Public Interest Litigation No. /2021

1st NSL INTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2021

TEAM CODE – 18

1ST NSL INTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2021

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIVA
(PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION)
PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION NO. /2021
1. KAMLA MEHTA
2. LAMNESTY INTERNATIONAL
3. RAJU KUMAR.
.................................................................................................PETITIONER
VS.
UNION OF INDIVA.
..................................................................................................RESPONDET
UPON SUBMISSION TO THE SPECIAL BENCH OF THE SUPREME

COURT OF INDIVA
THE HUMBLE SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER
MEMORIAL for PETITIONER Page 1 of 44

-TABLE OF CONTENTS-
LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................... 04
INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................. 06
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ................................................................................ 10
STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................................................... 11
ISSUES RAISED ............................................................................................................... 12
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ....................................................................................... 13
ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ........................................................................................... 15
I. THAT SEDITION CANNOT BE DETERMINED ONLY ON THE BASIS OF THE

CONTENT OF THE LANGUAGE USED TO CAUSE DISAFFECTION, HATRED OR
CONTEMPT ....................................................................................................................... 15
A. THE LANGUAGE OF THE CONTENT DOES NOT DETERMINE DISAFFECTION,

HATRED OR CONTEMPT ................................................................................................ 15
B.) THE EFFORT AND INTENTION OF THE LANGUAGE USED ARE IMPORTANT
INGREDIENTS .................................................................................................................. 16
C.) LANGUAGE DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE AMBIT OF ART. 19(2) ................... 17
II. THAT SEDITION CANNOT BE DETERMINED ONLY INSOFAR AS SEDITIOUS

SPEECH TENDED TO INCITE PUBLIC DISORDER ...................................................... 18
A. THE LAW OF SEDITION IS VAGUE IN MEANNING AND APPLICATION ............ 18
1. The law is vague and ambiguous in language .................................................................. 18
2. The ‘tendency’ to incite public disorder is an undefined and arbitrary concept................. 18
B. THERE MUST BE IMMINENT THREAT TO THE ‘STATE’ IN ANY FORM ............ 19
C. ALTERNATIVE LEGISLATIONS FOR PROTECTION AND SECURITY OF STATE

........................................................................................................................................... 20
III. [A] KEDAR NATH RULING OF SUPREME COURT OF INDIA LIMITING

INTERPRETATION OF SEDITION TO PUBLIC DISORDER-CAUSING SPEECH MAKES
IT EASY FOR IT TO BE INVOKED AGAINST ALL DISSENTERS ............................... 22
A. THE KEDAR NATH JUDGEMENT IS SUBJECTIVE AND OPEN ENDED ............... 22

B. THE INTERPRETATION IS USED FOR CRIMINALISING MERE POLITCIAL

DISSENT AND OVERRIDING THE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS GUARANTEED IN
THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION ........................................................................................ 23
III. [B] SUCH AN INTERPRETATION IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH FREE SPEECH

UNDER ART. 19(1)(A) OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION ............................................ 25
A. RESTRICTION IMPOSED IS NOT PROPORTIONAL AND UNREASONABLE IN

NATURE ............................................................................................................................ 26
1.IT CAUSES THE CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPERMISSIBLE CHILLING EFFECT ON

SPEECH ............................................................................................................................ 26
2. IT IS AGAINST THE EFFECTIVE DOCTRINE ............................................................ 27
B. SECTION 124(A) IS CONSTITUTIONALLY ULTRA VIRES AND SHOULD BE

STRUCK DOWN ............................................................................................................... 28
1. SECTION 124(A) IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS

........................................................................................................................................... 28
2. THE ALTERNATE LEGISLATIONS IN PRACTICE DILUTE THE NECESSITY OF

THE SEDITION LAW........................................................................................................ 29
IV. THAT THE SECTION 124A OF IPC INFRINGES THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF
FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION ENSHRINED UNDER ARTICLE 19(1) (A)
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIVA ............................................................................ 30
A. THE SEDITION LAW IS BECOMING A TOOL OF HARASSMENT ......................... 30
B. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HATE SPEECH & SEDITION ........................................... 30
V. THAT THE SECTION 124A OF IPC INFRINGES THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO

LIFE AND LIBERTY ENSHRINED UNDER ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDIVA .............................................................................................................................. 40
A. 42ND REPORT OF LAW COMMISSION (1971) ........................................................... 42
PRAYER ........................................................................................................................... 44

NSL INTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2021
-LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS-
Abbreviations Full-Form
¶ Paragraph
§ Section
& And
AIR All India Reporter
Anr. Another
AP Andhra Pradesh
Art. Article
Aug August
Bom. Bombay
Cal. Calcutta
Cent. Central
cl. Clause
Co. Company
Const. Constitution
Cri. Criminal
CrLJ Criminal Law Journal
Del Delhi
Ed. Edition
HC High Court
Hon’ble Hounourable
i.e. That is
ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political

Rights
Id. Ibidem

ILR Indian Law Review
IPC Indian Penal Code
J&K Jammu & Kashmir
J. Justice
Ker. Kerala
Ltd. Limited
MP Madhya Pradesh
NCT National Capital Territory
No. Number
Ors. Others
Para Paragraph
PC Privy Council
PIL Public Interest Litigation
Prop. Proposition
Punj. Punjab
SC Supreme Court
SCC Supreme Court Cases
SCR Supreme Court Reporter
U.S. United States
UAPA Unlawful Activities Prevention Act
UP Uttar Pradesh
v. Versus
Viz. Namely
WP Writ Petition

-INDEX OF AUTHORITIES-
INDIAN CASES
A.K. Roy & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors , (1982) 1 SCC 271 (India). ................................ 22
Ajay Goswami v. Union of India, (2007) 1 SCC 143 (India). .............................................. 26
Asit Kumar Sen Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh,Cri. App No. 86 of 2011 (India). ................ 16
Balwant Singh & Anr. v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214 (India). ................. 15, 16, 20, 37
Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India (1972) SCC 788 (India). .......................... 26, 27,33
Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of AP, (1977) 7 SCC 431 (India). ............................................ 19
Chandrakant Kalyandas Kakodhar v. State of Maharashtra, (1969) 2 SCC 130 (India) ........ 26
Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1951 (38) SC 118 (India). ................. 26, 38
Chintaman Rao v. State of UP (1950 SCR 759) (India). ...................................................... 26
Common Cause v. Union of India, (2016) 15 SCC 269 (India). ........................................... 24
Director General of Doordarshan v. Anand Parwardhan, (2006) 8 SCC 433 (India) ............. 26
Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. Sholapur & Weaving Co., (1954) SCR. 119 (India) ...................... 27
H.R. Bhantia v. Union of India, (1969) 2 SCC 166 (India) .................................................. 22
HANIF QURESHI V. STATE OF BIHAR AIR 1958 SC 731)............................................ 39
I.R Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2007 SC 861(India). ............................................. 25
Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975 AIR 1590 (India). .......................................................... 25
Indirect Tax Practitioners Assn. v. R. K. Jain (2010) 8 SCC 281(India). .............................. 29
Jolly Varghese v. Bank of Cochin, 1980 AIR 470 (India). ................................................... 28
K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2018) 1 SCC 809 (India). ........................................... 25
Kanhaiya Kumar v. State Of Nct Of Delhi,Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 558/ 2016 (India). . 25
Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (1994) 3 SCC 569 (India). .................................................. 22
Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar, AIR (1962) SC 955 (India). ........... 16, 18, 22, 23, 24, 26, 27, 30
Khushboo v. Kanniammal(2010) 5 SCC 600 (India)............................................................ 27
King Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao, AIR (1947) PC 82 (India). ..................... 23, 34
KishorechandraWangkhemcha&Anr v. UOI, WP (Crl.) 106/2021 (India) ................ 24, 29, 30
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 2 SCR 621 (India). ....................... 19, 25, 28, 32, 41
Modern Dental College & Research Centre v. State of M.P. (2016) 7 SCC 353 (India). ...... 21
Namit Sharma v. Union of India, (2013) 1 SCC 745 (India) ................................................ 22
Nazir Khan v. State of Delhi (2003) 8 SCC 461 (India). ...................................................... 16
NiharenduDutt Majumdar v. King Emperor , AIR 1939 (Cal.) 703 (India). ......................... 23
P.J Manuel v. State of Kerala, ILR (2013) 1 Ker 793 (India). .............................................. 15

Pankaj Butalia v. CentralBoard of Film Certification &Ors., 2015 SCC OnLine Del 9694
(India). ................................................................................................................................ 17
Papnasam Labour Union v. Madura Coats Ltd., (1995) 1 SCC 501 (India) .......................... 26
Queen Empress v. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, ILR 1898 22 (Bom.) 112 (India). ................... 16, 33
R.C Cooper v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 564 (India). .................................................... 25
R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, 1970 1 SCC 248 (India). ..................................................... 25
Ram Manohar Lohia&Ors. v. Union of India (1960) 2 SCR 821(India). .............................. 19
Ram Nandan v. State, 1958 SCC OnLine All 117: AIR 1959 All 101 (FB) (India) ........ 17, 23
Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra, (1965) 1 SCR 65 (India) ..................................... 26
Romesh Thapar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124 (India) ............................ 17, 19, 26, 27
S. Rangarajan v. P.Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 SCC 574 (India)................................................ 27
S.GVomabatkere&Ors. v. Union of India &Ors., Writ Petition (C) No. 829 of 2013, (India).
........................................................................................................................................... 27
Sabir Raza v. The State, Cri App No. 1434 of 1955 (India). ................................................ 17
Sakal Papers v. Union Of India, (1962) 3 SCR 842. ............................................................ 27
Samaresh Bose v. Amal Mitra, (1985) 4 SCC 289 (India) .................................................... 26
Sanskar Marathe v. State of Maharashtra, 2015 SCC OnLine Bom 587 (India).
...................................................................................... ……………….17, 24, 27, 35, 36, 37
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, AIR 2015 SC 1523 (India). ....................................... 18, 33
State of Bihar v. K.K. Mishra, 1971 AIR 1667 (India) ......................................................... 26
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Baldeo Prasad, (1961) 1 SCR 970 (India)................................. 22
Tara Singh Gopi Chand v. The State, AIR (1951) Punj. 27 (India). ..................................... 17
Union of India v. Ganayutham, (1997)7 SCC 463 (India). ................................................... 26
Vinod Dua v. Union of India &Anr., 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1209 (India). ........................... 29
Zakir Hussain v. UT of Ladakh, 2021 SCC OnLine J&K 64 (India). ................................... 17
FOREIGN CASES
Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) .............................................................................. 22

Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (N.D.) ....................................................... 18
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958) .............................................................................. 26
BOOKS
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, 556, (4th ed. 1968) ........................................................... 18

K.D GAUR, INDIAN PENAL CODE 675 (9th ed. 2019)..................................................... 24

RATANLAL AND DHIRAJLAL, LAW OF CRIMES 491 (24th ed. 1997). ........................ 25
RATANLAL AND DHIRAJLAL, THE INDIAN PENAL CODE 501 (36th ed. 2019) ........ 15
STATUTES
INDIA CONST. Art 19 cl. (1). ............................................................................................ 18

INDIA CONST. art. 19 cl. (2), amended by The Constitution, (First Amendment) Act, 1951
........................................................................................................................................... 18
INDIA CONST. art. 19 cl. (2). ............................................................................................ 18
The Indian Penal Code 1860, No. 45 of 1860, § 124(A). ..................................................... 15
The Indian Penal Code 1860, No. 45 of 1860, § 505 cl. (1) sub cl. (b) and 505 cl. (1) sub cl. (c)
of IPC. ................................................................................................................................ 22
The National Security Act, 1980, No. 65, Acts of Parliament, 1980 (India) ......................... 23
The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, No. 37, § 3 (2). ........................................ 30
The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, No. 37, § 3(1)(a). ..................................... 30
The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, No. 37, § 8 (1). ........................................ 31
The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, No. 37, Acts of Parliament, 1967 (India) .. 23
INDIAN LAW REPORTS
Law Commission Report on Consultation Paper on Sedition, 2018 ..................................... 23

NATIONAL CRIME RECORDS BUREAU (NCRB), CRIME IN INDIA (2019). .............. 22
JOURNALS AND ARTICLES
Akshita Saxena, Presumption of Constitutionality Doesn’t Apply To Pre-Constitutional

Laws: former Union Minister Arun Shourie Moves Supreme Court Against Sedition Law,
LIVELAW, (Oct. 02, 2021, 2:34 P.M), https://www.livelaw.in/columns/sedition-ipc-124a-
article-19-1-a-of-the-indian-constitution-independence-of-the-judiciary-178280..................25
Ananya Kuthiala, Sedition and the Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression, THE SCC
ONLINE BLOG. (Oct. 06, 2021, 9:27 A.M)
https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2017/12/12/sedition-right-freedom-speech-expression/
……………………………………………………………………………………………….30
Criminal libel and sedition offences abolished, PRESS GAZETTE, (Oct. 31st, 2021, 3:09
P.M), https://www.pressgazette.co.uk/criminal-libel-and-sedition-offences-abolished.........30
Deepak Gupta, Justice Deepak Gupta: Law of Sedition Needs to be Toned down if not
Abolished, THE WIRE, (Oct. 01, 2021, 5:30 AM) https://thewire.in/law/justice-deepak-
gupta-supreme-court-sedition ………………………………………………………………22

Judith S. Koffler and Bennett L. Gershman, New Seditious Libel, CORNELL LAW
REVIEW, (Oct. 15, 2021, 7:14 A.M),
https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4352&context=clr. ………29
Narayanan Aishawarya, A Theoretical Analysis of the Law on Sedition in India, CHRIST
UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL, (Oct. 05, 2021, 10:20
AM),https://journals.christuniversity.in/index.php/culj/article/view/490…………………..15
Parthasarathy Suhrith, Sedition and the Government, THE HINDU, (Oct. 17th, 2021, 4:23
PM) http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/Sedition-and-the-
government/article14082471.ece...........................................................................................15
Rae Langton, Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts, JSTOR, (Oct 24, 2021 2:18 PM)
www.jstor.org/stable/2265469 ……………………………………………………………...17
Reema Omer, India’s Sedition law is just another colonial hangover and has no place in
democracy, SCROLL.IN, (Aug. 06, 2021, 8:25 PM), https://scroll.in/article/952017/indias-
sedition-law-is-just-another-colonial-hangover-and-has-no-place-in-a-democracy.............20
Sarah Sorial, Can Saying Something Make it So? The Nature of Seditious Harm, JSTOR,
(Oct. 07, 3:10 PM)www.jstor.org/stable/40783443................................................................17
Sruthy Sriram, Whatdistinguishes Disturbance to Public Order from Sedition? A 1950
Decision shows the way, VIDHI LEGAL POLICY, (Oct. 15, 12:30 PM),
https://vidhilegalpolicy.in/blog/what-distinguishes-disturbance-to-public-order-from-sedition-
a-1950-sc-decision-shows-the-way/.....................................................................................22
Sunil Abraham, Shreya Singhal and 66-A: A Cup Half Full and Half Empty, ECONOMIC
AND POLITICAL WEEKLY, Oct, 16th, 2021, 5:08 P.M),
https://www.epw.in/journal/2015/15/commentary/shreya-singhal-and-66a.html................24
OTHER AUTHORITIES
Constitutional Assembly Debates, 1948. ............................................................................. 23

POOJAYA SRI JAGADGURU MAATE MAHADEVI, BASAVA VACHANA DEEPTHI
(Poojaya Sri Jagadguru Maate Mahadevi) (1998) ................................................................ 25

-STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION-
The Petitioner has approached the Hon’ble Supreme Court by the way of Public Interest
Litigation and derives this right under Article 321 of the Constitution of Indiva.
The present Public Interest Litigation has been filed for the enforcement of fundamental rights
and challenging the validity of Section 124(A) of IPC as being violative of Article 19(1) (a) &
Article 21 of the Constitution of Indiva.
The Hon’ble Court has the requisite jurisdiction for the adjudication of the present dispute.
Thereby, the Petitioner submits this memorial which sets forth the facts and the laws on which
the claims are based.
1
Remedies for enforcement of rights conferred by this Part
(1) The right to move the Supreme Court by appropriate proceedings for the enforcement of the rights conferred
by this Part is guaranteed.
(2) The Supreme Court shall have power to issue directions or orders or writs, including writs in the nature of
habeas corpus, mandamus, prohibition, quo warranto and certiorari, whichever may be appropriate, for the
enforcement of any of the rights conferred by this Part.
(3) Without prejudice to the powers conferred on the Supreme Court by clauses (1) and (2), Parliament may by
law empower any other court to exercise within the local limits of its jurisdiction all or any of the powers
exercisable by the Supreme Court under clause (2).
(4) The right guaranteed by this article shall not be suspended except as otherwise provided for by this
Constitution.

-STATEMENT OF FACTS-
1. Indiva is a small developing country where the freedom of speech and expression is guaranteed
as a fundamental right under the Constitution of Indiva.
2. Bangistan is a neighbouring country of Indiva. However, in the last few months there have been
various instances where freedom of speech and expression has come under the scanner in
Indiva.
3. Mr. Pappu Yadav filed a criminal complaint u/s 124A of IPC against Kamla Mehta. An actor –
politician who is the member of the Indiva National Party, the largest opposition party, for her
comment on social media: “Minister Mohan Singh said that going to Bangistan is like going to
hell.” People there is no difference. They treated us very well.
4. On the receipt of the complaint, summons was issued against Kamla Mehta. Being aggrieved
by these summons, she challenged the constitutionality of section 124A of IPC to be violative
of Art 19(a)(a) of the Constitution of Indiva.
5. Lamnesty International, a NGO, conducted a campaign named “Broken Families of Vienna”
(Vienna being a state of Indiva) where they talked about the human right violation by Indiva
Army on the people of Indiva and invited the victims of these violations to speak.
6. During the debate, the Indiva People Party (IPP, which is the ruling party) was heavily criticized
for its inaction. Moreover, at the end of the program the debate got heated and there were heard
some anti – Indiva slogans.
7. On the campus of Murli Shankar University, Democratic Students Union (DSU) held a protest
on the hanging of Faizal Khan convicted of terror attacks on the Parliament of Indiva. Anti –
Indiva slogans & slogans to overthrow the government were raised in the event.
8. A complaint was filed against Raju Kumar (President of DSU) for the charges of Sedition. The
disciplinary committee of the University investigated the matter to find that the slogans were
raised by a group of outsiders wearing masks.
9. All Indiva Student Organization, a student body associated with Indiva People Party (IPP) were
responsible for filing the complaint against Lamnesty International & Raju Kumar u/s 124A
IPC.
10. National Crime Record Bureau in its report stated that in 2014 as many as 47 cases of sedition
were filed leading to the arrest of 58 people and there has been an alarming increase in the cases
in 2015. In 2016 as many as 21 cases have been filed.
11. Kamla Mehta, Lamnesty International and Raju Kumar filed a PIL challenging the validity of
Section 124A as being violative of Article 19(1)(a) and Article 21 of the Constitution of Indivia.

-ISSUES RAISED-
ISSUE-1
WHETHER SEDITION CAN BE DETERMINED ONLY ON THE BASIS OF BY THE
CONTENT OF THE LANGUAGE USED TO CAUSE DISAFFECTION, HATRED, OR
CONTEMPT?
ISSUE-2
WHETHER SEDITION CAN BE DETERMINED ONLY INSOFAR AS SEDITIOUS
SPEECH TENDED TO INCITE PUBLIC ORDER?
ISSUE-3
WHETHER KEDAR NATH SINGH RULING OF THE SUPREME COURT OF INDIA
LIMITING INTERPRETATION OF SEDITION TO PUBLIC DISORDER-CAUSING
SPEECH MAKES IT EASY FOR OT TO BE INVOKED AGAINST ALL DISSENTERS?
WHETHER THE RULING OF SUPREME COURT IN KEDAR NATH SINGH IS
COMPATIBLE WITH FREE SPEECH GUARANTEED UNDER ART 19(1)(A) OF THE
CONSTITUTION?
ISSUE-4
WHETHER SECTION 124A OF IPC INFRINGES THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION ENSHRINED UNDER ARTICLE 19(1) (A)
OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIVA?
ISSUE-5
WHETHER SECTION 124A OF IPC INFRINGES THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO

LIFE AND LIBERTY ENSHRINED UNDER ARTICLE 21 OF THE CONSTITUTION OF
INDIVA?

-SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS-
I. THAT THE SEDITION CANNOT BE DETERMINED ONLY ON THE BASIS BY

THE CONTENT OF THE LANGUAGE USED TO CAUSE DISAFFECTION,
HATRED OR CONTEMPT
It is submitted that sedition cannot be determined only on the basis of the content of the
language used to cause disaffection, contempt or hatred. It is also important that the accused
should have had an intention to cause disaffection, contempt or hatred. Moreover, there should
be evidence of efforts made by the accused and there should also be a direct nexus between the
efforts thus made and the following course of action. The content of language also does not
determine any actual threat against the state hence it does not fall within the ambit of reasonable
restrictions on freedom of speech.
II. THAT THE SEDITION CANNOT BE DETERMINED ONLY INSOFAR AS

SEDITIOUS SPEECH TENDED TO INCITE PUBLIC DISORDER
It is humbly submitted that the charge of sedition cannot be established only on the basis of
tendency to incite public disorder. Firstly, ‘tendency’ is a very vague, arbitrary, and subjective
concept as there has been no accepted parameter to define the same. Secondly, sedition is
necessarily an offence against the state and mere disturbance in public order does not have the
capacity to become a threat to the sovereignty or security of the state. Thirdly, in the current
legal scenario, there are ample alternative legislations which protect public peace and order
and are punitive towards dissenters. Therefore, restrictions on freedom of speech and
expression on this ground cannot be justified.
III. THAT THE KEDAR NATH RULING OF SUPREME COURT OF INDIA

LIMITING THE INTERPRETATION OF SEDITION TO PUBLIC ORDER MAKES
IT EASY TO BE INVOKED AGAINST ALL DISSENTERS. THIS INTERPRETATION
IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH FREE SPEECH GUARANTEED UNDER ART. 19
(1)(a) OF THE CONSTITUTION
It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that the Kedar Nath Singh ruling of the Supreme
Court of India limits the interpretation of sedition to public disorder-causing speech as it is
subjective and open-ended; and makes it easy for section 124-A of the IPC, 1860 to be invoked
against all dissenters as the interpretation is used for criminalising mere political dissent and
overriding the fundamental freedoms guaranteed in the Indian Constitution. Furthermore, it

submitted that it is not compatible with free speech under art. 19(1)(a) of the Indian constitution
as the restrictions imposed under it are neither proportional nor reasonable and that Section
124A is ultra vires and should be struck down.
IV. THAT THE SECTION 124A OF IPC INFRINGES THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT
OF FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION ENSHRINED UNDER ARTICLE
19(1) (A) OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIVA
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that Section 124A of IPC violates the
fundamental right as guaranteed u/s 19(1) (a) of the Constitution of Indiva. The basic right
provided by the impugned article is infringed by the words used in sec 124A. The statute when
read as a whole ignores the basic element of any criminal offence, i.e., mens rea.
Also, the essentials of democracy (by the people, of the people, for the people) being free
discussion and debate for the measures of the government steps is curtailed by this impugned
section. Hence, this is violative of freedom of speech and expression.
V. THAT THE SECTION 124A OF IPC INFRINGES THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

TO LIFE AND LIBERTY ENSHRINED UNDER ARTICLE 21 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIVA
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that Section 124A of IPC violates article 21 as
it curtails the right to life with liberty and dignity. Imprisonment of a lot of citizens only on the
basis of accusation levied and later if they are acquitted, their dignity in the society is lost. It is
therefore curtailing the right guaranteed under article 21 of the Constitution.

-ARGUMENTS ADVANCED-
I. THAT SEDITION CANNOT BE DETERMINED ONLY ON THE BASIS OF THE

CONTENT OF THE LANGUAGE USED TO CAUSE DISAFFECTION, HATRED, OR
CONTEMPT
(¶ 1.) It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble court that the essentials compulsory to identify
an act as seditious are beyond the mere language used in speech, publication, or poster.
A. THE LANGUAGE OF THE CONTENT DOES NOT DETERMINE

DISAFFECTION, HATRED, OR CONTEMPT
(¶ 2.) Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code2is the primary source of sedition law in India.
On a plain reading of the section, one can identify the following three elements that are required
for it to be invoked:
i. A person must bring, or attempt to bring into hatred or contempt, or excite or attempt to excite
disaffection;
ii. Such disaffection should be targeted against the government established by law in India;
iii. The said disaffection may be caused by words (written or spoken), or by signs, or by visible
representation, or otherwise.3
(¶ 3.) These three elements make it clear that mere content of the language cannot determine
the offence of sedition. There should be an intention associated with the alleged act. 4 The extent
to which publishing or preaching of protest, even questioning the foundation of the form of
Government could be imputed as causing disaffection towards the Government and thus,
committing of any offence under Chapter VI of the IPC, 1860 in a democratic set up has to be
examined within the letter and spirit of the Constitution and not as previously done under the
imperial rule.5
(¶ 4.) In furtherance with this, the Hon’ble Supreme Court had also stated even the shouting of
slogans for the establishment of a classless society in line with the tenets of socialism would
not be punishable as sedition.6For illocutionary acts to have the desired effect, they must be
2
The Indian Penal Code 1860, No. 45 of 1860, § 124(A).
3
RATANLAL AND DHIRAJLAL, THE INDIAN PENAL CODE 501 (36 th ed. 2019) [hereinafter Ratanlal].
4
Narayanan Aishawarya, A Theoretical Analysis of the Law on Sedition in India, CHRIST UNIVERSITY LAW
JOURNAL, (Aug. 05, 2021, 10:20 AM),https://journals.christuniversity.in/index.php/culj/article/view/490.
5
P.J Manuel v. State of Kerala, ILR (2013) 1 Ker 793 (India).
6
Alavi v. State of Kerala, 2013 SCC Online Ker 12237 (India); Balwant Singh &Anr. v. State of Punjab, (1995)
3 SCC 214 (India).

uttered with the intention to do the said act,7 and that the words must be spoken by the
appropriate person in the appropriate context.8
B. THE EFFORT AND INTENTION OF THE LANGUAGE USED ARE

IMPORTANT INGREDIENTS
(¶ 5.) A plain reading of the section would show that its application would be attracted only
when the accused brings or attempts to bring into hatred or contempt or excites or attempts to
excite disaffection towards the Government established by law in India. 9 Necessary ingredient
to attract punishment under section 124A, IPC, 1860, appears to be the effort of bringing or
attempting to bring into hatred or contempt to excite or attempt to excite disaffection. 10
(¶ 6.) Even during the colonial era, the importance of ‘intention to cause disaffection’ was
stressed when the court observed in several cases that:
“It is sufficient for the purposes of the section that the words used are calculated to excite
feelings of ill-will against the Government, and to hold it up to the hatred and contempt of the
people, and that they were used with an intention to create such feeling”11
(¶ 7.) Even in the Kedar Nath12 judgement, in which the court had upheld the provision of
Sedition, a vital caveat was that there should be actual incitement of violence due to the act of
the accused.
(¶ 8.) The courts have been categorical in stating that criticism of the Government is integral
for the functioning of democracy and every criticism of the Government would not be
considered as Sedition. The object of sedition is understood to having induced discontent and
insurrection and stir up opposition to the Government by inciting the public to rebellion. 13
(¶ 9.) In Balwant Singh14 case, the slogans raised by the petitioner were inciteful and rebellious
in nature but he was not convicted for sedition as the court decided that:
“Had the appellants raised slogans with the intention to incite people or create disorder, or
had the slogans resulted in any other law and order problem, Section 124A would have been
applicable.”15
7
Rae Langton, Speech Acts and Unspeakable Acts, JSTOR, (July 24, 2021 2:18 PM) www.jstor.org/stable/2265469.
8
Sarah Sorial, Can Saying Something Make It So? The Nature of Seditious Harm, JSTOR, (Oct. 07, 3:10
PM)www.jstor.org/stable/40783443.
9
Balwant Singh &Anr. v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214 (India).
10
Asit Kumar Sen Gupta v. State of Chhattisgarh,Cri. App No. 86 of 2011 (India).
11
Queen Empress v. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, ILR 1898 22 (Bom.) 112 (India).
12
Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955, (India).
13
Nazir Khan v. State of Delhi (2003) 8 SCC 461 (India).
14
Balwant Singh &Anr. v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214 (India).
15
Id.

(¶ 10.) The petitioner further relies on the judgement given in Pankaj Bulatia v. Central Board
of Film Certificate in which it was held that while examining any offence under Section 124A,
the intention with which the language of the seditious statement is made has to be looked at
holistically and fairly without focusing on isolated passages. 16
(¶ 11.) In a very recent case, the Jammu & Kashmir High Court had observed that unless the
conversation has the tendency or intention of creating public disorder or disturbance of public
peace by incitement to an offence, the same would not be sedition to attract the applicability of
Section 124A or for that matter Section 153A or 153B IPC.17
C. LANGUAGE DOES NOT FALL WITHIN THE AMBIT OF ART. 19(2)
(¶ 12.) Soon after the independence, the 1950s witnessed three important decisions with
regards to Sedition laws. These were Tara Singh Gopi Chand v The State18, Sabir Raza v.
State19 , and Ram Nandan v. State.20The Courts in the Tara Singh decision and the Sabir Raza
decision believed that Section 124A of the IPC had become void on the enforcement of the
Constitution.
(¶13.) However, post these judgements, Art. 19(2)21 was inserted in the Indian Constitution,22
which listed certain important restrictions on the freedoms guaranteed under Art. 19(1).23
According to these, there can be a restriction on speech and expression only when there is an
actual threat to the security of the state, incitement of an offence, the threat to the sovereignty
of the state, etc.
(¶ 14.) Determining these threats only on the basis of the content of the language is impractical.
It was also stated that the words, signs, or representations must bring the Government into
hatred or contempt or must cause or attempt to cause disaffection, enmity or disloyalty to the
Government.24
(¶ 15.) Moreover, in the words of Kania, C.J, “unless a law restricting freedom of speech and
expression is directed solely against the undermining of the security of the State or the
overthrow of it, such law cannot fall within the reservation under cl. (2) of art. 19 of the
Constitution”25
16
Pankaj Butalia v. Central Board of Film Certification &Ors., 2015 SCC Online Del 9694 (India).
17
Zakir Hussain v. UT of Ladakh, 2021 SCC OnLine J&K 64 (India).
18
Tara Singh Gopi Chand v. The State, AIR (1951) Punj. 27 (India).
19
Sabir Raza v. The State, Cri App No. 1434 of 1955 (India).
20
Ram Nandan v. State, 1958 SCC OnLine All 117:, AIR 1959 All 101 (FB), (India).
21
INDIA CONST. art. 19 cl. (2).
22
INDIA CONST. art. 19 cl. (2), amended by The Constitution, (First Amendment) Act, 1951.
23
INDIA CONST. Art 19 cl. (1).
24
25
Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124 (India).

(¶ 16.) Hence it can be concluded that determining the offence of sedition merely on the basis
of the content of the language used is grossly violative of the constitutional provisions.
II. THAT SEDITION CANNOT BE DETERMINED ONLY INSOFAR AS SEDITIOUS

SPEECH TENDED TO INCITE PUBLIC DISORDER
(¶ 17.) Disorder has been defined as the breach of peace or public order. Public disorder means
such substantial interference with public peace as to constitute a significant threat to the health
and safety of the people or a significant threat to public or private property. 26 It is humbly
submitted before the Hon’ble Court that seditious speech tended to incite disorder cannot
determine the charge of sedition firstly (I) due to the vagueness, secondly (II)because sedition
is necessarily an offence against the state, and thirdly (III) due to the existence of alternate
legislation dealing with public disorder.
A. THE LAW OF SEDITION IS VAGUE IN MEANING AND APPLICATION
(¶ 18.) The source of sedition law in India is Sec. 124A of IPC which has defined the offence
as the act of inciting disaffection, which included feelings of enmity, hatred, contempt, and
disloyalty against the government. 27As is evident from a plain reading of the provision,
elements of the offence are vague and over-broad, are open to subjective interpretations, and
give virtually no instruction to the people or to law-enforcement officials and the judiciary
regarding what behaviour is prohibited. 28
1. The law is vague and ambiguous in language
(¶ 19.) As per the Supreme Court verdict in Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, the vagueness
of law can be a sufficient ground for its invalidation. 29 Furthermore, The US Supreme Court in
Grayned v. Rockford30 said that “vague laws may trap the innocent by not providing fair
warning”. Such laws trap the innocent citizen or even a policeman prompting them to file false
cases under sedition law.
2. The ‘tendency’ to incite public disorder is an undefined and arbitrary concept
26
BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, 556, (4th ed. 1968).
27
The Indian Penal Code 1860, No. 45 of 1860, § 124(A).
28
Reema Omer, India’s Sedition law is just another colonial hangover and has no place in democracy,
SCROLL.IN, (Oct. 06, 2021, 8:25 PM), https://scroll.in/article/952017/indias-sedition-law-is-just-another-
colonial-hangover-and-has-no-place-in-a-democracy.
29
Shreya Singhal v. Union of India, AIR 2015 SC 1523 (India).
30
Grayned v. Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 108 (1972) (N.D.).

(¶ 20.) This provision was further read down in the Kedar Nath Judgement 31of the Supreme
Court. The Hon’ble apex court had held that unless an act of disaffection imports the tendency
to result in disorder through the incitement of violence against the government, the charge of
sedition cannot be upheld. 32
(¶ 21.) This judgement further added to the vagueness of the law as it did not define the
parameter for measurement of the ‘tendency’ of speech to cause public disorder. This
judgement adds to the ambiguity of the provision.
(¶ 22.) In A.K. Roy v. Union of India33 the Hon’ble court had stated:
“The requirement that crimes must be defined with appropriate definiteness is regarded as a
fundamental concept in criminal law. The underlying principle is that every person is entitled
to be informed as to what the State commands or forbids and that the life and liberty of a person
cannot be put in peril on an ambiguity.” This fundamental concept has been regarded as a
pervading theme of our Constitution since the decision in Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India.34
(¶ 23.) Hence, owing to reliance on the pre-existing arbitrariness of the section and further
vagueness created by the Kedar Nath judgement, it is submitted that the Impugned Provision
is unquestionably, unconstitutionally vague and ought to be struck down.
B. THERE MUST BE AN IMMINENT THREAT TO THE ‘STATE’ IN ANY FORM
(¶ 24.) The sedition law has been placed within the ambit of “Offences against the State”35
under the Indian Penal Code. Sedition in common language means a stirring up of rebellion
against the government.36 The word “sedition” under section 124A, IPC, 1860 is used to
designate those activities which, either by words, deeds, or writings, are calculated to disturb
the tranquility of the State and lead people to subvert the government established by law. 37
(¶ 25.) Also, according to the report of National Crime Record Bureau, the offences against
the state which are mentioned under Chapter VI of IPC are the ones that are against the
existence of the state itself. 38 The decisive ingredient for establishing the offence of Sedition
under section 124A, IPC, 1860 is the doing of certain acts which would bring the Government
established by law in India into hatred or contempt, etc.39
31
Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955 (India).
32
Id.
33
A.K. Roy v. Union of India, (1982) 1 SCC 271(India).
34
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India (1978) 2 SCR 621 (India).
35
The Indian Penal Code 1860, No. 45 of 1860.
36
K.D GAUR, INDIAN PENAL CODE 675 (9th ed. 2019) (hereinafter K.D Gaur).
37
RATANLAL AND DHIRAJLAL, LAW OF CRIMES 491 (24th ed. 1997).
38
NATIONAL CRIME RECORDS BUREAU (NCRB), CRIME IN INDIA (2019).
39
Bilal Ahmed Kaloo v. State of AP, (1977) 7 SCC 431 (India).

(¶ 26.) The Hon’ble Apex Court had rightly led the path in judgements like Romesh
Thapar40and Ram Manohar Lohia41 that serious and aggravated forms of public disorder which
are calculated to endanger the security of the State and the relatively minor breaches of the
peace of a purely local significance.
(¶ 27.) Ideally, this judgment should put to rest all doubts about when concerns around
disturbance to public order would warrant restrictions on the freedom of expression. The
slightest apprehension of disturbance to public order cannot warrant restraint on this freedom.42
(¶ 28.) While these judgements are essential in distinguishing between incitement to public
disorder and sedition, the petitioner is again drawn back to the previous argument of
‘vagueness.’ There is very little importance given to the parameter which defines the
seriousness of the offence and renders it dangerous for the safety of the state.
(¶ 29.) Moreover, even the Law Commission report of 2018 confirmed the importance of threat
to the state when it concluded: “Section 124A should be invoked only in cases where the
intention behind any act is to overthrow the Government with violence and illegal means.”43
(¶ 30.) Furthermore, the interplay between the interpretation of sedition and public order owes
reliance to the Kedar Nath Judgement because the term does not find a mention in the original
definition of sedition in IPC. Deepak Gupta, J. rightly pointed out that
“If one carefully analyses the constitution bench decision in Kedar Nath Singh, it is apparent
that if the creation of disorder or disturbance of law and order or incitement to violence had
not figured, the constitution bench may have in all likelihood, struck down Section 124A. It
was held to be constitutional only when read in the context of incitement to violence or
creating public disorder or disturbing law and order.” 44
(¶ 31.) Arguendo, even if we ignore the previous arguments of arbitrariness and offence
against State, it has been clarified time and again by this Hon’ble Court that there must be
actual violence caused to term the offence as sedition. 45
40
Romesh Thapar v. Union of IndiaAIR 1950 SC 124 (India).
41
Ram Manohar Lohia & Ors. v. Union of India (1960) 2 SCR 821(India).
42
Sruthy Sriram, Whatdistinguishes Disturbance to Public Order from Sedition? A 1950 Decision shows the way,
VIDHI LEGAL POLICY, (Oct. 15, 12:30 PM), https://vidhilegalpolicy.in/blog/what-distinguishes-disturbance-
to-public-order-from-sedition-a-1950-sc-decision-shows-the-way/.
43
Law Commission Report on Consultation Paper on Sedition, 2018.
44
Deepak Gupta, Justice Deepak Gupta: Law of Sedition Needs to be Toned down if not Abolished, THE WIRE,
(Oct. 01, 2021, 5:30 AM) https://thewire.in/law/justice-deepak-gupta-supreme-court-sedition.
45
Balwant Singh v. State of Punjab, (1995) 3 SCC 214 (India).

C. ALTERNATIVE LEGISLATIONS FOR PROTECTION AND SECURITY OF

STATE
(¶ 32.) During the constitutional assembly debate over the validity of sedition law,
prominent objections were raised by Sardar Hukum Singh and K.M. Munshi. 46. The main
reason given for retaining the provision by the makers of the constitution was security of the
state. In the current legal scenario, this counterargument however stands unfounded and
unwarranted in the first place, because in India there exist scores of special laws like The
Unlawful Activities Prevention Act 47, The National Security Act, 48 etc.
(¶ 33.) This particular issue is solely concerning public disorder (Whether sedition can be
determined only insofar as seditious speech tended to incite public disorder?) 49 There is a
separate provision in the IPC that deals specifically with public unrest and incitement of
violence.50 Therefore, such issues should be dealt with under this law rather than sedition.
The existence of these alternate legislations further renders the provision of sedition invalid.
(¶ 34.) In Modern Dental College & Research Centre v. State of M.P.,51 the court observed
that the exercise which is to be taken is to find out as to whether the limitation of constitutional
rights is for a purpose that is reasonable and necessary in a democratic society and such an
exercise involves the weighing up of competitive values, and ultimately an assessment based
on proportionality i.e., balancing of different interests.
(¶ 35.) Therefore, owing to reliance on the aforementioned arguments and authorities, it is
humbly submitted by the petitioner that sedition cannot be determined only on the basis of the
tendency to incite public disorder.
46
Constitutional Assembly Debates, 1948.
47
The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, No. 37, Acts of Parliament, 1967 (India).
48
The National Security Act, 1980, No. 65, Acts of Parliament, 1980 (India).
49
Moot prop. Issue 2.
50
The Indian Penal Code 1860, No. 45 of 1860, § 505 cl. (1) sub cl. (b) and 505 cl. (1) sub cl. (c) of IPC.
51
Modern Dental College & Research Centre v. State of M.P. (2016) 7 SCC 353 (India).

III. [A] KEDAR NATH RULING OF SUPREME COURT OF INDIA LIMITING

INTERPRETATION OF SEDITION TO PUBLIC DISORDER-CAUSING SPEECH
MAKES IT EASY FOR IT TO BE INVOKED AGAINST ALL DISSENTERS
(¶ 36.) It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that the Kedar Nath Singh ruling of the
Supreme Court of India limits the interpretation of sedition to public disorder-causing speech
and makes it easy for section 124-A of the IPC, 1860 to be invoked against all dissenters. This
can be said on the following basis: firstly, the judgement is subjective and open-ended [1] and
secondly, the interpretation is used for criminalizing mere political dissent and overriding the
fundamental freedoms guaranteed in the Indian Constitution [2].
1. THE KEDAR NATH JUDGEMENT IS SUBJECTIVE AND OPEN-ENDED
(¶ 37.) It is submitted that the Kedar Nath ruling is subjective and open-ended because Section
124A is vague in its construction and there is an absence of legislative competence or
unreasonableness of the law. 52
(¶ 38.) The Hon’ble Supreme Court in Kedar Nath Singh v. State of Bihar 53
laid down
‘incitement or tendency to incite violence’ to be the test of establishing the offence of sedition.
However, this phrase has been interpreted differently in various judgments given by the Apex
Court54 making it highly subjective and open-ended.
(¶ 39.) In A.K. Roy & Ors. v. Union of India &Ors.55, and State of Madhya Pradesh &Anr. v.
Baldeo Prasad56, different provisions were struck down as unconstitutional as they were vague.
(¶ 40.) Moreover, the words ‘hatred’, ‘disaffection’ and ‘contempt’ that constitute essential
ingredients of the provision, are words devoid of any parameters and convey different
meanings to different people. The absence of any precise objective standard or norm leaves the
provision at the discretion and autonomy of the authorities enforcing the law.
(¶ 41.) In Kedar Nath57 ruling the apex Court used two different interpretations of Section
124A Doctrine of Severability and Presumption of Constitutional but the court did not apply
the doctrine of severability because the court did not read down any part of Section 124A,
52
Namit Sharma v. Union of India, (2013) 1 SCC 745 (India).
53
Id.
54
Sunil Abraham, Shreya Singhal and 66-A: A Cup Half Full and Half Empty, ECONOMIC AND POLITICAL
WEEKLY, (Sep, 30th, 2021, 5:08 P.M), https://www.epw.in/journal/2015/15/commentary/shreya-singhal-and-
66a.html.
55
A.K. Roy &Ors. v. Union of India &Ors , (1982) 1 SCC 271 (India).
56
State of Madhya Pradesh v. Baldeo Prasad, (1961) 1 SCR 970 (India); H.R. Bhantia v. Union of India, (1969)
2 SCC 166 (India); Kartar Singh v. State of Punjab (1994) 3 SCC 569 (India).
57

rather the court read into the section and applied the Doctrine of Presumption of
Constitutionality to uphold the section. 58
(¶ 42.) It is pertinent to note that the Doctrine of Presumption of Constitutionality does not
apply to pre-constitutional laws because these laws were made by the then rulers/foreigners
and thus the constitutional validity of Section 124A still lingers over our head. 59
(¶ 43.) Thus, even after the Hon’ble Supreme Court’s interpretation of Section 124A in Kedar
Nath,60 the provision remains vague, wide worded, and ambiguous.
2. THE INTERPRETATION IS USED FOR CRIMINALISING MERE POLITICAL

DISSENT AND OVERRIDING THE FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS GUARANTEED
IN THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION
(¶ 44.) It is submitted before the hon’ble court that public discussion with people participation
is a basic feature and a rational process of democracy distinguishing it from all other forms of
government. Democracy can neither work nor prosper unless people share their views. 61
(¶ 45.) In NiharenduDutt Majumdar v. King-Emperor62, The Federal Court was of the view
that sedition implies resistance or lawlessness in some form. In King-Emperor v. Sadashiv
Narayan Bhalerao63, the Privy Council overruled the decision of the Federal Court and held
that excitement of feelings of enmity to the government is sufficient to make one guilty under
Section 124A of IPC.
(¶ 46.) Further, it is important to note that in the case of Ram Nandan v. State64, Allahabad HC
declared Section 124A of IPC unconstitutional as the Court believed that the said section
transgressed its authority by imposing unreasonable restrictions on the freedom of speech
enshrined under Article 19(1)(a).
(¶ 47.) Originally defined as the act of inciting disaffection, which included feelings of enmity,
hatred, contempt, and disloyalty against the government, Section 124A was read down in Kedar
Nath65. The Court in Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar66 upheld the validity of Section 124A of the
58
Akshita Saxena, Presumption of Constitutionality Doesn’t Apply To Pre-Constitutional Laws: former Union
Minister Arun Shourie Moves Supreme Court Against Sedition Law, LIVELAW, (Oct. 02, 2021, 2:34 P.M),
https://www.livelaw.in/columns/sedition-ipc-124a-article-19-1-a-of-the-indian-constitution-independence-of-
the-judiciary-178280.
59
Id.
60
61
POOJAYA SRI JAGADGURU MAATE MAHADEVI, BASAVA VACHANA DEEPTHI (Poojaya Sri
Jagadguru Maate Mahadevi) (1998).
62
NiharenduDutt Majumdar v. King Emperor , AIR 1939 (Cal.) 703 (India).
63
King Emperor v. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao, AIR (1947) PC 82 (India).
64
Ram Nandan v. State, 1958 SCC OnLine All 117: AIR 1959 All 101 (FB) (India).
65
66
Id.

Indian Penal Code, 1860 where the court held that the very existence of the State will be in
jeopardy if the Government established by law is subverted.
(¶ 48.) Despite the reading down, the continued employment of the charge of sedition to silence
dissent continued undeterred and has been taken judicial notice of. This prompted the Hon’ble
Supreme Court to reiterate the Kedar Nath law in 2016 in Common Cause v. Union of India67,
directing all authorities to scrupulously follow the Kedar Nath dictum.
(¶ 49.) The aftermath of the case is reflected in Kedarnath v. State of Bihar68 where the Privy
council’s interpretation of “Sedition” was edited i.e., it was narrowed down to fit the current
scenario as well as to fall within the ambit of 19(2) thereby becoming a reasonable restriction.
The Supreme Court of India made it clear that allegedly seditious speech and expression may
be punished only if the speech is an ‘incitement’ to ‘violence’, or ‘public disorder’.
(¶ 50.) The crime of sedition over the years has been narrowed down to the extent that merely
criticizing the policies and actions of the government will not attract the crime of sedition but
if the actions and words incite the feelings of hatred and disaffection in the minds of the
audience, it will be considered as sedition. 69
(¶ 51.) It is submitted that now sedition is being used as a political tool. The law has been
misinterpreted time and again. More than seventy years have passed since the Kedarnath
judgment, which laid down the interpretation of sedition as it is understood today. The
provision under Section 124A is being allowed to be put to use irrespective of whether or not
the alleged act or words are, in fact, seditious acts, or words constituting a “tendency to cause
public disorder or incitement to violence” 70.
(¶ 52.) The charges of sedition against the accused have failed to stand up to judicial scrutiny.
Charges for the offence of sedition today are framed to instill fear and to scuttle dissent and are
in complete violation of the scope of sedition laid down in Kedarnath’s case.71
(¶ 53.) The Writ Petition72 filed in public interest challenges the constitutional validity of
Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 as being ultra vires Article 19(1)(a) of the
Constitution read with Articles 14 and 21. The Impugned Provision was upheld in Kedar
Nath73subject to a partial reading down.
(¶ 54.) Here, the petitioner submitted that the section 124A of IPC is wholly unconstitutional
as the reasoning employed in Kedar Nath to uphold the Impugned Provision has been overruled
67
Common Cause v. Union of India, (2016) 15 SCC 269 (India).
68
69
Id.
70
71
Kedarnath v. State of Bihar , AIR 1962 SC 955 (India).
72
Kishorechandra Wangkhemcha & Anr v. UOI, WP (Crl.) 106/2021 (India).
73

by the larger Constitution Bench Judgments in R.C Cooper v. Union of India74 and later
reaffirmed and strengthened in Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain75 (5 Judges), Maneka Gandhi v.
Union of India76(7 Judges), I.R Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu77 and more recently in Justice
K.S Puttaswamyv. Union of India78(9 Judges)) which have expanded the scope, extent and the
interrelationship between Articles 14, 19, and 21 of the Constitution. In the changing legal and
constitutional landscape, the said section ought to be unequivocally and unambiguously struck
down.
(¶ 55.) It is trite that abuse of the law, in itself, does not bear on the validity of that law, this
phenomenon clearly points to the vagueness and uncertainty of the current law. Additionally,
it is submitted that the abuse and the inherent “political association” of this abuse, should be a
relevant “prevailing circumstance of the time.”
(¶ 56.) Many cases have recently made headlines in this regard. In examples of authorities
employing the uncertain ‘intention’ or ‘tendency’ elements of sedition, people have been
arrested and charged for merely possessing Maoist literature, merely interviewing people seen
as threats, publically criticizing the government, and speaking out against army atrocities. 79
(¶ 57.) When sedition is read together with conspiracy, it is virtually possible to make a case
against anyone who expresses themselves. It is submitted that the vagueness and discretionary
nature of the offence of sedition is what has allowed this abuse.
III. [B] SUCH AN INTERPRETATION IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH FREE

SPEECH UNDER ART. 19(1)(A) OF THE INDIAN CONSTITUTION
(¶ 58.) It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble court that the Kedar Nath ruling of limiting
interpretation of sedition to public disorder-causing speech makes it easy for it to be invoked
against all dissenters, and is not compatible with free speech guaranteed under Art 19 (1)(a) of
the Constitution of India because firstly, Restriction imposed is not proportional, and
unreasonable in nature [A], and secondly, Section 124(A) is constitutionally ultra vires and
should be struck down [B].
74
R.C Cooper v. Union of India, AIR 1970 SC 564 (India).
75
Indira Gandhi v. Raj Narain, 1975 AIR 1590 (India).
76
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India, AIR 1978 SC 597 (India).
77
I.R Coelho v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 2007 SC 861(India).
78
K.S. Puttaswamy v. Union of India, (2018) 1 SCC 809 (India).
79
Kanhaiya Kumar v. State Of Nct Of Delhi, Writ Petition (Criminal) No. 558/ 2016 (India).

A. RESTRICTION IMPOSED IS NOT PROPORTIONAL AND UNREASONABLE IN

NATURE
1.) It causes the constitutionally impermissible chilling effect on speech
(¶ 59.) It is humbly submitted before the hon’ble apex court that the Indian Constitution
guarantees freedom of speech and expression to all its citizens. 80 It is indispensable for the
preservation of a free society. 81
(¶ 60.) Freedom of expression has various important functions; The supreme court held in
Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India82 that: Freedom of expression is necessary: (I) for
individual fulfilment, (II) for the attainment of truth, (III) for participation by members of the
society in political or social decision making and (IV) for maintaining the balance between
stability and change in society. 83
(¶ 61.) Every citizen has Fundamental Rights that the state cannot infringe on 84 but it is not
completely unchecked. Article 19(2)85 empowers the state to restrict the fundamental right of
speech and expression in the interest of sovereignty and integrity of India 86, the security of the
State, friendly relations with foreign states, public order87, decency or morality88, contempt of
court, defamation, and incitement to an offence.
(¶ 62.) Reasonable’ implied intelligent care and deliberations, that is, the choice of a course
which reason dictated.89 In Papnasam Labour Union v. Madura Coats Ltd,90 the Hon’ble
Supreme Court stated that the restriction must not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature to go
beyond the requirement of the felt need of the society and object sought to be achieved. 91The
doctrine of proportionality is understood under the Indian Constitution as the burden being on
the state to show that the rights-limiting measure is the least restrictive of all available
alternatives. 92
80
INDIA CONST. art. 19, cl. 1, sub cl. a.
81
Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958).
82
Bennett Coleman & Co. v. Union of India (1972) SCC 788 (India).
83
Id.
84
Kesavananda Bharti v. State of Kerala, (1973) 4 SCC 225 (India).
85
INDIA CONST. art. 19, cl. 2.
86
INDIA CONST. art. 3.
87
Romesh Thapar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124 (India); State of Bihar v. K.K. Mishra, 1971 AIR 1667
(India); Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar, AIR (1962) SC 955 (India).
88
Ranjit D. Udeshi v. State of Maharashtra, (1965) 1 SCR 65 (India); Chandrakant KalyandasKakodhar v. State
of Maharashtra, (1969) 2 SCC 130 (India); Samaresh Bose v. Amal Mitra, (1985) 4 SCC 289 (India); Director
General of Doordarshan v. Anand Parwardhan, (2006) 8 SCC 433 (India), Ajay Goswami v. Union of India,
(2007) 1 SCC 143 (India).
89
Chintaman Rao v. State of UP (1950 SCR 759) (India).
90
Papnasam Labour Union v. Madura Coats Ltd., (1995) 1 SCC 501 (India).
91
Chintaman Rao v. State of Madhya Pradesh, AIR 1951 (38) SC 118 (India).
92
Union of India v. Ganayutham, (1997)7 SCC 463 (India).

(¶ 63.) Employing phrases that are incapable of precise definition, cause a chilling effect on
speech, is an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right to free expression. 93 It employs
an unconstitutional invasion into the right of free speech. 94 Time and again, the court has given
the judgment that law should not be used in a manner that has chilling effects on the freedom
of speech and expression. 95
(¶ 64.) Further, it is submitted, that the concept of ‘sedition’ was withdrawn from the
reasonable restrictions provided therein Article 19(2) during constituent assembly
debates96The Court did not establish a reasonable nexus 97 between a speech and its role as an
instrument to the causation of public disorder in Kedar Nath98 Judgement. Later on, the court
has held that the anticipated danger should have a proximate and direct nexus with the
expression.99
(¶ 65.) The same is not followed, and arrests and slapping charges were imposed by the police
authority without proper consideration. Sedition is used to curb the right to free speech and
expression without imminent threat.100 There is no absolute provision in existence for
identifying the nexus, which results in the chilling effect in the society, which is in a direct
contradiction of the articulation of the freedom endowed under Article 19(1)(a).101 The section
clearly has a ‘chilling effect’ on the freedom of expression. 102 Therefore, it is submitted before
the hon’ble court that the restriction imposed on the fundamental rights is arbitrary and
unreasonable and does have a chilling effect on the speech of individuals.
2. It is against the ‘Effect Doctrine’
(¶ 66.) If the proximate effect and operation of the Act are such as to bring it within the mischief
of Article 19 (1) (a) it is liable to be struck down.103 The effect doctrine has been explained by
the Apex Court in Bennett Coleman & Co. &Ors v. Union Of India &Ors104:
93
S.G Vomabatkere & Ors. v. Union of India &Ors., Writ Petition (C) No. 829 of 2013, (India).
94
Id.
95
Khushboo v. Kanniammal, (2010) 5 SCC 600 (India).
96
Romesh Thappar v. State of Madras, AIR 1950 SC 124 (India).
97
Parthasarathy Suhrith, Sedition and the Government, THE HINDU, (Oct. 17th, 2021, 4:23 PM)
http://www.thehindu.com/opinion/lead/Sedition-and-the-government/article14082471.ece.
98
Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar, AIR (1962) SC 955 (India).
99
S. Rangarajan v. P.Jagjivan Ram, (1989) 2 SCC 574 (India).
100
101
Ananya Kuthiala, Sedition and the Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression, THE SCC ONLINE BLOG.
(Oct. 06, 2021, 9:27 A.M) https://www.scconline.com/blog/post/2017/12/12/sedition-right-freedom-speech-
expression/.
102
Criminal libel and sedition offences abolished, PRESS GAZETTE, (Sep. 31st, 2021, 3:09 P.M),
https://www.pressgazette.co.uk/criminal-libel-and-sedition-offences-abolished.
103
Dwarkadas Shrinivas v. Sholapur & Weaving Co., (1954) SCR. 119. ; RC Cooper v. Union of India, (1970) 1
SCC 248; Sakal Papers v. Union Of India, (1962) 3 SCR 842 (India).
104
Bennett Coleman& Co. & Ors v. Union of India & Ors, (1972) SCC 788 (India).

“The true test is whether the effect of the impugned action is to take away or abridge
fundamental rights if it is assumed that the direct object of the law or action has to be a direct
abridgment of the right of free speech by the impugned law or action it is to be, related to the
directness of effect and not to the directness of the subject matter of the impeached law or
action.”
(¶ 67.) The effect of this section is restricting the citizen’s fundamental right of freedom of
speech and expression as laid down under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. Hence, the
overall effect of §124A sufficiently establishes a case for its unconstitutionality.
B. SECTION 124 (A) IS CONSTITUTIONALLY ULTRA VIRES AND SHOULD BE

STRUCK DOWN
(¶ 68.) In 1979, India ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
hereinafter (ICCPR), which sets forth internationally recognized standards for the protection
of freedom of expression105. Under Article 19 thereof allowed restriction measures on free
speech only the ground inter alia, of “necessity for the maintenance of public order”.It is
submitted that this is a much higher standard than a measure that is merely “in the interest of
maintenance of public order”.106
1. Section 124 (A) is inconsistent with the International conventions
(¶ 69.) The jurisprudence of testing legislation curtailing fundamental rights is based on the
following (I) on the anvil of substantive and procedural reasonableness, (II) necessity, and
(III) proportionality. 107 In the previous part, it has already been dealt with that sedition law is
against the concept of proportionality, and reasonableness, and it failed on the third parameter
as well.
(¶ 70.) The requirement of ‘necessity in part comes from India having ratified in the ICCPR in
1979, which in its Art. 19 requires speech-limiting state action to be backed by a law and to be
necessary on the grounds of respect for rights and reputations of others, national security,
etc.108The necessity here is in the context of state action limiting fundamental freedoms as the
burden being on the state to establish that such a limiting measure is ‘necessary in a democratic
society’109
105
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights,1966, art. 19.
106
R.C. Cooper v. Union of India, 1970 1 SCC 248 (India).
107
Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India1978 SCR (2) 621(India).
108
Jolly Varghese v. Bank of Cochin, 1980 AIR 470 (India).
109
Modern Dental College v. State of Madhya Pradesh, (2016)7SCC 353 (India).

(¶ 71.) The foundational reason adopted by the SC for validating the provision was the retention
of the sedition law in England at that time110. That law of sedition was abolished in Britain in
2009,111 as it was found untenable in the light of the Human Rights Act, 1998. Therefore, it is
clear that the British legislation is no longer good law in the legal or political sense.
(¶ 72.) The existence of seditious libel started being considered in contravention to the tenets
of the Human Rights Act, 1998112 and the European Convention on Human Rights. 113 It is
submitted that this doctrine lends a juristic mask to political repression. 114 Therefore, it is
submitted before the hon’ble court that sedition is in contradiction with the international
obligations and a misfit for qualifying as good law.
2. The alternate legislations in practice dilute the necessity of the sedition law
(¶ 73.) It is submitted before the hon’ble court that in 1962 the Kedar Nath115did not engage in
an extensive enquiry into the ‘necessity’ of Section 124-A to justify it. The lack of alternative
legislation made sedition a necessity in crime control at that time. 116At present, this is not the
case, there are alternate legislations already in practice. For instance, in 1969, the Unlawful
Activities (Prevention) Act was passed to provide for the more effective prevention of certain
unlawful activities.117Adding to this, it is submitted that The National Security Act was passed
in 1980. It gives the Central Government or the State Governments the power to detain persons
if satisfied that it was necessary to do so to prevent him from ‘acting in any manner prejudicial
to the defence of India118or security of the State119or maintenance of Public order120. This
legislation would also cover the same material offences as section 124A. 121
(¶ 74.) Alternative legislation eliminates the need to employ Section 124-A to deal with public
disorder and violence. 122It is trite that the actions of an individual can be simultaneously
unlawful under multiple penal sections, this multiplicity in itself does not invalidate the
legislation. 123 Any benefits in terms of protecting public order are far outweighed by the harm
done to freedom of expression, the ‘cornerstone of democracy’. 124
110
111
Coroners and Justice Act, 2009, c.25, (Eng.).
112
The Human Rights Act, 1998.
113
1950. Eur.Conv. on H.R.
114
Judith S. Koffler and Bennett L. Gershman, New Seditious Libel, CORNELL LAW REVIEW, (Oct. 09, 2021,
7:14 A.M), https://scholarship.law.cornell.edu/cgi/viewcontent.cgi?article=4352&context=clr.
115
116
Vinod Dua v. Union of India &Anr., 2020 SCC OnLine SC 1209 (India).
117
The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, No. 37, Acts of Parliament, 1967 (India).
118
The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, No. 37, § 8 (1).
119
The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, No. 37, § 3(1)(a).
120
The Unlawful Activities (Prevention) Act, 1967, No. 37, § 3 (2).
121
The National Security Act, 1980, No. 65, Acts of Parliament, 1980 (India).
122
KishorechandraWangkhemcha&Anr v. UOI, WP (Crl.) 106/2021 (India).
123
Id.
124
Indirect Tax Practitioners Assn. v. R. K. Jain (2010) 8 SCC 281(India).

(¶ 75.) Given the advent of international law in the determination of constitutional enquiry,
international law standards, specifically necessity, legality, and proportionality should be read
into ‘reasonableness’. 125 When this criterion is read in, it is submitted that Section 124-A no
longer constitutes a reasonable restriction.
IV. SECTION 124A OF IPC INFRINGES THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT OF

FREEDOM OF SPEECH AND EXPRESSION ENSHRINED UNDER ARTICLE 19(1)
(A)OF THE CONSTITUTION OF INDIVA?
It is humbly submitted that section 124A of Indian Penal Code, 1860 constitutes an
unreasonable restriction to freedom of speech and expression under article 19(1)(a).
It is most humbly submitted before this bench that Right of Freedom of Speech and Expression
is being violated by the impugned section. The section itself is vague. The said legislation is
misapplied and there is being wide abuse of law under the cover of this impugned section.
The Sedition Law is becoming a tool of harassment
(¶ 76.) While the provision of sedition can only be applied under extraordinary circumstances,
accompanied by sanctions from relevant authorities, practically it has become a tool of
harassment.
It was observed in the case of Kedar Nath v. State of Bihar126 & the constitutional bench of apex
court held that “A citizen has a right to say or write whatever he likes about the Government,
or its measures, by way of criticism or comment, so long as he does not incite people to violence
against the Government established by law or with the intention of creating public disorder”.
Difference between hate speech & Sedition
(¶ 77.) The 267th Report of the Commission on ― Hate Speech, (2017), distinguished between
‘sedition ‘and ‘hatespeech ‘, providing that the offence of hate speech affects the State indirectly
by disturbing public tranquility, while the sedition is directly an offence against the State. The
Report adds, that to qualify as sedition, the impugned expression must threaten the sovereignty
and integrity of India and the security of the State.
In the present matter at hand, the petitioner Kamla Mehta, while giving her comment stated that
125
Kishorechandra Wangkhemcha & Anr v. UOI, WP (Crl.) 106/2021 (India).
126
1962 AIR 955, 1962 SCR Supl. (2) 769

People there are just like us and there is no difference. They treated as well.
(¶ 78.) Being an actor-politician, the petitioner was trying to maintain harmonious relationship
with the neighboring country Bangistan. It is rightly known to all that these public figures have
influential value onthe public- at- large. The intention behind the comment was not to create the
feeling of hatred or disaffectiontowards Indivia as it was just a praise for that particular country
and nothing mentioned in the comment was exciting hatred towards Indivia. Moreover, to
constitute any offence mens rea is an important aspect which is not present in the said comment
in the present matter.
(¶ 79.) In case of Romesh Thapper 127, it was rightly observed by Shastri J. Freedom of Speech
and Expression and of press lay at the foundationof all democratic organization, and held that
criticism of Government exciting disaffection or bad feelings towards is not to be regarded as
a justifying ground for restricting the freedom of expression.
(¶ 80.) The petitioner, Lamnesty International is an NGO working on the human rights of the
people. The organization organized a debate which is totally legal. As the facts is clear on the
part that the citizens of Vienna were already the victims of violation of human rights, the debate
was not the point of extended heated up arguments and rage in the particular state.
(¶ 81.) In the aforementioned case Hon’ble Supreme Court held that A citizen has a right to say
or write whatever he likes about the government or its measures, by way of criticism or
comments, so long as he does not incite people to violence against the government established
by law or with the intention of creating public disorder.
In the impugned case, petitioner Lamnesty International did not intend or provoke people to
create violence against the government.
(¶ 82.) The petitioner Raju Kumar also, did not incite people to violence. The facts are very
clear on this part, where it was in the reports of the disciplinary committee that the slogans were
raised by a group of outsiders wearing masks. The case filed against Raju Kumar is also
politicized. It is very obvious that the AISO, who filed the complaint was associated with the
IPP which is the ruling party. Raju Kumar being in a position which is not secured by any
member of the ruling party, is a victim of the game plan and politics. Hence, there is abuse of
law.
(¶ 83.) Pt. Jawaharlal Nehru, who while introducing the first Constitution of India
(Amendment) Bill 1951, referred to sedition and stated: Now so far as I am concerned that
particular section is highly objectionable and obnoxious and it should have no place both for
127
Romesh Thappar vs The State of Madras 1950 AIR 124, 1950 SCR 594

practical and historical reasons, if you like, in any body of laws that we might pass. The sooner
we get rid of it the better. We might deal with that matter in other ways, in more limited ways,
as every other country does but that particular thing, as it is, should have no place, because all
of us have had enough experience of it in a variety of ways & apart from the logic of the
situation, our urges are against it.
(¶ 84.) As per the facts, Raju Kumar & Lamnesty International were accused of allegedly
raising Anti Indiva Chants and Slogans. It is imminently clear that their acts did not create any
Public Disorder or any incitement of violence, nor do they fall within the ambit of Section 124A
of IPC,1860.
(¶ 85.) Freedom of speech, considered the basic freedom by most philosophical thinkers,
consists of several facets, including the right to express one’s opinion unhindered, unfettered
by the fear of retribution. It is one of the most basic elements for a healthy, open minded
democracy and is foundation of any democratic society128.
(¶ 86.) Under Indian Constitution Freedom of speech and expression has been guaranteed under
Article 19(1)(a) Article 19(1)(a) reads as: “Protection of certain rights regarding freedom of
speech, etc.—All citizens shall have the right— (a) to freedom of speech and expression.” The
freedom of speech under Article 19(1)(a) includes the right to express one’s views and opinions
at any issue through any medium. It thus includes the right to propagate opinion. The Preamble
of the Constitution of India inter alia speaks of liberty of thought, expression, belief, faith and
worship.
(¶ 87.) As in Romesh Thappar V. Union of India129, Justice Patanjali has rightfully held that
19(1)(g) is the very basis and essence of the constitution and our democracy which is further
supported by Maneka Gandhi V. Union of India130,Bhagwati J.,has emphasized on the
significance of the freedom of speech & expression in these word: “Democracy is based
essentially on free debate and open discussion, for that is the only corrective of government
action in a democratic set up. If democracy means government of the people by the people, it
is obvious that every citizen must be entitled to participate in the democratic process and in
order to enable him to intelligently exercise his rights of making a choice, free & general
discussion of public matters is absolutely essential. “The right of free speech is absolutely
indispensable for the preservation of a free society in which Government is based upon the
consent of an informed citizenry and is dedicated to the protection of the rights of all, even the
most despised minorities. 131
128
Union of India V. Motion Picture Association, AIR 1999 SC 23345
129
[1950] S.C.R. 594
130
1978 AIR 597, 1978 SCR (2) 621
131
Speiser V. Randall, 357 US 513.

(¶ 88.) In a separate concurring judgment Beg,J. said in Bennett Coleman & Co. &Ors. V.
Union of India & Ors.132,that the freedom of speech and of the press is the Ark of the Covenant
of Democracy because public criticism is essential to the working of its institutions. In S.
Khushboo V. Kanniamal & Anr.133, this Court stated that the importance of freedom of
speech and expression though not absolute was necessary as we need to tolerate unpopular
views.
(¶ 89.) It is submitted that when it comes to democracy, liberty of thought and expression is a
cardinal value that is of paramount significance under our constitutional scheme. 134 However
this right is subject to reasonable restrictions being imposed under Article 19(2) 135. The freedom
to air ones views is the lifeline of every democratic institution and any attempt to stifle,
suffocate this right would be inconsistent with the democratic setup.136 So, it can be construed
that freedom of speech, is crucial to the working of a democratic Constitution and is an aspect
of human self-fulfilment or autonomy.
(¶ 90.) It is submitted that The Constitution of India does not define the word sedition. Section
124-A of the Indian Penal Code defines the offence of ‘Sedition’ and provides as follows
“Whoever, by words, either spoken or written, or by signs, or by visible representation, or
otherwise, brings or attempts to bring into hatred or contempt, or excites or attempts to excite
disaffection towards, the Government established by law in India137, As per the Indian law,
sedition is any form of speech, action, writing that incites hatred against the established order
and harms the systematic peace of the country. 138
(¶ 91.) With increasing incidents of mutiny and the rising wave of nationalism, the offence of
sedition was incorporated by the British Government under Section 124A of the IPC.The main
object to bring in such a tool was to suppress the voices against the British, not to serve the
people but to rule. Bal Gangadhar Tilak was tried under sedition law, was convicted and
sentenced to six years imprisonment to Mandalay jail139.
Mahatma Gandhi was tried in 1922 for his articles published in the magazine Youth India.
Mahatma Gandhi said that ‘the section 124-A under which he was charged is perhaps the prince
among the political sections of the IPC designed to suppress the liberty of the citizen’ 140.
132
[1973] 2 S.C.R. 757 at 829; See also Sakal Papers (P) Ltd. & Ors. V. Union of India, (1962) 3 S.C.R. 842 at
866; Romesh Thappar V. The State of Madras,1950 AIR 124
133
(2010) 5 SCC 600(Para 45)
134
Shreya Singhal V. Union of India AIR 2015 SC 1523
135
Article 19(2) The Constitution of India, 1950
136
LIC V. Manubhai D. Shah, AIR 1993 SC 171
137
Section 124A of Indian Penal Code,1860
138
Kedarnath V. State of Bihar, 1962 AIR 955
139
Queen Empress V. Bal Gangadhar Tilak, ILR (1898) 22 Bom. 112.
140
A.G. Noorani Indian Political Trials: 1775-1947, page no. 235

(¶ 92.) In Niharendu Dutt MajumdarV. King Emperor141, The Federal Court held that
“public disorder or the reasonable anticipation or likelihood of public disorder is the gist of the
offence”. The court was of the view that sedition implies resistance or lawlessness in some
form. In King Emperor V. Sadashiv Narayan Bhalerao 142 ,the Privy Council overruled the
decision of the Federal Court and held that excitement of feelings of enmity to the government
is sufficient to make one guilty under Section 124A of IPC.
(¶ 93.) A prominent objection to the inclusion of sedition as an exception to the freedom of
speech and expression under Article 19(2) was raised by Sardar Hukum Singh143. He also
criticised the validation of laws on the ground that they were “in the interest of public order” or
undermined the “authority or foundation of the state” as classifications that were too vague.144.
Most vocal opposition to the inclusion of the term sedition came from Mr. K.M. Munshi 145.The
term ‘sedition’ was thus dropped from the suggested amendment to Article 13 of the
Draft Constitution. Even P.M. Jawaharlal Nehru was against the existence of offence of
sedition146,Nehru’s government decided to amend the Constitution inserting the words ‘public
order’ and ‘relations with friendly states’ into Article19 (2) and the word ‘reasonable’ before
‘restrictions’, which was meant to provide a safeguard against misuse by the government 147.
(¶ 94.) In the case of Ramnandan V. State148, Allahabad HC declared Section 124A of IPC
unconstitutional as the Court was of the opinion that the said section transgressed its authority
by imposing unreasonable restriction on the freedom of speech enshrined under Article
19(1)(a). As a result of this, the meaning of the term “Sedition” given by the Privy Council was
rejected.
(¶ 95.) The after math of the case is reflected in Kedarnath V. State of Bihar149 where the
Privy council’s interpretation of “Sedition” was edited i.e. it was narrowed down to fit the
current scenario as well as to fall within the ambit of 19(2) thereby becoming a reasonable
restriction. The SC made it clear that allegedly seditious speech and expression may be
punished only if the speech is an ‘incitement’ to ‘violence’, or ‘public disorder’. The crime of
sedition over the years has been narrowed down to the extent that merely criticizing the policies
and actions of government will not attract the crime of sedition but if the actions and words
141
AIR 1939 Cal 703
142
(1944) 46 BOMLR 459
143
Constituent Assembly Debates on December 7, 1948,
144
Constituent Assembly Debates on December 7, 1948
145
Constituent Assembly Debates on 1 December, 1948 Part I Volume VII
146
Parliamentary Speech on the Bill relating to the First Constitution of India Amendment 1951
147
The Constitution (First Amendment) Act, 1951
148
AIR 1959 All 101
149
1962 AIR 955

incite the feelings of hatred and disaffection in the minds of the audience, it will be considered
as sedition. 150
(¶ 96.) It is submitted that now sedition is being used as a political tool. The law has been
misinterpreted time and again. More than fifty years have passed since Kedarnath judgment,
which laid down the interpretation of sedition as it is understood today. The provision under
Section 124A is being allowed to be put to use irrespective of whether or not the alleged act or
words are, in fact, seditious acts, or words constituting a “tendency to cause public disorder or
incitement to violence”151.
(¶ 97.) It is submitted that the charges of sedition against the accused have failed to stand up to
judicial scrutiny. Charges for the offence of sedition today are framed with a view to instil fear
and to scuttle dissent and are in complete violation of the scope of sedition laid down
Kedarnath’s case152.
(¶ 98.) In 1979, India ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
which sets forth internationally recognized standards for the protection of freedom of
expression153. However, misuse of sedition law under Section 124A and arbitrary slapping of
charges continue to restrict speech in ways inconsistent with ICCPR.
(¶ 99.) It is acknowledged that the words which directly provoke violence or which directly
threaten the maintenance of public order may deserve censure under the restrictions mentioned
in Article 19(2) of the Indian Constitution154. However, that is not what the misapplication of
sedition law seeks to achieve. The present practice of misapplication of sedition law aims to
crush all opposition to the ruling political party. Its regular use continues to hamper freedom of
speech and expression in the country.
(¶ 100.) It is submitted that though a very small number of sedition cases leads to actual
conviction, it causes harassment of individuals till the time judgment comes out. There have
been many cases:
1. Prof. Binayak Sen, a civil right activist was arrested and convicted of the offence of sedition in
2007 for having links with Naxalites. Prof. Sen was granted bail on an appeal filed before
Chhattisgarh HC. 155
2. In November 2010, noted writer and activist Arundhati Roy was charged with Sedition by Delhi
Police for allegedly having made anti-India remarks at an event organized in Kashmir on
21.10.2010.
150
1962 AIR 955
151
Sanskar Marathe V. State of Maharashtra, Cri.PIL 3-2015
152
Kedarnath V. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955
153
Article 19 of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
154
Article 19(2) of The Constitution of India, 1950
155
Dr Vinayak Binayak Sen 2 Pijush ... V. State of Chhattisgarh, Criminal Appeal No 20 of 2011

3. In September 2011 Anti-Nuclear activist S.P. Udayakumar, faced several cases of sedition for
protesting against Kudankulam Nuclear Power Plant in Tamil Nadu.
4. In September 2012 Aseem Trivedi, a noted political cartoonist was arrested on the 09.09.2012,
based on a political activist’s complaint that his cartoons insulted the country. The charge was
in connection to a cartoon he had made depicting the national emblem in support of the anti-
corruption movement in the country. 156
5. In 2014 67 Kashmiri students were charged with sedition by the Uttar Pradesh police for
supporting Pakistan in a cricket match between India and Pakistan. Later the Uttar Pradesh
government dropped the charges.
6. In October 2015 Tamil folk singer S Kovan was slapped with a sedition case for singing songs
critical of Tamil Nadu Chief Minister J Jayalalithaa and her liquor policy. He had criticized the
state government for allegedly profiting from state-run liquor shops at the expense of the poor.
The petition was later dismissed.
7. A resident of Kerala, Anwar Sadhik was arrested by police under Section 124A for a derogatory
Facebook comment.
8. On 15.02.2016 Former DU lecturer S.A.R Geelani was arrested on sedition charge related to an
event conducted at the Press Club in New Delhi. The police had claimed to have registered the
FIR taking suo motu cognizance of media clips of the incident. Sessions court granted bail to
Geelani.
(¶ 101.) It is submitted that according to the National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) Report,
2014157 as many as 47 sedition cases were reported in 2014 alone, across India which did not
involve violence or incitement to violence. As per the NCRB figures total of 58 persons were
arrested for the same with only one conviction.
In 1979, India ratified the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR),
which sets forth internationally recognized standards for the protection of freedom of
expression. However, misuse of sedition law under Section 124A and arbitrary slapping of
charges continue to restrict speech in ways inconsistent with ICCPR. In Kedar Nath, this
Hon’ble Court unequivocally narrowed the scope of Section 124A, but it continues to be
misused. Thereby, making it imperative that this Hon’ble court issues necessary directions
and guidelines to uphold its decision in Kedar Nath which is also compatible with India’s
international obligations.
156
157
National Crime Records Bureau (NCRB) Report, 2014

(¶ 102.) With reference to facts of the present case158 in Gurjatinder Pal Singh V. State of
Punjab159, Punjab & Haryana HC quashed the FIR filed against him under Section 124A of the
IPC, where in a religious ceremony organised in memory of the martyrs during Operation Blue
Star, the petitioner gave a speech to the people present advocating the establishment
“Khalistan”. He stated that the Constitution was a “worthless/useless” books for the Sikhs.
The supporters of the petitioner then raised aggressive slogans and naked swords were raised
in the air. The High Court cited the decision of the SC in Balwant Singh V. State of Punjab160,
where it was held that the mere casual raising of slogans a couple of times without the intention
to incite people to create disorder would not constitute a threat to the Government of India.
The court have acquitted the citizens accused of the charge of sedition on the grounds that the
prosecution had failed to produce sufficient evidence to prove that they had committed a
seditious act161.
(¶ 103.) In the light of cases mentioned under 4.8, sedition law is used to threaten civilians with
legal action. The Law is misunderstood by the Police Authority, in carrying out arrests and
slapping charges, rarely have they given respect to the restriction of ‘incitement to violence or
threat of public disorder’.162 In spite of the fact that there being no imminent threat, even then
it is used to curb the right to free speech and expression.
(¶ 104.) The foundational reason adopted by the SC for validating the provision was the
retention of the sedition law in England at that time 163.That law of sedition was abolished in
Britain in 2009,164 as it was found untenable in the light of the Human Rights Act, 1998. The
emphasis on free speech by the European Convention on Human Rights (ECHR) accelerated
the process of expulsion of sedition laws from many democracies. New Zealand followed suit
after noting that in the United States, Canada and Australia, the law is practically in disuse.
Therefore, it is clear that the British legislation is no longer a good law in the legal or political
sense.
(¶ 105.) A law like Sedition is a colonial law and has no place in a country like India. When we
construe Article 19(1)(a) and Section 124A of IPC together it is made out that the current
application of law goes way beyond its ambit.
(¶ 106.) This law creates an unreasonable restriction on the fundamental right to speech and
expression. This right of freedom to speech and expression granted by Article 19(1)(a) is not
158
Moot Proposition (Para 2)
159
(2009) 3 RCR (Cri) 224
160
(1995) 3 SCC 214: AIR 1995 SC 1785
161
Indra Das V. State of Assam ((2011) 3 SCC 380); State of Assam V. Fasiullah Hussain (2013) 4 GLT 284;
State of Rajasthan V. RavindraSinghi (2001) 3 WLN 242
162
163
Kedarnath V. State of Bihar, AIR 1962 SC 955
164
Coroners and Justice Act, 2009

completely unchecked. Article 19(2) empowers the state to place restriction on the fundamental
right of speech and expression in the interest of: -
(¶ 107.) Sovereignty and Integrity of India, The Security of the State, Friendly relations with
foreign states, Public order, Decency or Morality, Contempt of Court, Defamation, Incitement
to an offence.
In Chintaman Rao V. State of M.P.165 SC said: “The phrase 'reasonable restriction' connotes
that the limitation imposed on a person in enjoyment of the right should not be arbitrary or of
an excessive nature, beyond what is required in the interests of the public. The word
'reasonable' implies intelligent care and deliberation, that is, the choice of a course which
reason dictates. Legislation which arbitrarily or excessively invades the right cannot be said to
contain the quality of reasonableness and unless it strikes a proper balance between the
freedom guaranteed in Article 19(1)(g) and the social control permitted by clause (6) of Article
19, it must be held to be wanting in that quality."
(¶ 108.) The following principles and guidelines has been laid down for considering the
constitutionality of a statutory provision upon a challenge on the alleged vice of
unreasonableness of the restriction imposed by it 166:
(a) The restriction sought to be imposed on the Fundamental Rights guaranteed by Article 19 of
the Constitution must not be arbitrary or of an excessive nature so as to go beyond the
requirement of felt need of the society and object sought to be achieved.
(b) There must be a direct and proximate nexus or a reasonable connection between the restriction
imposed and the object sought to be achieved.
(c) It is imperative that for consideration of reasonableness of restriction imposed by a statute, the
Court should examine whether the social control as envisaged in Article 19 is being effectuated
by the restriction imposed on the Fundamental Rights.
(d) Although Article 19 guarantees all the seven freedoms to the citizen, such guarantee does not
confer any absolute or unconditional right but is subject to reasonable restriction, which the
Legislature may impose in public interest. It is therefore necessary to examine whether such
restriction is meant to protect social welfare satisfying the need of prevailing social values.
(e) Restriction imposed on the Fundamental Rights guaranteed under Article 19 of the Constitution
must not be arbitrary, unbridled, uncanalised and excessive and also not unreasonably
discriminatory.
(¶ 109.) In the light of above findings, it is submitted that the object of section 124A is to punish
any person for bringing the government into contempt or to excite disaffection towards the
165
AIR 1951 SC 11
166
Papnasam Labour Union V. Madura Coats Ltd, 1995 AIR 2200, 1995 SCC (1) 501

government by ‘violent means’ and in the present there has been an expression of an opinion
by the students. The charge of sedition section 124A of IPC is arbitrary and excessive which
goes beyond the requirement of the need of the society. A rally had been conducted every year
inside the college premises and the alleged raising of slogans did not result in any disturbance
to public order or any violence. There is no direct and proximate nexus or a reasonable
connection by charging the students for sedition and the object sought to be achieved by this.
The test of reasonableness has to be determined in an objective manner and from the standpoint
of the interest of general public 167.The charge of sedition is unreasonableness restriction and no
social control can be effectuated by imposing such restriction.
(¶ 110.) At best, the offence alleged to be committed in the present case is covered by another
law in force in India. Unlawful Activities (prevention) Act,1967, Section2(1)(o) says that:
“Unlawful Activity in relation to an individual or association, means any action taken by such
individual or association (whether by committing an act or by words, either spoken or written,
or by signs or by visible representation or otherwise), and(iii) which causes or is intended to
cause disaffection against India”
(¶ 111.) However, in spite of the narrowing down of the scope of the sedition law by this
Hon’ble Court and the widening of the freedom of speech and expression to allow for dissent,
governments have routinely invoked Section 124A with an aim to restrict dissent. The
petitioner acknowledges that words which directly provoke violence or which directly
threaten the maintenance of public order maydeserve censure. However, that is not what the
misapplication of sedition law seeks to achieve. The present practice of misapplication of
sedition law violates the Kedarnath judgment. It further aims to crush all opposition to the
ruling political party. Its regular use continues to have a chilling effect on the freedom of
speech and expression in the country.
(¶ 112.) It is submitted that during a parliamentary debate on freedom of speech in 1951,
Jawaharlal Nehru said, “Take again Section 124-A of the Indian Penal Code. Now as far as I
am concerned that particular Section is highlyobjectionable and obnoxious and it should
have no place in any body of laws that we might pass. The sooner we get rid of it the better.”
It is submitted that the use of sedition to silence the critics of the government including human
rights activists, journalists and intellectuals was a regular practice before Independence and has
continued till date.
167
Hanif Qureshi V. State of Bihar AIR 1958 SC 731

(¶ 113.) It is humbly submitted that the restriction imposed by Section 124A of IPC constitutes
and unreasonable restriction on the Right to Freedom of Speech and Expression (Article 19)
and the same should be declared unconstitutional.
(¶ 114.) The counsel on behalf of petitioner humbly submits that section 124 A IPC is violating
the freedom of speech and expression enumerated under article and hence is ultra vires and
unconstitutional.
V. WHETHER SECTION 124A OF IPC INFRINGES THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT

TO LIFE AND LIBERTY ENSHRINED UNDER ARTICLE 21 OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF INDIVA?
It is humbly submitted before the Hon’ble Court that Section 124A of IPC violates article 21 as
it curtails the right to life with liberty and dignity. Imprisonment of a lot of citizens only on the
basis of accusation levied and later if they are acquitted, their dignity in the society is lost. It is
therefore curtailing the right guaranteed under article 21 of the Constitution.
(¶ 115.) Pope John Paul II: said that “When freedom does not have a purpose, when it does
not wish to know anything about the rule of law engraved in the hearts of men and women, when
it does not listen to the voice of conscience, it turns against humanity and society.”
(¶ 116.) In the present matter at hand, it is humbly submitted that section 124A IPC is violative
of Right to life and liberty. The facts of the case states a Report by National Crime Records
Bureau stated that in 2014 as manyas 47 cases of sedition were filed leading to arrest of 58
people and there has been alarming increase in thecases in 2015. In 2016, as many as 21 cases
have been filed.
However, the report is silent on the part of convictions. The counsel on behalf of petitioner
would like to draw the attention of the bench on an article by senior advocate Sanjay Hegde in
which he mentioned that “The primary reason for the abysmally low conviction rate for sedition
cases is that the law is misapplied,”
(¶ 117.) One must understand that only an act of violence committed to overthrow the
government qualifies as a case of sedition,” said senior advocate Prashant Bhushan. “But these
days we get to see people getting charged with sedition for comments on social media and even
celebrations after cricket matches. Such cases, which are pursued more as a tool of harassment,
finally stand weak in the court of law and so the conviction rate is abysmally low.”
It is submitted that according to the National Crime Records Bureau(NCRB) Report, 2014
as many as 47 sedition cases were reported in 2014 alone, across nine Indian states. Many of
these cases did not involve violenceor incitement to violence, which is a pre-requisite for a
sedition charge. It is submitted that as per the NCRB figures total of 58 persons were arrested
in connection with these cases, but the government has managed only one conviction.
(¶ 118.) It is submitted that though a very small number of sedition cases leads to actual
conviction, it causes harassment of individuals till the time judgment comes out, which in
various cases takes many years to come. Meanwhile, persons chargedwith sedition have to live
without their passport, are barred from government jobs, and must produce themselves in
the court at all times as and whenrequired. A person so charged also has to spend money
on regular legal fee. The charges have rarely stuck in most of the cases, but the process itself
becomes the punishment.
(¶ 119.) In the present case, the liberty of the petitioners is violated by charging them under
124A IPC. The petitioners are dignified citizens of the country and by accusing them, their
dignity was stained black. A social stigma is created by such accusations. It is very evident
through a lot of examples like those of Rohtak Sisters. Once a person is accused or is charged
with certain offence, it becomes really difficult for them to survive peacefully with dignity in
the society. All the three petitioners are socially active membersof the country and have good
social standing.
(¶ 120.) Kanhaiya Kumar, the president of Jawaharlal Nehru University Student’s Union
along with his colleagues Umar Khalid, Anirban Bhattacharya and one other were arrested and
charged with sedition by the Delhi Police for raising anti- India slogans in a student event
organized within the JNU campus. When Kumar was brought to the Patiala Housecourt on
February 15, 2016, JNU students and professors, aswell as journalists, were attacked by a
group of lawyers. On 17 February, Kumar was once again assaulted by somelawyers inside the
Patiala House court. On February 22,2016, India Today broadcast a video in which three
lawyersof the Patiala House court claimed that they had beaten Kanhaiya Kumar while the
latter was in police custody. A six-member Supreme Court-appointed panel later confirmed that
the policemen present at the Court were responsible for the security lapses, and further stating
that police allowed 2 persons to enter the court room, and continued to let the assault take place,
in direct violation of the SC direction on Kanhaiya's safety. On 02 March 2016, Kanhaiya
Kumar was released on interim bail for lack of conclusive evidence. A separate magisterial
investigation appointed by the Delhi Government did not find any evidence of Kanhaiya
Kumar participating in anti-national slogans. There are conflictingreports about the veracity of
the videos and some of them have been found to be doctored.

(¶ 121.) In case of Maneka Gandhi v. Union of India168 The court has reinterpreted Art.21 and
practically overruled Gopalan case which can be regarded highly creative judicial
pronouncement on the part of Supreme Court. Since Maneka Gandhi case Supreme Court has
given Art. 21, broader and broader interpretation so as to imply many- more fundamental rights.
In course of time, Art.21 has proved to be very fruitful source of rights of the people. The
expression personal liberty in Art. 21 were given an expansive interpretation. The court
emphasized that the expression personal liberty is of wide stamp-litude covering a variety of
rights which go to constitute the personal liberty of man. Thus Article 21 in its widest sense
included the right to reputation.
In case of State of Bihar vs Lal Krishna Advani & Ors169 It has been stated that “Right to
reputation is a facet of the right to life of a citizen under article 21.
42nd Report of Law Commission (1971)
(¶ 122.) The 42nd report (1971) titled “Indian Penal Code”, the commission made three crucial
suggestions to be incorporated in section 124A IPC. They were:
1. Incorporation of men’s rea.
2. The scope of the section be widened., incorporating Constitution of India, Legislatures and the
administration of justice (Judiciary), along with the executive government, against whom
disaffection would not be tolerated, and,
3. Bridging the odd gap between imprisonment of life and imprisonment which may extend to
three years, or fine, by fixing a maximum punishment for sedition at seven years’ rigorous
imprisonment and fine.
(¶ 123.) In the present case at hand, the right of live with dignity of all the petitioners in is
question and section 124A IPC is violating that right, hence it is unconstitutional. The basic
motive behind the drafting of the legislation was to control the activities but that is now being
used a tool to harass citizens by curbing their right u/a 124A IPC. Also, accusing citizens under
such a law will also defeat the motive of democracy.
(¶ 124.) It is submitted that the aforesaid cases illustrate how sedition law is used to threaten
activists with legal action with an aim to frighten civil rights groups into keeping quiet. Though
a very small number of sedition cases leads to actual conviction, it causes harassment of
individuals till the time judgment comes out, which in various cases takes many years to come.
168
AIR 1978 SC 597: (1978) 1 SCC 836
169
Civil Appeal No. 1792 of 1997

(¶ 125.) Meanwhile, persons charged with sedition have to live without their passport, are
barred from government jobs, and must produce themselves in the court at all times as and when
required. A person so charged also has to spend money on regular legal fee. The charges have
rarely stuck inmost of the cases, but the process itself becomes the punishment.
The petitioners hereby submit in the words of M.P. Jain, “Democracy is based essentially on
free debates and open discussion for that is the only corrective steps inthe democratic setup”.
Also, right to live with dignity is basic human right as K. Iyer J. rightly mentioned “the spirit of
a manis atthe root of Art. 21”, “personal liberty makes for the worth of the human person.”

-PRAYER-
Wherefore, in the light of the facts stated, arguments advanced and authorities cited, it is most
humbly prayed and implored before the Hon’ble Supreme Court of Indiva, that it may be
graciously pleased to adjudge and declare that:
1. Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 is void and inoperative for being ultra vires
Article 19(1)(a) & Article 21 of the Constitution of Indiva.
2. All subsisting criminal proceedings before any court to the extent of such proceedings in any
way related to a charge under Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860 stand closed to
such extent;
3. No authority including any state or central police shall take any step in furtherance of
investigation or prosecution of any cases in respect of and to the extent that the accusation is
of an offence under Section 124A of the Indian Penal Code, 1860.
And pass any such or other orders as this Hon’ble Court may deem fit in the interests of justice,
equity, and good conscience.
For this act of Kindness, the Petitioner shall duty-bound forever pray.
ALL OF WHICH IS RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED
S/d-
COUNSELS for THE PETITIONERS

Public Interest Litigation No. /2021 - Sanjeev Kumar Singh

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Public Interest Litigation No. /2021 - Sanjeev Kumar Singh

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Public Interest Litigation No. /2021 - Sanjeev Kumar Singh

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

What is the case about?

What is the case about?

What are the arguments made regarding the constitutionality of Section 124A?

What are the arguments made regarding the constitutionality of Section 124A?

1st NSL INTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2021

1ST NSL INTRA MOOT COURT COMPETITION, 2021

BEFORE THE HON’BLE SUPREME COURT OF INDIVA

(PUBLIC INTEREST LITIGATION)

UPON SUBMISSION TO THE SPECIAL BENCH OF THE SUPREME

THE HUMBLE SUBMISSION ON BEHALF OF THE PETITIONER

MEMORIAL for PETITIONER Page 1 of 44

LIST OF ABBREVIATIONS ........................................................................................... 04

INDEX OF AUTHORITIES ............................................................................................. 06

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION ................................................................................ 10

STATEMENT OF FACTS ............................................................................................... 11

ISSUES RAISED ............................................................................................................... 12

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS ....................................................................................... 13

ARGUMENTS ADVANCED ........................................................................................... 15

I. THAT SEDITION CANNOT BE DETERMINED ONLY ON THE BASIS OF THE

A. THE LANGUAGE OF THE CONTENT DOES NOT DETERMINE DISAFFECTION,

II. THAT SEDITION CANNOT BE DETERMINED ONLY INSOFAR AS SEDITIOUS

A. THE LAW OF SEDITION IS VAGUE IN MEANNING AND APPLICATION ............ 18

1. The law is vague and ambiguous in language .................................................................. 18

2. The ‘tendency’ to incite public disorder is an undefined and arbitrary concept................. 18

B. THERE MUST BE IMMINENT THREAT TO THE ‘STATE’ IN ANY FORM ............ 19

C. ALTERNATIVE LEGISLATIONS FOR PROTECTION AND SECURITY OF STATE

III. [A] KEDAR NATH RULING OF SUPREME COURT OF INDIA LIMITING

A. THE KEDAR NATH JUDGEMENT IS SUBJECTIVE AND OPEN ENDED ............... 22

MEMORIAL for PETITIONER Page 2 of 44

B. THE INTERPRETATION IS USED FOR CRIMINALISING MERE POLITCIAL

III. [B] SUCH AN INTERPRETATION IS NOT COMPATIBLE WITH FREE SPEECH

A. RESTRICTION IMPOSED IS NOT PROPORTIONAL AND UNREASONABLE IN

1.IT CAUSES THE CONSTITUTIONALLY IMPERMISSIBLE CHILLING EFFECT ON

2. IT IS AGAINST THE EFFECTIVE DOCTRINE ............................................................ 27

B. SECTION 124(A) IS CONSTITUTIONALLY ULTRA VIRES AND SHOULD BE

1. SECTION 124(A) IS INCONSISTENT WITH THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTIONS

2. THE ALTERNATE LEGISLATIONS IN PRACTICE DILUTE THE NECESSITY OF

A. THE SEDITION LAW IS BECOMING A TOOL OF HARASSMENT ......................... 30

B. DIFFERENCE BETWEEN HATE SPEECH & SEDITION ........................................... 30

V. THAT THE SECTION 124A OF IPC INFRINGES THE FUNDAMENTAL RIGHT TO

A. 42ND REPORT OF LAW COMMISSION (1971) ........................................................... 42

MEMORIAL for PETITIONER Page 3 of 44

AIR All India Reporter

CrLJ Criminal Law Journal

ICCPR International Covenant on Civil and Political

MEMORIAL for PETITIONER Page 4 of 44

ILR Indian Law Review

IPC Indian Penal Code

J&K Jammu & Kashmir

NCT National Capital Territory

PIL Public Interest Litigation

SCC Supreme Court Cases

SCR Supreme Court Reporter

U.S. United States

UAPA Unlawful Activities Prevention Act

MEMORIAL for PETITIONER Page 5 of 44

MEMORIAL for PETITIONER Page 6 of 44

Burstyn v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) .............................................................................. 22