Case Study 1 TQM
Case Study 1 TQM
Case Study 1 TQM
BMT1022 D1
https://mmunsoed27.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/1-human-side-australia.pdf
BY
C. KAVYA SREE SOMESH J C. MANOSH S. HAJA SHAREEF
19BBA0072 19BBA0074 19BBA0078 19BBA0080
-INTRODUCTION-
This analysis is all about the reasons why businesses (MetalFab, SteelCo),
having adopted total quality management (TQM), fail to sustain their reforms
over time. This analysis is done after thoroughly reading the case study. The
case study indicates that a lack of attention to the human element of change,
especially inconsistent senior management support, a lack of involvement of
supervisors and middle managers in planning for change, and lack of attention
to groups of staff affected negatively by the changes, are the reasons why TQM
programs are not sustaining in the companies like MetalFab and SteelCo. In this
analysis, the problems for the failure of sustaining TQM programs are found
and the solutions & recommendations are given to sustain TQM programs in
MetalFab & SteelCo.
-BACKGROUND-
2|Page
international corporate linkages and markets, and enjoy access to resources to
implement change. Commitments to confidentiality, the two companies were
referred to as MetalFab and SteelCo in the case study. Both companies had
entered the 1990s with a weakened competitive position and had chosen
Deming’s total quality management philosophy as the basis of their reform
programme.
MetalFab, an affiliate of a large Japanese multinational corporation,
commenced operations in Australia in the mid-1960s. The company
produces large, metal-based consumer goods. In the early 1990s it employed
1,700 workers. Seven trade unions represented the workforce, which was
mostly made up of migrants from non-English speaking backgrounds. The
working environment at the plant was far from pleasant. Work was
continuous, noisy and dusty.
SteelCo is a subsidiary of a large Australian company that was established in
the early 1970s to add value to the output of other subsidiaries of the same
parent. In the early 1990s, it employed 1,500 workers on a very large site in
a rural area. Three trade unions represented the workforce that comprised
mainly Australian or English-born people. The plant is a relatively modern,
clean, but noisy, workplace, divided into a series of production lines, each in
its own building. The production process is highly automated and work
mainly comprises controlling the production process through the use of
computerised control panels.
Three major reasons for TQM failure in MetalFab and SteelCo are:
1. Opposition from middle management
2. Dissatisfaction with employee participation
3. The inappropriate design of training programmes.
To a large extent, all of these factors reflect a failure of the human factor in the
introduction or implementation of TQM.
3|Page
A common feature at MetalFab and SteelCo was the opposition of certain
groups to the introduction of TQM. Managers outside the HRM sections were
often excluded from the discussions over TQM. At MetalFab, managers
complained that they were the last to hear about plans and agreements. Less
training took place at SteelCo than had been agreed because management would
not release people to undertake the training. This was because “production
demands gave no headroom”. Managers at SteelCo opposed job rotation,
preferring to leave the best person doing their job. This strategy protected
production but sacrificed employee progress and labour flexibility targets.
Managers considered that their role was being taken over by their subordinates.
They placed administrative barriers against the full implementation of the
reforms. Similar problems faced supervisors who were in a very difficult
position at both plants. Their support of, and participation in, the
implementation of reforms was essential but they had the most to lose from
them.
In summary, the lack of recognition of the central role of supervisors in
implementing change was a major stumbling block. Being the first line
managers, supervisors had a major bearing on the attitudes of production
workers towards their work and the changes to it. The fact that they were left
out of the negotiating process, had no new role defined for them, and lost status
compared to the new team leaders, caused them to oppose the reforms.
4|Page
participation at both plants when he said “involvement does not mean
endorsement”. At SteelCo the equivalent revelation was “participation does not
mean consensus”.
The participation, in practice, is one sided, with management only accepting
those recommendations that generate productivity growth, ignoring those that
improve working conditions.
In summary, there was little sustained commitment by management to engage in
genuine consultation at each plant. One-way, one-sided information exchange,
together with confusion over the meaning of “participation”, caused the reform
to fail and to be abandoned.
5|Page
» MetalFab implemented four elements called Teams, Skills based structure,
new quality assurance system, a renewed focus on production to improve
TQM.
» SteelCo focused on Employee participation, skill-based career structure,
Augmentation to improve TQM programme in their company.
» Job security should be given so that supervisors and managers won’t feel
threatened of losing their jobs to their subordinates.
» Enhancing productivity through education or consultative decision making
needed to be seen as a long-term aim.
» “Production first” must be demolished because it reduces the time given for
the quality checks which is a barrier to follow TQM.
» Senior management must understand that training is not the only way to
improve productivity.
» Employees or workers must be provided with good working conditions as
they asked.
» “Throwing some training” at a problem is not a solution. If the superior says
one thing and the trainer says another, workers would go with their superior.
So, it is important that all levels of management at the company stands on
one line in improving TQM.
» Senior management should focus not only on production but also the
implementation of TQM.
» Senior management should practice TQM, demand it from people who
report to them and supply training so they can comply.
» Providing the training will not create the need. It should come from top level
management. “If it does not flow down from the top it will never flow up.”
-CONCLUSION-
In the early 1990s, faced by severe competition, SteelCo and MetalFab resolved
to improve quality and productivity by introducing total quality management.
Each company enjoyed some significant savings and productivity improvement.
These originated mainly from work intensification for management, especially
supervisors, and a degree of greater flexibility among shop-floor workers. Shop-
floor employees achieved improved access to training which led to pay rises
through reclassification. Supervision became somewhat more humane.
6|Page
However, attempts at changing the philosophy of management, as understood in
total quality management, were unsuccessful and were not sustained.
The primary factor explaining the lack of success was the lack of attention to
the human element in change. The implementation of TQM focused on
structures, such as teams and training schemes, rather than the values or
attitudes of the people involved. Importantly, the reforms were introduced
without sufficient explanation, or the involvement of middle managers or
supervisors, which caused these groups to oppose the reforms. They lost status,
security, and career prospects through TQM, but were expected to play key
roles in its implementation. They responded with passive resistance (“playing
dead”), leaving elements of TQM either partially implemented, unresourced, or
isolated.
The new structures were superimposed on the two organisations, leaving the
existing structures to continue. Having attempted to introduce total quality
management without accounting for the human element, the reform could not be
sustained.
-REFERENCES-
Case Study Links:
https://www.emerald.com/insight/content/doi/10.1108/01437720310491080/full
/html
https://mmunsoed27.files.wordpress.com/2011/11/1-human-side-australia.pdf
7|Page
THANK YOU
8|Page