This document discusses two theories that focus on the role of feelings in morality: ethical subjectivism and emotivism. Ethical subjectivism holds that moral judgments are dependent on personal feelings and there are no objective moral facts. Emotivism views moral judgments not as statements of fact but as expressions of emotion, where saying "X is right" means "Hooray for X." Both theories have been criticized for failing to account for moral disagreement and knowledge. The document also analyzes key aspects of each view, such as their stances on moral truth and how moral language is used.
This document discusses two theories that focus on the role of feelings in morality: ethical subjectivism and emotivism. Ethical subjectivism holds that moral judgments are dependent on personal feelings and there are no objective moral facts. Emotivism views moral judgments not as statements of fact but as expressions of emotion, where saying "X is right" means "Hooray for X." Both theories have been criticized for failing to account for moral disagreement and knowledge. The document also analyzes key aspects of each view, such as their stances on moral truth and how moral language is used.
This document discusses two theories that focus on the role of feelings in morality: ethical subjectivism and emotivism. Ethical subjectivism holds that moral judgments are dependent on personal feelings and there are no objective moral facts. Emotivism views moral judgments not as statements of fact but as expressions of emotion, where saying "X is right" means "Hooray for X." Both theories have been criticized for failing to account for moral disagreement and knowledge. The document also analyzes key aspects of each view, such as their stances on moral truth and how moral language is used.
This document discusses two theories that focus on the role of feelings in morality: ethical subjectivism and emotivism. Ethical subjectivism holds that moral judgments are dependent on personal feelings and there are no objective moral facts. Emotivism views moral judgments not as statements of fact but as expressions of emotion, where saying "X is right" means "Hooray for X." Both theories have been criticized for failing to account for moral disagreement and knowledge. The document also analyzes key aspects of each view, such as their stances on moral truth and how moral language is used.
Download as DOCX, PDF, TXT or read online from Scribd
Download as docx, pdf, or txt
You are on page 1of 3
QUIZ 4 REVIEWERS
Part 2: The Act (Lesson 1: Feelings and Moral Decision-Making)
Feelings and Moral Decision-Making There are at least two theories in ethics that give focus on the role of feelings on morality: Metaethical Theories- analyze what makes the actions good. (emotions) 1.Ethical Subjectivism 2.Emotivism Feelings as Instinctive Response to Moral Dilemmas Some ethicists believe that ethics is also a matter of emotion. They hold that moral judgments at their best should also be emotional. Feelings are seen as also necessary in the judgment as they are even deemed by some as instinctive and trained response to moral dilemmas. Reason and emotion are not really opposites. Both abstract inference and emotional institutions or instincts are seen as having relative roles in ethical thinking. Feelings or emotions are said to be judgments about the accomplishment of one’s goals. Emotions, it is thus concluded, can be rational in being based at least sometimes on good judgments about how well a circumstance or agent accomplishes appropriate objectives. Feelings are also visceral or instinctual by providing motivations to act morally. Moral sentiments highlight the need for morality to be based also on sympathy for other people. Many ethicists conclude that being good involves both thinking and feeling. Feeling based theories in Ethics: Ethical Subjectivism: This theory basically utterly runs contrary to the principle that there is objectively in morality. Fundamentally a meta-ethical theory, Ethical Subjectivism is not about what things are good and what things are bad, It also does not tell how we should live or what moral norms we should practice. Instead, it is a theory about the nature of moral judgments. Ethical Subjectivism holds that the truth or falsity of ethical propositions is dependent on the feelings, attitudes, or standards of a person or group of persons. Contrary to the belief that morality is about objective facts, this theory states that moral judgments simply describe our personal feelings. For every controversial topic, a third stance might say that people in the first two groups are expressing their respective opinion, but where morality is concerned, there are no objective facts and no position is objectively right. This third stance represents Ethical Subjectivism. It submits that our moral opinions are based on our feelings and nothing more. The theory therefore proposes that when we say that something is morally good, this just means that we approve of that thing. Hence, the statement “X is moral” and all its variants, simply mean “I like X” or “approve of X”/ Similarly, when we state that something is morally bad this means, in the theory, that we disapprove of or do not like that thing, nothing more. Analyzing Ethical Subjectivism The theory has plenty of problems. It indicates, unbelievably, that the mere fact that we like something would make it good. This also implies that each of us is infallible so long as we are honestly expressing our respective feelings about moral issues. Furthermore, Subjectivism cannot account for the fact of disagreement in Ethics. Suppose John believes that hazing is wrong while Peter maintains it is good. Certainly, they have disagreement. In Subjectivism, however, there is no disagreement between them- both of them are correct provided that they are sincere in their feeling and beliefs. Finally, the theory could also have dangerous implications in moral education. When the theory is faithfully subscribed to, children would be taught, to simply follow their likes and dislikes. Deficient in providing us any guide on how to develop sensible and proper feelings, the theory, in effect, tells us to simply follow our personal feeling and emotions. Emotivism: One way to look at Emotivism is to view it as an improved version of Subjectivism. Considered by its proponents as far more subtle and sophisticated than Subjectivism, Emotivism is deemed invulnerable to many objections. This theory that was developed chiefly by the American philosopher Charles L. Stevenson (1909-1979) has been one of the most influential theories of Ethics in the 20th Century. The theory basically states that moral judgments express positive or negative feelings. “X is right” merely means “Hooray for X”- and “X is immoral” just means “Boo on X!” Since ethical judgments are essentially commands and exclamations, they are not true or false; so there cannot be moral truths and moral judgments. Emotivism is actually the most popular form of non-cognitivism, the meta-ethical theory that claims that ethical sentences do not convey authentic propositions. Moral judgments according to Emotivism, are not statements of fact but are mere expressions of the emotions of the speaker, especially since they are usually feelings-based. In denying moral truths and moral knowledge, some emotivists base their stance on logical positivism, which claims that any legitimate truth claim must be empirically verifiable. It is held that since moral judgments cannot be tested by sense experience, they cannot be authentic truth claims but can only express feelings. To understand how the theory views moral judgments, it would help to note that language is used in a variety of ways. Language can be used to state facts or what we believe to be facts: Ex: “Marcos was a president of the Philippines”, “Gasoline costs Php 50 per litter”, and “Jose Rizal is the author Noli Me Tangere” In each case, we are saying something that is either true or false, and the purpose of utterance is typically, to convey information to the listener. Language may be used to utter statements that are neither true or false, statements that are not actually statements but are commands. Its purpose is not to convey information but to get one to do something Ex: “Close the door”, “Go to sleep”, and “Read your notes.” In giving a command, you are not being altered in your beliefs; instead you are being influenced by conduct. Aside from commands, the following utterances are also not statements of fact: “Hurrah for Marcos!”; “Boo on the price of gasoline!”; and “Alright Jose Rizal!” None of these can be true or false- it would make no sense to say: “It is true that hurrah for Marcos” or “It is false that boo on the price of gasoline.” Note that these sentences are not used to state facts. Instead, they are used to express the speaker’s attitudes. Now, we also need to note the difference between reporting an attitude between reporting an attitude and expressing the same attitude. If I say “I like Marcos,” I am reporting the fact that I have a positive attitude toward him. The statement is a statement of fact, which is either true or false. On the other hand, if I shout “Hurrah for Marcos!” I am not stating any sort of fact, not even a fact about my attitudes. I am rather expressing an attitude, but no reporting that I have it. With these points in mind, let us turn our attention to ethical sentences. According to Emotivism, utterances in ethics are not fact-stating sentences, that is, they are not used to convey information. Emotivism claims that they have two entirely different purposes: 1. First, they are used as a means of influencing other’s behavior. 2. Second, moral-sentences are used to express (not report) the speaker’s attitude. So there lies the difference between Emotivism and Subjectivism Subjectivism interprets ethical sentences as statements of fact, particularly as reports of the speaker’s attitudes. Emotivism on the other hand, denies that the utterance does not state any fact at all, even a fact about him. Evaluating Emotivism: It is barely sensible to base a moral theory on logical positivism as this view has been abandoned and rejected by philosophers. For one thing, logical positivism is self-refuting as the view is not itself verifiable by sense experience and thus would not be a genuine truth claim on its own grounds. It is thus unsurprising that Emotivism, too is prone to serious criticism. Emotivism provides morality with insufficient explanations. In denying moral truths and moral knowledge, it seems to dilute what morality is instead of elucidating it. It is also unclear how the ethical “good” can be reasonably reducible to mere exclamation.
Ethical Subjectivism- both can be true or right
Emotivism- None of this is true or false, right or wrong
DR Surya Deva, DR David Bilchitz - Human Rights Obligations of Business - Beyond The Corporate Responsibility To Respect - Cambridge University Press (2013)