1. Standard Vacuum Oil vs.

Luzon Stevedoring
G.R. No. L-5203, April 18, 1956

DOCTRINE:

Whenever merchandise is transported on the sea by virtue of a contract entered into between the
shipper and the carrier, the merchandise is deemed transported at the risk and venture of the shipper,
if the contrary is not stipulated, and all damages suffered by the merchandise during the
transportation by reason of accident or force majeure shall be for the account and risk of the shipper,
but the proof of these accidents is incumbent on the carrier.

FACTS:
Standard Vacuum Oil Co. entered into a contract with Luzon Stevedoring Co. Inc. to transport
between the ports of Manila and Nin Bay, Sagay, Iloilo, 2,916.44 barrels of bulk gasoline belonging to
the former. The gasoline was delivered in accordance with the contract but Luzon Stevedoring failed
to transport it to its place of destination. It appeared that the tugboat towing barge L-522 which was
laden with gasoline, among others, stalled due to a broken idler during the morning of 4 February
1947. The barges that tied to it broke off due to the rough condition of the sea during the afternoon.
The tugboat and the barges were dashed against rocks, the tugboat sunk, and barge L-522 was so
badly damaged that the gasoline leaked out.

Standard Vacuum Oil brought an action in the CFI of Manila to recover the sum of P75,578.60
as damages. Luzon Stevedoring, in its answer, pleaded that its failure to deliver the gasoline was due
to fortuitous event or caused by circumstances beyond its control and not to its fault or negligence or
that of any of its employees. The court, after receiving the evidence, rendered decision finding that the
disaster that had befallen the tugboat was the result of an unavoidable accident and the loss of the
gasoline was due to a fortuitous event which was beyond the control of Luzon Stevedoring and,
consequently, dismissed the case with costs against Standard Vacuum Oil. The Supreme Court
reversed the decision appealed from; and ordered Luzon Stevedoring to pay to Standard Vacuum Oil
Co. the sum of P75,578.50, with legal interest from the date of the filing of the complaint, with costs.

ISSUE:

1. Whether or not Luzon Stevedoring is a common carrier.

2. Whether or not the Luzon Stevedoring liable for damages.

HELD:

1. Luzon Stevedoring Co. not a common carrier but has earned level of a public utility; Contract
covered by Code of Commerce

Luzon Stevedoring is a private stevedoring company engaged in transporting local products, including
gasoline in bulk and has a fleet of about 140 tugboats and about 90 per cent of its business is devoted
to transportation. Though it is engaged in a limited contract of carriage in the sense that it chooses its
customers and is not opened to the public, nevertheless, the continuity of its operations in this kind of
business have earned for it the level of a public utility. Herein, the contract between Standard Vacuum
Oil and Luzon Stevedoring comes therefore under the provisions of the Code of Commerce.

Article 361 of the Code of Commerce provides that “the merchandise shall be transported at the risk
and venture of the shipper, if the contrary was not expressly stipulated. Therefore, all damages and
impairment suffered by the goods during the transportation, by reason of accident, force majeure, or
by virtue of the nature or defect of the articles, shall be for the account and risk of the shipper. The
proof of these accidents is incumbent on the carrier.”

Merchandise transported at risk of shipper unless otherwise stipulated; Damages due to force
majeure to be proven by carrier. Whenever merchandise is transported on the sea by virtue of a
contract entered into between the shipper and the carrier, the merchandise is deemed transported at
the risk and venture of the shipper, if the contrary is not stipulated, and all damages suffered by the
merchandise during the transportation by reason of accident or force majeure shall be for the account
and risk of the shipper, but the proof of these accidents is incumbent on the carrier.

Proof required of carrier- All a shipper has to prove in connection with sea carriage is delivery of the
merchandise in good condition and its non-delivery at the place of destination in order that the burden
of proof may shift to the carrier to prove any of the accidents above adverted to. “Shippers who are
forced to ship goods on an ocean liner or any other ship have some legal rights, and when goods are
delivered on board a ship in good order and condition, and the shipowner delivers them to the shipper
in bad order and condition, it then devolves upon the shipowner to both allege and prove that the
goods were damaged by reason of some fact which legally exempts him from liability” (Mirasol vs.
Robert Dollar Co., 53 Phil., 129).

The tugboat “Snapper” was acquired by Luzon Stevedoring from the Foreign Liquidation Commission.
It was a surplus property. It was a deep-sea tugboat that had been in the service of the United States
Armed Forces prior to its purchase by the Luzon Stevedoring Co. The tugboat was put into operation
without first submitting it to an overhaul in a dry-dock. The tugboat had previously made several trips
and each time it had to obtain a special permit from the Bureau of Customs because it had never
been dry-docked and did not have complete equipment to be able to obtain a permanent permit. The
special permits that were issued by said Bureau specifically state that they were issued “pending
submission of plans and load line certificate, including test and final inspection of equipment.” When
the tugboat was inspected by the Bureau of Customs on 18 October 1946, it found it to be
inadequately equipped and so the Bureau required Luzon Stevedoring to provide it with the requisite
equipment but it was never able to complete it.

No justification for Luzon Stevedoring to put unequipped tugboat in business Although there were
then no dry-dock facilities in the Philippines, this does not mean that they could not be obtained
elsewhere. It being a surplus property, a dry-dock inspection was a must to put the tugboat in a sea
going condition. The fact that the deficiency in the equipment was due to the fact that no such
equipment was available at the time, this did not justify Luzon Stevedoring in putting such tugboat in
business even if unequipped merely to make a profit. Nor could the fact that the tugboat was given a
special permit by the Bureau of Customs to make the trip relieve Luzon Stevedoring from liability.

2. Yes Luzon Stevedoring negligent, did not use reasonable diligence and therefore liable for
damages. The fact that the tugboat was a surplus property, has not been dry-docked, and was not
provided with the requisite equipment to make it seaworthy, shows that Luzon Stevedoring did not use
reasonable diligence in putting the tugboat in such a condition as would make its use safe for
operation. Where owner buys old tug, licensed coastwise, and equips it for ocean going, it is
negligence to send tug out without knowing something of her stability and especially without stability
test, where history and performance with respect to crankiness and tenderness are matters of official
record.

Lack of spare parts show lack of precaution and diligence. Another circumstance which shows the
lack of precaution and diligence taken by Luzon Stevedoring to make the travel of the tugboat safe, is
the failure to carry on board the necessary spare parts. When the idler was broken, the engineer of
the tugboat examined it for the first time and it was only then that he found that there were no spare
parts to use except a worn out spare driving chain. Vessels motored by diesel engines it is necessary
always to carry spare chains, ball bearings and chain drives. This was not done.

Tug liable for damage to barge’s cargo by faulty equipment. A tug engaged to tow a barge is liable for
damage to the cargo of the barge caused by faulty equipment of the tug.

Deficiency or incompetence in the manpower of the tugboat. Another circumstance, which shows the
lack of precaution and diligence, refers to the deficiency or incompetence in the manpower of the
tugboat. According to law, a tugboat of the tonnage and powers of one like the “Snapper” is required
to have a complement composed of one first mate, one second mate, one third mate, one chief
engineer, one second engineer, and one third engineer, (section 1203, Revised Administrative Code),
but when the trip in question was undertaken, it was only manned by one master, who was merely
licensed as a bay, river, and lake patron, one second mate, who was licensed as a third mate, one
chief engineer who was licensed as third motor engineer, one assistant engineer, who was licensed
as a bay, river, and lake motor engineer, and one second assistant engineer, who was unlicensed.
The employment of this crew to perform functions beyond its competence and qualifications is not
only risky but against the law and if a mishap is caused, one cannot but surmise that such
incompetence has something to do with the mishap. The fact that the tugboat had undertaken several
trips before with practically the same crew without any untoward consequence, cannot furnish any
justification for continuing in its employ a deficient or incompetent personnel contrary to law and the
regulations of the Bureau of Customs.

The efforts made by Luzon Stevedoring fall short of that diligence and precaution that are demanded
by the situation to save the tugboat and the barge it was towing from disaster. More than 24 hours
had elapsed before the tug “Tamban” showed up to extend help. The delay was caused not so much
because of the lack of available ships in the vicinity where the “Snapper” stalled but because Luzon
Stevedoring did not have in readiness any tugboat sufficient in tonnage and equipment to attend to
the rescue. The tug “Tamban” that was ordered to extend help was fully inadequate for that purpose.
It was a small vessel that was authorized to operate only within Manila Bay and did not even have any
map of the Visayan Islands. A public utility that is engaged in sea transportation even for a limited
service with a fleet of 140 tugboats should have a competent tug to rush for towing or repairs in the
event of untoward happening overseas. If Luzon Stevedoring had only such a tug ready for such an
emergency, this disaster would not have happened. Luzon Stevedoring could have avoided sending a
poorly equipped tug which failed to do job.

Cause of disaster attributed to negligence or lack of precaution. While the breaking of the idler may be
due to an accident, or to something unexpected, the cause of the disaster which resulted in the loss of
the gasoline can only be attributed to the negligence or lack of precaution to avert it on the part of
Luzon Stevedoring. It had enough time to effectuate the rescue if it had only a competent tug for the
purpose because the weather was good from 3:00 a.m. to 12:00 p.m. of 4 February 1947 and it was
only in the afternoon that the wind began to blow with some intensity, but failed to do so because of
that shortcoming. The loss of the gasoline certainly cannot be said to be due to force majeure or
unforeseen event but to the failure of Luzon Stevedoring to extend adequate and proper help.
2. Planters Products, Inc. vs. CA
G.R. No. 101503, September 15, 1993

DOCTRINE
Presumption of negligence on the part of the respondent carrier has been efficaciously
overcome by the showing of extraordinary zeal and assiduity exercised by the carrier in the care of
the cargo.

CONTRACTS
1. CONTRACT OF CARRIAGE - Planters Products, Inc. (PPI), purchased from Mitsubishi
International Corporation (MITSUBISHI) of New York, U.S.A., 9,329.7069 metric tons (M/T) of Urea
46% fertilizer which the latter shipped in bulk on 16 June 1974 aboard the cargo vessel M/V "Sun
Plum" owned by private respondent Kyosei Kisen Kabushiki Kaisha (KKKK) from Kenai, Alaska,
U.S.A., to Poro Point, San Fernando, La Union, Philippines, as evidenced by Bill of Lading No. KP-1
signed by the master of the vessel and issued on the date of departure.
2. TIME CHARTER PARTY CONTRACT- Prior to its voyage, a time charter-party on the vessel M/V
"Sun Plum" pursuant to the Uniform General Charter was entered into between Mitsubishi as
shipper/charterer and KKKK as shipowner, in Tokyo, Japan.

FACTS
After the Urea fertilizer was loaded in bulk by stevedores hired by and under the supervision
of the shipper, the steel hatches were closed with heavy iron lids, covered with three (3) layers of
tarpaulin, then tied with steel bonds. The hatches remained closed and tightly sealed throughout the
entire voyage.
Upon arrival of the vessel at her port of call, the steel pontoon hatches were opened with the
use of the vessel's boom. Petitioner unloaded the cargo from the holds into its steelbodied dump
trucks which were parked alongside the berth, using metal scoops attached to the ship, pursuant to
the terms and conditions of the charter-partly (which provided for an F.I.O.S. clause). The hatches
remained open throughout the duration of the discharge.
Each time a dump truck was filled up, its load of Urea was covered with tarpaulin before it
was transported to the consignee's warehouse located some fifty (50) meters from the wharf. Midway
to the warehouse, the trucks were made to pass through a weighing scale where they were
individually weighed for the purpose of ascertaining the net weight of the cargo. The port area was
windy, certain portions of the route to the warehouse were sandy and the weather was variable,
raining occasionally while the discharge was in progress. The petitioner's warehouse was made of
corrugated galvanized iron (GI) sheets, with an opening at the front where the dump trucks entered
and unloaded the fertilizer on the warehouse floor. Tarpaulins and GI sheets were placed in-between
and alongside the trucks to contain spillages of the fertilizer.
A report revealed a shortage in the cargo of 106.726 M/T and that a portion of the Urea
fertilizer approximating 18 M/T was contaminated with dirt. The same results were contained in a
Certificate of Shortage/Damaged Cargo which showed that the cargo delivered was indeed short of
94.839 M/T and about 23 M/T were rendered unfit for commerce, having been polluted with sand, rust
and dirt.
PPI sent a claim letter to Soriamont Steamship Agencies (SSA), the resident agent of the
carrier, KKKK, for P245,969.31 representing the cost of the alleged shortage in the goods shipped
and the diminution in value of that portion said to have been contaminated with dirt.
Respondent SSA denied by them because they "had nothing to do with the discharge of the
shipment." Hence, PPI filed an action for damages with the Court of First Instance of Manila.
On appeal, respondent Court of Appeals reversed the lower court and absolved the carrier
from liability for the value of the cargo that was lost or damaged. Relying on the 1968 case of Home
Insurance Co. v. American Steamship Agencies, Inc.,17 the appellate court ruled that the cargo
vessel M/V "Sun Plum" owned by private respondent KKKK was a private carrier and not a common
carrier by reason of the time charterer-party. Petitioner PPI appeals to us by way of a petition for
review assailing the decision of the Court of Appeals.

ISSUES
1. Whether or not KKKK should be considered a private carrier.
2. Whether or not KKKK should be liable for the loss and deterioration of the goods.

HELD
1. NO. A public carrier shall remain as such, notwithstanding the charter of the whole or
portion of a vessel by one or more persons, provided the charter is limited to the ship only, as in the
case of a time-charter or voyage-charter. It is only when the charter includes both the vessel and its
crew, as in a bareboat or demise that a common carrier becomes private, at least insofar as the
particular voyage covering the charter-party is concerned.
2. NO.
A) RESPONDENT CARRIER HAS SUFFICIENTLY OVERCOME, BY CLEAR AND
CONVINCING PROOF, THE PRIMA FACIE PRESUMPTION OF NEGLIGENCE.
The master of the carrying vessel, Captain Lee Tae Bo, in his deposition taken on 19 April
1977 before the Philippine Consul and Legal Attache in the Philippine Embassy in Tokyo, Japan,
testified that before the fertilizer was loaded, the four (4) hatches of the vessel were cleaned, dried
and fumigated. After completing the loading of the cargo in bulk in the ship's holds, the steel pontoon
hatches were closed and sealed with iron lids, then covered with three (3) layers of serviceable
tarpaulins which were tied with steel bonds. The hatches remained close and tightly sealed while the
ship was in transit as the weight of the steel covers made it impossible for a person to open without
the use of the ship's boom.
It was also shown during the trial that the hull of the vessel was in good condition, foreclosing
the possibility of spillage of the cargo into the sea or seepage of water inside the hull of the vessel.
When M/V "Sun Plum" docked at its berthing place, representatives of the consignee boarded, and in
the presence of a representative of the shipowner, the foreman, the stevedores, and a cargo surveyor
representing CSCI, opened the hatches and inspected the condition of the hull of the vessel. The
stevedores unloaded the cargo under the watchful eyes of the shipmates who were overseeing the
whole operation on rotation basis. Verily, the presumption of negligence on the part of the respondent
carrier has been efficaciously overcome by the showing of extraordinary zeal and assiduity exercised
by the carrier in the care of the cargo.
The period during which private respondent was to observe the degree of diligence required
of it as a public carrier began from the time the cargo was unconditionally placed in its charge after
the vessel's holds were duly inspected and passed scrutiny by the shipper, up to and until the vessel
reached its destination and its hull was reexamined by the consignee, but prior to unloading. This is
clear from the limitation clause agreed upon by the parties in the Addendum to the standard
"GENCON" time charter-party which provided for an F.I.O.S., meaning, that the loading, stowing,
trimming and discharge of the cargo was to be done by the charterer, free from all risk and expense to
the carrier. Moreover, a shipowner is liable for damage to the cargo resulting from improper stowage
only when the stowing is done by stevedores employed by him, and therefore under his control and
supervision, not when the same is done by the consignee or stevedores under the employ of the
latter.

B) LOSS OR DAMAGE ATTRIBUTABLE TO THE NATURE OF THE GOODS AND DEFECT

IN THE PACKING OR CONTAINER
1. In unloading fertilizer in bulk with the use of a clamped shell, losses due to spillage during
such operation amounting to one percent (1%) against the bill of lading is deemed "normal" or
"tolerable." The primary cause of these spillages is the clamped shell which does not seal very tightly.
Also, the wind tends to blow away some of the materials during the unloading process.
2. The dissipation of quantities of fertilizer, or its daterioration in value, is caused either by an
extremely high temperature in its place of storage, or when it comes in contact with water.
3. The probability of the cargo being damaged or getting mixed or contaminated with foreign
particles was made greater by the fact that the fertilizer was transported in "bulk," thereby exposing it
to the inimical effects of the elements and the grimy condition of the various pieces of equipment used
in transporting and hauling it.

The evidence of respondent carrier also showed that it was highly improbable for sea water to
seep into the vessel's holds during the voyage since the hull of the vessel was in good condition and
her hatches were tightly closed and firmly sealed, making the M/V "Sun Plum" in all respects
seaworthy to carry the cargo she was chartered for.
The Court notes that it was in the month of July when the vessel arrived port and unloaded
her cargo. It rained from time to time at the harbor area while the cargo was being discharged
according to the supply officer of PPI, who also testified that it was windy at the waterfront and along
the shoreline where the dump trucks passed enroute to the consignee's warehouse.
Indeed, we agree with respondent carrier that bulk shipment of highly soluble goods like
fertilizer carries with it the risk of loss or damage. More so, with a variable weather condition prevalent
during its unloading, as was the case at bar. This is a risk the shipper or the owner of the goods has
to face. Clearly, respondent carrier has sufficiently proved the inherent character of the goods which
makes it highly vulnerable to deterioration; as well as the inadequacy of its packaging which further
contributed to the loss.
On the other hand, no proof was adduced by the petitioner showing that the carrier was
remise in the exercise of due diligence in order to minimize the loss or damage to the goods it carried.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DISMISSED. The assailed decision of the Court of Appeals, which
reversed the trial court, is AFFIRMED. Consequently, Civil Case No. 98623 of the then Court of the
First Instance, now Regional Trial Court, of Manila should be, as it is hereby DISMISSED.
3. Mecenas vs Court of Appeals
G.R. No. 88052 December 14, 1989
Feliciano, J:

DOCTRINE: In requiring compliance with the standard which is in fact that of the highest possible
degree of diligence, from common carriers and in creating a presumption of negligence against them,
the law seeks to compel them to control their employees, to tame their reckless instincts and to force
them to take adequate care of human beings and their property. In this light, exemplary damages are
designed by our civil law to permit the courts to reshape behaviour that is socially deleterious in its
consequence by creating negative incentives or deterrents against such behaviour.

FACTS: On April 22, 1980, at the Talbas Straight in Mindoro, M/T Tacloban City, a barge-type oil
tanker registered in the Philippines, owned by the Philippine National Oil Company (PNOC) and
operated by PNOC Shipping and Transport Corporation, collided with M/V Don Juan, a inter island
vessel registered in the Philippines, owned and operated by Negros Navigation Co. Inc. The latter,
which carried about 750 passengers, sank. The collision transpired in spite of calm seas, fair weather,
and good visibility.

Spouses Perfecto Mecenas and Sofia Mecenas, the parents of the petitioners, were among the
passengers whose bodies were never found despite intensive search. Their seven children filed a suit
against Negros Navigation Co., Inc. and M/V Don Juan’s Captain Roger Santisteban, without
impleading PNOC or PNOC Shipping. They alleged that the spouses died because of the negligence
of the private respondents.

The Regional Trial Court of Quezon City decided that Negros Navigation and Capt. Santisteban are
jointly and severally liable to the Marcenas children for the death of their parents. Negros Navigation,
Capt. Santisteban, PNOC and PNOC Shipping appealed the trial court's decision to the Court of
Appeals.

In time, the Court of Appeals rendered a decision affirming the trial court’s verdict with modifications
as to the amount of damages, reducing it from P400,000 to P100,000. It deleted exemplary damages,
which the trial court awarded based on the conclusion that Negros Navigation and its captain were
grossly negligent.

ISSUE: Whether or not the Court of Appeals erred in deleting the award for exemplary damages for
petitioners.

RULING: Yes, the Court of Appeals committed a mistake by deleting the award for exemplary
damages for petitioners because the negligence of M/S Don Juan and its crew was sufficiently
established.

In requiring compliance with the standard which is in fact that of the highest possible degree of
diligence, from common carriers and in creating a presumption of negligence against them, the law
seeks to compel them to control their employees, to tame their reckless instincts and to force them to
take adequate care of human beings and their property. In this light, exemplary damages are
designed by our civil law to permit the courts to reshape behaviour that is socially deleterious in its
consequence by creating negative incentives or deterrents against such behaviour.

According to Article 2332 of the Civil Code, in contracts and quasi-contracts, the court may award
exemplary damages if the defendant acted in a wanton, fraudulent, reckless, oppressive or
malevolent manner.

The existence of gross negligence on the part of the private respondents were conclusively found not
only by the Minister of National Defense, which initially heard the case, but also by the trial and
appellate courts. The following facts support such finding:

1. M/S Don Juan's Master, Capt. Rogelio Santisteban, was playing mahjong before and up to
the time of collision. Moreover, after the collision, he failed to institute appropriate measures
to delay the sinking MS Don Juan and to supervise properly the execution of his order of
abandon ship. His officers, who detected the incoming oil tanker on radar, also failed to report
an imminent collision with M/T Tacloban City and prevent, by all necessary means, the fast
sinking of the ship.
2. The "Don Juan" was carrying more passengers than she had been certified as allowed to
carry. The Certificate of Inspection dated 27 August 1979, issued by the Philippine Coast
Guard Commander at Iloilo City, the Don Juan's home port, shows that 864 passengers were
permitted to board as against its capacity which is only at 810 passengers. It was permitted to
sail, however, the actual number of passengers was misdeclared, as it was really at 1,004.
3. M/S Don Juan was running twice as fast as M/T Tacloban at a top speed of 17 knots in
contrast with the latter’s top speed of 6.3 knots. The former likewise sailed so near the latter
in such a manner that would create the hazard or inevitability of collision. This happened
despite the early warnings of M/T Tacloban which blared its horns. M/S Don Juan, which sped
faster, did not heed the signal.

Thus, it was correct to hold Capt. Santisteban and Negros Navigation liable for gross negligence in
connection with the collision of the "Don Juan" and "Tacloban City" and the sinking of the "Don Juan"
leading to the death of hundreds of passengers. The company and its crew failed to exercise the
extraordinary diligence required of a common carrier in carrying passengers as required by law.

Following this conclusion, the Court of appeals erred in deleting the earlier exemplary damages
awarded by the trial court. Exemplary damages should be awarded to the plaintiffs.
4. Brinas vs. People of the Phils.
G.R. No. L-30309 | November 25, 1983 | GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:

FACTS:
In the afternoon of January 6, 1957, Juanito Gesmundo bought a train ticket at the railroad station in
Tagkawayan, Quezon for his 55-year old mother Martina and his 3-year old daughter Emelita, who
were bound for Barrio Lusacan, Tiaong. At about 2:00 p.m., Train No. 522 left Tagkawayan with the
Martina and Emelita among the passengers. At Hondagua the train’s complement were relieved, with
Victor Millan taking over as engineman, Clemente Briñas as conductor, and Hermogenes
Buencamino as assistant conductor. Upon approaching Barrio Lagalag in Tiaong at about 8:00 p.m. of
that same night, the train slowed down and the conductor shouted ‘Lusacan’, ‘Lusacan’. Thereupon,
the old woman walked towards the left front door facing the direction of Tiaong, carrying the child with
one hand and holding her baggage with the other. When Martina and Emelita were near the door, the
train suddenly picked up speed. As a result the old woman and the child stumbled and they were seen
no more. It took three minutes more before the train stopped at the next barrio, Lusacan, and the
victims were not among the passengers who disembarked thereat.

Next morning, the Tiaong police received a report that two corpses were found along the railroad
tracks at Barrio Lagalag. Repairing to the scene to investigate, they found the lifeless body of a
female child, sprawled to the ground with her belly down, the hand resting on the forehead, and with
the back portion of the head crushed. The investigators also found the corpse of an old woman about
2 feet away from the railroad tracks with the head and both legs severed and the left hand missing.
The head was located farther west between the rails. An arm was found midway from the body of the
child to the body of the old woman. Blood, pieces of scattered brain and pieces of clothes were at the
scene. Later, the bodies were identified as those of Martina and Emelita.

On January 7, 1957, the bodies of the deceased were autopsied by Dr. Pastor Huertas, the Municipal
Health Officer of Tiaong. Dr. Huertas testified on the cause of death of the victims was shock caused
by the running over by the wheel of the train and the impact of the head against a steel object.

The CFI of Quezon convicted Clemente Briñas for double homicide thru reckless imprudence but
acquitted Hermogenes Buencamino and Victor Millan. On appeal, the respondent Court of Appeals
affirmed the judgment of the lower court.

ISSUE:
Whether the conductor was negligent, hence, liable for the death of the deceased

RULING:
Yes. It is undisputed that the victims were on board the second coach where the petitioner-appellant
was assigned as conductor and that when the train slackened its speed and the conductor shouted
"Lusacan, Lusacan", they stood up and proceeded to the nearest exit. It is also undisputed that the
train unexpectedly resumed its regular speed and as a result "the old woman and the child stumbled
and they were seen no more."

In finding petitioner-appellant negligent, respondent Court of Appeals ruled that:

"The appellant’s announcement was premature and erroneous, for it took a full three minutes more
before the next barrio of Lusacan was reached. In making the erroneous and premature
announcement, appellant was negligent. He ought to have known that train passengers invariably
prepare to alight upon notice from the conductor that the destination was reached and that the train
was about to stop. Upon the facts, it was the appellant’s negligent act which led the victims to the
door. Said acts virtually exposed the victims to peril, for had not the appellant mistakenly made the
announcement, the victims would be safely ensconced in their seats when the train jerked while
picking up speed. Although it might be argued that the negligent act of the appellant was not the
immediate cause of, or the cause nearest in time to, the injury, for the train jerked before the victims
stumbled, yet in legal contemplation appellant’s negligent act was the proximate cause of the injury.
As this Court held in Tucker v. Milan, The proximate cause of the injury is not necessarily the
immediate cause of, or the cause nearest in time to, the injury. It is only when the causes are
independent of each other that the nearest is to be charged with the disaster. So long as there is a
natural, direct and continuous sequence between the negligent act the injury that it can reasonably be
said that but for the act the injury could not have occurred, such negligent act is the proximate cause
of the injury, and whoever is responsible therefore is liable for damages resulting therefrom. One who
negligently creates a dangerous condition cannot escape liability for the natural and probable
consequences thereof, although the act of a third person, or an act of God for which he is not
responsible intervenes to precipitate the loss."

It is a matter of common knowledge and experience about common carriers like trains and buses that
before reaching a station or flagstop they slow down and the conductor announces the name of the
place. It is also a matter of common experience that as the train or bus slackens its speed, some
passengers usually stand and proceed to the nearest exit, ready to disembark as the train or bus
comes to a full stop. This is especially true of a train because passengers feel that if the train resumes
its run before they are able to disembark, there is no way to stop it as a bus may be stopped.

It was negligence on the conductor’s part to announce the next flag stop when said stop was still a full
three minutes ahead. As the respondent Court of Appeals correctly observed, "the appellant’s
announcement was premature and erroneous."

That the announcement was premature and erroneous is shown by the fact that immediately after the
train slowed down, it unexpectedly accelerated to full speed. Petitioner-appellant failed to show any
reason why the train suddenly resumed its regular speed. The announcement was made while the
train was still in Barrio Lagalag.

The proximate cause of the death of the victims was the premature and erroneous announcement of
petitioner-appellant Briñas. This announcement prompted the two victims to stand and proceed to the
nearest exit. Without said announcement, the victims would have been safely seated in their
respective seats when the train jerked as it picked up speed. The connection between the premature
and erroneous announcement of petitioner-appellant and the deaths of the victims is direct and
natural, unbroken by any intervening efficient causes.

Petitioner-appellant also argues that it was negligence per se for Martina Bool to go to the door of the
coach while the train was still in motion and that it was this negligence that was the proximate cause
of their deaths. We agree with the respondent court that the negligence of petitioner-appellant in
prematurely and erroneously announcing the next flag stop was the proximate cause of the deaths of
Martina Bool and Emelita Gesmundo. Any negligence of the victims was at most contributory and
does not exculpate the accused from criminal liability.

WHEREFORE, the judgment appealed from is modified in that the award for death indemnity is
increased to P12,000.00 for the death of Martina Bool instead of P6,000.00 and P12,000.00 for the
death of Emelita Gesmundo instead of P3,000.00, but deleting the subsidiary imprisonment in case of
insolvency imposed by the lower court. The judgment is AFFIRMED in all other respects.
5. Batangas Laguna Tayabas Bus Company, Inc. vs. IAC
G.R. No. 74387-90, November 14, 1988

Doctrine:
1. Based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault
or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible for the payment
of the damages sought by the passenger.
2. Carrier has express obligation to transport passenger to their destination safely and
to observe extraordinary diligence
Facts:
1. In the afternoon of August 11, 1978, the collision between Bus No. 1046 of the Batangas
Laguna Tayabas Bus Company (BLTB, for brevity) driven by Armando Pon and Bus No. 404
of Superlines Transportation Company (Superlines, for brevity) driven by Ruben Dasco took
place at the highway traversing Barangay Isabong, Tayabas, Quezon.
2. It resulted in the death of Ancieto Rosales, Francisco Pamfilo and Neri.
3. The evidence shows that as BLTB Bus No. 1046 was negotiating the bend of the highway, it
tried to overtake a Ford Fiera car just as Bus No. 404 of Superlines was coming from the
opposite direction.
Case Proceeding
4. Nena Vda. de Rosales and Baylon Sales and the surviving heirs of the deceased Francisco
Pamfilo, Aniceto Rosales and Romeo Neri instituted separate cases in the Court of First
Instance of Marinduque against BLTB and Superlines together with their respective drivers
praying for damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses plus costs.
5. Criminal cases against the drivers of the two buses were fied in the Court of First Instance of
Quezon.
6. Defendants BLTB and Superlines, together with their drivers Pon and Dasco, denied liability
by claiming that they exercised due care and diligence and shifted the fault, against each
other. They all interposed counterclaims against the plaintiffs and crossclaims against each
other.
RTC Ruling:
The lower court exonerated defendants Superlines and its driver Dasco from liability and
attributed sole responsibility to defendants BLTB and its driver Pon, and ordered them jointly and
severally to pay damages to the plaintiffs.
CA: Affirmed

Petitioner: It is argued by petitioners that if the intention of private respondents were to file an action
based on culpa contractual or breach of contract of carriage, they could have done so by merely
impleading BLTB and its driver Pon. As it was in the trial court, private respondents filed an action
against all the defendants basing their action on culpa aquiliana or tort.

Issue: Whether or not the IAC erred in adjudging that the action of private respondents are based on
culpa contractual?

Ruling: The contention of the petitioner has no merit.

It is settled that the proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of three and injuries
to two of the passengers of BLTB was the sole negligence of the driver of the BLTB Bus, who
recklessly operated and drove said bus in a lane where overtaking is not allowed by Traffic Rules and
Regulations. Such negligence and recklessness is binding against petitioner BLTB, more so when
The SC considers the fact that in an action based on a contract of carriage, the court need not make
an express finding of fault or negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible for the
payment of the damages sought by the passenger.

By the contract of carriage, the carrier BLTB assumed the express obligation to transport the
passengers to their destination safely and to observe extraordinary diligence with a due regard for all
the circumstances, and any injury that might be suffered by its passengers is right away attributable to
the fault or negligence of the carrier (Art. 1756, New Civil Code).
Petitioners also contend that "a common carrier is not an absolute insurer against all risks of
travel and are not liable for acts or accidents which cannot be foreseen or inevitable and that
responsibility of a common carrier for the safety of its passenger prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755
of the New Civil Code is not susceptible of a precise and definite formulation.

The Supreme Court held that the contention held no water because they had totally failed to
point out any factual basis for their defense of force majeure in the light of the undisputed fact that the
cause of the collision was the sole negligence and recklessness of petitioner Armando Pon. For the
defense of force majeure or act of God to prosper the accident must be due to natural causes and
exclusively without human intervention.

WHEREFORE, premises considered, the appealed decision is hereby AFFIRMED.

6. Batangas Transportation Company vs. Caguimbal, et al
G.R. No. L-22985, January 24, 1968

FACTS:

There is no dispute at all that the deceased Pedro Caguimbal, Barrio Lieutenant of Barrio
Calansayan, San Jose, Batangas, was a paying passenger of BTCO bus, with plate TPU-507, going
south on its regular route from Calamba, Laguna, to Batangas, Batangas, driven by Tomas Perez, its
regular driver, at about 5:30 o'clock on the early morning of April 25, 1954. The deceased's
destination was his residence at Calansayan, San Jose, Batangas. The bus of the Biñan
Transportation Company, bearing plate TPU-820, driven by Marciano Ilagan, was coming from the
opposite direction (north-bound). Along the national highway at Barrio Daraza, Tanauan, Batangas,
on the date and hour above indicated, a horse-driven rig (calesa) managed by Benito Makahiya,
which was then ahead of the Biñan bus, was also coming from the opposite direction, meaning
proceeding towards the north. As to what transpired thereafter, the lower court chose to give more
credence to defendant Batangas Transportation Company's version which, in the words of the Court a
quo, is as follows: "As the BTCO bus was nearing a house, a passenger requested the conductor to
stop as he was going to alight, and when he heard the signal of the conductor, the driver Tomas
Perez slowed down his bus swerving it farther to the right in order to stop; at this juncture, a calesa,
then driven by Benito Makahiya was at a distance of several meters facing the BTCO bus coming
from the opposite direction; that at the same time the Biñan bus was about 100 meters away likewise
going northward and following the direction of the calesa; that upon seeing the Biñan bus the driver of
the BTCO bus dimmed his light as established by Magno Ilaw, the very conductor of the Biñan bus at
the time of the accident; that as the calesa and the BTCO bus were passing each other from the
opposite directions, the Biñan bus following the calesa swerved to its left in an attempt to pass
between the BTCO bus and the calesa; that without diminishing its speed of about seventy (70)
kilometers an hour, the Biñan bus passed through the space between the BTCO bus and the calesa
hitting first the left side of the BTCO bus with the left front corner of its body and then bumped and
struck the calesa which was completely wrecked; that the driver was seriously injured and the horse
was killed; that the second and all other posts supporting the top of the left side of the BTCO bus were
completely smashed and half of the back wall to the left was ripped open. (Exhibits 1 and 2). The
BTCO bus suffered damages for the repair of its damaged portion.

As a consequence of this occurrence, two (2) passengers of BTCO died, namely, Pedro Caguimbal
and Guillermo Tolentino, apart from others who were injured. The widow and children of Caguimbal
instituted the present action, which was tried jointly with a similar action of the Tolentinos, to recover
damages from the Batangas Transportation Company, hereinafter referred to as BTCO. The latter, in
turn, filed a third-party complaint against the Biñan Transportation Company — hereinafter referred to
as Biñan — and its driver, Marciano Ilagan. Subsequently, the Caguimbals amended their complaint,
to include therein, as defendants, said Biñan and Ilagan.

ISSUE:

WON BTCO has proven the exercise of extraordinary diligence on its part

HELD:

NO. BTCO has not proven the exercise of extraordinary diligence on its part. For this reason, the case
of Isaac vs. A. L. Ammen Trans. Co., Inc. 5 relied upon by BTCO, is not in point, for, in said case, the
public utility driver had done everything he could to avoid the accident, and could not have possibly
avoided it, for he "swerved the bus to the very extreme right of the road," which the driver, in the
present case, had failed to do.

We note that the recklessness of defendant was, manifestly, a major factor in the occurrence of the
accident which resulted, inter alia, in the death of Pedro Caguimbal. Indeed, as driver of the Biñan
bus, he overtook Benito Makahiya's horse-driven rig or calesa and passed between the same and the
BTCO bus despite the fact that the space available was not big enough therefor, in view of which the
Biñan bus hit the left side of the BTCO bus and then the calesa. This notwithstanding, the Court of
Appeals rendered judgment against the BTCO upon the ground that its driver, Tomas Perez, had
failed to exercise the "extraordinary diligence," required in Article 1733 of the new Civil Code, "in the
vigilance for the safety" of his passengers. 2

The record shows that, in order to permit one of them to disembark, Perez drove his BTCO bus partly
to the right shoulder of the road and partly on the asphalted portion thereof. Yet, he could have and
should have seen to it — had he exercised "extraordinary diligence" — that his bus was completely
outside the asphalted portion of the road, and fully within the shoulder thereof, the width of which
being more than sufficient to accommodate the bus. He could have and should have done this,
because, when the aforementioned passenger expressed his wish to alight from the bus, Ilagan had
seen the aforementioned "calesa", driven by Makahiya, a few meters away, coming from the opposite
direction, with the Biñan bus about 100 meters behind the rig cruising at a good speed. 3 When Perez
slowed down his BTCO bus to permit said passenger to disembark, he must have known,
therefore, that the Biñan bus would overtake the calesa at about the time when the latter and
BTCO bus would probably be on the same line, on opposite sides of the asphalted portions of
the road, and that the space between the BTCO bus and the "calesa" would not be enough to
allow the Biñan bus to go through. It is true that the driver of the Biñan bus should have slowed
down or stopped, and, hence, was reckless in not doing so; but, he had no especial obligations
toward the passengers of the BTCO unlike Perez whose duty was to exercise "utmost" or
"extraordinary" diligence for their safety. Perez was thus under obligation to avoid a situation which
would be hazardous for his passengers, and, make their safety dependent upon the diligence of the
Biñan driver. Such obligation becomes more patent when we considered the fact — of which the
Court may take judicial cognizance — that our motor vehicle drivers, particularly those of public
service utilities, have not distinguished themselves for their concern over the safety, the comfort or the
convenience of others.

We, however, believe otherwise, for: (1) the accident in question took place on April 25, 1954, and the
Caguimbals have been constrained to litigate for over thirteen (13) years to vindicate their rights; and
(2) it is high time to impress effectively upon public utility operators the nature and extent of their
responsibility in respect of the safety of their passengers and their duty to exercise greater care in the
selection of drivers and conductor and in supervising the performance of their duties, in accordance,
not only with Article 1733 of the Civil Code of the Philippines, but, also, with Articles 1755 and 1756
thereof 6 and the spirit of these provisions, as disclosed by the letter thereof, and elucidated by the
Commission that drafted the same.
7. Mallari vs. CA
G.R. No. 128607 January 31, 2000
BELLOSILLO, J.:

FACTS:

At about 5:00 o'clock in the morning, the passenger jeepney driven by petitioner Alfredo Mallari Jr.
and owned by his co-petitioner Alfredo Mallari Sr. collided with the delivery van of respondent Bulletin
Publishing Corp. (BULLETIN, for brevity). The sketch of the accident showed that the collision
occurred after Mallari Jr. overtook the blue Ford Fiera while negotiating a curve in the highway. The
impact caused the jeepney to turn around and fall on its left side resulting in injuries to its passengers
one of whom was Israel Reyes who eventually died due to the gravity of his injuries.

Claudia G. Reyes, the widow of Israel M. Reyes, filed a complaint for damages against Alfredo Mallari
Sr. and Alfredo Mallari Jr., and also against BULLETIN, its driver Felix Angeles, and the N.V.
Netherlands Insurance Company. The complaint alleged that the collision which resulted in the death
of Israel Reyes was caused by the fault and negligence of both drivers of the passenger jeepney and
the Bulletin Isuzu delivery van.

ISSUE:

What was the proximate cause of the accident?

RULING:

Based on the sketch and spot report of the police authorities, the collision occurred immediately after
petitioner Mallari Jr. overtook a vehicle in front of it while traversing a curve on the highway. This act
of overtaking was in clear violation of Sec. 41, pars. (a) and (b), of RA 4136 as amended, otherwise
known as The Land Transportation and Traffic Code which provides:

Sec. 41. Restrictions on overtaking and passing. — (a) The driver of a vehicle shall not drive
to the left side of the center line of a highway in overtaking or passing another vehicle
proceeding in the same direction, unless such left side is clearly visible and is free of
oncoming traffic for a sufficient distance ahead to permit such overtaking or passing to be
made in safety.

(b) The driver of a vehicle shall not overtake or pass another vehicle proceeding in the same
direction when approaching the crest of a grade, nor upon a curve in the highway, where the
driver's view along the highway is obstructed within a distance of five hundred feet ahead
except on a highway having two or more lanes for movement of traffic in one direction where
the driver of a vehicle may overtake or pass another vehicle: Provided That on a highway,
within a business or residential district, having two or more lanes for movement of traffic in
one direction, the driver of a vehicle may overtake or pass another vehicle on the right.

The rule is settled that a driver abandoning his proper lane for the purpose of overtaking another
vehicle in an ordinary situation has the duty to see to it that the road is clear and not to proceed if he
cannot do so in safety. When a motor vehicle is approaching or rounding a curve, there is special
necessity for keeping to the right side of the road and the driver does not have the right to drive on the
left hand side if a car approaching from the opposite direction comes into view.

Petitioner Mallari Jr. already saw that the BULLETIN delivery van was coming from the opposite
direction but mindlessly occupied the left lane and overtook two (2) vehicles in front of it at a curve in
the highway. Clearly, the proximate cause of the collision resulting in the death of Israel Reyes, was
the sole negligence of the driver of the passenger jeepney, who recklessly operated and drove his
jeepney in a lane where overtaking was not allowed by traffic rules. Under Art. 2185 of the Civil Code,
unless there is proof to the contrary, it is presumed that a person driving a motor vehicle has been
negligent if at the time of the mishap he was violating a traffic regulation. Petitioners failed to present
satisfactory evidence to overcome this legal presumption.
The negligence and recklessness of the driver of the passenger jeepney is binding against petitioner
Mallari Sr., who admittedly was the owner of the passenger jeepney engaged as a common carrier. In
an action based on contract of carriage, the court need not make an express finding of fault or
negligence on the part of the carrier in order to hold it responsible for the payment of damages sought
by the passenger.

Under Art. 1755 of the Civil Code, a common carrier is bound to carry the passengers safely as far as
human care and foresight can provide using the utmost diligence of very cautious persons with due
regard for all the circumstances. Moreover, under Art. 1756 of the Civil Code, in case of death or
injuries to passengers, a common carrier is presumed to have been at fault or to have acted
negligently, unless it proves that it observed extraordinary diligence. Further, pursuant to Art. 1759 of
the same Code, it is liable for the death of or injuries to passengers through the negligence or willful
acts of the former's employees. This liability of the common carrier does not cease upon proof that it
exercised all the diligence of a good father of a family in the selection of its employees.
8. Nocum vs. Laguna Tayabas Bus Company
G.R. No. L-23733, October 31, 1969

DOCTRINE: Article 1733 of the Civil Code reasonably qualifies the extraordinary diligence required of
common carriers for the safety of the passengers transported by them to be "according to all the
circumstances of each case." In fact Article 1755 repeats this same qualification.

FACTS:
Appellee, Herminio L. Nocum, who was a passenger in appellant's Bus No. 120 then making a trip
within the barrio of Dita, Municipality of Bay, Laguna, was injured as a consequence of the explosion
of firecrackers, contained in a box, loaded in said bus and declared to its conductor as containing
clothes and miscellaneous items by a co-passenger.

The bus conductor, Sancho Mendoza, testified that the box belonged to a passenger whose name he
does not know and who told him that it contained miscellaneous items and clothes. He helped the
owner in loading the baggage which weighed about twelve (12) kilos and because of company
regulation, he charged him for it twenty-five centavos (P0.25). From its appearance there was no
indication at all that the contents were explosives or firecrackers. Neither did he open the box
because he just relied on the word of the owner.

Dispatcher Nicolas Cornista of defendant company added that they were not authorized to open the
baggages of passengers because instruction from the management was to call the police if there
were packages containing articles which were against regulations.

ISSUE: WON the Laguna Tayabas Bus Co. exercised extraordinary diligence in this case.

RULING: YES. Article 1733 reasonably qualifies the extraordinary diligence required of common
carriers for the safety of the passengers transported by them to be "according to all the circumstances
of each case." "In fact, Article 1755 repeats this same qualification: "A common carrier is bound to
carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances."

In this particular case before Us, it must be considered, that while it is true the passengers of
appellant's bus should not be made to suffer for something over which they had no control, fairness
demands that in measuring a common carrier's duty towards its passengers, allowance must be given
to the reliance that should be reposed on the sense of responsibility of all the passengers in regard to
their common safety. It is to be presumed that a passenger will not take with him anything dangerous
to the lives and limbs of his co-passengers, not to speak of his own. Not to be lightly considered be
the right to privacy to which each passenger is entitled. He cannot be subjected to any unusual
search, when he protests the innocuousness of his baggage and nothing appears to indicate the
contrary, as in the case at bar. In other words, inquiry may be verbally made as to the nature of a
passenger's baggage when such is not outwardly perceptible, but beyond this, constitutional
boundaries are already in danger of being transgressed. Calling a policeman to his aid, as suggested
by the service manual invoked by the trial judge, in compelling the passenger to submit to more rigid
inspection, after the passenger had already declared that the box contained mere clothes and other
miscellaneous, could not have justified invasion of a constitutionally protected domain. What must be
importantly considered here is not so much the infringement of the fundamental sacred rights of the
particular passenger herein involved, but the constant threat any contrary ruling would pose on the
right of privacy of all passengers of all common carriers, considering how easily the duty to inspect
can be made an excuse for mischief and abuse.
#9 PAL v. CA
G.R. No. L-82619 | September 15, 1993
Extraordinary diligence in carriage by air

DOCTRINE: The relation of carrier and passenger continues until the latter has been landed at the
port of destination and has left the carrier's premises.

FACTS:
On 25 November 1976, private respondent filed a complaint for damages for breach of
contract of carriage against Philippine Airlines, Inc. (PAL) before the Court of First Instance of
Misamis Occidental at Ozamiz City. According to him, on 2 August 1976, he was among the twenty-
one (21) passengers of PAL Flight 477 that took off from Cebu bound for Ozamiz City. The routing of
this flight was Cebu-Ozamiz-Cotabato. While on flight and just about fifteen (15) minutes before
landing at Ozamiz City, the pilot received a radio message that the airport was closed due to heavy
rains and inclement weather and that he should proceed to Cotabato City instead. Upon arrival at
Cotabato City, the PAL Station Agent informed the passengers of their options to return to Cebu on
flight 560 of the same day and thence to Ozamiz City on 4 August 1975, or take the next flight to
Cebu the following day, or remain at Cotabato and take the next available flight to Ozamiz City on 5
August 1975. The Station Agent likewise informed them that Flight 560 bound for Manila would make
a stop-over at Cebu to bring some of the diverted passengers; that there were only six (6) seats
available as there were already confirmed passengers for Manila; and, that the basis for priority would
be the check-in sequence at Cebu. Private respondent chose to return to Cebu but was not
accommodated because he checked-in as passenger No. 9 on Flight 477. He insisted on being given
priority over the confirmed passengers in the accommodation, but the Station Agent refused private
respondent's demand explaining that the latter's predicament was not due to PAL's own doing but to
be a force majeure. Private respondent even tried to stop the departure of Flight 560 for his
belongings were still on board but his plea fell on deaf ears. He was left at the airport and could not
even hitch a ride in the Ford Fiera loaded with PAL personnel. PAL neither provided transportation
from the airport to the city proper nor food and accommodation for his stay in Cotabato City. For its
part, PAL denied the allegations and said that there was simply no more seat for private respondent
on Flight 560 since there were only six (6) seats available and the priority of accommodation was
based on the check-in sequence. The CFI ruled in favor of the plaintiff and ordered PAL to pay actual,
moral, and exemplary damages. On appeal, the CA affirmed the CFI judgment hence, the present
petition.

ISSUE: Whether or not PAL is liable for breach of contract.

HELD:
Yes. Undisputably, PAL's diversion of its flight due to inclement weather was a fortuitous
event. Nonetheless, such occurrence did not terminate PAL's contract with its passengers. Being in
the business of air carriage and the sole one to operate in the country, PAL is deemed equipped to
deal with situations as in the case at bar. The ruling of the Supreme Court in one case again must be
stressed, that is, the relation of carrier and passenger continues until the latter has been landed at the
port of destination and has left the carrier's premises. Hence, PAL necessarily would still have to
exercise extraordinary diligence in safeguarding the comfort, convenience and safety of its stranded
passengers until they have reached their final destination. On this score, PAL grossly failed
considering the then ongoing battle between government forces and Muslim rebels in Cotabato City
and the fact that the private respondent was a stranger to the place. As the appellate court correctly
ruled, since PAL knew that Ozamis City had no all-weather airport and had to cancel flights in the
event of inclement weather, it becomes the duty of defendant to provide all means of comfort and
convenience to its passengers when they would have to be left in a strange place in case of such by-
passing. The steps taken by the defendant airline company towards this end has not been put in
evidence, especially for those 7 others who were not accommodated in the return trip to Cebu, only 6
of the 21 having been so accommodated. It appears that the plaintiff had to leave on the next flight 2
days later. If the cause of non-fulfillment of the contract is due to a fortuitous event, it has to be the
sole and only cause (Art. 1755 CC., Art. 1733 C.C.)

However, while the Court found that PAL failed to exercise its duty of extending utmost care
to private respondent, there was no sufficient basis to conclude that PAL failed to inform the private
respondent of his non-accommodation on Flight 560, or that it was inattentive to his queries. If indeed
PAL omitted to give information about the options available to its diverted passengers, it would have
been deluged with complaints since there were other passengers who were stranded. Further, private
respondent's insistence on being given priority in accommodation was unreasonable considering the
fortuitous event and that there was a sequence to be observed in the booking. With regard to the
contention that PAL employees were disrespectful and inattentive toward private respondent, the
records were bereft of evidence to support the same because private respondent was attended to not
only by the personnel of PAL but also by its Manager.

WHEREFORE the decision appealed from is AFFIRMED with modification however that the award
of moral damages of Fifty Thousand Pesos (P50,000.00) is reduced to Ten Thousand Pesos
(P10,000.00) while the exemplary damages of Ten Thousand Pesos (P10,000.00) is also reduced to
Five Thousand Pesos (P5,000.00). The award of actual damages in the amount Five Thousand
Pesos (P5,000.00) representing business losses occasioned by private respondent's being stranded
in Cotabato City is deleted. SO ORDERED.
10. Vda. De Abeto vs. PAL
G.R. No. L-28692, July 30, 1982

FACTS:
About 5:30 in the afternoon of November 23, 1960, Judge Quirico Abeto, with the necessary
tickets, boarded the PAL’s PI-C133 plane at Iloilo City bound to Manila. The plane did not reach its
destination and the plane went missing. After 3 weeks, it was ascertained that the plane crashed at
Mt. Baco, Province of Mindoro. All the passengers, including Judge Abeto was killed instantly and all
their remains were scattered all over the area.
The personal belongings of Judge Abeto which were lost amounted to P300.00 and the burial
expenses was P1,700.00. When defendant-appellant would not hear demands for settlement of
damages, the plaintiff-appellees (Conrada Vda. de Abeto and children of the deceased) were
compelled to hire counsel for the institution and prosecution of the case.
According to the defendant, the plane crash at Mt. Bco was beyond the control of the pilot and
at the time of the crash, the plane was airworthy for the purpose of conveying passengers as shown
by a certification issued by the Civil Aeronautics Administration (CAA) According to them, there were
no negligence or malfeasance on the part of the pilot but it was due to a navigational error. Also, the
deviation of the plane from its prescribed route was due to bad weather conditions between Mt. Baco
and Romblon and strong winds caused the plane to drift to Mt. Baco. They argued that it was due to a
fortuitous event, therefore, could not be held liable under the provisions of Art. 1174 of the New Civil
Code.
Thereafter, the trial court ruled that the defendant is liable for the said event as it was proved
that there was negligence on the defendant’s pilot when it disobeyed the prescribed route of Amber 1
by the CAA in Violation of Standard Regulation. Second, it failed to perform a pre-flight test on the
plane before it took off from Mandurriao Airport to Manila in order to find out the possible defect of the
plane. Third, it allowed a student Officer on training in the said flight. Lastly, the pilot failed to report
his position over or abeam Romblon which is compulsory reporting point. According to the trial court,
these facts lead to the conclusion that the defendant did not exercise extraordinary diligence or
prudence as required by the law. According to the evidence of the defendant as shown by the Sectio
Chief of Actuarial Department of the Insular Life Insurance Company, the late Judge Abeto at the age
of 79 would still live or have a life expectancy of 4.75 years.
Hence, the appeal by the defendant. According to the defendant, it exercised extraordinary
diligence and that the trial court failed to recognize the fact that it acted in good faith and exerted
efforts to minimize damage.

ISSUE:
Whether or not the defendant (PAL) is liable for violation of its contract of carriage.

RULING:
Yes. PAL is liable for the violation of its contract of carriage. The provisions of the Civil Code
on the question of liability are clear and explicit. Article 1733 binds common carriers, "from the nature
of their business and by reasons of public policy,... to observe extraordinary diligence in the
vigilance... for the safety of the passengers transported by them according to all the circumstances of
each case." Article 1755 establishes the standard of care required of a common carrier, which is, "to
carry the passengers safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost
diligence of very cautious persons, with due regard for all the circumstances." Article 1756 fixes the
burden of proof by providing that "in case of death of or injuries to passengers, common carriers are
presumed to have been at fault or to have acted negligently, unless they prove that they observed
extraordinary diligence as prescribed in Articles 1733 and 1755." Lastly, Article 1757 states that "the
responsibility of a common carrier for the safety of passengers... cannot be dispensed with or
lessened by stipulation, by the posting of notices, by statements on tickets, or otherwise."
The prescribed airway of plane PI-C133 that afternoon of November 23, 1960, with Capt. de
Mesa, as the pilot, was Iloilo-Romblon-Manila, denominated as airway "Amber I," and the prescribed
elevation of the flight was 6,000 ft. The fact is, the plane did not take the designated route because it
was some 30 miles to the west when it crashed at Mt. Baco. According to defendant's witness,
Ramon A. Pedroza, Administrative Assistant of the Philippine Air Lines, Inc., this tragic crash would
have not happened had the pilot continued on the route indicated.
It is clear that the pilot did not follow the designated route for his flight between Romblon and
Manila. The weather was clear and he was supposed to cross airway "Amber I" over Romblon;
instead, he made a straight flight to Manila in violation of any traffic rules. At any rate, in the absence
of a satisfactory explanation by appellant as to how the accident occurred, the presumption is, it is at
fault.

The judgment of the court a quo is modified in the sense that the defendant is hereby ordered
to pay the said amount to the plaintiffs, with legal interest thereon from the finality of this judgment.
With costs against defendant-appellant.
11. Japan Airlines vs. Michael Asuncion et al
G.R. No. 161730, January 28, 2005

DOCTRINE:
Under Article 1755 of the Civil Code, a common carrier such as JAL is bound to carry its passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with due regard for all the circumstances.

FACTS:
Respondents Michael and Jeanette Asuncion left Manila on board Japan Airlines' (JAL) Flight 742
bound for Los Angeles. Their itinerary included a stop-over in Narita and an overnight stay at Hotel
Nikko Narita. Upon arrival at Narita, Mrs. Noriko Etou-Higuchi of JAL endorsed their applications for
shore pass and directed them to the Japanese immigration official. A shore pass is required of a
foreigner aboard a vessel or aircraft who desires to stay in the neighborhood of the port of call for not
more than 72 hours. The Japanese immigration official noted that Michael appeared shorter than his
height as indicated in his passport. Because of this inconsistency, respondents were denied shore
pass entries and were brought instead to the Narita Airport Rest House where they were billeted
overnight. The immigration official also handed Mrs. Higuchi a Notice where it was stated that
respondents were to be "watched so as not to escape". Mr. Atsushi Takemoto of the International
Service Center (ISC) brought respondents to the Narita Airport Rest House where they stayed
overnight until their departure the following day for Los Angeles. Respondents were charged
US$400.00 each for their accommodation, security service and meals. Respondents filed a complaint
for damages claiming that JAL did not fully apprise them of their travel requirements and that they
were rudely and forcibly detained at Narita Airport. JAL denied the allegations of respondents. It
maintained that the refusal of the Japanese immigration authorities to issue shore passes to
respondents is an act of state which JAL cannot interfere with or prevail upon. Consequently, it cannot
impose upon the immigration authorities that respondents be billeted at Hotel Nikko instead of the
airport resthouse.

The trial court rendered judgment in favor of respondents ordering defendant JAL to pay respondents.
The Court of Appeals affirmed in toto the decision of the trial court. Its motion for reconsideration
having been denied, JAL now files the instant petition.

ISSUE:
WON JAL is guilty of breach of contract.–NO

HELD:
Under Article 1755 of the Civil Code, a common carrier such as JAL is bound to carry its passengers
safely as far as human care and foresight can provide, using the utmost diligence of very cautious
persons, with due regard for all the circumstances. When an airline issues a ticket to a passenger,
confirmed for a particular flight on a certain date, a contract of carriage arises. The passenger has
every right to expect that he be transported on that flight and on that date and it becomes the carrier's
obligation to carry him and his luggage safely to the agreed destination. If the passenger is not so
transported or if in the process of transporting he dies or is injured, the carrier may be held liable for a
breach of contract of carriage.

JAL did not breach its contract of carriage with respondents. It may be true that JAL has the duty to
inspect whether its passengers have the necessary travel documents, however, such duty
does not extend to checking the veracity of every entry in these documents. JAL could not
vouch for the authenticity of a passport and the correctness of the entries therein. The power to
admit or not an alien into the country is a sovereign act which cannot be interfered with even by
JAL. This is not within the ambit of the contract of carriage entered into by JAL and herein
respondents. As such, JAL should not be faulted for the denial of respondents' shore pass
applications. Prior to their departure, respondents were aware that upon arrival in Narita, they must
secure shore pass entries for their overnight stay. Respondents' mother, Mrs. Imelda Asuncion,
insisted though that Ms. Linda Villavicencio of JAL assured her that her children would be granted the
passes.

Respondents claimed that petitioner breached its contract of carriage when it failed to explain to the
immigration authorities that they had overnight vouchers at the Hotel Nikko Narita. They imputed that
JAL did not exhaust all means to prevent the denial of their shore pass entry applications. To
reiterate, JAL or any of its representatives have no authority to interfere with or influence the
immigration authorities. The most that could be expected of JAL is to endorse respondents'
applications, which Mrs. Higuchi did immediately upon their arrival in Narita. Mrs. Higuchi did all she
could to assist the respondents. Upon being notified of the denial of respondents' applications, Mrs.
Higuchi immediately made reservations for respondents at the Narita Airport Rest House which is
really more a hotel than a detention house as claimed by respondents.

There being no breach of contract nor proof that JAL acted in wanton, fraudulent or malevolent
manner, there is no basis for the award of any form of damages. Neither should JAL be held liable
to reimburse respondents the amount of US$800.00. It has been sufficiently proven that the amount
pertained to ISC, an agency separate and distinct from JAL, in payment for the accommodations
provided to respondents. The payments did not in any manner accrue to the benefit of JAL.

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the instant petition is PARTLY GRANTED. The October 9,
2002 decision of the Court of Appeals and its January 12, 2004 resolution in CA-G.R. CV No. 57440,
are REVERSED and SET ASIDE insofar as the finding of breach on the part of petitioner and the
award of damages, attorney's fees and costs of the suit in favor of respondents is concerned.
Accordingly, there being no breach of contract on the part of petitioner, the award of actual, moral and
exemplary damages, as well as attorney's fees and costs of the suit in favor of respondents Michael
and Jeanette Asuncion, is DELETED for lack of basis. However, the dismissal for lack of merit of
petitioner's counterclaim for litigation expenses, exemplary damages and attorney's fees, is
SUSTAINED. No pronouncement as to costs.

SO ORDERED.