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PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES v. JOSE RAYRAY y AREOLA

G.R. No. 90628 , February 1, 1995

After offering to sell 2.9452 grams of marijuana to a stranger in San Fernando, La Union, who turned out
to be the Chief Administrative Officer of the Regional Integrated National Police (INP) Command
stationed in Baguio City, accused-appellant Jose Rayray y Areola was arrested, tried and subsequently
convicted of violation of Sec. 4, Art. II of R. A. No. 6425.

The antecedents as found by the trial court: At nine forty-five in the morning of 12 September 1986 P/Lt.
Ramon Ancheta was at the Friendly Shop located at Ortega St., San Fernando, La Union, when accused-
appellant Jose Rayray y Areola approached him offering to sell marijuana. Making the latter believe that
he was interested in buying, Lt. Ancheta asked where the merchandise was and accused-appellant
responded by taking marijuana wrapped in komiks from his pocket. Catching sight of the marijuana
fruiting tops and marijuana cigarette being offered him, Lt. Ancheta immediately identified himself as a
police officer, arrested accused-appellant and brought him to the San Fernando Police Station where he
was turned over to the desk officer, Sgt. Carmelito Leyga, who entered the details of the arrest in the
police blotter.

Accused-appellant denied making the offer to sell and instead testified that he was at Dodies' Fishing
Supply at Ortega Street with his friend Bonifacio Chan to buy fish hooks when he was suddenly tapped
on the shoulder by somebody who whispered, "Don't try to involve somebody." After being ordered to
undress, he was made to face the stranger who was holding something wrapped in paper and which he
tried to pass off as that of accused-appellant by saying, "You are selling marijuana." Afterwards,
accused-appellant was forced into a tricycle, brought to the municipal jail and there incarcerated for no
reason.

On 29 August 1989, rejecting the defense of frame-up and invoking the presumption of regularity in the
performance of official duties in favor of the prosecution, Judge Benito A. Dacanay declared accused-
appellant guilty of the offense charged and sentenced him to suffer life imprisonment and to pay a fine
of P20,000.00. [1]

Hence, this recourse to us. But for reasons set forth below, the appeal should be denied.

Accused-appellant argues that his arrest was illegal because P/Lt. Ancheta had no authority to arrest
persons in San Fernando, La Union, being then assigned at the Regional INP Command in Baguio City. [2]

We cannot yield to appellant's view that just because Lt. Ancheta was assigned in Baguio City he could
not arrest persons caught in the act of committing a crime in some other place, especially so where he
was the intended victim. A policeman cannot callously set aside his essential duty of apprehending
criminal offenders and of keeping peace and order on the shallow excuse that he is not in his place of
assignment. His responsibility to protect the public by apprehending violators of the law, especially one
caught in flagrante delicto is not limited by territorial constraints. It follows him wherever he goes.
Moreover, Sec. 5, par. (a), Rule 113, of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure authorizes a warrantless
arrest, otherwise called a citizen's arrest, "when, in his presence, the person to be arrested has
committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit an offense." Thus, although officially
assigned in Baguio City, Lt. Ancheta's act of arresting accused-appellant (after the latter offered to sell
him marijuana in San Fernando, La Union) is justified not only by his duty as a law enforcer but also by
Sec. 5 of Rule 113, which authorizes instances of warrantless or citizens' arrests.

Second, accused-appellant takes exception to the fact that the trial judge accepted the uncorroborated
testimony of P/Lt. Ancheta over his which was in fact corroborated by two other witnesses.

The argument is without merit. No rule exists which requires that a testimony has to be corroborated to
be adjudged credible. [3] Witnesses are to be weighed, not numbered, [4] hence, it is not at all
uncommon to reach a conclusion of guilt on the basis of the testimony of a single witness and despite
the lack of corroboration where such testimony is found positive and credible by the trial court. In such
a case, the lone testimony is sufficient to produce a conviction. [5] For although the number of
witnesses may be considered a factor in the appreciation of evidence, preponderance is not necessarily
with the greatest number [6] and conviction can still be had on the basis of the credible and positive
testimony of a single witness more so when such testimony proceeds from the positive narration of a
police officer who, in addition, has to his credit the presumption of regularity in the performance of
official duty and obedience to law. [7] Narration of an incident by prosecution witnesses who are police
officers and who are presumed to have regularly performed their duties is credible. [8]

In the case at bench, while details of accused-appellant's offense came from the lone testimony of P/Lt.
Ancheta, that of the defense is admittedly corroborated by the testimonies of witnesses Gabriel Galvez
and Bonifacio Chan. However, such fact failed to render the version offered by the defense more
credible and believable than that of the prosecution. Apart from the fact that both Galvez and Chan are
not entirely disinterested witnesses, being a companion in the fishing business [9] and close friend or
barkada of accused-appellant, [10] respectively, a review of their respective testimonies vis-a-vis that of
accused-appellant reveals certain points which render their corroboration not so reliable, as correctly
concluded by the court a quo.

Accused-appellant testified that in the morning of 12 September 1986 while packing fish in the house of
Junior Galvez (also known as Gabriel Galvez), he suddenly remembered that somebody from Pangasinan
requested him to buy fish hooks and that was why he asked permission from Galvez to go to Dodies
Fishing Supply at Ortega Street. [11] However, Junior Galvez testified that it was he himself who asked
accused-appellant to buy the fish hooks and that he did so in the same morning in question. [12]
Secondly, Galvez testified that he was informed about the arrest of accused-appellant by the latter's
grandmother, an old woman called Isten (not presented as a witness). [13] However, Bonifacio Chan
claimed that it was from him that Gabriel Galvez learned of the incident. [14] Third, while Bonifacio
Chan corroborated accused-appellant's defense by claiming to have witnessed the alleged frame-up, it is
curious to note that Chan did not even lift a finger to help accused-appellant (his supposed close friend)
while the latter was allegedly being ordered to undress and forced into a vehicle by an "unknown man"
in civilian clothes for no apparent reason. Instead, Chan appeared unaffected by his friend's fate for he
just went home after the incident [15] and did nothing except to inform Galvez (who even denied that
he learned about the incident from Chan) about the arrest, who in the same manner, likewise did
nothing by way of succor. [16] If the story about the alleged frame-up is true, a friend as Chan claims
himself to be would do everything in his power to assist his friend and not abandon him as Chan
practically did. It even appears from the records that Bonifacio Chan initially refused to testify for the
defense (by refusing to receive the subpoena being served on him) and denied any knowledge about the
incident, nay, even his close association with accused-appellant. [17]

Third, accused-appellant argues that there was misappreciation of evidence since the judge who
decided the case was not the one who conducted the trial. [18]

Again, we cannot ascribe any merit to the argument since it is now well recognized that the fact that the
judge who heard the evidence is not himself the one who prepared, signed and promulgated the
decision, but some other judge in his place, constitutes no compelling reason to jettison his findings and
conclusions [19] and does not per se render it erroneous. [20] The trial judge's assessment of the
credibility of a testimony is not to be anchored solely on how the witness conducted himself on the
witness stand. Aside from the danger of being misled by appearances inherent in such a case, a judge is
supposed to render a decision on the basis of the evidence before him, i. e., records and all. Although an
undeniable tool in arriving at the correct decision, the failure of the trial judge to observe the witnesses
testify on the stand in no way affects the validity of the judgment rendered or ipso facto condemns it as
erroneous more so where the judgment appears to be fully supported by the evidence on record as in
the case at bench.

Finally, with respect to accused-appellant's contention that his constitutional rights were violated during
the custodial investigation conducted by the San Fernando Police, we can only say that although he was
admittedly not informed of his constitutional rights, much less assisted by counsel during the
interrogation, such did not paralyze the cause for the prosecution because the confession allegedly
elicited from him that the subject marijuana was indeed confiscated from him [21] does not constitute
the whole fabric of the evidence for the prosecution. It should be remembered that accused-appellant's
attempt at selling marijuana was succinctly and clearly detailed by the positive testimony of P/Lt.
Ancheta as earlier pointed out. Thus, although the alleged admission is inadmissible in evidence having
been obtained from accused-appellant without the assistance of counsel, the act constituting the
offense (offer to sell marijuana) was nevertheless credibly established by the prosecution coupled with
the presentation of the corpus delicti [22] of the offense making accused-appellant's conviction
inevitable.

But, a modification in the penalty imposed on accused-appellant is called for in view of the amendments
introduced by R. A. No. 7659. [23] The court a quo sentenced accused-appellant to life imprisonment
and to pay a fine of P20,000.00. However, under Sec. 20 of R. A. No. 6425 (The Dangerous Drugs Act of
1972) as amended by Sec. 17 of R. A. No. 7659, the illegal sale of marijuana is now penalized with
reclusion perpetua to death and a fine ranging from P500,000.00 to P10,000,000.00 if the marijuana
unlawfully sold is 750 grams or more; otherwise, if the quantity is less than 750 grams, the penalty shall
range from prision correccional to reclusion temporal [24] without fine. Since the amount of marijuana
confiscated from accused-appellant is only 2.9452 grams, the proper imposable component penalty is
prision correccional to be applied in its medium period in view of the absence of any mitigating or
aggravating circumstance. Applying the Indeterminate Sentence Law, the maximum penalty shall be
taken from the medium period of prision correccional, which is two (2) years, four (4) months and one
(1) day to four (4) years and two (2) months, while the minimum shall be taken from the penalty next
lower in degree, which is arresto mayor the range of which is one (1) month and one (1) day to six (6)
months.
WHEREFORE, the decision of the Regional Trial Court of San Fernando, La Union, Br. 28, declaring
accused-appellant JOSE RAYRAY Y AREOLA guilty of violating Sec. 4, Art. II, of R. A. No. 6425 is AFFIRMED
with the modification that he is sentenced to suffer an indeterminate prison term of six (6) months of
arresto mayor maximum as minimum to four (4) years and two (2) months of prision correccional
medium as maximum.

It appearing that accused-appellant has already been detained at the New Bilibid Prisons in Muntinlupa
for more than seven (7) years, he is ordered immediately released from custody unless he is held for
some other lawful cause.

SO ORDERED.