NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
Virtual Meeting of December 7, 2021
(Information subject to editing)
Hazardous Liquid Pipeline Strike and Subsequent Explosion and Fire
Aboard Dredging Vessel Waymon Boyd
EPIC Marine Terminal, Corpus Christi Ship Channel, Corpus Christi,
Texas
August 21, 2020
DCA20FM026
This is a synopsis from the NTSB’s report and does not include the Board’s rationale for
the findings, probable cause, and safety recommendations. NTSB staff is currently
making final revisions to the report from which the attached findings and safety
recommendations have been extracted. The final report and pertinent safety
recommendation letters will be distributed to recommendation recipients as soon as
possible. The attached information is subject to further review and editing to reflect
changes adopted during the Board meeting.
Executive Summary
What Happened
On August 21, 2020, about 0802 central daylight time, the US-flagged dredge
Waymon Boyd struck a submerged 16-inch liquid propane pipeline during dredging
operations in Corpus Christi, Texas. A geyser of propane gas and water erupted
adjacent to the vessel. Shortly thereafter, propane gas engulfed the vessel and an
explosion occurred. Fire damaged the vessel and surrounding shoreline. A total of 18
personnel employed by Orion Marine Group were working or resting on the dredge
and assist boats (tender boats, anchor barges, booster barges, and a supply barge) on
the day of the accident. Three crewmembers aboard the Waymon Boyd and one on an
adjacent anchor barge died in the explosion and fire. Six crewmembers aboard the
dredge were injured, one of whom later died from his injuries. The Waymon Boyd,
valued at $9.48 million, was a total loss. The cost of pipeline damage was $2.09 million.
The cost of physical damage to the EPIC facility was $120,000.
What We Found
The accident occurred because the Waymon Boyd’s rotating cutterhead struck
Enterprise Products’ pipeline TX219, breaching the pipeline, which allowed propane
gas to escape, surround the dredge, and ignite within the engine room, causing the
explosion. Inadequate planning and risk management by the dredging company,
Orion Marine Group, meant that not enough controls were in place to mitigate the risk
of the cutterhead breaching pipeline TX219.
We also found that the engineering drawings for the dredging project were deficient,
which led to the Orion Marine Group project engineer misinterpreting information
within the drawings and communicating incomplete and inaccurate information during
the one-call (call before you dig) process, which dissuaded Enterprise Products from
protecting pipeline TX219 in accordance with the company’s damage prevention
program.
Pipeline protection measures specific to dredging, such as greater collaboration
between pipeline operators and dredging companies, sharing GPS coordinates of
pipelines, improved marking requirements, and tolerance zones for dredging, could
have prevented this accident.
Probable Cause
We determined that the probable cause of this accident was Orion Marine Group’s
inadequate planning and risk management processes, which failed to identify the
proximity of their dredging operation to Enterprise Products’ pipeline TX219 and
resulted in the absence of effective controls to prevent the dredge’s cutterhead from
striking the pipeline. Contributing to the accident were deficient dredging plans
provided by Schneider Engineering and Consulting, which resulted in incomplete and
inaccurate information communicated to Enterprise Products by Orion Marine Group
during the one-call process, which resulted in insufficient measures to protect the
pipeline from excavation damage.
What We Recommended
As a result of this investigation, we made recommendations to the companies involved
in the accident to implement or update policies and procedures for dredging near
pipelines. We also made recommendations to a federal regulator and industry
organizations about developing additional guidance and training specific to pipeline
protection for marine dredging projects and establishing tolerance zone guidance for
marine construction and dredging projects near pipelines.
Findings
1. None of the following were safety issues for the accident: (1) experience and
qualifications of the vessel and pipeline personnel; (2) fatigue; (3) distraction
from cell phone use; (4) vessel mechanical and electrical systems failures; (5)
environmental conditions; (6) leak detection systems on pipeline TX219; (7)
pipeline operating history and operating pressure; (8) pipeline integrity; (9)
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transport of non-odorized propane in the pipeline; or (10) pipeline depth of
cover.
2. Enterprise’s pipeline TX219 was struck by the dredge Waymon Boyd’s rotating
cutterhead, causing a breach in the line that allowed propane to escape and
form a gas cloud that surrounded the dredge.
3. Propane gas that had released from pipeline TX219 was drawn into the
Waymon Boyd’s engine room by the ventilation fans and was ignited, causing
the explosion.
4. The Enterprise pipeline controller’s and pipeline technicians’ actions to secure
the pipeline were appropriate and facilitated a timely shutdown.
5. Given the GPS margin of error, potential inaccuracies in the dredging
configuration information, and the resolution of the DREDGEPACK display, the
dredging area specified in the Schneider Engineering and Consulting plans
was too close to pipeline TX219 for safe excavation using a cutterhead dredge.
6. Orion Marine Group did not have adequate procedures to require that
pipelines be identified and included in DREDGEPACK; thus, the Waymon
Boyd’s leverman was unaware how close he was operating the cutterhead to
the pipeline.
7. Orion Marine Group’s planning and risk management process was inadequate,
which resulted in their failure to identify and mitigate the risk of a cutterhead
impact with pipeline TX219.
8. The Schneider Engineering and Consulting plans provided to Orion Marine
Group for the EPIC dock project were deficient because they did not clearly
depict the extent of the dredging area or the pipeline location in all drawings,
which resulted in the Orion Marine Group project engineer misinterpreting the
information, overestimating the distance between the dredging area and
pipeline TX219, and communicating incomplete and inaccurate information
during the one-call process, which dissuaded Enterprise from protecting
pipeline TX219 in accordance with the company’s damage prevention
program.
9. Marine dredging projects require a greater level of collaboration and review
between pipeline operators and dredging companies than the one-call
process provides because of the challenges associated with marking marine
pipelines and the lack of precision associated with dredging operations.
10. Third-party damage prevention efforts would be improved if dredging
companies obtained accurate location data from pipeline operators for
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pipelines within and near dredging project boundaries to incorporate into
dredge control software files.
11. Although Enterprise courtesy-marked the pipelines with cane poles, the
markers did not meet pipeline excavation damage protection standards, nor
were they required to based on the incorrect information provided by Orion,
and therefore were insufficient to visually warn the leverman of the danger of
the pipeline.
12. Project boundary marking requirements for dredging projects (equivalent to
land-based white-lining requirements) would provide utility operators with
additional visual information about the location of dredging projects to
confirm any encroachment of the proposed project on pipelines.
13. The clearance required by existing state-regulated tolerance zones is not
adequate for large-scale dredging activities because of the inherent
inaccuracies associated with operating a cutterhead dredge.
14. The Enterprise damage prevention program did not provide for an adequate
tolerance zone for dredging projects.
15. Written policies and procedures could have eliminated confusion about the
pipeline TX219 location and minimum tolerance distances for pipeline
damage prevention.
16. Because Schneider Engineering and Consulting did not have company
specifications, quality control measures, or best practices for including pipeline
hazards and tolerance zones in their engineering plans and drawings, the
engineering plans and drawings did not clearly reflect the proximity of the
pipeline to the full dredging area.
17. The dredge crew lacked function-specific pipeline safety training and
emergency procedures that could have prepared them to react quicker and
more effectively to the gas pipeline strike.
Recommendations
To Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration:
1. In collaboration with Coastal and Marine Operators and the Council for
Dredging and Marine Construction Safety, develop recommended practices
and processes for pipeline operators and dredging companies to obtain and
use accurate pipeline location data during planning and one-call locating
activities for pipelines both in and near project locations.
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2. In collaboration with Coastal and Marine Operators and the Council for
Dredging and Marine Construction Safety, develop guidance for excavators to
clearly identify proposed dredging boundaries for dredging projects before
notifying one-call centers by either physically marking the boundaries where
practicable, or identifying the boundary with accurate location data.
3. Include criteria for minimum tolerance or safety zones for dredging in state
pipeline safety program evaluation guidelines.
To Coastal and Marine Operators:
4. Modify the existing Working Safely Near Underwater Pipelines online pipeline
safety training to incorporate lessons learned from this accident.
To Coastal and Marine Operators and the Council for Dredging and Marine
Construction Safety:
5. Work with the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration to
develop recommended practices and processes for pipeline operators and
dredging companies to obtain and use accurate pipeline location data during
planning and one-call locating activities for pipelines both in and near project
locations.
6. Work with the Pipeline and Hazardous Materials Safety Administration to
develop guidance for excavators to clearly identify proposed dredging
boundaries for dredging projects before notifying one-call centers by either
physically marking the boundaries where practicable or identifying the
boundary with accurate location data.
To Orion Group Holdings:
7. Require Orion Marine Group to, for all future dredging projects, conduct a
formal, documented risk assessment with risk analysis, such as a risk matrix,
before starting work, and based on the risk assessment, develop a hazard
control plan.
8. Require Orion Marine Group to develop standardized, written policies and
procedures for planning dredging operations near pipelines that include
pipeline operator engagement on pipeline avoidance measures, minimum
tolerance zones, minimum requirements for marking and verifying pipelines,
and uploading of pipeline information into DREDGEPACK or other navigation
software.
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9. Require Schneider Engineering and Consulting to develop specifications and
quality control measures to ensure pipeline and other hazard data is included
and clearly represented in engineering plans and drawings, to include
depicting tolerance distances from underwater pipelines.
To Enterprise Products:
10. Revise your damage prevention program guidelines to include a larger
tolerance zone for dredging operations.
