51
Muheyta Mohammed is member of Afar –Oromo joint peace committee and resident of Kilentina Derseda Kebele, Dawe
Woreda. The interview was held on April125,2014, Woderage.See also Ali, 2008:131.

100
The Afar pastoralists are demanding grazing land for their cattle, even by turning Oromo farm
land to grazing land. For example, as the Mohammed Hassen 52 reports:
In 2001 E.C, places namely,Uchiru, Gedabura and Haro of Dire kebele which were
lands of the Oromo in the past, are taken by the Afar through their expansion into
the Oromo territory. These places become forests/ grazing land because of being
unploughed farm land. If we go to these places claiming that these lands are our
forefathers, conflict will arise with the Afar.

In 2001 E.C., when conflict had happened, the federal and regional governments looking the
situation in depth, had made attempts to solve the problem through various means such as
through joint peace committees and elders and religious leaders. Specially, regional governments
continuously struggling to settle the problem. However, as the case is the issue of borderland, it
has been crucial. According to both Afar and Oromo Informants, the Ethiopian Regions ( kilil)
do not have clear territory 53. As this is the case, i.e., all regional states of Ethiopia are without
delimited borders. Both Afar and Oromo are Ethiopians without demarcated border. As this the
case in relation to the Afar –Oromo border area claim, the views of Oromo on the relation
maintained with Afar, and trust they have with their representatives, Hussein Mohammed
comments as follows 54:
We treat the Afar as our good neighbors; we treat them politely when they
approach us. We show them good conduct, when they are hungry, we give them
food by inviting them here in our territory. With this situation, tolerating each
other, we are living side by side as nieghbours. This is without expressing our
internal feelings considering other issues of neighbourhood. Then, slowly they
reconcile with us. But, in doing this, when we see the feelings of our people
(Oromo), they say to us ‘you are not enabling us to bring back our farm land
occupied by the Afar’. The people (Oromo) are losing confidence and tell us we are
losing credibility.

In response to his fellow Oromo, Hussein in JPC 55 further said that:

We (Oromo) and Afar are not equal in many aspects. We are not equal with Afar.
We are better educated compared to the Afar. So, we have to teach them little by
little as they are pastoralists. It is unnecessary to quarrel with them. They are our
neighbors, so neighbors live in tolerance. Above all, the Afar do have problem of

52
Mohammed Hassen is a member of Afar –Oromo joint peace committee and resident of Wocheka Kebele, Dawa Harawa
Woreda. The interview was held on June15,2014. Harawa.
53
Focus Group discussions of Afar and Oromo separately conducted in Harawa with Oromo on May17, 2014 and in Woderage
with Afar on April28,2014.
54
Hussein Mohammed is chairman of Afar- Oromo joint peace committee and resident of Dire Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda.
The interview was held on June 16, 2014.Dire.
55
Joint Peace Committee composed fifty representatives from each Oromo and Afar ethic group.

101
outlook when it comes to us. God (Allah) says that neighbors should live in peace
by tolerating each other.

In earlier times, the two communities were living in the same Woreda and Province, Dawe
Rahmado and Wollo respectively. Hussein Mohammed reports that 56:
In older times, the situation was not like today’s conflict. During earlier times,
Afar and Oromo were killing each other not on land issue. Rather, it was due to
their ‘backward’ culture. Conflict occurred, mainly due to cultural differences.
But, after the re-structuring of the Ethiopian State into Federal arrangement on
ethnic lines, i.e, national regional states, conflict between Afar and Oromo has
been escalated in the area. It is after re-structuring the Ethiopian state into
ethnic federalism that conflict between the two ethnic groups becomes severe.
The Afar in Afar National Regional State and the Oromo in Amhara National
Regional State brought claims and counter claims on land issue.

The Oromo informants told me that they have been planning to organizing individuals who are
jobless and landless persons and, returnees from Arab countries to plow the land, which had
historically been the Oromo land. But, fearing that conflict would arise, they have abandoned
their plan not to let them in conflict with the Afar. Conflict arises as the Afar prevent the Oromo
from ploughing the land. Conflict occurs, though the Woreda administration organize 'peace
committee' constituting from both sides. When Oromo farmers want to plough the land, Afar
prohibit the Oromo not to plough the land, in a pretext that their camels will not have grazing.
The Afar say ‘don't plough the land’. So the Oromo refrain from ploughing the land fearing that
conflict will escalate. At present, I observed that the land is not ploughed. It has been left un
ploughed and only the Afar camels are using the grass and the bush.

During the previous period, the Afar did not bother whether Oromo plough the land or not. The
Oromo would plough the land up to they can. This indicates change in mode of production, i.e.,
from herder to mixed cultivation especially small-scale irrigation. During Haile Selassie and
Derg periods, the Afar did not practice farming land but now they want to farm the land in
addition to grazing their cattle. The Afar instead of ploughing, they were trying to feed their
cattle even the crops of the Oromo. So there have been changes in the Afar way of life, i.e., from
pastoralists to mixed ones (both pasture and farming). In the past, the Afar did not halt Oromo

56
Hussein Mohammed is chairman of Afar- Oromo joint peace committee and resident of Dire Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda.
The interview was held on June 16, 2014.

102
when they want to plough land. But, nowadays they are barring ploughing land, specially, in the
border areas. As a result conflict arises between the two ethnic groups.

In the study area, the conflict arises because the Afar occupy Oromo land by burning the houses
of Oromo. Afar claim over Oromo land is unabated. Even they want to occupy more lands from
the Oromo territory, for example, from Dire, Medine and Urene Selama kebele of Oromo
Woreda. After the conflict, there had been conflict settlement. There have been property damage
and killings from both sides. Conflicts were settled in conferences through help of sheiks and
elders, that has been agreed by both, the Oromo to plough the land, but to date the land is not
ploughed. The Afar refused to allow the Oromo to plough the land by saying that ‘we died
because of this land, we will not give this land to the Oromo’. Contrary to this, the Oromo are
saying ‘you died in the Oromo land not in the forest or on your land. So, why you disallow the
Oromo to plough the land which, is not yours? Seid Abdu told reports that 57:
I do have many hectares of land in the conflict area of Dire Kebele. For example,
thirteen hectares of irrigable land which was mine, left empty and unploughed. This
is in Dire Kalu village. This land is near the border of Dawe Woreda. Dire Kalu
Village a place where conflict is severe with Dawe Woreda- adjacent to Dire Kebele
of Dawa Hrawa Woreda. Another place Huluka irrigable land is not ploughed.

After conflict resettlement, both groups agreed that the Oromo plough the land which they had
been ploughing previously. Though the land is not ploughed to date. Agreement was reached
through the help of clan leaders, elders and sheiks but no solution to date. The Oromo are
blaming the Afar as ‘disobedient to the law’. As Seid further remarks:
We are in need of peace. So we retrain from ploughing the land fearing that violence
will be recur (escalate). But we are paying tax for the land to date even though we
are not benefiting from it, we do have holding right certificate given from the
government. The government did not exempt us from tax even though we are not
ploughing and benefiting the land.

In connection to this, Endris Mohammed, who is a member of joint peace committee of Afar and
Oromo, he ordered all Oromo in that area not to plough the land until peace is maintained or
some other viable solution is made. 58 However, in some neighboring areas of Afar and Oromo,
the Oromo are ploughing land with the permission of Afar. It is only in one place, i.e. in Dire

57
Seid Abdu is resident of Dire Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on June 16,2014 ,Dire.
58
Endris Mohammed is resident of Ourene selama Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda. He is member of Afar-Oromo joint peace
committee. Interview was held on June16,2014, Bora Town.

103
Kebele Gerebura place that the Afar refuse to allow the Oromo to plough the land. For example,
according to Afar and Oromo focus group discussions, in Medene and Urune Selama Kebele
the Oromo are plaughing the land. No significant measure is taken by the government, only the
two groups were told by government officials to be calm and stay in caution without stopping
their work. In regard to this, Endris Mohammed said that: 59
The government is blaming us as instigators of conflict, which is not actually true.
We are awaiting the measures to be taken by the government. The Afar took our
land and prevented us from ploughing it. We lost our land. The Afar burned our
houses and their cattle graze our crops. They are ordering us to pay tribute for
Afar Region, which we refused. We are saying that starting from period of Haile
Selassie, we have been paying taxes to the highland authorities (former Kalu
Awuraja (sub-province)) not to the Afar low land authorities (former Aussa
Awuraj (sub-province)). We have never paid tribute to them. We lost our land
because of conflict between Afar and Oromo. As a result of the recent conflict
more than 12 Oromo died. Mendibo village was totally burned by Afar. Another
village which suffered Afar raid is Haro. At Haro village there were more than 300
Oromos. The Afar looted Oromo properties; even government institutions (like
school furnitures) were ransacked.

As reported by Mohammed Aliyu 60, Afar boldly claim that ‘there is no Oromo between Afar and
Amhara’. In conformity to this, Nuru gaz Da’ato said ‘in the past there was no Oromo in between
Afar and Amhara area. In the area, only Afar and Amhara are neighbours. Only Afar and
Amhara’ reside side by side in the area. 61 The reason why the Afar are saying this is due to
failure of the government to demarcate the border between Afar and Amhara Regional states. As
a result, Afar continued pushing up ward to the highland and the Oromo stop there in their
confined territory lacking anywhere to go. In contrary to the Afar position, Yasin Ahmed claims
that: 62
In the earlier times, we were together and it is our forefathers’ land that we are
claiming. The land is our forefathers' land from the earlier times to date. We are
not claiming Afairs' land, it is ours, which is inherited from our fathers. It is the
Afar who are pushing us upward to the highland even during the times of our
fathers. They were pushing us by taking our land. As we did not get anybody to
push up ward to the highland, which is deep inside Oromo territory, we ended here.

59
Endris Mohammed is resident of Ourene selama Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda. He is member of Afar-Oromo joint peace
committee. Interview was held on June16,2014, Bora Town.
60
Mohammed Aliyu is resident of Medine Kunye Kebele,Dawa Harawa Woreda.The interview was held onJune20,2014,
Harawa.
61
Nuru gaz Da’ato is a member of Afar-Oromo joint peace committee and resident of Gendawarina Eyeledi Kebele, Dawe
Woreda. The interview was held on May5,2014, Harawa.
62
Yasin Ahmed is resident of Harawa town, Dawa Hrawa Woreda. Interview was held on May 12,2014. Harawa.

104
As a result, conflict arises and this happens, when the Afar try to evict the Oromo from their land
further to the highland, they are no more to go out of the area where they settled because land is
occupied densely by other Oromo deep inside the Oromo Nationality Zone of Dawa Harawa
Woreda. The Oromo are in such grief situation. Because schools are looted, students are out of
school, they couldn’t build houses. They are living under tree shades and bush. Still now, their
land is not returned. They lost their irrigated land. They do not have enough food to eat, even
when they ask support no body dare to support them. They are living hopelessly. One can see
the situation on the ground what is happening. They are waiting for anybody who can restore the
previous situation.

According to Mohammed Awol, government authorities are saying to the people ‘farmland is
farmland while grazing land is grazing land. He further reports that 63:
they are seriously demanding their territory but no government body dared to show
their territory. Even the Afar are claiming land further extending deep inside the
Oromo territory. When we asked the government officials (Woreda and Zone) they
do not give us any concrete solution. We apply for the Oromo Zone and woreda
government officials but they said us ‘it is up to the Regional States’. We kept silent,
seeking solution, but the Afar are mapping a territory including our land- even the
Afar refused building roads in Dire Kalu village which was formerly our farm land.
The Afar are preparing map that shows inclusion of the Amhara or Oromo territory.

The Oromo claim that they are severely in problem with the Afar. They argue while it seems a
peaceful situation actually it is not. The Oromo focus group discussants said that ‘Even at this
joint militia trainees' graduation ceremony the Woderage (Dawe Woreda Center) Afar officials
do not come to the militia trainees’ graduation ceremony. It is only Telalak Woreda Afar
representatives come there for the ceremony. They are taking Oromo land piece by piece every
year. This shows they don’t have trust on the Afar even when they come together for a certain
agenda such as in carrying out a common project like joint militia training in Harawa 64 in June
2014 .There is fear and suspicion between the two ethnic groups mainly because of contested
boundary.

63
Mohammed Awole administrator of Medine Kunyo Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on June21,2014,
Bora town.
64
This is a Joint Millitia Training carried outskirt of Harawa Town in Dawa Harawa woreda.The trainees are from Dawa
Harawa woreda of Oromo Nationalty Zone and Telalak Woreda of Afar Region. At this Millitia trainees graduation cermony, I
was invited by government officials to award certificate for trainees, as guest of honor which I made short remark on the
occation.

105
When seen in the framework of theorethical perspective, primordialists argue that conflicts are
rooted with ethnic markers. Ethnic attributes by themselves become the source of ethnic tensions
through the feeling of in –group and out-group mentality. Afar and Oromo had lived peacefully
for many years except sporadic water and grazing clashes maintain their ethnic differences. After
the introduction of ethnic–based federalism, conflicts become more violent and identity based.
However, elites used ethnicity as a factor of mobilization for the sake of power and reputation.
Therefore, instrumentalist argument that ethnic elites aggravate conflicts for economic, social
and political agenda best explains the recent Afar-Oromo relation which exhibits ethnic conflict.

5.1.2 Competition over Grazing Land and Water points

Violent conflicts are usually associated with deterioration of natural resources. Natural resource
depletion can be caused by intertwined factors like population explosion, poverty, environmental
degradation, and decline of local resource management (Abrha, 2012; Atsibha, 2014). Bekele
(2010) argues that inter communal clashes are associated with scarcity of pastoral resources and
the decline of environmental space. Similarly, in the study areas, competition over scarce grazing
lands and reserved resources bring Dawa Harawa Oromo farmers and pastoral Dawe Afar into
recurrent clash sometimes to the extent of bloodshed. For better understanding of this issue, let
us further divide competition over resources, one of the causes of the conflict in the area, into
two categories viz. competition for grazing land and competition for water points.

Conflicts among the two ethnic groups frequently arise due to competition over grazing land and
waterpoints. Mostly, the Afar pastoralist community and to some extent the Oromo farmers
follow a seasonal migratory pattern that has long been recognized as a way for searching pasture
and water. Since the economic basis of the two communities is highly dependent on agriculture
and livestock rearing, they enter into conflict when their economic practice cannot sufficiently
sustain their needs for reasons of natural scarcity. Although animal rearing requires water and
pasture, both ethnic groups in the study area do not have sufficient access to those resources due
to their scarcity. The problem here is the difficulty to explain /measure the scarcity and if this is
the real issue when viewed against the others such as territorial issues discussed above. Hence,
during periods of drought, the Afar pastoralists who inhabit arid land migrate with their livestock
to lands of Oromo to use available resources for their animals. However, this competition often
results in violent conflicts. As an informant from Oromo Nationality Zone Administration and

106
Security Affairs Department stated, competition over grazing land is one of the major issues that
leads the two ethnic groups to enter into conflict. Usually, members of the two communities
living in adjacent areas enter into conflicts when they meet on grazing lands. In addition, there
are situations in which the Afar made their cattle feed the straws reserved by the Oromo farmers.
In such cases, violent conflicts erupt between the two groups. 65

In the study area, initially, rainfall has been uncertain, which, in turn, results in loss of grass on
which cattle depend. Specially, of the Afar side, this in turn led to loss of cattle, which were
regularly moved to various grazing areas of the contested areas and Oromo territory. In this case,
conflict between Afar and Oromo arise and elders and local administrations try to resolve
conflicts. Besides, both groups have been claiming lands at the border to put under their
respective domain. The Afar said that ‘they have traditional use rights’, while the Oromo said the
‘land is vacant and have the right to expand their farming in to such area.’

The Afar pastoralists move from place to place in search of pasture and water for their animals
under the direction of their clan leaders. The orders of the clan leaders are strongly respected. If
they are encouraged by their clan leaders, they can even infringe private properties and feed the
reserved pastures of Oromo farmers including, straws, crops, protected forests and the grass,
which is only open for oxen, to their livestock. 66 Similarly, Yesuf Mohammed told me that, due
to over grazing of protected forests and grazing areas by Afar cattle, heavy damage occurred to
the environment in the Oromo areas. As to him, Afar move their livestock to the reserved
pastures, protected forests, and crops on the farm lands and most of the time they perform such
wrong deeds at night and it is one of the causes of the conflicts between the two ethnic groups. 67

On the other hand, Mohammed Seid from Afar claimed that ‘they did not intentionally encroach
crop’. He stated that ‘due to their large number, sometimes animals may enter into the reserved
areas by being out of the control of herders’. He also added that ‘Oromo prevent us feeding our
camels in forests, they also prevent us pastures. We are Ethiopians, if there is shortage of pasture

65
Suleiman Mussa is Chairman of Wahilona Gidale Kebede administration, Dawe Woreda. The interview was held on
April118,2014, Woderage.
66
Mohammed Awole administrator of Medine Kunyo Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on June21,2014,
Bora town.
67
Yesuf Mohammed is resident of Dire Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on June 16, 2014, Dire.

107
in our area, we should not let our animals die but Oromo prevent us from using resources in their
localities and we enter into conflict’. 68

During earlier times, there was common grazing land for both Afar and the Oromo in which both
keep their cattle for grazing. Nowadays, when farmland is turned to grazing land, which was
Oromo land before, the Afar are claiming that land as it is their land. The Oromo also claim the
land is their fathers’ farm land; there is no reason why Afar would take this land, which is not
theirs. The Afar prohibit grazing land not to be ploughed rather it should be served for grazing
their camels and cattle. Afar are saying ‘the land should be unploughed, it should be grazing,
land not farmland’. 69

The cause of the conflict is that when the Afar bring their camels to the Oromo farm land during
crop season and destroy their crop. So, in connection with this, conflict arises. What the Oromo
do have, as an alternative, is to prevent Afar camels from grazing their crop because the Oromo
need peace at the expense of their crop damage. Even if Afar are sending their camels to the
Oromo farm land repeatedly they are keeping away their animals not to destroy their crop. 70 In
the past, when Afar livestock was large they caused damage on crop of neighboring sedentary
Oromo cultivators. This led to conflict between Afar pastoralists and Oromo farmers. But, Afar
focus group discussants claim that nowadays this is not a problem. The livestock number and
movement have been reduced and, moreover, the existing livestock are weak to encroach into the
neighboring areas. 71 But, the Oromo counter part who specifically consider this as unacceptable
and false claim. 72

On the other hand, the Oromo have attempted to resolve the problem by allowing the Afar to
graze their cattle in the Oromo territory such as in Cheffa 73 wetland during dry season and also

68
Mohammed Seid is member of Afar-Oromo joint peace committee and resident of Wahilona Gidale Kebele, Dawe Woreda.
The interview was held on April21,2014, Woderage.
69
Ali Tuahir is resident of Dire Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on 16, 2014, Dire.
70
Ahmed Endris is resident of Wocheka Kebele,Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on May 27,2014,Harawa.
71
(Afar Focus group discussion conducted on April 19, 2015, Harawa.)
72
(Oromo Focus group discussion conducted on June 12, 2015 Kemissie.
73
Cheffa is a marsh area and wet land located in the Oromo Nationalty Zone.It is a place where many Afar and Oromo cattle
rescued from recurrent drought in the region. Cheffa grazing area was good before 1991 E.C in terms of grass(Afar and Oromo
informants). During wet season, it was flooded. During dry season it is good grazing area.Now adays, most of it is converted into
farmland(Ali,2008;Oromo and Afar informants).Thus, it created problem of access to grazing for Afar in dry season or during
drought.

108
the Oromo to graze their cattle inside the Afar territory during rainy season. The Afar move to
escarpments found in the Oromo locality where some leaves and trees are available to feed their
cattle. Afar animals are to be moved to Cheffa in search of grass. While they have been in Cheffa
small rain might fell. Thus, the Oromo tell the Afar to withdraw their stock from their locality.
As a result, the Afar are forced to return, even if it might not rain in their locality. The relation
between Oromo and Afar deteriorates, as the Oromo expell the Afar from Cheffa, after rain
showered in Cheffa valley because it is time for cropping for the Oromo. 74 Cheffa grazing area
was free access before 1983 E.C. Both Afar and Oromo used these areas for grazing during
drought time. Due to recurrent drought and expansion of farmland by the Oromo, the Cheffa wet
grazing area gradually shrank and grassland became scarce. During dry season, animals rely on
crop residues. After rainy season, flooding is minimal and Afar and Oromo use these grazing
areas in Cheffa. In some ways, the Oromo do not oppose the Afar in using these areas, since they
take their cattle to Afar localities during wet season for grazing. When these areas are flooded
and fields are planted, Oromo also take their cattle into the Afar areas for grazing in manner of
reciprocity. 75

Competition over water points between the two ethnic groups is another source of conflict. The
competition reaches its climax during dry season. Since there is scarcity of water resources in the
area, the two ethnic groups compete to get access to water resources. Cattle herders from both
sides need to make a queue for watering their animals in the same river. During this time,
however, the absence of tolerance between cattle herders drives them into conflict. For instance,
a river called Dawe is found between the border of Dawa Harawa and Dawe Woreda.There are
also Afar who carry out small scale irrigation at Dawe River. The river is totally dependent on
rainfall. It has much volume of water only during the rainy season. At this time, both groups can
water their animals. But in the dry season, the amount of Dawe River water dramatically
decreases resulting in water scarcity in the area. This water scarcity leads the two groups to
compete for watering their animals and crops. 76

74
Musa Ali is conflict prevention and resolution expert in the office of administration and security, Dawe Woreda. The
interview was held on April10, 2014, Woderage. Also refer Ali, 2008.
75
Hassen Seid is resident of Medine Kuniye Kebele, DawA Harawa Woreda.The interview was held on May 30, 2014. Bora.
76
Mohammed Aliyu is resident of Ourene selama Kebele andSecretary of Afar-Oromo Joint Peace Committee, Dawa Harawa
Woreda .The interview was held on June 21, 2014, Bora town.

109
Several empirical studies show that increasing resource scarcity is the main cause of conflicts in
different parts of the world (Bekele, 2010; Homer-Dixon, 1994). Competition over resources
(mainly over grazing land, over cattle, over water points and over arable land) are common
phenomenon of inter-ethnic tensions and conflicts in Ethiopia (Sisay, 2007). Disputes of access
rights on water and pasture resources are very common in the Amhara Regional State of Oromia
Zone. They occur when herders use water resources without the prior permit request and contact
of the individual owner (Hagmann, 2000; Gedi, 2005; Merga,2012).Related to this, the Afar-
Oromo conflict, which is mainly, caused by competition over scarce resources, shares the
commonalities of conflict that occurred along various ethnic lines.

Besides, this cause of conflict can be related with the human needs theory of conflict which state
that violent conflicts are caused when various structural violences jeopardize individual’s
physical safety and security, which, in turn leads to denial of basic needs (Clements, 2005:23).
Since the safety of both groups in the area is attached mainly to animal husbandry, they are
always in need of pasture and water resources. Therefore, the scarcities of these resources
prevent them from meeting their needs and have a great potential for inducing conflicts.

5.1.3 Ethnic- based State Restructuring

Entertaining ethnic diversity in multi-lingual and multi-cultural societies using federalism is a

bone of contention for most scholars in the area. Some scholars choose the federal system of
government to accommodate ethnic diversity but many commentators have observed that a
federal system of government is inherently fragile even without adding ethnicity into the mix
(Alem, 2003:56). There is considerable evidence to suggest that ethnic federalism entails conflict
since it politicizes tribal identity and scholars soundly refute its applicability, especially in the
Ethiopian context. When it was introduced and developed, social critics and intellectuals have
stated the negative consequences of ethnic federalism in the Ethiopian context since this nation is
an ancient country having multi-cultural and multi-lingual societies that have been assimilated
due to thousands of years of continuous interaction, intermarriage, trade, migration, and other
social activities. But, the ‘current government’ has imposed a federal structure and has
politicized human diversity.

110
Ethnic conflicts in Ethiopia are nowadays frequent and recurrent across the different regions
where there are competing and divergent ethnic groups following the establishment of
significantly ethnic- based federal system by creating largely ethnic- based territorial
administrative units (Alem, 2003:56). In addition to traditional resources of conflict (i.e.
resources use, belief systems), another element (political one) is introduced along the ethnic
politics since 1991. The establishment of administrative structure on ethnic lines and the
concomitant ‘delineation’ of ‘borders’ as such, have added new dimension to claims and counter
claim of lands and over resources. The border line between the ‘areas or territories’ of these
ethnic groups has been traditionally fluid. In fact, the buffer zone served as a neutralizing border
claims. Even in localities joint use and management of resources was used. But, after the advent
of the new administrative structures along ethnic lines, each group has been conscious about the
buffer zone. Each group wants to put it under its domain through claiming traditional use rights
as justification.

The same has happing in the study areas, for example, Mohammed Sule said that ‘in 1985/86E.C
OLF has agitated the Oromo to claim and seize more land from Afar territory’. 77 Ali Hassen
reports that ‘though there was competition over the use of resources, concern for border was less
important in the past. Their relation with neighboring Oromo was smooth during the Derg
regime. We are the foot, while they (Oromos) are the head’. 78 In this, he wanted to say that they
are one entity with two inseparable parts; one needs the other for surviving. He said they were
interdependent in terms of market, bond fried, support and business. The head represents the
highlanders (cultivators) and the ‘foot’ the lowlanders (pastoralists). Thus, the Afar felt that the
current political arrangement brought other element of sources of mistrust and conflict between
the two groups.

The border is fluid and not demarcated. Both Oromo and Afar have claims of land. Afar claimed
that it is under their domain. They see this land as additional grazing area. It is endowed with
bushes and trees on which livestock depend during dry and drought periods. In this regard,

77
Mohammed Sule is member of Afar-Oromo joint peace committee and resident Gendawarina Eyeledi Kebele, Dawe Woreda.
The interview was held on April15,2014, Woderage.
78
Ali Hassen is chairman of Kilentina Derseda Kebele administration, Dawe Woreda. The interview was held on April26,2014,
Woderage.

111
Mohammed Sule said, ‘it is our lifeline, the area is our life-belt, because livestock, which could
not reach Cheffa often stay in this area.’ 79 They also claim that their land is encroached by
Oromo. It seems that the land that both claim might not be occupied by either groups sometimes
in the past. But, as resources became scarce, both went around and met at the buffer zone. Thus,
they ended up in claiming that border area to be designated in their name particularly after the
current government restructured administrative regions mainly, on the basis of ethnic lines.

During the Derg period, Afar were living in Bora town, Dawa Harawa woreda, with whom they
were grazing their cattle peacefully in the Oromo territory. But, after ethnic-based federal
arrangement was set up, things have changed dramatically. Yesuf Hussein reports that 80:
After restructuring of the state into ethnic based-regional national states
arrangement, Afar are aspiring for land grabbing that is amassing every land as
much as they can. If we beat Afar we will be caught by the government as criminals.
But when they violet the law, no body ask them even when they kill the Oromo. The
government prevents us not to attack them even when they are killing us.

It is clear that the problem arises as a result of federal arrangement of the Ethiopian government
on ethnic base. The government does not take measures up on the Afar when they violet the law.
According to Mohammed Awole, ‘the government always says that the ‘Afar are disadvantaged,
compared to the Oromo relatively, as they are pastoralists. It is ‘you (Oromo) should be careful
and tolerate them.’ If the government allows us, we would take our own measure up on them.’ 81
These shows, as they are pastoralists, the government authorities are standing on the side of the
Afar.

In nutshell, the political changes which includes the federal arrangement in the post -1991 period
and how that has been affecting relations between the communities in the study area can be the
central point, This means that discussions on other factors such as resource discussed previously
and environment below can be understood or viewed within the recent dynamics of politics in
Ethiopia.

79
Mohammed Sule is member of Afar-Oromo joint peace committee and resident Gendawarina Eyeledi Kebele, Dawe Woreda.
The interview was held on April15,2014, Woderage.
80
Yesuf Hussein is member of Afar-Oromo joint peace committee and resident of Orene selama Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda .
The interview was held on June 21, 2014, Bora town.
81
Mohammed Awole administrator of Medine Kunyo Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on June21,2014,
Bora town.

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5.1.4 Environmental Degradation and Drought

Pastoral communities in Ethiopia are vulnerable to the impacts of climate change specifically to
the recurrent drought and floods. They occupy the most inhospitable arid and semi-arid
environments characterized by high temperature and low and erratic rainfall patterns often with
an annual rainfall of less than 500-700mm (Markakis, 2004; Kelemework, 20014). Delayed
seasonal rains are causing livestock loss in Afar region and increasing livestock deaths are
threatening the livelihood of pastoralists (ibid.)

Environmental degradation has led to widespread drought in the area causing degradation of
arable land and water scarcity. Since the livelihood of Afar pastoralist is predominantly
dependent on livestock rearing, they enter into the Oromo of Dawa Harawa Woreda in search of
pasture for their animals during drought period. The recurrent occurrence of drought in the study
areas resulted in a further decline on an already scarce supply of water, arable land, and pasture.
It is during this time of drought that conflicts between these two groups most often arise.

During times of drought, the Afar from near and far-off Kebele leave their place and come to
Oromo areas. Since their coming is usual for such times, they are welcomed by the local people
in the Oromo areas. However, conflict emerges when Afar disregard the rules or violate limits in
utilizing resources. The Oromo communities claimed that the temporarily settlers of Afar move
their livestock to the reserved pastures, protected forests, and crops on the farm lands. They did
this at the night, which upset the Oromo community to enter into conflict with the Afar. 82 In
need of move livestock to the Oromo territory Mohammed Seid states that: 83
as a result of drought it is a matter of saving our life. Being pastoralists, if four cattle die
our life will be endangered. Cattle should not die due to drought in the availability
forests and grazing land in the Oromo areas. We are Ethiopians as the Oromos are. Even
they face natural calamity, we will help them as our neighbors.

In this case, for the Afar, instead of protection of forests and reserved grass lands priority is given for
their cattle life saving. According to Afar and Oromo informants, the study area is exposed to
environmental degradation and drought due to the increasing number of population and the
subsequent improper utilization of resources. Related with this, Mohammed Amin asserts that the
82
Yesuf Mohammed is resident of Dire Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on June 16, 2014, Dire.
83
Mohammed Seid is member of Afar-Oromo joint peace committee and resident of Wahilona Gidale Kebele, Dawe Woreda.
The interview was held on April21,2014, Woderage.

113
environment in the area is encountering serious hazards by the actions of the two communities 84.
Much of the land is overgrazed and loses its fertility. There is also an act of deforestation for the
purpose of expansion of farm land and for charcoal preparation from the Oromo side and for
camel pasture from the Afar side. This situation has contributed much to the deterioration of
environmental resources and occurrence of drought thereby instigating conflict for scarce
resources. 85 According to Girma Mulugeta, ‘during 2008 E.C drought, more than 500,000 Afar
cattle were in Cheffa’. 86 This situation depicts, on one side, the peaceful relation of the two
ethnic groups by sharing resources. On the other side, as Oromo communities claimed, when
these animals engage in destroying reserved areas and crops on the farm land, conflict emerges
and sometimes escalates into violence.

Since 1977 E.C., Afar were not able to fully recover and reconstitute their stock due to recurrent
drought and erratic rainfall (Ali, 2008; Bekele, 2010). After the 1977 E.C, there were shortages
of rainfall. For instance; the 1985/86 E.C drought led to loss of cattle, displacement of people
and movement of livestock to Harbu, Kemisie, Bati, Mille, Kassa Gita, to Zone-Four, etc. To
receive food aid, Afar went to Bati, Millie, Kassa Gita. Livestock moved upto Senbetie, even
passing Cheffa, which is deep inside the Oromo territory, in 1989/90 E.C. summer rainfall failed,
and food was not enough. It resulted in migration to Ewa, Wama (Afar Zone-one), and Cheffa
(Ali, 2008:142). Response to the crisis was food distribution made by Red Cross and the
government (Bekele, 2010).

Afar were unable to meet their needs and dependent on external support due to recurrent drought
that affected cattle population. In addition, since the Ethio- Eritrea war of 1998-2000, the
livestock price dropped drastically and no good price for the livestock (Ali, 2008:142).
Particularly when Id al Fatir and Id al adiha approached, Arab traders were used to come to
local markets via Assab. So, the Afar received good price both during dry and wet seasons. In
fact, rain has been unreliable since the 1977E.C and there is recurrent drought and famine. As a

84
Mohammed Amin is an expert in the Agriculture and Rural Development Office, Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was
held on June15, 2014, Harawa town.
85
Musa Ali is conflict prevention and resolution expert in the office of administration and security, Dawe Woreda. The
interview was held on April10, 2014, Woderage.
86
Girma Mulugeta is deputy head of Oromo NatinalityZone Administration and head of Agriculture and Rural Development
Deparment . The interview was held on May 16,2014, Kemissie.

114
result, there has been displacement of people. The Afar moved their livestock to Cheffa, and
even during the time of conducting this study, there had been acute drought in 2008 E.C.
According to Woreda officials ‘more than 500,000 cattle were moved to Cheffa wetland in
search of grass.’ Despite all these efforts, livestock died due to the drought. Ahmed Yayo
claimed that: 87
Nearly all places become grass deficit area, which makes difficult tracking areas
where grass is available. The traditional grazing areas with the locality are no more
grazing areas. Other grazing areas located at distant places (Baadu, Cheffa, Afar,
Megenta, Ewa) have been also inaccessible to Afar herders.

In sum, according to Homer-Dixon (1994), environmental degradation leads to scarcity of

natural resources which further induces conflict. Related with this, the Afar-Oromo area is
repeatedly hit by droughts, such as 1977E.C, 1985/86 E.C, 1991E.C, and through man-made
practices, such as deforestation for charcoal and for animal fodder (Ali, 2008; Bekele,2010). The
occurrences of this drought in the area led to resource scarcity particularly pasture and water.
And this, in turn, as discussed previously, leads into competition over scarce resource and
conflict. Of course, all these factors have been exacerbated as a result of the 1991 political
dynamics of ethnic based federalism, the dynamics of territorial space among national regional
states of Ethiopia.

5.2 Immediate Causes of the Conflict

There are contradictory positions between government officials and local people over the major
and immediate causes of Afar –Oromo conflict. For instance, Girma Mulugeta explained the root
causes of the conflict as follows: 88
As known, the major cause of conflict between Afar and Oromo is competition over
water and grazing. Especially, in dry season conflict is inevitable. In addition to
water and grazing, unemployment, illegal arm trafficking and violent cultural
practices-revenge, theft and blood feud fuel the conflict. The local people said that
border is the major cause of conflict; it might be but not that much.

The Annual Report of Amhara Region Administration and Security Affairs Bureau (2016 and
2017) also outlined the aforementioned factors as root causes of conflict. The report indicated

87
Ahmed Yayo is head of administration and security office of Dawe Woreda. The interview was held on April 14, 2014,
Woderage.
88
Girma Mulugeta is deputy head of Oromo NatinalityZone Administration and head of Agriculture and Rural Development
Deparment . The interview was held on May 16, 2014, Kemissie.

115
that theft and blood feud are among the grave causes exacerbated the conflict. Simply, the
government officilals repeatedly claim that water and grazing rivalry as root causes of conflict.
Conversely, almost all interviewees, informal and focus group discussants explained that water
and pasture competition, harmful cultural practices, unemployment and drought are not root
causes of current conflict. Interviewees and focus group discussants argued that completion over
water and pasture were causes of earlier intermittent personal conflicts. They strongly underlined
that water and pasture, unemployment, drought and arm trafficking are words that the
government uses to justify the conflict as small scale as before.

5.2.1 Pressure from ISSA –Somalis

The Afar experienced conflict with the neighbouring ethnic groups (Ali, 2008; Bekele, 2010;
Yasin, 2010). They are in a long standing conflict with Issa, and rarely clash with the
neighbouring Amhara, Argoba, or Oromo (ibid). Historically, the Afar had severe conflict with
Wajirats who come from Tigray and attacked the Afar at various times. Issa and Wajirat
contributed to depletion of the Afar economy through livestock raiding, denying them access to
grazing areas, killing persons and setting fire on huts (Ali, 2008; Yasin, 2010). Nowadays, the
Wajirats don’t come to Dawe district. But, the conflict with Issa is recurrent and has become
intense (Asnake, 2013; Markakis, 2013; Mu’uz, 2009).The traditional reason was competition
over grass and water and animal raiding. Currently, after the establishment of the ethnic-based
federalism, competition over land has been the main cause for recurrent clash. For instance,
Adaytu and Hundifo areas have been contested areas between Afar and Issa-somalis (Getachew,
2001; Ali, 2008; Yasin, 2010; Markakis, 2013). Both ethnic groups claim that these areas are
their domains and compete to put under their administrative border. In connection to this, Ahmed
Yayo reported that ‘Issa claimed all the land up to Awash River as their domain.’ 89 Along with
this, the Issas have continued with animal raiding and killing persons. And, such attacks by Issa
have become severe after the 1977 E.C famine in which the Issa invaded the area up to Dawe
Wereda and took many camels. After the drought, they made several attacks and took many
livestock by killing herds and many Afar (Ali, 2008; Yasin, 2010).

89
Ahmed Yayo is head of administration and security office of Dawe Woreda. The interview was held on April 14, 2014,
Woderage.

116
In the past (i.e. before the 1977 E.C drought) Afar were able to keep the Issa to areas where they
were. After the 1977E.C, the capacity of Afar has reduced due to recurrent drought. Moreover,
the Issa got armed with modern weapons and have got upper hand on the Afar (Mu’uz, 2009;
Yasin, 2010). After 1977E.C., the Issa raiding was severe and frequent, this is because first, the
Afar are dispersed to other places and those left behind were unable to prevent the Issa’s
intrusion; second, the Afar, because of drought, sold their rifle and were unable to defend their
animals from raiding; and thirdly, some of the youth and energetic ones didn’t return
immediately after the drought occurred (Ali, 2008; Yasin, 2010).

According to Mohammed Sule during the drought periods, the Issas came and attacked the Afar
who remained in the villages and took some of their stocks. 90 They did this, because they knew
that the Afar, particularly the youth and the energetic ones had left their villages. They killed
Afar and took camels and cattle. Since the drought lasted for consecutive years and the Afar
were not reinforced, they were not able to stop the Issa’s intrusion by the time. Thus, the Issas
were able to reach up to the Oromo community and pushed the Afar into the Oromo locality.
Moreover, the Afar sold most of their rifle to buy livestock and were empty-handed to protect
themselves and the Issas reached to Haro area 91, which is found near the Oromo locality. Animal
raiding by Issa have been a threat to Afar livestock production next to drought. Particularly,
dispersed settlements, aged person and male children, and areas close to Awash River are more
vulnerable to Issa’s attack. Nearly, all the Afar community members lost some of their livestock
to one or another Issa livestock raiding (Ali, 2008; Mu’uz, 2009).

The Afar informants reported that the government discourages revenge from Afar side. Rather it
tends to use legal means 92 to control Issa encroachment in to the Afar locality. However, the
legal means used by the Federal and Regional Governments has not been effective. At times,
even the Afar National Regional Government appealed to the House of Federation about the
Issas repeated attack on Afar community. So far, according to Mohammed Sule, from Dawe

90
Mohammed Sule is member of Afar-Oromo joint peace committee and resident Gendawarina Eyeledi Kebele, Dawe Woreda.
The interview was held on April15,2014, Woderage.
91
Haro is a contested village where Afar and the Oromo conflict with each other.This village is located in the boredering kebele
of Dire of Oromo and Gendawarina Eyelendi of Afar.
92
The Regional and Federal Governments organized various peace conferences during which both parties agreed to avoid
violence, clashes, animal raiding and killings, and to resolve their problems through discussion, and negotiation via local
administration and elders from both sides. However, all these efforts aren’t successful in bringing viable peace in the area to date.

117
Wereda, many peace conferences were held in Awash town to establish mechanisms of conflict
management and resolution which are not been effective. 93

The Afar felt that there is something, which is beyond the traditional animal raiding. Tracing
and returning the raid animals would not have been with capacity of Issa groups (Ali, 2008:137).
The Afar felt that it is related to politics. There might be a backing from some groups living in
Djibouti and Somali (Yasin, 2010). The Issas destroyed and burn any property of Afar whenever
they come across the Afar locality. Currently, both the Federal and Regional Governments are
simply watching the situation. But, the Issas are making move into the Afar territory not because
of the searching water and grazing. It is expanding of their territory. They started putting
settlements into the Afar area. For example, the settlement called Hundifo in Issa and the Afar
call it Endafo-ao. Osman Abdu mentioned that 94:
the Issa even put one time the flag of Djibouti in this settlement. They wanted to
make one country from Djibouti to Issa land in Somali Region of Ethiopia. This
makes the Afar to think that the Issas’ current move to their area is not for searching
water and grass as it was used to be. It is rather a claim that their border is the
Awash River.

Afar felt that the current move by Issas might be for expanding their territory under the condition
of new administration based on ethnic identity. This in turn, exacerbates the conflict between
their neighbors, with the Oromo in the west, who wage in search of grazing land and water.
When the Afar are pushed by Issa-Somalis, they in turn push the Oromo towards the hillside in
the Amhara National Regional State of Oromo Nationality Zone of Dawa Hrawa Woreda’s
territory. So, Issa -Somalis pressure on the Afar is a pressure on Oromo by the Afar, which is
one of the causes for the Afar –Oromo conflict in the study area.

5.2.2 Theft, Homicide, and Looting

Theft and homicide acts are one of the immediate causes of conflict in the study area. Theft of
camel and other animals by individuals is one immediate source of conflict that might later on
turn in to communal level. The Afar give high value for their camels and when the camels are
stolen the Afar would not be easily persuaded. They would take any possible measure they deem
93
Mohammed Sule is member of Afar-Oromo joint peace committee and resident Gendawarina Eyeledi Kebele, Dawe Woreda.
The interview was held on April15,2014, Woderage.
94
Osman Abdu is head of Militia office, Dawe Woreda . The interview was held on April 15, 2014, Woderage.

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necessary against the Oromo. Oromo also engage in conflict when their animals are stolen by
Afar. Such practices of theft exercised by some individuals from both groups become immediate
source of communal conflict in the study area.

Theft of animals was practiced earlier in group as raid. There were times when Afar raided
Oromo areas and took herd of animals by attacking cattle herders and vice versa. This practice of
raid has decreased gradually from year to year since 1991 though there were times when sudden
raid occurs sporadically in the area. For instance, chairperson of the Afar-Oromo Joint Peace
Committee (JPC) said that there was raid by Afar and later on counter- raid by Oromo three
years ago. Therefore, raid and counter raid is not totally absent in the area but theft of animals by
individuals is widespread. 95

Looting of properties was one of the immediate causes of conflict that aggravated conflicts to
develop into violent action in the study area. As informants stated, there are robbers in both
ethnic groups. When properties like livestock and firearms are looted by one ethnic group, the
other group avenges by looting of properties and killing individuals. 96 Moreover, in times of
drought the Afar pastoralists move into lands of the Oromo in search of animal and water.
Similarly, Oromo agro- pastoralists move into lands of the Afar in the rainy season. As a result
of this, the two ethnic groups have experienced resource sharing. But, the problem emanated
when Afar or Oromo took the animals, which did not belong to them. When Afar or Oromo
return to their homeland some individuals stole animals from the contending ethnic group and as
a result conflict emerges and escalates into violence.

Betrayal of cattle entrusted in one’s protection is also another manifestation of theft. Since the
livelihood system of the Oromo inhabitants is partly dependent on agriculture, members of the
community usually make agreements with whom they have closer relationship in Afar to keep
their animals in their range lands. This agreement between the owner of the cattle and the one
who is entrusted to keep the cattle is traditionally known to be Amana 97. This agreement is

95
Mohamed Abdu is chairman of Afar-Oromo Joint peace committee and resident of Medine Kebele,Dawa Harawa Woreda,
The interview was held on May 20,2014. Bora.
96
Hussein Ahmed is resident of Gendawarina Eyeledi Kebele, Dawe Woreda. The interview was held on April16,2014,
Woderage
97
The word indicates loyalty and trust to keep one‘s promise among people in the study area.

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concluded based on give and take principle, i.e., the owner of the cattle provides some gifts such
as crops during the harvest season and few calves among the newly born animals to the one who
is entrusted to keep the cattle. He also makes friendly reception when the Afar come to Oromo
during times of resource scarcity. But, sometimes this relationship could be spoiled or becomes a
source of conflicts either when the entrusted person breaks his promise refuse to return the cattle
to the owner or deceive the exact number of the cattle, which the owner of the cattle deserves.
Inter-personal conflicts that result in homicide also gradually extend to inter-ethnic conflict.
When a member of either of the two groups kills a person, the victimized group is motivated and
compelled to take a similar action or beyond that. If one person is killed from either group, it is
conceived by the community as thought Oromo or Afar are killed (perceived as their identity is
attacked) and they should kill someone from the belligerent group. The prevalent of looting and
homicide acts, therefore, are other immediate causes that escalate inter-personal conflicts in to
communal level between the two ethnic groups.
Table 2: The Oromo Animals stolen by Afar from 1991-2006 E.C.

Animal Taken by Taken by Total Returned Not

No. Type Amana looting Returned
1 Cattle 186 752 938 276 662
2 Camel 5 17 22 3 19
3 Goat - 6 6 - 6
4 Donkey - 2 2 - 2
5 Firearm - 7 7 - 7
6 Total 191 784 975 279 696
Source: Dawa Harawa Woreda Administration and Security Affairs Office.
As can be seen from the table above, for instance, 777 animals and 7 firearms were looted by
members the Afar communities. In addition, 191 animals were taken from among the Amana
animals. The data is compiled by analyzing various reports prepared by Dawa Harawa Woreda
Administration Office at different years. The table indicates how theft of animal can be a cause
of conflict. Such kind of theft aggravates one group over the other to take revenge

The aforementioned causes of conflicts in the study area have resemblance with relative
deprivation theory. The theory asserts that the deprivation of needs by other groups such as an

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ethnic group or an individual can lead to conflict between the two groups or individuals (Coser,
2006; Rosati, 1990; Raimann, n.d). These people and groups have the emotional and material
resources to become involved in conflict and social change (Coser,2006). People may experience
a sense of loss or deprivation if the economic structural changes cannot keep with their rising
expectations (Jeong, 2008).When individuals or groups from Afar or Oromo enter into killings
and looting, they are denying the security and freedom (economic freedom, and civil liberty) of
others. Hence, such deprivation breeds counter communal violence.

5.2.3 Government Development Policies and Schemes

There is a misconception that pastoral areas are vast tracts land left idle. For the majority
outsiders, the need for an extensive area to enable pastoralists to move freely in accordance to
the availability of resources in various seasons is yet less understandable concept. However,
pastoralists develop their traditional production system and transhumance way of life in order to
cope with the inhospitable physical environment and to adapt, to the environment where they
inhabit. As stated in Harbeson (1978:253), ‘the Tendaho Plantation Share Company (TPSC) was
founded in 1962 as a partnership of the sugar factor Company and the Ethiopian Government to
produce sugar in the lower Awash Valley.’ Apart from successive eviction of Afar in Amibara,
Angelele, Bolhama and Maro Gala, the Ethiopia Government carried on to execute schemes to
tourism businesses (Ayele, 1986; Kebede, 2005). As listed by Muderis (2000: 12), a total of
353,000 hectare of pasturelands were taken, including West Awash Wildlife Reserve (17,810ha),
Gewane Wildlife Reserve (24,390hectare), Mille Serdo Wildlife Reserve (87,660), Gewane
Controlled Hunting area (59,320) and West Awash controlled hunting area (91,360 hectare).

In recent years, development projects launched by Ethiopian government for sugarcane

plantations have aggravated Afars’ economic problem and intensified the conflict between Afar-
Oromo. According to Nurgaz Da’ato, ‘Sugar plantations in Afar territory evicted Afar from their
grazing land without compensation. Although, government promised to develop 25,000 hectare
of grazing land for our cattle, this has not been implemented.’ 98 As a result, Afar along the
Awash Valley became victims of 'development' schemes which alienated them from their
ancestral land, limited their mobility, decreasing of grazing land areas, spreading of livestock
98
Nurgaz Da’ato is a member of Afar-Oromo joint peace committee and resident of Gendawarina Eyeledi Kebele, Dawe
Woreda. The interview was held on May5,2014, Harawa.

121
diseases as the result of agro-chemicals used in irrigation schemes, cutting of long aged plant
species that have prevailing value for pastoral livelihood and how land degradation led to a man-
made famine.

In general, development schemes of successive Ethiopian governments have intensified the

conflict among the pastoralists group and particularly that of Afar and Oromo due to high rate of
population pressure and from scarcity of grazing lands and water points. The eviction of Afar
from their grazing land by government development schemes forces the Afar to bring their cattle
into the Afar- Oromo border areas in search of grazing. As a result of fierce competition between
the two ethnic groups for controlling grazing land and water points in the area is a phenomenon.
As the situation getting worse, fighting erupts between the two ethnic groups who were known
for relatively living in peace together in the study areas.

5.2.4 Access to Illegal Arms and Light Weapons

The easy accessibility and proliferation of firearms is another triggering factor for conflict in the
study area. The abundance of illegal small arms and light weapons (SALW) adds fuel to the
conflict. The neighboring countries such as Eritrea, Sudan and Somalia, and the previous military
regime in Ethiopia are the major sources of illicit arms (Abraha, 2012; Tigist, 2010). Following
the collapse of the Derg regime in 1991, large numbers of SALW were left behind the armed
forces of the defeated regime and got into the hands of civilians, criminals, and others (ibid.).
The existence of inter-ethnic conflict and the violent cultural practices that promote heroism
between Afar and Oromo communities have increased the demand for gaining firearms in order
to protect oneself and one’s livestock.

A combination of different economic, political, historical, and cultural factors explains the
availability of guns in the hands of pastoralists and agro- pastoralist communities in the study
area. In connection to this, Yasin Ali said that ‘If you do not have a rifle, you become vulnerable
to attack: when you quarrel with others they easily attack you.’ 99 This fear of vulnerability makes
very much important the need to possess fire arms, licitly or illicitly. Another informant from
Afar pointed out two basic reasons why people of the study area buy and own arms. First,

99
Yasin Ali is resident of Medene Kuniyo Kebele,Dawa Heraw Woreda. The interview washeld on May 25.2014. Bora.

122
possession of a gun in the area is considered as a symbol of wealth and respect. Therefore, in
order to be respected by the society, every household capable of buying will have a gun. Second,
having a gun is considered as a means of self-protection and guaranteeing security. 100

There is high dependence on firearms by the local people. According to Endris Ali, there are
illegal arms dealers and brokers that function in the areas of both Woreda and people have great
access to firearms 101. People in the area feel secured when they have arms. As to one of the
informants, especially in Dawe, relatively wealthy individuals are expected to buy modern
weapons and if they don’t, they will be out-casted by the community. Control of firearms by
officials in the area is also relatively weak. Because of these reasons Afar are well armed than
their counter parts.

According to information secured from chairperson and secretary of the Afar-Oromo joint peace
committee and the militia offices of both Woreda, the two communities possess SALW. On the
part of government there is loose control on the possession of such small arms and light weapons
especially in Afar Dawe Woreda. 102 However, in Dawa Harawa Woreda, there is relatively strict
control of illegal weapons. 103 Although there is an attempt to control illegal SALW in Dawa
Harwa, it was however, impossible to fully control the circulation of firearms in the area because
of the remoteness of the area that has territorial attachment with Afar Dawe Woreda. From the
Afar side, Afar pastoralists including boys below the age of 18 own firearms as a common tool
and move from place to place freely particularly in the rural areas. Therefore, weapons owned
for self-protection and respect is used for hostility and retaliation by both groups, thus, adding
fuel to the conflict.

100
Nuru gaz Da’ato is a member of Afar-Oromo joint peace committee and resident of Gendawarina Eyeledi Kebele, Dawe
Woreda. The interview was held on May5,2014, Harawa.
101
Endris Ali is the head of administration and security department of Oromo Nationality Zone. The interview was held on June
6, 2014.Kemissie.
102
Inspector Mohammed is head of Police office, Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on June15, 2014, Bora town.
103
Mohammed Suabir is head of Militia office, Dawa Harawa Woreda . The interview was held on June15, 2014, Bora town.

123
5.2.5. Ethno- Political Parties and Groups
5.2.5.1 Remnants of Oromo Liberation Front and Afar Liberation Front Aggravation of
Afar -Oromo Conflict

Conflict between Afar and Oromo had also been agitated by political parties. Remnants of OLF
(Oromo Liberation Front) and ALF (Afar Liberation Front) in the Oromo Nationality Zone and
Afar Region, respectively, have their own role in exacerbating the conflict. According to
informants, these political parties were working in clandestine. During the Transition Period,
there was intense conflict between the two ethnic groups mainly because of these political parties
(Ali, 2008:137; Interview with Afar key informants). The neighboring Oromo and the Afar were
entered into sharecropping arrangement, while producing crop through irrigation. Previously,
however, it has been interrupted due to conflict aroused when OLF fighters took hideout in the
Oromo Zone and tried to recruit young Oromo people to fight the central government (Ali,
2008:137). This period is known by the Afar a Transition Period where the OLF was working
with government for meanwhile. 104

During the Transition Period, the Oromo claimed that their border was somewhere along the
Awash River, based on those OLF fighters who came from Hararghe and agitated the local
Oromo that their border was at Awash River. This, again created suspicion and mistrust between
the Afar and their Oromo neighbours. This in turn, led to disagreement between sharecroppers.
As a result, the Afar stopped sharecropping arrangements with Oromo cultivators.

Finally, when the OLF withdrew from the Transitional Government, government soldiers came
and expelled the OLF fighters from the Oromo Nationality Zone. Some informants felt that the
Government did this in collaboration with ALF. In the operation, the Afar leaders guided the
government soldiers to localities where the OLF elements took hideout. The Afar perceives that
Oromo are newcomers to the area. They said that ‘Amhara were their neighbors before Oromo
came into their areas.’ 105 This also pronounced by ALF’s ‘Afar triangle’ ambition. Before the
conflict, the Oromo and the Afar were easily and openly engaged in sharecropping arrangements
104
Nuru gaz Da’ato is a member of Afar-Oromo joint peace committee and resident of Gendawarina Eyeledi Kebele, Dawe
Woreda. The interview was held on May5, 2014, Harawa.
105
Nuru gaz Da’ato is a member of Afar-Oromo joint peace committee and resident of Gendawarina Eyeledi Kebele, Dawe
Woreda. The interview was held on May5, 2014, Harawa.

124
to produce crop and share equally. It was because that there was no very much concern about the
border from both sides.

Conflict aroused after OLF started operation in the Oromo locality. The Oromo started clearing
grazing lands and claimed more land that was traditionally used by the Afar for grazing. Thus,
they stopped renting out their land for Oromo on the basis of sharecropping arrangement since
the eruption of conflict between two groups due to competition over the use of land at their
borders. In sum, the Oromo informants said that many people benefited from small irrigation
before conflict arose between Oromo and the Afar. Since 1984/85, there was cultivation crop
until they stopped it due to conflict with neighboring Oromo community when OLF was
operating in the Oromo Nationality Zone.

5.2.5.2 Assemela 106 group

Assemela are group of people who are offshoot of Afar and Oromo ethnic groups. According to
Mohammed Ahmed, the other reason for the Afar-Oromo conflict is that rent-seeking people in
both sides, that is from both the Afar and Oromo ethnic groups. In this regard, he claims: 107
the Asymela group know that Oromo are in need of wheat. They do not want produce
wheat on the farm; instead they receive wheat from the government and donors. They
say to us there is a lot of wheat in the form of aid in the Afar Region why don’t you
join us? We are saying to them why not we together produce wheat at home, on our
fertile land? We have to produce fresh and organic wheat here on our farm to feed
ourselves instead of seeking wheat aid from government and donors. When we say
this to them, as our stand point, they ignore us and they do not want to work hard. As
a result, they are the one who prefer laziness in seeking wheat aid from government
and want take our land to the Afar Region in exchange of wheat.

This group is trying to deceive Oromo in the name of receiving wheat in way of aid from the
government and resorting to take their land to the Afar National Regional State. This is one of
the reasons why the conflict between Afar and Oromo is unabated in the study area.

In the past, there was an irrigation which was serving both of (Afar and Oromo) in which tax was
being paid to the Amhara Region (Oromo Nationality Zone).Both the Afar and Oromo were

106
A group of people reside between Afar and Oromo territory. They are hybrid of Oromo and Afar i.e they are from Afar
husband and Oromo wife. They are living in Afar-Oromo contested areas. They have been one source of Afar-Oromo conflict as
they are being opportunist vis-a vis the two ethnic groups (Mohammed Awole administrator of Medine Kunyo Kebele, Dawa
Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on June21, 2014, Bora town).
107
Mohammed Ahmmed is ex-chairman of Medine Kunyo Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda. He is a member of Afar –Oromo
joint peae committee.The interview was held on June21, 2014, Bora town.

125
using the land by irrigating and paying tax to the Oromo Zone. They were ploughing the land
together by using the irrigation. But now Assemela group are claiming the land which they have
settled to be included in the Afar Region though the land which is being claimed by Oromo.
According to Mohammed Awole ‘Assemela group aspire and incline to Afar Region though the
land is ours’ 108. The Assemala group who are neither Afar nor Oromo but want to be included in
Afar region. This group is conspiring to take our land to the Afar region’. But, when Assemela
group want to go away from Amhara Region to Afar Region, with the Oromo land, conflict
arises. Earlier before they were living in peace by producing crops using the irrigation, paying
tribute to Oromo zone of Amhara region. But things become deteriorated when the half- casted
group known as Asemela emerged. This group wanted to go to the Afar region controlling the
land as a result conflict arises. Concerning the position of Oromo on Assemela, Mohammed
Awole explains as follows 109:
If they want to go to Afar Region, it is their right that they can go to Afar Region. If
they say ‘we should go to Afar Region with the land’, they are only 5 individuals,
what about 150 persons (Oromo) living there? As they are few in number, they can
go to Afar Region. These 150 people (Oromo) have no place where to go? No
where to go. As they are few in number they can go and plow land in the Afar
Region as there is irrigable and plenty of land there in Afar territory. This is
because their father is Afar despite the mother is Oromo.
Furthermore, Mohammed said that: 110
Believing that they are our brothers, we have allowed them to live with us in our
territory. They do not listen to our advice. This is mainly because of wheat they
receive from the government in the form of aid, every month the government gives
them. Afar is believed to be pastoralist but they receive huge amount of wheat from
the government. The government has ears but has no eyes. As a result, they over
report the number of Afar residing in the area as if they are more than 100 but the
actual number of Afar are about 10 in the area. A person takes up to 10kuintal of
wheat. The Afar said to us, if you come with us or join our region, you will take
wheat as you want. If you come to our region with your land, you will have food, i.e
wheat from us as you want.

Contrary to the above Oromo claim, the Afar perceive that Oromo are ‘newcomers to the area’.
They said that ‘Amhara were their neighbors before Oromo came into their areas recently.’ 111

108
Mohammed Awole administrator of Medine Kunyo Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on June21,2014,
Bora town.
109
Mohammed Awole administrator of Medine Kunyo Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on
June21,2014, Bora town.
110
Mohammed Awole administrator of Medine Kunyo Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on June21,2014,
Bora town.

126
This indicates how far government officials have complicated the problem being lenient rather
than solving it with closer look at. Hence, this is one factor exacerbating the conflict between
Afar and Oromo in the area. The assemela are living in the Afar –Oromo contested territory
because of marriage, but they want join to the Afar Region. In the past, the Afar-Oromo
relationship was good. Their relations were strong and like each other (as indicated in chapter
four of this study). But, because of land/ territory/, conflict arises between the two ethnic groups.
However, as informants reported, as a result of the simmering Afar-Oromo conflict with
attention and involvement of the security bodies, peace committee, elders and religious leaders,
the two groups have been addressing their conflicts for the time being. This shows there is no
everlasting solution.

5.2.6 Change of Afar Mode of Production and Life Style

In the past, the Afar community did not about know crop cultivation. Historically, the Afar used
to raise cattle more dominantly. But, as cattle became more vulnerable due to ecological stress
and decline of range, the shift to crop cultivation has recently arisen in response to decline of
livestock production. Most of the Afar have learned and started cultivation from their neighbors.
Afar Interviewee remarked that they wanted to try cultivation not only to be immediately full-
fledged cultivator, they also wanted to learn more about crop cultivation by themselves. 112 Afar
resort to crop cultivation, which is traditionally an activity of the Oromo and Amhara. There are
also Afar who carry out irrigation at Dawe River.

Crop cultivation particularly by clearing bushes of valleys and growing maize was learnt from
the Oromo. The Afar adopt crop cultivation in micro-valleys. In the past, the Afar got support
from Oromo for ploughing. As oxen became scarce and Afar lack skills to plough, the Afar use
hoe to prepare their fields. In this case, Afar had to resort to small-scale irrigation in order to
cultivate crops along the river sides. In the past, they hired Oromo to make furrow for irrigation.
So, these sedentary agricultural activities left them in competition with their neighbouring
Oromo.

111
Seid Omer is resident of Wocheka Kebele,Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on June22,2014,Bora
112
Ahmed Yayo is head of administration and security office of Dawe Woreda. The interview was held on April 14, 2014,
Woderage.

127
The main reason that the Afar resorted to irrigation is due to crop failure in the neighboring
communities (Ali, 2008; Interview with Suleiman Mussa 113). In the past, they used to get access
to enough grain food in the highlands via their social and economic relations (i.e. affinal
relations, friendship, renting out oxen, sharecropping arrangements). Moreover, grains were
cheap in the neighbouring markets. But, now the neighboring communities are also affected by
crop failure either due to lack of rainfall or pests. Thus, the Afar had to resort to small-scale
irrigation in order to cultivate crops along the river sides. Thus, irrigation activity has been
started aiming at supplementary source food for human and crop residues as source of animal
feed. However, there is inadequate support from the government to enhance irrigation despite the
strong need expressed by the Afar with regard to the development of irrigation along rivers 114.

The situation of pastoralists in three periods is characterized by first, the economic situation was
best and better during the Hailessilasie and Derg regimes, respectively; and worst in the past
25years(Ali, 2008; Bekele, 2010). But, human security was worse in the past particularly during
the Imperial period and Derg time, since there was animal raiding, theft, killing and predators
attack. But, nowadays this has been relatively reduced due to relation with neighboring
communities, absence of bandits along the roads to markets, availability of access roads and
transport, involvement of local administrations from both sides to monitor security situations and
act to resolve conflict and increased easy movement of members of the two groups into others
locality. Economic situation in recent years has being worse in Afar that forced them to change
their mode of production to sedentary agriculture. However, sedentary agricultural activities left
the Afar in competition with their neighbouring Oromo, which eventually led them to conflict.

The shift towards more agro-pastoralist and farming activities alters the dynamics of mode of
production. Sedentary activities create incentives for groups or individuals to own, or at least
seek rights, to specific plots of land that they can harvest and from which they can derive
economic benefits (Ayele, 2005; Merga, 2012). In the Oromia Zone of Amhara Region State,

113
Suleiman Mussa is Chairman of Wahilona Gidale Kebede administration, Dawe Woreda. The interview was held on
April118,2014, Woderage.
114
Musa Ali is conflict prevention and resolution expert in the office of administration and security, Dawe Woreda. The
interview was held on April10, 2014, Woderage.

128
there is an increasingly individual land use-right, i.e. ordinary holding for cultivation, from time
to time and this practice fosters individual use of land in contrary to the traditional communal use
of land (Merga, 2012: 18). All in all, the making of physical boundaries demarcating border
between Amhara and Afar Regional States and individual land use right for cultivation heightens
the potential for conflict in the study area.

5.2.7 Conflict of interest between Peasants and Pastoralists

The Afar cut trees for house construction and clear land for farming. The Oromo, on the other
hand, cut trees for charcoal making and fuel wood. The Afar lost their important grazing areas
like Baadu 115. They lost their dry time grazing areas. During summer, the Banks of Awash River
are flooded and during dry season the Afar used to move their livestock to those flooded areas to
graze. But, since the establishment of farms of big plantation agriculture and government
development schemes, they faced constraints to move to such areas (Ayele, 1986; Kebede,
2005). Besides, they also fear the threat of Issa’s attack. During drought times, the Afar used to
migrate to the Awash River and Cheffa, since water points dried up in their permanent villages.
Thus, the banks of Awash River and Cheffa areas are not only the sources of grazing, but also
sources of water during severe droughts.

Conflict arises, between Afar and Oromo, when the Oromo try to clear the area for farming.
Currently, Afar are struggling to meet their household needs through raising livestock. In time of
severe drought, they have to get some support from government to survive drought. There is
conflict of interest between these groups. Not only pressure on cultivators from Afar pastoralists
to share grain and crop residues, there is emerging conflict over the use of lands for irrigation.
Competition over the use of land by clearing has been prevalent. Elders and local
administrations try to resolve conflicts, which arise due to claims for land. And yet, both groups
have been claiming lands at the border to put under their respective domain. The Afar said that
they had traditional use right, whereas the Oromo said the land was vacant and they have the
right to expand their farming into such area. 116

115
This is a place where Afar and Issa-Somalis severly fought for control.
116
Mohammed Osman is deputy head of Dawa Harawa Woreda Administration and security office. Mohammed resides in
Harawa town. Even though he resides in Harawa town, he is the one who has grown in the Afar-Oromo border conflict area. The
interview was held on June15, 2014, Harawa town.

129
There were consultations between elders of both groups to resolve conflicts. But despite efforts
to calm the clashes, there is no demarcation between the borders of the two Wereda. This conflict
over the use of this border area is imminent as the groups have faced resource scarcities (farm
and grazing land). During my field visits, although both visit markets found in their respective
areas, particularly traders, there seems to be mutual suspicion. Each follows carefully other’s
movement across the study area.

5.2.8 Summary

Although the two ethnic groups share commonalties in their culture (religion), economic
activities (their way of life), political participation (mostly marginalized from the center) and the
like, they are engaged in continuous conflicts for almost more than two decades and they are
considered as traditional enemies to each other. These pastoral and agro-pastoral areas are well
known for their recurrent conflicts. As a result of such recurrent and severe conflicts the area
have never been a place where agro-pastoral activities run peacefully and progressively
particularly due to the Afar and Oromo conflict.

Access to resources such as grazing land and water sources are the major causes that are
historically documented in these areas (Getachew, 2001; Markakis, 2003). The causes of their
conflicts are varied, dynamic and multifaceted in nature. Homer-Dixon (2001) argues that
environmental scarcities will have profound social consequences contributing to insurrections,
ethnic clashes, urban unrest, and other forms of civil violence, especially in the developing
world. More specific studies in east Africa also show that resource scarcity is the principal cause
for recurrent conflicts among different pastoral and agro-pastoral groups (Ayalew, 2001;
Opschoor, 2001; Getachew, 2001). Population explosion, local migration, unfriendliness for
large areas of plantations, conservation and other activities combined with the increased focus on
cultivation and expansion of the cultivated area have ultimately led to pressure on arable land
pastures (Odgaar, 2003, Desalegn,2007; Merga,2012).

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The causes of the current forms of Afar -Oromo ethnic conflicts in the study area is not only
resource scarcities but, due to the combined effects of environmental degradations/ resource
scarcity, population pressure, social, cultural and political factors more specifically the
politicization of ethnic identities which is used as an instrument for the mobilization of ethnic
groups by political elites. Therefore, analyzing and resolving their conflicts from diverse
perspectives is paramount to the ongoing efforts to bring a sustainable peace and development in
the study area in particular and the Northeast Ethiopia in general. Conflict resolution requires a
practical process of examining and understanding the realities of a conflict from a variety of
perspectives. It demands a systematic study of the profile, causes, and dynamics of a conflict. It
helps development, humanitarian and peace building organizations to gain a better understanding
of the context in which they work and their role in that context. Understanding and identifying
the real causes of conflict is tantamount to reaching half-way to the resolution mechanisms of
conflict between the Afar and Oromo communities in the study area. Hence, understanding and
identifying the root and triggering causes the conflict as milestone, the next chapter assesses the
major impacts of Afar-Oromo conflicts in the study areas.

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CAPTER SIX: MAJOR EFFECTS OF AFAR –OROMO CONFLICT

In the previous chapter causes of Afar-Oromo conflict have been dealt. As there are causes of
conflict, naturally there are also consequences of conflict. It is with this understanding that one
might search for indentifying mechanisms of conflict resolution. Under this chapter the major
effects of Afar -Oromo conflict are briefly discussed focusing on social, economic and political
consequences. Ethnic conflicts are the most destructive and violent which causes too much
bloodshed and devastation (Kellas, 1998; Smith, 2009; Thomson, 2010) both on human life and
property. Shocking consequences have been observed in many countries because of ethnic
clashes.

The intensity of the consequences of an ethnic conflict is determined by the nature and scope of
the conflict concerned. In this regard, informants of both groups tell that the 2001 E.C violence
was so wide in its scope and intensity. It was a wide-ranging in that it involved a large number of
people and carried out in most of the kebele where the two-ethnic groups border each other.
Consequently, it led to undesirable effects in a number of ways, including loses of human lives,
looting of property, burning of houses and dislocation of a large number of people. The major
implication of the conflict is the activation of a dividing boundary of ‘us’ and ‘them’ between the
historically coexistent, economically interdependent and culturally complementary groups. The
conflict demonstrated the potent force of ethnicity in that Afar and Oromo who were far beyond
the disputed territories were believed to have participated in the conflict. The impacts of ethnic
conflict are not limited to a single sector; rather it has vicious circle of impacts accompanied by a
range of spillover effects. Apparently, the impacts of ethnic conflicts are interlocked and multi-
faceted including economic, social, political, psychological and environmental. Delimited on
social, economic and political aspects, the finding of this study revealed the following social,
economic and political repercussions using Afar and Oromo ethnic conflict as a litmus test.

6.1. Social Effects

6.1.1 Deterioration of Ethnic Relations

As clearly indicated in chapter four, Afar and Oromo had strong economic, social and cultural
relations and interdependences. Their relations were more peaceful and less hostile (Ali, 1998;
Yasin, 2010) within frequent water and pasture conflicts. There existed mutual market and trade

132
exchange and common market places between them (Anteneh, 2013; Levine, 1974). According
to Amhara and Afar Region Administrations and Security Affairs Bureau reports (2005 and 2006
E.C, respectively) the relations between Amhara and Afar have been increasing since 1991.
Nevertheless, interviewees including government officials at Woreda level, informal and focus
group discussants witnessed that positive relations between Afar and Oromo are decreasing from
time to time. For instance, Mohammed Awole explained post conflict setting of relations as
follows 117:
We are intermarried and have offsprings. We were close relatives and friends. We
had firm relations in wedding and mourning; Afar came with camels for meat and
Oromo went with cereal for food. There were strong market relations too. We traded
cereal, vegetable, animals and animal product, wood and charcoal, etc… Afar had
spent the winter with Oromo and Oromo went to Afar during summer season
peacefully. But now, all these relations are interrupted. We are at war; Afar stopped
to come, Oromo stopped to go: who will come or go for dying.

Good relations are deteriorated and gave way to conflict. Relations in market, wedding and grief
are reduced since 2001 E.C considerably. This is what I witnessed at my presence in the area.
All good relations have been eroded. Inter-ethnic relations are decreasing including traditional
mode of cooperation and friendships. The economic and social relations are interrupted and
mutual friendship is weakened. Prior friendly relations are on the verge of ending, and the
feeling of ‘Oromo’ versus ‘Afar’ is being cultivated. Afar-Afar and Oromo-Oromo cooperation
is increasing rather than Afar-Oromo collaborations. The conflict has created the feeling of
mutual suspicion and mistrust between the two people and prior amicable relations are reducing
significantly. 118 Badly enough, hatred and animosity are being planted in place of earlier good
relations. The conflict created cleavage and it became bottleneck to mutual social, economic and
cultural relations. Suspicion and fear started to develop between the two people, and currently
there is fear for one to go with another. This move may further deteriorate relations and increase
the persistence of the conflict.

The conflict has increased ethnic loyalty, and Afar versus Oromo feeling is being placed on the
ground. This is in line with the argument that the ethnic conflicts have the potential to breed the

117
Mohammed Awole is administrator of Medine Kunyo Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on
June21,2014, Bora town
118
Ali Hassen is chairman of Kilentina Derseda Kebele administration, Dawe Woreda. The interview was held on April26,2014,
Woderage.

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feeling of ‘we’ versus ‘them’ (Abbink, 2006; Asebe, 2012; Muhabie, 2015b) between ethnic
groups. According to Asebe (2012) and Bekalu (2017) ethnic conflicts are likely to happen
suspicion, fear, distrust and hatred alarmingly. The conflict bred fear, distrust and suspicion in
place of former friendship. Surprisingly, earlier modes of trust and friendship (Tekesay and
Amana) are trapped by new trends of mistrust and suspicion. Even worse, the current senses of
division and hatred are likely to pave avenue for more havoc. Ethnic conflict impoverishes socio-
economic interdependence and deteriorates customary life (Mworia and Ndiku, 2012; Tache and
Oba, 2009). Likewise, the socio-cultural interactions (wedding, mourning and Tekesay
(friendship) and economic (trade and market exchange) relations between Afar and Oromo are
severely affected because of the conflict.

6.1.2 Insecurity

The conflict bet between Afar and Oromo created social tension and worry on the normal
functioning of life. The people feel insecure to carry out their tasks. Interviewees (including
government officials) and focus group discussants unanimously claimed that the conflict
becomes obstacle to free movement and peaceful living. For example, Osman Abdu said that
‘because of the increasing intensity of the conflict especially since 2001 E.C, the area becomes
zone of insecurity’. 119 There is fear and stress; no one is sure whether a conflict erupts today or
tomorrow. The people are protecting themselves by their own commonly. There is fear and
worry because they heard that warriors are coming for aggression. The residents do not feel
secure so that they guard the border day and night. The people fed up with the sound of gun fire
and marching for conflict. Free movement and carrying day to day tasks freely is questionable 120.
The continuation of the conflict bred fear, insecurity and worry. Hence, the conflict created
mental and psychological disturbance and security threat. ‘All the night, guns were fired; people
shouted… the residents of Haro village are bagging their luggage for dislocation fearing the
conflict’. 121 Fear and insecurity continues to disturb the people. When guns are fired, the people
fear that conflict will erupt. They entered into constant worry and they are in a problem to lead
normal life tasks. Moreover, farmers cannot plough border lands because such places are hot

119
Osman Abdu is head of Militia office, Dawe Woreda . The interview was held on April 15, 2014, Woderage.
120
Mohammed Jud is head of administration and security office, Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on June15,
2014, Bora town.
121
Endris Mohammed is resident of Wocheka Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda. He is member of Afar-Oromo joint peace
committee. Interview was held on June16,2014, Harawa Town.

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point of conflict due to questions of claim. Currently, border lands used for neither Afar to graze
nor Oromo to plow 122.

As the border is in conflict, we sold our cattle, camels and goats. We have left only
few camels and goats. We also lost for many years of crop product because of this
conflict. Still, we did not plough because of the continuation of the conflict. This
means we are going to lose additional years’ crop yield. We used what we have;
our whole of crop run out, we are going to poverty. Our greatest fear is that a
starvation will happen because we have finished all of our reserved cereal.

Further than fear and worry, the conflict posed poverty and threat of food insecurity. Farm lands
remained idle and farmers spent days while being vigilant to the border. Oromo farm and Afar
grazing lands turned into firing grounds due to the ceaseless border competition. Conflict diverts
human and financial resource away from development and facilitates poverty (Muhabie, 2015a;
Mworia and Ndiku, 2012; Shale, 2004). It may cause starvation and dislocation of people. In
addition, ethnic conflict disrupts normal social and economic life and gives new focus of
attention. Similarly, this conflict diverted Oromo farmers’ attention from production to border
keeping. It also posed the threat of dislocation in the residents of border villages (Haro, Uchiru,
Mandibo, Gadabora to mention few examples). The conflict and its continuation breed
insecurity, poverty and threat of famine among other things. This is related with (Asnake,2013;
Theodros.2017) findings that ethnic conflict creates the sense of trauma and insecurity as well as
death, dislocation, migration, orphanage which are the worst consequences of conflict in the
people.

6.1.3 Disruption of Social Services

Interviewees commonly explained that the conflict has affected the provision of social services
(mainly education, and health). Due to insecurity and tension the conflict has breed, social
services are either interrupted or inadequately provided. According to interviewees, education is
the first to be affected by the conflict significantly. Seid Abdu explains the impact of the conflict
on social services in general and education in particular as follow: 123
As a result of the recent conflict more than twelve Oromo died. Mendibo village was
totally burned by Afar. Another village which suffered Afar raid is Haro. At Haro
village there were more than 300 Oromo. The Afar looted Oromo properties; even

122
Tuahir Ali is resident of Dire Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on May 28, 2014. Hrawa.
123
Seid Abdu is resident of Dire Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on June 16,2014 ,Dire.

135
government institutions (like school furniture) were ransacked. Hence, the conflict
has disturbed the provision of social services. Schools are closed and students cut off
from going to school. For example, Haro School was closed many times and still
closed. Other schools found around the border also closed when conflict erupts.
Since teachers are at fear, they do not carry out their task properly and quietly.
Students drop out from school; who will go to school while father, brother and uncle
at a conflict with the Afar? No education as far as conflict exists; education is at
peace time.

The data obtained from government officials revealed that the conflict created burden on the
delivery of social services. As clearly indicated, there are times in which schools are shut down
because of the conflict. The conflict created fear and anxiety on student. Just like students,
teachers feel insecure to carry out their task of teaching quietly. In addition to this, parents feel
insecure to send their children to school. There are also women who are in a problem to send
their children to school because their husbands are dying of the conflict. All these increased
school dropout and make many children out of school. Mostly, schools found around the border
are victims of such problems. As a result, the conflict is increasing the problem of illiteracy. The
conflict affects not only education but also health service. The insecurity of the conflict becomes
an obstacle to provide services properly in border areas. Physicians, teachers and other service
providers fall under trouble because of the conflict and its tension. Workers either leave their
place of work or not been there daily. 124 They need to flee to more secured place of work or pass
days in such places. In short, the conflict created setback to social service especially education.
In this regard, Mworia and Ndiku (2012) and Sintayehu (2014) maintained that ethnic conflict
impoverishes social welfare and breeds social poverty.

6.1.4 Unemployment

The conflict created joblessness particularly among the youth. The interruption of cross border
trade and market increased unemployment. The conflict made youth unsafe to go to Woderage
for trade and search of job. Owing to border conflict and tension, neither Oromo nor Afar used
border lands for grazing and farming. This created shortage of pasture land, and farmers are
forced to sell their cattle and camels. This makes cattle keeper youths jobless. Therefore, in

124
Mohammed Jude is head of administration and security office of Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on June 10,
2014, Bora.

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addition to insecurity and worry, the conflict came up with another socio-economic evil,
joblessness.

Joblessness in turn created another social problem, addiction. Jobless youths come together and
engage in smoking cigarette and chewing Khat. Desperate youths consider such activities as
fashion to hide them but sank there. In this respect, a government informal discussant stated that
‘The conflict disrupted trade relations and free movement of people for social and economic
purpose. Youths working cross border become jobless because of the conflict. The interruption
of border trade exposed youths to addiction’. 125 Very interesting expression by Moheta
Mohammed 126 from Afar on the crisis of joblessness and the probable future impact is worth
mentioning here:
We sold our cattle because of grazing land shortage the conflict has created. We
become jobless and going to poverty. Cattle and goat keeper youths are sitting here
(Woderage) all the day while smoking cigarette and chewing Khat. Since they were
cattle and goat keepers, many youths did not come here before. After a while, the
youths you see (pointing to youths) will engage in smoking and chewing. The
problem is increasing quickly; and my fear is that these youths may go to theft and
robbery when they run out of money to buy Khat and cigarette.

The conflict created shortage of pasture land especially for farmers. As discussed in the previous
sections, former common pasture lands along the border became point of contestation and
conflict. Youths who have passed their time while looking after cattle become jobless.
Unemployment, the result of the conflict created spillover effect, addiction. As evidenced from
the above speech, there is also fear that the problem of joblessness and addiction may come up
with new problems of theft and robbery. This will create another circle of insecurity and social
crisis. Even though addiction is not the direct effect of the conflict, the problem widens its
horizon because of joblessness the conflict has resulted. This is related with (Shale, 2004; Tache
and Oba, 2009; Wolff, 2006) finding that conflict disrupts customary life and polarizes social
structure. Thus, the conflict and its spillover effect disturb the normal functioning of life that
may impede social structure.

125
Genene Assefa is head of trade office, Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on June15, Harawa town.
126
Moheta Mohammed is a member of Afar-Oromo joint peace committee and resdent of Kelintena Derseda Kebele, Dawe
Woreda. The interview was held on April 16,2014, Woderage.

137
6.2 Economic Effects

The conflict between Afar and Oromo has brought considerable impact on the economic
interactions and conditions of the two communities. Many people have been displaced from their
home, several women became widowed, and a number of children remained orphan. The
productive members of the population that contribute to economic advancement of the society
were killed and injured. The conflict has also created economic and security related problems in
the border areas of the two Woreda. It has resulted in human and animal loss, as well as, material
destructions. This signals the violation of citizen’s constitutional rights to life (1995 FDRE
Constitution, article 15, and security article 16). The loss of human life and damage of property
is summarized in the table below.
Table 3: Human, animal and material loss conflict between Afar and Oromo
Human loss Displaced Estimated value of Estimated value Un ploughed Remark
persons Properties looted of properties land in ha.
Ethnic
damaged
Group
Death Injury Starting
2001 E.C
Oromo 13 2 517 384,000 700,000 27
Afar 9 5 250 317,000 90,000 50
Total 22 7 767 701,000 790,000 77
(Source: Dawa Hara and Dawe Woreda Administration and Security Affairs Offices,2006E.C).
As can be seen from the above table, damages starting 2001 E.C made to humans, animals and
properties clearly imply the severity of the inter-ethnic conflict among the two neighboring
ethnic groups. The data are obtained from the analysis of various reports made by Dawa Harawa
and Dawe Woreda administration offices. Violent incidents on both sides resulted in deaths and
injuries. For instance, according to Abdu Abaye 127:
During the 2001 E.C Afar –Oromo conflict 334 houses were destroyed in one
conflict. The land which was used by both of us remains unploughed. Earlier before
being the land under Oromo hand and the Afar were using it by paying tribute to the
Oromo administration. One school was destroyed and as a result education is
discontinued. The Afar have taken the properties of the school. Students are not
getting education because of the conflict between Afar and Oromo in the area. As a
result of conflict, there have been, both government and private, properties

127
Abdu Abaye is resident of Dire Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on June 16,2014 ,Dire.

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damaged. Villages like Haro, Uchiru and Mendibo have faced devastating Afar
raids.
In the border area villages, so many properties are destroyed by the Afar raids. According to
Oromo informants; many properties are damaged at the border area villages. Haro village is a
typical example. Uchiru village in Dire Kebele burned three times. After this, Mendibo village
one hundred and eighty houses are burned once. This village was totally destroyed by Afar. It
was ransacked and burned by them. After burning of houses, it has turned to forest and covered
with forest. This is to take these places as theirs’ when turned to forest from settled villages of
the Oromo. 128 The Afar believes that when these places are turned into forests, they can to take
easily to Afar Region, which is territorial expansion. The Oromo are in a grief situation without
good prospect.

6.3 Political Effects

6.3 .1 Mistrust between Government and People

The conflict between Afar and Oromo ethnic groups strained relations between the government
and local people and created mistrust. Interviewees and focus group discussants witnessed that
the conflict created mistrust between government and people. The people are desperately waiting
for the government to give solution to the conflict. 129 Almost all of the interviewees and focus
group discussants have similar idea. For instance, as Mohammed Osman 130 described the
situations as ‘now we are keeping ourselves by our own militia men. We lost hope on the
government: we expect nothing from it. The people also said that we have to protect ourselves.
And the condition is let we save ourselves by our own energy and gun’. The people recruit their
own militia and safeguard the border turn by turn day and night. The people are more relied on
themselves than the government to be secure from a likely conflict. This implies that there is loss
of trust and increasing mistrust to the government. As Inspector Mohammed comments 131:
This conflict diminished our cordial relations with the people; even there
are conditions in which the people failed to accept command. For example,
only few people come when we call for meeting. Now-a-days, the people are
128
Mohammed Awole administrator of Medine Kunyo Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on June21,2014,
Bora town.
129
Nuru gaz Daato is a member of Afar-Oromo joint peace committee and resident ofWahilona Gidele Kebele,Dawe Woreda.
The interview was held on April10,2014, Woderage.
130
Mohammed Osman is deputy head of Dawa Harawa Woreda Administration and security office. Mohammed resides in
Harawa town. Even though he resides in Harawa town, he is the one who has grown in the Afar-Oromo border conflict area. The
interview was held on June15, 2014, Harawa town.
131
Inspector Mohammed is police commander, Dawa Harawa Woreda . Interview was held on June12, 2014, Bora.

139
less voluntary to discuss on the issue: they started to consider it as futile and
waste of time. Not only this, the conflict becomes obstacle to government-
people rations and good governance.

This indicates that the conflict is weakening government-people relations. The conflict polarized
relationship between the governor and governed and created the sense of mistrust and suspicion.
Besides, the conflict becomes obstacle on governments’ acceptance. Remarkably, the increasing
intensity of the conflict and its continuation created hopelessness on the people towards the
government. Increasing mistrust and strained relationship have the potential to create questions
of legitimacy. Asebe (2012) and Asnake (2013) indicated that ethnic conflicts cultivate the
culture of suspicion and mistrust between ethnic groups. However, the findings of these studies
unveiled that ethnic conflicts are likely to breed distrust and suspicion not only between ethnic
groups but also between government and people.

6. 3 .2 Public Grievances

The conflict between Afar and Oromo created public grievance towards the government. As
indicated above, the relation between the government and people is declining and gaps are
widening mainly because of the conflict. The persistence of the conflict and government’s failure
to resolve it created more grievance and resentment. The people started to developed the belief
that the government gives little/or no attention to the conflict. Interviewees and focus group
discussants affirmed that the government gave deaf ear to the conflict and far from giving lasting
solution. The people complained that government is limited on carrying out trivial tasks than
tangible and grounded activities that can avert the conflict and its threat. Governments’ focus on
minor tasks which can neither end the conflict nor endure lasting peace opened the room for
more resentment. Mohammed Awole comments the situatiion as follows 132:
….the government gave neither attention nor place to this conflict. If the
government gave attention, it would not have continued for three years. In
general, the conflict does not matter to the government. Even when it comes, the
government only focuses on very shallow and silly activities used for media
consumption. Now-a-days, we do not believe that the government will solve this
conflict. We lost our hope; we never expect that anyone will give us a solution,
except Allah.

132
Mohammed Awole administrator of Medine Kunyo Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on June21,2014,
Bora town.

140
There is increasing resentment and grievance towards the government for its failure to end. The
persistence of the conflict, governments’ little and slow responses and the increasing cost of the
conflict reduced public confidence and induced more resentment. As Abdella Mifta
comments 133:
The local people do not have good feeling for the government; they did not want
our presence there; the people hate to see government officials. Government
officials are also unhappy to go and discuss with the people about the issue as they
fear to respond to the question ‘why you are coming for not ending the conflict’. In
short, the conflict created high grievance to the government among the people.

The persistence of the conflict loosens government-people relations and created hatred to the
government and its officials. Fade up with the recurring conflict and the insecurity it has created,
the people needed lasting solution. However, the persistence of the conflict and governments
lenient position increased resentment. Moreover, as mentioned earlier, there is grave complaint
that the government itself needs the conflict for its political gain, extending power. The presence
of such type of complaints along with conflicts’ persistence becomes fertile ground for
resentment. Not surprisingly, the inability of the government to give lasting solution and its focus
on trivial tasks paved venue for another grievance. There are signs that the resentment of the
people is going to open opposition and violence. All in all, beyond social and economic impacts,
the conflict has come up with its own political repercussions. The finding Asebe (2007), Asnake
(2011), Shale (2004), Sintayehu (2014) and Tache and Oba (2009) magnified social and
economic impacts of ethnic conflicts. However, while the social and economic costs remain in
place, ethnic conflicts have their own implicit and explicit political hindrance too.

6. 3 3 Obstacle to Consensus and Unity

In 1991 the military regime deposed from power and ethnic- based federalism was adopted in
Ethiopia. As stated by many authors, Ethno-federal arrangement is launched for protecting ethnic
minorities and guaranteeing national unity (Alemseged, 2004; Assefa, 2006; Beken, n.d). The
new federal arrangement is seen as an attempt to resolve chronic and deep- rooted ethnic
grievances (Cohen, 1995; Kidane, 2001; Tronvoll, 2008) and perceived injustices in the country.
Remarkably, the federal system is opted as a panacea to the risk of disintegration (Aklilu, 2006;

133
Abdella Miftah is a meber of Afar-Oromo joint peace committee and resident of Wocheka Kebele,Dawa Harawa Woreda. The
interview was held on May 29,2014, Harawa.

141
Assefa, 2006) and provided solid base of state unity (Alemseged, 2004; Hashim, 2010). Needless
to mention, the federal arrangement is acknowledged as a panacea to recurrent ethnic conflicts
(Alem, 2004; Cohen, 1995) and maintenance of lasting peace. National unity is, thus, the major
factor for inducing the federal system. In spite of such novel rationales, given that recently,
ethnic conflicts are intensified and threatened the unity of the country.

The conflict between Afar and Oromo is the one that is stressed and augmented since recently.
Opposite to the justifications of the federalization, the conflict becomes more common in the
post-1991 period. The idea of Tefera Teshome on how the conflict affects national unity and
consensus is worth mentioning here 134:
The prospect of the conflict is widening and it becomes ethnic. This conflict becomes
obstacle to national unity and consensus. It is putting the tolerance of nations and
nationalities into question. If the people of one country enter into war on the basis of
identity, where is national unity and nationalism?! This is against the constitutional
principle of tolerance of nationalities and togetherness. In short, the conflict is
deteriorating unity and becoming setback to cohesiveness.

As a result of conflict, the relationship between the two ethnic groups has been strained. Distrust
and suspicion are started to be planted in the place of trust and mutual understanding. For
instance, the two regions compete over border, and one blames another. This implies that the
conflict is widening gap and reducing mutual trust. The conflict is creating the sense of ‘we’
versus ‘them’ which impedes togetherness. Such types of attitudes are more likely to reduce
national unity and belongingness. This is opposed to the rationale of the federalization and its
project of solidifying national unity. Put simply, the conflict is becoming antithesis to common
consensus and nation building. Related to this, Bertrand (2004:34) founded that ethnic conflicts
can destabilize the whole nation. Seemingly, ethnic conflict reduces common consensus and
unity by breeding mistrust between ethnic groups and poses the risk of dismemberment. Thus, it
is logical to generalize that the Afar- Oromo conflict hinders to reach a viable conflict resolution
mechanisms for sustained peace in the area.

134
Tefera Teshome is expert in the administrative and security Bureau of the Afar National Regional State. The interview was
held on May 11,2014. Sumera.

142
The diagram below shows the link between causes of the Afar-Oromo ethnic conflict and their
major social, economic and political impacts in the study area.

143
Diagram: Problem tree conflict analysis of Afar- Oromo ethnic groups of the study area

Effects of Afar-Oromo conflict

o Deterioration of cordial Afar -Oromo ethnic

relation, insecurity, disruption social services,
unemployment, mistrust between government and
people, public grievances, hindrance to consensus
and unity, large scale killings and damage of
property/insurrection takes place

Problem of
o Access to illegal o The blood feud /response or revenge ,theft, looting conflict
arms and light and killings
weapons

o Contested boundary
Root causes of
o Competition over scarce natural
conflict
resources

o Completion for grazing land and

water points for pasture and
o social and cultural diversity arable land for farming and
/value differences conflict of interest between
o -violent cultural practices famers and pastoralists
o -ethno-political parties and o Ethnic-based federal
groups such as OLF,ALF, arrangement
Assemela

o Environmental degraation and

drought/ prolonged dry seasons
o Government development
schemes
o Change of Afar mode of
production

The challenge of Destruction of

forest,change of dry climatic
conditions of the area.
Source: extracted from field data
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CHAPTER SEVEN: CONFLICT RESOLUTION MEHANISMS IN DAWA
HARAWA WOREDA OF AMAHARA NATIONAL REGIONAL STATE
AND DAWE WOREDA OF AFAR NATIONAL REGIONAL STATE

In the preceding two chapters, the study dealt with the causes and effects effects of Afar-Oromo
ethnic conflict in the bordering Woreda of Dawe of Afar Regional State and Dawa Hrawa of
Amhara Regional State of Oromo Nationality Zone. Specially, understanding and identifying the
real causes of conflict is tantamount to reaching half-way to the resolution mechanisms of
conflict between the Afar and Oromo communities in the study area. The magnitude and the
intensity of the consequences of the conflict also demand to search viable resolution
mechanisms. This chapter explores conflict resolution mechanisms in the study area. It tries to
explain the practices of resolving conflict between the two ethnic groups using indigenous and
modern of conflict resolution mechanisms in light of Galtung’s (1973) Attitude, Behavior and
Contradiction (ABC) model. The model suggests that a conflict moves among the triangle’s three
corners, where corner A refers to conflict attitudes, B to conflict behavior and C to the conflict or
contradiction itself. From this, it follows that conflict resolution is never ending process
(Wallensteen, 2007:33). For effective long-term conflict resolution, attitudes, behaviors and
contradictions have to be properly addressed. Hereafter, the works done on attitudes, behaviors
and contradictions in the study area are discussed. Further more, actors in the process of conflict
resolution and challenges to practice conflict resolution mechanisms in the study area are
examined.

7.1. Practice on Attitudes

In order to resolve the attitudes of the two communities and develop positive relationships in the
short and long run the following major tasks are undertake in the study area.

7.1.1 Public Conferences

According to the information secured from Oromo Nationality Zone Administration and Security
Department, conferences are held at various levels to bring attitudinal change and provide lasting
remedies to ethnic conflicts 135. Nurugaz Da’ato from Afar, also stated the significances of the

135
Endris Ali is the head of administration and security department of Oromo Nationality Zone. The interview was held on June
6, 2014.Kemissie.

145
conferences for promoting relations between the two communities 136. The conferences are
organized and financed mainly by the government. To some extent, non- governmental
organizations, especially Kombolcha Catholic organized trainings for advocating peace in the
area. Besides, local communities are also involved in financing conferences that are held in their
localities.

The conferences help to reduce misconceptions betwen ethnic groups and contribute towards
building peace. To this end, Dawa Harawa Woreda 137 Administration and Security Office head
Mohammed Jude said, ‘Community conferences play vital role in strengthening the socio-
economic and cultural interactions of the two distinctive communities by keeping peace and
stability and identifying security threats in the past two years.’ 138 The conferences have focused
on building the value of peace. This is basically about changing the attitudes of the two
communities at the grass root level. This mechanism is designed to teach the value of peaceful
coexistence between individuals and groups. In order to achieve this purpose, the woreda and
zonal administration and security offices prepare public discussions and give trainings at least
once in every quarter of the year for different sections of the community such as community
elders, religious leaders, women and youth. Besides, when a need arises, more conferences were
organized revising the time frame. 139

To normalize relation between Afar and Oromo, joint militia trainings and conferences are used.
At the moment, both Afar and Oromo are trying to manage their conflicts jointly. For example,
Afar militia men are being trained in the Oromo territory (early June 2014, the training was held
for 15 days in Dawa Harawa) 140. They were in a good mood as they were managing their conflict
through discussions in the joint meeting together. In the past, there were cattle raiding and killing
each other, now due to conferences, they are able to minimize these to a greater degree. Stolen

136
Nuru gaz Da’ato is a member of Afar-Oromo joint peace committee and resident of Gendawarina Eyeledi Kebele, Dawe
Woreda. The interview was held on May5,2014, Harawa.
137
A Woreda is one of the administrative divisions of Ethiopia immediately one step down the zonal administrative divisions.
138
Mohammed Jude is head of administration and security office of Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on June 10,
2014, Bora.
139
Anuar Yesuf is conflict prevention and resolution expert in the administration and security office , Dawa Harawa Woreda.
The interview was held on June10, 2014
140
My personal obserhaion during my second field visit in June 2014. Harawa Town.

146
cattle are being returned to their owners of both sides. This normalizes ties and builds trust
between the two ethnic groups.

Participants at this conference include, representatives (security forces) and administrators from
Oromo Zone and Afar Zone Five, administrators from both wereda and, community
representatives ( namely, elders, clan leaders, kebele administration leaders) from both sides. The
conflict that took place in study area led to the call of the conference. As narrated by Mussa
Ali: 141

The neighbouring Oromo marched their cattle to the Afar reserved area. At the
time, the Afar reserved this area and marched their livestock below the main road
leaving the grazing area as reserve for use in other season. The Afar said that the
area was their reserve and the Oromo should have not moved their stock into the
reserved area. Then, they told the Oromo to go back to their locality. This led to
conflict since the Oromo refused the Afar request. It was because the Afar
considered the Oromo presence around encroaching into their settlement, not only
as searching grass. At that point, the Oromo opened fire towards the Afar. The
Afar youth then fired back and snatched some cattle from the Oromo group. But,
the Afar elders intervened and persuaded the Afar youths to return the cattle they
took from Oromo. But, the Oromo launched attack after they had received their
cattle back from the Afar. Then the Afar got organized and opened offensive
attack. The Dawe Wereda administrator and Police tried to stop the clash by going
to the front showing the Ethiopian flag.

As a result of this conflict, conference has been organized. The initiators of the conference were
representative from Afar and Amhara Regional States. They proposed to conduct conference
between the two conflicting groups. They did this through consulting clan leaders and elders to
organize meeting of the two parties. The aim was to enable the local leaders to solve this
conflict. The government bodies played a facilitating role. Clan leaders and kebele
administration leaders participated in the conference during which they agreed to return looted
animals and pay blood compensation for the killed persons. Hussein Mohammed expresses
reconciliation proceess as follows 142:

141
Musa Ali is conflict prevention and resolution expert in the office of administration and security, Dawe Woreda. The
interview was held on April10, 2014, Woderage.
142
Hussein Mohammed is ex-chairman of Dire Kebele admnistration , Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on June
16, 2014, Dire.

147
The Oromo requested residents of Baro villagers (Afar) to pay Guma (blood
indemnity) and the Afar paid 15,000-20,000 birr. But, the Afar claimed that the
Oromo did or did not return their camel, which the Oromo after the second conflict
took and slaughtered them. At the conference, they formed a joint committee to
facilitate the return of looted livestock and payment of blood compensation and to
resolve future conflicts that may arise due to clearing land for farm and
encroachment into pastures areas. A joint peace committee, consisting of
representatives from the adjacent kebele, constituting twenty members who were
drawn from four kebele (i.e. five from each) from Afar and from Oromo side, was
established. At woreda level peace, committee was also established.

The conflict between Afar and other groups (Oromo, Argoba, Amhara and Tigre) is common
along the border that stretches along the escarpments ((Kinfe, 2014:157). All wereda (i.e. 10 in
number) along these borders have a problem of conflict between Afar and other groups (see the
Map on page 16). In the study area woreda, Dire, Ojo Wocheka, Medene Kunyo, and Urene
Selama Kebele from Dawa Harawa side and Gendewarina Ejelende, Kilintina Deresada, and
Wahilona Gedele Kebele from Dawe side are areas where the two ethic groups enter into
conflict. Especially, conflict between Dire and Gendewarina Ejelende border is severe. All
wereda, zones and regions have joint peace committees to follow up and handle conflicts that
can arise between neighbouring groups. These wereda also held joint meeting as need arises.

In addition to the conferences, festivals are carried out in border areas. An attempt had made to
integrate the two people through music, cultural dances, poems, jokes and sporting games. The
communities also celebrate the nations, nationalities and people’s day together through photo
exhibition and other festivities. The festivals were prepared through the agreement of the two
woreda administrations and many people involved from both sides as participants. Therefore,
such events had a great potential for shaping attitudes and promoting inter-cultural ties between
the Afar and Oromo communities.

Therefore, the undertakings of public conferences and festivals in the study area have a role of
facilitating the interaction and agreement between the two communities, aimed at bringing about
harmonious relations. The conferences are also provided with the intention of changing the
attitudes of people towards conflict and it was aimed at changing the cultural destructive patterns
that contribute to the rise of violence, thus contributing for cultural change in the long run.

148
7.1.2 Afar-Oromo Joint Peace Committee

For managing and resolving conflict, the government has organized join peace committees at the
kebele and at the woreda levels. At kebele level every fifteen days they meet to exchange
information. They meet to resolve their problems. This is through peace joint committee (JPC,
here after) both at the kebele and woreda. The government has organized a joint peace
committee, constituted from both sides. From both kebele prominent persons are members of
(JPC). These people by meeting together try to resolve Afar -Oromo problems of conflict.

The establishment of joint peace committee is a major forward for handling conflicts that arise
between the two ethnic groups and its function is taken as a preliminary work for conflict
resolution. Dawa Harawa and Dawe Woreda have joint peace committee (JPC), which is
established to meet regularly in every fifteen days to monitor the peace and security of the area.
The joint peace committee was organized with the support of the government. Its members were
selected by the respective communities in light of honesty and social acceptance. The committee
consists of religious leaders and known elders who are responsible to the people whom they
represent. When they establish peace committees, they select good and famous individuals who
have good behaviors or respected members of the society from both groups. And also they
underline the importance peace of development. They teach the people the need to have peace
and the benefits of peace for the people. 143 They teach the people the consequence of the conflict
and tell the people the stolen and lost materials and animals to return to the owners in both sides.
Benefits from lost animals and materials are not greater than prevalence of peace in the area.
Peace is vital for the well being of the society. The joint peace committees list the lost animals
and lost materials from both sides and tell the people to return to the owners of both sides to
restore peace.

The Dawa Harawa and Dawe Woreda JPC has thirty members in which each woreda contribute
fifteen from different kebele of the respective woreda. According to Dawa Harawa woreda

143
Mohammed Sobir is head of Dawa Harawa Woreda Militia office. The interview was held on June12, 2014, Bora.

149
administration and security affairs office report of June 2006 E.C, some of the functions of the
joint peace committee are:
• To facilitate the return of looted properties to owners.

• To decide and follow up the compensation payments for human injury and death
including animals.
• To discuss on the challenges of peace and identify causes of violence in the study area.

• To solve a disagreement before it turns into violence particularly when there are
potential resource conflicts between cattle herders during the drought seasons.

• To make reconciliation of ethnic conflicts.

The aforementioned tasks of the joint peace committee are mainly associated with management
of conflicts and lesser extent to conflict resolution. When members of the joint peace committee
identify causes of violence, it means that they are working for the containment of conflict, i.e. the
preservation of negative peace. When they manage disagreement, it means that they believe that
they are resolving disputes. Besides, facilitation of the return of looted properties to owners,
facilitation of compensation payment and the making of reconciliation of ethnic conflicts are
directly related to conflict management practice. However, all these efforts can also be taken as
preliminary tasks that are required for further resolution of conflicts.

The JPC in the study areas has its own rules and regulations that are designed and approved by
the public conferences of the two communities. The rules and regulations guide the relationship
of the two communities and are important in addressing conflicts. Since the people in the areas
are governed by the rules, they are contributing for promoting peace. These rules have lists of the
types of criminal offences and the compensation payments imposed on the offenders.

The Process of Reconciliation by the Joint Peace Committee

The moment members of JPC realize conflict arise, they will communicate through phone or
face to face sharing experience and updating information. The border kebele JPC chairmen have
communicated to stop both individuals from their action. So they together have stopped both the
Afar and the Oromo from killing each other. So, it is in this way that they stopped them from
killing each other.

150
As informants described, once a violent conflict erupted and crime is made by member of either
group, government officials, elders and religious leaders arrange time and place for
reconciliation assemblies. After an agreement is reached between the two parties, the joint peace
committee would decide on compensation payment based on the agreements signed by the two
ethnic group joint peace committee representatives. The compensation payment is given to the
victim parents in accordance with the governing rules of the joint peace committee.

One of the major functions of the joint peace committee is deciding on compensation payments
as per the rules of the committee. Using the rules, the committee imposes a compensation
payment on physical injury, death and damaged property. Each particulars of the payments will
be recorded by the committee and the woreda officials as it is totally completed or partly paid,
started or not, etc. or in case of refusal to pay compensation a person who has involved in
raiding (rustling) cattle will be taken to the court by the government for trial.
Table 4: Sample Compensation Payment 2005 E.C

Year Payer Woreda Receiver Payment for Payment for Payment for
Woreda human loss physical damaged
(ETB) injury(ETB property(ETB)
2005 Dawa Harawa Dawe 103,356 67,567 37,735
E.C
Dawe Dawa 113,190 78,163 102,782
Harawa

(Source: Dawe Woreda Administration and Security Affairs Office).

Table 5 : Compensation Payment from 1991-2000 E.C by Dawa Harawa

Affected Woreda Number of death and injury

Death Injury Compensation paid by Dawa
Harawa in ETB
Dawe 17 8 89,765
(Source: Dawa Harawa Woreda Administration and Security Affairs Office).

Table 6 : Compensation Payment from 1991-2000 E.C by Dawe

Affected Woreda Number of death and injury

Death Injury Compensation paid by Dawe
in ETB
Dawa Harawa 35 27 57,600
(Source: Dawa Harawa Woreda Administration and Security Affairs Office).

151
The above tables show how the joint peace committee works for the payments of compensation.
The data are obtained from the assessment of reports made by Dawe and Dawa Harawa woreda.
Human loss and physical injury are evident in any violent conflicts. As a result of this many
people were died and injured in the conflict between Oromo and Afar communities. For instance,
table 2 & 3 shows 52 deaths and 35 injuries in the years between 1991 and 2000. Because of
such causalities the joint peace committee has been working starting from September 1993. 144
As discussed so far, since one of the major functions of the committee was deciding on
compensation payments, the above data shows sample of the amounts imposed by the committee
and paid by the two communities. It also reflects the task of the JPC in dealing with conflicts in
the area.

In the process of the reconciliation, oath will be undertaken by members of each group with the
facilitation of community elders and religious leaders. Once the crime perpetuator and his
families accept their wrong deeds, they shake the hands of the victims’ parents and both groups
swear by putting their hands on the Holy Quran held by the hands of religious leaders. After the
oath practice is concluded, religious leaders and elders of the two ethnic groups give blessing and
the two conflicting group meal together in order to restart new friendship. The oath and the
traditional practice of eating together, after reconciliation, symbolize the achievement of the
reconciliation by the two parties. Especially, eating together is considered as an indication of
sense of love and respect. Errensa is a religious place for both ethnic groups, located east of
Kemissie town. At this place, with the assistance of woreda and kebele administrations, conflict
is resolved and then after this peace settlement, joint peace committees were established in both
territories. After the major reconciliation, they resolve conflicts within themselves by setting
programs. Afar –Oromo joint committees call each other periodically for discussions and to
resolve the conflict for two-three days in each others’ territory.

According to Wallensteen (2007:33), the key role of conflict resolution is establishing strategies
that integrate short-term responses with long-term changes. It addresses both immediate and

144
Anuar Yesuf is conflict prevention and resolution expert in the administration and security office, Dawa Harawa Woreda.
The interview was held on June10, 2014,Bora.

152
broader relationship patterns. With this conflict resolution perspective, the preceding
reconciliation process, however, focused on the immediate causes of conflict, which require a
short term response. It is not more concerned to address problems of broader relationship
patterns like harmful cultural traditions and environmental degradation, which require long- term
responses. But, it had contributed much to resolve contested issues. Through continuous dialogue
between the conflicting parties, the reconciliation practice was effective in resulting in a win-win
outcome thereby, contributing for change in attitudes and reducing acts of revenge.

On the other hand, the role of the joint peace committee is now weakening, from time to time.
Its acceptance is declining from time to time. The strict obedience it received from the elders
who were loyal to the values of the community strengthened it earlier. But, now youths are not
ready to be bound by all decisions of the committee, as was in the past. They can engage in
retaliation even after reconciliation or they can involve in obstructing a reconciliation process.
This is due to the lack of enough support both material and moral from government officials in
undertaking their functions and also overlapping duties of committee members. This would have
a devastating impact on the implementation of the regulation of the committee and on the
process of handling conflicts. 145 The existing situations indicate that members of the joint peace
committee alone are not effective in resolving conflicts and hence external intervention is
crucial. This is one manifestation of the gradual weakening of the ability of the joint peace
committee to resolve conflicts. Besides, some of the causes of conflicts like territorial claim,
dispute over irrigation, etc. are now becoming beyond the capacity of the committee. Members
are also not meeting regularly and conflicts are turning into violence to the extent of taking the
lives of security officers.

In regard to the weakness of JPC, Mohammed Gudile narrates as follows: 146

I am a security head of the Dire Kebele. I am in charge of security issues of Dire
Kebele. By convincing our people, we left farming our land, which is ours because of
Afar continual claim upon the land. We left the land unploughed though we pay tax
in the border areas between Afar and Oromo. By convincing our people we left the

145
Mustefa Ahmed is secretary of theAfar-Oromo joint peace committee,Dawa Harawa Woreda Interview was held on June 21,
2014, Harwa.
146
Mohammed Gidile is security head ofof Dire Kebele admnistration , Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on June
16, 2014, Dire.

153
land un plaughed. Though the government told us to plough the land, because of the
fear from the Afar side we left farming the land. The agreement is only on
conferences while there is no real agreement on the ground. No implementation of
the agreement was made. Agreement is only on conferences while there is no real
agreement on the ground. No practicality of the agreement in the conference with
Federal, Zone, Woreda officials presence. The solution that higher authorities gave
us only in words there is no reality on the ground. In the conferences, the focus is
not to escalate conflict. When we notify the problem for higher officials they come
and negotiate us but it is not put in practice. We are not using our farmland as a
result of banning the land by the Afar.

These shows how far joint peace committees are lacking trust and credibility by the people as a
result of failure of implementation of the agreements made at various conference through the
help of joint peace committees under the auspices of the government bodies.

Based on the rules of the joint peace committee, criminal offenders are obliged to pay some sort
of compensation, which is related with the crime committed. The compensation differs
depending on the way the crime was committed. If the murder was committed accidentally and
unintentionally, it is taken as accidental. But on the other hand, if the murder was committed
deliberately for revenge or if it was committed intentionally in violation of the reconciliation
agreements, it is taken as a cruel murder. Usually, the compensation not lies on the individual
offender but to the entire community. That means if a member of either community is found
guilty, community members share the burden. 147

7.2. Practice on Behavioral Change

The behavioral element of the conflict in the study areas is manifested by the physical acts of
violence. Human and animal casualties and resource damages occurred as a result of such
behavior. Thus, the following strategies seem to manage and resolve such behaviors in the study
area.

7.2.1 Exchange of Suspected Criminals

An agreement has been reached by the joint peace committee to exchange suspected criminals
who are accused of killing of members of other ethnic group. This means if a member of the

147
Mustefa Ahmed is secretary of theAfar-Oromo joint peace committee,Dawa Harawa Woreda Interview was held on June 21,
2014, Harwa. And document analysis of the Afar-Oromo customary law.

154
Oromo community kills an Afar, the suspected criminal is hunted by the Dawa Harawa of the
Oromo police and would surrendered to the police of Dawe of the Afar region. Likewise, the
Dawe police would handover the criminal offenders wanted by the Dawa Harawa police. 148

In relation with this agreement, one of the informants from Dawa Harawa Woreda
Administration and Security Affairs Office reported a case that depicts the exchange of
criminals 149. As to him, an Oromo from Dawa Harawa killed two members of the Afar
community in 2005 E.C due to the conflict over grazing land along the border of Dawa Harawa
and Dawe Woreda. Eventually, the suspected criminal and his accomplice were hunted by the
Dawa Harawa woreda police and then were handed over to the Dawe woreda police. After their
cases had been seen by the higher court, they were sentenced to imprison in Delifaghe, the center
of Afar Zone Five Administration (known as Hari Rasu).

The reason behind this agreement is that the Dawa Harawa community members do not want to
be imprisoned in Afar region because they will be suffered from harsh weather condition and
fear of unfair treatment within the prisons. The Dawe community members too do not want to be
imprisoned in Oromo Nationality Zone because of fear of unfair treatment in the prisons by
Oromo ethnic groups. In this case, the agreement has contributed for the de-escalation of violent
conflicts, by reducing acts of homicide. However, this agreement is not welcomed by the Dawa
Harawa community. They claimed that the Afar are not committed to handover suspected
criminals rather, they hide them and said that they escaped Djibouti. 150 On the other hand, Afar
claimed that the Dawa Harawa communities are not willing to expose criminals rather they
report as they went to Saudi Arabia. 151 Therefore, this agreement falls short off being
materialized.

148
Seid Abdu is resident of Dire Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda. Relatively, Dire Kebele is place where there is high intensity
conflict between the Afar and Oromo ethnic groups. The main reason for such acute conflict is that the area is irrigable land. The
interview was held on June12, 2014, Bora Town.
149
Anuar Yesuf is conflict prevention and resolution expert in the administration and security office , Dawa Harawa Woreda.
The interview was held on June10, 2014,Bora.
150
Mohammed Suabir is head of Militia office, Dawa Harawa Woreda . The interview was held on June15, 2014, Bora town.
151
Muheyta Mohammed is member of Afar –Oromo joint peace committee and resident of Kilentina Derseda Kebele, Dawe
Woreda. The interview was held on April125,2014, Woderage.

155
7.2.2 Legalization and Confiscation of Small arms and Light Weapons (SALW) and
Raising Its Price

Being part of the resolution process, the Dawa Harawa Woreda Administration has been working
on disarming and legalizing of weapons. On the side of Dawe, too, there is an effort to legalize
weapons. The Dawe administration developed a new format for registering and authorizing
private gun owners. 152 These efforts, tried by the two administrations, help to minimize illicit
trafficking of weapons and make legal gun owners accountable for proper utilization of their
firearms.
Table 7 : SALW Confiscated by government in Dawa Harawa 2001-2006 E.C

No. Year Types of SALW

Rifles Pistols Bullets Bombs
1 2001 5 6 79 23
2 2002 7 3 18 11
3 2003 4 3 67 8
4 2004 3 11 277 12
5 2005 2 6 58 3
6 2006 1 5 21 44
Total 22 34 520 101
(Source: Dawa Harawa Woreda Militia Office).

As is shown from the above table 22 rifles, 34 pistols, 520 bullets, and 101 bombs were
confiscated by the Dawa Harawa administration in the years between 2001 and 2006 E.C. As
discussed so far, though there is control of SALW in the area it was difficult to totally control the
circulation of arms. But the above figure depicts the efforts made to control the circulation of
illicit arms. In addition, the figure also indirectly indicates the availability of hidden arms in the
hands of individuals. According to Mohammed Ahmed, ‘there are many hidden weapons even
including machine guns’. 153 Therefore, the accumulation of such small arms has contributed to
destabilizing internal situations by exacerbating crime and violence in the study area. On the
other hand, it can be argued that if there is strict control of arms it will contribute for the
maintenance of peace.

152
Osman Abdu is head of Militia office, Dawe Woreda . The interview was held on April 15, 2014, Woderage.
153
Mohammed Ahmmed is ex- administrator of Medine Kunyo Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on
June21,2014, Bora town.

156
According to Regulation No.44/2001 article 17 sub-article 2, which is enacted by the council of
the Amhara National Regional State Government, the militia offices at different levels of the
government have been working for the reduction and control of illicit arms from the community.
This regulation states that any person who is armed by the government to safeguard the security
of the people has a legal duty to use the weapon in responsible manner. One who trades these
SALW, their parts and ammunitions is accused by the criminal code of the state for legal
punishment. Furthermore, he pays the price determined by the regional government for the lost
weapons. However, this provisional law issued by regulation number 44/2001 could not limit the
illicit trade in firearms and ammunitions rather it encouraged the selling of state owned guns for
high prices while they are paying less penalty for the lost weaponries. For this reason, the
regional government has revised the regulation in 2007. Accordingly, the price of SALW owned
by government agents such as militias, police officers and reserved national armies has been
increased. The increasing of prices of weapons is aimed at controlling the easy circulation of
firearms in the area thereby reducing the negative effect the arms brought to the security of the
communities.

7.2.3 Conflict Early Warning and Response Mechanism

Nowadays, the Ethiopian government has established a chain of information communication

strategy starting from the lowest (kebele) level to the highest (federal) level. Accordingly, in
every 24 hours the focal persons from each kebele in the study area communicate with the
concerned authorities in each hierarchy before the outbreak of violent conflicts. The mechanism
is used to detect the early escalation or occurrence of violence, with the objective of preventing
the outbreak of further escalation of violence in order to save life. Through this chain of
communication, public officials from kebele to zonal level from both Afar and Amhara Regions
are able to contain the escalation of violence in the study area. The strategy has contributed to
prevent violence at the grass root level. 154

154
Musa Ali is conflict prevention and resolution expert in the office of administration and security, Dawe Woreda. The
interview was held on April10, 2014, Woderage.

157
7.3. Practice on Contradictions

The main issue in conflict resolution is identifying the fundamental causes of the conflict,
namely contradictions. In the study area, contradiction is constituted by the underlying causes of
the conflict that includes, contested boundaries, competition over scarce natural resources,
environmental degradation and drought, and violent cultural practices. ‘Conflict can be
successfully minimized and resolved when basic needs are addressed, and which meant violent
conflict can be terminated by satisfying needs for access’ (Wallensteen, 2007:37). In respect of
the underlying causes of the conflict, due emphasis has not been given in the study area. Much of
the efforts are focused on managing conflict.

7.3.1 Building of Infrastructural Developments

On the side of Dawe, there is a sustainable development goal project undertaken by the Federal
Ministry of Agriculture and Natural Resource in pastoralist region. As part of the Millennium
Development Goals, the project is being carried out since 2012 under the auspices of the Federal
government in Afar region. The main purpose of this project is to bring together the sparsely
settled pastoralists in one area by changing their livelihood system from pastoralism to agro-
pastoralism. 155 This will help them experience a settled life in villages and minimizes their
seasonal migration (which is one of the causes of the conflicts with their neighboring ethnic
groups) particularly during the dry seasons.

Based on this project, infrastructural developments are being built in different parts of Dawe
Administrative Woreda. These infrastructural developments include roads, schools, clinics, and
veterinary clinics. Besides, in order to alleviate the serious shortage of surface water, the project
has been developing underground water for irrigation agriculture 156. This practice has a great
potential for Afar to experience a settled life thereby addressing the root causes of conflict
between the two ethnic groups due to competition for scarce resources, like grass and water.

155
Tefera Teshome is expert in the administrative and security Bureau of the Afar National Regional State. The interview was
held on May 11,2014. Sumera.
156
Mohammed Seid is member of Afar-Oromo joint peace committee and resident of Wahilona Gidale Kebele, Dawe Woreda.
The interview was held on April21,2014, Woderage.

158
On the side of Dawa Harawa, the small irrigation projects are constructed by the Amhara
National Regional Government. The projects have a great potential for development of
agriculture through irrigation. It will also serve for animal watering and it can be taken as a
development endeavor that addresses problem of water scarcity in the area. However, the
projects are not based on the common understanding of the two ethnic groups. Besides, as Dawa
Harawa woreda administration and security affairs office head, Mohamed Jude reported, efforts
are made to enhance development endeavors in the area (interviewed on 21 May 2014). Since
building common infrastructures in the border areas is indispensable for resolution of conflict,
the government tried to provide health, education and agricultural facilities for the two groups.
On the other hand, the official claimed that much of the works were not intended to deal with
conflicts rather they spontaneously emerged as development works.

To conclude, the developmental endeavors that are undertaken by the two woreda
administrations are not clearly designed and implemented for the purpose of resolving conflicts
in the area. Rather they are targeted to deal with the major problems faced by the community.
They are designed and implemented by institutions, which do not have direct concern about
conflict and conflict resolution. However, such developmental efforts have their own indirect
role in resolving and transforming conflictual relations. Even though they are not targeted to deal
with the conflicts, works focused on reduction of poverty, protection of natural resources (done
by other institutions), for instance, will contribute for addressing root causes of conflict in the
area like competition over natural resources, environmental degradation and drought.

7.3.2 Inter- Woreda Cooperation

There are also arrangements for maintaining cooperation between the two woreda
administrations to enhance joint efforts. Through inter-woreda cooperation the two woreda
administrations are working together. The inter- woreda cooperation, is aimed at reformulating
the structural causes of the conflict. This is done through formulating joint plans, i.e. both
woreda have a joint plan that helped them address problems of conflict in the area. The
cooperation formally started in the mid-1990s related with the coming of the EPRDF or current
government and it has gradually been strengthened. As per the agreement, public leaders from
both sides are expected to meet in accordance with their time schedule. The cooperation has

159
some set of hierarchy. It started from the top governmental officials of the two regions. At
regional level, administration and security affairs bureau heads and officers agreed to meet twice
a year (January and June 157), i.e at zonal level, once in every quarter of the year, at woreda and
kebele levels , once in a month 158.

According to information obtained from Amhara Administration and Security Affairs Bureau,
recently an agreement has been reached between the two regions to involve chief administrators
from both sides at different levels of cooperation (Dawa Harawa woreda security and
administration office report, 2005:16). Previously, the cooperation was guided by the
involvement of only heads and officers of administration and security affairs. But, now
entrusting the involvement of chief administrators is expected to strengthen the cooperation and
they have agreed to involve administrators in each level of hierarchy. This shows the emphasis
given to the cooperation. However, this cooperation is not established by formal proclamations
and it has no formalities that bind the two sides for enforcing plans and for being accountable for
their failure, it rather emerged by the agreement of the two neighboring regional administrations.

The inter-woreda cooperation is practical through the enactment of joint plans. According to
information obtained from ANRS administration and security bureau, joint plans are enacted by
both regions. An opportunity was gained to look into the 2014 and 2015 annual joint plans made
by the Amhara and Afar regions administration and security bureaus. As per the plans, the
circulation of illegal SALW and environmental degradation and drought were identified as major
factors that induce conflict in the area. The plans gave due emphasis for organizing public
conferences especially for youth and women. This is done because most of the time, it is the
youth that involve in direct fighting at grazing fields. Since women can also contribute to the
escalation of conflicts by encouraging their men, conferences are planned to bring their
attitudinal change. The plans also revealed the need for establishment and strengthening of
several institutions at kebele levels that deal with conflicts. In each bordering kebele of Afar and

157
Recently, conference has been held at Dessie towm to discuss on matters of conflict in the border areas of Amhara and Afar
regions organized by president Awol Arba of Afar Region and president Temesgen Tiruneh of Amhara region for two days i.e
from June 25 to 26/ 2020.
158
Mohammed Seid is member of Afar-Oromo joint peace committee and resident of Wahilona Gidale Kebele, Dawe Woreda.
The interview was held on April21,2014, Woderage.

160
Oromo joint community policing and joint peace committees were organized. Besides, focal
persons who work for early warning and response mechanism were appointed in each kebele.
These all actions were performed through the inter woreda cooperation scheme (ibid.).

According to information obtained from the two woreda offices, the woreda officials conduct
joint meetings once in a month under normal circumstances and once in fortnight when possible
peace threats exist. Under normal circumstances, the officials and experts meet once in a month
and discuss the condition of peace and security in their respective areas. When conflict erupts,
they meet shortly to address the problems before it leads to human live loss and material
destruction.
Table 8: Inter- Woreda officials’ meeting, 2005 E.C

No. Contacts made by Woreda Plan Achievement

and Kebele
1 Between woreda 12 14
2 Beween Kebele 24 25
3 Total 36 39
Source: Dawa Hrawa Woreda Security and Administration Office report ,2005.
Table 9: Joint Peace Committees’ meetings. 2005 E.C

Contacts made by Woreda Plan Achievement

and Kebele
Between woreda 12 14
Beween Kebele 24 23
Total 36 37
Source: Dawa Hrawa Woreda Security and Administration Office report , 2005 E.C.

These trends have a dual advantage of solving capacity problems of the woreda and improving
inter- woreda cooperation for the attempt of restructuring the sources of the contradictions,
which require the concerted efforts of all actors. But, officials from both sides are not always
bounded by the cooperation scheme, which has emerged as a result of the joint agreement. If
either of the two woreda, for instance, cancel a scheduled meeting the other cannot take on any
measure unless awaiting the arrival of the other woreda. Therefore, though this cooperation is
taken as a good start of promoting positive relations, it should be strengthen and endevour
maintained. The woreda should place on all efforts required for developing positive relations
between the two communities. Besides, both groups should work to formalize and legalize the

161
cooperation through proclamations. If done, it would be possible to create sense of accountability
on both sides.

7.4 Actors in the Process of Conflict Resolution in the Study Area

Actors are the most significant role players in the process of inter-ethnic conflict resolution. The
resolution mechanism of inter-ethnic conflict involves the participation of several actors at
different levels (Miall, 2004: 165). Depending on various contexts, both domestic and
international actors may participate in ethnic conflict resolution. In the study area, the major
actors that are working for managing and resolving conflicts are local actors involving local level
of administration, particularly the woreda administration. Noticeably, this study unveiled that the
following actors have participated directly or indirectly being involved in the conflict resolution
process. According to interviewees and focus group discussants local farmers, pastoralists,
elders, religious leaders, abagar, clan leaders, government officials, and those who have
participated in the conflict directly or indirectly are actors in the conflict resolution process.

7.4.1 Government Bodies

It is the government that organizes the peace committee and also the government bodies help
maintaining peace. It is the government bodies that support the kebele to organize the elders and
peace committees from both woreda and kebele. Government officials are doing their best in
organizing conferences and meetings between the two ethnic groups. From both kebele and
woreda government officials including police and JPC try to resolve conflicts. Both the woreda
and the kebele administrations try to their best to avert conflict. 159 They try to avert conflicts
between these two ethnic groups. Both the kebele and woreda administrations try to stop or
contain the conflict by gathering the people and leaders of kebele and Woreda. At the irrigation
places, many discussions were made not to involve in conflict, but as a matter of fact, conflict
happens between these ethnic groups. Otherwise, they tried their best to manage the conflict
between the two groups at the irrigation land after the conflict arises. Both the kebele and woreda
administrative bodies believe that they are responsible in discouraging conflicts. 160

159
Endris Mohammed is resident of Wocheka Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda. He is member of Afar-Oromo joint peace
committee. Interview was held on June16, 2014, Harawa Town.
160
Endris Ali is the head of administration and security department of Oromo Nationality Zone. The interview was held on June
6, 2014.Kemissie.

162
When there conflict arises in a certain place between the two ethnic groups, before reaching the
woreda officials at the conflict place, the kebele peace committee try to resolve the conflict
immediately by discussion, negotiation. The peace committee would try to resolve or manage the
conflict at the kebele, and if it is impossible the woreda officials would come together and try to
solve. As soon as possible, the conflict would be resolved before escalation through the help of
peace committees- elders, religious leaders. If it is beyond the kebele, the woreda would involve
in the maintenance of peace through negotiations and discussions. Here the problem lies in the
partisanship of representatives of the two ethnic groups to their side.

After the 2001 E.C conflict, government officials from both Regions, that is from Afar and
Amhara National Regional States, and Federal Government visited the study area to see the
situation. 161 Officials closely listened to whose views that the cause of the Afar-Oromo conflict
is border claims and counter claims. The local people reported this seriously to the officials of
federal and regional governments. However, there is no lasting solution given by both Federal
and regional authorities to date. If we look at seriously what is quest of the Oromo, idiomatically,
Mohammed Awol expressed as follows 162:
The Afar –Oromo border dispute should be resolved as a father does for his
married son. A father will give plot of land to his married son by clearly
demarcating his farm land from the piece of farmland land that is given for
his son. The father is not limited only giving new name for his married son
but, also he further gives farm land and other properties to enable him to live
independently.

This is done to strengthen relation between father and son and to lead lives peaceful. Likewise,
there are Afar and Oromo elders who can do this. This shows how Afar and Oromo are families
like a father and married son. By way of coming together and bringing their differnces on the
table for discussion, with the support of the government they can demarcate the disputed territory
once and for all. They can live in peace averting conflict to peace. This should be reinforced by
the government bodies. As a father does for his married son, the government should clearly
demarcate the borders of the two ethnic groups or regional states. Regional states’ border issue is
federal affairs. This is the jursdiction of the federal government in which this is stipulated in the

161
Mohammed Ahmmed is ex-chairman of Medine Kunyo Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on June21,
2014, Bora Town.
162
Mohammed Awol is administrator of Medine Kunyo Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on
June23,2014, Bora town.

163
FDRE Constitution. The government failed to delimit the border between the two regions, which
is the main problem leading to conflict in the study area. The Afar are claiming that their
territory extends up to the highway from Dessie to Addis Ababa, while the Oromo claim their
territory up to the Awash River. According to Mohammed Awole, ‘the Afar are not doing their
best from the bottom of their heart in the maintenance of peace in the area. The problem is not a
concern for the federal and regional states. People are dying from time to time, as there is no ever
lasting solution to date. The issue is not reported to the regional and federal governments.’ 163

In the administration and security affairs of the two woreda, conflict is administered through two
major phases viz. conflict prevention and conflict management. In each of these two phases two
further practices are covered out. Under conflict prevention, teaching of the value of peace and
early warning and response mechanisms are major tasks. To create awareness on the value of
peace, the administration and security offices established peace committees and peace clubs at
kebele and school levels, respectively. The awareness creation programs and the operation of
early warning and response mechanisms are strategies for preventing the outbreak of violent
conflicts. However, while conflicts exist in every day interactions of peoples (Adeleye, 2011:21),
conflicts manifested in different ways in the study area. Therefore, when conflicts erupted, the
administration and security offices administer conflicts by stopping violent confrontations, and
working to transform relations. During times of violence, the offices try to minimize the further
escalation of conflicts and will facilitate restoration of negative peace. After negative peace is
restored, further actions that promote positive relations will be carried out. For instance,
according to Mohammed Osman 164:
In the border area namely, Haro village, more than 40 individuals’ irrigated land
has been taken by the Afar. Afar are ploughing the land, which was Oromo farm
before. Not only the irrigated land the Afar are banning Oromo even the non-
irrigated land. The Afar are saying to the Oromo, if you join us, i.e., included in
our territory you can plough the land you can take both the irrigated land non-
irrigated land what is needed from you is to pay tax to our woreda. If the Oromo
continue pay tax to Kemissie they would not get all the land i.e., both irrigated and
non- irrigated land. If they pay tax to Afar Region i.e Dawe Woreda, Afar will allow
them to plough the land.
163
Mohammed Awol is administrator of Medine Kunyo Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on
June21,2014, Bora town.
164
Mohammed Osman is deputy head of Dawa Harawa Woreda Administration and security office. Mohammed resides in
Harawa town. Even though he resides in Harawa town, he is the one who has grown in the Afar-Oromo border area where
conflicts recurr. The interview was held on June15, 2014, Harawa town.

164
According to Oromo focus group discussion participants, recently after reconciliation, the school
building properties were robbed by the Afar. Three vehicles, building materials were taken by
them, which were Dawa Harawa Woreda’s property to build school in that village. Oromo know
that Afar would not allow them to build any infrastructure in the area ( like schools, health
stations even roads and the like) but the Oromo officials are trying their best which is not
possible to reach solution yet. The Oromo suggest that Federal Government should be there to
build any infrastructure otherwise it is not possible to build houses, clinics, roads and irrigation
project. However, this might not be sustained unless and otherwise a sustainable peace is
maintained in the area.

The woreda administration and security affairs offices receive help from the zonal and regional
administration and security offices via their chain of command. The structure of the
administration and security affairs offices of Amhara and Afar regions were set up from region
through kebele levels. The bureaus at regional level have the role of dealing with conflicts and
guiding the works of zonal security departments. They are directed by the chief administrator of
their regional state. But they have been given power to deal with conflicts through proclamation.
They can also undertake any security related issues in collaboration with the police commission
and militia bureau on behalf of the regional administration. Similarly, the zonal administration
and security affairs departments deal with conflicts that would occur within their respective
areas. They also provide support to the woreda to handle any conflicts. With the help and
guidance of the Regional, as well as, zonal administrations, the woreda are undertaking various
activities to handle conflicts in their localities. As Dawa Harawa administration and security
office reported, the woreda administrations have the following major functions:-
• Assessing the general status of peace and security, and identifying potential causes of violence
through locally based informants (focal persons) as part of the early warning and response
mechanism,

• Facilitating the works of peace committees by channeling resources through the finance received
from the regional administrations,

• Deploying security forces to areas where violence is erupted,

• Coordinating developmental activities around social and economic services in pursuit of long
term conflict resolution aims, and

• Bringing perpetrators of violence before justice.

165
The above listed functions of the woreda administration are relevant for resolving conflicts and
maintaining peace in the area. The woreda administrations make preliminary assessments on the
areas, which are prone to conflicts and through amateur local focal persons they are able to
control any emergence of violent conflict and its further escalation. They also regularly monitor
the status of peace and security in each kebele of the woreda administration. Thus, they
investigate factors causing the conflict and address sources of conflicts with the involvement of
local actors and other sector divisions such as the police and militia. If violent conflicts occurred,
which cannot be controlled by the local security forces, the woreda administrations can also
deploy security forces to result in ceasefire through the use of force.

On the Afar side of the study area, the kebele chairpersons discuss with clan leaders and work
together in the Afar community. There is no Ada (Afar customary law) suppressed or abandoned
due to the presence of government structure. The kebele administration structure did not replace
the clan leadership, since the local people insisted in their Ada administration. Suleiman Mussa
reported that Afar do not drop their traditional administration. For instance, Feima function well.
The government has recognized it. If the Ada is unable to handle case, the traditional
administration refers it to formal government office. 165

In the study community of the Afar side, clan leadership was functioning well than kebele
administrations. Currently, the clan leaders and elders are involved as members of various
committee established by the initiation of the government (school committee, peace committee,
etc), participate in conferences, woreda regular meeting of councils, participate in NGOs
initiation (e.g. NOGs consult them), participate in disaster management committee at kebele
level; participate in site selection for establishment of facilities (school, health, post, etc).

The informants claimed that the current government allows the Afar to handle their cases
(adultery, theft, conflicts) by the council of elders. Conflicting parties present their cases to the
traditional leadership and elders mediate and resolve cases. If one presents a case to formal

165
Suleiman Mussa is Chairman of Wahilona Gidale Kebede administration, Dawe Woreda. The interview was held on
April118,2014, Woderage.

166
government office, the office may refer him back to elders’ council or decide by itself. Though
government recognizes the traditional leadership, the young generations are close to the modern
administrative rules. On the other hand, elders try to maintain the traditional leadership and
administrative rules. If one commits an offence, the police may arrest him. In this case, the elders
and clan leaders can request the police to see the case through Feima (elders’council) institution.
The elders need to take the responsibility for preventing any further revenge, if the victims may
try. In most cases, the Afar police refer cases to elders for handling through the Afar Ada. These
elders fine the offender or guilt and cause to compensate the victim. The fine is paid either in
kind or cash and the amount of fine vary according to the status an offender has in his
community.

The formal institutions often handle severe offences. For instance, if one kills a person and is
caught by police first, the Feima cannot request to see the case. If the offender escaped from
police and confess to Feima first, Feima will handle the case. The police may not insist to see
that case if once the case is presented to elders and elders take the responsibility to settle it.

In the process of ethnic conflict reconciliation, the woreda and kebele administrations play
pivotal role by facilitating the works of peace committee. They provide financial assistance and
security protection for the committee. Besides, they engage in coordinating developmental
activities around social and economic services. However, all these functions of the woreda are
too much limited to managing and preventing conflict. This is also evaluated by the joint
meetings of government officials (the 2005 and 2006 E. C Afar-Oromo joint meetings) as the
main challenge they failed to achieve what is planed together due to overburden of other
governmental works, as a result they did not go beyond managing conflict .

7.4.2 Indigenous Institutions

Although the customary ethnic conflict resolution mechanism has some weaknesses relating to
the violation of human rights, the Afar and Oromo ethnic groups of the study area prefer its
services because it is cheap, accessible, gives the people the chance to participate in the process
and emphasizes reconciling the conflicting parties, rather than punishing the offender(Amin,
2009;Kinfe, 2014). Especially, when the conflict involves disagreement between ethnic groups,

167
the government usually needs the help of these customary institutions to resolve cases instead of
using the formal justice system.

There is a growing acceptance for the importance of traditional approaches of conflict resolution
in understanding and resolving local conflicts. Historically, natural resource conflicts at local
level in different parts of the Horn of Africa were dealt with through customary or indigenous
conflict resolution practices (Ahmed, 2003; Amin, 2009). Currently, there is emerging curiosity
on the relevance of indigenous resolution mechanism. At present, community based peace
building and conflict resolution is increasingly getting attention, including the rehabilitation and
rural development programs (Amin, 2009; Kinfe, 2014). Nevertheless, currently indigenous
mechanisms alone cannot be enough for the resolution of the new challenges and changes in the
global environment that results many of the conflicts that local people are experiencing today
(Tyler, 1990; Ahmed , 2003). One could argue that the level of conflict resolution will depend on
the cooperation between the customary and formal conflict resolution institutions and practices.

In the two communities there are customary institutions. These communities have clans’ leaders
(Makaban), religious leaders (sheiks), Abagar and the famous individuals who contribute to
resolve conflicts with their good knowledge, experience and abilities. These indigenous
institutions facilitate and determine the peace of the two ethnic groups for the mutual uses of
natural resource such as land for pasture, arable land for farming and utilization of water.
Elders, sheiks, clan leaders and abagar have the potential for peace making without interventions
of government. Religious leaders who have taught according to ‘Koran’ principles promote
peace, tolerance, and mutual respect among people. These religious principles are believed in
and respected by both communities than rules of government bodies, and also the contribution of
abagar and aba-aga (Aba dhiiraa), makaban and fiema are high importance to mediate and stop
disputes 166.

Community elders and religious leaders also play crucial role in the process of inter-ethnic
conflict resolution in the study area. Community elders and religious leaders are responsible for

166
Merga Fufa is communication and research expert, Oromo Nationality Zone. The interview was held on February 10, 2015,
Kemissie.

168
building peaceful relationships. They are trusted by society and are enthusiastically working for
the benefit of the people. As it is observed from a recorded video of reconciliation ceremony,
community elders and religious leaders participate in resolving conflict. They attend
reconciliation ceremonies, discuss issues and give blessing to the people. Mohammed Jude
explained this as follows 167:
The sheiks and elders along with government officials reconcile Afar and Oromo
communities and as a result we (Oromos) return to Haro village of Dire kebele.
When conflict arises between the two groups, elders would go to the sheiks and
elders. Then, both the elders and sheiks would try to stop the conflict. The
government bodies also do the same in collaboration with the sheiks and elders.
After the case is presented to the sheiks and elders, they would call both the
Oromo and Afar for meeting to identify who is involved in the conflict. Then, with
the help of sheiks and elders, the government officials will reconcile the
conflicting parties in maintaining peace and stability. It is in this way that they
are living by resolving conflicts.

This indicates eventhough they are not successful, the Afar and Oromo are trying to resolve thier
conflict with their own methods. By using religious leaders and elders, they are trying to manage
and resolve conflicts. Religious leaders are more respected by both ethnic groups because they
do have common religion, i.e., Islam. As they believe in peace, neighbors should strive for peace,
which is better by far than conflict. This is done with far-sighted elders and religious leaders. As
Mohammed Awole said ‘Afar should be ‘wat’ and we should be ‘ enjera’. 168 This is through
their own method to manage themselves not to indulge into conflict.

Above all, the common values of the Afar and Oromo communities help to resolve conflict that
arises between the two communities. Since both subscribe to same religion, i.e., Islam; bilingual
in terms of language at border areas have no language problem to communicate with each other.
There is also inter-marriage between the two communities.

Members of joint peace committee, women and youths are the other local actors that work for
resolving the conflict in the study area. Women and youth are also involved in the mitigation of
conflicts. In the continuous conferences prepared for women and youth, women are discouraging

167
Mohammed Jude is head of administration and security office of Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on June 10,
2014, Bora.
168
Mohammed Awol is administrator of Medine Kunyo Kebele, Dawa Harawa Woreda. The interview was held on
June21,2014, Bora town.

169
their sons and men for violence. The youth are also involved in developing friend ties in the
grazing lands. 169. The joint peace committee was organized to identify the challenges of peace
and promote healthier relationship between the two communities. For this reason, they contribute
their part for the conflict resolution process.

Makaba and Fiema 170

There are different sorts of disputes and conflicts in Afar community. These include inter and
intra-clan disputes over clan land or other resources (pasture and watering points) and conflict
with non-Afar migrants and neighbouring ethnic groups (Issa, Oromo, Amhara, Argoba, Tigre).
Although there is some degree of tolerance to accommodate each other, conflicts between clans
over scarce resources, and disputes over or claims on territories are common among the pastoral
Afar (Yacob et al., 2000: 16). In this connection, the Afar say, ‘We love each other, but we will
quarrel with each other, if it comes to land. It means there is no compromise over clan land.’
(Getachew, 2001:62).

In Afar area, conflicts can take place at three levels: intra-clan, inter-clan and inter-ethnic. The
causes may include claims on or access to resources (land, grazing, and watering points), animal
theft, adultery, raids and counter raids, insults, etc. The Afar use various institutions or
mechanisms to resolve conflicts that can arise with their neighbouring ethnic communities.
Makaba is a representative of the clans towards everything outside the clan, government or
private group or clan. Makaba represent clans and to contact with government or other clans.
This is locally known as Dätamo Aba or Daära Aba. For instance, Dawid Muhayta was Dätamo
Aba for Bahir-Aghini and Seko Duaba for Megenta Aghini before 1991. 171 Nowadays, Dawid is
Dätamo Aba for both groups and Seko Dawid’s vice. During the Derg time in the study area the
leadership of Makabantu (Dätamo Aba) and clan leaders (Kädo Aba) were not abolished, and
they were functioning as they used to be before 1974(Ali, 2008:142).

169
Nuru gaz Da’ato is a member of Afar-Oromo joint peace committee and resident of Gendawarina Eyeledi Kebele, Dawe
Woreda. The interview was held on May5,2014, Harawa.
170
Feima serves as community police and defense force, and the main task is to enforce sanctions passed by the clan authorities
(clan leaders and elders). Thus Feima is expected to collaborate with elders of the clan and clan head. (Afar Key Infromants;
Ali,2008; Getachew, 2001a)
171
Kedo Abba is clan leader of Kilentina Derseda Kebele, Dawe Woreda. The interview was held on April 30, 2014, Woderage.

170
Nowadays Kebele are established to perform government activities. They represent the clan
towards outside government, private groups and non-Afar. 172 The clan authority also functions
parallel without interfering with government activities. But, the government structures consult
clan leaders to recognize the Afar Ada (customary law). The clan leaders mediate conflicting
parties through the Afar Ada. Most of the elected Kebele leaders are not from clan leaders. kebele
perform such tasks as coordinating communal works (e.g. access road construction), labor
contribution (i.e., mobilization), water development, passing government’s message to the
community members, present community’s request to government, while clan leaders handle
such matters like, theft i.e. searching the offender through Afar Ada, adultery: punishing the
offender, minor quarrels between individuals.

However, people in the study area, pay attention to the clan leaders, elders and religious leaders,
since they have no exposure to modern manipulation of modern administration. The Afar
community members have more trust in clan leaders. The Afar pay attention to the clan leaders
more than the elected ones. The elected ones get leadership by chance and their leadership
position is not inherited traditionally. The power of elected is temporary, whereas that of the clan
is long-term and life- long. Very few clan leaders are included in the modern administration.
Mostly, they are from non-clan leadership groups. This meant that clan leadrs, eleders, and
religious leaders have big role in resoving conflicts in the study areas.

Currently, the government law gives indirect recognition for the function of Fiema as court,
police and customary law enforcement. Thus, individuals can apply to Feima or to formal
government institution. The current practice is that the Afar tend to use Feima rather than formal
institutions. If an individual appeal to the court or police, his case can be handled by these
institutions. But, in most of the cases his action is considered as undermining the Afar Ada and
Feima. This discourages individuals from going to formal institutions. Addition, if an individual
takes a case to the formal institutions, Fiema leaders request the formal institution to take care of
the case first through their customary laws. If the institution agrees and the applicant agrees with
his case to be seen by Feima, the Feima leaders and leaders investigate and pass decisions. If the

172
Ali Hassen is chairman of Kilentina Derseda Kebele administration, Dawe Woreda. The interview was held on April26,2014,
Woderage.

171
culprit does not agree with final decision, he would be referred to the formal institution. If the
applicant insists that his case should not be seen first by the Afar customary law, he would be
considered as deviant and receive punishment and deprived respect by the community members.

In general, as Kedo Aba reported, the institution of Feima is functional and effective at the
community level. 173 On the other hand, if the formal institutions refuse or allow to be seen, the
case refers back to the case to Feima, no mechanism for Feima to influence the institution and
the case will be treated there. According to Kedo Abba, in the case of conflicts within Afar
ethnic group, the law is called afare and those conflicts Afar with outsiders or non –Afar ethnic
groups is called adanle (ibid.). Islamic law (Shari’a) is secondary to Afar customary law(Ada).
So, the Afar –Oromo conflict will be resolved in accordance with adanle. However, the main
reason that Afar are not serious in passing the Afar culprit in the border area to formal
institutions is because of the Afar Ada. They prefer an Afar’s case to be seen under Afar Ada. In
this regard, the Oromo complain against the Afars’ failure to bring the Afar culprit to the formal
institution such as the police and the court.

Abagar and Aba-aga

In the Oromo community of the study area, abagar and aba-aga do have major role in the
resolution of conflicts. Both inter and intra-ethnic conflicts over the use of natural resources are
common in Oromo Nationality Zone of Amhara Regional State, such conflicts are usually settled
by the local elders using the principles of the abagar and aba-aga. Abagar and aba- aga with
their elders penalize individuals or groups for conflict any damage or harm. In the intra conflict
of the Oromo the abagar have big role in resolving conflict – by the use of Gumma (paying
blood compensation or indemnity for the victim). The penalty depends on the degree of harm on
the victim. Conflicts are frequent phenomena and are usually contained and managed within the
cultural set up.

As regards inter –ethnic conflict, abagar and aba- aga along with elders apply the set of rules
and obligations developed by Oromo elders to mediate Oromo and Afar conflicting clans and

173
Kedo Abba is clan leader of Kilentina Derseda Kebele, Dawe Woreda. The interview was held on April 30,2014, Woderage.

172
sub-clans. However, the universality of abagar with elders is contested. Because it is localized
bilateral agreement between specific sub-clans that traditionally live adjacent to one another and
application of its rule is flexible and varies from place to place depending on circumstances and
situations. Therefore, abagar and aba-aga are not successful, as religious leaders, in inter- ethnic
conflict resolution of the study area.

In general, currently indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms alone cannot be enough for the
resolution of the new challenges and changes in the local environment. Hence, effective conflict
resolution mechanisms will depend on the integration and cooperation between the customary
and formal conflict resolution institutions and practices. In this regard, the joint peace
committees(JPCs), which is organized by including the abagar from Oromo and clan
leaders/makaban/ from Afar, have a paramount importance in resolving conflict between Afar
and Oromo ethnic groups in the study area. Therefore, collaboration with the joint peace
committees, woreda administrations and indigenous institutions contribute to addressing conflict
and building positive relations. This is what is called holistic approach of conflict resolution.

7.5 Challenges to Conflict Resolution Practices in the Study Area

One factor that can be taken as a challenge to the process of conflict resolution in the study area
is the great emphasis given to settling and managing conflicts, not to long term resolution.
Government officials consider conflict resolution and management as similar issues. This implies
that officials at the local level are less aware of the ideals of conflict resolution. For instance, a
report sent to Amhara National Regional State administration and security bureau by Oromo
Nationality Zone administration and security department on September twenty 2003 E.C stated
that ‘the conflict could be resolved within fifteen days’ which is difficult to be practical, as the
there is still recurrent conflict in the area. This shows capacity limitation of government officials.
This capacity limitation leads to short-term conflict settlement practices. Once conflicts are
settled temporarily, the attempts to deal with their underlying causes are too minimal.

Peace and security workers at the local level are in fact, too focused on variety of security
problems. Theft, murder, and other security related problems are handled by those officials and
they are responsible for any security related problem in the area. Hence, their primary focus is at

173
handling of peace disturbances and settling the conflict for a time being thereby paying less
attention to the root causes. However, effective utilization of conflict resolution ideals takes time.
Even more, harvesting the fruits of conflict resolution can only be yielded in the long term
(Miall, 2004). But many of the measures in the study areas are aimed at reducing and containing
violence.

Another challenge is the great emphasis advanced on the indigenous conflict resolution
mechanisms, which can solve only the immediate causes of the conflict. However, the root
causes of the conflicts, which are beyond the indigenous reconciliation process are not given
consideration. Indigenous resolution mechanisms alone cannot be enough for the resolution of
the new challenges and changes in the social dynamism. Besides, the roles of these indigenous
conflict resolution mechanisms are reducing currently. Their acceptance nowadays is declining.
Members will assemble and resolve conflicts only when they are told to do by the woreda
officials, otherwise they have no opportunity to meet and handle conflicts by themselves
independently in most of the time.

The challenges are many, but mention some, giving priorities for modern constitutions, both at
federal and regional levels that contradicts or confronts the customary structure is one of the
challenges. Another challenge is the loose collaboration, if any between the customary or
indigenous and the formal institutions in dealing with conflict resolution issue both within and
between the communities. The proliferation of elders as a result of the natural demographic
factor of population increase, which happened at a more rapid pace leading to an increased need
to split groups in different way, as they become too big for an elder to manage is another
challenge. Consequently, many new elders were elected, who may not always posses sufficient
knowledge of the abagar and aba-aga, and clan leaders. Furthermore, customary institutions
lack of enforcement mechanisms, growth of globalization and expansions of government
institutions.

The government fails to appreciate, collaborate and support indigenous conflict resolution
mechanisms and there is little resource allocation. Limited government understanding of the role
played by customary institutions has diminished their efficiency and relevance in conflict

174
resolution (Desalegn, et al 2005; Amin, 2009). Formal government institutions especially kebele,
woreda, courts, villages have replaced the function of local leaders. Some factors pushing for
replacement of indigenous institutions with formal institutions in the Afar community according
to elders include, privatization of land for cultivation, sedentrization that increased access to
facilities like schools, clinic..etc, exposure to modernizations, food aid provided through formal
government institutions and some development works like water development that comes
through formal administration (PCDP, 2005).

Although customary ethnic conflict resolution mechanism makes a considerable contribution to

keeping law and order in the state, it has not acquired legal recognition under national
law(Kinfe, 2014:161). To bridge the gap between practice and the law, the House of Peoples’
Representatives and the Regional states of Amhara and Afar State Councils should officially
recognize this customary conflict resolution mechanism, and should consider the implications of
limiting its jurisdiction to personal and family issues according to Article 34 (5) of the FDRE
Constitution (FDRE 1995). This would be important in raising the awareness and confidence of
the Afar and Oromo peoples, especially those who serve as makaban, abagar and elders.

Ethnic groups fight because they are denied not only their biological needs, but also
psychological needs that relate to growth and development (Anteneh, 2013; Burton, 198).
Therefore, great emphasis need to be placed on the expansion of developmental undertakings in
the areas. Besides, there are no non-governmental organizations that involve in a broader scale
that might have contributed to the efforts of conflict resolution except Kombolcha Catholic that
gives short training on the values of peace. In line with this, Miall (2004) claims that
international NGOs concerned with conflict prevention and resolution are main actors that have
the potential to resolve conflicts. But, practically the involvement of NGOs in the study area is
too limited.In Africa, conflicts have become a way of life for many international organizations
(Kinfe, 2014:161). As a result, instead of focusing on strategic and long-term solutions, many
international NGOs are focusing on short-term solutions; and some may even play a role in
aggravating the conflicts. It is now time to rethink the issue and then give long-lasting solutions
by taking the main causes of the disputes into account and resolving conflicts in an African way
(using the indigenous knowledge systems of dispute resolutions).

175
CONCLUSION

This study has explored ethnic conflict resolution mechanisms of the Afar and the Oromo ethnic
groups by taking the Afar of Dawe Woreda, and Oromo of Dawa Harawa Woreda of Afar and
Amhara Regional States of Ethiopia, respectively. The study attempted to assess the dynamics
of interaction of the two ethnic groups since 1991, investigated the various causes and the effects
of the conflict, and the practice of conflict resolution mechanisms in the areas.

The findings of the study show that the post-1991 Oromo in Dawa Harawa and their neighboring
Afar in Dawe interactions were characterized by twofold relations, peaceful and conflicting.
Peaceful relations between the two ethnic groups took the forms of local market interactions and
trade exchange, close friendship, i.e., through teketeyisa (friendship), cross border resource
sharing, and social and religious interactions. They had mutual cultural, social, and economic
interdependences. However, these peaceful interactions were spoiled by various factors that have
contributed to conflicts. Such pacific and friendly relations have gradually been eroded after the
introduction of ethnic- based federalism in Ethiopia. Before the administrative re-map of the
country, Afar and Oromo ethnic groups used resources commonly. They had more of cordial
relation except some sporadic water and pasture conflicts. Therefore, the claim of boundary
changed the dynamics of earlier water and pastures conflicts and gave new form.

The study has identified root causes and triggering factors of the conflict. The root causes of the
conflict are attributed to contested boundary, competition over natural resources, ethnic-based
federalism, environmental degradation and drought and violent cultural practices. The Afar -
Oromo conflict has also been triggered by Issa-Somali pressure, acts of homicide, theft and
looting. Inter-personal conflicts, government developments schemes, illegal arms, ethno-political
parties and groups that caused by theft and homicide sporadically extend to inter-ethnic conflict.
Specially, ethnic -based federalism by and large led Afar and Oromo ethnic group to indulge
into stiff claim of border. Furthermore, the Afar and Oromo elite maneuvered ethnic differences
and the issue of border is used to secure power, resource and other entitlements. The presence of
disputing boundary used to justify implicit motives of the elite. Spearheaded by ethnic elite,
ethnic groups’ overemphasis on their identity regardless of ‘others’ and overstretch ethnicity that
leads to conflict between individuals having different identity likely to take ethnic shape.

176
The study has identified the effects of the Afar-Oromo conflict of the study areas. It has affected
the social, economic, and political relations of the two ethnic groups. It has resulted both in
human and animal causalities and material destructions. Due to the conflict, people have been
displaced, women became widowed, children became orphaned, and the social interaction
between the communities has become adversely affected. The conflict damaged ethnic
cooperation and interaction. Insecurity, worry and fear of conflict became common experiences
of the local people. In the same fashion, the interruption of cross border trade and tense claim
over border farm/grazing lands resulted in unused of border land by the neighboring local people
which eventually brought joblessness. Dispersion of family, dislocation and psychological scar
are also among the grave consequences the conflict. Moreover, the conflict disrupted the
provision of social services, too. Politically, the conflict swayed government-people relations
and breed distrust and hatred in place.

Findings of this study have also revealed that various conflict resolution mechanisms have been
practiced among the two groups. Public conferences and establishment of joint peace committees
are major accomplishments in changing attitudes. The undertakings of public conferences, joint
militia trainings and festivals, the establishment of peace clubs in schools, have to some extent
contributed in changing the attitudes of the communities and in the long-run helped lessen ethnic
animosity from the feelings of the two communities. Exchange of criminals, legalization and
confiscations of SALW and raising its price, and conflict early warning system and response
mechanisms are measures undertaken to control the behavior of the communities. And to address
the underlying causes of the conflict, some infrastructural developments are undertaken to
redress contradictions of the communities. Besides, the inter-woreda cooperation, which aimed
at restructuring the roots of conflicts, falls in this category.

Indigenous conflict resolution mechanisms have been overwhelmed by external factors and have
been ineffective. This is due to the inability of the government officials to integrate indigenous
and formal conflict resolution mechanisms, i.e., failure to employ holistic approach of conflict
resolution mechanisms consequently; conflict resolution is now taken over by government-
sponsored peace committees. However, government approach has not brought sustainable peace

177
between Afar and Oromo communities in the study areas. Conflict resolution is an expensive
process, mainly when addressed using imported knowledge and skills. The best strategy is to
prevent conflict before it occurs. But, ones conflict arises, it should be resolved looking into its
root causes. In the Afar- Oromo case, the attempts have focused on addressing mostly the
immediate causes. Government officials and members of peace committees’ measures are not
addressing the underlying causes of the conflict. Their overall efforts are reactive, instead of
proactive. Even nowadays, the function of the joint peace committee is declining. Therefore, the
practices showed the efforts done on managing conflicts, not on resolving conflict between Dawa
Harawa Oromo and Dawe Afar.

Based on the findings of the study, the following implications can be drown for effective
resolution of the conflict into positive relationships of Afar and Oromo ethnic groups. Ethiopia
has launched ethnic federalism as a panacea to deep rooted power centralization, ethnic
grievances and inequalities. However, its organizing principles have created intricate problems.
Despite the underlying assumption by many that ethnic federalism will improve relations among
ethnic groups of the country and lessen conflicts, the formation of ethnic federal arrangement
brought about violent conflicts among the long time friendly peoples of the Afar and the Oromo.
Ironically, regardless of the rationale of the federalism, maintaining national unity, the conflict
hindered togetherness and consensus. Historical validity, social reality and cultural
interdependence are hardly considered while ethnic based regions are instituted. The denial of
such things brought an impasse on the existing inter-ethnic relations. And this has bred its own
political repercussion on the dynamics of conflicts and ethnic relations. In place rectifying
perceived past injustices and ethnic grievances, the ethno-federal system has come up with new
injustices and grievances. As a result, in the post-1991peiod ethnic tensions and unrests become
common scenarios between Afar and Oromo communities in the study areas. So that is why
resolution mechanisms of ethnic conflicts have been complicated.

Local government officials have a duty to promote harmonious inter-cultural relationship among
the country’s diverse ethnic groups. Nevertheless, the Afar and Amhara regional states, as well,
as local governments under these regional states failed to effectively discharge their
responsibilities pertaining to conflict resolution for a variety of reasons. First, the understanding

178
of the basic principles of federalism among some of the regional and local government officials
is doubtful. Thus, the federal principles would not seem to have been fully appreciated by these
regional and local governments. Some of the regional and local government authorities usually
promote localized interests and biased attitudes towards their own ethnic groups. As a result, let
alone resolving the prevailing conflicts, in some areas, they aggravated the conflict. Second, the
resolution mechanisms used to ‘end’ the conflicts by the government at different levels was ‘fire-
fighting approach’, for which both of the conflicting groups bitterly blame the regional as well as
the federal governments. The government intervention was too late, and after intervention they
didn’t investigate the root causes, triggering factors and the actors of the conflicts so as to give
lasting remedies to the problems. In general, the different structures, processes, and mechanisms
of conflict resolution employed by different levels of government structures were unplanned,
disorganized and, above all, their actions were largely reactive instead of proactive.

The study revealed that absence of comprehensive and all-inclusive conflict resolution
mechanisms, led to continuation and escalation of conflicts between the Afar and Oromo ethnic
groups in the borders of Afar and Amhara Regional States in the northeast Ethiopia. Instead, the
over- all efforts of all stake-holders refer to attempts on ad-hock approaches and elite perspective
of ethnic conflict management to minimize the consequences of ongoing crises. Inspite of its
devastating impact on the social and economic lives of the people, the issue has so far received
less attention from the concerned bodies, such as the Ministry of Federal Affairs, the Amhara
and Afar National Regional States, local administrators, peace and security forces of the
bordering woreda (districts), community elders and religious leaders of both ethnic groups, non-
governmental organizations (NGOs), as well as, policy- makers. It should be noted that the
indigenous and modern conflict resolution mechanisms co-exist and have their own roles in the
conflict resolution process. Hence, both resolution mechanisms have their own role in either
aggravating or resolving conflict between two ethnic groups. It is commendable that the best
practices of the two resolution styles (the indigenous and the modern) be harmonized. It is time
to harmonize these by taking the best practices and the common ones so that, agreed upon and
harmonized indigenous knowledge and methods of conflict. This could enable us to resolve
conflicts in the African way. In a nut shell, harmony with modern and formal institutions is more
important. Nonetheless; this study is not comprehensive enough. For that reason, higher level of

179
attention needs to be accorded for the conflict in the study area and further investigations need to
be conducted on the issue at hand.

180
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ANNEXES
Addis Ababa University
College of Social Sciences
Department of Political Science and International Relations
INTERVIEW AND FGD GUIDE QUESTIONS
GENERAL INTRODUCTION
I am Kebede Yimam. Currently, I am doing my PhD degree in Political Science in Addis Ababa
University. I am conducting this research as part of my post graduate thesis work. The purpose of
this study is to explore ethnic conflicts and mechanisms of their resolution in the northeast
Ethiopia. In order to undertake the study this interview/FGD has been designed with a view to
shed light on the entire problem. The information that you will provide in response to the
questions during this interview is for the purpose of conducting a research on inter-ethnic
conflict resolution mechanisms between Dawa Harawa of Oromo and Dawe of Afar. I am really
glad that you are willing to participate in this research.

First I would like to ask your permission about recording this interview/FGD. I want to record
our discussion because that will give me the opportunity to listen the conversation again and
again during transcription. This in turn will enable me to keep the accuracy of the data and avoid
misinterpretation of your responses. The information collected through the interview/FGD will
be used by the investigator for strictly academic purposes. I do respect your wishes to stay
anonymous and your responses will remain confidential.

Thank you for sharing your time with me!!

Informant’s Background
Sex_______ Place of Interview______________
Age_______ Role in Community_____________

Interview questions for local elders and members of joint peace committee
1. How do you explain the interaction of Afar and Oromo since 1991?
2. What are the major causes of the conflict between Oromo and Afar ethnic groups?

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3. Are there any local verses that promote heroism in your area?
4. What are the different types of conflict that most of the time occurs between the two ethnic
groups?
5. Who are the actors of the conflict? And what positions do they have? What are the factors
motivating these actors to engage in the conflict? What are the intended outcomes expected
by the actors from the conflict?
6. What are the overall impacts of the conflict on the relation between Afar and Oromo ethnic
groups under the study area?
7. What is the conflict resolution mechanism used to handle the conflict in the area?
8. Does the post 1991political and socio-economic change of Ethiopia have any positive or
negative impact on the Oromo-Afar relation?
9. What is the role of traditional conflict resolution mechanism for resolving the conflict in the
area?
10. Which intervention mechanism /legal or traditional/ is more preferable and successful to
manage and resolve conflict in the area?
11. What steps/procedures do the peace committee followed to handle conflicts and held
reconciliations?
12. What kinds of sanctions are imposed by the rules of the joint peace committee?
13. What is the current status of the joint peace committee? Does it fulfilling its responsibility as
required or weakening? If its role is weakening why?
14. Do you think that the traditional and governmental institutions are working cooperatively? If
so, how are they working cooperatively?
15. What is the role of stakeholders (governmental officials, elders, religious leaders, youth,
women, victims of the conflict, and NGOs) in resolving the conflict between the two ethnic
groups?
16. What looks like the current conflict trends? (If there are escalations and descalations)?
17. What are the major challenges to resolve conflicts in the area?
18. What actions do you think should be taken to further resolve the conflict in to peaceful co-
existence?
Thank you!

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Interview questions for governmental officials and officers of peace and
security
Interview Guide on the causes of conflict and nature of relationship
1. How do you explain the interaction of Afar and Oromo since 1991?
2. What are the major causes of the conflict between Oromo and Afar ethnic groups?
3. What are the different types of conflict that most of the time occurs between the two ethnic
groups?
4. Who are the actors of the conflict? And what positions do they have? What are the factors
motivating these actors to engage in the conflict? What are the intended outcomes expected
by the actors from the conflict?
Interview guide on the impacts of conflict

5. What are the overall impacts of the conflict on the relation between Afar and Oromo ethnic
groups under the study area?
5.1 How could be the conflict seen in terms of human causalities and material destruction?
5.2 What is the outcome of the conflict in terms of security related problems?
5.3 Who are the most vulnerable groups during the conflict?
Interview guide on the process of handling conflict

6. What is the conflict resolution mechanism used to handle the conflict in the area?

7. What measures are taken to resolve the conflict and develop positive relationship between
the two ethnic groups?
8. What actions are taken to change the attitudes of the communities? What is the role of
government institutions in promoting peaceful relations?
9. What actions are taken to resolve or change the behavior of conflicting parties?
10. What measures are undertaken to address the contradictions of the conflict?
11. Does the post 1991political and socio-economic change of Ethiopia have any positive or
negative impact on the Oromo-Afar conflict?

201
12. What is the role of traditional conflict resolution mechanism for resolving the conflict in the
area?
13. Which intervention mechanism /legal or traditional/ is more preferable and successful to
manage and resolve conflict in the area?
14. Do you think that the traditional and governmental institutions are working cooperatively? If
so, how are they working cooperatively?

Interview guide on the roles of stakeholders in the process of resolving

conflict

15. What is the role of stakeholders in resolving the conflict between the two ethnic groups?
15.1 What are the roles played by governmental officials (from kebele to federal level) to resolve
the conflict?
15.2 What are the roles played by local peoples (elders, religious leaders, youth, women, victims
of the conflict) to resolve the conflict?
15.3 What are the roles played by Non-governmental Organizations (NGOs) to resolve the
conflict?
Interview guide on the dynamics and challenges of practice conflict
resolution

16. What looks like the current conflict trends? (If there are escalations and descalations)?

17. What are the major challenges to resolve conflicts in the area?

18. What actions do you think should be taken to further resolve the conflict in to peaceful co-
existence?

Interview questions for militia heads

1. How do you explain the interaction of Afar and Oromo since 1991?
2. What are the major causes of the conflict between Oromo and Afar ethnic groups?
3. What are the different types of conflict that most of the time occurs between the two ethnic
groups?
4. In which year‟s does higher violence exhibited in the area?

202
5. Who are the actors of the conflict? And what positions do they have? What are the factors
motivating these actors to engage in the conflict? What are the intended outcomes expected
by the actors from the conflict?
6. What are the overall impacts of the conflict on the relation between Afar and Oromo ethnic
groups under the study area?
7. Why the people do heavily relied on weapons in the area?
8. What kind of impacts does the availability of SALW brought in the area?
9. Does the numbers, and types of SALW are clearly known by the government?
10. To what extent does the control of SALW strong enough? How such controls of SALW can
bring security guarantee for the people in the area?
11. How can you describe the power balance in terms of arm possession by the two groups?
How such imbalances bring security threat in the area?
12. What is the conflict resolution mechanism used to handle the conflict in the area?
13. Does the post 1991political and socio-economic change of Ethiopia have any positive or
negative impact on the Oromo-Afar conflict?
14. What is the role of stakeholders (governmental officials, elders, religious leaders, youth,
women, victims of the conflict, and NGOs) in resolving the conflict between the two ethnic
groups?
15. What looks like the current conflict trends? (If there are escalations and descalations)?
16. What are the major challenges to resolve conflicts in the area?
17. What actions do you think should be taken to further resolve the conflict in to peaceful co-
existence?

Guide Questions for FGD

1. What are the root causes of the conflict?
2. What factors make the conflict to be recurrent?
3. List the social, economic and political impacts of the conflict?
4. Who is responsible to the conflict? Please explain how?
5. Who are the actors of the conflict? What motivates them to participate?
6. What actions do you think should be taken to further resolve the conflict in to peaceful co-
existence

203
Figure 3: Picture Showing Reconciliation Process

(Source: Dawa Harawa Woreda Government Communication Office).

Figure 4: Picture Showing Oath Practice between the two groups

(Source: Dawa Harawa Woreda Government Communication Office).

204
Figure 5: Picture Showing Eating Together after Reconciliation

(Source: Dawa Harawa Woreda Government Communication Office).

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