20220926-Fso Safer Prodoc Final
20220926-Fso Safer Prodoc Final
PROJECT DOCUMENT
REPUBLIC OF YEMEN
Project Title: Peace Support Facility (PSF) : Safer Salvage Operation Project (SSOP)
Project Number: 00143160
Implementing Agency: UNDP
Start Date: May 2022 End Date: December 2024 PAC Meeting date: 23 September 2022
Brief Description
The Floating Storage and Offloading (FSO) vessel Safer is moored approximately 8 kilometres off the coast of Yemen
and 50 kilometres northeast of the port of Hodeida. Constructed in 1976 as an oil tanker and converted in 1987 to
be a floating storage facility, the vessel is single-hulled, 362 meters in length, and is believed to contain an estimated
1.148 million barrels of light crude oil. Safer has been under the de facto authorities (DFA) in Sana’a since March
2015. Production and offloading operations are suspended due to the conflict, and no maintenance operations have
been undertaken for seven years. The FSO is now uninsurable, with an expired certificate of seaworthiness. The
Safer’s age and lack of maintenance have deteriorated its structural integrity. The vessel is at risk of spilling oil due
to leakages, an explosion from the accumulation of volatile explosion gases, or a strike from a floating sea mine. A
significant spill could occur at any time, discharging up to 1,148 million barrels of its cargo of oil along Yemen’s Red
Sea coastline and towards its neighbouring countries. Heavy contamination and pollution could extend as far as the
Bab-El-Mandab strait, with some oil passing beyond the Gulf of Aden.
The disaster would quickly surpass national capacity and resources to respond effectively, estimated at four times
the amount of crude oil spilt in the Exxon Valdez catastrophe of 1989. The lives and livelihoods of up to 12 million
people will be directly affected, with the unique environment of the Rea Sea experiencing enormous damage above
and below the water. Recovery from the oil spill could take up to 3 years and potentially cost US $20 billion without
urgent intervention. Life below water is not anticipated to recover for 25 years. In addition, one of the world’s major
shipping lanes could be affected, impacting many more people globally.
This project aims to prevent a catastrophic oil spill occurring in the Red Sea and its potentially disastrous impacts.
This shall be achieved by mobilising salvage assets (including a Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) and installation of a
Catenary Anchor Leg Mooring (CALM) Buoy, offloading the oil from FSO Safer to the VLCC, placing an oil-spill
contingency response on standby.
Agreed by (signature):
UNDP
1|Page
DocuSign Envelope ID: B98B5422-2DA5-44F3-AEA5-82A5CBF1F366
Table of Contents
1 Development Challenge ..................................................................................................... 6
1.1 Summary ............................................................................................................................... 6
1.2 Affected population ............................................................................................................... 6
1.3 Economic impact ................................................................................................................... 6
1.4 Health Impacts ...................................................................................................................... 8
1.5 Environmental Impacts .......................................................................................................... 9
1.5.1 Oil spill trajectory ............................................................................................................................ 9
1.5.2 Oil spill thickness ............................................................................................................................. 9
1.5.3 Life below water .............................................................................................................................. 9
2 Strategy ...........................................................................................................................10
2.1 Safer salvage solutions ......................................................................................................... 10
2.2 Approach............................................................................................................................. 10
2.3 Potential impacts on project approach ................................................................................. 11
3 Results and Partnerships ..................................................................................................12
3.1 Expected Results.................................................................................................................. 12
3.1.1 Project output ............................................................................................................................... 12
3.1.2 Key Activities ................................................................................................................................. 12
3.1.2.1 Activity 1 – FSO Safer oil spill contingency plan ....................................................................... 13
3.1.2.2 Activity 2 – Preparatory works, engagement of the salvage company and VLCC lease/purchase13
3.1.2.3 Activity 3 – Mobilisation of salvage assets and inspection ....................................................... 13
3.1.2.4 Activity 4 – Oil Transfer from FSO Safer to VLCC ...................................................................... 14
3.1.2.5 Activity 5 – Inspection of subsea structures, closing of PLEM, disconnect risers ..................... 14
3.1.2.6 Activity 6 – Installation of CALM buoy ...................................................................................... 15
3.1.2.7 Activity 7 – Removal and support of FSO Safer sale ................................................................. 15
3.2 Partnerships ........................................................................................................................ 15
3.2.1 The SLC, DFA and IRG .................................................................................................................... 15
3.2.2 United Nations Organisations ....................................................................................................... 16
3.2.3 Donors ........................................................................................................................................... 16
3.2.4 Private Sector and Industry ........................................................................................................... 16
3.3 Risks and Assumptions ......................................................................................................... 16
3.3.1 Operating context .......................................................................................................................... 17
3.3.2 Political risks .................................................................................................................................. 17
3.3.3 Legal Risks ...................................................................................................................................... 17
3.3.4 Operational Risks ........................................................................................................................... 18
3.3.4.1 Risks stemming from misunderstandings or poor communications on site ............................. 18
3.3.4.2 Risks associated with the vessel and salvage operation ........................................................... 18
3.3.5 UNDP organisational risks ............................................................................................................. 19
3.3.6 Security risks .................................................................................................................................. 19
3.3.6.1 Maritime hazards ...................................................................................................................... 19
3.3.6.2 Land hazards ............................................................................................................................. 19
3.3.6.3 Emergency medical facilities..................................................................................................... 20
3.3.7 Summary of Risk Log ..................................................................................................................... 20
3.4 Stakeholder Engagement ..................................................................................................... 21
3.5 Exit Strategy ........................................................................................................................ 22
3.6 Communication Strategy...................................................................................................... 22
2|Page
DocuSign Envelope ID: B98B5422-2DA5-44F3-AEA5-82A5CBF1F366
List of Figures
Figure 1: Summary of worst-case predictions for Yemen oil spill from FSO Safer (Ballard & JFA, 2022) ______________ 6
Figure 2: Extent of oil spill by season (worst case) - (IMO, 2021) ____________________________________________ 7
Figure 3: the impact on Yemen's fisheries (ACAPS, 2021) (Ballard & JFA, 2022) ________________________________ 8
Figure 4: Air pollution simulation models for fire aboard FSO Safer (Huynh, et al., 2021) _________________________ 9
Figure 5: FSO Safer at mooring (2019) ________________________________________________________________ 19
Figure 6 : UNDP ERM risk matrix following proposed treatment ___________________________________________ 21
Figure 7: PSF Steering Committee structure and governance (strategic) _____________________________________ 34
Figure 8: PSF and SSOP organisational structure ________________________________________________________ 34
List of Tables
3|Page
DocuSign Envelope ID: B98B5422-2DA5-44F3-AEA5-82A5CBF1F366
Table of Acronyms
OSESGY Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary General for Yemen
4|Page
DocuSign Envelope ID: B98B5422-2DA5-44F3-AEA5-82A5CBF1F366
PM Project Manager
5|Page
DocuSign Envelope ID: B98B5422-2DA5-44F3-AEA5-82A5CBF1F366
1 DEVELOPMENT CHALLENGE
1.1 Summary
FSO Safer oil spill predictions (commissioned by the IMO in 2021) and case studies (Purves & Culmer, 2020) suggest
that the unique environment of the Rea Sea would suffer enormous damage above and below water. The extent of
pollution will be very much driven by season, prevailing winds and currents, with environmental risks potentially
affecting Saudi Arabia, Eritrea, Djibouti, and Somalia. The impact would be considered worst between July and
September (see Figure 1). Shipping routes through the Bab al-Mandab Strait and the Red Sea could be disrupted for
months, leading to a significant financial impact on global economies. The oil spill could occur from an explosion aboard
the vessel (Cranfield University, 2022), a strike from a drifting sea mine (EODEX, 2021), or corrosion to the hull, each
event likely to lead, in varying degrees of severity, to the ingress of water and potential sinking of the entire structure.
Figure 1: Summary of worst-case predictions for Yemen oil spill from FSO Safer (Ballard & JFA, 2022)
If oils spill happens, up to one third of Yemeni population (11.9 million people out of 30.7 million(almost half of them
are women and girls) could be directly exposed by food insecurity as they may not receive food aid because of the
closure of Yemeni ports. (Huynh et al., 2021). Yemen’s fisheries would be devastated within three weeks, affecting over
1,000 species, with a predicted recovery period of 25 years. The impact on food security would indirectly affect all
Yemenis for many months (OCHA, 2022).
A spill from FSO Safer could see the shipping route through the Bab al-Mandab Strait, and the Red Sea disrupted for
many months (see Figure 2). The economic impact of such a spill is difficult to quantify at such a scale, but clean-up
alone is estimated at US $20 billion (ACAPS, 2021) based on Exxon Valdez extrapolation. There would also be knock-on
effects to global shipping, with the extent of oil travel compromising main international shipping routes and imposing
a toll of tens of billions of dollars on the shipping business and the industries it services (Caesar, 2021). Perspective is
provided by the EverGiven container ship in the Suez Canal, which froze US$10 billion of trade in one day (Yee & Glanz,
2021).
6|Page
DocuSign Envelope ID: B98B5422-2DA5-44F3-AEA5-82A5CBF1F366
The Yemeni ports would see heavy oil contamination. Port operations in Hodeida1 and Saleef ports would be seriously
affected, those ports closing for up to 6 months, limiting fuel and food imports for 8.1 million people, and putting the
jobs of port workers at risk. If Aden’s port were impacted too, this would rise to 11.9 million people who would not
receive food aid. Fuel imports and supply chains would be altered (perhaps through Aden and Mukalla to offset the
shortfall), further reducing the already restricted fuel supply through Hodeida. More fuel would be sold through the
black market, and prices would likely rise by up to 200%. This would have impact on electricity production, health
services, and transportation provision across the country.
Food imports and supply chains would stagnate. The redirection of food imports to Aden and/or Mukalla, coupled with
already limited capacities, could lead to congestion and delays in those ports; onward transport of wheat to mills would
increase out of these two ports, with capacities unknown. Food security would further destabilise, whereby June 2022
over 19 million Yemeni citizens could be at IPC Phase 3 and above without the added complication of an oil spill from
Safer (OCHA Yemen, 2022). Over 2.25 million cases of children aged 0 to 59 months, and more than a million pregnant
and lactating women were projected to suffer from acute malnutrition in the course of 2021 (OCHA, 2021).
The spill threatens 66.5 – 85.2% of Red Sea fisheries within the first week and potentially 100% of Yemen’s fisheries
within three weeks, which provide subsistence for 1.7 million Yemeni people (ACAPS, 2021). The livelihoods of 67,300
fisherfolks and over 500,000 people including many women in fishing-related industries (such as ice making, packaging,
and transportation) would be at risk (Ballard & JFA, 2022) – see Figure 3. The cost to the fishing industry from the
environmental impact would be US$30 million per year.
1 There are many local spellings for Hodeida. Except for the spelling of Hudaydah in the UN Mission to Support the Hudaydah
Agreement (UNMHA), Hodeida shall be used throughout this document.
7|Page
DocuSign Envelope ID: B98B5422-2DA5-44F3-AEA5-82A5CBF1F366
If there were to be a cargo fire, around 500km2 of agricultural land in Yemen (40% of the country’s farmable land) could
receive depositions of pollutants that would impair plant growth of crops grown for both subsistence and profit.
Dependent upon the time of year the catastrophe happens, papaya, citrus, and mango fruits would be covered by soot,
and the quality of corn, tomatoes, sesame, watermelon, and sweet potatoes would be diminished. Around 3.25 million
farmers might experience crop losses through impaired growth or fruit damage, reducing their income and potentially
threatening their livelihoods for a year. The estimated loss in agricultural production could be US$ 70 million (ACAPS,
2021).
Figure 3: the impact on Yemen's fisheries (ACAPS, 2021) (Ballard & JFA, 2022)
Pollution from the oil spill, whether by evaporation or smoke following fire/explosion, would cause cardiovascular and
respiratory health issues, leading to increased hospitalization and morbidity in affected areas. The estimate lies
between 11.3 million to 19.5 million person-days in hospital, dependent upon the season (Huynh, et al., 2021). A
healthcare system already struggling with COVID-19 would be simply overwhelmed. Up to 60 humanitarian agencies
could suspend services due to unsafe air, cutting services to 7 million Yemenis in affected areas. See Figure 4 for
projected health impacts by season and speed of release. Furthermore, many researches revealed that oil pollution
increases the risk of preterm birth, miscarriage, birth defects and gestational diabetes among women in oil polluted
communities2.
2https://journals.plos.org/plosone/article?id=10.1371/journal.pone.0263495#:~:text=Furthermore%2C%20the%20integration%20
of%20existing,16%2C%2018%2C%2019%5D.
8|Page
DocuSign Envelope ID: B98B5422-2DA5-44F3-AEA5-82A5CBF1F366
Figure 4: Air pollution simulation models for fire aboard FSO Safer (Huynh, et al., 2021)
Over 8000 potable water wells are at risk of contamination from the oil spill, which would reduce access to water and
increase the outbreak of diseases.
As can be observed in Figure 2, an oil spill at any time of year is likely to impact the sea areas of Yemen, Eritrea and
Saudi Arabia (IMO, 2021), but between April and December could also reach the coastal areas of Djibouti and Somalia.
Oil could impact the Yemen coast within as little as 3 hours of release and sea areas of neighbouring countries within
days (Djibouti (7 days), Eritrea (5 days 15 hours), Saudi Arabia (4 days, 9 hours), and Somalia (11 days, 15 hours). With
the exception of January to March, oil could travel up to 700 km from release. Heavy shoreline oiling will likely impact
the Yemeni coastline, and moderate to light oiling of sections of coastline in Djibouti, Eritrea and Saudi Arabia may
appear. Heavy oiling could be found up to 280 km from the release location.
Spilled oil in the marine environment spreads out on the water surface rapidly, very quickly even a relatively small
amount of oil can cover a large area (as little as 40 litres may cover 1 km2). Based on the modelling conducted (figure
2), in the event of a total release, oil may be visible as a silvery sheen up to 700 km from the release location (April to
June, Figure 2). Thicker, darker oil (and potentially recoverable) oil (thickness of 0.2mm) could extend as far as 150km.
Oil of thickness greater than 0.2mm could be found up to 150 km away (January to March), with reducing thickness
down to 3 microns observed up to 700 km (April to June) from the release location. Heavy shoreline oiling will likely
impact the Yemeni coastline, and moderate to light oiling of sections of coastline in Djibouti, Eritrea and Saudi Arabia
may appear. Heavy oiling could be found up to 280 km from the release location.
Fishing stocks could take 25 years to recover (ACAPS, 2021), with the impact on the eco-system reported to threaten
416 species of fish, 625 species of mollusc, 16 species of shark, 53 species of crustaceans and 283 species of
phytoplankton.
9|Page
DocuSign Envelope ID: B98B5422-2DA5-44F3-AEA5-82A5CBF1F366
2 STRATEGY
2.1 Safer salvage solutions
There have been several engagements involving the De-Facto Authorities (DFA), Internationally Recognized
Government (IRG), UN entities in Yemen, UN member states, non-governmental organizations, commercial companies
and private entities to find solutions to the FSO Safer situation. The UN proposal via UNOPS for an initial inspection and
minor repairs (but not for a final transfer of the oil) had to be aborted when UNOPS was unable to finalise an agreement
with the DFA.
The option that now has agreement from all parties (Guterres, 2022) (Gressley, 2021) is engaging a Salvage contractor
and the DFA agrees that the crude oil should be transferred as quickly as possible to a temporary replacement tanker
(the first phase of operations), with a replacement storage capability (the second phase of operations) being provided
as a longer-term solution (MOU, 2022). Further consent can be reinforced with a letter of consent from the DFA, as
required.
IRG acknowledges the common interest in preventing an oil spill and agrees that the only effective way forward is to
engage with the DFA to find a solution. The consent of the SLC has also been obtained and assurances have been given
that the area around the FSO Safer shall be designated a no-strike zone via the UN’s normal deconfliction procedures.
All parties stress the need for urgent action and see the avoidance of a humanitarian and environmental disaster as of
the utmost importance.
2.2 Approach
In the second phase, the UN will facilitate the installation of a replacement option for the FSO Safer. Based on extensive
technical consultations and on political engagement with Yemeni governance institutions, the UN has proposed a
floating CALM Buoy, permanently attached to a Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) slightly modified to be an FSO as the
optimal long-term solution in the Ras Issa environment.
The CALM buoy with a permanently attached double-hull VLCC as FSO is the safest, fastest and most flexible option.
▪ The emergency operation to mitigate the immediate environmental threat, can be completed within 10 months, faster
than any of the other options.
▪ The CALM buoy can be attached and detached from the FSO should the vessel need to be replaced or drydocked. The
CALM buoy solution can also be used to load oil directly to tankers from an onshore storage facility.
▪ The system is proven safe in use by the industry as a long-term Floating Storage and Offloading (FSO) solution.
The CALM buoy system is more compatible with other storage options that may be possible in the future, such as
connection to onshore storage (i.e. tank farm).
From the latest replacement option plan (UN, 2022), the first phase of operation involves five main activities: Activity
1) FSO Safer oil spill contingency plan.
Activity 2) preparatory works (including the procurement of a Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC);
Activity 3) the mobilisation of salvage assets to the work site;
Activity 4) the ship-to-ship (STS) transfer of oil from the FSO Safer to the VLCC, tank cleaning and de-mucking, thereby
eliminating the environmental hazard;
Activity 5) the Inspection of subsea structures, closing of PLEM (Pipeline End Manifold), disconnect risers and removal
of FSO Safer;
Successful implementation of the project Phase 1 activities will minimise the potential for an oil spill from the FSO Safer
and the associated environmental, socio-economic and humanitarian consequences and contribute toward Sustainable
Development Goals (SDGs) 14 and 15:
SDG 14 - Conserve and sustainably use the oceans, seas and marine resources for sustainable development.
SDG 15 - Protect, restore and promote sustainable use of terrestrial eco-systems, sustainably manage forests,
combat desertification, and halt and reverse land degradation and halt biodiversity loss
Successful implementation of Phase 2 activities will provide a replacement option for the FSO Safer. The results of this
phase will deliver the potential for economic and industrial dividends to benefit the Yemeni people and can incentivize
parties to reach agreement as part of a formal peace process.
SDG 8 – Promote inclusive and sustainable economic growth, employment and decent work for all
SDG 9 – Build resilient infrastructure, promote sustainable industrialization and foster innovation
SDG 16 – Promote just, peaceful and inclusive societies
The approach described above for this project (Phase 1) is based on the following successful requirements and
assumptions:
Requirements:
The salvage assets are able to be secured and deployed to the Safer site
The successful operation of oil transfer from FSO Safer tanker to VLCC,
Conditions for the disposal of the FSO Safer are established after the transfer of oil to VLCC,
Assumptions:
Authorities and parties to the conflict shall honour the agreements approving the salvage operations.
The conflict does not escalate, especially in the vicinity of the coast of Yemen, where the FSO Safer is moored.
The ownership of the VLCC, CALM buoy and oil is determined and documented and the handover of procured
assets is agreed amongst all parties
A well-developed contingency plan with clear roles and responsibilities is in place prior to implementation of
the project. This is to ensure that structures are in place to address small, medium and catastrophic oil spills
The United Nations RC shall mobilise the required resources and partnerships for the salvage and transfer
operations
The FSO Safer shall not disintegrate before the salvage operations or during the transfer operation.
Then the potential oil spill from FSO Safer tanker and associated impacts are prevented,
And thus, contributing to a sustainable environment above and below water in the Red Sea and Gulf of Aden, and
maintaining access to vital food supplies.
11 | P a g e
DocuSign Envelope ID: B98B5422-2DA5-44F3-AEA5-82A5CBF1F366
Priority is to prevent a potential oil spill from the FSO Safer tanker.
A revision to the national oil spill response plan is currently under development, in consultation and collaboration with
Yemeni authorities (DFA and IRG), in the event of a major oil spill. An Incident command structure is expected to be
adopted to organise and coordinate personnel, equipment, and response operations within the respective territories.
Insurance coverage will be optimised to reflect the potential impact of an accidental release of oil into the environment
and all donors will be held unaccountable for the consequence of oil spill.
The first phase of the project has already begun with recruitment of key project staff who are focused on resource
mobilization, operational planning and project management, and maintaining political and security dialogue with
Yemeni authorities. Once the necessary resources are in hand, it is anticipated that the preparatory phase of the
operation, notably contracting of key technical, legal and risk advisory services, contracting of Salvage company and
procurement of VLCC will take three (3) months.
Once procured, chartering and delivery of VLCC will require three (3) months, including recruitment of crew, insurance,
inspections, minor modifications and transfer to the site. The STS operation will require around two (2) months to
complete. The total time for implementation of Phase 1 is eight (8) months. Phase one is contingent upon clarity
around ownership of the VLCC and the Oil.
If the required funding is available, UNDP can proceed to the second phase of the project concurrently with Phase 1
activities. In practice, this means sourcing and procuring a second-hand CALM buoy, a preferable option for its speed
and cost-efficiency. Alternatively, if a suitable second-hand CALM buoy is not available on the market, the project would
commission fabrication of a new CALM buoy. Contracting and fabrication of a new CALM buoy is estimated to take
ten (10) months. Phase two is contingent upon clarity of ownership of the CALM buoy.
Given that Phase 1 would take eight (8) months, there is a clear imperative to procure a CALM buoy as soon as possible
to avoid a long lag after the conclusion of the STS. If a new CALM buoy is procured, it may be that the VLCC and
stabilized FSO Safer need to remain at their mooring for a further two to three (2-3) months to wait for the delivery of
the CALM buoy. It is expected that CALM Buoy installation will take one (1) month to complete. The towing and
scrapping of the FSO Safer is the final step in the process, requiring one (1) month to complete. At the conclusion of the
project, UNDP will implement an appropriate handover . Phase 2 of the project would therefore take a maximum of
twelve (12) months.
Variable factors can impact the duration of the activities and thus, the timeline serves only as a guide.
There are a number of options in this description of key activities that will influence both the cost and duration of the
project. The contracting of technical, maritime legal and other advisory services in the preparatory work described
under Activity 1, below, is a key step and will provide services to the UN to source the best options that will deliver the
12 | P a g e
DocuSign Envelope ID: B98B5422-2DA5-44F3-AEA5-82A5CBF1F366
project against the best possible timeline and cost effectiveness. Successful resource mobilization and rapid
disbursement of funds will further allow the UN to move quickly and efficiently to complete the project.
Phase 1:
3.1.2.1 Activity 1 – FSO Safer oil spill contingency plan
This activity involves developing an oil spill contingency plan (Al-Duaij, 2022) that draws on the national oil spill
contingency plan and includes elements from the UN support plan and contingency provisions made by the salvage
company.
1) Recruitment of consultants to develop a contingency plan, including travel for consultants and training for
national focal points.
2) Development of a UN support plan describing the contributions of UN agencies, funds and programmes
(RCO, OCHA, IMO, UNEP, WFP, UNDP) to oil spill response
3) Purchase and pre-positioning of equipment for shore-based clean-up
4) Community outreach and training on shoreline clean-up and waste management.
5) Development of a contingency plan by salvage company, including equipment lists to be brought with
salvage vessel
6) Synthesis exercise to develop a dedicated contingency plan specifically for the high-risk period of the STS
operation
7) Tabletop exercise prior to execution of STS transfer
8) Preparation of funding application to CERF for emergency release of assistance in the event of a major spill
9) Identification of potential waste disposal options
3.1.2.2 Activity 2 – Preparatory works, engagement of the salvage company and VLCC
lease/purchase
The following key tasks and inputs are expected under preparatory works:
The new FSO will be a standard second-hand VLCC which will be procured from the market and will most likely need to
be modified for conversion to FSO compatible with a CALM buoy. Ample VLCCs are generally available in the market,
and one will be selected and procured once the operation can start, after the necessary funding is obtained and
disbursed.
13 | P a g e
DocuSign Envelope ID: B98B5422-2DA5-44F3-AEA5-82A5CBF1F366
1) As there is a risk of H2S (Hydrogen Sulphide) leak, the cargo should be sampled to test for this and to gauge
the status of the oil quality. A warranty surveyor should be considered for insurance purposes and for the
subsequent tow-out;
2) Carrying out a pre-mobilisation inspection where the hull integrity is confirmed prior to putting any large
vessels alongside the Safer hull. At the same time a survey of the mooring bits and fairleads should be carried
out to ensure structural integrity for mooring the Offtake tanker;
3) Detailed planning of operations, permits, visas, mobilizing assets, equipment, and personnel;
4) Operational parameters for contractor inspection vessel to reach FSO Safer to be developed;
5) Establish that Security and explosion risk mitigations are in place (Control Risks, 2022) (JFA Consulting, 2021)
(Collett, 2022).
A Hazop or detailed risk assessment should be carried out prior to conducting any tasks, to ensure all mitigation
measures have been actioned. Key actions under Activity 4 include:
1) On-board assessment and inspection of FSO Safer, creating safe working environment for personnel and
assets, preparations for STS and subsequent operations;
2) Pumping inert gas into FSO Safer’s cargo tanks;
3) Arrival of receiving VLCC;
4) Mooring of the receiving tanker;
5) STS transfer of the oil;
6) Conducting tank washing;
7) Conducting de-mucking cargo tanks and safe disposal of sludge;
8) Post-oil-transfer management of the Safer cargo tanks.
The Safer vessel will then remain on station until an agreement has been made with a green scrapping company Post
oil-transfer tank management (tank washing, purging, gas freeing and de-mucking) will mitigate the risk of explosions
from Safer whilst it awaits disposal. Upon completion of this operation, the VLCC can moor on site awaiting the arrival
of the CALM buoy.
The procurement process of CALM buoy must be started during the phase I as the delivery of secondhand buoy may
take 5 months and new buoy may take 10 months. Therefore, the securing resource for the procurement of CALM buoy
is the priority task during the phase I.
Phase 2:
3.1.2.5 Activity 5 – Inspection of subsea structures, closing of PLEM, disconnect risers
Battery limits for this activity are from the outlet valve on the PLEM to the manifold of the offtake tanker. Key actions
under activity 5 are:
1) Inspection of subsea pipeline and identification of whether pipeline can be closed to prevent pollution during
disconnection;
2) Divers secure PLEM valves, purge and remove riser hoses;
3) Partially remove anchor chains, anchors remain on site;
4) Servicing PLEM for later connection risers.
Once the CALM buoy arrives on site, the FSO Safer can be disconnected from the subsea infrastructure, followed by the
hook-up of the CALM buoy and the semi-permanent mooring of the VLCC to replace the FSO Safer under activity 6.
14 | P a g e
DocuSign Envelope ID: B98B5422-2DA5-44F3-AEA5-82A5CBF1F366
1) Replacement of mooring anchor chains and connect them to the CALM buoy;
2) Installation of new riser hoses to PLEM and connect them to the CALM buoy;
3) Test the valves on the PLEM and confirm operational status;
4) Prepare FSO Safer for tow and arrival at scrap yard;
5) Disconnect FSO Safer and tow to final destination.
Initial assessments indicate an FSO attached to a CALM buoy is viable. Detailed engineering on the CALM buoy needs
to be executed in order to calculate the loads on the buoy. These calculations can only be done in detail once the tanker
is selected and loading scenarios are considered. Evaluation of the FSO mooring chains should be carried out with a
view to redeploying them on the CALM buoy.
Further arrangements will be required to implement the above titled activity, as it requires legal advice. The revenue
from the sale of scrap vessel will be returned to the project.
3.2 Partnerships
This is a complex project that requires taut processes and technical expertise to deliver success. Strong partnerships
will be pivotal to project vison, organisation, leadership, and stakeholder management as well as risk and issue
management. Transparency is paramount with an outline proposal for the initiative having been circulated amongst all
stakeholders regularly (UN, 2022). The RC/HC and his office have invested heavily in building and maintaining
relationships of trust with all partners.
The maintenance of workable relations between the SLC, DFA and IRG is paramount given the need to maintain safe
access for working vessels and personnel in the vicinity of Safer. The UN will agree on security protocols with the DFA
prior to the Salvage contractor team’s arrival in the working area and define a maritime start line3, the location at which
security arrangements transfer from the Salvage contractor to the UN. It will also ensure other relevant parties (SLC,
IRG) have an understanding of the operation and agree to the arrangements being made. Critical to ongoing security
will be that the Salvage contractor maintains good liaison with the authorities at all times and that any new
developments or changes of plan are communicated and explained. The UN shall support this by deploying an
experienced and diplomatic liaison officer (the Senior Political and Security Advisor - SPSA) to Hodeida. The UN must
also ensure that all personnel working in Hodeida itself and Sana’a have an appropriate profile for the work, so that
mistrust of motive does not arise. All personnel operating in Hodeida and on the Safer tanker must therefore have the
3 With an operation of such scale and complexity, the start line provides clear visibility of where the Salvage contractor ’s security
responsibilities end, and where those of the UN begin and end. It may be, for example, where international waters give way to
Yemeni national waters.
15 | P a g e
DocuSign Envelope ID: B98B5422-2DA5-44F3-AEA5-82A5CBF1F366
appropriate politically neutral profile. All personnel involved must have adequate pre-deployment training, which
includes situational briefings.
SLC air operations in the Red Sea and along the west coast in the vicinity of Hodeida provide a potential risk to life for
the Salvage contractor’s team. De-confliction with the KSA Emergency and Humanitarian Operations Cell (EHOC) prior
to the Salvage contractor’s crossing the start line will be undertaken in the normal manner for UN operations. The UN
shall issue a notification to EHOC of the Safer operation to cover the duration of all work. The locations of all people
working on the operation shall be placed within the SLC no-strike zones – as per normal operating procedures. This is
to include both land-based and sea-based working areas, and their associated supply chains.
There is a need to closely collaborate with key DFA and IRG government institutions to provide access and risk
mitigation. The principal key actor from the DFA is the Supervisory Committee for the Implementation of the Urgent
Maintenance Agreement and Comprehensive Evaluation of the Safer Floating Tank committee, represented by its
chairperson. UNDP will communicate to other entities through this committee. This committee is composed of MoFA,
the Ministry of Transport and the Maritime Affaires Authorities and other authorities in Hodeida. The DFA requires that
the UN plays the central role in this project, and the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator (RC/HC) has been
delegated the lead. Functional responsibility for contracting and project management has been passed to UNDP
(Yemen) under the leadership of the Resident Representative (RR). In parallel, regular engagement with DFA leadership
in Sana’a and the IRG in Aden will be critical and will be led by the RC/HC.
In September 2021, the RC/HC for Yemen was requested by UN HQ in New York to provide UN system-wide leadership
and coordinate all efforts to mitigate the threats posed by the Safer. The work builds on agreements (MOU, 2022)
(Guterres, 2022) to have a Salvage contractor carry out a ship-to-ship transfer of the oil and respond to the requests of
both contractor and the DFA that the UN manages the contracts for the work. The UN agreed to this because of the
significant environmental and humanitarian impact of any oil spill, an event that must be avoided if at all possible.
Accordingly, the RC/HC and his office have collaborated with the relevant UN specialist agencies to develop the project
document. In parallel with this, the UN has held discussions with all the main stakeholders and has developed a funding
strategy.
UN and stakeholder interest has been represented through continuous dialogue provided by RC/HC, UNDP RR, UNDP
Special Advisor and donors, with each donor providing key input to developing the project plan, with formal technical
documents having been provided as necessary.
3.2.3 Donors
Donors expressing support to date are the European Union, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Sweden, Norway,
Switzerland, Greece, the UK, Qatar, the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United States, Finland, Sweden, The Grand Duché
of Luxembourg, Denmark and Canada. Further formal pledges are being pursued from a range of other traditional
donors including the United Arab Emirates, Kuwait, Japan, China, Australia and Greece, noting that each country has a
vested interest in the outcome, which includes private sector donors, the oil industry, the shipping industry and
insurance brokers.
The project is heavily dependent upon the skills brought to bear by the private sector and industry. UNDP shall contract
with the Salvage contractor to facilitate each technical aspect of Phase 1. and will employ the services of a marine
management consultancy firm to carry out due diligence of the Salvage company and support development of the TORs
for each supporting entity, e.g., legal and insurance.
The transfer of the FSO Safer cargo is a complex operation with numerous attendant risks. Control Risks have
undertaken both a threat analysis and a security risk assessment on behalf of the Salvage (Control Risks, 2022). World-
leading explosive engineers have completed explosion risk assessments and the required mitigation (Collett, 2022). The
16 | P a g e
DocuSign Envelope ID: B98B5422-2DA5-44F3-AEA5-82A5CBF1F366
UN has carefully considered all the recommendations to mitigate risks, and these shall be implemented. The key issues
and accompanying mitigating measures are outlined below in
, with the attendant UNDP net risk assessment from Annex 1 summarised as follows:
The current conflict situation in Yemen provides an unstable and unpredictable security context within the littoral area
of the west coast. However, since mid-November 2021 the frontline has shifted to the south of the Hodeida
governorate, roughly from just north of al Hayma on the coast to Hays, and some 90km south of the port of Hodeida.
At time of writing a two-month truce exist between the DFA and IRG. As a result, the immediate environment is less
volatile than previously. The FSO Safer lies within the DFA area of control and they maintain tight control over security.
It is assessed that in terms of the overall operating environment, the risks identified can be mitigated to the extent
where they become relatively low. The UN continues to have its senior leadership based in Sana’a, with a strong
presence in Aden, and has developed good relationships with all parties to the conflict. Numerous UN agencies have
sub-offices in Hodeida and likewise have developed good working relationships with the local authorities. The United
Nations Mission to support the Hudaydah Agreement (UNMHA) is also headquartered in Hodeida and has a strong
political team that follows developments in the area and is ready to support the Safer mission, oil spill contingency
planning, and provide medical support. The UN has developed clear procedures for its operations, including movements
of personnel and the deconfliction of all areas where UN personnel operate and will support the Salvage contractor
personnel within its capabilities to operate under these procedures. It also undertakes regular political analysis, which
informs its operational decisions. The RC/HC continues to use his good offices with all parties to resolve issues as they
occur and to promote and maintain a functional operating environment.
Yemen is a country embroiled in a conflict that has both national and regional dimensions. If the FSO Safer operation is
to be successful, it will require continuing agreement from all major stakeholders in the conflict: the DFA, the IRG and
the SLC. Disagreements, if unresolved, could impact the operation. The critical mitigating strategies to ensure there is
no adverse fallout from the operation are:
1) To develop a good understanding of the position of all parties before the operation begins, in order to have
confidence that their core requirements are met by the agreed proposal;
2) To have a very clear and detailed written proposal (the operational plan) before work starts; this will detail the
process, the actions to be undertaken, and what each party has agreed to within this;
3) To have clarity from the beginning around ownership of the VLCC, the CALM buoy and the oil and agreement
of handover, potential sale etc;
4) To invest heavily in building and maintaining relationships of trust with all stakeholders, both before and during
the process;
17 | P a g e
DocuSign Envelope ID: B98B5422-2DA5-44F3-AEA5-82A5CBF1F366
5) To agree on a mechanism for solving any disputes that arise in the course of the operation, involving the parties
as well as international stakeholders;
6) Development of a communications strategy in relation to all stakeholders, to help prevent or resolve
misunderstandings that may develop;
7) A clear common understanding of the end of the UNDP's engagement in the project.
FSO Safer is owned by SEPOC, a Yemeni state company headquartered in Ma’rib. The ownership of FSO Safer will be
clarified and scrapping the FSO has been agreed by the IRG (Letter from MoFA, July 2022). The cargo of Ma’rib Light is
owned by a number of different entities and there has been no update since 2015. As such, the exact amount of liftable
oil is not known. It is required to determine whether these owners4 will consent to waive their entitlements so the oil
can be sold, although sale of the oil is not covered under this project document. Legal advice is being taken on oil
ownership issues, and on liability if there is a spill in the course of transferring the oil to the replacement VLCC. Normally
this would be covered by insurance, which FSO Safer does not have as an ‘out-of-class’ vessel. A RACI5 will be required
to show liability on the insurance during STS and storage.
Legal advice is also being sought on the implications of transferring ownership of the VLCC at the close of the project.
There needs to be clarity on the vessel and oil ownership, transfer and handover from the beginning of the project.
The Control Risk analysis (Control Risks, 2022) notes that project and contract personnel shall be operating in an
unfamiliar environment where, due to the ongoing conflict, tensions can easily develop if, for example, there is an
unexpected change of plan due to operational necessities. While this is a reality, good planning and liaison can largely
mitigate the risks involved.
The UN will agree on security protocols with the DFA prior to the Salvage contractor team’s arrival in area. This will
include relations with DFA local security apparatus and agreement on the issue of people carrying weapons in the
vicinity of the Safer operation. The Yemeni Coast Guard (YCG) remain a professional service, both in IRG- and DFA-
controlled areas, staffed by career coastguards who have worked for the service since before the current conflict. They
shall be used to provide a safe environment in the vicinity of FSO Safer and to conduct escort duties for the Salvage
contractor’s personnel and vessels from the start line to the FSO Safer working area and land-based work sites. As part
of the project team, the Senior Political and Security Advisor (SPSA) shall ensure all local arrangements are in place and
are agreed upon by all.
The vessel is old, single-hulled and has not been maintained for a long time (see Figure 5). In particular, no inert gases
have been pumped into its storage tanks since the boilers ran out of fuel in 2017. The risks associated with working on
such a vessel shall be mitigated through the Salvage contractor, which has undertaken this kind of operation in the past.
The Salvage contractor shall own these risks as part of normal operating modalities. A ship-to-ship transfer operation
shall be completed based on the guidelines from the Oil companies’ international marine forum (OCIMF) and the
International Chamber of Shipping (ICS), laid down in the Guide for Petroleum, Chemicals and Liquefied Gas. The
contractor shall create a safe work environment onboard the FSO Safer prior to the commencement of operations. The
transfer shall be done independently of the FSO Safer cargo handling and safety systems, with specialized mobile
salvage equipment. Tank washing, purging, gas freeing and de-mucking upon completion of the cargo transfer will
mitigate the risk of explosions. Explosive engineers (Collett, 2022) and environmental engineers (IMO, 2021) have been
consulted on the appropriate mitigation measures in accordance with international regulation and best practice. These
4 The parties agreed in principle that should the oil be sold, in whole or in part, at some future date then the proceeds could be
used to pay for public servant salaries
5 Responsible - those who do the work (Salvage contractor); Accountable - approver and guides the “responsible” (UN); Consulted
– experts, they inform others, 2-way communication (UN); Informed - need to be kept up to date, 1-way communication
(stakeholders)
18 | P a g e
DocuSign Envelope ID: B98B5422-2DA5-44F3-AEA5-82A5CBF1F366
experts shall remain part of the project to mitigate / advise on any ‘real-life’ risks that emerge as the project progresses.
A HAZOP (Hazardous operations) or TRA’s (Task risk assessment) are to be developed for each stage. All activities should
be managed under the Salvage company’s control of the work system.
As the project requires significant financial and technical resources and incorporates political and security risks, UNDP
needs to ensure these resources to implement activities. The financial resource must be fully covered for all activities,
and the preparation and procurement process should not be delayed. For example, in order not to delay the
procurement process of a second-hand CALM buoy, it is required to mobilise resources for the procurement of the
buoy as soon as possible. The delay of CALM buoy procurement may cause further expenditure and will cause financial
risk to the project. There is also uncertainty about foreign exchanges and global inflation. Therefore, the project is
required to take fluctuation and inflation into consideration for budgeting and needs to conduct market research to
ensure cost-efficient, as made explicit in the RFP. Accurate contingency planning is also required to avoid oil spills which
may also cause reputational damage to the UN and UNDP, along with economic and environmental catastrophe. Other
risks associated with UNDP project management and operations can be referred to the risk log (annexe 1)
Maritime hazards and their mitigation are covered in two key reference documents and further listed in the risk register
(Collett, 2022) (Control Risks, 2022).
As in many conflict situations, landmines are a remnant of war and pose a risk in the Hodeida area and travelling from
Sana’a to Hodeida. As such, the operation is predominantly sea-based, with a minimal land footprint. In consultation
with the DFA, UNDSS shall be responsible for ensuring the road between Sana’a and Hodeida remains free running,
with UNDSS and UNMHA providing levels of protection to contractor/project staff in accordance with their mission
mandates (accommodation, security, movement). Strict instructions will be given to stay on main roads or within
marked areas.
19 | P a g e
DocuSign Envelope ID: B98B5422-2DA5-44F3-AEA5-82A5CBF1F366
These risks will be managed as part of the overall security arrangements for the project (Control Risks, 2022) (UN, 2022),
with the SPSA playing a critical role in negotiating successful outcomes. It should be noted that the recent vacating of
the area around Hodeida by the forces of the IRG has moved the frontline south of the Safer area and made the
immediate operating environment less volatile. A site-specific emergency response plan needs to be developed to cover
security risks.
At the time of writing, precise emergency medical arrangements for daily healthcare support and casualty evacuation
remain under review. However, the plan is to ensure that a casualty can receive triage at the point of injury with a clear
evacuation chain back to the country of origin, within safe timelines that allow for stabilisation and onward movement.
Both the UN Common Services and UNMHA run basic clinics, and UNMHA is prepared to put a trauma unit into their
clinic. Both also have armoured ambulances, and the road is tarmac all the way to Sana’a, after which there is an
arrangement with AMREF Flying Doctors to airlift to Nairobi. UNMHA also have a helicopter stationed in Djibouti and
this could be used for medical evacuation if agreements we made in advance for a suitable landing site and for
procedures to agree on flights. If medical arrangements become complicated, it is likely that the Salvage contractor
shall require a Dive Support Vessel (DSV) at the worksite to provide immediate trauma support, thereby allowing for
airlift evacuation.
Further comprehensive risk assessment including the legal and reputational risk will be required before proceeding
with the STS operations with the support from technical and legal experts. A site-specific emergency response plan will
cover medical emergencies, including Medivacs and pandemic management.
I. Political Risks
1 Delay or refusal of the implementation of MOU by DFA.
2 False or malicious information causing issues with the performance of the project
II. Legal Risks
3 The owners of the oil file lawsuit due to the financial loss.
4 Failure to obtain sufficient insurance cover.
5 The selected salvage company is taken over by another company.
III. Operational Risks
FSO Safer discharges her entire oil contents in accordance with worst case IMO predictions – 100%
6
release
7 FSO Safer discharges her oil contents based on the most likely IMO scenario – 25% oil contents
8 FSO Safer discharges the oil contents from one tank during ship-to-ship (STS) transfer operation.
9 Hull failure during STS operation.
10 The salvage company fails to repair the critical elements of the SAFER to conduct STS.
11 Supply chain interruption in Hodeidah impacts salvage company resupply
12 Salvage company unable to initiate operation within the timeline.
Salvation operation is not implemented in accordance with maritime and environmental international
13
regulations
14 Failure to remove all oil residues from the FSO Safer.
IV. UNDP Organisational Risks
UNDP is unable to identify project team with appropriate project management and technical advisory
15
expertise
16 Delay in completing the project preparation work and implementation.
17 Failure to manage budget
18 Funding for the project is insufficient
20 | P a g e
DocuSign Envelope ID: B98B5422-2DA5-44F3-AEA5-82A5CBF1F366
Given the complexity of the project, stakeholder engagement shall be via regular online meetings and /or on-site visits
whenever possible. To date, the following stakeholders are directly and indirectly involved in this project:
International: European Union, the Netherlands, Germany, France, Sweden, Norway, Switzerland, the UK, US,
Finland, The Grand Duché of Luxembourg.
Private Sector: SEPOC and Faheem Industries; current owners of the SAFER oil (incl Total); the Oil Majors,
accessed via the Oil Companies International Marine Forum (OCIMF), based in London.
The RC/HC is responsible for interacting with the IRG, the DFA and various regional stakeholders. He shall endeavour
to maintain the full agreement of parties with the underlying proposal. In addition, the RC/HC will interact with potential
donor countries to ensure sufficient funding for the proposal in order to start on time. UNDP CO shall be responsible
for the overall program management. This includes the procurement of the replacement vessel, contracting the vessel
21 | P a g e
DocuSign Envelope ID: B98B5422-2DA5-44F3-AEA5-82A5CBF1F366
crew, maintenance and insurance of the vessel. ln addition, UNDP will contract the Salvage contractor and shall sign
contribution agreements.
As the Government of Yemen informed the UN that the Safer tanker and oil in the Safer belong to them6, and therefore,
they remain as the owner of the new vessel, which replaces the Safer tanker. UNDP will handover all responsibility
related to the vessel to the Government of Yemen. Therefore, the maintenance of the vessel will be conducted by the
Government of Yemen after the project period. UNDP will support establishing a maintenance plan. RCO and OSESGY
will be responsible for finding a political solution to sell the remaining oil in the new vessel.
The RC/HC’s senior communications advisor is responsible for the Safer communications plan in order to support the
operation and mitigate risks to the UN’s reputation. The plan shall be coordinated with all partners engaged in the Safer
salvage operation, including national and international NGO’s, civil society and contractors, national women machinery
and CSOs, the relevant authorities, regional actors and donors. Key elements of the strategy are: a crisis response
communications plan; progress reports; the clarification of roles and responsibilities for the management of media;
coordinated message sharing amongst partners; and media monitoring and social listening for periodic feedback and
exit strategy.
3.6.1 Introduction
The communication and visibility plan supports the implementation of the project, which is managed by UNDP under
the overall leadership of the UN Resident and Humanitarian Coordinator for Yemen.
The overarching objective of the Communications Strategy is to raise awareness of the framework of the project and
its results and impact on the lives of Yemenis through the prevention of an environmental and economic catastrophe
as well as the preservation of Yemen’s food security. It also aims to communicate project results to UN leadership and
to contributing donors.
National authorities and potentially affected population: Sensitize around the potential impact of an oil spill from
the FSO Tanker on Yemen’s livelihoods, crops, food security, and biodiversity across the region. It will stress the
cost of an oil spill cleanup versus the Salvage Operation and will present an opportunity to raise awareness about
the impact of an oil spill. Additionally, in a country where over 70 per cent of the population needs humanitarian
support, it could potentially stall operations in northern Yemeni ports that are critical to Yemen’s food security.
6 Confirmed by the Minister of Oil and Minerals through the letter sent to RC on 17th September 2022
22 | P a g e
DocuSign Envelope ID: B98B5422-2DA5-44F3-AEA5-82A5CBF1F366
Contributing donors: informed of public opinion both in Yemen and internationally about their efforts related to
resource mobilization and advocacy. Lobby for a long-term solution to the FSO Safer issue. Focus on the
harmonized approach and risk-sharing approach strategy that donors have adopted to resolve this important issue.
United Nations: Highlight the commitment of the United Nations to addressing the threat posed by the FSO Safer
and its ongoing coordination work within the United Nations System and with local and international entities,
including member states, PERSGA and Greenpeace.
The Resident Coordinator’s Office (RCO) Yemen developed a Communications Strategy with the objectives of building
and maintaining support for the United Nations-coordinated efforts to resolve the threat posed by the FSO Safer and
the Contingency Plan in the event of a catastrophic oil leak, while helping to mitigate associated reputational risks to
the United Nations. The strategy was developed in collaboration with the senior communications officers from the
International Maritime Organization (IMO), OCHA Yemen, the Office of the Special Envoy of the Secretary-General for
Yemen (OSESGY) and the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), who form a core communications group in
Yemen.
3.6.4 Activities
Activities listed below will be implemented during the period of validity of the communication and visibility plan.
23 | P a g e
DocuSign Envelope ID: B98B5422-2DA5-44F3-AEA5-82A5CBF1F366
24 | P a g e
DocuSign Envelope ID: B98B5422-2DA5-44F3-AEA5-82A5CBF1F366
UN websites are - Media The websites All published documents, Donor logos are inserted
regularly - Youth will be updated reports and events are posted in thank you section on
updated. - Donors regularly with on the UN websites. relevant web sites (e.g.
- UN new materials FSO Safer microsite)
Leadership as necessary UN Department of Global
and updated communication Trello board. Amplification can also be
figures, donors, made via social media
etc. channels when new
materials are available.
A crisis Late June, early Colleagues are made aware of Ensure donor logos are
communication UN leadership July 2022 communications actions inserted in key
plan is Donors necessary documents.
developed. Roles and responsibilities are
clearly defined
Leads are defined
Pledging events Potential June 2022 Required resources to Ensure donor logos are
are organized international implement the SSOP for both inserted in the cover
and regional phases are secured. page of any document
donors shared with media.
Smooth implementation of
NGOs/IGOs/Lo the SSOP is enabled.
bby groups
that can
provide
expertise/in-
kind
contribution
Human resources to contribute to the implementation of the communication strategy are as follows:
7 Translation and design of reports and communications products, design and printing of reports
25 | P a g e
DocuSign Envelope ID: B98B5422-2DA5-44F3-AEA5-82A5CBF1F366
4 PROJECT MANAGEMENT
4.1 Cost Efficiency and Effectiveness
UNDP has already examined four (4) options to successfully deliver its proposed theory of change (JFA Consulting,
2021): 1) repair of the Safer; 2) replacing the Safer with another FSO; 3) transferring oil to be stored in a new tanker,
known in the industry as a Very Large Crude Carrier (VLCC) and 4) construction of tank farm onshore. These options
were scored based on simplicity, safety, cost, operational risk, export potential of crude oil and technical feasibility.
To deliver cost efficiency, Option 1 was not considered viable for safety reasons. Option 2 was technically achievable
and would provide export capacity but would be expensive and – more critically – lengthy as such vessels are not
immediately available. Option 3 was technically achievable and could be done relatively quickly. Option 4 was
technically feasible but would require the build of an onshore storage facility following a land / maritime survey. Both
the build and survey would be expensive and take considerable time to underpin assurance due to the presence of land
mines and potential UXO on the seabed.
As such, the preferred solution to implement the theory of change is to replace the FSO Safer with a VLCC capable of
holding 200,000m3 crude oil. In July 2022, after further cost efficiencies analysis and meetings, it was agreed among
UN, DFA and IRG that a VLCC lightly modified to be an FSO permanently attached to a CALM buoy.
The CALM buoy with a permanently attached double-hull FSO is both safe, the fastest and the most flexible option and
this option has the following advantages.
The works, including the emergency operation to mitigate the current environmental threat, can be completed
in 10 months – faster than any of the other options.
The CALM buoy can be attached and detached from the FSO should the vessel need to be replaced or
drydocked. The CALM buoy solution can also be used to load oil directly to tankers from an onshore storage
facility.
The system is proven safe in use by the industry as a long-term Floating Storage and Offloading (FSO) solution.
In terms of effectiveness, a technical review and discussions held at Ras Issa in February 2022, give reason to believe
that the Safer is at risk of being the cause of a major oil spill and thus constitutes an emergency situation that cannot
wait 18 months for a permanent FSO solution to be delivered. The UN has therefore developed the operational plan
(UN, 2022) which was updated in July 2022.
The FSO Safer Salvage Project shall be managed by UNDP Yemen Country Office (CO) using a direct implementation
modality. UNDP will bring together programme and operational capacities from national authorities, the UN, IMO and
industry that shall work jointly to ensure effective, efficient, and swift delivery. Basing is currently being finalised, but
the project will involve land-based logistic hubs in Djibouti and Hodeida, a sea-based working site around FSO Safer,
with support from the UN’s good offices in Amman, Sana’a and Aden. The establishment of the project will follow the
structure below, with detailed job specifications for the SPSA, SSC and PM in annexe 2:
4.2.1 Staffing
- Senior Political and Security Advisor (SPSA - D1) – based in Hodeida. 6 months from commencement of
the project. The SPSA is responsible for developing good relations between the UN, the Salvage and the
DFA authorities in both Sana'a and Hodeida, including inter alia the Chair of the Safer Committee, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Head of the CBY-S, the Governor of Hodeida, and the military and security
authorities in Hodeida.
26 | P a g e
DocuSign Envelope ID: B98B5422-2DA5-44F3-AEA5-82A5CBF1F366
- Senior Safer Coordinator (SSC - International - P5 level) based in Amman. Twelve months from
commencement of the project. Provides support to the RC/HC in his role as UN lead on Safer issues,
including work with the DFA, IRG, Saudi-led Coalition (SLC), donors and UN HQ in New York. Manages day-
to-day SAFER-related issues and acts as the focal point for UN on Safer related issues. Ensure effective
progress in the implementation of the Safer Plan, in relation to the emergency plan, work on the long-
term solution and contingency planning. Supports the RC/HC in donor coordination and resource
mobilisation.
- Project Manager (International – P4) based in Sana'a. 24 months from commencement of the project.
Responsible for managing the project to a conclusion with the assistance of the SPSA, SSC, CTA, the Salvage
contractor, Fahem coordinator and authorities.
- Technical experts - technical experts such as legal consultants to provide legal advice and legal drafting of
legal documents on issues related to the ownership and vessels and on maritime assurance.
The exact positions and budgeted amount can be subject to change based on needs of the project.
In addition, the following PSF staff will provide support to this project as complementary support provided at to no-cost
to the budget of the action.
- PSF Procurement Specialist (International – P3 level) is based in Amman and is responsible for the
effective, efficient, and timely delivery of all procurement services of the Facility. S/He provides solutions
for complex procurement issues and develops related strategies.
- PSF Procurement Analyst (National – NOB level) is based in Sana'a and manages the procurement
processes of the projects. S/he manages and processes procurement contracts, rosters of suppliers and
duly implements the internal control system.
- PSF Finance Specialist (International - TAP3 level) is based in Amman, responsible for effective and
transparent utilisation of financial resources and integrity of financial services. His/She manages the
financial resources of the project, including budget planning and revisions, payment of contractors,
financial reporting to donors and to UNDP Management and ensures that expenses are recorded
accurately.
- PSF Finance Assistant (National – NPSA6 level) is based in Sana'a, and s/he ensures the day-to-day
processing of payments, inventory and asset management and assists the operation manager in the
management of project budget and proper control of accounts.
- Monitoring and Reporting/communication (UNV) officer for which the timing and engagement will
ideally be determined to coincide with the beginning of operations.
The project shall also draw on support from relevant UNDP HQ units, OSESGY, UNRCO and other UN agencies in Yemen.
CO Programme and Operations support cost including personnel: Due to the volume of operations foreseen in this
project all functions related to support, compliance, assurance, delivery is required to ensure efficient, transparent,
compliant and effective project implementation. The Programme and Operations support includes, but is not limited
to, the following functions: Programme portfolio management, finance, travel, procurement, administration, protocol
and management support related services, communication and oversight and programme quality assurance, security,
and medical services. The Project will be billed based on workload study depending on staff support for implementation
of the project's activities. The cost of staffing is based on the UNDP proforma costing and dispatched between CO
project per year on a prorate basis.
Other costs: In addition, the budget for the action also provides for the costs of travel and subsistence costs for the
project's staff to ensure monitoring mission across the country for quality assurance and timely implementation of
activities as well as international travel cost for donors meetings, briefings and HQ briefings; accommodation and office
rent costs, depreciation costs, rental costs or lease of equipment and assets composing the project office (this may
include depreciation, maintenance or lease of vehicles); costs of maintenance and repair contracts; costs of
consumables and supplies, costs of IT and telecommunication services, costs of electricity and water, costs of facility
management contracts, including security and insurance costs, as required for the operations of the project.
Project planning, cost control and Document control will need to be factored into the team structure to monitor
progress of the project and to ensure that all documentation and records are properly maintained
27 | P a g e
DocuSign Envelope ID: B98B5422-2DA5-44F3-AEA5-82A5CBF1F366
Audit: The project shall be subject to the internal and external auditing procedures laid down in the Financial
Regulations, Rules and directives of UNDP.
Monitoring and evaluation costs: UNDP shall ensure continuous monitoring and final evaluation will be conducted as
per UNDP corporate requirements and guidelines.
4.2.2 Sub-contractors
- The MMCC will also carry out the due diligence of the Salvage contractor.
- Subcontracting of the Legal Firm specialized on maritime law for the management of all legal aspects
related to the FSO Safer salvaging and for assisting UNDP in preparing contracting clauses that cover all
legal risks attached to the salvaging operation.
Financial contributions can be channelled to the Peace Support Facility for Yemen and shall be managed in accordance
with UNDP’s Financial Rules and Regulations, and in alignment with Donor Contribution Agreements.
28 | P a g e
DocuSign Envelope ID: B98B5422-2DA5-44F3-AEA5-82A5CBF1F366
8The exact quantity of Marib crude oil and its physical condition is not known. As such, it is unlikely that 1.148 million usable barrels will be transferred before demucking and tank washing takes place. 97% of
the verified volume post inspection is therefore an achievable quantity based on consultation with the contractor and international regulations (MARPOL, 2013) – evidence base: VLCC New Diamond STS,
demucking and tank washing.
29 | P a g e
DocuSign Envelope ID: B98B5422-2DA5-44F3-AEA5-82A5CBF1F366
Monitoring Plan
Partners Cost
Monitoring Activity Purpose Frequency Expected Action
(If joint) (If any)
Progress data against the results indicators in the RRF will Quarterly, or in the Slower than expected progress will be N/A See Budget
Track results
be collected and analysed to assess the progress of the frequency required addressed by project management. table
progress
project in achieving the agreed outputs. for each indicator.
Identify specific risks that may threaten achievement of Risks are identified by project The selected See Budget
intended results. Identify and monitor risk management management and actions are taken to Salvage table
actions using a risk log. This includes monitoring manage risk. The risk log is actively contractor
Monitor and
measures and plans that may have been required as per Quarterly maintained to keep track of identified
Manage Risk
UNDP’s Social and Environmental Standards. Audits will risks and actions taken.
be conducted in accordance with UNDP’s audit policy to
manage financial risk.
The quality of the project will be assessed against UNDP’s Areas of strength and weakness will N/A DPC
Annual Project quality standards to identify project strengths and be reviewed by project management
Annually
Quality Assurance weaknesses and to inform management decision making and used to inform decisions to
to improve the project. improve project performance.
Performance data, risks, lessons and N/A N/A
Review and Make Internal review of data and evidence from all monitoring quality will be discussed by the project
At least annually
Course Corrections actions to inform decision making. board and used to make course
corrections.
A progress report will be presented to the Project Board The selected N/A
and key stakeholders, consisting of progress data showing Salvage
the results achieved against pre-defined annual targets at Annually, and at the contractor
Project Report the output level, the annual project quality rating end of the project
summary, an updated risk long with mitigation measures, (final report)
and any evaluation or review reports prepared over the
period.
The project’s governance mechanism (i.e., project board) N/A N/A
Any quality concerns or slower than
Project Review will hold regular project reviews to assess the Specify frequency
expected progress should be
(Project Board) performance of the project and review the Multi-Year (i.e., at least annually)
discussed by the project board and
Work Plan to ensure realistic budgeting over the life of
30 | P a g e
DocuSign Envelope ID: B98B5422-2DA5-44F3-AEA5-82A5CBF1F366
Partners Cost
Monitoring Activity Purpose Frequency Expected Action
(If joint) (If any)
the project. In the project’s final year, the Project Board management actions agreed to
shall hold an end-of project review to capture lessons address the issues identified.
learned and discuss opportunities for scaling up and to
socialize project results and lessons learned with relevant
audiences.
Table 2: Monitoring Plan
Evaluation Plan
Related
UNSDCF/CPD Planned Key Evaluation Cost and Source of
Evaluation Title Partners (if joint) Strategic Plan
Outcome Completion Date Stakeholders Funding
Output
Final Evaluation of the SSOP 3.1 CPD/F Outcome 3 March 2024 US$40,000
Table 3: Evaluation Plan
31 | P a g e
DocuSign Envelope ID: B98B5422-2DA5-44F3-AEA5-82A5CBF1F366
33 | P a g e
DocuSign Envelope ID: B98B5422-2DA5-44F3-AEA5-82A5CBF1F366
The PSF steering committee (SC) composed of the project donors, UNDP, RC/HC and SE. The PSF SC is the most senior,
dedicated oversight body for all PSF funded projects, including the SSOP. The SC makes strategic decisions, provides
direction, and endorses projects presented by the the PSF technical team. The technical team is composed of the SE,
RCO, donor partners and UNDP. It advises the SC on PSF project matters and concept notes submitted by the UN
tripartite team. The tripartite team is composed of the SE, RCO, UNDP and PSF staff. The main role is to review and
prepare concept notes for submission to the technical team.
Figure 7 and Figure 8 provide an overview of the PSF and SSOP organisation structures at the strategic and project level.
34 | P a g e
DocuSign Envelope ID: B98B5422-2DA5-44F3-AEA5-82A5CBF1F366
9 LEGAL CONTEXT
This project document shall be the instrument referred to as such in Article 1 of the Standard Basic Assistance
Agreement between the Government of the Republic of Yemen and UNDP, signed on 11 April 1977. All references in
the SBAA to “Executing Agency” shall be deemed to refer to “Implementing Partner.”
This project will be implemented by UNDP in accordance with its financial regulations, rules, practices, and procedures.
10 RISK MANAGEMENT
2. UNDP as the Implementing Partner will undertake all reasonable efforts to ensure that none of the [project
funds]9 [UNDP funds received pursuant to the Project Document]10 are used to provide support to individuals or entities
associated with terrorism , that the recipients of any amounts provided by UNDP hereunder do not appear on the
United Nations Security Council Consolidated Sanctions List, and that no UNDP funds received pursuant to the Project
Document are used for money laundering activities. The United Nations Security Council Consolidated Sanctions List
can be accessed via https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/content/un-sc-consolidated-list. This provision must be
included in all sub-contracts or sub-agreements entered into under this Project Document.
3. Social and environmental sustainability will be enhanced through application of the UNDP Social and
Environmental Standards (http://www.undp.org/ses) and related Accountability Mechanism
(http://www.undp.org/secu-srm).
4. UNDP as the Implementing Partner will: (a) conduct project and programme-related activities in a manner consistent
with the UNDP Social and Environmental Standards, (b) implement any management or mitigation plan prepared for the project
or Programme to comply with such standards, and (c) engage in a constructive and timely manner to address any concerns and
complaints raised through the Accountability Mechanism. UNDP will seek to ensure that communities and other project
stakeholders are informed of and have access to the Accountability Mechanism.
5. In the implementation of the activities under this Project Document, UNDP as the Implementing Partner will
handle any sexual exploitation and abuse (“SEA”) and sexual harassment (“SH”) allegations in accordance with its
regulations, rules, policies and procedures.
6. All signatories to the Project Document shall cooperate in good faith with any exercise to evaluate any programme
or project-related commitments or compliance with the UNDP Social and Environmental Standards. This includes providing
access to project sites, relevant personnel, information, and documentation.
7. UNDP as the Implementing Partner will ensure that the following obligations are binding on each responsible
party, subcontractor, and sub-recipient:
a. Consistent with the Article III of the SBAA [or the Supplemental Provisions to the Project Document], the
responsibility for the safety and security of each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient and its
personnel and property, and of UNDP’s property in such responsible party’s, subcontractor’s and sub-
recipient’s custody, rests with such responsible party, subcontractor, and sub-recipient. To this end, each
responsible party, subcontractor, and sub-recipient shall:
i.put in place an appropriate security plan and maintain the security plan, taking into account the security
situation in the country where the project is being carried.
ii.assume all risks and liabilities related to such responsible party’s, subcontractor’s and sub-recipient’s
security, and the full implementation of the security plan.
b. UNDP reserves the right to verify whether such a plan is in place, and to suggest modifications to the plan
when necessary. Failure to maintain and implement an appropriate security plan as required hereunder shall
be deemed a breach of the responsible party’s, subcontractor’s, and sub-recipient’s obligations under this
Project Document.
c. Each responsible party, subcontractor, and sub-recipient (each a “sub-party” and together “sub-parties”)
acknowledges and agrees that UNDP will not tolerate sexual harassment and sexual exploitation and abuse of
anyone by the sub-parties, and other entities involved in Project implementation, either as contractors or
subcontractors and their personnel, and any individuals performing services for them under the Project
Document.
(a) In the implementation of the activities under this Project Document, each sub-party shall comply with the
standards of conduct set forth in the Secretary General’s Bulletin ST/SGB/2003/13 of 9 October 2003,
concerning “Special measures for protection from sexual exploitation and sexual abuse” (“SEA”).
(b) Moreover, and without limitation to the application of other regulations, rules, policies and procedures
bearing upon the performance of the activities under this Project Document, in the implementation of
activities, each sub-party, shall not engage in any form of sexual harassment (“SH”). SH is defined as any
unwelcome conduct of a sexual nature that might reasonably be expected or be perceived to cause offense or
humiliation, when such conduct interferes with work, is made a condition of employment or creates an
intimidating, hostile or offensive work environment. SH may occur in the workplace or in connection with
work. While typically involving a pattern of conduct, SH may take the form of a single incident. In assessing the
reasonableness of expectations or perceptions, the perspective of the person who is the target of the conduct
shall be considered.
d. In the performance of the activities under this Project Document, each sub-party shall (with respect to its own
activities) and shall require from its sub-parties (with respect to their activities) that they, have minimum
standards and procedures in place, or a plan to develop and/or improve such standards and procedures in
order to be able to take effective preventive and investigative action. These should include policies on sexual
harassment and sexual exploitation and abuse; policies on whistleblowing/protection against retaliation; and
complaints, disciplinary and investigative mechanisms. In line with this, sub-parties will and will require that
their respective sub-parties will take all appropriate measures to:
(i) Prevent its employees, agents or any other persons engaged to perform any services under this Project
Document, from engaging in SH or SEA;
(ii) Offer employees and associated personnel training on prevention and response to SH and SEA, where sub-
parties have not put in place its own training regarding the prevention of SH and SEA, sub-parties may use the
training material available at UNDP;
(iii) Report and monitor allegations of SH and SEA of which any of the sub-parties have been informed or
have otherwise become aware, and status thereof;
(iv) Refer victims/survivors of SH and SEA to safe and confidential victim assistance; and
(v) Promptly and confidentially record and investigate any allegations credible enough to warrant an
investigation of SH or SEA. Each sub-party shall advise UNDP of any such allegations received and investigations
being conducted by itself or any of its sub-parties with respect to their activities under the Project Document,
and shall keep UNDP informed during the investigation by it or any of such sub-parties, to the extent that such
notification (i) does not jeopardize the conduct of the investigation, including but not limited to the safety or
security of persons, and/or (ii) is not in contravention of any laws applicable to it. Following the investigation,
the relevant sub-party shall advise UNDP of any actions taken by it or any of the other entities further to the
investigation.
e. Each sub-party shall establish that it has complied with the foregoing, to the satisfaction of UNDP, when
requested by UNDP or any party acting on its behalf to provide such confirmation. Failure of the relevant sub-
party to comply of the foregoing, as determined by UNDP, shall be considered grounds for suspension or
termination of the Project.
f. Each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient will ensure that any project activities undertaken by
them will be implemented in a manner consistent with the UNDP Social and Environmental Standards and shall
ensure that any incidents or issues of non-compliance shall be reported to UNDP in accordance with UNDP
Social and Environmental Standards.
g. Each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient will take appropriate steps to prevent misuse of funds,
fraud, corruption or other financial irregularities, by its officials, consultants, subcontractors and sub-recipients
in implementing the project or Programme or using the UNDP funds. It will ensure that its financial
management, anti-corruption, anti-fraud and anti-money laundering and countering the financing of terrorism
policies are in place and enforced for all funding received from or through UNDP.
h. The requirements of the following documents, then in force at the time of signature of the Project Document,
apply to each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient: (a) UNDP Policy on Fraud and other Corrupt
Practices (b) UNDP Anti-Money Laundering and Countering the Financing of Terrorism Policy; and (c) UNDP
Office of Audit and Investigations Investigation Guidelines. Each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-
36 | P a g e
DocuSign Envelope ID: B98B5422-2DA5-44F3-AEA5-82A5CBF1F366
recipient agrees to the requirements of the above documents, which are an integral part of this Project
Document and are available online at www.undp.org.
i. In the event that an investigation is required, UNDP will conduct investigations relating to any aspect of UNDP
programmes and projects. Each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient will provide its full
cooperation, including making available personnel, relevant documentation, and granting access to its (and its
consultants’, subcontractors’ and sub-recipients’) premises, for such purposes at reasonable times and on
reasonable conditions as may be required for the purpose of an investigation. Should there be a limitation in
meeting this obligation, UNDP shall consult with it to find a solution.
j. Each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient will promptly inform UNDP as the Implementing
Partner in case of any incidence of inappropriate use of funds, or credible allegation of fraud, corruption other
financial irregularities with due confidentiality.
Where it becomes aware that a UNDP project or activity, in whole or in part, is the focus of investigation for
alleged fraud/corruption, each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient will inform the UNDP
Resident Representative/Head of Office, who will promptly inform UNDP’s Office of Audit and Investigations
(OAI). It will provide regular updates to the head of UNDP in the country and OAI of the status of, and actions
relating to, such investigation.
k. Choose one of the three following options:
Option 1: UNDP will be entitled to a refund from the responsible party, subcontractor or sub-recipient of any
funds provided that have been used inappropriately, including through fraud corruption, other financial
irregularities or otherwise paid other than in accordance with the terms and conditions of this Project
Document. Such amount may be deducted by UNDP from any payment due to the responsible party,
subcontractor or sub-recipient under this or any other agreement. Recovery of such amount by UNDP shall
not diminish or curtail any responsible party’s, subcontractor’s or sub-recipient’s obligations under this Project
Document.
Note: The term “Project Document” as used in this clause shall be deemed to include any relevant subsidiary
agreement further to the Project Document, including those with responsible parties, subcontractors and sub-
recipients.
l. Each contract issued by the responsible party, subcontractor or sub-recipient in connection with this Project
Document shall include a provision representing that no fees, gratuities, rebates, gifts, commissions or other
payments, other than those shown in the proposal, have been given, received, or promised in connection with
the selection process or in contract execution, and that the recipient of funds from it shall cooperate with any
and all investigations and post-payment audits.
m. Should UNDP refer to the relevant national authorities for appropriate legal action any alleged wrongdoing
relating to the project or programme, the Government will ensure that the relevant national authorities shall
actively investigate the same and take appropriate legal action against all individuals found to have
participated in the wrongdoing, recover and return any recovered funds to UNDP.
n. Each responsible party, subcontractor and sub-recipient shall ensure that all of its obligations set forth under
this section entitled “Risk Management” are passed on to its subcontractors and sub-recipients and that all
the clauses under this section entitled “Risk Management Standard Clauses” are adequately reflected, mutatis
mutandis, in all its sub-contracts or sub-agreements entered into further to this Project Document.
Special Clauses. In case of government cost-sharing through the project, the following clauses should be included:
1. The schedule of payments and UNDP bank account details.
2. The value of the payment, if made in a currency other than United States dollars, shall be determined by
applying the United Nations operational rate of exchange in effect on the date of payment. Should there be a change
in the United Nations operational rate of exchange prior to the full utilization by the UNDP of the payment, the value
of the balance of funds still held at that time will be adjusted accordingly. If, in such a case, a loss in the value of the
balance of funds is recorded, UNDP shall inform the Government with a view to determining whether any further
financing could be provided by the Government. Should such further financing not be available, the assistance to be
provided to the project may be reduced, suspended or terminated by UNDP.
3. The above schedule of payments takes into account the requirement that the payments shall be made in
advance of the implementation of planned activities. It may be amended to be consistent with the progress of project
delivery.
37 | P a g e
DocuSign Envelope ID: B98B5422-2DA5-44F3-AEA5-82A5CBF1F366
4. UNDP shall receive and administer the payment in accordance with the regulations, rules and directives of
UNDP.
5. All financial accounts and statements shall be expressed in United States dollars.
6. If unforeseen increases in expenditures or commitments are expected or realized (whether owing to
inflationary factors, fluctuation in exchange rates or unforeseen contingencies), UNDP shall submit to the government
on a timely basis a supplementary estimate showing the further financing that will be necessary. The Government shall
use its best endeavours to obtain the additional funds required.
7. If the payments referred above are not received in accordance with the payment schedule, or if the additional
financing required in accordance with paragraph 6 above is not forthcoming from the Government or other sources,
the assistance to be provided to the project under this Agreement may be reduced, suspended or terminated by UNDP.
8. Any interest income attributable to the contribution shall be credited to UNDP Account and shall be utilized
in accordance with established UNDP procedures.
In accordance with the decisions and directives of UNDP's Executive Board:
The contribution shall be charged:
(a) 8% cost recovery for the provision of general management support (GMS) by UNDP headquarters and
country offices
(b) Direct cost for implementation support services (ISS) provided by UNDP and/or an executing
entity/implementing partner.
9. Ownership of equipment, supplies and other properties financed from the contribution shall vest in UNDP.
Matters relating to the transfer of ownership by UNDP shall be determined in accordance with the relevant policies and
procedures of UNDP.
10. The contribution shall be subject exclusively to the internal and external auditing procedures provided for in the
financial regulations, rules and directives of UNDP.”
38 | P a g e
DocuSign Envelope ID: B98B5422-2DA5-44F3-AEA5-82A5CBF1F366
11 ANNEXES
1. Risk log
See attachment 1
Mandate
Composition
The PSF Steering Committee members are:
UN Special Envoy to the Secretary-General in Yemen (Co-chair)
UN Resident Coordinator in Yemen (Co-chair)
UNDP Resident Representative
PSF donor partners
The PSF Steering Committee Co-chairs may invite additional permanent or ad-hoc observers.
Meeting Schedule
The Steering Committee meets formally twice a year. The Co-chairs may call for ad-hoc meetings if required.
Secretariat
As part of its PSF assurance role, UNDP serves as the Secretariat to the Steering Committee. In this role, UNDP will:
Facilitate the organisation of Steering Committee meetings.
Present regular updates on assessments, implementation, results, and contributions.
Provide narrative and financial progress reports every six months and final reports to partners.
Develop and circulate minutes of the Steering Committee meetings.
39 | P a g e
DocuSign Envelope ID: B98B5422-2DA5-44F3-AEA5-82A5CBF1F366
12 WORKS CITED
ACAPS. (2021, July 01). Yemen FSO Safer Impact Assessment. Retrieved February 2022, from ACAPS.ORG:
https://www.acaps.org/sites/acaps/files/products/files/20210407_acaps_yemen_fso_safer_impac
t_assessment_april-june_2021.pdf
Al-Duaij, S. (2022). Capacity Assessment Report - FSO Safer. Sana'a: UNDP.
Ballard, S., & JFA. (2022). FSO Safer: Understanding Risks and Assessing Impact. London: IMO, OSR, ACAPS.
Caesar, E. (2021, October 4). The ship that became a bomb. Retrieved April 2022, from The New Yorker:
https://www.newyorker.com/magazine/2021/10/11/the-ship-that-became-a-bomb
Collett, G. (2022). Explosion Risk Modelling - FSO Safer. Aden: UNDP.
Control Risks. (2022). Risk and Risk Management Assessment - FSO Safer. Amsterdam: Control Risks
Benelux B.V.
Cranfield University. (2022). FSO Safer explosive risk management assessment. Shrivenham: Cranfield
University.
EODEX. (2021). Countering Maritime Explosive Ordnance Threats in Yemen. Portsmouth: EODEX.
Gressley, D. (2021, December 15). UN Prinicplas Meeting on FSO afer. New York.
Guterres, A. (2022, April 7). UNSG Letter to the UNSC. New York: UN.
Huynh, B. Q., Kwong, L. H., Kiang, M. V., Chin, E. N., Mohareb, A. M., Jumaan, A. O., . . . Rehkopf, D. H.
(2021, October 11). Public health impacts of an imminent Red Sea oil spill. Nature Sustainability, 1 -
8.
IMO. (2021). FSO Safer - Support for tactical response planning. London: IMO.
IMO. (2021). Oil Spill Modelling Report for FSO Safer. Oil Spill Response.
JFA Consulting. (2021). JFA Technical Report on the disposal of FSA Safer. Dallas: JFA Consulting.
Johnson, C. (2021, December 18). Safer Contingency Plan. Sana'a, Yemen: Resident Coordinator.
MARPOL. (2013, February 11). Regulations for the prevention of pollution by oil. Retrieved March 2022,
from Marpol Training Institute:
http://www.marpoltraining.com/MMSKOREAN/MARPOL/Annex_I/r29.htm
MOU. (2022, March 5). Parties: The United Nations, Abdullah Mohamed Fahem & Co and the Supervisory
Committee for the implementation of the urgent maintenace agreement and the comprehensive
evaluation of the Safer floating tank. Memorandum of Understanding, 1,2.
OCHA. (2022, February 28). OCHA Services. Retrieved from Yemen: Population Estimates:
https://data.humdata.org/dataset/population-estimates-in-yemen-for-2019
OCHA Yemen. (2022). Yemen: Food Security & Nutrition Snapshot. Sana'a: OCHA.
Oxfam. (2017). Missiles and food: Yemen's man-made food security crisis. Oxford: Oxfam GB.
Purves, M., & Culmer, T. (2020, December 14). Case Study: Modelling the risk from the FSO Safer. Retrieved
April 2022, from Riskaware - Actionable Intelligence: www.riskaware.co.uk/insight/potential-
impact-of-a-release-from-the-fso-safer/
40 | P a g e
DocuSign Envelope ID: B98B5422-2DA5-44F3-AEA5-82A5CBF1F366
Yee, V., & Glanz, J. (2021, July 19). How One of the World’s Biggest Ships Jammed the Suez Canal. Retrieved
February 2022, from The New York TImes:
https://www.nytimes.com/2021/07/17/world/middleeast/suez-canal-stuck-ship-ever-given.html
41 | P a g e