ILLIBERAL PROPAGANDA:

POLITICAL DISCOURSE, MONOPOLIES OF

KNOWLEDGE, AND GOVERNMENTALITY IN ORBAN’S
HUNGARY

By Daniel Berg

Submitted to Central European University

School of Public Policy

In partial fulfillment of the requirements for the degree of Masters

of Public Policy
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Media and Communication Concentration

Supervisor: Agnes Batory

Budapest, Hungary

2017
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Declaration

I, the undersigned Daniel Berg, hereby declare that I am the sole author of this thesis.

To the best of my knowledge this thesis contains no material previously published by any
other person except where due acknowledgement has been made.

This thesis contains no material, which has been accepted as part of the requirements of
any other academic degree or non-degree program, in English or in any other language.

This is a true copy of the thesis, including final revisions.

Date: June 10th, 2017

Name: Daniel Berg

Signature: DANIEL BERG

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Acknowledgments

My thanks and gratitude to my supervisor, Agnes Batory, and to Miklós Haraszti, András

Bozóki, and the staff of the Center for Media, Data and Society for their aid in my

research and writing. I dedicate this work to my mother, Klara, in recognition of her love

and support.
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Abstract

Propaganda is a ubiquitous theme in modern politics. This thesis presents a case study of

the propaganda techniques used by Hungary’s ruling party, Fidesz, with an aim of

exploring a proposed model of propaganda, illiberal propaganda. The nature of

propaganda and illiberal democracies is discussed, as though propaganda is present in

virtually all political systems, its use is constrained by regime type and political

actualities on the ground. Drawing on critical and Marxist theory, the author argues that

the Governmentality of illiberal regimes focuses on building a monopoly on knowledge

not only in the political sphere, but also across society, in a concentrated effort to shape

citizens’ governability and manufacture consent for policies through epistemic control.

The case study of illiberal propaganda in Hungary argues that this technique is predicated

on three conceptual pillars: reactionism, nationalism and populism. A review of

Hungary’s epistemic landscape is provided, along with an analysis five examples of

Fidesz propaganda. The Kötcse speech of 2009, the national consultation of 2011, the

Yearly Evaluation of 2012, the “illiberal democracy” speech of 2014, and the poster

campaigns of 2015 to 2017 are analyzed using insights from discourse analysis and

Jowett and O’Donnell’s 10-step division of propaganda analysis.

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“When one with honeyed words but evil mind

Persuades the mob, great woes befall the state.”

― Euripides, Orestes

"The whole aim of practical politics is to keep the populace alarmed (and hence

clamorous to be led to safety) by menacing it with an endless series of hobgoblins, all of

them imaginary."

― H. L. Mencken
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TABLE OF CONTENTS
Abstract
Acknowledgments
INTRODUCTION
Context
Research Questions and Methodology
Thesis Structure and Relevance
PART 1: LITERATURE REVIEW
1.1. Propaganda Defined
1.2. Illiberal Democracy Defined
1.3. Epistemic Control, Monopolies of Knowledge, and Governmentality
PART 2: A CASE STUDY OF FIDESZ PROPAGANDA
2.1. Hungary’s Epistemic Landscape
2.2. The Three Pillars of Fidesz Propaganda
2.3. Text I: Kötcse Speech (2009)
2.4. Text II: National Consultation on the New Constitution (2011)
2.5. Text III: Yearly Evaluation speech (2012)
2.6. Text IV: “Illiberal Democracy” speech (2014)
2.7. Text V: Poster Campaigns (2015-2017)
2.8. Propaganda Analysis
CONCLUSIONS
LIST OF REFERENCES
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INTRODUCTION

Context

Propaganda is a ubiquitous theme in modern politics. The 20th century was in

many ways its golden age, as the advent of mass communication, the spread of education

and literacy, and the permeation of political conflict through all layers of society

established propaganda as a potent political tool. In the early part of the century,

nationalist movements and both sides of belligerents in the Great War used propaganda to

rally support for their respective causes. Propaganda was also deployed to devastating

effect by the totalitarian regimes of the mid-century, manipulating entire populations to

make unprecedented sacrifices and commit horrendous atrocities in the name of Fascism

and Stalinism. Subsequently, the Cold War also saw the use of propaganda by both of the

superpowers in a concentrated effort to win more hearts and minds than their opponent.

At the dawn of the 21st century, the terror attacks of September 11th and the

resulting conflicts in the Middle East were also framed through the use of propaganda by

the Bush administration and Islamic fundamentalists alike. Near the end of the second

decade of the century, propaganda still has a prominent place in politics. In the US, the

results of the 2016 presidential election were tainted by the prevalence of “fake news”
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and suspected foreign intervention. The use of sophisticated propaganda and

disinformation tactics was also suspected in several European elections in early 2017,

notably in the Netherlands, Austria and France. Further, democratic and authoritarian

governments alike continue to use propaganda, albeit with varying intensity and by

different means, to consolidate support or maintain their hold on power. While the age of

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all-encompassing mass ideologies has passed, the emergence of the networked society

offers new and subtle tools for propagandists, supplemented by a century of experience.

The extensive history of propaganda and recent developments combined ensure the

subject’s continued prominence in the field of political communication studies, and

further technological advances in mass communication will likely continue to do so for

the foreseeable future.

Thesis Structure and Relevance

The following thesis presents a case study of the propaganda techniques used by

Hungary’s ruling party, Fidesz, with an aim of exploring a proposed model of

propaganda, illiberal propaganda. The thesis opens with a review of some of the

definitions of propaganda as developed in the propaganda studies literature, and with

particular regard to issues surrounding the normative and epistemological dimensions of

propaganda. Second, the nature of illiberal democracies is discussed, as while propaganda

is present in virtually all political systems, its use is constrained by regime type and

political actualities on the ground. The author explores the dichotomy between liberal and

illiberal democracies, the distinctions between illiberal, authoritarian and totalitarian

regimes, and the political communication favored by illiberal governments. Finally, the

review of relevant literature concludes with a discussion of some applicable insights from
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critical theory. The work of Gramsci, Althusser, and Foucault are used to conceptualize

how illiberal regimes exert epistemic control. Borrowing a term from Innis, the author

argues that these regimes work to construct a monopoly on knowledge not only in the

political sphere, but also across society, in a concentrated effort to shape their citizens’

governability and manufacture consent for their policies through epistemic control.

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The second half of the thesis features an analysis of selected examples of Fidesz

propaganda from 2009 to 2017, opening with an overview of the three pillars of illiberal

propaganda and Hungary’s epistemic landscape. The author argues that Fidesz developed

and continues to mobilize an intricate and highly effective propaganda machine,

predicated on reactionary nationalist populism. Further, the thesis aims to demonstrate

the ways in which Fidesz is working to establish an effective monopoly on knowledge in

Hungary through exerting control over the media and other political, scientific, cultural

and educational institutions. The distinctive nature and relative complexity of the

Hungarian language means that as a case, it is underrepresented in English academic

literature, particularly with regards to discourse analysis and other text-driven methods.

Nevertheless, the author maintains that the model of illiberal propaganda proposed could

be applied, with slight modification, to the activities of similar regimes in Belarus,

Russia, Turkey, or Poland, as well as further afield.

Research Question and Methodology

The central point of inquiry is how illiberal governments shape the governability

of their citizens and manufacture consent for their policies through a mixture of

traditional propaganda techniques, modern political communication tools, and the

exercise of a monopoly on knowledge. In the specific case of Hungary, the thesis focuses
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on how Viktor Orbán’s regime communicates its identity through the use of propaganda,

the types of narratives commonly employed by Fidesz, and the strategic and epistemic

purposes of the party’s propaganda efforts. Five examples of Fidesz propaganda are

analyzed to demonstrate the central ideological elements underpinning the Fidesz

propaganda machine. The texts are first evaluated individually, applying insights from

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discourse analysis to demonstrate how they use the rhetoric of reactionism, nationalism,

and populism. They are then analyzed in aggregate according to Jowett and O’Donnell’s

10-step plan of propaganda analysis, reproduced below.

10 Divisions for Propaganda Analysis

1. The ideology and purpose of the propaganda campaign

2. The context in which the propaganda occurs

3. Identification of the propagandist

4. The structure of the propaganda organization

5. The target audience

6. Media utilization techniques

7. Special techniques to maximize effect

8. Audience reaction to various techniques

9. Counterpropaganda, if present

10. Effects and Evaluation

(Jowett and O’Donnell 2006, 270).

PART 1: LITERATURE REVIEW

1.1. Propaganda Defined

Propaganda is a common subject of study in the field of political communication, yet

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the concept is vast, and many varying definitions appear in the literature. This is

complicated by the many subtypes of propaganda, as well as changing perceptions

through history and depending on national context. The term is also often saddled with

negative implications. For many, the mere mention of propaganda immediately brings to

mind lies, fabrications, and untruths, or dystopian visions of vast machineries dedicated

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to churning out disinformation and manipulating the masses into abject compliance.

While this is a commonly held stereotype, political communication need not be

monolithic or even patently false to qualify as propaganda. In reality, propaganda is

designed like many other political communication campaigns, though successful

propaganda requires creativity, an intimate knowledge of the appropriate techniques, and

a finger on the pulse of the society it targets. Definitions of propaganda can be divided

into negative, neutral, and positive, an the same texts can be described as one or the other

by applying a different standard for what qualifies as propaganda. It is thus advisable to

outline a definitional framework and delimit the concept before proceeding further.

As an initial point of departure, one can begin with the neutral definition of Jowett

and O’Donnell, which approaches propaganda as a distinct form of communication, and

more specifically as a “subcategory of persuasion” (Jowett and O’Donnell 7). In this

light, propaganda is “the deliberate, systematic attempt to shape perceptions, manipulate

cognitions, and direct behavior to achieve a response that furthers the desired intent of the

propagandist” (Ibid.). The first criterion for propaganda mentioned is that it must be

deliberate and systematic, which implies that it cannot happen by accident, but always by

design, and that it is conducted according to some overarching rationale. Second, the goal

of propaganda is not only to influence how the public perceives an issue, but also to
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fundamentally alter cognitive processes. The ultimate aim is to provoke a specific

response or change in behavior. Lastly, there is the criterion that the invoked response

unfolds in line with the propagandist’s intent, which implies a desired, predetermined

trajectory and end goal. In sum, propaganda always has a clear purpose and process, and

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it alters not only how the recipient of its messages sees that world, but also how they

interact with it.

The description of propaganda as a subcategory of persuasion is also of interest.

According to the Jowett/O’Donnell purpose model of propaganda, persuasion is a

response-shaping, response-reinforcing, response-changing communication process. Its

purpose is “to promote [the] mutual fulfillment of needs” of the sender and receiver. The

purpose of information, on the other hand, is to “share ideas, explain and instruct,” with

the primary goal of “to promote mutual understanding”. In this model, propaganda is

situated between information and persuasion, and is designed to “control information

flow, manage public opinion, and manipulate behavior patterns.” Ultimately, its aim is to

promote the objectives of the sender, but not necessarily in the best interest of the

receiver. (Jowett and O’Donnell 29).

Jowett and O’Donnell refer to several particular forms of propaganda, categorized

by function. The three main forms are white, gray and black propaganda. These three

forms are distinguished by “an acknowledgment of source and its accuracy of

information” (Jowett and O’Donnell 16). White propaganda is “presented in a manner

that attempts to convince the audience that the sender is the ‘good guy’ with the best

ideas and political ideology” (Ibid.). Public information campaigns, nation branding, and
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stump speeches are often white propaganda. Black propaganda refers to “when a source

is concealed or credited to a false authority and spreads lies, fabrications, and deceptions”

(Jowett and O’Donnell 17). Examples include the propaganda methods and messages

perfected by totalitarian regimes such as the Third Reich, and the disinformation

campaigns favored by the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Gray propaganda is the

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median of the two, when “the source may or may not be correctly identified, and the

accuracy of the information is uncertain” (Jowett and O’Donnell 20). Gray propaganda is

the hardest to pin down. It often hews closer to either white or black propaganda. A

prominent example from the Cold War is the work of Radio Free Europe, which

broadcast anti-communist messages beyond the Iron Curtain. Ostensibly a private

enterprise, it was actually funded by the US government (Turner 2007, 11).

The Jowett and O’Donnell definition is clear about the process of propaganda and

its constituent elements, as well as its place in communication theory. However, it leaves

aside – albeit by design – the normative and epistemic elements of propaganda for the

sake of clarity. These two elements are of considerable importance when analyzing

propaganda as a political phenomenon. Shaping perceptions and manipulating cognitions

could also generally describe education or advertising, while the desired intent of the

propagandist is by itself inadequate to argue that propaganda is harmful, unethical, or

damaging to rational thought or the quality of a democracy.

Trying to arrive at a comprehensive definition of propaganda that accounts for its

ethical dimensions, the philosopher Randal Marlin proposes:

Propaganda = (def.) The organized attempt through communication to affect belief

or action or inculcate attitudes in a large audience in ways that circumvent or
suppress an individual’s adequately informed, rational, reflective judgment.
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(Marlin 2013, 12)

Like Jowett and O’Donnell, Marlin focuses on propaganda as a directed, systematic

set of appeals carefully presented to sway the opinions of not just one individual, but

entire masses. An important addition is the second part, which highlights the way

propaganda circumvents and suppresses informed, rational, and reflective judgment. This

aspect of highlights how propaganda not only channels individuals’ existing cognitive

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processes and shapes them to a desired end, but also works to alter their core values so

they fall in line with the aims of the propagandist. This leads to fundamental shifts in

behavior and attitudes, leading to decisions based on exogenous influence as opposed to

rational choice, clearly troubling from the perspective of individual autonomy and

personal freedom.

Marlin acknowledges the debt he owes to two of his predecessors, George Orwell

and Jacques Ellul. The former is known for his well-deserved place in modern English

literature. Orwell wrote in detail about the manipulation of language and its dangers in

his essay, “Politics and the English Language”, along with other similar works. The latter

was an early and prominent pioneer of propaganda studies. Ellul’s magisterial work,

Propaganda: The Formation of Men's Attitudes, is still a foundational text of the field

five decades later. Any informed discussion of propaganda would be incomplete without

reference to the duo.

Orwell helped establish propaganda as a subject of interest in the popular

consciousness, through his essays on language and politics, and with the publication of

his iconic novel, 1984. A main takeaway of the author’s work on language is that due to

sloppy, inexact usage, willful negligence and change over time, language no longer

conveys the ideas it purports to represent. This observation holds particular relevance in
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an age of social media and Twitter politics. 1984 is a vivid and disturbing portrait of a

society completely beholden to propaganda, a thinly veiled lampooning of Soviet Russia.

In his essay, “Politics and the English Language", Orwell is particularly critical of

political writing, which in his view is generally of poor quality, overly reliant on

mechanistic repetition and vague, stilted metaphors. This is significant in the context of

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propaganda because as Orwell observes, “if thought corrupts language, language can also

corrupt thought” (Orwell 1968, 127-40). In his view, political writers and their ilk use a

whole lot of fancy, evocative words while saying nothing of value, leading to an overall

deterioration of public discourse and the death of rational debate. Irresponsible use or

deliberate manipulate of language is a threat to liberal democratic society precisely

because it erodes citizens’ ability to think critically. This line of reasoning is taken to its

natural – if hyperbolic – conclusion in 1984. The totalitarian one-state government in the

novel has completely colonized language and openly uses speech as a mechanism of

control. In this society, words are weapons, lies are truth, peace is war, and any who

disagree with the limited vocabulary of permitted usage set out by the government’s

Newspeak commits a thoughtcrime. 1984 is fiction, but it highlights many of the

potentially troubling associations between language – specifically, its misuse and

manipulation – and thought, issues prominent in a discussion of the ethical and epistemic

aspects propaganda.

Jacques Ellul describes propaganda as decidedly modern technique, governed by

scientific considerations and insights and rules drawn from social science disciplines like

psychology and sociology (Ellul 1973, 4). He argues that propaganda is analytical,

statistical, and precisely tuned to achieve the maximum effect possible, which makes it
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all the more dangerous. The difference between modern and classical propaganda lies,

according to Ellul, in both purpose and process:

The aim of modern propaganda is no longer to modify ideas, but to provoke

action. It is no longer to change adherence to a doctrine, but to make the
individual cling irrationally to a process of action. It is no longer to lead to a
choice, but to loosen the reflexes. It is no longer to transform an opinion, but to
arouse an active and mythical belief. (Ibid. 25)

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In terms of external characteristics, propaganda addresses the masses, of which the

individual is only ever be a component part. It must also be totalizing, in that it must

control all available mediums and account for each medium’s strengths and weaknesses;

it must be continuous, dominating the entirety of the information sphere and doing so

over an extended period; and finally, it must be organized, both in delivery and design

(Ellul 6-33). In regards to internal characteristics, to be effective it must be cognizant of

the psychological terrain of a given society; it must account for fundamental currents

trends; it must be phrased and contrived as to be timely; and it tends to perform better

when avoiding outright falsehoods (Ibid. 33-57).

Ellul also distinguishes between four paired categories of propaganda: political

and sociological propaganda, the propaganda of agitation and integration, vertical and

horizontal propaganda, and rational and irrational propaganda.

The main focus of the present discussion, political propaganda, “involves

techniques of influence employed by a government, a party, an administration, a pressure

group, with a view to changing the behavior of the public” (Ibid. 62). Sociological

propaganda is a more nebulous concept; less rooted in political organizations and more in

the general culture of a society. It can be reflected in arts and entertainment, religion,

literature, advertising, and the general zeitgeist. Sociological propaganda is not deliberate
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but self-reinforcing and spontaneous, though political propagandists will often turn the

language of sociological propaganda to service their own deliberate designs.

Agitative propaganda is “subversive propaganda…led by a party seeking to

destroy the government or the established order,” favored by revolutionaries and

governments that wish to “galvanize energies to mobilize the entire nation for war” or

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inspire support for some other drastic or radical action (Ibid. 72). According to Ellul, this

type of propaganda requires massive exertions and sacrifice from the population, and is

thus unsustainable in the long term. He groups the propaganda of Mao, Lenin and Hitler

into this category, and argues it is most useful in manipulating the lower classes and the

uneducated. Integrative propaganda, on the other hand, is described as the

propaganda of conformity… [a] self-reproducing propaganda that seeks to obtain

stable behavior, to adapt the individual to his everyday life, to reshape his
thoughts and behavior in terms of the permanent social setting. (Ibid. 75)

Ellul associates integrative propaganda with the modern period along with Western

civilization. He notes that it is more effective when targeted at better-educated segments

of society. His most prominent examples of integrative propaganda are the techniques

applied in the Soviet Union after Lenin’s death and the consolidation of the ‘30s, as well

as the propaganda used by the United States during the Cold War, which put patriotism

and the ideal of freedom above national origin, political affinity, or creed. Ellul further

notes that revolutionary and radical movements that form governments will have to

slowly transition from agitative to integrative propaganda, a difficult and drawn-out

process (Ibid. 78).

Vertical and horizontal propaganda refers to the origin of the propaganda. As the

names imply, the former is a top-down process, useful for proponents of agitative
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propaganda, while the latter is propagated by a group or societal unit which is ostensibly

equal in status and power, and particularly useful for integration propaganda (Ibid. 81).

Vertical propaganda is most effective when applied by a charismatic leader figure, while

horizontal propaganda is predicated on social cohesion and peer-group connections.

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The last pair of categories in Ellul’s typology is irrational and rational

propaganda, which touches directly on the epistemic dimensions of propaganda. The

common perception of propaganda is of irrational propaganda, characterized by logical

fallacies, appeals to pathos over ethos, and deliberate misrepresentations of the truth.

Rational propaganda is more subtle, and is characterized by the use of statistics, facts,

figures and other seemingly valid evidence, but carefully curated and presented to reflect

the propagandists’ purpose.

There are many other existing definitions of propaganda in the literature, but

between the work of Jowett and O’Donnell, Marlin and Ellul, the pertinent dimensions of

the neutral and negative definitions are well represented. The views of the author align

most closely with Cunningham’s normatively charged position on propaganda:

Because of propaganda's systematic mistreatment of truth and information and

their procedural safeguards, its virtually imperceptible erosion of individual
capability and social freedom, and its unnerving magnitude…it is simply myopic
to regard [it] as an ethically neutral state of affairs. (Cunningham 2002,205)

As mentioned above, there are also positive definitions of propaganda, such as

the ones advanced by early public relations professionals like Bernays and Lee, as well as

Harold Laswell, who took a distinctly utilitarian view of propaganda. A detailed look at

these is omitted here because they are somewhat anachronistic, in many cases predating
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the Second World War, and also because their focus is more on advertising, public

relations and public opinion than political propaganda. Similarly, Noam Chomsky’s work

on propaganda is not discussed, as it is a mainly a critique of the contemporary media

environment of the United States.

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In its most insidious form, propaganda deploys sophisticated techniques with

messages that offer compelling narratives and comprehensive worldviews, eroding

citizens’ ability to think and judge rationally. When put into the service of political goals,

it is a highly potent tool for generating consent and even enthusiasm for particular

policies. Yet propaganda is socially constructed and embedded in specific cultural and

political contexts, so when discussing specific cases, it is critical to account for these

variances. In the following section, the author explores the concept of illiberal

democracy, with the aim of highlighting the identifying characteristic of these regimes

and the effects they have on political discourse.

1.2. Illiberal Democracy Defined

Much has been written lately of the apparent crisis of liberal democracy. In

academic, policymaking, and diplomatic circles alike, the heady optimism that

accompanied the third wave of democratization has been supplanted by a creeping

existential dread over the uncertain future of Western liberal democracy. The increasing

prevalence of a number of so-called “illiberal democracies” is a significant contributing

factor to this unease. But what exactly is an illiberal democracy? Where is the line

between liberal and illiberal democracy, and between illiberal democracy and

authoritarianism? And finally, in terms of political communication, what are the

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distinguishing qualities of these regimes?

In democratization literature, regime types are traditionally divided into three

categories: democratic, authoritarian and totalitarian. Yet as Linz and Stepan remarked,

“the existing tripartite regime classification has not only become less useful to democratic

theorists and practitioners…it has also become and obstacle” (Linz and Stepan 1996, 39).

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The question then arises of how to define regimes which are not full autocracies or

totalitarian states, but do not qualify as full democracies, or at best can only be called

defective democracies?

Since the end of the Cold War, scholars have worked diligently to broaden traditional

regime typologies so as to account for different degrees of democracy and

authoritarianism. This endeavor has led to the proliferation of a number of terms for

regimes that occupy the “gray area” between these two poles, collectively called

“democracy-with-adjectives” or “autocracy-with-adjectives” (Altundal 2016).

Some notable examples are illiberal democracy (Zakaria 1997), empty or low-

intensity democracy (Diamond 1999), hollow democracy (Gagon 2013), hybrid regime

(Diamond 2002), dictablanda and democradura (Karl 1995), and electoral or competitive

authoritarianism (Levitsky and Way 2009). In the following discussion, the author will use

illiberal democracy, for two reasons.

First, while similar in many regards, other related terms have different contextual

elements based on the particular case in question. For instance, Diamond uses competitive

authoritarianism in describing several Latin American countries, but unlike their Western

counterparts, it is arguable if these were ever full democracies, or if they simply

transitioned from hardline authoritarian regimes to ones with the trappings of democratic
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systems. Second, the central focus of the thesis is the case of Hungary. Prime Minister

Viktor Orban has personally described his governing vision as an illiberal democracy,

provoking outrage from leaders of other European states. For those focused on political

discourse, language is key. The main theme of the present inquiry is how Fidesz

constructs its image through the use of propaganda. With this in mind, it seems

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appropriate to take Orban at his word and categorize Hungary as an example of an illiberal

democracy. But what exactly is an illiberal democracy?

The dominant paradigm of postmodern Western politics is liberal democracy.

After the collapse of the USSR seemed to signal the “end of history” (Fukuyama 1989),

this system of governance seemed to many the last and best model of government. Yet

despite the optimism that accompanied third wave democratization, the often-bitter

experience of the next decades showed that these democratic transitions were at times

unsustainable in the long-term, prone as they were to democratic backsliding, or even

more troublingly, reversible, leading to the rise of a variety of defective democracies, one

of which is illiberal democracies. Fareed Zakaria used this term prominently in a much-

discussed essay published soon after the end of the Cold War. At the outset, he the

highlights the two component parts of liberal democracy: democratic decision-making as

represented by competitive, fair, open elections; and constitutional liberalism, meaning

the protection of individual rights and freedoms within a rule of law framework (Zakaria

1997).

Illiberal democracies are regimes that retain some elements of the former (though

often in a diminished or defective capacity), while rejecting or repressing the values

associated with the latter. Illiberal democracies will hold elections, often as regularly as
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liberal democracies, but while these elections may be procedurally sound -- meaning no

outright election rigging, coercion of voters or similar abuses – they will often favor the

ruling party over potential challengers. Similarly, while these regimes may pay lip service

to the rights of their citizens, they will often infringe on these rights or even hold them in

complete disregard. Zakaria argues that this is problematic because “democracy without

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constitutional liberalism [produces] centralized regimes, the erosion of liberty, ethnic

competition, conflict, and war” (Ibid.). Further, the values often associated with modern

conceptions of liberalism, such as an emphasis on pluralism and acceptance or a

dedication to social justice, are also viewed with distaste or rejected outright by illiberal

regimes.

It is important to distinguish illiberal democracies from authoritarian and

totalitarian regimes as much as from full democracies. Following Linz’s typology,

totalitarian regimes are characterized by “an ideology, a single mass party…and

concentrated power in an individual and his collaborators or a small group that is not

accountable to any large constituency and cannot be dislodged from power by

institutionalized, peaceful means” (Linz 2000, 67). Authoritarian regimes, on the other

hand, are defined as

political systems with [limited] political pluralism, without elaborate and guiding
ideology, but with distinctive mentalities, without extensive or intensive political
mobilization…and at which a leader or occasionally a small group exercises
power within formally ill-defined limits, but actually quite predictable ones.
(Ibid.159)

In illiberal democracies, there is always at least the surface appearance of political

pluralism, with regular, multiparty elections, some form of representative legislative body

that meets regularly, an ostensibly independent judiciary, and other democratic

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institutions. Despite the existence of these institutions, they are often beholden to state

interests, controlled by elites loyal to the governing party, or insufficiently autonomous to

act as true checks and balances on power. This aligns with a recent definition which

characterizes illiberal democracies as regimes where “civil and political rights are not

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guaranteed, [and] although they exist de jure, constitutional principles do not de facto

work properly or have less effect on the government” (Altundal 2016, 10).

Altundal follows Merkel’s concept of embedded democracy, which measures

democracy across five dimensions: electoral regime, political liberties, civil rights,

horizontal accountability, and effective power to govern (Merkel 2004, 37). Civil rights

are a damaged or missing attribute in illiberal democracies, and political rights are also

often defective in these regimes (Altundal 2016, 12). According to Merkel, the former is

comprised of the rule of law, or “the principle that the state is bound to uphold its laws

effectively and to act according to clearly defined prerogatives”, and constitutional rights,

which “protect the individual against the state executive and against acts of the legislator

that infringe on an individual’s freedom” (Merkel 2004, 39). Negative freedoms that

enshrine the rights of life, liberty and property, individual autonomy, and an impartial,

rational state are core tenets of classical liberalism, so it is not surprising that these areas

of political life are most threatened in illiberal democracies.

A clear delineation of the concept of illiberal democracy allows an examination of

how these regimes utilize political communication to cement their authority and

perpetuate their power. While totalitarian and authoritarian regimes exercise rigid control

over mediums of communication, illiberal regimes do so in less overt ways, primarily

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through regulation of content, consolidation of control and pressure applied via state-

friendly oligarchs and obsequious editors (Hague and Harrop 2007, 139). Charismatic

leaders in illiberal regimes can exploit the appearance of a pluralist media to target

content at their supporters and launch attacks on their rivals with impunity, while

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avoiding claims of censorship or manipulation. Simon describes such leaders as

“democratators”, and outlines their preferred method of media control:

Deprived of an ideological basis for state control, [the democratators] have

adapted to a new global reality. Instead of relying on brute force and direct
control, they use stealth, manipulations, and subterfuge [to] hide their policies
behind a democratic façade [and] manage critical expression through diverse
measures such as national security prosecutions, punitive tax audits, manipulation
of government advertising, and seemingly reasonable [content restrictions].
(Simon 2015, 27)

Democratators come in all stripes and situate themselves across the entire political

spectrum (from extreme right to extreme left) according to personal preference, but their

methods are remarkably consistent. Their main interest is to maintain the illusion of

democracy while using underhanded political communication techniques to advance their

agenda, consolidate their support base, enrapture their supporters, and discredit the

opposition. Since they control the legislative mechanism of the state and eschew violence

and outright repression, their actions have the veneer of legality. Regular elections ensure

that they can also claim legitimacy and a democratic mandate, despite the fact that these

elections are often heavily weighed in their favor through the strategic deployment of

propaganda and debilitating restrictions on their opponents’ access to media.

Democratators preserve their media dominance through placing major television

channels, newspapers, and radio stations in the hands of stromans and sympathizers, and
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pump public funds into these ventures through government advertising. The only medium

democratators have yet to sufficiently conquer is the Internet, but they are quickly

adapting with the use of fake news, disinformation, and the employment of a veritable

army of paid content producers, known in netspeak as “trolls”.

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Political life in an illiberal democracy takes place on a carefully constructed stage

set, mimicking the appearance of a true democracy but devoid of the substance.

Democratators play the role of the director. The actors on the stage, the citizens, seem to

move and act freely, but in truth they have no real agency: their options are limited by

predetermined factors. Most everything they see and hear is constrained by the director’s

choices, realized through the work of crony media and propagandists, who act as stage

managers. The play itself may be improvisatory in nature, and some parts are given

greater leeway to improvise to keep up appearances, but those who step too far out of

character are quickly whisked off the stage, and often their fellow players are none the

wiser.

The preceding overview of the technique of propaganda and the nature of illiberal

democracies allows for a more nuanced discussion of how propaganda is applied in such

regimes. Before turning to a practical case study of illiberal propaganda, however, some

relevant insights from Western Marxism and critical theory are touched on, with the aim

of fleshing out the concepts of epistemic control and monopolies of knowledge,

foundational elements of illiberal propaganda.

1.3. Epistemic Control, Governmentality and Monopolies of Knowledge

Of the commonly applied frameworks of political philosophy, Marxism and Marxist-

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inspired perspectives lend themselves best to the analysis of the social and cultural

dimensions of politics. While Marx himself focused primarily on the economic aspects of

political life, his successors in academia, particularly Western and Neo-Marxists, laid the

groundwork for a rich body of work that examines the intricate relationships between

knowledge, ideology, culture and power. The writings of Antonio Gramsci and Louis

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Althusser on hegemony and ideological state apparatuses, along with the theories of

Michel Foucault on power-knowledge, discourse and Governmentality, have much to

offer students of propaganda. They are of particular interest for those who wish to

examine how propaganda forms knowledge and channels communication to perpetuate

and preserve power relations in a given society.

Antonio Gramsci dealt extensively with the concept of hegemony in his essays

written while imprisoned by Mussolini’s Fascists. In classic Marxist theory, the

superstructure refers to the political, social and cultural factors of human society, which

serve to perpetuate the economic conditions that make up the base, composed of the

means and relations of production (Marx 1977). Gramsci expanded on Marx, in what he

called “the philosophy of praxis”, by dividing the superstructure further into two levels,

political society and civil society (Gramsci 1971, 12). The former is the traditional

domain of state power: the military, police, judiciary, and similar institutions. The latter

symbolizes how the elite exercises power throughout a given society based on the

“consent given by the great masses of the population to the general direction imposed on

social life by the [dominant group]” (Ibid.).

This concept of cultural hegemony articulates the tangible power of thoughts and

words in the political sphere. For Gramsci, the pen may not be mightier than the sword in
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all instances, but it is just as necessary. The stability of power structures is expressly

dependent on the viability of the ideas championed by the elite, and how well these ideas

are conveyed to the masses. Gramsci’s work also touches on a concept that would be

developed further by Foucault, the significance of discourse as a mechanism of control,

as he argued,

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a hegemonic class held state power…through its ability to [have] successfully
articulated or expressed in a coherent, unified fashion the most essential elements in
the ideological discourses of the subordinate classes in civil society (Ramos 1982).

Althusser would further expand on Gramsci’s idea of cultural hegemony. Like his

predecessor, Althusser makes a distinction between what he terms the (Repressive) State

Apparatus, which includes all aspects and organs of government, and Ideological State

Apparatuses, which include private institutions like the media, schools, family, political

parties, literature, the arts, and so forth. While the former operates primarily through

violence, the latter operates primarily through ideology (Althusser 1970, 146).

Ideological State Apparatuses are key to epistemic control, because they are the methods

by which the state propagates and perpetuates its ideology. The (Repressive) State

Apparatus serves as the enforcement arm of the state, but it is only one half of the power

dynamic in political society. According to Althusser, “no class can hold State power over

a long period of time without at the same time exercising its hegemony over and in the

State Ideological Apparatuses” (Ibid.) Divorced from the Marxist preoccupation with

class struggle, the implication remains that the elites in a society must assert themselves

both in the private and public sphere, and control or at least influence public discourse if

they hope to maintain their power in the long term. The best tool for this is propaganda, a

technique of epistemic control geared to consciously constructing discourse in a given

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society.

Michel Foucault revolutionized the way social scientist examined discourse and the

power of discursive formations. Foucault wrote about a wide range of subjects, but the

exploration of the dynamics of power in society was central to most of his work. While

he did not define himself as a Marxist, and tended to reject such labels, including the one

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he was branded with most often, that of “post-structuralist”. The most pertinent aspects of

the Foucaldian oevuer to the study of propaganda are his thoughts on the relationship

between power and knowledge and the related concept of Governmentality.

Foucault saw power not as a rigid, top-down structure. Instead, he argued that power

relations permeated all aspects of society, and that the production of power is essentially

a discursive process. In the Foucauldian worldview, power is linked directly to truth and

knowledge. Power is channeled and reinforced through “regimes of truth” and through

disciplinary processes, which transforms individuals into subjects:

Each society has its regime of truth, its “general politics” of truth: that is, the types of
discourse which it accepts and makes function as true; the mechanisms and instances
which enable one to distinguish true and false statements, the means by which each is
sanctioned; the techniques and procedures accorded value in the acquisition of truth;
the status of those who are charged with saying what counts as true (Foucault 1984,
73).

Following Foucault, propaganda can be conceived as a technique of epistemic

control. Power and knowledge are two sides of the same coin, a realization that lies at the

heart of propaganda. Propaganda shapes discourse, setting boundaries for what can and

cannot be said, and accordingly, what can and cannot be conceived in a given discursive

setting. The skilled propagandist acknowledges, as Foucault did, that power is socially

constructed and constituted through discourse.

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Those who wish to sway the masses must not only shape what they think, but how

they think. Propaganda is a technique predicated on promoting the state’s preferred

regimes of truth at the expense of all others. It is not enough to convince the masses that

Jews are parasites, for instance, or that the Five Year Plan is working. To be effective,

propaganda must remove the option of any alternative so completely; embed the

government’s regime of truth so fully, control discourse so holistically, that its subjects

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never think to question it premises. The thoughts that perhaps Jews are just like everyone

else, or that there was ever any doubt about the success of the Five Year Plan, are simply

not viable in this discursive setting.

By dominating and shaping discourse through propaganda, governments promote

one canonical version of the truth: an official, state-sanctioned regime of truth. It does not

matter if its claims made are objectively, rationally true or not. If the propagandist is

effective, the discursive power of propaganda conditions the subject to accept fully its

claims, and reject any that are antithetical. In this sense, propaganda is a technique of

rationalization, which touches on another Foucaldian concept, that of Governmentality.

Foucault never gave a concise definition of Governmentality, but described it as “the

conduct of conduct” and “governmental rationality”, meaning

a way or system of thinking about the nature of the practice of government (who can
govern; what governing is; what or who is governed), capable of making some form
of that activity thinkable and practicable both to its practitioners and to those upon
whom it was practiced. (Gordon 1991, 2).

Governmentality is the rationalization of the processes of government, and propaganda is

a technique through which this rationale is encoded, transmitted, and conveyed to its

subjects, the citizens. This goes beyond the formal procedure of government (how leaders

are elected, laws are passed, decisions are made, and so forth), to the core reasoning
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behind the processes. Through propaganda, the state can frame its policies into a

discursive formation, which justifies and perpetuates its power in the social and political

sphere. While Gramsci explored the nature of cultural hegemony and Althusser described

Ideological State Apparatuses as the tools for achieving and maintaining this hegemony,

Foucault expanded these concepts through the linkage of power and knowledge. In the

Foucauldian sense, power is diffuse through all of society, and while the state and other

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actors that wield power do use coercion and repression, a large part of their hold on

power is discursive in nature. Discourse establishes and reifies power, and by suffusing

all layers of social life, it turns subjects into unwitting but willing partners in their own

subjectification.

Having discussed the significance of linkages between power, knowledge, and

truth through the lens of Marxist and critical theory, the question arises of how to

temporally influence and control such abstract domains. One possible approach is

developing the concept of a monopoly on knowledge put forward by the Canadian

communication theorist Harold Innis.

Innis does not supply a specific definition of the term, but broadly speaking, it is

an application of the economic concept of a monopoly to the field of knowledge, which

includes the disciplines of literature, media, and science, as well as data and statistics

(Heyer 2003, 76). In a sweeping overview of communication through history, Innis

attributes the success of the great empires of Antiquity to their ability to exercise a

monopoly on knowledge, which he linked to the development of writing, a prerequisite

for developing such monopolies. He argued that the

“[manipulative power] of mechanized mass communication…had so debased our

intellectual and civic culture that freedom and democracy were in danger of
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becoming illusions useful for little more than upholding commercial and political

elites” (Noble 1999, 35).

When considering the political discourse of illiberal regimes, Innis’ warning

seems eerily prescient. In a liberal democratic society, knowledge is produced freely and

disseminated by a number of institutions; those Althusser termed the Ideological State

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Apparatuses. Illiberal regimes crave consensus and control, so free inquiry and critical

debate is anathema to their stability. The deliberate, systematic use of propaganda and the

centralization of discursive power are favored methods of these regimes for ensuring

epistemic control.

Illiberal regimes aim to construct a monopoly of knowledge so they can control

the process of knowledge production and dissemination, tapping into the inherent power

potential of discourse. Gramsci would have seen this as a manifestation of cultural

hegemony, while Foucault would have recognized epistemic control and the development

of monopolies on knowledge as key components of illiberal Governmentality. While

Foucault was a frequent critic of Western liberal democracy, he would have likely

recognized the dangerous implications of subordinating all knowledge-producing

institutions to the service of one overarching discourse designed to serve state interests.

Having established a conceptual framework for propaganda and illiberal

democracy based on the relevant literature, and supplemented with insights from critical

theory, the author now turns to an analysis of a practical case, that of Hungary, which

touches on these issues.

PART 2: A CASE STUDY OF FIDESZ PROPAGANDA

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2.1. Hungary’s Epistemic Landscape

In many ways the archetypical illiberal state, Orbán Viktor’s Hungary serves as

an apt demonstration of propaganda in illiberal democracies, and of how these regimes

use epistemic control to build monopolies of knowledge and cement their power through

discourse. Hungary’s government has drawn censure from a wide range of international

observers due to a perceived trend of democratic backsliding, and the role propaganda

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plays in this particular dynamic is of special interest. While the proposed model of

illiberal propaganda is not unique to Hungary, the country has been a bellwether of the

wave of populist illiberalism that has washed over the West in recent years, making it an

inviting subject for propaganda analysts. Before turning to the five texts selected to

represent a cross section of Hungarian state propaganda, a brief overview of Hungary’s

epistemic landscape is required. The state of Hungarian media is first examined to

demonstrate the attempts by Fidesz to establish a monopoly of knowledge, before turning

to three ideological pillars that underpin the party’s discourse.

After the 2010 national election, Fidesz moved quickly to consolidate its control

over the media sphere. One of its first acts was to overhaul media regulations “in such a

way as to cement for the long haul the dominance of the current ruling parties in the

public domain” (Mérték 2015, 5). The most significant change to media law was the

establishment of a media control body, which has the power to impose significant fines

on any media organs that do not toe the party line under the banner of “offenses to public

morality” (Human Rights Watch 2011).

In the six years since, the governing party and businesspeople with party

affiliations have purchased newspapers, television channels, and radio stations, ensuring

that most of the airwaves and print media is dominated by Fidesz. While the process is
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certainly opaque, a recent investigative report, which describes the government’s

propaganda effort as “political heavy-weaponry”, estimates that the party and its allies

have spent “tens of billions of forints” on building its national media empire (Rényi

2017). Freedom House has tracked the gradual decline of the freedom of press in

Hungary since 2010. In six years, the country’s free press ranking has shifted from “Free”

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to “Partly Free”. Currently, Freedom House ranks Hungary 44 out of 100 in press

freedom, with 0 signifying most free and 100 signifying least free. The scores for press

freedom, legal environment, political environment, and economic environment have all

deteriorated accordingly. Freedom House country reports for Hungary between 2010 and

2017 express concern about the politically motivated closure of newspapers, the

calculated takeover of media by pro-government owners, the controversial reform of

freedom of information laws, a difficult financial environment for independent media,

and an atmosphere of censorship and self-censorship in public broadcasting (Freedom

House 2010-2017).

In October 2016, for instance, the center-left newspaper Népszabadság, which

was often critical of Fidesz, was closed, purportedly for economic reasons. The

newspaper’s staff alleged government pressure on the paper (BBC 2016). The

government rejected the claims of political interference. Nevertheless, shortly after the

closure, Lőrinc Mészáros, a longtime associate of Orbán, purchased Mediaworks, the

company that had published the paper. The company’s portfolio has now been

reconfigured to focus on publishing local papers all over Hungary, which are a useful

channel for communicating with rural voters in smaller towns and villages. Additionally,

the government formed the Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office in 2015, which coordinates
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its propaganda messages under the direction of Antal Rogán. Another key figure in

developing messaging is Árpad Habony, a Fidesz consultant with no official position.

Fidesz has also made moves to dominate discourse and silence critical voices in

other epistemic domains. In the field of education, the government rewrote the

humanities curriculum for primary and secondary education, and nationalized the

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textbook publishing industry, proceeding to publish history textbooks with a pro-

government bias and narratives skewed to paint the party in a “flattering light” (Deutsche

Welle 2016). In the spring of 2017, it also passed legislation that was widely perceived as

a political attack on Central European University, an American higher education

institution disliked by Orban for its associations with Hungarian-American financier

George Soros and for its promotion of values associated with open society. Soon after the

CEU law, the parliament also passed a law restricting the operation of civil society

groups, requiring those that received funding from abroad to identify themselves on their

webpages and in their communication as foreign-funded. The party has also colonized

intellectual life, supporting and promoting the work of a select group of supportive

cultural institutions, and a collection of “court intellectuals” such as the historian Mária

Schmidt and Zsolt Bayer.

Having established a near-monopoly on knowledge in Hungary, Fidesz is able to

exert considerable epistemic control over a large portion of the population. The well-

oiled propaganda machinery designed by the party allows it to dominate virtually all

public discourse, control the flow of information. This stranglehold is used to generate

consent for its policies and mobilize its voters, as well as to attack its opponents and

critics. The Fidesz communication strategy and messaging is founded on three

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interconnected pillars -- reactionism, nationalism, and populism -- which are outlined in

the following section.

2.2. The Three Pillars of Illiberal Propaganda

The last seven years in power has given Fidesz plenty of opportunity to fine-tune

its propaganda efforts. These messages are centered on the three related conceptual

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pillars of reactionism, nationalism, and populism, which are consistent themes in Fidesz

communication.

Reactionism is a hardline revisionist strain of conservatism, with an emphasis on

returning to a rose-colored, mythical vision of the past. Reactionism is not “not simply a

conservative preference for things as they are…but a passionate loathing of the status quo

and a desire to return to the past in one emotionally cathartic revolt” (Sullivan 2017). The

reactionary decries the decadence of modern times and the tide of progress, and wishes to

return to what they describe as a simpler, purer, golden age. Reactionary movements have

risen as a response to many of the conflicts and vicissitudes of European history,

including the Protestant Reformation, the French Revolution, and during the interwar

period. Today, reactionism is encapsulated in the process of Brexit, in the rhetoric of

right-wing populist like Marine Le Pen and Geert Wilders, and the evocation of the

imperial past in Russia and Turkey.

Orbán’s particular brand of reactionism rejects both the occupation of Hungary by

Nazi Germany and the Soviet Union alike, as well as what he perceives as the failed

regime change of the 1990s. Its template for Hungary’s golden age is the post-WWI

Kingdom of Hungary when a soft-authoritarian, Christian nationalist government ruled

the county under Regent Miklós Horthy. The Hungarian Fundamental Law specifically
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states that the government traces the continuity of its democracy and constitutional order

to before the occupation, and does not recognize the period between 1944 and 1990 as

part of Hungarian history. Another passage expresses the need for Hungary’s spiritual

renewal and the vow to “make Hungary great again,” all classic calling cards of

reactionary rhetoric (Fundamental Law 2011).

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The law is rife with nationalist and Christian imagery, and accordingly,

nationalism is the second pillar of illiberal propaganda. Benedict Andersen described the

nation as an imagined community, and one of the goals of illiberal propaganda is to

imagine and promote a cohesive national identity. By using nationalist symbols and

appeals to patriotism, illiberal propaganda promotes a conservative and majoritarian

brand of nationalism. The nationalist prizes tradition and heritage, and illiberal

propaganda use a distinct “blood and soil” rhetoric, mounting a fierce defense of national

sovereignty and autonomous self-determination. This is reflected in Orbán’s positioning

of Hungary as a Christian nation with a glorious thousand year history, his crusade

against the aloof technocrats of Brussels, and such political posturing as granting

citizenship to ethnic Hungarians living in Romania, Slovakia, Ukraine and other areas

that belonged to Hungary before its territory was significantly reduced under the Treaty

of Trianon after the First World War.

The final conceptual pillar of illiberal propaganda is populism, and populists often

drawn on reactionary and nationalist political philosophy to fuel their messages. The core

concepts of populism are the distinctions between “the people, the elite, and the general

will” (Mudde 2017). Populist leaders position themselves as champions of the common

people and representatives of their will against their enemies, the malignant elite. As the
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voice of the amorphous “people”, they embody and speak with the authority of a mandate

drawn on the general will. Mudde remarks that European populists often combine

populism with “two other ideologies: authoritarianism and nativism,” which are

conceptually related to the pillars of reactionism and nativism. Since populists

characterize themselves as protecting the people against harmful foreign influence and

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the depredations of elites, they conceive of the nation as a homogenous mass. In this

Manichean conception of society, there is only the body of the people, as represented by

the populist leader, and their enemies, the elite, who are in turn aided by traitorous,

foreign-hearted aliens and discontents. Illiberal regimes the world over apply the rhetoric

of populism to legitimize their actions under the banner of popular sovereignty and

advance a unitary vision of society.

Having outlined the three pillars of illiberal propaganda, the author now turns to

five Hungarian examples, with the aim of demonstrating these elements at work. The five

texts are first discussed individually based on the discipline of discourse analysis, and

then in aggregate following Jowett and O’Donnell’s 10-step plan for propaganda

analysis.

2.3. Text I: The Kötcse Speech, 2009

The speech given by Viktor Orbán before the 2010 elections to a group of

supporters at Kötcse is in many ways a verbal expression of his political manifesto.

Entitled “Preserving the Hungarian Quality of Existence,” the speech outlines Orbán’s

vision and aims if Fidesz wins the elections. Divided into sections on culture, the elite’s

role in constructing culture, civic unity, and similar topics, it is an early example of the

reactionary nationalist populism that would be come the hallmark of Fidesz propaganda.
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The speech opens with a promise to usher in a new era, and a critique of the

perceived failures of what Orban describes as “the culture forming elite” (Orbán 2010).

In his view, the Hungarian elite of the post-regime change era failed to formulate a

convincing narrative to guide the country, and the crisis of the country’s economic and

cultural is caused by a lack of a cohesive value system. In Orbán’s view, “the values

offered by the neoliberal elite have led Hungary to failure, [to] defeat in various areas of

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economy and public life,” (Ibid.). This failure in turn has ushered in what he sees as a

new era. The responsibility of the new governing power in this discourse becomes the

grounding of Hungarian social life on a new foundation, which must reject the “social

liberal” ideology of the previous elite, discredited as it was by their mistakes. Orbán sees

this breakdown of the elite as a “great opportunity [and at once] a great risk” (Ibid.). The

opportunity comes in the form of the left’s identity crisis, which offers a chance to create

a new political elite and community, based on Christian, conservative, and Hungarian

values.

Orbán emphasizes that the differences between the right and left are not political

in nature, but normative, as the two sides believe in diametrically opposing values. The

solution he proposes for this is the rejection of dualist field of power, divided between the

opposition and government, in favor of establishing what he describes as a “central arena

of power” (Ibid.). The goal of this central arena of power is to establish a system for “the

next fifteen-twenty years” that can represent the nation (Ibid.). According to Orbán,

debating values and philosophy is the job of the elite, not the job of politicians, who

should instead focus on governing and advancing the national interest. Because of the

failures of the selfish neoliberal elite since the regime change, Hungarian society has

been akin to a rudderless ship, and Orbán’s central arena of power is how he proposes to
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fix this sorry state of affairs.

The Kötcse speech draws heavily on populist rhetoric, as demonstrated by its

preoccupation with the misdeeds and failures of the elite, and on its messianic, “us versus

them” message. It features passing references to nationalist and reactionary values,

particularly in its conception of the Hungarian value system and the call to arms to open a

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new era based on traditional values, but its primary purpose is agitative. The speech can

also be classified an example of white propaganda, as it aims to posture Fidesz as a

conservative civic coalition with a more convincing morality and purpose than the

immoral neoliberal elite, which has squandered the chances offered by the regime

change. The results of the election, which Fidesz won with a hitherto unprecedented two-

thirds majority, seemed to validate Orbán’s vision In Fidesz discourse, it is still referred

to as a “voting booth revolution”, and is the primary justification for the legitimacy of

wide-ranging changes enacted by the government to date.

2.4. Text II: The National Consultation on the New Constitution, 2011
When in power, populists favor national referendums and consultations to

highlight and reiterate that they are the duly chosen representatives of the people. In

2011, the Fidesz government proceeded to use its two-thirds majority to alter the

Hungarian Constitution. The second text analyzed is the “National Consultation:

Questions About the New Constitution,” which was sent out to Hungarian voters before

the adoption of the new constitution. Curiously, the questions do not touch on whether

the voters support the creation of a new constitution, but rather on a set of highly

technical questions regarding the content of the new constitution.

The first question asks if it the new constitution should express not only the rights
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of Hungarian citizens, but also their duties, including in regards to work, education, and

the national defense. This is a subtle reference to nationalist rhetoric, signified by the

emphasis on duties to the nation. The third question asks whether the constitution should

protect “mutually accepted social values (work, home, family, order, and health),” as well

as human rights. This question has a distinct populist bent, evoking the traditional,

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conservative conceptions of the listed concept. Its vague wording also allows for a

conveniently subjective interpretation of what such protections entail on a policy level.

Questions 8 to 10 also play on nationalist themes: question 8 asks if the new constitution

should “express national unity with Hungarians living beyond the border”, while

questions 9 to 10 concern themselves with the protection of Hungarian land, national

resources, and quintessentially Hungarian natural resources, termed “hungarikums”.

The second section of the consultation focuses on social issues. Most of the

questions revolve around quality of life, such as additional protections for senior citizens;

to what extent the government can regulate public utilities, if the government should

provide jobs to the homeless instead of welfare benefits, whether those with children

should receive additional retirement funding, and so on. The third section is similar in

scope, with a focus on fiscal policy, such as questions about tax exemptions for working

senior citizens, whether families with children should receives social subsidies for

purchasing automobiles, tax exemptions for companies that “create jobs,” and so forth.

The majority of these questions concern veiled proposals for pork barrel spending

and government benefits, a favored strategy of populists who wish to maintain the

support of their voters. Cast as a consultation based on empirical research and policy

considerations, it is a good example of rational propaganda. Since the Fidesz government

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came to power, it has utilized a series of national consultations, and the wording of

questions has been similarly skewed and devoid of details, allowing for a claim to

popular support without committing to any actual substantive changes in policy.

2.5. Text III: Yearly Evaluation speech, 2012

Viktor Orbán is fond of giving long, complex speeches as part of his yearly

evaluations. Often they have less to do with taking stock of the accomplishments of the

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past or outlining the challenges of the future, and more with advancing the latest

discourses favored by the government. The third text analyzed is his yearly evaluation for

2012.

The speech was rich with symbolism, both in terms of setting and content (Field

2015). Orbán spoke on a stage bedecked with Hungarian flags, leaning on a podium

bearing the government slogan “Hungary is getting stronger”. Appropriately, he started

with a flag reference, stating,

All can see that our flag is flying high. All can see that we are a civic national
community based on Christian democratic values and [our guiding principle] is a
civic Hungary. (Ibid.)

Orbán continued the speech with strong appeals to nationalism, emphasizing the

importance of national interest, as well as the need to subordinate individual ambition

individual and group interests to service of the nation (Ibid.). He also condemned the

failures of what he termed “liberal multiculturalism” specifically, and liberalism

generally. He argued that this philosophy couldn’t give sufficient answers for the

problems of the 21st century, seeing a nationally motivated politics as a more promising

alternative. Finally, Orbán suggested that by moving away from liberalism and rejecting

political correctness, Hungary is pioneering a new form of national politics that will serve
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as an example for the other countries in Eastern Europe (Ibid.).

This text has elements drawn from each of the three pillars of illiberal

propaganda. It is reactionary because it rejects multiculturalism, liberalism, and

humanitarianism, along with other values associated with the modern European political

philosophy, as impractical or sentimental conceits. Further, it evokes a nationalist concept

of geopolitics that seems more at home in the 19th century than the 21st. There are many

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references to national interests, pride in the nation, and national service, as well as

Christian values and a Christian democratic national identity. It also features trenchant

critiques of pan-Europeanism, European integration, and the European project as a whole.

Finally, it is populist in its condemnation of elites, both political and financial; in the

emphasis on national sovereignty and Hungarian solutions to Hungarian problems; in the

use of migrants and other foreign elements as a threat to the integrity of the people as a

whole; and in its exhortation to dismiss neoliberal economics and “choose the future”

(Ibid.). In all its aspects, this text perfectly encapsulates the three pillars of illiberal

propaganda.

2.6. Text IV: “Illiberal Democracy” speech, 2014

The fourth and penultimate text analyzed is perhaps the best known of Orbán’s

speeches. His critics often highlight it as the ultimate expression of Fidesz conceptually

distancing itself from Western liberal democracy. The speech is one in a series that Orbán

regularly gives at a Fidesz summer gathering in Tusnádfürdő, a town located in the

Székely Land region of Romania. The speech was delivered in the wake of the Fidesz

victory in the 2014 national elections. This election was made all the more interesting

because the party barely managed to secure another two-thirds majority, and Orbán

acknowledges that the only reason it was able to do so was due to the votes of ethnic
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Hungarians living outside Hungary.

Orbán begins his speech by suggesting that the regime change is no longer a

convenient point of reference for political life in the postmodern world. Instead, he

positions Fidesz as the true regime changers in Hungarian politics and describes the 2008

financial crisis as the originator of the new era of regime change. The excesses of

neoliberal economics and the moral deficiencies of liberalism caused the crisis itself, and

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thus, according to Orbán, and thus the duty of politicians in the post-crisis era becomes to

“find the form of government, which is most capable of making a nation successful”

(Orbán 2014). This thought segues into the speech’s main thesis: namely, that Western-

style liberal democracy has failed, and the most promising states in the world are not

Western, liberal, or necessarily democracies, but nonetheless, successful. Orbán

specifically mentions Singapore, China, India, Russia and Turkey as examples of these

successes, and congratulates the Fidesz community for having the foresight to reject

liberalism. The future of governance, he expounds, is illiberal:

We have known three forms of organizing government: the nation-state, the

liberal state, and the welfare state. The question is, what comes next? The
Hungarian answer is that this is the era of the work-based state…we must part
ways with the liberal principles of social organization, methods, and overall, the
liberal concept of society (Ibid.)

In his view, the past failures of Hungary were due to adherence to a liberal worldview,

advanced by elites more beholden to liberalism than the national interest. The new

society of Hungary, according to Orbán, is communitarian and nationally minded, and

therefore illiberal. One should accept the stigma of the illiberal label because this concept

only has negative connotations based in Western European “dogma and ideology”, and

the rejection of these values is a prerequisite of Hungary’s success on the national stage.
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Orbán concludes by painting an apocalyptic vision of liberal democracy’s uncertain

future in the world, and to rail against the European Union, which he sees as attacking

Hungary based on misguided value judgments rooted in this failing political philosophy.

The illiberal democracy speech is also a typical rhetorical expression of the three

pillars. One may ask how the speech is reactionary, as Orbán seems to talk of establishing

a new model of governance? When examining the argument more closely, however, it is

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clear that Orbán’s proposed vision is not substantially different from the semi-

democracies that predate the liberal state and were commonplace at the start of the last

century. If liberalism is the central paradigm of modern Western politics, than its

rejection is not a novel innovation, but a revisionist argument for a return to the past.

Orbán is essentially making an argument for a return to the nation state, where God and

country are placed above the freedom of the individual, and accordingly, the national

interest also outweighs the interests of the individual. Instead of the chaos of

multiculturalism, he argues for a distinctly Hungarian national identity, and nationalist

solutions to global problems. Finally, it is populist because of the appeals to a work-based

society composed of the people, justified by a popular mandate and in defiance of the

liberal elites running the European Union.

2.7. Text V: Poster Campaigns, 2015-2017

The final text examined in this section is a series of poster campaigns ordered by

the Hungarian government in relation to the European migrant crisis of 2015. The posters

can be grouped into two categories based on messaging. One set is addressed at migrants

coming to Hungary, while the other is critical of Brussels and more generally, the

European Union’s migration policies. Both sets feature large, minimalist posters on

display throughout the country with pointed messages. The first set was aimed at
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migrants, although the text was in Hungarian, with such messages as “If you come to

Hungary, you have to respect our laws,” “If you come to Hungary, you must respect our

culture,” and “If you come to Hungary, you can’t take the jobs of Hungarians” (Medvegy

2015). The second set, which came out a year later, responded to European Union

criticism of Hungary’s refusal to allow migrants to enter. It featured a text box at the top

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that read “Did you know”? This headline was followed by messages including “Since the

start of the migrant crisis, molestation of women has grown by leaps and bounds,”

“Brussels wants to settle a city’s worth of migrants in Hungary,” and “The Paris attacks

were carried out by migrants”. The posters were accompanied by a national consultation

that asked questions about the EU migrant quotas and migration in general.

The poster campaigns are a prime example of the way Fidesz stokes nationalist

xenophobia and creates enemy figures to unite its supporters. As such, they are instances

of agitation propaganda, irrational propaganda and black propaganda, as they use us

versus them rhetoric, source of the information is not revealed, and they include patent

falsehoods. The poster campaigns were the most traditional forms of propaganda

deployed by Fidesz. A great deal of public funds was used to place the posters in virtually

all cities, towns and settlements in Hungary, and it was not uncommon to see dozens in

the same town. Their ubiquity ensured that they achieved a high-rate of constant

penetration, as one did not need access to a television, radio or any other technology to

view them. Further, the juxtaposition of the Hungarian people against their enemies, the

EU and the migrants, is redolent of populist rhetoric, which is one of the pillars of

illiberal propaganda.

Having discussed five examples of propaganda deployed by Fidesz since it has

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been in government, the texts are now analyzed in aggregate using the Jowett and

O’Donell 10-step division of propaganda analysis.

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2.8. Propaganda Analysis
1. The ideology and purpose of the propaganda campaign
The ideology of Fidesz propaganda is characterized by the adherence to the three

pillars of illiberal propaganda, reactionism, nationalism, and populism. Fidesz

propaganda is reactionary because it posits a return to an idealized vision of Hungary as a

homogenous, conservative Christian nation that ostensibly existed before the Nazi

occupation and the era of Soviet rule. It is nationalist, because it deploys nationalist

symbols and rhetoric, aiming to construct and promote a strict interpretation of

Hungarian national identity that should be shared universally by all Hungarians. It is

populist because it features strong evocations of “the people”, portraying Fidesz as their

sole and ultimate representative, and frames its narratives in a populist worldview based

on the rejection of elites and a motivation of the general will. Fidesz propaganda is

directed at supporters of the party, and no rational arguments are made to convince those

who may disagree with its messages. As agitative propaganda, it aims to mobilize and

gain political capital from outrage against the enemies of the people, whether migrants,

Brussels, or some other entity represents these enemies at any given time. In its capacity

as integrative propaganda, it aims to create an in-group of Fidesz supporters, who

represent the Hungarian nation, and any who disagree with the values of this group are
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seen as foreign-hearted outsiders.

2. The context in which the propaganda occurs

Fidesz propaganda occurs in the closed system of Hungary’s epistemic landscape.

By constructing a monopoly on knowledge through the takeover of key institutions,

including media organs, schools, civil society and cultural centers, among others, the

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party works to exercise constant epistemic control over Hungarian society, which is also

a key attribute of its approach to Governmentality. Due to this pervasive epistemic

control, there are few commonly available alternative viewpoints, which also makes

Fidesz propaganada highly effective.

3. Identification of the propagandist

Fidesz propaganda is disseminated through the media organs controlled by the party. It is

formulated by influential praetorians of the regime, including Antal Rogán (government

communication), Arpád Habony (media), Lőrinc Mészáros (newspapers and radio), and

Andy Vajna (television). Foreign consultants, like the company GEB International, run

by George E. Birnbaum and Arthur J. Finkelstein, help mold Fidesz’s political message.

The Prime Minister, Viktor Orbán, is directly involved in determining the message due to

his personal approach to leadership and as the ideological head of the party. He often

gives speeches and interviews, which outline the overall message behind the party’s

propaganda efforts.

4. The structure of the propaganda organization

Fidesz propaganda is primarily deployed through government communications and client

media. The Prime Minister’s Cabinet Office is the main body responsible for political

communication, but each government ministry also follows the overall guidelines set for
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government messaging. A network of party-friendly owners oversees the operation of

client media and ensures the government’s messages are incorporated into content.

5. The target audience

The primary target audience of Fidesz propaganda is its own supporter base. Party

propaganda rarely features convincing or evidence based argumentation, as it is geared

toward voter retention and mobilization of the supporter base, rather than gaining new

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voters. Recently, Fidesz propaganda has skewed to the right, which indicates that it also

targets voters of the far-right party Jobbik, which is one of Fidesz’s main rivals.

6. Media utilization techniques

Fidesz propaganda utilizes simple but effective media techniques such as sensationalistic

“news” stories, blatant emotional appeals, fear mongering and the creation of enemies,

and consistent repetition. Due to the near-monopoly of knowledge enjoyed by the party,

it can deploy its messages on a wide variety of platforms, including television, radio, and

in print media. It does not enjoy such rigid control over the Internet, but is working to

acquire more websites and news portals, the most recent example being the site Origo.

7. Special techniques to maximize effect

Fidesz propaganda’s hallmark is that it controls most channels of communication in

Hungary, and permeates all layers of society. Other than this focus on epistemic control,

the techniques deployed by Fidesz run the gamut of traditional propaganda techniques,

which allows for maximization of effect.

8. Audience reaction to various techniques

Fidesz propaganda is highly effective in retaining voter support among its base, as

indicated by the consistent electoral victories of the party. It is less effective in switching

party loyalty of opposition voters or gaining new voters, but due to Hungary’s

gerrymandered electoral system and political environment, this is sufficient to keep the
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party in power and to maintain its majority in the parliament.

9. Counterpropaganda, if present
There is little counterpropaganda present in Hungary due to Fidesz domination of

the epistemic environment. A few independent media organs do exist, but their audience

is mostly limited to the opposition. Restrictive media regulations combined with generous

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funding of government friendly media and a sophisticated propaganda machinery work in

concert to drown out most opposing voices effectively.

10. Effects and Evaluation

Fidesz propaganda is highly effective in retaining support of the party’s traditional voter

base. The speeches of Viktor Orbán serve as a platform for promoting the prime

minister’s personal image, and he remains very popular in the circle of Fidesz voters. The

propaganda favored by the party is also effective in discrediting the opposition and

shifting the blame for the ill effects of government politics on third parties, particularly

the European Union. The creation of enemy groups, which shifts according to the

prevailing political atmosphere, helps agitate in favor of the government and against

opposition to its policies. Enemy groups to date have prominently included the

opposition, migrants, the European Union, and most recently, the person of George

Soros. Fidesz propaganda deploys messages based on the three pillars of illiberal

propaganda through a countrywide network of propaganda organs. Without significant

reform of the media environment or a concentrated effort by other stakeholders, such as

the opposition parties and civil society, it is doubtful that the Fidesz stranglehold on

Hungary’s epistemic environment can be broken. The main takeaway is that unless

effectively countered through such initiatives, Fidesz will continue to enjoy and expand
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its near-monopoly of knowledge in Hungary and control political and public discourse in

the country.

CONCLUSIONS
In the second decade of the 21st century, propaganda remains a potent tool for

mobilizing support and manufacturing consent for government policies. The effectiveness

of propaganda techniques is largely determined by political environment and social

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context. Illiberal democracies, increasingly on the rise due to the challenge offered to

liberal democracy by their compelling narratives and seductive worldview, use

sophisticated propaganda techniques to influence the governability of their citizens. The

Governmentality of illiberal regimes is characterized by the centralization of power and

control, which in the context of political communication is dependent on exercising

epistemic control and building monopolies of knowledge. These regimes exert

considerable resources to ensure the advancement of their discourses and to discredit and

restrict the emergence of alternatives. Conceptually, the main elements of illiberal

propaganda are reactionism, nationalism, and populism. These three elements work in

concert to offer a vision of an idealized golden age, construct a cohesive national identity,

and consolidate support by claims to speak for the people and to protect them from

uncaring elites. The propaganda machinery and systems of epistemic control utilized by

the Orbán regime in Hungary are typical of these processes, and demonstrate the

effectiveness of illiberal propaganda techniques. To develop effective measures against

such techniques, further research on illiberal propaganda is desirable and highly

necessary.
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