The Princeton Encyclopedia of Poetry and Poetics

Classical Poetics

I. Early Greek Poetics.

Ancient Greek poetics at its inception was shaped by two features of archaic culture:
the treatment of the Homeric epics as a source of authoritative knowledge and the
nature of early poetry as song or recitation performed in social contexts.
Accordingly, the concerns of the earliest Western poetics centered on criteria that
had little to do with the notion of lyric subjectivity. At issue instead were poetry’s
ethical and pedagogical value; the poet’s relationship to truth; the suitability of a
poem to its performative context and the pleasure and judgment of the audience.
These emphases would change with the move away from an oral culture and the
rise of formal and aesthetic criteria of judgment.

The term “poetics” itself requires a caveat. Prior to the 5th c. B.C.E there was no
single term to mark out poetry as a genre; an early “poetics” can only be derived
from the implicit views embedded in early poetry, philosophy, and rhetoric. Early
epideictic prose and poetry were affiliated; the former was marked by rhythm,
figure, and parallelism, features evident in the sophist Gorgias’ (ca. 485-ca. 380
B.C.E) display-piece Encomium of Helen, which itself claims that poetry is merely
“logos (speech) with meter” (Helen 8). Such prose and poetry shared an incantatory
quality; Gorgias says of logos that it produces shuddering and pity as well as goeteia,
enchantment, which beguiles the soul and affects it physically (Helen 10). Not until
the 5th c. is attention directed to the formal study of poetry’s properties abstracted
from its performance context, perhaps due to the increasing commitment of song to
writing (Ford). At this point the term poietai (poets) comes into general use to
denote such crafters; in the 4th c. we find, in Aristotle’s Poetics, a poietike tekhne, an
art or craft of poetry sustaining formal analysis.

Poetry was held to be the educator of men, especially early epic, which was seen as a
source of ethical and practical knowledge (e.g. Herodotus 2.53.1-2, Xenophon
Symposium 3.5, Isocrates 2.43, Strabo 1.2.3). Homer, by virtue of his priority, held a
cultural authority not unlike that of the Bible later in the Christian West. Yet the
epic depiction of the gods as ruled by human passions was a target of criticism: the
6th c. critic Xenophanes condemned (in verse) the notion of anthropomorphism and
the immoral behavior of the epic Olympians, who engaged in theft, adultery, and
deception (fr. B11-16 Diels-Kranz). Similar complaints occur in his near-
contemporaries, the Presocratics Pythagoras of Samos and Heraclitus of Ephesus
(Hieronymus of Rhodes, fr. 42 Wehrli; fr. 42 D-K). The lyric poets Stesichorus (ca.
640-555 B.C.E) and Pindar (ca. 522–443 B.C.E) explicitly correct earlier “tales” (cf.
Olympians 1.27-29, Nemeans 7.20ff); the elegists Solon and Theognis cast
themselves as moralists. To take these criticisms as evidence for Plato’s claim of “an
ancient war” between poetry and philosophy, however (Republic 607b), is risky;
issues of truth and falsehood in this period occur in the context of bids for poetic
authority, and the genres of philosophy and poetry are not clearly distinct until the
classical period.

From Homer on the Muses, daughters of Memory, were invoked as the source of
both the poet’s knowledge and his inspiration, a pairing not seen as incompatible till
Plato. The poet represents himself as relying on the Muses in his recreation and
memorialization (aletheia, bringing out of forgetfulness) of heroic deeds. To listen
to this poetic song brings enchantment and forgetfulness of present troubles
(Odyssey 8.44-45; 17. 385, 521; cf. Phemius at Od. 1.326ff.). Similarly the Hesiodic
muses, who offer knowledge of the past and future, bring a pleasing forgetfulness of
the present (Theogony 53-55, 98-105), though Hesiod attributes to them the
statement that they can speak true-seeming lies as well as the truth (Th. 27-28).

Aristophanes (ca. 445-ca. 385 B.C.E) devotes several of his comedies to attacks upon
the tragedian Euripides (ca. 480 B.C.E – 406 B.C.E) and the 5th c. Sophists, whose
new-fangled ideas (relativism, skepticism, agnosticism) influenced Euripidean
drama. They were pilloried in the Clouds, as was Euripides himself in Acharnians
and Thesmophoriazusae. The Frogs (405 B.C.E) stages the first scene of literary
criticism, a contest as to whether Euripides or Aeschylus was a better teacher of the
Athenians. Aeschylus’ view is that the poet should conceal wickedness and speak of
honorable things; he sees himself as a latter-day Orpheus or Mousaios, and his old
fashioned morals, martial topics, and larger-than-life heroes carry the day (Frogs
1030-36). In contrast, the argumentative and impious characters of Euripides are
judged too base to offer ethical models, however realistic his drama may be.

Underlying meanings (hyponoia) in Homer and Hesiod were sought by means of

etymologized narrative, allegory, and other forms of exegesis. Already in the late 6c
Theagenes of Rhegium, in the oldest known Greek treatise on poetry, defended
Homer by interpreting the warring divinities of Iliad 20 as representing a conflict
between physical elements or psychological forces (fr. A2 D-K). The Stoics
employed a similar approach, reading the Olympian gods as personifications of air,
ether, fire, etc., and relying heavily on etymology in their explications (cf. also the
Derveni papyrus and in Metrodorus of Lampsacus, 5th c. B.C.E). The Sophists
accepted pay for giving ethical lessons based on Homeric exegesis; indeed,
Protagoras in Plato’s Protagoras 316d-317b calls the poets “Sophists in disguise”
who conceal their wisdom in verse. This search for underlying meaning was already
a familiar procedure in Greek culture, as evident from interpretations of the Delphic
oracle and the fable (ainos): Pindar and Theognis claim to speak an “ainos” that will
be understood only by the wise. The term allegoria (“speaking otherly”) came into
use only in Plutarch’s time (Plut. Moralia 19E).

II. Plato on Poetry

With Plato (427-347 B.C) poetry is treated—if only to be condemned—as a field of

endeavor with a single object, by analogy to the crafts of painting and sculpture.
Plato acknowledges the enormous influence of Homer and the poets as teachers
(Rep. 598d-e, 599a), but criticizes them in the Ion and Republic especially; his
response to the debate about the ethical and practical uses of poetry is to banish the
poets (with a few exceptions) from his ideal state (Rep. Books 3, 10). Their task is
better achieved by Socratic dialogue (Prot. 347d).

The attack on poetry in Republic 2 focuses on the familiar issue of the poets’
representation of the gods: their lying tales are to be rejected, and the gods should
be described as unchanging, good, and incapable of violence (2.379a-382e). The
vulnerability of the young leads Socrates to reject even poetry sanitized by hyponoia
(Rep. 2.378e)—after all, one poem can lead to many interpretations, nor can the
absent poet answer questions about his intent (Prot. 347c-348a). In Book 3, we
encounter the conceptual tool upon which much of Plato’s argument rests: mimesis,
i.e. dramatic/expressive representation or a replication of something in material
form. Listing three genres—drama, epic, and dithyramb (a form of choral lyric,
though iambic, elegiac, and lyric monody are omitted)—Plato distinguishes between
them based on the difference between “plain narrative” (diegesis) and mimetic
narrative, i.e. direct speech. Dithyrambs exemplify the former, since there the poet
speaks in his own person; in drama, only mimetic narrative is used; a combination
of the two occurs in epic (Rep. 3.392d-394c). The Guardians should not engage in
mimetic narrative lest from enjoying the imitation, they come to enjoy the reality–or
if they do imitate, it should be what is appropriate for them: courageous, self-
controlled, pious, and free people. Thus they will use Homeric-type narratives,
mostly plain narrative and a small amount of mimetic narrative (but only of the
ethically appropriate type) (Rep. 3.395d-96d). The lyric modes are excluded except
for songs that inspire courage or address the gods (Rep. 2.299b-c).

For Plato, it is not only the “imitators” but also their audience who are at risk.
Because the tragic poets mostly portray people suffering—and reacting to their
suffering non-philosophically—they strengthen the non-rational part of the
audience’s souls, throwing into disarray their psychic constitution (Rep. 10.605b);
the same happens in the case of “sex, anger, and all the desires, pleasures, and pains”
that accompany our actions. (One might contrast Gorgias’ view that “the deceiver is
more just than the non-deceiver, and the deceived wiser than the undeceived,” D-K
B23). Plato (or his spokesperson Socrates) proposes instead that the citizens be
told a “noble lie” justifying the hierarchies in the city (Rep. 414c). In the Laws,
however, the Athenian emphasizes the importance of setting up choruses for the
city to persuade the citizens that the most philosophical life is the happiest one,
harnessing the power of song about which Plato is so cautious in the Republic (Laws
2.664b-c).

Elsewhere Plato treats poetry under the heading of inspiration (enthusiasmos)

rather than mimesis (the two concepts do not appear together until the Laws). His
treatment of inspiration innovates; in relying on the Muse the poet does not acquire
knowledge so much as enter upon a kind of madness (mania) beyond his control
(Ion passim, Apology 22a-c, Meno 99c-e, Phaedrus 245, Laws 3.682a, 719c-d).
Although the poet does not know what he is saying, he can nonetheless produce
beautiful poetry; in the Phaedrus his inspiration is said to be winged by Love (Eros)
and capable of attaining truth.

III. Aristotle

With the Poetics of Aristotle (384-322 B.C.E) comes a shift in emphasis from poetry
as a socio-religious activity to poetry as an artifact with a generic form and telos.
Aristotle starts his discussion with the “modes of imitation,” which differ from each
other in their means, objects, or imitative procedures rather than performance
context (1447a). Aristotle thus deploys Plato’s view of poetry as a mimetic art; even
the verse form is a less important criterion than its mimesis of what is fictional. The
objects of imitation are the actions of good or bad men; the manner is (as with
Plato) plain narrative, mimetic narrative, or a mixture thereof. The bias towards
mimesis is also shown in Aristotle’s focus on drama rather than lyric, elegy, or
iambus. But imitation here is not condemned as a poor copy of reality or a
corruptive influence; instead, Aristotle points out that imitation is natural to man
from childhood, that it is fundamental to the learning process, and that we delight in
realistic works of imitation even if their subject matter is unpleasant; and it is in
these traits that he locates the origin of poetry (Poet.1448b). Moreover, since the
poet’s function is to produce an imitation of what could happen rather than what did
happen, poetry is more serious and more philosophical than history (Poet. 1451a-b).

Tragedy, says Aristotle, developed from the improvisations of the leader of choral
dithyrambs (Poet. 1449a). Its “soul” is the plot (mythos). The other elements of
tragedy are: character (ethos), thought (dianoia, probably the arguments of the
characters), poetic expression (lexis), the composition of the choral odes
(melopoieia), and spectacle (opsis), in decreasing order of importance (Poet. 1450a).
Tragedy is “the imitation of an action that is complete in itself,” with a certain order
and of a certain magnitude—that is, long enough for the hero to pass via probable or
necessary stages from misfortune to happiness or vice versa (Poet. 1452a). It is in
the representation of this “action”, as constrained by probability and causal
necessity (not contiguity), that the famous Aristotelian unity resides. Aristotle also
minimizes the power attributed to rhythmic and melodic discourse by Gorgias and
Plato. There is no mention of the dramatist’s inspiration; instead his work is a
rational art, a tekhne, with a specific goal, the catharsis of the audience by the
evocation of “pity and fear,” preferably by the plot rather than the spectacle (Poet.
1450b, 1453b). Whether the primary sense of catharsis is medical, ethical, or
otherwise is unclear, but the sense is that catharsis improves the human capacity to
feel the proper emotions towards the correct objects (Halliwell) and it represents
one part of Aristotle’s response to Platonic criticism.

Plots can be simple or complex. In the former, the protagonist’s change of state is
linear; in the latter it is caused by a sudden and unexpected reversal of fortune
(peripeteia), or a recognition (anagnorisis, a change from ignorance to knowledge),
or both (Poet. 1452a). Two other plot types are the pathetic (where the motive is
passion) and the ethical (where the motives are ethical). The best tragedy entails a
reversal from happiness to unhappiness; the hero should be a good man, but not a
perfect one and the change should not be caused by wickedness but by some
hamartia (Poet. 1453a). The term may mean "moral flaw,” "intellectual error” or
some intermediate quality; excluding culpability allows for a tragic disparity
between a character’s intention and its outcome (Halliwell).

Epic (Poet. 1459a-1460a) is similar to tragedy in so far as it is a representation, in

verse, of characters of a higher type. It too must be simple, or complex, “ethical,” or
“pathetic.” Tragedy however is the superior form; while epic has no limit in time,
can portray simultaneous actions, and incorporates elements of the supernatural,
tragedy tries to contain its action within a single day and to what can be shown on
stage and is thus the more efficient and superior genre (Poet. 1462a-b). Aristotle's
theory of comedy may have been contained in a lost second book of the Poetics but
is probably not represented in the 10th c. ms. known as the Tractatus Coislinianus.
Lost are his three books of On Poets, and six or more of Homeric Problems.

IV. Hellenistic Poetics

The Museum and Library founded by Ptolemy I at Alexandria in the early 3rd c.
housed not only the ancient world’s largest collection of volumes but also a
community of scholars devoted to textual criticism, philology, and exegesis.
Zenodotus of Ephesus (ca. 325–260 B.C.E), the first head of the Library, devoted
himself to producing authoritative editions of the Homeric and Hesiodic epics. His
successor Eratosthenes (ca. 276 B.C.E– ca. 195 B.C.E) criticized the widespread use
of Homer for pedagogy, and emphasized that poetry’s goal was enchantment, not
instruction (Strabo 1.1.10). Aristophanes of Byzantium (ca. 257–180 B.C.E)
introduced punctuation and was the first known critic to deal with the issue of
plagiarism, chastising Menander for his borrowings from other poets. Aristophanes,
and Aristarchus after him (ca. 217–145 B.C.E), formally evaluated the work of their
literary forebears, producing official lists (the kanones, or canons) of those
considered best and worthy of preservation; no contemporaries were included.
Aristarchus instituted the critical principle that each author is his own best
interpreter and editorial decisions should thus be based on the poet’s own usage
and thought (as represented by the maxim “Homeron ex Homerou,” Homer from
Homer).

A synchronous phenomenon was the rise of Alexandrianism in poetic composition, a

style that emphasized the display of mythological and scientific erudition presented
with painstaking poetic craftsmanship. The trend is best represented by
Callimachus (ca. 305-ca. 240 B.C.E), whose programmatic statement that “a big book
is a big evil” (fr. 465 ed. Pfeiffer) represented the rejection of large-scale Homeric
epic in favor of shorter poems on little-known episodes in myth. The introduction
to his Aetia sets forth a new poetics epitomized by Apollo’s command: “Poet, let
your sacrificial victim be fat, but your muse slim.”

V. Poetry and the Hellenistic Philosophers

Of the three major schools of Hellenistic philosophy, the Epicureans, Stoics, and
Cynics, two took distinct positions on the nature and function of poetry. The Stoics
detected their own cosmology in Homer and Hesiod; Crates of Mallos (2nd c. B.C.E),
e.g., treated Agamemnon’s shield in Iliad 11 as a representation of the cosmos
(Eustathios on Iliad 11.32-40) while Cornutus (1st c. C.E.), like the Greek Stoics, used
etymological readings of Homer to recover early beliefs about the world. Balbus in
Cicero’s On the Nature of the Gods 2.60ff also invokes metonymy (Ceres stands for
grain) and the deification of virtues and emotions as interpretive techniques. The
Stoic emphasis on hyponoia suggests that the Stoics did not feel poetry could lead an
audience to virtue without the correct critical reception; the mental ability of the
reader or listener to recognize what was morally commendable and what needed
adaptation was the crucial issue. The Stoics recognized that poetic form helped the
absorption of content: as reported by Seneca, Cleanthes held that the force of meter
and music added greater impact to the thought (Sen. Epistles 108.8-11).

The allegorist Heraclitus (1st c. C.E.) claims that both Plato and Epicurus were hostile
to Homer, and that Epicurus himself condemned all poetry “as a destructive lure of
fictitious stories” (Homeric Problems 4 = Epicurus fr. 229 Usener). Sextus Empiricus
(Against the Mathematicians 1.296-97) reports that Epicurus felt that poets pursued
falsehood because it naturally moves the soul more than truth, and because it
inflames the baser human passions. However, Epicurus may have been receptive to
poetry as entertainment as long as it made no claims to education. The later
Epicurean Philodemus of Gadara (110-40 B.C.E) wrote that poetry should be
beautiful and produce pleasure, not serve any moral or utilitarian purpose; nor did
it need to be truthful (On Poems 5). Philodemus also argued that style and content
are inseparable, with the result that any change in the order of the words
(metathesis) changes the meaning as well. Epicurean didactic should thus be an
oxymoron, yet Lucretius composed precisely that in the mid-first c. B.C.E. His epic
poem On the Nature of Things characterizes itself via the well-known metaphor of
the medicinal cup rimmed with honey in order to fool children into taking their
medicine; his verse—and perhaps such images as the opening tableau of Mars and
Venus sharing a bed—is to be the sweet lure into Epicurean philosophy. His
Philodemian view of the inseparability of style and content is reflected in his
“atomistic poetics,” in which the letters are conceived of as atoms, so that lignum
(wood) is said to contain igni(s) (fire).

We know only a little of the Aristotelian critic Neoptolemus of Parium (3 c. B.C.E).

His division of poiema, poiesis, and poietes (poem, poetry, poet) linked the first term
to style and the second to the mimesis of fictional stories. This division of poetry
into (roughly) expression vs. content may be the precursor of a later division
between grammatike (criticism), philology, and glosses on the one hand, and
hermeneutics on the other (Walker). Neoptolemus’ terminology was criticized by
the Stoic philosopher and polymath Posidonius (ca. 135-51 B.C.E). Poetic criticism
throughout this period thus revolved around the oppositions of form vs. content and
pleasure vs. instruction; also at issue was the question of whether poetry was the
result more of natural genius or of hard work, with Callimachus naturally the
representative of art (cf. Longinus On the Sublime 33.4-5).

VI. The Romans as Epigones

The Romans inherited Greek literature before they established a literature of their
own. Their earliest recorded poet, the Greek ex-slave Livius Andronicus, was a
translator; he set Homer’s Odyssey in Latin Saturnian verse and also translated
Greek comedy and tragedy for staging at the Great Games of 240 B.C.E. Early Roman
verse was thus colored by its association with the Greeks and with ex-slaves or non-
citizens. Moreover, prose was already held to be the more authoritative form
because of its propriety for forensic oratory and history, the writing of which
occupied the leisure time of the elite classes. Indeed the first original Roman poetry
was the historical epic composed by Naevius (ca. 270 – 201 B.C.E) and Ennius (ca.
239 B.C.E-169 B.C.E). Ennius’ treatment, in the Annales, of Roman history from the
fall of Troy to 184 B.C.E opened with a description of how Homer’s soul was
transferred into him by metempsychosis; he also adopted Homer’s dactylic
hexameter. At the beginning of the Roman epic tradition, accordingly, stands a
“second Homer.” Despite the temporal priority of Livius Andronicus, later Romans
too chose to set Naevius or Ennius at the head of a Roman poetics; Lucretius, e.g.,
claims that Ennius first brought the poet’s crown from Helicon (Lucr. 1.117-18; cf.
Horace Epistle 2.1.156-59).

These circumstances meant that a particular set of anxieties colored early Roman
poetics, esp. their epigonal status vis-à-vis the Greeks, who had already produced a
great national literature; the tension between imitation of these models and
originality; the negative associations that touched upon writing poetry, which, like
philosophy, was considered unmanly, foreign, and—unless given to a practical goal
like the glorification of a Roman family or Rome itself—of little practical
applicability (cf. Aulus Gellius 9.2.5); also at issue were the low social status of the
actors of the Roman theater (unlike those of Attic drama, who were respectable
citizens) and, finally, the need to distinguish between the poet’s verse and the
orator’s prose, in composition and in performance. Horace’s famous quip, “Greece,
though captured, captured in turn her savage victor” (Ep. 2.1.156) captures some of
these tensions. This “anxiety of influence” would lead to much discussion of the
proper imitation of others both in poetry and in rhetoric (cf. Cicero, On the Orator
2.8-97; the fragments of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, On imitation; Horace Ep.
1.19.19 and Ars Poetica 133ff.; Seneca the Elder, Suasoria3.7; Seneca the Younger,
Ep. 84; Quintilian 10.2.27-8; Longinus 13-14). Too literal an imitation of other
poetry is to be avoided; instead, the source should be recognized at the same time as
the changes (even polemic ones) rung upon it by the poet, a process now termed
“intertextuality.”

The first Roman dramatic criticism is to be found, not in a treatise, but in the
prologues to the plays of the ex-slave Terence (195/185–159 B.C.E). Like his
predecessor Plautus, Terence staged translations of Greek new comedy, but his
frequent combination of two originals for use in a single Roman drama brought on
the accusation of “spoiling” (contaminatio) the looted Greek plays for use by other
Roman playwrights (cf. the prologues to the Andria, the Adelphoe, and the Self-
Tormentor). These dramas gained in literary stature through the efforts of Aelius
Stilo (ca. 154-74 B.C.E) in the late 2nd c. B.C.E, when they were added to the school
curriculum. Stilo is said by Suetonius to have played a key role in the development
of a literary education at Rome (Gram. 3), following the example of Crates of Mallos,
who encouraged critical attention to poetry during his visit to Rome in 159 B.C.E. A
list of Roman republican and early imperial grammatici (teacher/critics) and their
critical contributions is preserved in Suetonius’ On Grammarians.

The orator and statesman Cicero (106 – 43 B.C.E) claims, in his legal defense of the
Greek poet Archias, that the poet’s inspiration is divine (Pro Archia18). In a more
Roman vein he adds that the poet benefits the state because he celebrates the deeds
of Roman heroes and the Roman people and thus provides an incentive to glory
(Arch. 19ff.) In his Orator, Cicero suggests that the main distinction between oratory
and poetry cannot be meter, since Plato and Demosthenes have more in common
with poetry than do the writers of comedy (Orat. 67). Further linking the two, he
argues that both orators and poets move the audience by being moved themselves
(de Orat.2.194; Div. 1.80; Orat. 132). As a statesman and advocate, however, he is
often careful to affect ignorance about Greek literature and to insist upon the
distance separating the orator from the poet (Brutus 191). In his letters, Cicero
criticizes the “cantores Euphorionis” (bards of the school of Euphorion), his
pejorative term for the poets who adopted the Callimachean program at Rome
(Tusculan Disputations 3.45). Catullus, Calvus and Cinna are its best-known
representatives; they adopted such Alexandrian mannerisms as allowing a spondee
in the fifth foot of their verse spondaizing line (Cic. Letters to Atticus 7.2.1, cf. Orat.
161). These “neoteric” poets rejected annalistic epic, privileged ekphrasis and
erudition, used difficult diction, and produced intricately structured and highly
polished verse; Catullus describes his book of poems as a trifle, but an elegant one
that has been well-polished with dry pumice. He influenced the Roman elegists and
Vergil, in whose 6th Eclogue we find Apollo warning the shepherd Tityrus off martial
epic, telling him to keep his sheep fat but his song finely-spun.

Roman higher education was based on training in rhetoric as well as the reading of
poetry, with the result that both were grouped under litterae (loosely, the liberal
arts) and shared critical terminology and standards of eloquence. Rhetorical
handbooks come to include commentary on “criticism,” which includes, in the Art of
Grammar of Dionysius Thrax (2nd c. C.E.), reading aloud, the explanation of figures,
glosses of difficult words, the finding of etymologies, the elucidation of analogies,
and judgment of the poetry. The On Composition of the Greek rhetorician Dionysius
of Halicarnassus (ca. 60 B.C.E–after 7 B.C.E) treated the styles of poets, historians,
and orators from the classical period. Focusing on the arrangement of words,
Dionysius held that the poetic goal of pleasure and beauty could be created by a
particular combination of sounds, variety, and rhythm. These criteria were used to
set up three distinct styles, the austere, the elegant, and the mixed (21-4).
Demetrius’ On Style (date unknown) treats both poetry under prose under four
styles: elevated, elegant, plain, and forcible.
VIII. Horace and the Augustan Age

The centralization of political power in a single individual after the Augustan victory
of 31 B.C.E oriented contemporary poetics around issues of patronage, ideology, and
the relationship of poet to state. We see accordingly such poetic features as the
recusatio: originally exemplified by Callimachus’ refusal to write grand epic, in the
early imperial period it evolved into the poet’s statement of his inadequacy to
celebrate the deeds of a contemporary military or political “great man” (cf. Horace
Ep 2. 1, Odes 1.6, 2.12, 4.2, 4.15; Prop. 2.1, 3.1, 3.2, 3.3, 3.9; Ovid Amores 1.1, Vergil
Georgics 3.16ff.). Also characteristic of this refusal is the thematic opposition of
amor, love, to political topics as the subject of poetry.

Horace (65-8 B.C.E) wrote as both poet and critic. His Odes cast him as the Roman
heir to Greek lyric. The Satires criticize the unpolished and prolific verse of his
predecessor Lucilius (ca. 160s-103/2 B.C.E) and refuse to imitate his attacks on his
peers (Sat. 1.4, 1.10); instead his own verse will expose societal vice and folly in
gentler terms. The Epistles make a claim for the moral value of reading poetry; Ep.
1.2 finds Homer more useful in this regard than the Stoics, while Ep. 2.1 points out
the poet’s usefulness: he teaches the young, offers moral exempla, and helps the
state with hymns and prayers—an echo of Plato’s Republic. Here Horace also offers
a defense of contemporary poets and laments the conservative preference for the
past, based upon a false analogy, he argues, of the earliest Roman poets to the
earliest Greek poets. A brief history of Roman drama gives it a local origin with
Fescennine verses at rustic festivals; these verses became so violent in their abuse
that a law was passed to temper them, and to this moment Horace attributes the
form of contemporary drama. The Epistle ends with a plea for poetic patronage in
general.

The famous Ars Poetica (Ep. 2.3 to the Pisos; the name comes from Quintilian) is a
Roman variation on Aristotelian poetics combined with Hellenistic concerns. On the
evidence of Porphyrio and Philodemus it seems Horace took his major precepts here
from Neoptolemus, including the focus on unity (also Aristotelian) and the view of
poetry’s dual function in delighting and being useful. The poem may also reflect
Neoptolemus’ tripartite structure of poiema, poiesis, and poietes, treated roughly as
the opposition between words/style and subject matter. The focus on unity
motivates the famous opening analogy of the bad poem to the painting of monstrous
body with parts from different animals (1-13), a twist on the bodily metaphors used
for the coherent poem or speech by Plato (Phaed. 264c), Aristotle (Poet. 1450b),
and Cicero (de Orat. 2.325). Horace’s demand that the poem be finely-crafted recalls
the Callimachean program, while his support of the poet’s right to coin new words
meshes with his critique of backwards-looking conservatism in Ep. 2.1. His
metaphor of words flourishing and decaying like leaves and men adapts Homer’s
original comparison of the generations of men to leaves at Iliad 6.14ff. , suggesting
that language, too, has a natural life-span (46-82).

Horace next addresses what can be represented with propriety in tragedy and
comedy (89-98, cf. 180-88), and argues (as in the rhetorical treatises) that the actor
must feel what he portrays in order to affect his audience (103-105). From this
point onwards it is clear that he takes drama, and especially tragedy, to be his main
subject, without particular regard to the contemporary situation at Rome. He
includes a number of traditional prescriptions for the dramatist (five acts; three
actors; choral odes relevant to the plot, 189-95), but unlike Aristotle gives more
prominence to character than to plot, a typically Roman concern with ethos also
influenced by rhetoric (120-24, 156-78). His aetiology for Greek drama differs from
that of Aristotle Poetics 1449a, here beginning with poets competing for the prize of
a goat (220ff.); one Thespis later invents the modern version (275-77.). Also non-
Aristotelian is his attention to the moral role of drama: the chorus should sooth the
angry, give good advice, regulate the passionate, praise what’s right, and pray to the
gods (196-201). The moral role is supported by his claim that Socratic wisdom is
the font of good writing (309-10). Avoiding the pleasure/education dichotomy
about the role of poetry, he claims that the best poet wishes to do both (342-34). As
for the poet himself, the cult of flattery at Rome may mislead about his talent; an
honest critic is rare, but necessary (419-52). Both ingenium (talent) and ars (skill)
are needed to write good poetry (408-11); Horace does not praise the “divine
madness” of the Ion and Phaedrus, which he associates with a reading of Democritus
as requiring poets to be mad (295-308; cf. the mad Eumolpus in Petronius’
Satyricon).

IX. Poetics of the Roman Empire

Much of the literature of the 1st c. C.E. (both poetry and rhetoric) identifies itself as
in decline from its republican acme. This “poetics of inferiority” could be used as
ethical, social, or political commentary; thus the (supposed) development of luxury
and sexual deviance, detrimental changes in literary taste, and the end of the
political clout of the elite classes in were all offered as the causes of deterioration.
Lucan’s (39-65 C.E.) epic Pharsalia signifies its opposition to the triumphant
narrative of the Aeneid not only in describing the end of Republican Rome but also
in describing itself as written under conditions of “slavery”—after praising Nero at
the poem’s start. Similarly, Tacitus’ (56-117 C.E.) Dialogue on Orators poses the
question of why there are no good orators in the present day, but eschews
answering it directly in favor of an exploration of three topics: the superiority of
oratory or poetry as a career, the superiority of the ancients or the moderns, and the
cause of the decline of eloquence. The dialogue itself stages another issue, the
danger incurred by one of its three main protagonists, Maternus, for writing drama
about historical or mythical tyrants and heroic republicans such as Cato the
younger. Poetry is thus shown to be the site of true political commentary despite its
criticism by Aper as detached from the world of oratory. At the end of the dialogue,
Maternus executes a surprising about-face in praise of the quiet times brought on by
autocracy; but this very praise from a critic of the regime effectively demonstrates
the oppressive force of that autocracy and undermines its own laudatory content.
The Dialogue thus models the relationship between literature and politics under the
empire and demonstrates the political rather than philosophical uses of allegory.

The Stoic Seneca the Younger (ca. 3 B.C.E-65 C.E.) devotes several of his letters to
poetic issues. Epistle 84 discusses the imitation of our poetic models: we should
read as the bees gather, and blend the whole into one delicious compound so that it
both reveals its source and differs from it (Ep. 84.3-5). In Epistle 88 he criticizes the
idea that Homer was a philosopher, or that the liberal arts can teach us virtue.
Poetry can prepare the mind for virtue, but only philosophy can instill it (Ep. 88.20,
95.8). His own poetic practice may be seen in the tragedies, which offer an indirect
critique of the Aristotelian model by portraying the shocking spectacle of good men
coming to a bad end and bad men triumphant. Critics are divided as to whether this
dovetails with his philosophical teachings or shows up their idealism, but in any
case it is clear that the dramas require an intellectually engaged audience if they are
to provoke more than horror.

The rhetorician Quintilian (ca. 35-100 C.E.), who held an imperial post under
Vespasian, eschews any narrative of decline in his Institutio oratoria (On the
Education of the Orator) in favor of describing an educational practice and a theory
of rhetoric that hearken back to the Ciceronian period. Book 10 contains brief
appraisals of Greek and Roman authors as educators and stylistic models; the
reading of these models is necessary for the development of true eloquence.

Plutarch’s (ca. 46-120 C.E.) essay on “How a Young Man should Study Poetry”
characterizes epic and tragic verse as an introduction to philosophy. Recapitulating
earlier philosophical procedures on negating the force of ethically inappropriate
verse, he urges readers to offset apparently immoral passages by recalling other
passages from the same author—or another—or even emendation. As such
Plutarch provides an answer to Socrates’ demonstration of poetic pliability in the
Protagoras: here it can always be made to look to Zeus’ concern for human beings.
Augustine borrows such techniques from classical authors in On Christian Doctrine
when instructing his readers on how to interpret apparent contradictions or
immoralities in Holy Scripture.
The mysterious Ps.-Longinus (1st c. C.E.?) stands outside the classical tradition in his
On the Sublime, concentrating on forms of expression which “transport us with
wonder” and “uplift our souls” (ch. 1). Drawing his examples from oratory, poetry,
history, philosophy, and the Old Testament (the author was most likely a Hellenized
Jew), “Longinus” argues that both natural genius and skill are required for great
writing. The sublime can only be achieved by writers who have the ability to form
`grand conceptions' through their nobility of soul; the other sources of this ability
are a spirited treatment of the passions, the use of figures of speech and figures of
thought, elegant diction, and an elevated style of composition (ch. 8). Phantasia—
the power of the imagination—is crucial in both the orator and the poet (ch. 15).
The true sublime stands the test of different readerships and different eras, and
sticks in the memory. “Longinus” suggests that when we face a topic that demands
grandeur we should ask our- selves how Homer or Plato or Demosthenes or
Thucydides might have given it sublimity. Here as elsewhere in such classical lists
we see not so much genre criticism as the establishment of the best writer to
emulate in each tradition. The final chapter (44) is a brief essay on the decline of
eloquence, a common 1st c. C.E. topic. Longinus casts this in the form of a dialogue
with an unnamed philosopher, who (like Tacitus’ Maternus in the Dialogue on
Orators) claims that the lack of political freedom has suppressed the possibility of
sublimity. “Longinus” in his response plays it safe by citing, traditionally, the moral
degeneration of the age and its addiction to luxury and pleasure.

X. Neoplatonic Poetics

The Neoplatonists (3 c. C.E. onwards), a school of philosophy founded by Plotinus,

reiterated the philosophical importance of poetry while allegorizing Homer to show
his conformity to Plato’s thought. Plotinus (204-70 C.E.) protested against the
Platonic view that poetry was the imitation of a world that was itself an imitation;
the arts, he argued, come from the imagination, not from reality (Enneads 5.8.1). In
his essay “On the Cave of the Nymphs,” Plotinus’ follower Porphry (ca. 234-ca. 305
C.E.) offered multiple metaphysical interpretations of the Homeric passage in which
Odysseus hides guest-presents in a cave in Ithaca (Od. 13.102ff): e.g. the cave can
stand for our world of matter, being dark, rocky, and damp; or for the cosmos,
where the nymphs represent the souls who descend to be reborn. For Porphyry, the
epic as a whole shows Odysseus’ journey through the different stages of genesis, the
Cyclops episode his brief longing for the shortcut of suicide. This openness to
multiple meanings was unusual in antiquity.

Proclus (412-485 C.E.) addresses Plato’s criticisms of poetry in essays 5 and 6 of his
commentary on the Republic. Essay 6 in particular takes on Plato’s attack on Homer
in Republic 2 and 3, in which he condemns Homer’s depiction of the afterlife in
Hades, and of Hera seducing Zeus on Mt. Ida; Plotinus reconciles poet and
philosopher by showing that Homer’s version is an veiled version of Plato’s truth. In
his essay on Republic 10 Proclus offers a general defense of poetry on metaphysical
grounds: not all poetry is at three removes from reality. Inspired poetry allegorizes
the union of the soul with the One, didactic poetry offers information about the
physical world or about ethics, and mimetic poetry is “eikatic” or “phantastic” and
shows things in the sensible world as they appear to man; only the last is the object
of Plato’s criticism (6. 177.7-196.13). Homer, who deployed all three types, was
exempt from Plato’s banishing of the poets.
(6300 words)

See also APOLLONIAN-DIONYSIAN; CLASSICISM; CRITICISM, bibl.; GENRE; GREEK

POETRY, Classical; IMITATION; REPRESENTATION AND MIMESIS; RHETORIC AND
POETRY

Classical Poetics : Bibliography

(1) General.

G. Saintsbury, Hist. of Criticism and Literary Taste in Europe, 3 v., 1900-4.

C. S. Baldwin, Ancient Rhetoric and Poetic, 1924.
J.W.H. Adkins, Literary Criticism in Antiquity: A Sketch of its Development, 2. v., 1934.
R. R. Bolgar, The Classical Heritage and its Beneficiaries, 1954.
G. M. A. Grube, The Greek and Roman Critics, 1965.
K. Borinski, Die Antike in Poetik und Kunsttheorie , 2d ed., 2 v. 1965.
R. Pfeiffer, History of Classical Scholarship from the Beginnings to the End of the
Hellenistic Age, 1968.
Ancient Literary Criticism, ed. D. A. Russell and M. Winterbottom (1972)—contains a
wide range of ancient sources.
M. Fuhrmann, Einführung in die antike Dichtungstheorie, 1973.
J. D. Boyd, The Function of Mimesis and Its Decline, 2d ed., 1980.
D. A. Russell, Criticism in Antiquity, 1981.
The Cambridge History of Classical Literature; I. Greek Literature, ed. P.E. Easterling
and B.M.W. Knox (1985); II: Latin Literature, ed. E.J. Kenney and W.V. Clausen
(1982)
The Cambridge History of Literary Criticism. Volume 1: Classical Criticism, ed. G. A.
Kennedy (1989).
Y.L. Too, The Idea of Ancient Literary Criticism, 1998.
J. Walker, Rhetoric and Poetics in Antiquity, 2000.
Classical Literary Criticism, tr. T.S. Dorsch and P. Murray (2000)—contains Plato’s
Ion and Republic 2-3, 10, Aristotle’s Poetics, Horace’s Art of Poetry, Longinus’ On the
Sublime.
Studies in Ancient Literary Theory and Criticism, ed. J. Styka (2000).
J. Farrell, “Classical Genre in Theory and Practice,” NLH 34/3 (2003)
Oxford Readings in Ancient Literary Criticism, ed. A. Laird (2006).

(2) Greek Poetics, General and Preplatonic.

Van Hook, LaRue, The Metaphorical Terminology of Greek Rhetoric and Literary
Criticism, 1905.
W. C. Greene, “The Greek Criticism of Poetry,” HSCL 20 (1950).
A. W. Gomme, The Greek Attitude to Poetry and Hist., 1954.
C. Segal, “Gorgias and the Psychology of the Logos,” HSCP 66 (1962).
W. J. Verdenius, "The Principles of Greek Literary Criticism," Mnemosyne 36 (1963).
R. Harriott, Poetry and Criticism before Plato, 1969.
W. Trumpi, “The Ancient Hypothesis of Fiction: An Essay on the Origins of Literary
Theory,” Traditio 27 (1971).
H. Fränkel, Early Greek Poetry and Philosophy, tr. 1975.
C. Macleod, “Homer on Poetry and the Poetry of Homer,” Collected Essays, ed. C.
Macleod (1983).
G. B. Walsh, The Varieties of Enchantment, 1984.
N. Richardson, “Pindar and Later Literary Criticism in Antiquity,” Proceedings of the
Liverpool Latin Seminar 5 (1985).
M. Heath, The Poetics of Greek Tragedy, 1987.
R. Meijering, Literary and Rhetorical Theories in Greek Scholia, 1987.
M. Heath, Unity in Greek Poetics, 1989.
S. Goldhill, The Poet’s Voice: Essays on Poetics and Greek Literature, 1991.
Homer's Ancient Readers: The Hermeneutics of Greek Epic’s Earliest Exegetes, ed. R.
Lamberton and J. J. Keaney (1992).
L. Pratt, Lying and Poetry from Homer to Pindar, 1993.
Greek Literary Theory after Aristotle, ed. J.G.J. Abbenes, S.R. Slings, and I. Sluiter
(1995).
M. Detienne, The Masters of Truth in Archaic Greece, tr. J. Lloyd, 1996.
A. Ford, The Origins of Criticism: Literary Culture and Poetic Theory in Classical
Greece, 2002.
G.M. Ledbetter, Poetics before Plato, 2003.

(3) Roman Poetics, General.

J. F. D'Alton, Roman Literary Theory and Criticism, 1931.

K. Quinn, Texts and Contexts: The Roman Writers and their Audience, 1979.
C. Martindale, Redeeming the Text: Latin Poetry and the Hermeutics of Reception,
1993.
S. Hinds, Allusion and Intertext: Dynamics of Appropriation in Roman Poetry, 1998.
L. Edmunds, Intertextuality and the Reading of Roman Poetry, 2001.
S.M. Goldberg, Constructing Literature in the Roman Republic: Poetry and its
Reception, 2005.

(4) Plato.

Primary sources:
Standard tr. of complete works by B. Jowett, 5 v. (1892, rev. ed. 1953).
Collected Dialogues, ed. E. Hamilton and H. Cairns (1961).
Republic , tr. F. M. Cornford (1941); tr. A. Bloom (1968); tr. G. M. A. Grube (1974); tr.
R. W. Sterling and W. C. Scott (1985).
Studies:
W.J. Verdennius, Mimesis: Plato’s Doctrine of Artistic Imitation and its Meaning to Us,
1949.
G.F. Else, “’Imitation’ in the Fifth Century,” CP 53 (1958)
L. Golden, “Plato’s Concept of Mimesis,” BJA 15 (1975)
A. Cameron, Plato’s Affair with Tragedy, 1978.
E.E. Ryan, “Plato’s Gorgias and Phaedrus and Aristotle’s Theory of Rhetoric: A
Speculative Account,” Athenaeum 57 (1979)
C. Griswold, “The Ideas and Criticism of Poetry in Plato’s Republic, Book 10,” Journal
of the History of Philosophy 19 (1981)
Plato on Beauty, Wisdom, and the Arts, ed. J. Moravscik and P. Temko (1982)
J. A. Elias, Plato's Defence of Poetry, 1984.
E. Belfiore, “A Theory of Imitation in Plato’s Republic,” TAPA 114 (1984).
G. F. Else, Plato and Aristotle on Poetry, ed. P. Burian (1986).
D. Frede, “The Impossibility of Perfection: Socrates’ Criticism of Simonides’ Poem in
the Protagoras,” Review of Metaphysics 39 (1986)
G.R.F. Ferrari, Listening to the Cicadas: A Study of Plato’s Phaedrus, 1987.
S. Rosen, The Quarrel Between Philosophy and Poetry, 1988.
G.R.F. Ferrari, “Plato and Poetry,” Cambridge History of Literary Criticism I (1989).
E. Asmis, “Plato on Poetic Creativity,” The Cambridge Companion to Plato, ed. R Kraut
(1994).

(5) Aristotle.

Primary sources:
Complete Works , ed. J. Barnes, 2 v. (1984).
Poetics, tr. with commentary, L. Golden and O.B. Hardison (1968, 1981); tr. with
commentary, S. Halliwell (1987); tr. R. Janko (1987).
Rhetoric, tr. G. A. Kennedy (1991).
Studies:
L. Cooper, The Poetics of Aristotle: Its Meaning and Influence, 1923, 1963.
L. J. Potts, Aristotle on the Art of Fiction, 1953.
G. F. Else, Aristotle's "Poetics": The Argument, 1957.
H. House, Aristotle's Poetics (1956).
R. Ingarden, "A Marginal Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics ," JAAC 20 (1961-62).
J. Jones, On Aristotle and Greek Tragedy (1962).
T.C.W. Stinton, “Hamartia in Aristotle and Greek Tragedy,” CQ 25 (1975).
R. Janko, Aristotle on Comedy (1984).
S. Halliwell, Aristotle's Poetics (1986).
C. E. Butterworth, Averroes' Middle Commentary on Aristotle's Poetics (1986).
E. Belfiore, Tragic Pleasures: Aristotle on Plot and Emotion, 1992.
Essays on Aristotle's Poetics, ed. A. O. Rorty (1992).
A.D. Nuttal, Why does Tragedy Give Pleasure?, 1996.
Making Sense of Aristotle: Essays in Poetics, ed Ø. Andersen and J. Haarberg (2001).

(6) The Hellenistic Philosophers and Hellenistic Poetry

Primary sources:
The Hellenistic Philosophers, v. 1, tr. A.A. Long and D.N. Sedley (1987).
Philodemus, On Poems I, tr. with commentary R. Janko (1991)
Studies:
P. De Lacy, “Stoic Views of Poetry,” AJP 69 (1948).
N. A. Greenberg, "The Use of Poiema and Poiesis," HSCP 65 (1961).
G. Hutchinson, Hellenistic Poetry, 1988.
G.A. Kennedy, “Hellenistic Literary and Philosophical Scholarship,” Cambridge
History of Literary Criticism I, 1989.
G. Most, “Cornutus and Stoic Allegoresis: A Preliminary Report,” ANRW 2.36.3
(1989).
M.L. Colish, The Stoic Tradition from Antiquity to the Early Middle Ages, 2nd ed, 1991.
E. Asmis, “Neoptolemus and the Classification of Poetry,” CP 87 (1992).
M.C. Nussbaum, “Poetry and the Passions: Two Stoic Views,” Passions and
Perceptions, ed. J. Barnes and M. Nussbaum (1993)
J.I. Porter, “Stoic Morals and Poetics in Philodemus,” Cronache Ercolanesi (1994).
E. Asmis, "Epicurean Poetics,” Philodemus and Poetry: Poetic Theory and Practice in
Lucretius, Philodemus and Horace, ed. D. Obbink (1995).
P. Kyriakou, "Aristotle's Poetics and Stoic Literary Theory," RhM 140 (1997).
Metaphor, Allegory, and the Classical Tradition, ed. G. Boys-Stones (2003).
(7) Cicero and the Rhetorical Critics

Primary sources:
Brutus, Orator, tr. G.L. Hendrickson (1939)
De oratore, tr. E.W. Sutton and H. Rackham, 2 v., (1948)
A Greek Critic: Demetrius On Style , tr. with notes G.M.A Grube (1961)
Dionysius of Halicarnassus, On Literary Composition, tr. W. R. Roberts (1910)
Grammatici Latini, 7 v., ed. H. Keil (1855-1923)
Suetonius, De Grammaticis et Rhetoribus, tr. w. commentary R.A. Kaster (1995)
Studies:
G. C. Fiske and M. A. Grant, Cicero's "De oratore" and Horace's "Ars poetica,” 1929.
S. F. Bonner, The Literary Treatises of Dionysius of Halicarnassus, 1939.
H. North, “The Use of Poetry in the Training of the Ancient Orator,” Traditio 8
(1952).
A.D. Leeman, Orationis Ratio: The Stylistic Theories and Practice of the Roman
Orators, Historians, and Philosophers, 1963.
D. M. Schenkeveld, Studies in Demetrius, "On Style,” 1964.
G.A. Kennedy, The Art of Rhetoric in the Roman World, 1972.
L.P. Wilkinson, “Cicero and the Relationship of Oratory to Literature,” The
Cambridge History of Classical Literature II, ed. E.J. Kenney (1982).
C. Gill, “The Ethos/Pathos Distinction in Rhetorical and Literary Criticism,” CQ 34
(1984).
E. Fantham, “The Growth of Literature and Criticism at Rome,” Cambridge History of
Literary Criticism I (1989).
M. Heath, “Dionysius of Halicarnassus On Imitation,” Hermes 117 (1989).
J.I. Porter, “Cicéron, les ‘kritikoi’ et la tradition du sublime dans la critique
littéraire,” Cicéron et Philodème: La Polémique en philosophie, ed. C. Auvray-Assayas
and D. Delattre, 2001.

(8) Horace.

Primary sources:
Ars poetica, tr. H. Fairclough (1929).
The Poetry of Friendship: Horace, Epistles I, ed. R.S. Kilpatrick (1986).
The Poetry of Criticism: Horace, Epistles II and Ars Poetica (1990).
Studies:
J. Tate, “Horace and the Moral Function of Poetry,” CQ 22 1928).
C. O. Brink, Horace on Poetry, 3 v., 1963-82.
P. Grimal, Horace: Art poétique, 1966.
K. Reckford, Horace, 1969.
B. Fischer, Shifting Paradigms: New Approaches to Horace’s Ars Poetica (1991).
M. Fuhrmann, Die Dichtungstheorie der Antike: Aristoteles, Horaz, "Longin": eine
Einführung, 1992.
K. Freudenburg, The Walking Muse: Horace on the Theory of Satire, 1993.
Philodemus and Poetry: Poetic Theory and Practice in Lucretius, Philodemus and
Horace, ed. D. Obbink (1995).

(9) The Augustan Age

Studies:
J.K. Newman, Augustus and the New Poetry, 1967.
K. Quinn, “The Poet and his Audience in the Augustan Age,” ANRW 2.30.1 (1982).
J.E.G. Zetzel, “Re-creating the Canon: Augustan Poetry and the Alexandrian Poet,”
Critical Inquiry 10 (1983).
D. C. Innes, “Tradition, Originality, and the Callimachean Legacy in Latin Poetry,” and
“Augustan Critics,” Cambridge History of Literary Criticism I (1989).
R. Tarrant, “Ovid and Ancient Literary History,” The Cambridge Companion to Ovid,
ed. P. Hardie (2002).

(10) The Roman Empire

Primary sources:
Longinus, On the Sublime, tr. D.A. Russell (1995)
Plutarch, “How the Young Man should Study Poetry,” Moralia v. 1, tr. F.C. Babbitt
(1927).
Seneca, Tragedies, 2 v., tr. J. G. Fitch (2002-4).
Tacitus, Dialogue on Orators, tr. H.W. Benario (1967)
Studies:
C.P. Segal, “‘UYOS and the Problem of Cultural Decline,” HSCP 64 (1959).
D.A. Russell, “Longinus Revisited,” Mnemosyne 34 (1981).
F. Ahl, “The Art of Safe Criticism in Greece and Rome,” AJP 105 (1984).
E. Fantham, “Latin Criticism of the Early Empire,” Cambridge History of Literary
Criticism I (1989).
S. Bartsch, Actors in the Audience, 1994.
A. Schiesaro, The Passions in Play: Thyestes and the Dynamics of Senecan Drama,
2003.
D. Konstan, “The Birth of the Reader: Plutarch as Literary Critic,” Scholia 13 (2004).
D.S. Levene, “Tacitus’ Dialogus as Literary History,” TAPA 134/1 (2004).
G.A. Staley, Seneca and the Idea of Tragedy, 2010.
(11) Neoplatonists

Primary sources:
Porphyry on the Cave of the Nymphs, tr. R. Lamberton (1983).
Studies:
J.A. Coulter, The Literary Microcosm: Theories of Interpretation of the Later
Neoplatonists, 1976.
A.D.R Sheppard, Studies on the Fifth and Sixth Essays of Proclus’ Commentary on the
Republic, 1980.
R. Lamberton, Homer the Theologian: Neoplatonist Allegorical Reading and the
Growth of the Epic Tradition, 1986.

Shadi Bartsch
The University of Chicago