Captcha & Phishing
Captcha & Phishing
Captcha & Phishing
Amal A. AlSuwaidan
King Saud University
Riyadh, K.S.A
P.O Box 291772, Riyadh 11362
[email protected]
ABSTRACT
Since browsing internet became a daily need for all people, which means it
should satisfies the security and accessibility issues. CAPTCHA became an
important part of internet browsing and it is used to prevent the bots illegal
access to the web sites. On the other hand, CAPTCHA is inaccessible,
especially for the blind persons, visually impaired or dyslexic. This paper is
about CAPTCHA and its history, advantages, applications, disadvantages and
future.
Keywords
Web accessibility, CAPTCHA accessibility, CAPTCHA and special needs people,
and CAPTCHA alternatives.
.INTRODUCTION:
In this paper I will talk about CAPTCHA and some its related issues. At first I
will talk about CAPTCHA history and related work. Then I will talk about how
to create CAPTCHA and how does CAPTCHA work. After that I will show
CAPTCHA benefits. Then I will discuss the CAPTCHA accessibility survey.
After that I will talk about CAPTCHA accessibility and brief discussing about
some CAPTCHA alternatives. Finally, I will talk about CAPTCHA future.
.FUTURE OF CAPTCHA:
A lot of CAPTCHA alternatives are provided. Therefore, a lot of web sites
replace the CAPTCHA with some alternative. Most of CAPTCHA alternatives
are accessible and easy to use. In the CAPTCHA accessibility survey 23.73%
of responders said they are not using CAPTCHA in their web site. CAPTCHA
could disappear in the coming few years because it is inaccessible and facing
a hard challenge with accessible alternatives. We hope CAPTCHA creator
find some way to make CAPTCHA accessible. In fact, I think CAPTCHA will
disappear before they can make it accessible.
Benefit
DEMERITS
Ok, i agree
pids part & should look into making the game more fair for everyone!
it a good way to stop automation programs, but i also think its a
bad thing to introduce on this game. Yes its a good way to sort
human from non human activity but it also sets people at a
disadvantage & here is why..
Maybe they should go back to click & not type because this is
clearly showing a divide to many of its players, they can still use
captcha's but also give a box of words below on the one that
matches which fill's in the box for them. I know this is becoming
well used on some sites where its users have disabilities like one
arm, poor eye sight & so forth.
PHISHING
MEANING
(fish´ing) (n.) The act of sending an e-mail to a user falsely claiming to be
an established legitimate enterprise in an attempt to scam the user into
surrendering private information that will be used for identity theft. The e-
mail directs the user to visit a Web site where they are asked to update
personal information, such as passwords and credit card, social security,
and bank account numbers, that the legitimate organization already has.
The Web site, however, is bogus and set up only to steal the user??s
information.
For example, 2003 saw the proliferation of a phishing scam in which users
received e-mails supposedly from eBay claiming that the user??s account
was about to be suspended unless he clicked on the provided link and
updated the credit card information that the genuine eBay already had.
Because it is relatively simple to make a Web site look like a legitimate
organizations site by mimicking the HTML code, the scam counted on
people being tricked into thinking they were actually being contacted by
eBay and were subsequently going to eBay??s site to update their account
information. By spamming large groups of people, the "phisher" counted on
the e-mail being read by a percentage of people who actually had listed
credit card numbers with eBay legitimately.
Phishers use a number of different social engineering and e-mail spoofing ploys to
try to trick their victims. In one fairly typical case before the Federal Trade
Commission (FTC), a 17-year-old male sent out messages purporting to be from
America Online that said there had been a billing problem with recipients' AOL
accounts. The perpetrator's e-mail used AOL logos and contained legitimate links.
If recipients clicked on the "AOL Billing Center" link, however, they were taken to
a spoofed AOL Web page that asked for personal information, including credit
card numbers, personal identification numbers (PINs), social security numbers,
banking numbers, and passwords. This information was used for identity theft.
The FTC warns users to be suspicious of any official-looking e-mail message that
asks for updates on personal or financial information and urges recipients to go
directly to the organization's Web site to find out whether the request is legitimate.
If you suspect you have been phished, forward the e-mail to [email protected] or call
the FTC help line, 1-877-FTC-HELP.
Most phishing emails are meant to "shock" you, if you know what I mean.
Take the example of Paypal phishing emails. The scam emails arrive at
your inbox with distressing email subjects - "Your Paypal account has been
hacked", "Your Paypal account has been blocked" etc. If you hold a Paypal
account you already know the kind of sensitive information it contains not to
mention any "real money" stored in your account. So if the con artists get
hold of your Paypal login details, you will end up not only losing the monies
but also your bank account information. Read Paypal phishing scam
attacks with real world examples of the choicest emails that I have
received.
Another well known phishing email was one promising you about million
dollars if you help the sender transfer funds to your bank account. The total
funds amount to millions of dollars (in most cases its 5 million USD - don't
ask me why) and you would be given 20-25% share if the transfer took
place successfully. This phishing email supposedly originates from one of
the African countries and is sent by a wife/daughter/son of a slain military
leader (killed in a coup - what else?). You can read The famous Nigerian
email scam - get a million dollars from a stranger if you want to know more.
This depends on the amount of information you share with the frauds.
Providing your Paypal login details would immediately give free access to
your account. Not only can the stored money be quickly transferred to
another Paypal account or used for purchase on eBay or other online
stores, additional funds can be stolen, if you've tied up your bank account
with your Paypal account.
Bank account details can be used in various nefarious ways. For example,
your credit card can be misused for online purchases or funds can be wire
transferred in a few hours to bank accounts located in the other part of the
world.
A quick and easy way that offers a decent level of protection against scam
attacks is the Netcraft's free antiphishing toolbar. Netcraft is an Internet
services company devoted to tracking online technology. This toolbar is
available for both Internet Explorer and Firefox and runs on a community
effort that protects you from phishing attacks.
The Yahoo! toolbar also offer antiphishing features that are specially
beneficial for Paypal and eBay.com account holders.
For all the greedy folks looking out for that pot of gold at the end of the
rainbow, my advice is that it's not going to come from a stranger - esp. one
on the Internet. And neither will you be the lucky winner of a million dollar
lottery if you haven't bought a ticket. People are not there to dole out
money.
Phishing
From Wikipedia, the free encyclopedia
A phishing technique was described in detail in 1987, and the first recorded use of
the term "phishing" was made in 1996. The term is a variant of fishing,[4] probably
influenced by phreaking,[5] [6] and alludes to baits used to "catch" financial
information and passwords.
A phishing technique was described in detail, in a paper and presentation delivered to the
International HP Users Group, Interex.[7] The first recorded mention of the term "phishing" is on
the alt.online-service.america-online Usenet newsgroup on January 2, 1996,[8] although the term
may have appeared earlier in the print edition of the hacker magazine 2600.[9]
Phishing on AOL was closely associated with the warez community that
exchanged pirated software and the hacking scene that perpetrated credit card fraud
and other online crimes. After AOL brought in measures in late 1995 to prevent
using fake, algorithmically generated credit card numbers to open accounts, AOL
crackers resorted to phishing for legitimate accounts[10] and exploiting AOL.
A phisher might pose as an AOL staff member and send an instant message to a
potential victim, asking him to reveal his password.[11] In order to lure the victim
into giving up sensitive information the message might include imperatives like
"verify your account" or "confirm billing information". Once the victim had
revealed the password, the attacker could access and use the victim's account for
fraudulent purposes or spamming. Both phishing and warezing on AOL generally
required custom-written programs, such as AOHell. Phishing became so prevalent
on AOL that they added a line on all instant messages stating: "no one working at
AOL will ask for your password or billing information", though even this didn't
prevent some people from giving away their passwords and personal information if
they read and believed the IM first. A user using both an AIM account and an AOL
account from an ISP simultaneously could phish AOL members with relative
impunity as internet AIM accounts could be used by non-AOL internet members
and could not be actioned (i.e.- reported to AOL TOS department for disciplinary
action.)
Eventually, AOL's policy enforcement with respect to phishing and warez became
stricter and forced pirated software off AOL servers. AOL simultaneously
developed a system to promptly deactivate accounts involved in phishing, often
before the victims could respond. The shutting down of the warez scene on AOL
caused most phishers to leave the service.[12]
The capture of AOL account information may have led phishers to misuse credit
card information, and to the realization that attacks against online payment systems
were feasible. The first known direct attempt against a payment system affected E-
gold in June 2001, which was followed up by a "post-9/11 id check" shortly after
the September 11 attacks on the World Trade Center.[13] Both were viewed at the
time as failures, but can now be seen as early experiments towards more fruitful
attacks against mainstream banks. By 2004, phishing was recognized as a fully
industrialized part of the economy of crime: specializations emerged on a global
scale that provided components for cash, which were assembled into finished
attacks.[14][15]
Phishers are targeting the customers of banks and online payment services. E-
mails, supposedly from the Internal Revenue Service, have been used to glean
sensitive data from U.S. taxpayers.[16] While the first such examples were sent
indiscriminately in the expectation that some would be received by customers of a
given bank or service, recent research has shown that phishers may in principle be
able to determine which banks potential victims use, and target bogus e-mails
accordingly.[17] Targeted versions of phishing have been termed spear phishing.[18]
Several recent phishing attacks have been directed specifically at senior executives
and other high profile targets within businesses, and the term whaling has been
coined for these kinds of attacks.[19]
Social networking sites are now a prime target of phishing, since the personal
details in such sites can be used in identity theft;[20] in late 2006 a computer worm
took over pages on MySpace and altered links to direct surfers to websites
designed to steal login details.[21] Experiments show a success rate of over 70% for
phishing attacks on social networks.[22]
The RapidShare file sharing site has been targeted by phishing to obtain a premium
account, which removes speed caps on downloads, auto-removal of uploads, waits
on downloads, and cooldown times between downloads.[23]
Attackers who broke into TD Ameritrade's database (containing all 6.3 million
customers' social security numbers, account numbers and email addresses as well
as their names, addresses, dates of birth, phone numbers and trading activity) also
wanted the account usernames and passwords, so they launched a follow-up spear
phishing attack.[24]
Some people are being victimized by a Facebook Scam, the link being hosted by
T35 Web Hosting and people are losing their accounts.[26]
There are anti-phishing websites which publish exact messages that have been
recently circulating the internet, such as FraudWatch International and
Millersmiles. Such sites often provide specific details about the particular
messages.[27][28]
Phishers have used images instead of text to make it harder for anti-phishing filters
to detect text commonly used in phishing e-mails.[38]
Once a victim visits the phishing website the deception is not over. Some phishing
scams use JavaScript commands in order to alter the address bar.[39] This is done
either by placing a picture of a legitimate URL over the address bar, or by closing
the original address bar and opening a new one with the legitimate URL.[40]
An attacker can even use flaws in a trusted website's own scripts against the victim.
[41]
These types of attacks (known as cross-site scripting) are particularly
problematic, because they direct the user to sign in at their bank or service's own
web page, where everything from the web address to the security certificates
appears correct. In reality, the link to the website is crafted to carry out the attack,
making it very difficult to spot without specialist knowledge. Just such a flaw was
used in 2006 against PayPal.[42]
Not all phishing attacks require a fake website. Messages that claimed to be from a
bank told users to dial a phone number regarding problems with their bank
accounts.[45] Once the phone number (owned by the phisher, and provided by a
Voice over IP service) was dialed, prompts told users to enter their account
numbers and PIN. Vishing (voice phishing) sometimes uses fake caller-ID data to
give the appearance that calls come from a trusted organization.[46]
[edit] Other techniques
The stance adopted by the UK banking body APACS is that "customers must also
take sensible precautions ... so that they are not vulnerable to the criminal."[53]
Similarly, when the first spate of phishing attacks hit the Irish Republic's banking
sector in September 2006, the Bank of Ireland initially refused to cover losses
suffered by its customers (and it still insists that its policy is not to do so[54]),
although losses to the tune of €11,300 were made good.[55]
[edit] Anti-phishing
There are several different techniques to combat phishing, including legislation and
technology created specifically to protect against phishing. Most new internet
browsers come with anti-phishing software.
People can take steps to avoid phishing attempts by slightly modifying their
browsing habits. When contacted about an account needing to be "verified" (or any
other topic used by phishers), it is a sensible precaution to contact the company
from which the e-mail apparently originates to check that the e-mail is legitimate.
Alternatively, the address that the individual knows is the company's genuine
website can be typed into the address bar of the browser, rather than trusting any
hyperlinks in the suspected phishing message.[58]
Nearly all legitimate e-mail messages from companies to their customers contain
an item of information that is not readily available to phishers. Some companies,
for example PayPal, always address their customers by their username in e-mails,
so if an e-mail addresses the recipient in a generic fashion ("Dear PayPal
customer") it is likely to be an attempt at phishing.[59] E-mails from banks and
credit card companies often include partial account numbers. However, recent
research[60] has shown that the public do not typically distinguish between the first
few digits and the last few digits of an account number—a significant problem
since the first few digits are often the same for all clients of a financial institution.
People can be trained to have their suspicion aroused if the message does not
contain any specific personal information. Phishing attempts in early 2006,
however, used personalized information, which makes it unsafe to assume that the
presence of personal information alone guarantees that a message is legitimate.[61]
Furthermore, another recent study concluded in part that the presence of personal
information does not significantly affect the success rate of phishing attacks,[62]
which suggests that most people do not pay attention to such details.
The Anti-Phishing Working Group, an industry and law enforcement association,
has suggested that conventional phishing techniques could become obsolete in the
future as people are increasingly aware of the social engineering techniques used
by phishers.[63] They predict that pharming and other uses of malware will become
more common tools for stealing information.
Everyone can help educate the public by encouraging safe practices, and by
avoiding dangerous ones. Unfortunately, even well-known players are known to
incite users to hazardous behaviour, e.g. by requesting their users to reveal their
passwords for third party services, such as email.[64]
Most websites targeted for phishing are secure websites meaning that SSL with
strong PKI cryptography is used for server authentication, where the website's
URL is used as identifier. In theory it should be possible for the SSL authentication
to be used to confirm the site to the user, and this was SSL v2's design requirement
and the meta of secure browsing. But in practice, this is easy to trick.
The superficial flaw is that the browser's security user interface (UI) is insufficient
to deal with today's strong threats. There are three parts to secure authentication
using TLS and certificates: indicating that the connection is in authenticated mode,
indicating which site the user is connected to, and indicating which authority says
it is this site. All three are necessary for authentication, and need to be confirmed
by/to the user.
The standard display for secure browsing from the mid-1990s to mid-2000s was
the padlock. In 2005, Mozilla fielded a yellow URL bar 2005 as a better indication
of the secure connection. This innovation was later reversed due to the EV
certificates, which replaced certain certificates providing a high level of
organization identity verification with a green display, and other certificates with
an extended blue favicon box to the left of the URL bar (in addition to the switch
from "http" to "https" in the url itself).
The user is expected to confirm that the domain name in the browser's URL bar
was in fact where they intended to go. URLs can be too complex to be easily
parsed. Users often do not know or recognise the URL of the legitimate sites they
intend to connect to, so that the authentication becomes meaningless.[3] A condition
for meaningful server authentication is to have a server identifier that is
meaningful to the user; many ecommerce sites will change the domain names
within their overall set of websites, adding to the opportunity for confusion.
Simply displaying the domain name for the visited website[65] as some anti-
phishing toolbars do is not sufficient.
Some newer browsers, such as Internet Explorer 8, display the entire URL in grey,
with just the domain name itself in black, as a means of assisting users in
identifying fraudulent URLs.
An alternate approach is the petname extension for Firefox which lets users type in
their own labels for websites, so they can later recognize when they have returned
to the site. If the site is not recognised, then the software may either warn the user
or block the site outright. This represents user-centric identity management of
server identities.[66] Some suggest that a graphical image selected by the user is
better than a petname.[67]
The browser needs to state who the authority is that makes the claim of who the
user is connected to. At the simplest level, no authority is stated, and therefore the
browser is the authority, as far as the user is concerned. The browser vendors take
on this responsibility by controlling a root list of acceptable CAs. This is the
current standard practice.
The problem with this is that not all certification authorities (CAs) employ equally
good nor applicable checking, regardless of attempts by browser vendors to control
the quality. Nor do all CAs subscribe to the same model and concept that
certificates are only about authenticating ecommerce organisations. Certificate
Manufacturing is the name given to low-value certificates that are delivered on a
credit card and an email confirmation; both of these are easily perverted by
fraudsters.[citation needed] Hence, a high-value site may be easily spoofed by a valid
certificate provided by another CA. This could be because the CA is in another part
of the world, and is unfamiliar with high-value ecommerce sites, or it could be that
no care is taken at all. As the CA is only charged with protecting its own
customers, and not the customers of other CAs, this flaw is inherent in the model.
The solution to this is that the browser should show, and the user should be
familiar with, the name of the authority. This presents the CA as a brand, and
allows the user to learn the handful of CAs that she is likely to come into contact
within her country and her sector. The use of brand is also critical to providing the
CA with an incentive to improve their checking, as the user will learn the brand
and demand good checking for high-value sites.
This solution was first put into practice in early IE7 versions, when displaying EV
certificates.[68] In that display, the issuing CA is displayed. This was an isolated
case, however. There is resistance to CAs being branded on the chrome, resulting
in a fallback to the simplest level above: the browser is the user's authority.[citation
needed]
Experiments to improve the security UI have resulted in benefits, but have also
exposed fundamental flaws in the security model. The underlying causes for the
failure of the SSL authentication to be employed properly in secure browsing are
many and intertwined.
Because secure browsing was put into place before any threat was evident, the
security display lost out in the "real estate wars" of the early browsers. The original
design of Netscape's browser included a prominent display of the name of the site
and the CA's name, but these were dropped in the first release. Users are now
highly experienced in not checking security information at all.
[edit] Click-through syndrome
However, warnings to poorly configured sites continued, and were not down-
graded. If a certificate had an error in it (mismatched domain name, expiry), then
the browser would commonly launch a popup to warn the user. As the reason was
generally a minor misconfiguration, the users learned to bypass the warnings, and
now, users are accustomed to treat all warnings with the same disdain, resulting in
Click-through syndrome. For example, Firefox 3 has a 4-click process for adding
an exception, but it has been shown to be ignored by an experienced user in a real
case of MITM.[citation needed] Even today, as the vast majority of warnings will be for
misconfigurations not real MITMs, it is hard to see how click-through syndrome
will ever be avoided.
Another underlying factor is the lack of support for virtual hosting. The specific
causes are a lack of support for Server Name Indication in TLS webservers, and
the expense and inconvenience of acquiring certificates. The result is that the use
of authentication is too rare to be anything but a special case. This has caused a
general lack of knowledge and resources in authentication within TLS, which in
turn has meant that the attempts by browser vendors to upgrade their security UIs
have been slow and lacklustre.
The security model for secure browser includes many participants: user, browser
vendor, developers, CA, auditor, webserver vendor, ecommerce site, regulators
(e.g., FDIC), and security standards committees. There is a lack of communication
between different groups that are committed to the security model. E.g., although
the understanding of authentication is strong at the protocol level of the IETF
committees, this message does not reach the UI groups. Webserver vendors do not
prioritise the Server Name Indication (TLS/SNI) fix, not seeing it as a security fix
but instead a new feature. In practice, all participants look to the others as the
source of the failures leading to phishing, hence the local fixes are not prioritised.
Matters improved slightly with the CAB Forum, as that group includes browser
vendors, auditors and CAs.[citation needed] But the group did not start out in an open
fashion, and the result suffered from commercial interests of the first players, as
well as a lack of parity between the participants.[citation needed] Even today, CAB forum
is not open, and does not include representation from small CAs, end-users,
ecommerce owners, etc.[citation needed]
[edit] Standards gridlock
Control mechanisms employed by the browser vendors over the CAs have not been
substantially updated; the threat model has.[citation needed] The control and quality
process over CAs is insufficiently tuned to the protection of users and the
addressing of actual and current threats.[citation needed] Audit processes are in great need
of updating.[citation needed] The recent EV Guidelines documented the current model in
greater detail, and established a good benchmark, but did not push for any
substantial changes to be made.[citation needed]
The Bank of America's website[78][79] is one of several that ask users to select a
personal image, and display this user-selected image with any forms that request a
password. Users of the bank's online services are instructed to enter a password
only when they see the image they selected. However, a recent study suggests few
users refrain from entering their password when images are absent.[80][81] In
addition, this feature (like other forms of two-factor authentication) is susceptible
to other attacks, such as those suffered by Scandinavian bank Nordea in late 2005,
[82]
and Citibank in 2006.[83]
Still another technique relies on a dynamic grid of images that is different for each login attempt.
The user must identify the pictures that fit their pre-chosen categories (such as dogs, cars and
flowers). Only after they have correctly identified the pictures that fit their categories are they
allowed to enter their alphanumeric password to complete the login. Unlike the static images
used on the Bank of America website, a dynamic image-based authentication method creates a
one-time passcode for the login, requires active participation from the user, and is very difficult
for a phishing website to correctly replicate because it would need to display a different grid of
randomly generated images that includes the user's secret categories.
Specialized spam filters can reduce the number of phishing e-mails that reach their
addressees' inboxes. These approaches rely on machine learning and natural
language processing approaches to classify phishing e-mails.[87][88]
Several companies offer banks and other organizations likely to suffer from
phishing scams round-the-clock services to monitor, analyze and assist in shutting
down phishing websites.[89] Individuals can contribute by reporting phishing to
both volunteer and industry groups,[90] such as PhishTank.[91] Individuals can also
contribute by reporting phone phishing attempts to Phone Phishing,[92] Federal
Trade Commission.[93]
On January 26, 2004, the U.S. Federal Trade Commission filed the first lawsuit
against a suspected phisher. The defendant, a Californian teenager, allegedly
created a webpage designed to look like the America Online website, and used it to
steal credit card information.[94] Other countries have followed this lead by tracing
and arresting phishers. A phishing kingpin, Valdir Paulo de Almeida, was arrested
in Brazil for leading one of the largest phishing crime rings, which in two years
stole between US$18 million and US$37 million.[95] UK authorities jailed two men
in June 2005 for their role in a phishing scam,[96] in a case connected to the U.S.
Secret Service Operation Firewall, which targeted notorious "carder" websites.[97]
In 2006 eight people were arrested by Japanese police on suspicion of phishing
fraud by creating bogus Yahoo Japan Web sites, netting themselves ¥100 million
(US$870,000).[98] The arrests continued in 2006 with the FBI Operation
Cardkeeper detaining a gang of sixteen in the U.S. and Europe.[99]
In the United States, Senator Patrick Leahy introduced the Anti-Phishing Act of
2005 in Congress on March 1, 2005. This bill, if it had been enacted into law,
would have subjected criminals who created fake web sites and sent bogus e-mails
in order to defraud consumers to fines of up to US$250,000 and prison terms of up
to five years.[100] The UK strengthened its legal arsenal against phishing with the
Fraud Act 2006,[101] which introduces a general offence of fraud that can carry up
to a ten year prison sentence, and prohibits the development or possession of
phishing kits with intent to commit fraud.[102]
Companies have also joined the effort to crack down on phishing. On March 31,
2005, Microsoft filed 117 federal lawsuits in the U.S. District Court for the
Western District of Washington. The lawsuits accuse "John Doe" defendants of
obtaining passwords and confidential information. March 2005 also saw a
partnership between Microsoft and the Australian government teaching law
enforcement officials how to combat various cyber crimes, including phishing.[103]
Microsoft announced a planned further 100 lawsuits outside the U.S. in March
2006,[104] followed by the commencement, as of November 2006, of 129 lawsuits
mixing criminal and civil actions.[105] AOL reinforced its efforts against
phishing[106] in early 2006 with three lawsuits[107] seeking a total of US$18 million
under the 2005 amendments to the Virginia Computer Crimes Act,[108][109] and
Earthlink has joined in by helping to identify six men subsequently charged with
phishing fraud in Connecticut.[110]
In January 2007, Jeffrey Brett Goodin of California became the first defendant
convicted by a jury under the provisions of the CAN-SPAM Act of 2003. He was
found guilty of sending thousands of e-mails to America Online users, while
posing as AOL's billing department, which prompted customers to submit personal
and credit card information. Facing a possible 101 years in prison for the CAN-
SPAM violation and ten other counts including wire fraud, the unauthorized use of
credit cards, and the misuse of AOL's trademark, he was sentenced to serve 70
months. Goodin had been in custody since failing to appear for an earlier court
hearing and began serving his prison term immediately.[111][112][113][114]