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TEAM H Petitioner Memorial

This document is a submission on behalf of the petitioner, Maratha Butchers Association, in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of the Republic of Indica challenging the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Maharashtra Animal Preservation Act and its amendment. It contains a table of contents listing abbreviations, authorities cited, statement of facts, jurisdiction, issues, summary of arguments, arguments advanced, and prayer. The petitioner association represents butchers and is challenging restrictions on the slaughter of animals under the impugned laws.
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© © All Rights Reserved
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Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
100% found this document useful (6 votes)
5K views

TEAM H Petitioner Memorial

This document is a submission on behalf of the petitioner, Maratha Butchers Association, in a writ petition filed under Article 226 of the Constitution of the Republic of Indica challenging the constitutionality of certain provisions of the Maharashtra Animal Preservation Act and its amendment. It contains a table of contents listing abbreviations, authorities cited, statement of facts, jurisdiction, issues, summary of arguments, arguments advanced, and prayer. The petitioner association represents butchers and is challenging restrictions on the slaughter of animals under the impugned laws.
Copyright
© © All Rights Reserved
Available Formats
Download as PDF, TXT or read online on Scribd
You are on page 1/ 33

TEAM H

BEFORE
THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF STATE OF MARATHA

WRIT JURISDICTION
WRIT PETITION FILED UNDER ARTICLE 226 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF REPUBLIC OF INDICA
W.P.NO.____________OF 2016

IN THE MATTER BETWEEN


MARATHA BUTCHERS ASSOCIATION, A REGISTERED
SOCIETY AND OTHERS ……… PETITIONER
V.
STATE OF MARATHA AND OTHERS ……RESPONDENT

SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER


TEAM H

TABLE OF CONTENTS

1. LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS 3

2. INDEX OF AUTHORITIES 4

a) ARTICLES AND JOURNALS 4

b) BOOKS 4

• INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 4

• CONSTITUTION 5

c) CASE LAW 6

d) DICTIONARIES 8

e) ONLINE SOURCES 8

• WEBSITE REFERRED 8

• LEGAL DATABASES 8

f) STATUTES 8

3. STATEMENT OF FACTS 9

4. STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION 12

5. STATEMENT OF ISSUES 13

6. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 14

7. ARGUMENTS ADVANCED 16

8. PRAYER 33

PETITIONER 2
TEAM H

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS

& And

AIR All India Reporter

Anr Another

AP Andhra Pradesh

Art Article

Bom Bombay

Corpn Corporation

Dr Doctor

Ed Edition

Govt Government

Ltd Limited

MP Madhya Pradesh

Ors Others

P Page

SC Supreme Court

SCC Supreme Court Cases

SCR Supreme Court Reporter

TN Tamil Nadu

UP Uttar Pradesh

V Versus

Vol Volume

PETITIONER 3
TEAM H

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES

a) ARTICLES AND JOURNALS

“RECONCILING THE HUMAN RIGHTS AND PUBLIC INTEREST-


1 THE ROLE OF JUDICIARY”, Dr. D. Sankar, Nyaya Deep, Vol.8, Issue 3,
2007

“TOWARDS A ROBUST RIGHT TO PRIVACY IN INDIA”, Rishika


2
Taneja and Sidhank Kumar, (2012) 8SCC(J)

b) BOOKS

• INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES

JUSTICE G.P. SINGH, PRINCIPLES OF STATUTORY


1
INTERPRETATION, 12TH EDITION, 2010, LEXIS NEXIS

MAXWELL, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES, 12TH EDITION, 2006,


2
LEXIS NEXIS

N.S.BINDRA, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES 9TH EDITION, 2004,


3
LEXIS NEXIS

VEPA.P.SARATHY, INTERPRETATION OF STATUTES, 5 TH EDITION,


4
2008, EASTERN BOOK COMPANY

PETITIONER 4
TEAM H

• CONSTITUTION

M.P. JAIN, INDIAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW, 8 TH EDITION, 2018,


1
LEXIS, NEXIS

DR. J.N. PANDEY. CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, 56 TH


2
EDITION, 2009, CENTRAL LAW AGENCY

D.D. BASU, COMMENTARY ON ‘THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA’,


3
VOL 6 & 7, 8TH EDITION, 2010, LEXIS NEXIS

4 D.D. BASU, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 8TH EDITION, LEXIS NEXIS

D.D BASU, SHORTER CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 14TH EDITION,


5
2009, LEXIS NEXIS

H.M.SERVAI, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, 4TH EDITION,2002,


6
UNIVERSAL BOOK PUBLICATION

DURGA DAS BASU, HUMAN RIGHTS IN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW,


7
3RD EDITION, 2008, LEXIS NEXIS

M.P. SINGH, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 5TH EDITION, DELHI LAW


8
HOUSE

DR. KAILASH RAI, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, 11 TH


9
EDITION, 2017, CENTRAL LAW PUBLICATIONS

DR. AVTAR SINGH, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 1 ST EDITION,


10
2019, CENTRAL LAW PUBLICATIONS

NARENDER KUMAR, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, 1ST


11
EDITION, 2009, ALLAHABAD LAW AGENCY

V.N. SHUKLA, CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 11 TH EDITION,2011,


12
EASTERN BOOK COMPANY

PETITIONER 5
TEAM H

C) CASE LAWS

1 A. B. Abdul Kadir v. State of Kerala (1976) 3 SCC 219 : AIR 1976

Automobile Transport Ltd v. State of AIR 1962 SC 1406 (1963) 1


2
Rajasthan SCR 491

Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. AIR 1983 SC 109: (1983) 1


3
Dilip Kumar Ragavendra Nath Nadkarni SCC 124

4 Chintaman Rao v. State of M.P AIR1951 SC 118

5 D. K. Yadav v. J.M.A Industries (1930) 3 SCC 258

6 D.T.C v. D.T.C Mazdoor Congress AIR 1991 SC 101

7 Hanif Qureshi v. State of Bihar AIR 1958 SC 731

AIR 2003 SC 2120, JT 2002


8 Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian Oil Corpn Ltd (100 SC 561,2004 1 OLR
81,(2003) 2 SCC 107
I. C. Golaknath & Ors v. State of Punjab &
9 1967 AIR 1643
Anr

10 Kata Miah & others Ors v. S. C. Roy & Ors AIR 1964 Cal 49

11 Kharak Singh v. State of U.P AIR 1963 SC 1295

12 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India AIR 1978 SC 597

13 Minerva Mills v. Union of India AIR 1980 SC 1789

14 Mohammed Faruk v. State of M.P & Ors (1969) 1 SCC 853

15 M R F Ltd v. State of Kerala (1998) 8 SCC 227

PETITIONER 6
TEAM H

Nagar Rice and Flour Mills v. N.T.G and


16 AIR 1971 SC 246
Bros

National Legal Services Authority v. Union


17 AIR 2014 SC 1863
of India

AIR 1986SC 180; (1985) 3


18 Olga Tellis Bombay Municipal Corporation
SCC 545

AIR 1970 SC 564, (1970) 1


19 R. C. Cooper v. Union of India
SCC 248, (1970) 3 SCR 530

20 Re Kerala Education Bill AIR 1957 SC 957

21 R. M. D. C v. Union of India AIR 1957 SC 628

22 R. Rajagopal v. State of T.N (1994) 6 SCC 632

AIR 1954 SC 728,742(1995)


23 Saghir Ahmad v. State of U.P
1 SCR 707

Shaik Zahid Muktar & ors v. State of


24 2016 SCC Online Bom 2600
Maharastra

25 Sivani v. State of Maharashtra AIR 1995 SC 1770

State of Bihar v. Bihar Chamber of (1996) 9 SCC 136: AIR 1996


26
Commerce SC 2344

27 State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan AIR 1951 SC 228

AIR 1967 SC 1189, (1967) 2


28 State of Mysore v. H. Sajeeviah
SCR 361
Sukhanandan Saran Dinesh Kumar v. State
29 of U.P AIR 1982 SC 903

T. M. A. Pai Foundation v. State of


30 (2002) 8 SCC 481
Karnataka

31 Unni Krishnan v. State of A.P (1993) 1 SCC 645

32 Venkataraman v. State of Madras 1966 SCR (2) 229

PETITIONER 7
TEAM H

d) DICTIONARIES

Black’s Law Dictionary, Bryan .A. Garner, 8th Edition,


1
Thomson
Wharton’s Law Lexicon, Dr. A.R Lakshmana.J, 15th Edition,
2
Universal Law Publishing Co.

e) ONLINE RESOUCES

• WEBSITES REFFERRED

1 www.lexisnexisacademic.com

2 www.manupatra.com

3 www.indiakanoon.org

4 www.vakilno1.com

5 www.legalservices.com

• LEGAL DATABASES

1 Lexis Nexis

2 JSTOR

3 SCC Online

f) STATUTES

1 The Constitution of India,1950

2 Maharastra Animal Preservation Act, 1978


Maharastra Animal Preservation (Amendment)
3
Act,1995

PETITIONER 8
TEAM H

STATEMENT OF FACTS

1. The Republic of Indica is a nation which consists of 29 states and 7 union

territories. The Constitution of Republic of Indica has adopted a Parliamentary

system which has the president as its executive head of the Government. Even

though the Republic of Indica holds the population of Hindus as majority, the

nation is characterized by a diversity of religions like Islam , Buddhism, Jainism,

Sikhism, etc and different cultures.

2. The Constitution of Republic of Indica declared certain fundamental rights and laid

down some directive principles of State policy .One of the directives states that

‘State shall endeavor to organize agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and

scientific lines and shall take steps in particular for preserving and improving the

breeds and prohibiting the slaughter of cows and calves and other milch and

draught cattle’.

3. This directive was inserted after a long heated debate. In Hindu religion cows are

considered sacred, the Republic of Indica is a nation whose economy is largely

based on agriculture. The above mentioned directive was perceived to be an

outcome of a compromise between the scientific rationality and religious

sentiments of the majority Hindu citizens.

4. In 2015 various religious organizations started large / scale mobilization against

slaughter of cows throughout the Republic of Indica and this caused a huge

political turmoil in the nation. Few individuals were attacked based on the

accusation of storing cow flesh in their home. The individuals who got attacked

belong to a minority community `X`. This incident created a tension between two

PETITIONER 9
TEAM H

communities due to their contradicting religious beliefs .The degree of poverty was

high in community `X` and therefore , beef was an easy source of food for them to

obtain and was cheaper than other non-vegetarian foods.

5. The State of Maratha which is situated in the western region of the Republic of

Indica is the most populated state in the country. In 1978, the State of Maratha

enacted the Maratha Animal Preservation Act, 1978.

6. The Maratha Animal Preservation Act, 1978 was amended in 1995. the

amendments made in 1995 sought to make the following changes in the Act of

1978

a). It sought to extent the bans on the slaughter of cows and calves to bulls

and bullocks

b). It sought to prohibit the transport , export as well as purchase, sale and

disposal of cows, bulls and bullocks for the purpose of slaughter .

c). It sought to prohibit the possession of the flesh of cows, bulls or bullocks

slaughtered in contravention of the provisions of the Act

d).It also criminalizes the possession of beef per se, whether or not this was

obtained through lawful slaughter from another State.

e).The amendment sought to put the burden on the accused that he /she was not

in contravention of provisions of the Act.

f). The Amendment also stipulated punishment for the contravention of the Act.

PETITIONER 10
TEAM H

7. The Amendment Act of 1995 was reserved for the assent of the President and it

received the assent in 2015 and immediately came into force .It is to be noted that

under the Constitution of Republic of Indica, if on a subject matter both the

Republic as well as State Legislature enacted a law, then the state law will prevail

over the Republic law only if it has been reserved for the president`s assent and

received such assent.

8. Writ Petitions were filed by various associations and individuals before the

Hon’ble High Court of the State of Maratha challenging the constitutional validity

of the Amendment of the Maratha Animal Preservation Act, 1978 in 1995.

PETITIONER 11
TEAM H

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

THE PETITIONER HEREBY SUBMITS THIS MEMORANDUM BEFORE THE

HON`BLE COURT OF STATE OF MARATHA INVOKING THE WRIT

JURISDICTION OF THIS HON`BLE COURT UNDER ART 226 OF THE

CONSTITUTION OF REPUBLIC OF INDICA.

PETITIONER 12
TEAM H

STATEMENT OF ISSUES

1. WHETHER THE WRIT PETITION BEFORE THE HON`BLE HIGH COURT

OF STATE OF MARATHA IS MAINTAINABLE?

2. WHETHER THE MARATHA ANIMAL PRESERVATION (AMENDMENT)

ACT, 1995 VIOLATES THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHTS GUARANTEED

UNDER ARTICLE 19 (1) (g) AND 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF

REPUBLIC OF INDICA?

3. WHETHER THE IMPUGNED STATUTE IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 301

OF THE CONSTITUTION OF REPUBLIC OF INDICA?

PETITIONER 13
TEAM H

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

A. THE WRIT PETITION BEFORE THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF STATE

OF MARATHA IS MAINTAINABLE.

The counsel on behalf of the petitioner most humbly submits before the Hon’ble High

Court of State of Maratha that the writ petition is maintainable under Article 226 of the

Constitution of Republic of Indica.

B. THE MARATHA ANIMAL PRESERVATION (AMENDMENT) ACT, 1995 IS

VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 19 (1) (g) AND 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF

REPUBLIC OF INDICA.

The counsel on behalf of the petitioner most humbly submits before the Hon’ble High

Court of State of Maratha that the Maratha Animal Preservation (Amendment) Act, 1995

is violative of the right to freedom of profession, occupation, trade or business secured

under Article 19 (1) (g) of the Constitution of Republic of Indica.

The Maratha Animal Preservation (Amendment) Act, 1995 is violative of the right to

livelihood and right to privacy secured under Article 21. The right of a citizen to eat food

of his/her choice is a part of right to privacy as envisaged under Article 21.

C.THE IMPUGNED STATUTE IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 301 OF THE

CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDICA.

The counsel on behalf of the petitioner most humbly submits before the Hon’ble High

Court of State of Maratha that the impugned statute is unconstitutional, ultra vires and

PETITIONER 14
TEAM H

void. The freedom of trade and commerce secured under Art 301 of the Constitution of

Republic of Indica is violated.

The Amendment Act of 1995 is extraneous with the aims and objects of the parent Act and

has no nexus with the protection of cows, bulls and bullocks. The impugned statute is not

protected by Art 304(b) of the constitution.

PETITIONER 15
TEAM H

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED

A.THE WRIT PETITION BEFORE THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT

OF STATE OF MARATHA IS MAINTAINABLE

It is most humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that the writ petition in the instant

case is maintainable.

Article 226 of the Constitution empowers the Hon’ble High Court to exercise power

through issuance of writ. The exercise of jurisdiction is discretionary in nature and subject

to availability and exhaustion of the alternative remedy by the petitioner. The high court is

conferred with this power under Article 226 of the Constitution for the enforcement of any

of the fundamental rights conferred by part III of the Constitution or for any other purpose.

A writ petition can be filed by any person whose fundamental have been infringed or under

public interest, a public spirited person can file a writ petition for the enforcement of

constitutional rights of any other person or a class, if that person or a class is unable to

invoke the jurisdiction of the High Court due to any social or economic disability.

i. The amendment of 1995 violates Article 19(1) (g) of the Constitution of

Republic of Indica by imposing restrictions by way of total prohibition on the

petitioner’s fundamental rights to practice any trade or business .

In Chintaman Rao case1, an Act of Madhya Pradesh Government

empowered the Deputy Commissioner to prohibit the manufacturing of bidis

during the agricultural season in such villages as he might specify in his orders.

1Chintaman Rao. v. State of M.P, 1951 AIR 118,1950 SCR 759,V.N SHUKLA ,CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, 11 th
edition,2011,Eastern book company

PETITIONER 16
TEAM H

The court held that such a provision is void, since a total prohibition is an

excessive restriction on lawful profession of making bidis.

ii. The right to livelihood under Article 21 of the constitution includes the right to

food, Right to health, medical care and shelter. The amendment of 1995

violates The Right Of livelihood because beef eating were common food habit

of `X’ community and beef was less costly as compared to other non –

vegetarian food. As the poverty in community `X’ was high they used beef

which was a easy source of proteins which is necessary for their health.

In pavement dwellers case2 , a five judge bench of the court implied that

‘right to life’ as no person can live without the means of living, that is the means of

livelihood.

In an appropriate case3 , in spite of availability of the alternative remedy,

the High Court may still exercise its writ jurisdiction in at least three contingencies:

• Where the writ petition seeks enforcement of any of the fundamental rights

• Where there is failure of principle of natural justice

• Where the orders or proceedings are wholly without jurisdiction

Maratha Butchers Association has locus standi to file the present petition as it is a

registered society working for the protection of the interest of minority community ‘X’ in

the State of Maratha.

2 Olga Telis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation, 1986AIR 180,1985 SCR Supl (2) 51
3Harbanslal Sahnia v. Indian oil corpn .Ltd ,AIR 2003 SC2120,JT2002 (10) SC 561 , 2004 1 OLR 81 , (2003)
2SSC107

PETITIONER 17
TEAM H

B. THE MARATHA ANIMAL PRESERVATION (AMENDMENT)

ACT, 1995 IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 19 (1) (g) AND 21 OF THE

CONSTITUTION OF REPUBLIC OF INDICA.

It is humbly submitted before this Hon’ble High Court of State of Maratha that the

Maratha Animal Preservation (Amendment) Act, 1995 is unconstitutional as it violates

Article 19 (1) (g) and 21 of the Constitution of Republic of Indica.

B.1 The impugned statute is violative of Article 19 (1) (g).

It is respectfully submitted that the freedom of a citizen to practice any profession or to

carry on any occupation, trade or business guaranteed under Article 19 (1) (g) has been

violated. Under this article every citizen has a right to choose any occupation or to take up

any trade or business subject only to the restrictions as may be imposed by the State in the

interest of public welfare.

B.1.1 The right to trade beef is secured under Article 19 (1) (g).

By virtue of Article 19 (1) (g), all citizens shall have the right to practice any profession,

or to carry on any occupation, trade or business4.

The word ‘occupation’ has a wide meaning such as any regular work, profession, job,

principal activity, employment, business, or calling in which the individual is engaged. In a

wider sense it includes any vocation which engages one’s time 5.

In T.M.A Pai Foundation v. State of Karnataka6, it was held that Article 19 (1) (g)

employees four expressions namely profession, occupation, trade and business. Article 19

4 THE CONTITUTION OF INDIA,ARTICLE 19(1)(g)


5 DURGA DAS BASU, COMMENTARY ON THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, Vol.2, 8th Edition,2008, Lexis Nexis
p2829
6 (2002) 8 SCC 481

PETITIONER 18
TEAM H

(1) (g) uses the four expressions so as to cover all activity of a citizen in respect of which

income or profit is generated and which can consequently be regulated under Article 19 (1)

(g).

The trade, business, profession and occupation protected by Article 19 (1) (g) must

be those which can be regarded as lawful 7. It must not be anti-social.

Butchers and cattle dealers have suffered a great amount of losses after the ban on

cattle slaughter came into effect even when constitution has provided them with then right

to carry on any trade or occupation of their calling. As many butchers and cattle traders

earned their income by the trade of beef it can be brought under the purview of Article 19

(1) (g).

B.1.2 The impugned statute does not fall under the ambit of reasonable restrictions in

Article 19 (6).

The right to carry on a profession, occupation, trade or business can be restricted and

regulated by authority of law. Thus the State can under clause (6) of the Article 19 make

any law-

(a) imposing reasonable restriction on this right ‘in the interest of public’,

(b) prescribing professional or technical qualifications necessary for practicing any

profession or carrying on any occupation, trade or business,

(c) enabling the State to carry on any trade or business to the exclusion of citizens

wholly or partially8.

7 R.M.D.C v. Union of India, AIR 1957 SC 628


8 DR J .N. PANDEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, 56TH Edition,2019,Central Law Agency p.252

PETITIONER 19
TEAM H

Any restriction imposed on the exercise of this right must be a reasonable restriction 9. Here

the restriction is not reasonable.

A law which arbitrarily or excessively invades the right of a person cannot be said

to contain the quality of reasonableness and unless it strikes a proper balance between the

right guaranteed in Article 19 (1) and the social control in Article (6), it must be held to be

wanting in that quality 10. The phrase reasonable restriction indicates that the limitation

imposed on persons must not be arbitrary or excessive in nature which is completely

beyond what is actually required 11.The exercise of right under Article 19 (1) (g) is subject

only to the restrictions imposed in the interest of ‘general public’ and not that it adversely

affect others business12. There must be reasonable and rational relation between the

restriction and the public interest. The connection between the restriction and the public

interest must be direct and proximate13.

The Apex Court in Sivani v. State of Maharashtra14, had laid down the criteria to

evaluate the reasonableness of a restriction under Article 19 (6) as follows: - ‘In applying

the test of reasonableness, the broad criterion is whether the law strikes a proper balance

between social control on the one hand and the right of the individual on the other hand.

The court must take into account factors like nature of the right enshrined, underlying

purpose of the restriction imposed, evil sought to be remedied by the law, its extend and

urgency, how far the restriction is or is not proportionate to the evil and the prevailing

conditions at that time’.

State of Maratha already had legislation Maratha Animal Preservation Act, 1978 that

banned the slaughter of cows which were fit for agricultural purposes. This restriction was

9 THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, ARTICLE 19 (6)


10 Chintaman Rao v. State of MP, AIR 1951 SC 118
11 MRF Ltd v. State of Kerala, (1998) 8 SCC 227
12 Nagar Rice and Flour Mills v. N.T.G and Bros, AIR 1971 SC 246
13 Sukhanandan Saran Dinesh Kumar v. State of UP, AIR 1982 SC 903
14 AIR 1995 SC 1770

PETITIONER 20
TEAM H

reasonable. But when the Amendment Act of 1995 was brought into force, it imposed a

complete ban on slaughter, it is not only unfair to the butcher community but also affects

the farmers putting a burden on them to continue maintaining cattle which is no longer of

use to them.

A total ban on the slaughter of ‘useless cattle’ which involves a wasteful drain on the

nation’s cattle feed which is itself in short supply and which would deprive the useful

cattle of much needed nourishment, cannot be justified as being in the interests of the

general public15.

In Mohammed Faruk v. State of Madhya Pradesh & Ors16, the State Government

issued a notification whereby the earlier notification issued by the Jabalpur Municipality

which permitted the slaughter of bulls and bullocks along with other animals was recalled.

It was held that when the exercise of a fundamental right is prohibited, the burden of

proving that a total ban on the exercise of the right alone would ensure the maintenance of

the general public interest lies heavily upon the State. As the State Govt. failed in

discharging that burden, the notification was held liable to be struck down as imposing an

unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right of the petitioners.

Where the restrictions imposed are so stringent that the business cannot be carried

on, the court will regard the imposition of restriction as unreasonable 17. In the instant case

impugned legislation fails to maintain a balance between public interest and the freedom of

profession, trade or business so the restriction becomes arbitrary and unreasonable.

Therefore the Act cannot be given the protection under Article 19 (6).

15 Hanif Qureshi v. State of Bihar, AIR 1958 SC 731


16 (1969) 1 SCC 853
17 R.C Cooper v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 564, (1970) 1 SCC 248, (1970) 3 SCR 530

PETITIONER 21
TEAM H

B.2 The impugned statute is violative of Article 21.

It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble High Court of State of Maratha that the

Maratha Animal Preservation (Amendment) Act,1995 violates article 21 of the

Constitution of Republic of Indica.

By virtue of Article 21, ‘No person shall be deprived of his life or personal liberty

except according to procedure established by law’18.

Article 21 protects the right to life and personal liberty of citizen not only from the

executive action but from the legislative action also 19. By the term life as used here

something more is meant than mere animal existence20.

B.2.1 The impugned statute violates the right to livelihood secured under right to life.

Article 21 protects the right to livelihood as an integral facet of right to life.

In Olga Tellis v. Bombay Municipal Corporation21, a five Judges Bench of the Court

has finally ruled that the word ‘life’ in Article 21 includes the ‘right to livelihood’ also.

The court said: ‘It does not mean merely that life cannot be extinguished or taken away

as, for example, by the imposition and execution of death sentence, except according to the

procedure established by law. That is but one aspect of the right to life. An equally

important facet of that right is the right to livelihood because no person can live without

the means of livelihood. If the right livelihood is not treated as a part of the constitutional

right to life, the easiest ways of depriving a person of his right to life would be to deprive

him of his means of livelihood. In view of the fact that Articles 39 (a) and 41 require the

State to secure to the citizen an adequate means of livelihood and the right to work, it

18 THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, ARTICLE 21


19 Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597
20 Kharak Singh v. State of UP, AIR 1963 SC 1295
21 AIR 1986 SC 180, (1985) 3 SCC 545

PETITIONER 22
TEAM H

would be sheer pendentary to exclude the right to livelihood from the content of the right

to life’.

In D.K. Yadav v. J.M.A Industries 22, the Supreme Court held that the right to life

enshrined in Article 21 clubs life with liberty, dignity of person with means of livelihood

without which the glorious content of dignity of person would be reduced to animal

existence. In Board of Trustees of the Port of Bombay v. Dilip Kumar Ragavendra Nath

Nadkarni23 & in, D.T.C v. D.T.C Mazdoor Congress 24 the Court came to hold that ‘the

right to life guaranteed by Article 21 includes “the right to livelihood”.

The complete ban on the slaughter of cows, bulls and bullocks and prohibition on

the transport, purchase, sale and disposal of cows, bulls and bullocks for the purpose of

slaughter has been imposed by amending Section 5 of the Maratha Animal Preservation

Act, 1978. As the result of this Amendment, the butchers and cattle dealers have been

deprived of their means of livelihood. So the impugned legislation is violative of right to

livelihood envisaged under Article 21.

B.2.2 Right to eat food of one’s choice is a part of right to privacy as envisaged under

Article 21.

Right to food which is inherent to Article 21 of the Constitution which guarantees

fundamental right to life and personal liberty should be read with Article 39 (a) and 47 to

comprehend the obligations of the State in ensuring the realization of this right. Article 39

(a) of the Constitution enunciated as one of the directive principles states that the State

shall direct its policy towards securing to its citizens adequate means of livelihood and

Article 47 provides the duty of the State to raise the level of nutrition and standard of

22 (1995) 3 SCC 258


23 AIR 1983 SC 109:(1983) 1 SCC 124
24 AIR 1991 SC 101

PETITIONER 23
TEAM H

living and to improve public health 25. Thus the Constitution makes the right to food, a

fundamental right.

In the case of National Legal Services Authority v. Union of India26, the Apex court

held that Article 21 takes all those aspects which go to make a citizen’s life meaningful

and it protects personal autonomy and right of privacy. In R Rajagopal v. State of TN27,

the Supreme Court has expressly held the right to privacy or right to be let alone is

guaranteed by Article 21 of the Constitution.

Relaying on the decision of the Apex Court in the case of Kharak Singh v. State of

UP28, the Bombay High Court in the judgment in Shaikh Zahid Mukthar and Ors v. State

of Maharashtra29 held:

‘Article 21includes the right to lead a meaningful life. It protects the citizens from

unnecessary State intrusion into his home. For leading a meaningful life a citizen will

have to eat food and preferably food of his choice. If the State tells in not to eat a

particular kind of food though the same is not injurious to health, it will prevent the

citizen leading a meaningful life. If the State starts making intrusion into the personal

life of an individual by preventing him from eating food of his choice, such act may

well affect his personal liberty. Hence, even assuming that there may not be any right

of privacy, such interference will be a violation of personal liberty guaranteed by the

State’.

25 THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, ARTICLE 47


26 AIR 2014 SC 1863
27 (1994) 6 SCC 632
28 AIR 1963 SC 1295
29 Shaikh Zahid Mukthar and Ors v. State of Maharashtra, 2016 SCC Online Bom 2600

PETITIONER 24
TEAM H

In this case the Bombay High Court had struck down Section 5D of the Maharashtra

Animal Preservation Act, 1976. The Bombay High Court ruled that the law places an

unreasonable restriction on a person’s privacy.

Section 5D of the Amendment Act of 1995 prohibits any person from possessing flesh

of any cow, bull or bullock slaughtered outside the State of Maratha. It is to be noted that

even if a cow or bull or bullock is slaughtered at a place outside the state where there is no

prohibition of slaughter, the possession of the meat of such cow, bull or bullock in the state

is made an offence. This section of the Maratha Animal Preservation (Amendment) Act

1995 is an infringement of the right to eat food of one’s choice which is included in right

to privacy guaranteed under Article 21 of the Constitution. Thus the impugned legislation

is violative of Article 21.

B.3 Fundamental rights are violated for the implementation of Directive principle.

By virtue of directive principle laid down in Article 48, ‘the State shall endeavor to

organize agriculture and animal husbandry on modern and scientific lines and shall, in

particular, take steps for preserving and improving the breeds, and prohibiting the

slaughter of cows and calves and other milch and draught cattle’ 30.

Maratha Animal Preservation Act, 1978 was brought into force for the effective

implementation of the directive principle laid down in Article 48. But the total ban on

animal slaughter imposed by the Amendment Act of 1995 is violative of the fundamental

rights guaranteed under the Constitution.

Fundamental rights and directive principles of state policy together comprises the

rights of an individual. Unlike fundamental rights which are justiciable, Directive

30 CONSTITUTION OF INDIA, ARTICLE 48

PETITIONER 25
TEAM H

Principles of state policy are non-justiciable which means they are not enforceable by the

Courts.

According to Article 37, the Directive Principles of the State Policy, though they are

fundamental in the governance of the country and it shall be the duty of the State to apply

these principles in making law, but they are expressly made non-justiciable. On the other

hand, fundamental rights are enforceable by the courts and the courts are bound to declare

as void any law that is inconsistent with the fundamental rights. The Directive Principles

are not so enforceable by the courts nor can the courts declare as void any law which is

otherwise valid on the ground that it contravenes any of the directives 31.

In State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan32, the Supreme Court observed as follows:

“The Directive Principles of the State Policy, which by Article 37 are expressly made

unenforceable by Courts cannot override the provisions found in Part III which,

notwithstanding other provisions, are expressly made enforceable by appropriate writs,

orders or directions under Article 32. The Chapter on Fundamental Rights is sacrosanct

and not liable to be abridged by legislative or executive act or orders, except to the

extent provided in the appropriate article in Part III. The Directive Principles of State

Policy have to conform and to run as subsidiary to the chapter on Fundamental Rights.

In our opinion that is the correct approach in which the provision found in Parts III and

IV have to be understood. However, so long as there is no infringement of any

fundamental right to the extent conferred by the provisions in Part III, there can be no

objection the State Acting in accordance with the directive principles set out in part IV,

but subject again to the legislative and executive powers and limitations conferred on

the State under different provisions.”

31 DR J .N. PANDEY, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, 56TH Edition,2019,Central Law Agency p.498
32 AIR 1951 SC 228

PETITIONER 26
TEAM H

In the case of State of Madras v. Champakam Dorairajan 33, it was held that if any law is in

contravention to the provisions mentioned in Part III of the Constitution of India, it would

be held void but this is not applicable in case of Directive Principles of State Policy. This

shows that Fundamental rights are on higher pedestal than Directive Principles of State

Policy as far as this case is concerned.

In Re Kerala Education Bill34, the Court said that if a conflict arises between

Fundamental Right and Directive Principles of State Policies, the harmony between the

two should not be disturbed, but if, even after applying the doctrines of interpretation the

conflict doesn’t resolves then the former should be upheld and given more importance over

the other.

In I C Golaknath & Ors v. State of Punjab & Anr35, the Court was of the view that

fundamental rights cannot be curtailed by the Parliament. In Venkataraman v. State of

Madras36, the Court gave more importance to the Fundamental Rights over Directive

Principles of State Policy.

In the case of Minerva Mills v. Union of India37, the Court while deciding the case the

majority observed that the bed rock of the balance between Part III and Part IV. To give

absolute primacy to one over the other is to disturb the harmony of the Constitution which

is the essential feature of the basic structure. The goals set out in Part IV have to be

achieved without the abrogation of the means provided for by Part III. To destroy the

guarantees given by Part III in order to achieve the goals of Part IV is plainly to subvert

the constitution. Both are complementary to each other and they should be balanced for the

proper functioning of the State.

33 Ibid
34 AIR 1957 SC 956
35 1967 AIR 1643
36 1966 SCR (2) 229
37 AIR 1980 SC 1789

PETITIONER 27
TEAM H

In Unni Krishnan v. State of A.P38, the Supreme Court has reiterated the same principle

that ‘the fundamental rights and directive principles of state policy are supplementary and

complementary to each other.

In the instant case, Maratha Animal Preservation (Amendment) Act, 1995 failed to

maintain the balance between the Fundamental Rights and Directive Principles of State

Policy. For the implementation of directive principle laid down in Article 48, the

impugned statute has violated the fundamental rights guaranteed under article 19 (1) (g)

and 21 of the Constitution.

C. THE IMPUGNED STATUTE IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 301 OF

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDICA.

“All observations or impediments, whatever shape they may take to the free flow or

movement of trade and non-commercial intercourse offend Article 301 of the

constitution”39

The impugned statute violates the freedom of trade and commerce secured under Art

301 of the constitution of Republic of Indica.

C.1.The impugned statute is unconstitutional, ultra vires and void.

The freedom declared by Art 301 maybe defined as a right to free movement of persons or

thingy, tangible or intangible, commercial or non-commercial, unobstructed by barriers ,

inter-state or intra-state or any other impediments operating as such barriers. The object of

this article is to break down the border barriers between the constituent states and to make

38 (1993) 1 SCC 645


39 Automobile Transport Ltd v. State of Rajasthan, AIR 1962 SC 1406: (1963) 1 SCR 491

PETITIONER 28
TEAM H

the entire territory of the country as one unit with a view to encouraging trade and

commerce in the country 40.

In the instant case, the prohibitions imposed by the Maratha Animal Preservation

(Amendment) Act, 1995 on import and export of Cows, Bulls or Bullocks as well as sale,

purchase and disposal of them for the purpose of slaughter is in contravention of Art 301

of the constitution. So the impugned statute is unconstitutional, ultra vires and void.

In Kala Miah and others v. S C Roy and others41 , it was held that since the bill

restricts the transport of cattle for slaughter within and outside the state, it clearly violates

the provisions of Art 301 of the constitution and thus it is ultra vires.

C.2.The Amendment Act of 1995 is extraneous with the aims and objects of the

parent Act and has no nexus with the protection of cows, Bulls and bullocks.

Initially the act was brought into force in 1948 and there were no restrictions in

respect of slaughter of cows. However in 1954 the act was amended. Thereafter 1978 act

came into force. In the said act also possession of beef was not prohibited. The total ban on

the import of the flesh of the slaughtered animal is wholly extraneous with the aims and

objects the parent Act. Also, Art 48 of the constitution speaks for preservation of animals

and it doesn’t talk about animals which are already slaughtered for consumption and

imported in the state of Maratha. Thus the ban imposed of the import of flesh of the

slaughtered animals should not come under the ambit of Art 48. Also no research had been

done by the state before bringing in the said legislation.

40 DR AVTAR SINGH, THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIA,1st Edition, 2009, Allahabad Law Agency p 908
41 AIR 1964 Cal 49

PETITIONER 29
TEAM H

The impugned provisions are extraneous and have no nexus with the protection of

Cows, Bulls and Bullocks and it operates to criminalise possession of flesh of animals

which are lawfully slaughtered outside the State of Maratha. Bu virtue of the said

impugned provisions the State is seeking to impose a ban on the freedom of trade and

commerce of the individuals. Sec 5D of the impugned statute prohibits the possession of

flesh of any Cows, Bulls or Bullocks slaughtered outside the State of Maratha. It is a

stand-alone section and unconnected with the act, it’s objects and purpose. Under the guise

of implementation of the Act, the State cannot impose an unconnected provision. Thus the

act travelled far beyond the legislative sphere.

The business of sale of meat is a legitimate business. In the instant case, no

reasonable opportunity was given to the persons who are either carrying on the business of

slaughtering of Bulls and Bullocks as per sec 6 of the old act or of those who has imported

in tin or can form as is permitted, complying with the provisions of the old Act. As a result

of the sudden imposition of the ban an import of the goods (beef) which was lawfully in

possession of individuals or which was imported, suddenly had become illegal and

punishable under the Amendment Act. Also no opportunity whatsoever has been given to

the people.

In the case Saghir Ahmad v. State of Uttar Pradesh42, it was held that a law which

directly imposes a restrain upon trade and commerce as between the enacting state and

another state is not binding on the citizens. Thus a law prohibiting the import of Tendu

leaves into the state of Madhya Pradesh or of restricting the transportation within another

state would be clearly invalid.

42 AIR 1954 SC 728, 742: (1995) 1 SCR 707

PETITIONER 30
TEAM H

In the case of State of Mysore v. H Sanjeeviah43, the court held that a rule which

totally prohibits the movement of forest produce during the period between sunset and

sunrise is prohibitory or restrictive of the right to transport forest produce and thus invalid.

C.3. The impugned statute is not protected by Art 304(b) of the constitution.

Art 304(b) enables a state legislature to impose such “reasonable restrictions” on the

freedom of trade, commerce and intercourse as may be required in the “public interest”.

But no bill or amendment for this purpose shall be introduced or moved in the state

legislature without the previous sanction of the President. Thus there are three conditions

which must be satisfied in passing an act under Art 304(b):

(i) The previous sanction of the President must be obtained.

(ii) The legislation must be in the public interest; and

(iii) It must impose restrictions which are reasonable 44.

In the instant case, the Amendment Act of 1995 doesn’t obtain the previous sanction of

the President but obtained after it has been enacted in 2015. It has been held in the cases A

B Abdul Kadir v. State of Kerala 45 and State of Bihar v. Bihar Chamber of Commerce46

that the defect of not obtaining the previous sanction of the President may be cured, if

assent of the President to the act has been obtained after it has been enacted.

Article 304(b) necessarily postulates that the interest of public may require justifying the

imposition of restrictions on the freedom of trade, provided they are reasonable. In

determining the reasonableness of the restriction, it is necessary to consider the importance

of both, the freedom of trade and the requirement of public interest. It is a question of

43 AIR 1967 SC 1189 (1967) 2 SCR 361


44 NARENDER KUMAR, THE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF INDIA, 1st Edition, 2009, Allahabad Law Agency p.678
45 (1976) 3 SCC 219 : AIR 1976 SC 182
46 (1996) 9 SCC 136 : AIR 1996 SC 2344

PETITIONER 31
TEAM H

weighing one relevant consideration against another and harmonising both the competing

interests so as to serve the public interest in the end.

The impugned statute doesn’t fall under the ambit of reasonable restriction under Art

304(b). It prohibits the transport, export, as well as purchase, sale and disposal of cows,

Bulls and Bullocks for the purpose of slaughter, which is unreasonable. In the instant case,

the minority community ‘X’ was drastically affected as beef eating was their common food

habit. As the degree of poverty is higher in community ‘X’, beef eating was an easy source

of protein for them and was less costly as compared to other non-vegetarian foods. So the

ban on beef in unreasonable and it is not protected by Art 304(b).

The impugned provisions don’t show how it is in the public interest or for the public

purpose. The ban on beef doesn’t serve any public purpose. In order to impose a ban, the

state has to satisfy the court about the compelling state interest for which it was necessary

to impose the ban. The requirement of public interest and also of the reasonableness of the

restrictions is inevitable for balancing the importance of freedom of trade as against the

requirement of public interest. But the ban on beef doesn’t serve any reasonableness or

public interest.

In the case A B Abdul Kadir v. State of Kerala 47, it was held that the regulation of sale

and stocking an article like tobacco, which also constitute a health hazard and is

considered to be an article of luxury, by imposing a licence fee for the same, is a

permissible restriction in public interest within meaning of Art 304(b). But the ban of beef

is not a reasonable restriction and doesn’t serve any public interest. Also it violates Article

19(1) (g), 21 and 29 of the constitution. Thus the impugned provisions are not protected by

Art 394(b) of the constitution of Republic of Indica.

47 (1976) 3 SCC 219 : AIR 1976 SC 182

PETITIONER 32
TEAM H

PRAYER

Wherefore in the light of the issues raised, arguments advanced and authorities cited

the Petitioner most humbly and respectfully pray that this Hon’ble High Court may kindly

adjudge and declare that:

A. THE WRIT PETITION BEFORE THE HON’BLE HIGH COURT OF STATE

OF MARATHA IS MAINTAINABLE

B.THE MARATHA ANIMAL PRESERVATION (AMENDMENT) ACT, 1995 IS

ULTRAVIRES THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDICA

C.THE AMENDMENT ACT OF 1995 VIOLATES THE FUNDAMENTAL

RIGHTS OF CITIZENS OF INDICA GUARANTEED UNDER ARTICLE 19 (1)

(g) AND 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDICA

D.THE AMENDMENT ACT OF 1995 IS VIOLATIVE OF ARTICLE 301 OF

THE CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF INDICA

And may kindly pass any order that this Hon’ble High Court may deem fit.

And for this act of kindness the Counsel for the Petitioner shall in duty bound for ever
pray.

Date:
Counsel for Petitioner
Place:

PETITIONER 33

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