List of cases for Constitutional Law 1 (Atty.

Allan Lozare)

Interpretation/Constructionof the Constitution

FACTS ISSUE RULING
An impeachment complaint against Chief Justice Whether or not Yes. The second impeachment complaint is barred
Francisco v. House of Hilario Davide and seven Associate Justices was the second under Section 3 (5) of Article XI of the
Representatives, G.R. No. filed on 2 June 2003 but was dismissed on 22 impeachment is Constitution. The Court, in determining the
160261, November 10, October 2003. On 23 October 2003, Representative unconstitutional? merits of the issues raised in a petition before it,
2003 Gilbert Teodoro and Felix Fuentabella filed a new must necessarily turn to the Constitution itself
impeachment complaint against the Chief Justice. which employs the well-settled principles of
Thus arose the instant petitions against the House constitutional construction.
of Representatives et al, most of which contend that
the filing of the second impeachment complaint is In case of doubt, the Court resorts to the
unconstitutional, “no impeachment proceedings following: (1)Verba legis, that is, wherever
shall be initiated against the same official more than possible, the words used in the Constitution must
once within the period of one year.” be given their ordinary meaning except where
technical terms are employed. (2) Where there is
ambiguity, ratio legis est anima. The words of the
Constitution should be interpreted in accordance
with the intent of its framers. (3). Ut magis valeat
quam pereat. The Constitution is to be
interpreted as a whole.

Civil Liberties Union v.

Executive Secretary, 194
SCRA 317
Self-executing/non-self-executing provisions
FACTS ISSUE RULIN
G
Manila Prince Hotel v. Pursuant to the privatization program of the Whether Yes Paragraph 2, Article XII of the 1987
GSIS, G.R. No. 122156, Philippine Government, the GSIS sold in public paragraph 2, Constitution is a self-executing provision and
February 03, 1997 auction its stake in Manila Hotel Corporation Article XII of the does not need implementing legislation to carry
(MHC). Only 2 bidders participated: petitioner 1987 it into effect.
Manila Prince Hotel Corporation, a Filipino Constitution is a Sec. 10, second par., of Art XII is couched in such
corporation, which offered to buy 51% of the self-executing a way as not to make it appear that it is non-
MHC or 15,300,000 shares at P41.58 per share, provision and self-executing but simply for purposes of style.
and Renong Berhad, a Malaysian firm, with ITT- does not need But, certainly, the legislature is not precluded
Sheraton as its hotel operator, which bid for the implementing from enacting further laws to enforce the
same number of shares at P44.00 per share, or legislation to constitutional provision so long as the
P2.42 more than the bid of petitioner. Petitioner carry it into contemplated statute squares with the
filed a petition before the Supreme Court to effect? Constitution. Minor details may be left to the
compel the GSIS to allow it to match the bid of legislature without impairing the self-executing
Renong Berhad. It invoked the Filipino First Policy nature of constitutional provisions. the second
enshrined in §10, paragraph 2, Article XII of the paragraph can only be self-executing as it does
1987 Constitution, which provides that “ not by its language require any legislation in
in the grant of rights, privileges, and order to give preference to qualified Filipinos in
concessions covering the national economy and the grant of rights, privileges and concessions
patrimony, the State shall give preference to covering the national economy and
qualified Filipinos.” patrimony. A constitutional provision may be
self-executing in one part and non-self-executing
in another. Thus, a constitutional provision is
self-executing if the nature and extent of the
right conferred and the liability imposed are
fixed by the Constitution itself, so that they
can be determined by an examination and
construction of its terms, and there is no
language indicating that the subject is referred
to the legislature for action.
Pamatong v. Comelec, Petitioner Pamatong filed his Certificate of Whether or not No. What is recognized in Section 26, Article II of the
G.R. No. 161872, April 13, Candidacy (COC) for President. Respondent there is a Constitution is merely a privilege subject to
2004 COMELEC declared petitioner and 35 others as constitutional limitations imposed by law. It neither bestows
nuisance candidates who could not wage a right to run for or such a right nor elevates the privilege to the
nationwide campaign and/or are not nominated by hold public level of an enforceable right. There is nothing
a political party or are not supported by a office? in the plain language of the provision which
registered political party with a national suggests such a thrust or justifies an
constituency. interpretation of the sort.

Section 26, Article II of the Constitution neither

bestows a right nor elevates the privilege to the
level of an enforceable right. Like the rest of
the policies enumerated in Article II, the
provision does not contain any judicially
enforceable constitutional right but merely
specifies a guideline for legislative or executive
action. The disregard of this provision does not
give rise to any cause of action before the courts

Judicial Review
FACTS ISSUE RULING
Petitioner, Jose Angara won the election for Whether or not No. The Constitution has rationally provided the
National Assembly for the first district of Tayabas the Court has Judiciary the power to determine the nature,
Angara v. Electoral Province. The National Assembly passed jurisdiction to scope and extent of the powers of government.
Commission, 63 Phil. 139 Resolution No 8 declaring the deadline for filing review the And when the judiciary mediates to allocate
protest on 3 December 1935.On the other hand the rulings of the constitutional boundaries, it does not assert any
Electoral Commission set the deadline on 9 Electoral superiority over the other departments; it does
December 1935. Losing candidate, Pedro Ynsua Commission not in reality nullify or invalidate an act of the
filed before the Electoral Commission a Motion of organized Legislature, but only asserts the solemn and
Protest against the election of Angara. Angara under the sacred obligation assigned to it be by the
contended in his Motion to Dismiss the Protest that National Constitution to determine conflicting claims
Resolution No. 8 of the National Assembly was Assembly. of authority under the Constitution and to
adopted in the legitimate exercise of its establish for the parties in an actual controversy
constitutional prerogative to prescribe the period the rights which that instrument secures and
during which protests against the election of its guarantees them. This is “judicial supremacy”
members should be presented and that the protest which properly is the power of the judicial
was filed out of the prescribed period. review under the Constitution.
The petitioners having been arrested and held Whether or The duty remains to assure that the supremacy of
Aquino v. Enrile, 59 pursuant to General Order No. 2 of the not the the Constitution is upheld The power is inherent
SCRA 183 President (September 22, 1972), "for being validity of in the Judicial Department, by virtue of the
participants or for having given aid and Proclamation doctrine of separation of powers.
comfort in the conspiracy to seize political and No. 1081 is
state power in the country and to take over the subject to
Government by force ...", filed the petitions for judicial
habeas corpus. General Order No. 2 was issued inquiry?
by the President in the exercise of the powers
he assumed by virtue of Proclamation No. 1081
(September 21, 1972) placing the entire country
under martial law.
Bondoc v. Pineda, 201 Emigdio Bondoc and Marciano Pineda were rivals Whether or Yes. The SC can settle the controversy in the case at
SCRA 792 for a Congressional seat in the 4th District of not the bar without encroaching upon the function of
Pampanga. Pineda was a member of the Laban Supreme the legislature particularly a part thereof, HRET.
ng Demokratikong Pilipino (LDP). While Bondoc Court may The issue here is a judicial question. It must be
was a member of the Nacionalista Party (NP). inquire upon noted that what is being complained of is the act
Pineda won in that election. However, Bondoc the validity of of HRET not the act of Congress. In here, when
contested the result in the HRET (House of the said act of Camasura was rescinded by the tribunal, a
Representatives Electoral Tribunal). Bondoc won the HRET decision has already been made, members of the
in the protest and he was subsequently declared without tribunal have already voted regarding the
as the winner by the HRET. Pineda contends that violating the electoral contest involving Pineda and Bondoc
the issue is already outside the jurisdiction of the doctrine of wherein Bondoc won. The LDP cannot withdraw
Supreme Court because Camasura’s removal is an separation of their representative from the HRET after the
official act of Congress and by virtue of the doctrine powers? tribunal has already reached a decision. They
of separation of powers, the judiciary may not cannot hold the same election since the issue has
interfere. already become moot and academic. LDP is
merely changing their representative to change
the outcome of the election. That duty is part of
the judicial power vested in the courts by an
express grant under Sec. 1, Art. VIII of the
Constitution which states: “Judicial power
includes the duty of the courts of justice to settle
actual controversies involving rights which are
legally demandable and enforceable, and to
determine whether or not there has been a grave
abuse of discretion amounting to lack or excess of
jurisdiction on the part of any branch or
instrumentality of Government.

Who may exercise the power?

FACTS ISSUE RULING
There had been an existing law which prohibited Whether or Yes. The challenged measure is an invalid exercise
Ynot v. Intermediate the slaughtering of carabaos (EO 626). To not the law is of Police power because the method employed
Appellate Court, 148 strengthen the law, Marcos issued EO 626-A valid. Who to conserve the carabaos is not reasonably
SCRA 659 which not only banned the movement of carabaos may exercise necessary to the purpose of the law and,
from interprovinces but as well as the movement of the power ? worse, is unduly oppressive. To justify the
carabeef. On 13 Jan 1984, Ynot was caught State in the imposition of its authority in
transporting 6 carabaos from Masbate to Iloilo. He behalf of the public, it must be:
was then charged in violation of EO 626-A. Ynot
averred EO 626-A as unconstitutional for it violated 1) The interest of the public generally, as
his right to be heard or his right to due process. He distinguished from those of a particular class,
said that the authority provided by EO 626-A to require such interference
outrightly confiscate carabaos even without being
heard is unconstitutional. The lower court ruled 2) that the means employed are reasonably
against Ynot ruling that the EO is a valid exercise of necessary for the accomplishment of the
police power in order to promote general welfare so purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon
as to curb down the indiscriminate slaughter of individuals.
carabaos.
This Court has declared that while lower
courts should observe a becoming modesty in
examining constitutional questions, they are
nonetheless not prevented from resolving the
same whenever warranted, subject only to
review by the highest tribunal. 6 We have
jurisdiction under the Constitution to "review,
revise, reverse, modify or affirm on appeal or
certiorari, as the law or rules of court may
provide," final judgments and orders of lower
courts in, among others, all cases involving the
constitutionality of certain measures. 7 This
simply means that the resolution of such cases
may be made in the first instance by these lower
courts. Judicial power authorizes this; and when
the exercise is demanded, there should be no
shirking of the task for fear of retaliation, or loss
of favor, or popular censure, or any other similar
inhibition unworthy of the bench, especially this
Court.
Commissioner of Internal
Revenue v. Court of Tax
Appeals, 195 SCRA 444

Ongsuco v. Malones, 604 Petitioners are stall holders at the Maasin Public
SCRA 499 (2009) Market. After a meeting with the stall holders,
Sangguniang Bayan of Maasin approvedMunicipal
Ordinance No. 98-01, entitled "The Municipal
Revised Revenue Code."The Code contained a
provision for increased rentals for the stalls and the
imposition of goodwill fees in the amount of
P20,000.00 andP15,000.00 for stalls located on the
first and second floors of the municipal public
market, respectively. The same Code authorized
respondent to enter into lease contracts over the
said market stalls, and incorporated a standard
contract of lease for the stall holders at the
municipal public market.Sangguniang Bayan of
Maasin approved Resolution No. 68, series of 1998,
moving to have the meeting declared inoperative as
a public hearing, because majority of the persons
affected by the imposition of the goodwill fee failed
to agree to the said measure.
Functions of Judicial Review
c.symbolic
FACTS ISSUE RULING
Salonga v. Pano, 134
SCRA 438

Requisites of Judicial Review

a. Actual Case or Controversy: Prematurity
FACTS ISSUE RULING
The petitioners challenged a regulation of the Whether or not No. The Supreme Court declared that the case was
PACU vs Secretary of respondent requiring all private colleges and there is premature as there was no showing at the time of
Education, 97 Phil. 806 universities to first obtain a permit from the justiciable any conflict of legal rights that would justify
(1955) Department of Education before they could open controversy to assumption of jurisdiction by the judiciary. The
and operate. It appeared, however, that all the be settled by Court said that “mere apprehension that the
petitioners had previously obtained the required the Court? Secretary of Education might, under the law,
permit and that they were questioning the withdraw the permit of one of the petitioners
regulation only because of the possibility that such does not constitute a justiciable controversy.” A
permit might be denied them in the future request for an advisory opinion is not an actual
case or controversy. But an action for declaratory
relief is proper for judicial determination.
Juanito Mariano, resident of Makati filed a petition Whether or not Dismissed Petition was premised on a contingent events the
Mariano vs Comelec, for prohibition and declaratory relief, assailing RA 7854 is . happening of which was uncertain (Binay is not
G.R. No. 119694 March 7, unconstitutional sections in RA 7854 (“An Act unconstitutiona yet sure if will run or will win); the petitioner,
1995 Converting the Municipality of Makati Into a l? thus, posed a hypothetical issue which had not
Highly Urbanized City to be known as the City of yet ripened into an actual or controversy.
Makati”). Petitioners contend that that the new
corporate existence of the new city will restart the
term of the present municipal elective making it
favorable to incumbent Mayor Jejomar Binay.

Cutaran v. DENR, G.R.

No. 134958, January 31,
2001

Montesclaros v. Comelec, The Local Government Code of 1991 limited its Whether or not No. Petitioner’s prayer to prevent Congress from
G.R. No. 152295. July 9, membership to youths “at least 15 but no more than the proposed enacting into law a proposed bill lowering
2002 21 years of age.” On 11 March 2002 the Bicameral bill is subject to membership age in the SK does not present an
Committee consolidated Senate Bill 2050 and judicial review. actual justiciable controversy. A proposed bill is
House Bill 4456, resetting the SK election to 15 July not subject to judicial review because it is not a
2002 and lowered the membership age to at least 15 law. A proposed bill creates no rights and
but no more than 18 years of age. This was signed imposes no duty legally enforceable by the
by the President on 19 March 2002. The petitioners Court. A proposed bill, having no legal effect,
filed prohibition and mandamus for temporary violates no constitutional right or duty.
restraining order seeking the prevention of The Court has no power to declare a proposed
postponement of the SK election and reduction of bill constitutional or unconstitutional because
age requirement on 11 March 2002. that would be in the nature of rendering an
advisory opinion on a proposed act of Congress.

Requisites of Judicial Review

a. Actual Case or Controversy:Mootness
FACTS ISSUE RULING
Petitioner, Atlas Fertilizer engaged in the Whether or not Dismissed The provisions that the petitioners are refuting
aquaculture industry utilizing fishponds and RA 6657 is are now repealed and excluded from the
Atlas Fertilizer v. Sec, prawn farms. Assailed Sections 3 (b), 11, 13, 16 (d), unconstitutiona coverage of CARL. In view of the foregoing, the
DAR, G.R. No. 93100, 17 and 32 of R.A. 6657 (Comprehensive Agrarian l? question concerning the constitutionality of the
June 19, 1997 Reform Law), as well as the implementing assailed provisions has become moot and
guidelines and procedures contained in academic with the passage of a new law which
Administrative Order Nos. 8 and 10 Series of 1988 repealed the same.
issued by public respondent Secretary of the
Department of Agrarian Reform as
unconstitutional. They contend that R.A. 6657, by
including the raising of fish and aquaculture
operations including fishponds and prawn ponds,
treating them as in the same class or classification
as agriculture or farming violates the equal
protection clause of the Constitution and therefore
void.

Gonzales v. Narvasa,
G.R. No. 140835. August
14, 2000

On 01 May 2001, Gloria Arroyo, faced by an angry Whether or not Dismissed The instant petitions have been rendered moot
and violent mob armed with deadly weapons the and academic as Gloria Arroyo ordered the
Lacson v. Perez, G.R. No. assaulting and attempting to break into Proclamation lifting of the declaration of a state of rebellion on
147780, May 10, 2001 Malacanang, issued Proclamation No. 38 declaring No 38 and 06 May 2001.
that there was a state of rebellion in the National General Order
Capital Region. She likewise issued General Order No 1 are
No. 1 directing the Armed Forces of the Philippines unconstitutiona
and the Philippine National Police to suppress the l.
rebellion in the National Capital Region. On 06 May
2001 she ordered the lifting of the declaration of a
state of rebellion in Metro Manila. Petitioners assail
the declaration of a state of rebellion by Gloria
Arroyo and the warrantless arrests allegedly
effected by virtue thereof, as having no basis both
in fact an in law.

Defunis v. Odegaard, 416

U.S. 312 (1974)
Requisites of Judicial Review
a. Actual Case or Controversy:Exceptions to Mootness
FACTS ISSUE RULING
.
Acop v. Guingona, G.R.
No. 134855, July 2, 2002

Some 300 junior officers of AFP, stormed the Whether or not Dismissed The state of rebellion has ceased to exist and has
Sanlakas v. Executive Oakwood in Makati demanding for the resignation declaring state rendered the case moot. Nevertheless, courts will
Secretary, G.R. 159085, of the President, Sec of Defense and Chief of the of rebellion is decide a question, otherwise moot, if it is capable
February 3, 2004 PNP. State of rebellion was declared and the AFP needed to of repetition yet evading review. The case at bar
and PNP were directed to suppress the rebellion. declare General is one such case.
The state of rebellion was lifted. Petitions were filed order No 4? The President, in declaring a state of rebellion
challenging the validity of Proclamation of State of and in calling out the armed forces, was merely
Rebellion and calling out of the AFP. Sanlakas exercising a wedding of her Chief Executive and
contend that Section 18, Article VII of the Commander-in-Chief powers. These are purely
Constitution does not require the declaration of a executive powers, vested on the President by
state of rebellion to call out the armed forces. Sections 1 and 18, Article VII, as opposed to the
Because of the cessation of the Oakwood delegated legislative powers contemplated by
occupation, there exists no sufficient factual basis Section 23 (2), Article VI.
for the proclamation by the President of a state of
rebellion for an indefinite period. Solicitor General
argues that the petitions have been rendered moot
by the lifting of the declaration.
Gloria Arroyo issued appointments to various Whether or not Dismissed Due to the appointment of Gloria Arroyo to the
acting secretaries on 23 August 2004. The Congress the President respondents as ad interim immediately after the
Pimentel v. Ermita, G.R. commenced regular session on 26 July 2004 and may appoint in recess of the Congress, the petition has become
164978, October 13, 2005 some senators filed petition for certiorari and an acting moot. However as an exemption to the rule of
prohibition against respondents. The Senators secretaries mootness, courts will decide a question
contended that pursuant to Section 10 (2) Book IV without the otherwise moot if it is capable of repetition yet
of EO 292 the undersecretary shall be designated as consent of the evading review.
acting secretary in case of vacancy. Also, petitioners Commission on
assert that while Congress is in session there can be Appointments
no appointments without first obtaining consent while Congress
from Commission on Appointments. When is in session.
Congress adjourned on 22 September 2004, Gloria
Arroyo issued ad interim appointments to the same
respondents.

Requisites of Judicial Review

b. Proper Party
FACTS ISSUE RULING
The PCGG Chairman wrote to President Corazon Whether or not No. Legal standing means a personal and substantial
Aquino regarding the scheduled sale between the the petitioners interest in the case such that the party has
Joya vs PCGG, G.R. Republic of the Philippines and Christie’s of 82 Old have legal sustained or will sustain direct injury as a result
96541, August 24, 1993 Masers Painting housed in Metropolitan Museum standing? of the governmental act that is being challenged.
of Manila and 7 boxes of antique silverware in the One having no rights or interest to protect cannot
custody of Central Bank. The assets subject of invoke the jurisdiction of the court as party-
auction were historical relics and had cultural plaintiff in an action. The courts will exercise its
significance and thereby prohibited by law. As power of judicial review only if the case is
Filipino citizens, taxpayers and artists, petitioners brought before by a party who has legal standing
Dean Jose Joya et al contended that they have legal to raise the constitutional or legal question.
personality to restrain respondent from acting
contrary to preserving artistic creations pursuant to
Sec 14-18 Article XIV of the Constitution.
Petitioners filed instant petitions for prohibition Do petitioners Yes. Petitioners have direct and substantial interest to
seeking to prohibit the Manila International Airport have legal protect by reason of the implementation of the
Agan v. PIATCO, G.R. Authority (MIAA) and the Department of standing? PIATCO contracts. They stand to lose their
No. 155001, May 5, 2003 Transportation and Communications (DOTC) and source of livelihood, a property right which is
its Secretary from implementing the various protected by the Constitution. Subsisting
agreement executed by the Philippine Government agreements between MIA and petitioners stand
through the DOTC and the MIAA and the to be terminated by the PIATCO contracts. The
Philippine International Air Terminals Co., Inc. financial prejudice brought about by the PIATCO
(PIATCO) contract to petitioners is legitimate interests
sufficient to give them legal standing to file the
petition.
Petitioner Commission on Human Rights Employee Whether or not Yes. A proper party is one who has sustained or is in
Association challenged the CA and Civil Service CHREA has immediate danger of sustaining an injury as a
CHR Employees Assoc. Commission’s decision affirming the upgrading legal standing result of the act complained of. Petitioner
v. CHR, G.R. 155336, and reclassification of certain personnel positions in to file petition protests that the upgrading and collapsing of
Nov. 25, 2004 the CHR despite the disapproval of Department of for review positions benefited only a select few in the upper
Budget and Management. The assail that the against CHR? level positions in the Commission. This
reclassification and upgrading only benefited select sufficiently meet the injury test.
few in the upper level resulting to demoralization
on the rank and file members.

David vs. Arroyo, G.R.

No. 171396, May 3, 2006

Requisites of Judicial Review

b. Proper Party
Citizen Standing
FACTS ISSUE RULING
Invoking the people's right to be informed on Whether or not Yes. Clearly, the right sought to be enforced by
matters of public concern, a right recognized in the petitioners petitioners herein is a public right recognized by
Tanada vs. Tuvera, 136 Section 6, Article IV of the 1973 Philippine have legal no less than the fundamental law of the land. If
SCRA 27 (1985) Constitution, 1 as well as the principle that laws to standing petitioners were not allowed to institute this
be valid and enforceable must be published in the proceeding, it would indeed be difficult to
Official Gazette or otherwise effectively conceive of any other person to initiate the same,
promulgated, petitioners seek a writ of mandamus considering that the Solicitor General, the
to compel respondent public officials to publish, government officer generally empowered to
and/or cause the publication in the Official Gazette represent the people, has entered his appearance
of various presidential decrees, letters of for respondents in this case.
instructions, general orders, proclamations,
executive orders, letter of implementation and
administrative orders. The respondents, through
the Solicitor General, would have this case
dismissed outright on the ground that petitioners
have no legal personality or standing to bring the
instant petition.
The petition seeks to compel the Public Estates Whether or not Yes. The petitioner has standing to bring this
Chavez v. PEA and Authority to disclose all facts on PEA’s then on- petitioner has taxpayer’s suit because the petition seeks to
Amari, G.R. 133250, July going renegotiations with Amari Coastal Bay and legal standing compel PEA to comply with its constitutional
9, 2002 Development Corporation to reclaim portions of to compel PEA duties. The right of citizens to information on
Manila Bay. PEA argues that petitioner has no to comply with matters of public concern and the application of a
standing to institute mandamus proceedings to its constitutional provision intended to insure the
enforce his constitutional right to information constitutional equitable distribution of alienable lands of the
without a showing that PEA refused to perform an duties? public domain among Filipino citizens are two
affirmative duty imposed on PEA by the constitutional rights involved.
Constitution. PEA also claims that petitioner has
not shown that he will suffer any concrete injury
because of the signing or implementation of the
Amended JVA. Thus, there is no actual controversy
requiring the exercise of the power of judicial
review.

Requisites of Judicial Review

b. Proper Party
Associational Standing
FACTS ISSUE RULING
Petition for certiorari was filed by labour Whether or not Yes. The rule requires that a party must show a
group KMU to assail the constitutionality and KMU has legal personal stake in the outcome of the case or
KMU Labor Center vs. validity of certain memoranda, circulars and / standing to an injury to himself that can be redressed by
Garcia, G.R. 115381, Dec. or orders from DOTC in relation to increase in maintain the a favorable decision so as to warrant
23, 1994 suit?
public transportation fares. Respondent an invocation of the court’s jurisdiction and
contend that petitioner has no legal standing to to justify the exercise of the court’s remedial
sue and that it is within DOTC and LTFRB’s powers in his behalf. KMU members, who
authority to set a fare range scheme. avail of the use of buses, trains and jeepneys
everyday, are directly affected by the
burdensome cost of arbitrary increase in
passenger fares. They are part of the millions
of commuters who comprise the riding
public. Certainly, their rights must be
protected, not neglected nor ignored.

During March 13, 1992, Republic Act 7227 were Whether No. It is settled that when questions of constituional
John Hay PAC. v. Lim, enacted. The R.A. 7227 is also known as “ Bases Proclamation signifance are raised, the court can exercise its
G.R. No. 119775, Oct. 24, Conversion and Development Act of 1992” . This no. 420 is power of judicial review only if the following
2003 grants Subic SEZ incentives which provides tax and constitutional requisites are present: (1) existence of actual and
duty free importations, exemption of business by providing appropriate case; (2) person challenging the act
therein from local and national taxes, to other for national must have the standing to question or have
hallmarks of liberated financial and bhsiness and local tax personal/substantial interest in the case; (3)
climate. This also gave authority to the President to exemption question of constitutionality must be raised at
create through executive proclamation, subject to within and earliest opportunit; (4) issue of constitutionality
the concurrence of local government units directly granting other must be the very lis mota of the case. There is
affected, other Special Economic Zones in the areas economic none that have been mentioned in R.A 7227, a
covered respectively by the Clark Military incentives to grant of tax exemption to SEZ yet to be
reservation, the Wallace Air Station in San the John Hay established in base areas, unlike the grant under
Fernando, La Union and Camp John Hay. SEZ? Section 12 which provides for tax exemption to
July 5, 1994, President Ramos issued the established Subic SEZ.
proclamation no. 420 which established a SEZ on It was held that the controversy must be definite
a portion of Camp John Hay. and concrete, bearing upon the legal relations of
parties who are pitted against each other due to
their adverse legal interests. It is not enough that
the controversy exists at the outset; to qualify for
adjudication, it is necessary that the actual
controversy be extant at all stages of the review,
not merely at the time the complaint is filed.
President Ejercito Estrada directed the AFP Whether or No. The IBP primarily anchors its standing o its
IBP v. Zamora, G.R. No. Chief of Staff and PNP Chief to coordinate not IBP has alleged responsibility to uphold the rule of
141284, August 15, 2000 with each other for the proper deployment and legal standing law and the Constitution.
utilization of the Marines to assist the PNP in to assail Apart from this declaration, however, the
preventing or suppressing criminal or lawless constitutionali IBP asserts no other basis in support of its
violence. The Integrated Bar of the Philippines ty of calling locus standi. The mere invocation by the IBP
filed a petition seeking to declare the the AFP to of its duty to preserve the rule of law
deployment of the Philippine Marines null and assist PNP to and nothing more is not sufficient to clothe it
void and unconstitutional. Solicitor General suppress with standing in the case.
contend that petitioner has no legal standing to lawless
assail. violence,
invasion or
rebellion?

Republic Act 8042 (Migrant Workers and Overseas Whether or not No. An association has standing to complain of
Executive Secretary v. Filipino Act of 1995) took effect on 15 July 1995. ARCO-Phil has injuries of its members. This view fuses the legal
CA, 429 SCRA 781, May Prior to its effectivity, Asian Recruitment Council legal standing identity of an association with that of its
25, 2004 Philippine CHaptr Inc (ARCO-Phil) filed petition to assail RA members. An association has standing to file
for declaratory relief. They alleged that Section 6, 8042? suit for its workers despite its lack of interest if its
subsections (a) to (m) is unconstitutional because members are affected by their action. An
licensed and authorized recruitment agencies are organization has standing to assert the concerns
placed on equal footing with illegal recruiters. It of its constituents.
contended that while the Labor Code distinguished However, the respondent has no locus standi to
between recruiters who are holders of licenses and file the petition for and in behalf of unskilled
non-holders thereof in the imposition of penalties, workers. We note that it even failed to implead
Rep. Act No. 8042 does not make any distinction. In any unskilled workers in its petition.
their answer to the petition, they contend that
ARCO-Phil has no legal standing, it being a non-
stock, non-profit organization; hence, not the real
party-in-interest as petitioner in the action.
Sometime before March 1993, after learning that the Whether or not Yes. We find the instant petition to be of
Kilosbayan v. Guingona, PCSO was interested in operating an on-line lottery Kilosbayan has transcendental importance to the public. The
232 SCRA 110 (1994) system, the Berjaya Group Berhad (PGMC) became standing to issues it raised are of paramount public interest
interested to offer its services and resources to maintain and of a category even higher than those
PCSO. KILOSBAYAN submit that the PCSO cannot instant suit? involved in many of the aforecited cases. The
validly enter into the assailed Contract of Lease ramifications of such issues immeasurably affect
with the PGMC because it is an arrangement the social, economic, and moral well-being of the
wherein the PCSO would hold and conduct the on- people even in the remotest barangays of the
line lottery system in “collaboration” or country and the counter-productive and
“association” with the PGMC, in violation of retrogressive effects of the envisioned on-line
Section 1(B) of R.A. No. 1169, as amended by B.P. lottery system are as staggering as the billions in
Blg. 42. Respondents allege that the petitioners have pesos it is expected to raise. The legal standing
no standing to maintain the instant suit. then of the petitioners deserves recognitio
Issue on the locus standi of the petitioners
should, indeed, be resolved in their favor. A
party’s standing before this Court is a procedural
technicality which it may, in the exercise of its
discretion, set aside in view of the importance of
the issues raised. In the landmark Emergency
Powers Cases, this Court brushed aside this
technicality because “the transcendental
importance to the public of these cases demands
that they be settled promptly and definitely,
brushing aside, if we must, technicalities of
procedure.

Taxpayer’s Standing:

U.S. v. Richardson, 418 U.S. 166 (1974)

ITF v. Comelec, G.R. No. 159139. Jan. 13, 2004

Jumamil v. Café, G.R. 144570, September 21, 2005

Voter’s Standing:

Tolentino v. Comelec, 420 SCRA 438, January 21, 2004

Legislative Standing:

Ople v. Torres, 293 SCRA 141 (1998)

Governmental Standing:

People v. Vera, 65 Phil 56, November 16, 1937

Facial Challenge:

Estrada v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 148560, Nov. 19, 2001

a. Earliest Opportunity
Umali v. Guingona, 305 SCRA 533 (1999)

b. Necessity of Deciding Constitutional Questions

Arceta v. Mangrobang, G.R. No. 152895. June 15, 2004

1. Mandatory Notice
Mirasol v. CA, G.R. No. 128448, February 1, 2001

2. Functions of Judicial Review

Mitra vs Comelec, 104 SCRA 58 (1981)

Salonga vs Cruz-Pano, 134 SCRA 438 (1985)

Javier v. Comelec, 144 SCRA 194 (1988)

3. The Exercise of Judicial Review
Ynot vs. IAC, 148 SCRA 659 (1987)

4. Political Questions / Justiciable Questions

Velarde v. SJS, 428 SCRA 283 (2004)
Oposa v. Factoran, 224 SCRA 792 (1993)
Vinuya v. Romulo, 619 SCRA 533 (2010)
Defensor-Santiago v. Guingona, G.R. No. 134577, November 18, 1998

5. Presumption of Constitutionality
Perez v. People, 544 SCRA 532 (2008)

6. Effects of Declaration of Unconstitutionality

a. Orthodox view
Art. 7, Civil Code of the Philippines

b. Modern view
Serrano de Agbayani v. PNB, 35 SCRA 429
Belgica v. Ochoa, 710 SCRA 1 (2013)
Araullo v. Aquino III, G.R. No. 209287, July 1, 2014
Cocofed v. Republic, 663 SCRA 514 (2012)
Sameer Overseas v. Cabilles, G.R. No.170139, August 5, 2014
League of Cities vs. Comelec, August 24, 2010

CIR vs. San Roque, G.R. No. 187485, October 08, 2013

7. Partial unconstitutionality
In Re: Cunanan, 94 Phil. 534
Salazar v. Achacoso, 183 SCRA 145
A. Amendment

1. Amendment vs Revision

Lambino v. Comelec, G.R. No. 174153, October 25, 2006

FaCtS: Petitioners (Lambino group) commenced gathering signatures for an initiative petition to change the 1987 constitution, they filed a
petition with the COMELEC to hold a plebiscite that will ratify their initiative petition under RA 6735. Lambino group alleged that the petition
had the support of 6M individuals fulfilling what was provided by art 17 of the constitution. Their petition changes the 1987 constitution by
modifying sections 1-7 of Art 6 and sections 1-4 of Art 7 and by adding Art 18. the proposed changes will shift the present bicameral-
presidential form of government to unicameral- parliamentary. COMELEC denied the petition due to lack of enabling law governing initiative
petitions and invoked the Santiago Vs. Comelec ruling that RA 6735 is inadequate to implement the initiative petitions.

ISSue:

Whether or Not the Lambino Group’s initiative petition complie s with Section 2, Article XVII of the

Constitution on amendments to the Constitution through a people’s initiative.

Whether or Not this Court should revisit its ruling in Santiago declaring RA 6735 “incomplete, inadequate or wanting in essential terms an d
conditions” to implement the initiative clause on proposals to amend the Constitution.

Whether or Not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of discretion in denying due course to the

Lambino Group’s petition.

Held: According to the SC the Lambino group failed to comply with the basic requirements for conducting a people’s initiative. The Court held
that the COMELEC did not grave abuse of discretion on dismissing the Lambino petition.

1. The Initiative Petition Does Not Comply with Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution on Direct Proposal by the People

The petitioners failed to show the court that the initiative signer must be informed at the time of the signing of the nature and effect, failure to do
so is “deceptive and misleading” which renders the initiative void.

2. The Initiative Violates Section 2, Article XVII of the Constitution Disallowing Revision through Initiatives

The framers of the constitution intended a clear distinction between “amendment” and “revision, it is intended that the third mode of stated in
sec 2 art 17 of the constitution may propose only amendments to the constitution. Merging of the legislative and the executive is a radical
change, therefore a constitutes a revision.

3. A Revisit of Santiago v. COMELEC is Not Necessary

Even assuming that RA 6735 is valid, it will not change the result because the present petition violated Sec 2 Art 17 to be a valid initiative, must
first comply with the constitution before complying with RA 6735. Petition is dismissed.

2. Constituent vs Legislative Power

Imbong v. Comelec, 35 SCRA 28

FACTS:

This is a petition for declaratory judgment. Manuel Imbong and Raul Gonzales, filing separate cases and both interested in running as candidates
for delegates to the Constitutional Convention, question the constitutionality of R.A. No. 6132, claiming that it prejudices their rights as such
candidates. These are 2 separate but related petitions of running candidates for delegates to the Constitutional Convention assailing the validity of
RA 6132.
Gonzales: Sec, 2, 4, 5 and Par 1 Sec 8, and validity of entire law

Imbong: Par 1 Sec 8

ISSUE:

1. Does the Congress have the right to call for a constitutional convention and set the parameters of such convention?

2. Are the provisions of R.A. 6132 constitutional?

HOLDING:

The Congress has the authority to call for a Constitutional Convention as a Constituent Assembly. Furthermore, specific provisions assailed by the
petitioners are deemed as constitutional

RATIO:

1. Congress acting as Constituent Assembly, has full authority to propose amendments, or call for convention for the purpose by votes and
these votes were attained by Resolution 2 and 4. The Congress has authority to call a constitutional convention as the constituent assembly. The
Congress also has the authority to enact implementing details, contained in Res. Nos. 2 and 4 and R.A. 6132, since such details are within the
competence of the Congress in the exercise of its legislative power.

2. The provisions are constitutional. Sec. 4 of R.A. 6132 is merely an application with Sec. 2 of Art. XII of the Constitution and does not
constitute a denial of due process or equal protection of the law. Sec. 2 also merely obeyed the intent of the Congress in Res. Nos. 2 and 4
regarding the apportionment of delegates.
The challenged disqualification of an elected delegate from running for any public office in Sec. 5 is a valid limitation as it is reasonable and not
arbitrary.

Sec 5: State has right to create office and parameters to qualify/disqualify members thereof. Furthermore, this disqualification is only temporary.
This is a safety mechanism to prevent political figures from controlling elections and to allow them to devote more time to the Constitutional
Convention.

Lastly, par. 1 of Sec. 8(a) which is both contested by the petitioners is still valid as the restriction contained in the section is so narrow that basic
constitutional rights remain substantially intact and inviolate thus the limitation is a valid infringement of the constitutional guarantees invoked by
the petitioners.

Par 1 Sec 8: this is to avoid debasement of electoral process and also to assure candidates equal opportunity since candidates must now depend
on their individual merits, and not the support of political parties. This provision does not create discrimination towards any particular party/group, it
applies to all organization,

3. Steps in the amendatory process:

A.) Proposal (Secs. 1-3, Art. XVII)

Occena v. Comelec, 104 SCRA 1

Facts: The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions
proposing constitutional amendments, goes further than merely assailing their alleged constitutional infirmity. Samuel Occena and
Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed
the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973
Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the contrary notwithstanding.

Issue: Whether the 1973 Constitution was valid, and in force and effect when the Batasang Pambansa resolutions and the
present petitions were promulgated and filed, respectively.

Held: It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the dispositive portion of
Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its ratification, this
Court stated that it did so by a vote of six to four. It then concluded: "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial
obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect." Such a statement served a useful purpose. It could even
be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It made manifest that as of 17 January 1973, the present
Constitution came into force and effect. With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the
cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability
was removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as
simple as that. What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has both a positive and a negative
aspect. As was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black and Murphy, the Supreme Court can check as well as
legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In
the latter case, there is an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal
of a suit of this character suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court has
invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest case in point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely two weeks ago. During
the first year alone of the effectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited.

i. Congress
ii. Constitutional Convention
iii. People
Republic Act No. 6735 - An Act Providing for a System of Initiative and Referendum

a. Ratification (Sec. 4, Art. XVII)

Gonzales v. Comelec, 21 SCRA 774

Facts:

On March 16, 1967, the Senate and the House of Representatives passed the following resolutions:

1. R. B. H. (Resolution of Both Houses) No. 1, proposing that Section 5, Article VI, of the Constitution of the Philippines, be amended so as to
increase the membership of the House of Representatives from a maximum of 120, as provided in the present Constitution, to a maximum of 180,
to be apportioned among the several provinces as nearly as may be according to the number of their respective inhabitants, although each
province shall have, at least, one (1) member;

2. R. B. H. No. 2, calling a convention to propose amendments to said Constitution, the convention to be composed of two (2) elective delegates
from each representative district, to be "elected in the general elections to be held on the second Tuesday of November, 1971;" and

3. R. B. H. No. 3, proposing that Section 16, Article VI, of the same Constitution, be amended so as to authorize Senators and members of the
House of Representatives to become delegates to the aforementioned constitutional convention, without forfeiting their respective seats in
Congress.
Subsequently, Congress passed a bill, which, upon approval by the President, on June 17, 1967, became Republic Act No. 4913, providing that
the amendments to the Constitution proposed in the aforementioned Resolutions No. 1 and 3 be submitted, for approval by the people, at the
general elections, which shall be held on November 14, 1967.

Issue:

1. Does the Congress (through ordinary legislative process) have the power to amend or propose amendment to the Constitution?

2. May the proposed amendments be submitted at a plebiscite scheduled on the same day as the regular elections?

Held:

1. No. The power to amend the Constitution or to propose amendments is not included in the general grant of legislative powers to Congress.
It is part of the inherent powers of the people - as the repository of sovereignty in a republican state, to make, and, hence, to amend their own
Fundamental Law.

Congress may propose amendments to the Constitution merely because the same explicitly grants such power. Hence, when exercising the
same, it is said that Senators and Members of the House of Representatives act, not as members of Congress, but as component elements of a
constituent assembly. When acting as such, the members of Congress derive their authority from the Constitution, unlike the people, when
performing the same function, for their authority does not emanate from the Constitution - they are the very source of all powers of government,
including the Constitution itself.

Since, when proposing, as a constituent assembly, amendments to the Constitution, the members of Congress derive their authority from
the Fundamental Law, it follows that they do not have the final say on whether or not their acts are within or beyond constitutional limits. The
Constitution expressly confers upon the Supreme Court, the power to declare a treaty unconstitutional, despite the eminently political character of
treaty-making power.

The issue whether or not a Resolution of Congress - acting as a constituent assembly - violates the Constitution essentially justiciable, not
political, and, hence, subject to judicial review.

2. Yes. The term “election” in article XV of the 1935 Constitution does not indicate that the “election” therein referred to is a “special”, not a
general election. The circumstance that three previous amendments to the Constitution had been submitted to the people for ratification in special
elections merely shows that congress deemed it best to do so under the circumstances then obtaining. It does not negate its authority to submit
proposed amendments for ratification in general elections.

Tolentino v. Comelec, 41 SCRA 702

Facts: The challenge in these two prohibition proceedings against the validity of three Batasang Pambansa Resolutions
proposing constitutional amendments, goes further than merely assailing their alleged constitutional infirmity. Samuel Occena and
Ramon A. Gonzales, both members of the Philippine Bar and former delegates to the 1971 Constitutional Convention that framed
the present Constitution, are suing as taxpayers. The rather unorthodox aspect of these petitions is the assertion that the 1973
Constitution is not the fundamental law, the Javellana ruling to the contrary notwithstanding.

Issue: Whether the 1973 Constitution was valid, and in force and effect when the Batasang Pambansa resolutions and the
present petitions were promulgated and filed, respectively.

Held: It is much too late in the day to deny the force and applicability of the 1973 Constitution. In the dispositive portion of
Javellana v. The Executive Secretary, dismissing petitions for prohibition and mandamus to declare invalid its ratification, this
Court stated that it did so by a vote of six to four. It then concluded: "This being the vote of the majority, there is no further judicial
obstacle to the new Constitution being considered in force and effect." Such a statement served a useful purpose. It could even
be said that there was a need for it. It served to clear the atmosphere. It made manifest that as of 17 January 1973, the present
Constitution came into force and effect. With such a pronouncement by the Supreme Court and with the recognition of the
cardinal postulate that what the Supreme Court says is not only entitled to respect but must also be obeyed, a factor for instability
was removed. Thereafter, as a matter of law, all doubts were resolved. The 1973 Constitution is the fundamental law. It is as
simple as that. What cannot be too strongly stressed is that the function of judicial review has both a positive and a negative
aspect. As was so convincingly demonstrated by Professors Black and Murphy, the Supreme Court can check as well as
legitimate. In declaring what the law is, it may not only nullify the acts of coordinate branches but may also sustain their validity. In
the latter case, there is an affirmation that what was done cannot be stigmatized as constitutionally deficient. The mere dismissal
of a suit of this character suffices. That is the meaning of the concluding statement in Javellana. Since then, this Court has
invariably applied the present Constitution. The latest case in point is People v. Sola, promulgated barely two weeks ago. During
the first year alone of the effectivity of the present Constitution, at least ten cases may be cited.
Sanidad v. Comelec, 78 SCRA 333

Facts:

- On October 23, 1989, RA 6766, entitled “AN ACT PROVIDING FOR AN ORGANIC ACT FOR THE CORDILLERA AUTONOMOUS REGION”
was enacted into law;

- Pursuant to said law, the City of Baguio and Provinces of Benguet, Abra, Mt. Province, Ifugao and Kalinga-Apayao, all comprising the
autonomous region shall take part in a plebiscite originally scheduled for December 27, 1989 but was reset to January 30, 1990 specifically for the
ratification or rejection of the said act;

- By virtue of the 1987 Constitution and the Omnibus Election Code (BP 881), the Comelec issued Comelec Resolution No. 2167, Section 19 of
which provides:

“Section 19. Prohibition on columnist, commentators or announcers.- During the plebiscite campaign period, on the day before and on plebiscite
day, no mass media columnist, commentator, announcer or personality shall use his column or radio or television time to campaign for or against
the plebiscite issues.”
- On November 20, 1989, petitioner PABLITO V. SANIDAD who is a columnist (“OVERVIEW”) for the Baguio Midland Courier, a weekly
newspaper circulated in the City of Baguio and the Cordilleras, filed a petition for Prohibition with prayer for the issuance of a temporary restraining
order or a writ of preliminary injunction against the Comelec to enjoin the latter from enforcing Section 19 of resolution No. 2167. Petitioner claims
that the said provision is violative of his constitutional freedom of expression and of the press and it also constitutes a prior restraint because it
imposes subsequent punishment for those who violate the same;

- On November 28, 1989, the Supreme Court issued a temporary restraining order enjoining the respondent from enforcing Section 19 of
Resolution No. 2167;

- On January 9, 1990, Comelec through the Solicitor General filed its Comment and moved for the dismissal of the petition on the ground that
Section 19 of Resolution No. 2167 does not absolutely bar the petitioner from expressing his views because under Section 90 and 92 of BP 881,
he may still express his views or campaign for or against the act through the Comelec space and airtime.

Issue: Whether or not Section 19 of resolution No. 2167 is violative of the constitutional freedom of expression and of the press

Held: YES. What is granted by Art. IX-C of the Constitution to the Comelec is the power to supervise and regulate the use and enjoyment of
franchises, permits or other grants issued for the operation of transportation or other public utilities to the end that equal opportunity, time and
space, and the right to reply, including reasonable, equal rates therefor, for public information campaigns and forums among candidates are
insured. The evil sought to be prevented by this provision is the possibility that a franchise holder may favor or give undue advantage to a
candidate in terms of advertising time and space. This is also the reason why a columnist, commentator or announcer is required to take a leave
of absence from his work during the campaign period if he is a candidate.

HOWEVER, NEITHER ARTICLE IX-C OF THE CONSTITUTION NOR SECTION 11(B), 2ND PAR. OF RA 6646 CAN BE CONSTRUED TO
MEAN THAT THE COMELEC HAS ALSO BEEN GRANTED THE RIGHT TO SUPERVISE AND REGULATE THE EXERCISE BY MEDIA
PRACTITIONERS THEMSELVES OF THEIR RIGHT TO EXPRESSION DURING THE PLEBISCITE PERIODS. Media practitioners exercising
their freedom of expression during the plebiscite periods are neither the franchise holders nor the candidates. In fact, there are no candidates in a
plebiscite.

While it is true that the petitioner is not absolutely barred from campaigning for or against the Organic Act, said fact does not cure the
constitutional infirmity of Section 19, Comelec Resolution No. 2167. This is so because IT IS STILL A RESTRICTION ON HIS CHOICE OF THE
FORUM WHERE HE MAY EXPRESS HIS VIEW.

Plebiscite issues are matters of public concern and importance. The people’s right to be informed and to be able to freely and
intelligently make a decision would be better served by access to an unabridged discussion of the issues, INCLUDING THE FORUM.
The people affected by the issues presented in a plebiscite should not be unduly burdened by restrictions on the forum where the right
to expression may be exercised.

Ruling: ACCORDINGLY, the instant petition is GRANTED. Section 19 of Comelec Resolution No. 2167 is declared null and void and
unconstitutional. The restraining order herein issued is hereby made permanent.

Javellana v. Executive Secretary, 50 SCRA 50

FACTS:

On January 20, 1973, just two days before the Supreme Court decided the sequel of plebiscite cases, Javellana filed this suit against the
respondents to restrain them from implementing any of the provisions of the proposed Constitution not found in the present 1935 Constitution.

This is a petition filed by him as a Filipino citizen and a qualified and registered voter and as a class suit, for himself and in behalf of all citizens
and voters similarly situated.
Javellana also alleged that the President had announced the immediate implementation of the new constitution, thru his Cabinet, including
respondents.

Respondents are acting without or in excess of jurisdiction in implementing the said proposed constitution upon ground the that the President as
Commander-in-Chief of the AFP is without authority to create the Citizens Assemblies; without power to approve proposed constitution; without
power to proclaim the ratification by the Filipino people of the proposed constitution; and the election held to ratify the proposed constitution was
not a free election, hence null and void.

Following that, petitioners prayed for the nullification of Proclamation No. 1102 and any order, decree, and proclamation which have the same
import and objective.

ISSUES:

2. Whether or not the constitution proposed by the 1971 Constitutional Convention has been ratified validly conforming to the applicable
constitutional and statutory provisions.

3. Whether or not the proposed Constitution has been acquiesced in (with or without valid ratification) by the people.

HELD:

Second. The Constitution does not allow Congress or anybody else to vest in those lacking the qualifications and having the
disqualifications mentioned in the Constitution the right of suffrage.

The votes of persons less than 21 years of age render the proceedings in the Citizen’s assemblies void.

Proceedings held in such Citizen’s Assemblies were fundamentally irregular, in that persons lacking the qualifications prescribed in
Article V Section 1 of the 1935 Constitution were allowed to vote in said Assemblies. And, since there is no means by which the
invalid votes of those less than 21 years of age can be separated or segregated from those of the qualified voters, the proceedings in
the Citizen’s Assemblies must be considered null and void.

Viva voce voting for the ratification of the constitution is void.

Article XV of the 1935 Constitution envisages with the term "votes cast" choices made on ballots – not orally or by raising hands – by
the persons taking part in plebiscites.

This is but natural and logical, for, since the early years of the American regime, we had adopted the Australian Ballot System, with
its major characteristics, namely, uniform official ballots prepared and furnished by the Government and secrecy in the voting, with
the advantage of keeping records that permit judicial inquiry, when necessary, into the accuracy of the election returns.

The plebiscite on the constitution not having been conducted under the supervision of COMELEC is void.

The point is that, such of the Barrio Assemblies as were held took place without the intervention of the COMELEC and without
complying with the provisions of the Election Code of 1971 or even of those of Presidential Decree No. 73.

The procedure therein mostly followed is such that there is no reasonable means of checking the accuracy of the returns filed by the
officers who conducted said plebiscites. This is another patent violation of Article X of the 1935 Constitution which form part of the
fundamental scheme set forth in the 1935 Constitution, as amended, to insure the "free, orderly, and honest" expression of the
people's will. For this, the alleged plebiscite in the Citizen’s Assemblies is null and void, insofar as the same are claimed to have
ratified the revised Constitution.

Third. Proclamation No. 1102 is not an evidence of ratification. Article X of the 1935 Constitution places COMELEC the "exclusive"
charge to the "the enforcement and administration of all laws relative to the conduct of elections," independently of the Executive. But
there is not even a certification by the COMELEC in support of the alleged results of the citizen’s assemblies relied upon in
Proclamation No. 1102.

Also, on January 17, 1973 neither the alleged president of the Federation of Provincial or City Barangays nor the Department of
Local Governments had certified to the President the alleged result of the citizens' assemblies all over the Philippines. The citizen’s
assemblies did not adopt the proposed constitution. It is to my mind a matter of judicial knowledge that there have been no such
citizen’s assemblies in many parts of Manila and suburbs, not to say, also, in other parts of the Philippines

Elements of State

2. ) Territory

i. Straight baseline method- To determine the extent of archipelagic waters, the archipelagic state shall draw straight
baselines connecting the outermost points of the outermost islands and drying reefs, provided that ratio of the area of the
water to the area of the land, including atolls, is between 1:1 and 9:1. The length of such baselines shall not exceed 100
nautical miles, except that up to 3% of the total number of baseline enclosing any archipelago may exceed that length up to a
maximum of 125 miles. The baselines drawn should not depart, to any appreciable extent, from the general configuration of
the archipelago. All the waters within the baselines shall then be considers as internal waters. The breadth of the 12 mile
territorial sea, the contiguous zone, the exclusive economic zone and the continental shelf shall then be measured from the
archipelagic baselines

ii. UN Convention on the Law of the Sea - The Convention defines and codifies the standards and principles of international
maritime law, inherited from customary international law relating to maritime affairs and are expressed to a great extent in the
United Nations Charter and current international maritime law norms, such as the Geneva Conventions of 1958. A large
portion of these requirements were further strengthened and expanded.

1. For the purposes of this Convention:

(1) "Area" means the seabed and ocean floor and subsoil thereof, beyond the limits of national jurisdiction;

(2) "Authority" means the International Seabed Authority;

(3) "activities in the Area" means all activities of exploration for, and exploitation of, the resources of the Area;

(4) "pollution of the marine environment" means the introduction by man, directly or indirectly, of substances or energy into the marine
environment, including estuaries, which results or is likely to result in such deleterious effects as harm to living resources and marine life, hazards
to human health, hindrance to marine activities, including fishing and other legitimate uses of the sea, impairment of quality for use of sea water
and reduction of amenities;

(5) 

a)  "dumping" means:

i)  any deliberate disposal of wastes or other matter from vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures
at sea;

ii)  any deliberate disposal of vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea;

b) "dumping" does not include:

i)  the disposal of wastes or other matter incidental to, or derived from the normal operations of vessels, aircraft,
platforms or other man-made structures at sea and their equipment, other than wastes or other matter transported
by or to vessels, aircraft, platforms or other man-made structures at sea, operating for the purpose of disposal of
such matter or derived from the treatment of such wastes or other matter on such vessels, aircraft, platforms or
structures;

ii) placement of matter for a purpose other than the mere disposal thereof, provided that such placement is not
contrary to the aims of this Convention.

2. 

(1) "States Parties" means States which have consented to be bound by this Convention and for which this Convention is in force.

(2) This Convention applies mutatis mutandis to the entities referred to in article 305, paragraph l(b), (c), (d), (e) and (f), which become Parties to
this Convention in accordance with the conditions relevant to each, and to that extent "States Parties" refers to those entities.
iii. Magallona vs. Ermita

FACTS:  Magallona, et. al., assailed the constitutionality of Republic Act 9522 which  mandates the adjustment of the country’s archipelagic
baselines and classifying the baseline regime of nearby territories. Historically, Republic Act No. 3046 is the  ruling law which demarcates the
maritime baselines of the Philippines, as an  archipelago. Republic Act No. 3046 follows the framing of the Convention on  Territorial Sea and the
Contiguous Zone of 1958, which codifies the sovereign  rights of the states over their territorial sea. Republic Act No. 9522 aims to amend 
Republic Act No. 3046 by complying with the terms of United Nations Convention  on the Law of the Sea III which took between 1973 and 1982. 

ISSUE:  Whether or not Republic Act 9522 is unconstitutional for  reducing the Philippine
Maritime Territory 
DECISION:  No. United Nations Convention on the Law of  the Sea III (UNCLOS III) has nothing to do with  the acquisition or loss territory. 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  It is a multilateral treaty regulating sea use rights over maritime zones. Baseline  laws such as Republic Act 9522 are
enacted pursuant to UNCLOS III and only  serves to mark out specific basepoints from which baselines are drawn straight or  curve, and to serve
and to start as geographic starting points to measure the breadth  of maritime zones and continental shelf.  

3. ) Government

B. ) Functions

Romualdez-Yap v. Civil Service Commission, 225 SCRA 285

Shipside, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 143377, February 20,2001

Facts: The petitioner filed a certiorari with the CA containing the requisite certification on non-forum shopping but failed to attach proof that the
person signing the certification was authorized to do so. The CA dismissed the petition. The petitioner submits a motion for reconsideration
which attached a secretary’s certificate attesting to the signatory’s authority to sign certificates against forum shopping on behalf of the
petitioner. When the court of CA denied the motion, the petitioner sought relief with the SC.

Issue: Whether the CA erred in dismissing the petition of Shipside Inc.

Ruling: Yes, the CA erred in the dismissal of the petition. The SC revised the decision of CA recognizing the belated filing of the certifications
against forum shopping as permitted in exceptional circumstances. It further held that with more reason should a petition be given due course
when this incorporates a certification on non-forum shopping without evidence that the person signing the certifications was an authorized
signatory and the petitioner subsequently submits a secretary’s certificate attesting to the signatory’s authority in its motion for consideration.
The court allows belated submission of certifications showing proof of the signatory’s authority in signing the certification of forum shopping.
C. State Immunity

2.) Par in parem non habet imperium - "equals have no sovereignty over each other") is a general principle of international law, forming the
basis of state immunity. Because of this principle, a sovereign state cannot exercise jurisdiction over another sovereign state.

A. ) State’s Diplomatic Agents

Minucher v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 142396, February 11, 2003

Facts:

On 03 August 1988, Minucher filed Civil Case before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) for damages on account of what he claimed to have been
trumped-up charges of drug trafficking made by Arthur Scalzo. The Manila RTC detailed what it had found to be the facts and circumstances
surrounding the case.

Then, on 14 June 1990, after almost two years since the institution of the civil case, Scalzo filed a motion to dismiss the complaint on the ground
that, being a special agent of the United States Drug Enforcement Administration, he was entitled to diplomatic immunity. In an order of 25 June
1990, the trial court denied the motion to dismiss.

On 27 July 1990, Scalzo filed a petition for certiorari with injunction with the SC asking that the Civil Case complaint be ordered dismissed. The
case was referred to the Court of Appeals which sustaining the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo and ordering the dismissal of the complaint against
him. Minucher filed a petition for review with the SC appealing the judgment of the Court of Appeals which the SC reversed the decision of the
appellate court and remanded the case to the lower court for trial. RTC continued with its hearings on the case Adjudging defendant liable to
plaintiff in actual and compensatory damages of P520,000.00; moral damages in the sum of P10 million; exemplary damages in the sum of
P100,000.00; attorney’s fees in the sum of P200,000.00 plus costs.The trial court gave credence to the claim of Scalzo and the evidence
presented by him that he was a diplomatic agent entitled to immunity as such, it ruled that he, nevertheless, should be held accountable for the
acts complained of committed outside his official duties. On appeal, the Court of Appeals reversed the decision of the trial court and sustained the
defense of Scalzo that he was sufficiently clothed with diplomatic immunity during his term of duty and thereby immune from the criminal and civil
jurisdiction of the “Receiving State” pursuant to the terms of the Vienna Convention. Hence, this case.
Issue:

Whether Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity.

Held:

Yes, Arthur Scalzo is indeed entitled to diplomatic immunity.  Concededly, vesting a person with diplomatic immunity is a prerogative of the
executive branch of the government. The Court has recognized that, in such matters, the hands of the courts are virtually tied. Amidst
apprehensions of indiscriminate and incautious grant of immunity, designed to gain exemption from the jurisdiction of courts, it should behoove the
Philippine government, specifically its Department of Foreign Affairs, to be most circumspect, that should particularly be no less than compelling, in
its post litem motam issuances. It might be recalled that the privilege is not an immunity from the observance of the law of the territorial sovereign
or from ensuing legal liability; it is, rather, an immunity from the exercise of territorial jurisdiction. But while the diplomatic immunity of Scalzo might
thus remain contentious, it was sufficiently established that, indeed, he worked for the United States Drug Enforcement Agency and was tasked to
conduct surveillance of suspected drug activities within the country on the dates pertinent to this case. If it should be ascertained that Arthur
Scalzo was acting well within his assigned functions when he committed the acts alleged in the complaint, the present controversy could then be
resolved under the related doctrine of State Immunity from Suit.

The precept that a State cannot be sued in the courts of a foreign state is a long-standing rule of customary international law then closely identified
with the personal immunity of a foreign sovereign from suit and, with the emergence of democratic states, made to attach not just to the person of
the head of state, or his representative, but also distinctly to the state itself in its sovereign capacity. If the acts giving rise to a suit are those of a
foreign government done by its foreign agent, although not necessarily a diplomatic personage, but acting in his official capacity, the complaint
could be barred by the immunity of the foreign sovereign from suit without its consent. Suing a representative of a state is believed to be, in effect,
suing the state itself. The proscription is not accorded for the benefit of an individual but for the State, in whose service he is, under the maxim –
par in parem, non habet imperium – that all states are sovereign equals and cannot assert jurisdiction over one another.

This immunity principle, however, has its limitations. “It is a different matter where the public official is made to account in his capacity as such for
acts contrary to law and injurious to the rights of the plaintiff. Inasmuch as the State authorizes only legal acts by its officers, unauthorized acts of
government officials or officers are not acts of the State, and an action against the officials or officers by one whose rights have been invaded or
violated by such acts, for the protection of his rights, is not a suit against the State within the rule of immunity of the State from suit. In the same
tenor, it has been said that an action at law or suit in equity against a State officer or the director of a State department on the ground that, while
claiming to act for the State, he violates or invades the personal and property rights of the plaintiff, under an unconstitutional act or under an
assumption of authority which he does not have, is not a suit against the State within the constitutional provision that the State may not be sued
without its consent. The rationale for this ruling is that the doctrine of state immunity cannot be used as an instrument for perpetrating an injustice.
C.) Other international organizations/agencies

SEAFDEC-Aquaculture v. NLRC, 206 SCRA 283

FACTS:

Two labor cases were filed by the herein private respondents against the petitioner, Southeast Asian Fisheries Development
Center (SEAFDEC), before the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC), Regional Arbitration Branch, Iloilo City.

In these cases, the private respondents claim having been wrongfully terminated from their employment by the petitioner.

The petitioner, who claims to be an international inter-government organization composed of various Southeast Asian countries,
filed a Motion to Dismiss, challenged the jurisdiction of the public respondent in taking cognizance of the above cases.

Read: City of Angeles vs. Court of Appeals

The private respondents, as well as respondent labor arbiter, allege that the petitioner is not immune from suit and assuming that
if, indeed, it is an international organization, it has, however, impliedly, if not expressly, waived its immunity by belatedly raising
the issue of jurisdiction.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the petitioner is immune from suit.

HELD:

The Court ruled for the petitioner.

It is beyond question that petitioner SEAFDEC is an international agency enjoying diplomatic immunity.

It has already been held in Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department vs. National Labor Relations
Commission (G.R. No. 86773, 206 SCRA 283/1992).

Petitioner Southeast Asian Fisheries Development Center-Aquaculture Department (SEAFDEC-AQD) is an international agency
beyond the jurisdiction of public respondent NLRC.

Being an intergovernmental organization, SEAFDEC including its Departments (AQD), enjoys functional independence and
freedom from control of the state in whose territory its office is located.

Read: Callado vs. International Rice Research Institute (IRRI)

One of the basic immunities of an international organization is immunity from local jurisdiction, i.e., that it is immune from the legal
writs and processes issued by the tribunals of the country where it is found.

The obvious reason for this is that the subjection of such an organization to the authority of the local courts would afford a
convenient medium thru which the host government may interfere in their operations or even influence or control its policies and
decisions of the organization; besides, such objection to local jurisdiction would impair the capacity of such body to discharge its
responsibilities impartially on behalf of its member-states. 

Callado v. IRRI, 244 SCRA 210

FACTS:

Petitioner Ernesto Callado was employed as a driver at the International Rice Research Institute (IRRI).

On February 11, 1990, while driving an IRRI vehicle on an official trip to the Ninoy Aquino International Airport and back to the IRRI, petitioner
figured in an accident.

After evaluating petitioner's answer, explanations and other evidence by IRRI's Human Resource Development Department Manager, the latter
issued a Notice of Termination to petitioner on December 7, 1990.

Petitioner then filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter for illegal dismissal, illegal suspension and indemnity pay with moral and exemplary
damages and attorney's fees.
Private respondent likewise informed the Labor Arbiter, through counsel, that the Institute enjoys immunity from legal process by virtue of Article 3
of Presidential Decree No. 1620, and that it invokes such diplomatic immunity and privileges as an international organization in the instant case
filed by petitioner, not having waived the same.

Read: Department of Foreign Affairs (DFA) vs. National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)

However, the Labor Arbiter finds private respondent IRRI to have waived its immunity considered the defense of immunity no longer a legal
obstacle in resolving the case.

ISSUE:

Whether or not IRRI waived its immunity from suit in this dispute which arose from an employer-employee relationship.

HELD:

The Court ruled in the negative and vote to dismiss the petition.

There’s no merit in petitioner's arguments, thus IRRI's immunity from suit is undisputed.

  Presidential Decree No. 1620, Article 3  provides: Immunity from Legal Process. The Institute shall enjoy immunity from
any penal, civil and administrative proceedings, except insofar as that immunity has been expressly waived by the
Director-General of the Institute or his authorized representatives.

The grant of immunity to IRRI is clear and unequivocal and an express waiver by its Director-General is the only way by which it may relinquish or
abandon this immunity.

Read: United States of America vs. Ruiz

On the matter of waiving its immunity from suit, IRRI had, early on, made its position clear.

Through counsel, the Institute wrote the Labor Arbiter categorically informing him that the Institute will not waive its diplomatic immunity. 
4. ) Test to determine if the suit is against the State

Tan v. Director of Forestry, 125 SCRA 302

Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 286

Facts:

VMPSI alleges that the above provisions of R.A. No. 5487 violate the provisions of the 1987 Constitution against monopolies, unfair
competition and combinations in restraint of trade, and tend to favor and institutionalize the Philippine Association of Detective and
Protective Agency Operators, Inc. (PADPAO) which is monopolistic because it has an interest in more than one security agency.

Respondent VMPSI likewise questions the validity of paragraph 3, subparagraph (g) of the Modifying Regulations on the Issuance
of License to Operate and Private Security Licenses and Specifying Regulations for the Operation of PADPAO issued by then PC Chief Lt.
Gen. Fidel V. Ramos, through Col. Sabas V. Edades, requiring that “all private security agencies/company security forces must register as
members of any PADPAO Chapter organized within the Region where their main offices are located...”. As such membership requirement
in PADPAO is compulsory in nature, it allegedly violates legal and constitutional provisions against monopolies, unfair competition and
combinations in restraint of trade.

On May 12, 1986, a Memorandum of Agreement was executed by PADPAO and the PC Chief, which fixed the minimum monthly
contract rate per guard for eight (8) hours of security service per day at P2,255.00 within Metro Manila and P2,215.00 outside of Metro
Manila.

On June 29, 1987, Odin Security Agency (Odin) filed a complaint with PADPAO accusing VMPSI of cut-throat competition by
undercutting its contract rate for security services rendered to the Metropolitan Waterworks and Sewerage System (MWSS), charging said
customer lower than the standard minimum rates provided in the Memorandum of Agreement dated May 12, 1986.

PADPAO found VMPSI guilty of cut-throat competition, hence, the PADPAO Committee on Discipline recommended the expulsion
of VMPSI from PADPAO and the cancellation of its license to operate a security agency (Annex D, Petition).

The PC-SUSIA made similar findings and likewise recommended the cancellation of VMPSI’s license.

As a result, PADPAO refused to issue a clearance/certificate of membership to VMPSI when it requested one.

VMPSI wrote the PC Chief on March 10, 1988, requesting him to set aside or disregard the findings of PADPAO and consider
VMPSI’s application for renewal of its license, even without a certificate of membership from PADPAO
Issue:

                whether or not VMPSI’s complaint against the PC Chief and PC-SUSIA is a suit against the State without its consent

Held:

                Yes. The State may not be sued without its consent (Article XVI, Section 3, of the 1987 Constitution). Invoking this rule, the PC
Chief and PC-SUSIA contend that, being instrumentalities of the national government exercising a primarily governmental function of
regulating the organization and operation of private detective, watchmen, or security guard agencies, said official (the PC Chief) and
agency (PC-SUSIA) may not be sued without the Government’s consent, especially in this case because VMPSI’s complaint seeks not only
to compel the public respondents to act in a certain way, but worse, because VMPSI seeks actual and compensatory damages in the sum
of P1,000,000.00, exemplary damages in the same amount, and P200,000.00 as attorney’s fees from said public respondents. Even if its
action prospers, the payment of its monetary claims may not be enforced because the State did not consent to appropriate the necessary
funds for that purpose.

While the doctrine of state immunity appears to prohibit only suits against the state without its consent, it is also applicable to
complaints filed against officials of the state for acts allegedly performed by them in the discharge of their duties. The rule is that if the
judgment against such officials will require the state itself to perform an affirmative act to satisfy the same, such as the appropriation of the
amount needed to pay the damages awarded against them, the suit must be regarded as against the state itself  although it has not been
formally impleaded.

A public official may sometimes be held liable in his personal or private capacity if he acts in bad faith, or beyond the scope of his
authority or jurisdiction, however, since the acts for which the PC Chief and PC¬-SUSIA are being called to account in this case, were
performed by them as part of their official duties, without malice, gross negligence, or bad faith, no recovery may be had against them in
their private capacities.

The correct test for the application of state immunity is not the conclusion of a contract by the State but the legal nature of the act.

The restrictive application of State immunity is proper only when the proceedings arise out of commercial transactions of the foreign
sovereign, its commercial activities or economic affairs. Stated differently, a State may be said to have descended to the level of an
individual and can thus be deemed to have tacitly given its consent to be sued only when it enters into a  business contract. It does not
apply where the contract relates to the exercise of its sovereign functions.

In the instant case, the Memorandum of Agreement entered into by the PC Chief and PADPAO was intended to professionalize the
industry and to standardize the salaries of security guards as well as th e current rates of security services, clearly, a governmental function.
The execution of the said agreement is incidental to the purpose of R.A.5487, as amended, which is to regulate the organization and
operation of private detective, watchmen or security guard agencies.

1. Suits against Government Agencies

a. Incorporated

SSS v. Court of Appeals, 120 SCRA 707

FACTS:

Spouses David and Socorro Cruz, applied and granted a real estate loan by the SSS with residential lot located at Pateros, Rizal as
collateral. The spouses Cruz complied with their monthly payments. When delayed were incurred in their monthly payments SSS filed a petition for
foreclosure of their real estate mortgage executed by the spouses Cruz on the ground that the spouses Cruz defaulted in payment, Pursuant for
these application for foreclosure notices were published on the second notice the counsel for spouses Cruz sent a letter to SSS informing the
latter that his clients are up to date in their payment of the monthly amortization and the SSS should discontinued the publication of the notices of
foreclosure. This request remain unheaded, this spouses Cruz filed an action for damages against SSS before RTC in Rizal. SSS invoking its
immunity from suit being an agency of the government performing government function. The trial court and court of appeal nevertheless awarded
damages in favor of spouses Cruz which was affirmed by court of appeal, Hence this petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not SSS is immune from suit.

HELD:

Negative.. The SSS has a distinct legal personality and it can be sued for damages. The SSS does not enjoy immunity from suit by
express statutory consent.

It has corporated power separate and distinct from the government. SSS own organic act specifically provides that it can sue and be sued
in court. These words “sue and be sued” embrace all civil process incident to a legal action. So that even assuming that the SSS, as it claims,
enjoys immunity from suit as an entity performing governmental function, by virtue of the explicit provision of the aforecited enabling law, the
government must be deemed to have waived immunity in respect of the SSS, although it does not thereby concede its liability that statutory law
has given to the private citizen a remedy for the enforcement and protection of his rights. The SSS thereby has been required to submit to the
jurisdiction of the court; subject to its right to interpose any lawful defense.
Municipality of San Fernando, La Union v. Judge Firme, 195 SCRA 692

FACTS:

On December 16, 1965, a collision occurred involving a passenger jeepney driven by Bernardo Balagot and owned by the Estate of Macario
Nieveras, a gravel and sand truck driven by Jose Manandeg and owned by Tanquilino Velasquez and a dump truck of the Municipality of San
Fernando, La Union and driven by Alfredo Bislig.

Due to the impact, several passengers of the jeepney including Laureano Baniña Sr. died as a result of the injuries they sustained and four (4)
others suffered varying degrees of physical injuries.

The private respondents instituted a compliant for damages against the Estate of Macario Nieveras and Bernardo Balagot, owner and driver,
respectively, of the passenger jeepney in the Court of First Instance of La Union, Branch I, San Fernando, La Union.

Read: Veterans Manpower and Protective Services, Inc. vs. Court of Appeals

However, the aforesaid defendants filed a Third Party Complaint against the petitioner and the driver of a dump truck of petitioner.

Thereafter, the case was subsequently transferred to Branch IV, presided over by respondent judge. The private respondents amended the
complaint wherein the petitioner and its regular employee, Alfredo Bislig were impleaded for the first time as defendants.

Petitioner filed its answer and raised affirmative defenses such as lack of cause of action, non-suability of the State, prescription of cause of action
and the negligence of the owner and driver of the passenger jeepney as the proximate cause of the collision.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the Municipality of San Fernando, La Union can enjoy the immunity from suit.
HELD:

The Court granted the petition and the decision of the respondent court is hereby modified, absolving the petitioner municipality of any liability in
favor of private respondents.

Article XVI, Section 3 of the Constitution expressly provides that:

  the State may not be sued without its consent.

It is a general rule that the State may not be sued except when it gives consent to be sued.

Consent takes the form of express or implied consent.

Express consent may be embodied in a general law or a special law.

A special law may be passed to enable a person to sue the government for an alleged quasi-delict.

While implied consent occurs when the government enters into business contracts, thereby descending to the level of the other contracting party,
and also when the State files a complaint, thus opening itself to a counterclaim. 

Municipal corporations, like provinces and cities, are agencies of the State when they are engaged in governmental functions and therefore should
enjoy the sovereign immunity from suit.

Nevertheless, they are subject to suit even in the performance of such functions because their charter provided that they can sue and be sued.

The municipal corporations are suable because their charters grant them the competence to sue and be sued.

Read: Republic of the Philippines vs. Feliciano

Nevertheless, they are generally not liable for torts committed by them in the discharge of governmental functions and can be held answerable
only if it can be shown that they were acting in a proprietary capacity.

In the case at bar, petitioner Municipality of San Fernando, La Union is a municipal corporation existing under and in accordance with the laws of
the Republic of the Philippines. 

he driver of the dump truck of the municipality insists that "he was on his way to the Naguilian river to get a load of sand and gravel for the repair of
San Fernando's municipal streets."
In the absence of any evidence to the contrary, the regularity of the performance of official duty is presumed pursuant to Section 3(m) of Rule 131
of the Revised Rules of Court.

  Section 3 Disputable presumptions. — The following presumptions are satisfactory if uncontradicted, but may be
contradicted and overcome by other evidence:(m) That official duty has been regularly performed;

Therefore, the Court ruled that the driver of the dump truck was performing duties or tasks pertaining to his office.

The municipality cannot be held liable for the torts committed by its regular employee, who was then engaged in the discharge of governmental
functions.

Thus, the death of the passenger –– tragic and deplorable though it may be –– imposed on the municipality no duty to pay monetary
compensation.

National Irrigation Administration v. Court of Appeals, 214 SCRA 35

FACTS:

On June 28, 1963, a free patent over three (3) hectares of land, situated in barrio Baybayog, municipality of Alcala, province of Cagayan was
issued in the name of respondent's predecessor-in-interest, Vicente Manglapus, subject to the following proviso expressly stated in the title:
"...except in favor of the Government or any of its branches, units, or institutions, the land hereby acquired shall be inalienable and shall not be
subject to encumbrance for a period of five (5) years from the date of this patent [...] and subject finally to all conditions and public easements and
servitudes recognized and prescribed by law..." Subsequently, respondent Manglapus acquired the lot from Vicente Manglapus by absolute sale.

Sometime in 1982, NIA entered into a contract with Villamar Development Construction. Under the contract, NIA was to construct canals in
Amulung, Cagayan and Alcala, Cagayan. NIA then entered a portion of Manglapus' land and made diggings and fillings thereon.

On March 14, 1991, Manglapus filed a complaint for damages against NIA, alleging that NIA's diggings and fillings destroyed the agricultural use
of his land and that no reasonable compensation was paid for its taking.

ISSUE:

Whether or not the NIA should pay Manglapus just compensation for the taking of a portion of his property for use as easement of a right of way.  
DECISION:

NIA is under no obligation to pay for just compensation. The Court affirmed NIA's contention that the Transfer Certificate of Title and the Original
Certificate of Title covering the subject parcel of land contained a reservation granting the government a right of way over the land covered therein.
The Court noted that the canal NIA constructed was only eleven (11) meters in width which is well within the limit provided by law. Manglapus has
therefore no cause to complain. Article 619 of the Civil Code provides that, "Easements are established either by law or by the will of the owners.
The former are called legal and the latter voluntary easements." In the present case, the Court found and declared that a legal easement of a right-
of-way exists in favor of the government. The land was originally public land, and awarded to respondent Manglapus by free patent. The ruling
would be otherwise if the land were originally private property, in which case, just compensation must be paid for the taking of a part thereof for
public use as an easement of a right of way.

Philippine National Railways v. Intermediate Appellate Court, 217 SCRA 401

b. Unincorporated

Department of Agriculture v. NLRC, 227 SCRA 693

FACTS:  The case is regarding money claim against Department of Agriculture (DA) as filed and requested by National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC). Petitioner Department of Agriculture and Sultan Security Agency entered into a contract for security services to be
provided by the latter to the said governmental entity. Pursuant to their arrangements, guards were deployed by Sultan Security Agency in
the various premises of the DA. Thereafter, several guards filed a complaint for underpayment of wages, non-payment of 13th month pay,
uniform allowances, night shift differential pay, holiday pay, and overtime pay, as well as for damages against the DA and the security
agency. The Labor Arbiter rendered a decision finding the DA jointly and severally liable with the security agency for the payment of
money claims of the complainant security guards. The DA and the security agency did not appeal the decision. Thus, the decision became
final and executory. The Labor Arbiter issued a writ of execution to enforce and execute the judgment against the property of the DA and
the security agency. Thereafter, the City Sheriff levied on execution the motor vehicles of the DA. The petitioner charges the NLRC with
grave abuse of discretion for refusing to quash the writ of execution. The petitioner faults the NLRC for assuming jurisdiction over a money
claim against the Department, which, it claims, falls under the exclusive jurisdiction of the Commission on Audit. More importantly, the
petitioner asserts, the NLRC has disregarded the cardinal rule on the non-suability of the State. The private respondents, on the other
hand, argue that the petitioner has impliedly waived its immunity from suit by concluding a service contract with Sultan Security Agency. 

ISSUE:  Whether or not the doctrine of non-suability of the State applies in the case. 

DECISION:  Denied 

RATIO DECIDENDI:  No. The rule does not say that the State may not be sued under any circumstances. The State may at times be
sued. The general law waiving the immunity of the state from suit is found in Act No. 3083, where the Philippine government “consents
and submits to be sued upon any money claims involving liability arising from contract, express or implied, which could serve as a basis of
civil action between private parties.” n this case, The DA has not pretended to have assumed a capacity apart from its being a
governmental entity when it entered into the questioned contract; nor that it could have, in fact, performed any act proprietary in character.
But the claims of the complainant security guards clearly constitute money claims.  

Civil Aeronautics Administration v. Court of Appeals, 167 SCRA 28

FACTS:
 December 13, 1968: Ernest E. Simke , Honorary Consul Geileral of Israel in the Philippines, with several other persons went to the Manila
International Airport to meet his future son-in-law
 In order to get a better view of the incoming passengers, he and his group proceeded to the viewing deck or terrace of the airport.
 While walking on the terrace filled with other people, he slipped over an elevation about 4 inches high at the far end of the terrace.
 He fell on his back and broke his thigh bone.
 December 14, 1968: he was operated for 3 hours
 RTC: favored Simke
 CA: affirmed
ISSUE: W/N Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) was negligent as the entity empowered "to administer, operate, manage, control, maintain and
develop the Manila International Airport

HELD: YES.
 National Airports Corporation is dead and the Civil Aeronautics Administration is its heir or legal representative, acting by the law of its
creation upon its own rights and in its own name.  The better practice there should have been to make the Civil Aeronautics Administration the
third party defendant instead of the National Airports Corporation.
 CAA as an agency is not immune from suit, it being engaged in functions pertaining to a private entity
 This Court during its ocular inspection also observed the dangerous and defective condition of the open terrace which has remained
unrepaired through the years. It has observed the lack of maintenance and upkeep of the MIA terrace, typical of many government buildings
and offices. Aside from the litter allowed to accumulate in the terrace, pot holes cause by missing tiles remained unrepaired and
unattented. The inclination itself is an architectural anomaly for as stated by the said witness, it is neither a ramp because a ramp is an
inclined surface in such a way that it will prevent people or pedestrians from sliding.
 Article 1173 of the Civil Code, "(t)he fault or negligence of the obligor consists in the omission of that diligence which is required by the nature
of the obligation and corresponds with the circumstances of the person, of the time and of the place."
 Here, the obligation of the CAA in maintaining the viewing deck, a facility open to the public, requires that CAA insure the safety of the viewers
using it. 
 Contributory negligence under Article 2179 of the Civil Code contemplates a negligent act or omission on the part of the plaintiff, which
although not the proximate cause of his injury, contributed to his own damage, the proximate cause of the plaintiffs own injury being the
defendant's lack of due care -none here 
2. Suit against Public Officers
Sanders v. Veridiano, 162 SCRA 88
Shauf v. Court of Appeals, 191 SCRA 713
Republic v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 142476, March 20, 2001
Republic v. Hon. Edilberto Sandoval, 220 SCRA 124
Lansang v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 102667, February 23, 2000

3. Need for consent

a. Express consent
Department of Agriculture v. NLRC, 227 SCRA 693
Amigable v. Cuenca, 43 SCRA 360
EPG Construction v. Secretary Vigilar, G.R. No. 131544, March 16, 2001

b. Implied consent
Froilan v. Pan Oriental Shipping, G.R. No. L-6060, Sept. 30, 1950
U.S. v. Ruiz, 136 SCRA 487
Republic (PCGG) v. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 129406, March 6, 2006

4. Scope of Consent
National Housing Authority v. Heirs of Quivelondo, G.R. No. 154411, June 19, 2003
Municipality of San Miguel, Bulacan v. Fernandez, 130 SCRA 56
Municipality of Makati v. Court of Appeals, 190 SCRA 206

5. Suability not equated with outright liability

Merritt v. Government of the Philippine Islands, 34 Phil 311 (1916)
Fontanilla v. Maliaman, 194 SCRA 486