Mahal and the Dispossession

of the Palestinians

Dan Freeman-Maloy

The participation of thousands of overseas volunteers (the Mahal)

in Zionist military operations conducted throughout the 1948 war
has received insufficient critical attention. Mainly English-speaking
World War II veterans recruited by the Zionist movement in the
West for their expertise in such needed specializations as artillery,
armored warfare, and aerial combat, the Mahal’s importance to the
military effort far exceeded their numbers. Situating their involve-
ment within the broader historical context of Western support for the
Zionist project, this article examines their role within the Haganah
and Israel Defense Forces (particularly in aerial and armored units)
in operations involving the violent depopulation of Palestinian
communities.

In 1948, thousands of overseas volunteers traveled to Palestine to take part

in Zionist military operations. While various accounts of their participation
are available, the record of those Zionist combatants formally designated as
Mahal (from the Hebrew Mitnadvay Hutz La’aretz,“volunteers from abroad”)
has been distorted in deference to conventional Zionist historiography. The
Mahal recruits are generally depicted as “forgotten heroes,” as historian David
Bercuson describes them in The Secret Army.1 Providing the foreword to a
study published amidst Israel’s jubilee celebrations in 1998, Binyamin Netan-
yahu praises the “contribution to the struggle for liberation” made by Mahal
fighters.2 “For them,” the authors of the study explain, “justice lay entirely on
the side of the Jews”.3 The various memoirs written by volunteer combatants
themselves likewise emphasize heroics in the service of a just cause.4 Yitzhak
Rabin summarizes the standard narrative in his forward to one such volume:
“The contribution of this small band of men and women is a glorious chapter
in the story of Israel’s struggle for freedom.”5
Estimates vary regarding the number of Mahal personnel interspersed
throughout the Zionist forces. An initial Israeli census produced an esti-
mate of 2,400, a figure now roundly considered low.6 Bercuson asserts
that there were “more than 5,000 foreign volunteers who served with the
Israeli forces”; Benny Morris cites an estimate of “more than 4,000.”7 A short
study published by Israel’s Ministry of Education in 2007 puts the figure at

Dan Freeman-Maloy is a doctoral student in Middle East Politics at the University of

Exeter, affiliated with the university’s European Centre for Palestine Studies.

Journal of Palestine Studies Vol. XL, No. 2 (Winter 2011), pp. 43–61, ISSN: 0377-919X; electronic ISSN: 1533-8614.
© 2011 by the Institute for Palestine Studies. All rights reserved. Please direct all requests for permission
to photocopy or reproduce article content through the University of California Press’s
Rights and Permissions website, at http://www.ucpressjournals.com/reprintInfo.asp. DOI: jps.2011.XL.2.43.

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44 Journal of Palestine Studies

approximately 3,500.8 In any event, with total Israeli troop levels nearing
100,000 by the end of 1948, the significance of Mahal combatants did not lie
in their numbers.9 “Mahal’s special contribution,” in the words of David Ben-
Gurion, “was qualitative.”10 Mostly English-speaking veterans of World War II,
Mahal recruits devoted specialized skills to the Zionist military effort. Their
expertise in modern military organization, artillery, armored warfare, naval,
and aerial combat crucially facilitated the development (and early applica-
tion) of Israeli military power.
This “glorious chapter,” as Rabin calls it, has gradually been written into
the “heroic version” of Israel’s establishment.11 The role of foreign recruits
in the political and demographic transformation of Palestine effected in
1948 merits a more critical recounting. What is recorded in the annals of
Zionist historiography as Israel’s War of Independence was experienced by
Palestinians, some 750,000 of whom were displaced from their homes in the
process, as colonial conquest. Widespread ethnic cleansing was among its
principal features—a painful reality made more so by the denials, disinforma-
tion, and even celebrations that have surrounded it since. The present article
reexamines the record of Mahal recruits in this light.12

The Policy of Coercion and its International Underpinnings

From its establishment in 1897, the World Zionist Organization (WZO)
pursued its ambitions concerning Palestine through organizational activity in
Europe and North America and a strategic orientation toward the paramount
imperial powers of the time. This approach succeeded in spectacular fashion
during World War I when the Zionist movement secured British sponsor-
ship for the creation of a Jewish “national home” in Palestine—a sponsorship
given force by Britain’s occupation of Palestine during the war and incorpo-
rated into its subsequent rule over Palestine under a Mandate approved by
the League of Nations. With the growth of the prestate Jewish settlement (the
Yishuv) during the period of British Mandatory rule (1922–1948), the center
of Zionist decision making gradually shifted from Europe to Palestine. The
WZO presidency of Chaim Weizmann, anchored in London, was overtaken
by the leadership of David Ben-Gurion, based primarily “in the field.”13 But
militarily as otherwise, the strength of the Yishuv remained heavily depen-
dent upon international support.
Funds from Western affiliates of the WZO—notably, the United Palestine
Appeal (UPA), which channeled North American funds to Palestine through
the Keren Hayesod (Foundation Fund)—were allocated according to the pri-
orities of the Zionist Executive, including building military capacity.14 In mat-
ters of formal politics and diplomacy, the WZO operated in post-World War
I Palestine as the Jewish Agency, which enjoyed formal juridical standing
within the British Mandatory regime.15 Its military arm, the Haganah, though
formally illegal, in practice also received important (albeit uneven) support
from British authorities. This was most significant during the Palestinian

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Mahal and the Dispossession of the Palestinians 45

Arab rebellion of 1936–1939, when sections of the Haganah were equipped

and trained by the British to help put down the uprising within the frame-
work of “Special Night Squads” and the Supernumerary Police force.16 Their
experience bolstered the Haganah’s capacities and contributed to shaping its
military doctrine, particularly its preference for night-time assaults on Arab
villages.17
By the late 1930s, as Nur Masalha has shown, leading Zionist decision mak-
ers were engaged in frank internal discussions regarding the prospect of forc-
ibly expelling (or “transferring”) Palestinians to clear the way for a Jewish
state.18 The fate of statist Zionism and its quest for a Jewish demographic
majority would thus rest on coercive power. In a June 1938 discussion of trans-
fer with the Jewish Agency Executive, Ben-Gurion emphasized that although
the Zionist movement should seek Arab acquiescence, it “must enforce order
and security and it will do this not by moralizing and preaching ‘sermons on
the mount’ but by machine guns, which we will need.”19 “For Ben-Gurion,”
writes biographer Shabtai Teveth, “the Yishuv’s relationship with the Arabs
of Palestine was now a military and not a political question.”20
Local military strength would derive from international political support.
Planning a strategic break with Britain, Ben-Gurion launched an effort to
establish an alternative support base in the United States, stating his ambi-
tion to “take control of American Jewry” for this purpose.21 His American
campaign gained early support from key U.S. Zionist figures, including Henry
Montor and Abba Hillel Silver, and met with considerable success. In the
spring of 1942, American Zionists emerged from their landmark conference
at New York’s Biltmore Hotel with the demand “that Palestine be established
as a Jewish Commonwealth integrated in the structure of the new demo-
cratic world.”22 In earlier years, expressions such as “national home” had
been used, as the demand for Jewish statehood “came to be regarded as
quasi-immoral by many Zionists” in the United States.23 But the meaning of
“Palestine . . . as a Jewish Commonwealth” was clear. A U.S. base of support
for expansive, statist Zionism had been secured.
The threat of an Axis advance on the Middle East soon dissipated. The
Zionist military build-up, underwritten by Zionist donors in the West, inten-
sified. The UPA-funded Jewish Agency programs grouped under the heading
“National Organization and Security,” which amounted to slightly over $3.8
million in 1945/46, grew to $28 million for 1948, with $25 million earmarked
for “security needs.”24 Such tax-exempt fundraising was, however, vulnerable
to U.S. government oversight. Visiting the U.S. in the summer of 1945, Ben-
Gurion thus initiated a parallel support system for the military struggle that
would shape the future of Palestine.
Ben-Gurion enlisted Henry Montor, then executive director of the UPA, to
call a meeting of trusted donors who could act with discretion. This network
established itself as a covert body known as the “Sonneborn Institute” and
helped the Jewish Agency expand Haganah activity throughout the West.25
This quickly extended beyond fundraising to include procurement and

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46 Journal of Palestine Studies

smuggling of military equipment from both North America and Europe (an
effort which Ricky-Dale Calhoun outlines in the summer 2007 issue of this
Journal).26 In 1948, this support system would prove invaluable as a means
of circumventing the international military embargo imposed on all parties
to the Palestine conflict. It would also serve as a means of recruiting skilled
military personnel for the Zionist war effort.

Haganah Restructuring and the Role of the Mahal

Following the success of Ben-Gurion’s American campaign at Biltmore,
a British diplomat concluded that “the Zionist aim is nothing less than the
forcible seizure of Palestine after the war, relying on American influence to
keep us [the British] quiet.”27 This correctly anticipated the postwar trajec-
tory of statist Zionism. In October 1946, President Harry Truman endorsed
the demand for Jewish statehood over British objections, providing crucial
leverage to the Yishuv leadership in its developing push to eject Britain
from Palestine.28 By February 1947, Britain announced its intention to
abandon the Mandate and turned the Palestine question over to the United
Nations. As diplomatic developments paved the way for British withdrawal,
the Haganah prepared to establish itself as the dominant military force in
Palestine.
In December 1946, Ben-Gurion, who by this time had led the Yishuv
for more than a decade, assumed direct control of the defense portfolio.29
By late 1947, a consolidated military command structure (with Ben-Gurion
at its apex) had taken shape. The principal Haganah combat force, the
Field Corps, was initially organized into six brigades—the Golani, Carmeli,
Alexandroni, Kiryati, Giv‘ati, and Etzioni. The Palmach, a force associated
with center-left Labor Zionism, retained distinct headquarters while oper-
ating under overall Haganah command. The far-right Zionist militias, the
Etzel (Irgun) and Lehi (Stern Gang), operated autonomously but in recur-
ring coordination with the Haganah. In November, the Haganah also estab-
lished an “Air Service,” formally constituted as the Israeli Air Force (IAF) in
May 1948; and a Seventh, Eighth (Armored) and Ninth Brigade were added
to the Field Corps. It was in some of these latter units that Mahal recruits
had the greatest impact.
To increase troop levels, the Haganah set up a Special Committee for
Mobilization, issuing a mobilization order to the Yishuv in early December
1947.30 For command and technical expertise, Ben-Gurion looked to veter-
ans of World War II, both within the Yishuv and abroad.31 Although begun
earlier, international recruitment became more structured in January 1948
when the Jewish Agency Executive decided to establish a Committee for
Overseas Mobilization.32 In North America, the support system overseen by
the Sonneborn Institute and the Jewish Agency’s U.S. section (headed by
Abba Hillel Silver) established Land and Labor for Palestine as its recruitment
arm.33 In South Africa, the League for the Haganah enlisted support openly,

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Mahal and the Dispossession of the Palestinians 47

attracting more volunteers from the Belgian Congo, Kenya, Rhodesia, and
South Africa than the Haganah, interested only in skilled veterans, could
usefully absorb.34 By various means, recruitment extended from Western
Europe to Latin America and beyond. Public advocacy and clandestine mili-
tary support for the drive toward Zionist statehood (including foreign recruit-
ment) were often interconnected. The Canadian World War II veteran Ben
Dunkelman, for example, acted in turn as the Ontario public relations officer
of the Zionist Organization of Canada (ZOC) and as head of the Haganah’s
Canadian steering committee before going to Palestine, where he became a
brigade commander whose forces ethnically cleansed much of the Galilee in
the summer and fall of 1948.35
Mahal was not the only fighting force “recruited” from abroad. The
Haganah also sought to bring in Jewish immigrants from the Displaced
Persons (DP) camps of Europe, many of whom were intercepted and held
in British detention camps in Cyprus through 1948. These refugees were
designated as “Gahal,” literally “recruits from abroad,” and are distinguished
from Mahal by historians, as they were by Israeli authorities in 1948, because
their combat role “cannot accurately be considered as voluntary.”36 But while
Mahal were indeed volunteers, they were actively recruited and were some-
times perceived as mercenaries. Disputes with Mahal over pay and terms of
service (pertaining also to a loyalty oath that many Mahal recruits rejected)
shook the IAF by the summer of 1948. Official salary arrangements were
eventually put in place; meanwhile, “it was rumored that one fighter pilot
earned $2,000 (£500) per month and had been promised a $500 (£125)
bonus for every aircraft he shot down.”37
Until the Mandate expired, British authorities sought to prevent an influx
of military recruits to Palestine. The United Nations subsequently sought to
maintain barriers to the entry of prospective combatants.38 Mahal recruits
bypassed these restrictions by traveling under false pretexts or relying on
air and sea routes that avoided interception.39 Small groups were peppered
throughout the Haganah from early spring 1948; greater numbers arrived
after the Mandate ended.40 They were most prominent in artillery, armored,
naval, and aerial units, where specialized skills were required. Their pres-
ence would come to define certain units, such as the English company of the
82nd Tank Battalion and the 7th Brigade’s (72nd Armored) “Anglo-Saxon”
Battalion.41
One of the highest ranking foreign recruits, U.S. Colonel David “Mickey”
Marcus, was recruited early on and became deeply involved in the structural
overhaul of the Haganah.42 A West Point graduate, Marcus had served on
General Dwight D. Eisenhower’s staff at Allied Expeditionary Force head-
quarters in Europe.43 Arriving in Palestine at the beginning of 1948, he acted
as a close organizational and strategic aide to Ben-Gurion as the Haganah
expanded its operations. (He would go on to serve as commander of the
Jerusalem front in late May before falling to friendly fire in early June, and he
was the first Haganah officer to attain the rank of general.) 44

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48 Journal of Palestine Studies

Mahal recruits would play a particularly important role in the develop-

ment and deployment of Israeli air power. South African Air Force veteran
Boris Senior, for instance, was chosen to command the Haganah’s first aerial
squadron, established near Tel Aviv in late 1947.45 (Senior first joined the
Irgun but was redirected to the Haganah to put his expertise to use.46) In
the final count, an estimated 666 Mahal recruits served in the IAF by the end
of 1948. They would comprise the leading component of its approximately
6,000-person staff, accounting for “almost 70% of the 525 IAF aircrew that
served during the war, with a much larger percentage of pilots.”47 English
was thus the principal language of the IAF deployed in 1948 Palestine.48
The presence of specialized veterans became widespread in the second
half of 1948. But from the outset, they helped the Haganah to operate aggres-
sively within the political and military space opened by Britain’s incremental
withdrawal.

The Onset of Direct Mahal Participation in “Transfer”:

Spring Offensives
Throughout 1947, Anglo-American divergence on the Palestine ques-
tion, UN deliberations that had begun in April, and the growing certainty
of British withdrawal formed the diplomatic backdrop to Haganah prepara-
tions. Developments came to a head late in the year. On 29 November, under
intense U.S. pressure, the UN General Assembly passed Resolution 181, rec-
ommending the partition of Palestine into a Jewish state and an Arab state.
The full implications of this decision are not explored here,49 but perhaps its
most tangible effect, absent an enforcement mechanism, was to help precipi-
tate the end of the Mandate.
As British forces gradually relinquished control of Palestine in antici-
pation of their departure, set for 15 May 1948, the Haganah stepped up
its activity. The initial policy framework for Haganah operations against
Palestinians amidst creeping British withdrawal was Plan C, which man-
dated disproportionate punitive “counter-measures” against Palestinians
aimed at keeping lines with Jewish settlements open and deterring any
action against them.50 Yet neither sporadic Palestinian violence nor the
entry into Palestine of Arab Liberation Army (ALA) irregulars in early 1948
could rationalize the wholesale demographic transformation of Palestine.
As Haganah operations reached the limits of ostensible retaliation, Plan C
gave way to an operational policy of depopulating Palestinian communities
within seized territories.
Ilan Pappé traces the decision-making process underlying this develop-
ment to a small cluster of Arab affairs advisers and members of the Haganah
High Command assembled by Ben-Gurion, and referred to in one of Ben-
Gurion’s journal entries as Mesibat Mumhim (“a party of experts”).51 Pappé’s
thesis, which meshes with Nur Masalha’s examination of the Zionist politics
of transfer and with Walid Khalidi’s assessment of the Israeli documentary

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Mahal and the Dispossession of the Palestinians 49

record,52 runs counter to standard Zionist assertions that purely military

(rather than political-demographic) objectives guided the Haganah’s expul-
sion policy. This article will not explore this controversy.53 Suffice it here to
emphasize that Haganah policy and Mahal involvement converged in 1948 in
the expulsion of thousands of Palestinians from their homes.
Plan D, which spelled out the Haganah policy of offensive transfer, was
finalized in early March. The plan set the framework for a broad assault,
specifically mandating extensive expulsion of Palestinians: “In the event of
resistance, the armed force must be wiped out and the population must be
expelled outside the borders of the state”; and the razing of their villages:
“Destruction of villages (setting fire to, blowing up, and planting mines in
the debris), especially those population centers which are difficult to con-
trol continuously.”54 Orders were given and an assault force three times
larger than any used in previous Haganah operations was assembled.55 Thus
poised, the Haganah initiated Plan D on 5 April with the launch of Operation
Nachshon.
Official Israeli accounts generally describe Operation Nachshon as an effort
to lift the siege on the Jewish section of Jerusalem (to free it from “the Arab
noose choking the city,” as Yigal Allon put it).56 More to the point, it was an
assault aimed at incorporating the Jerusalem area—which under UN General
Assembly Resolution 181 was to be an internationalized zone—within the
Jewish state, and at linking it with the coastal plains where Jewish settle-
ment was concentrated. This meant occupying a wide swath of Palestinian
villages.57 Ethnic cleansing was the plan’s obvious corollary. Thus launched
on a wide scale, it continued with the additional dozen operations executed
within the Plan D framework through May.
In this setting, groups of Mahal recruits began arriving in April. Their
incorporation into fighting units took two main forms: the placement on an
individual basis of veterans with specific expertise and the wholesale integra-
tion of groups into preexisting units. The two forms will be illustrated here
with reference to early recruits from Canada.
Ben Dunkelman had fought with the Queen’s Own Rifles of Canada during
World War II and had received intensive officer’s combat training in the use
of mortars in Britain. He was recruited by the Haganah in 1947 and arrived
in Palestine in early April 1948. Dunkelman participated ad hoc in a vari-
ety of operations before being assigned in May to the Planning Staff of the
Palmach’s Harel Brigade. In this capacity, he claims primary responsibility
for the progress of Operation Maccabi.
Like Operation Nachshon, Maccabi was intended to establish a “Jerusalem
Corridor” cleared of Palestinian villages and Arab irregulars. Its primary
consequence was the capture of Bayt Mahsir, a village of approximately
2,000 people located in the hills south of the main road to Jerusalem. Bayt
Mahsir was subjected to sustained artillery fire and aerial attacks before
falling to Palmach troops on the morning of 11 May.58 Dunkelman attri-
butes defeat of the village, which had stood firm in the face of previous

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50 Journal of Palestine Studies

attacks, to his insistence on a surprise predawn assault relying on “heavy

covering fire from a Davidka mortar” (a Haganah artillery piece whose inac-
curate, notoriously loud 40-kilo shells—filled with nails and other assorted
shrapnel—had a crucial “morale-shattering” effect, in his words).59 Hours
after the village was taken, the Harel Brigade reported to Haganah Chief of
Operations Yigal Yadin that “we are currently blowing up the houses. We
have already blown up 60–70 houses.”60 Eventually, the entire village was
destroyed.
Dunkelman was a critical admirer of Haganah artillery, praising the Davidka
as “one of the wonders of the 1948 war.”61 But he was eager to introduce
more advanced equipment and techniques. To this end, he approached Ben-
Gurion and came away from their meeting with “full and complete authority
over all phases of the operation: production, distribution, and training of
crews.”62 Ben-Gurion’s memoirs confirm that he authorized Dunkelman “to
deal with the production of 6-inch mortars.”63 The Canadian artillery expert
was thus intimately involved in developing one of the main assault weapons
used by Israeli forces to depopulate Palestinian communities over the next
several months.
In contrast to Dunkelman’s individual deployment in specialized roles,
twenty-seven Canadian volunteers arriving in Palestine around the same time
were lodged together at a Haganah training camp before being assigned to
the Giv‘ati Brigade.64 The Giv‘ati Brigade, which had
been the anchor of Operation Nachshon, continued Mahal involvement in the
to play a prominent part in Haganah offensives.65 Haganah was intertwined
The recruits arrived at their post just as the Giv‘ati with the bolstering of its
Brigade attacked the village of `Aqir on 4 May.66 They capacities, the expansion
soon comprised around half of one of the two com- of its sphere of operations,
panies constituted as the 52nd Battalion. A few days and the turn toward
later, the Giv‘ati Brigade launched “Operation Barak,” widespread ethnic
aimed at extending its control of the coastal area west cleansing.
of Lydda and Ramla. The offensive, which pushed
deep into the Gaza district, targeted such Palestinian centers as Isdud (now
Ashdod), Majdal (now Ashkelon), and Yibna in what Giv‘ati headquarters
described as an effort “to force the Arab inhabitants ‘to move’”.67 Yibna and
many smaller villages in the area were conquered and depopulated in this
operation. On 11 May, the 52nd Battalion with its “Canadian platoon” spear-
headed the depopulation and destruction of Bashshit, a Palestinian village
with more than 1,600 residents.68
In sum, the onset of Mahal involvement in the Haganah was intertwined
with the bolstering of its capacities, the expansion of its sphere of operations,
and the turn toward widespread ethnic cleansing, which together framed
its activity in early 1948. By the time the British Mandate ended, the forc-
ible depopulation of Palestinian communities within territory seized by the
Haganah had become a well established pattern—one that Mahal recruits had
participated in setting.

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Mahal and the Dispossession of the Palestinians 51

Build-up of the Israeli Air Force and Armored Corps

On 14 May 1948, Israel declared statehood. The next day—the formal end
of the Mandate—the neighboring Arab countries deployed regular expedi-
tionary forces to Palestine. The new Israeli government formalized the estab-
lishment of the IAF and moved to consolidate full authority over all Zionist
military organizations through the creation of a unified Israel Defense Forces
(IDF).69
Expansion of the IAF addressed one area where the Haganah faced a
potentially serious challenge following the entry of Arab state forces into the
fighting. Until then, the aerial component of the fighting was one-sided. For
months, and notwithstanding the constraints placed on Zionist activities by
the British, the Haganah Air Service, its light aircraft equipped with machine
guns and hand-thrown explosives, flew combat missions with impunity in
loose conjunction with Haganah ground forces.70 After 15 May, however,
planes of the Royal Egyptian Air Force could down Israel’s improvised bomb-
ers, and for a time IAF operations were forced into the night.71 Egypt was
even able to deploy improvised bombers of its own: On 18 May, Tel Aviv’s
central bus station was hit, killing an estimated forty-two people.72
Israeli aerial vulnerability was short-lived. Despite a UN-imposed military
embargo on Palestine, weaponry and personnel from abroad continued to pour
into the country through 1948, relying on stealth and the benign neglect (or
purchased cooperation) of authorities in jurisdictions around the world. The
principal transport hub for this circuitous procurement was a former Luftwaffe
airfield at Zatec, Czechoslovakia, and within days of the end of the Mandate
modified German “Messerschmitt” fighter planes procured by the Haganah
via Zatec arrived and were soon deployed to deflect Egyptian raids. By the
end of May, the IAF was in a position to bomb not only Palestinian villages
(e.g., Isdud, Lydda, Ramla, and Ramallah) and Arab state forces in Palestine,
but also the Jordanian capital of Amman; on 10–11 June two tons of explosives
were dropped on Damascus.73 From Zatec, where a largely American group of
volunteers operated under the auspices of Czech authorities, an assortment of
transport planes including several C-46 Commandos procured from the U.S.
War Assets Administration formed an air bridge to Palestine.74 Aerial arms ship-
ments began on the eve of Operation Nachshon and continued through the
summer (often with new recruits aboard).
After less than a month of regular military engagements that did little to
slow the dispossession of the Palestinians, the first truce between Israel and
the regular Arab forces went into effect on 11 June, lasting until 8 July. The
truce provided the occasion for a new wave of Israeli military reorganization
during which command was further centralized under Ben-Gurion. At the
same time, new equipment and Mahal recruits were used to bolster Israeli air
power and lay the foundation for an Israeli armored corps.
With the onset of the truce, the IAF prepared to establish definitive aerial
dominance. Among the IAF’s many acquisitions during the truce were three

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52 Journal of Palestine Studies

B-17 “Flying Fortress” bombers, procured at the initiative of the American

Mahal operative Al Schwimmer (who went on to found Israel Aircraft
Industries) and prepared for combat under the command of Mahal recruit Ray
Kurtz, commander of a B-17 squadron for the U.S. Air Force during World War
II.75 Veteran-flown aircraft, now including fighter planes and heavy bombers,
would be deployed throughout Palestine to deadly effect.76
Meanwhile, the IDF established an armored corps in which Mahal person-
nel factored prominently. It founded its first regular armored unit—the 8th
Brigade—and reinforced the 7th Brigade with heavier equipment. The 8th
Brigade consisted of one tank battalion and one commando battalion (the
82nd and 89th, respectively). The 82nd Tank Battalion was mostly staffed by
recruits from Britain, South Africa, and Russia and was organized into two
companies, one “English” and one “Russian.”77 The reinforced 7th Brigade—
which according to one Israeli lieutenant colonel “was to become the IDF’s
foremost armored formation in later wars”—was placed under Dunkelman’s
command, and Mahal recruits were posted throughout its ranks.78 Indeed,
the 7th included perhaps the largest concentration of English-speaking Mahal
of any unit outside the IAF: 170 during the summer and approximately 300
by the fall.79
On 9 July, the first truce collapsed. Extended fighting raged for a week and
a half before commencement of a second, still shakier interstate ceasefire.
The period between the two ceasefires, defined by rapid Israeli advances
in which Mahal personnel helped bring heavier equipment to bear in the
conquest and depopulation of Palestinian communities, is known in Israeli
historiography as “the Ten Days.”

From Lydda to Saffuriyya

The two main components of the Ten Days offensive (9–18 July) were
“Operation Dani” in central Palestine and “Operation Dekel” in the north.
Mahal-heavy armored and aerial units participated in both. Operation Dani
aggressively hammered the emerging boundary of the West Bank inland from
the coast in a series of large-scale attacks and harsh expulsions targeting the
Palestinian towns Lydda and Ramla; Operation Dekel extended the Israeli-
controlled coastal strip in the north into the central Galilee and occupied
Nazareth. Both operations were executed well beyond the boundaries of the
Jewish state mandated by Resolution 181.
Operation Dani had originally been named “Operation Mickey” in honor
of U.S. Col. Marcus, killed the previous month, but the name was changed
amidst concerns that it may have been leaked.80 Its main objective was the
conquest of Lydda and Ramla, which had thus far been successfully defended
by their inhabitants (operating with limited support from regular Arab
armies). A large composite force was assembled for the attack, including
the 8th (Armored) Brigade (with its 82nd and 89th battalions), units from
four others, and a range of aerial and artillery units, all operating under the

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Mahal and the Dispossession of the Palestinians 53

command of Yigal Allon. The 8th Brigade formed part of the northern arm
of a pincer movement aimed at encircling the two communities, severing
them from the West Bank and conquering this heavily populated swath of
territory.
Lydda, whose population had more than doubled to 50,000 as a result
of the influx of refugees from occupied villages nearby, had resiliently
fended off previous attacks. Spiro Munayyer, a volunteer with the town mili-
tia, recounts: “The people were conscious of the gravity of the situation
and, after what had happened in other cities, were well aware that this war
would determine whether they would be able to remain in their city and
homeland.”81 However, the only regular forces deployed in defense of Lydda
(and Ramla) were the 125 soldiers of the Transjordanian Arab Legion’s Fifth
Infantry Company—hardly a sufficient reinforcement for irregular defenders
facing an assault force which Walid Khalidi estimates as 8,000 strong.82
The attack began after nightfall on 9 July with the advance of ground
forces and sustained aerial bombardment of Lydda and Ramla that continued,
alongside artillery strikes, through 10 July.83 Contrary to the initial plan, the
89th (Commando) Battalion made quicker progress than the tanks of the
82nd, punching through Lydda’s defenses with a column of jeeps and half-
tracks in a devastating 11 July raid during which as many as 200 Palestinians
were killed.84 The Arab Legion company soon withdrew and the town was
overrun and occupied. Early the next day, the IDF carried out another major
massacre, killing some 250 Palestinians while losing only 3–4 soldiers to
Palestinian resistance in the process.85 Yigal Allon proudly notes: “The les-
son was not lost on Ramle; on 12 July, Ramle surrendered to the IDF.”86 The
inhabitants of both towns were expelled eastward in massive waves of tens
of thousands. Historian Aref al-Aref, who conducted interviews with refugees
soon after the expulsions, estimates that 350 died from heat and thirst during
the forced march into the West Bank.87
While the 82nd Tank Battalion (with its “English company”) did not play
as infamous a role as the 89th, it did participate in the occupation, depopula-
tion, and destruction of villages in the area and in at least some of the docu-
mented abuses that followed.88 Records based on participants’ accounts are
unlikely to be complete in this regard, but there is little reason to presume
that the Mahal present during the offensive’s killings and expulsions were
mere witnesses.89 Nor do 82nd Battalion veteran and Israeli journalist Amos
Kenan’s reflections on the pervasiveness of rape in Dani’s aftermath— “At
night, those of us who couldn’t restrain ourselves would go into the prison
compounds to fuck Arab women”—suggest that his Mahal-heavy unit was
detached from such crimes.90
In the north, meanwhile, sustained bombing raids by Israeli aircraft tar-
geted central Galilee villages in the Nazareth district (defended only by vil-
lage militias and forces from the all-volunteer ALA) beginning the night of
8–9 July.91 The following night, 7th Brigade units supported by the Carmeli
Brigade’s 21st Battalion initiated Operation Dekel, capturing an ALA position

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54 Journal of Palestine Studies

at Tall Kiswan and occupying Kuwaykat, a village of over 1,000 people.92 One
villager recalled: “We were awakened by the loudest noise we had ever heard,
shells exploding and artillery fire . . . the whole village was in panic . . . women
were screaming, children were crying . . . Most of the villagers began to flee
with their pajamas on.”93 Two people were killed and two wounded during
the bombardment. “I don’t know whether the artillery softening up of the vil-
lage caused casualties,” a company commander from the 21st Battalion later
reflected, “but the psychological effect was achieved and the village’s non-com-
batants fled before we began the assault.”94 Indeed, throughout this offensive,
heavy mortar fire preceded the occupation of villages—hardly surprising given
7th Brigade commander Dunkelman’s particular expertise.95
On 13 July, the 7th Brigade launched the major offensive toward Nazareth,
capturing Shafa `Amr on 14 July (in what may have been the most dramatic
instance of Druze collaboration with Zionist forces in 1948).96 After captur-
ing a number of smaller villages in the vicinity, the 7th pushed southeast
from Shafa `Amr to conquer Nazareth itself on 16 July.
Dunkelman’s objection to the depopulation of Nazareth is well established.
According to Ben-Gurion, Moshe Carmel, commander of the northern front,
gave an order “to uproot all the inhabitants at Nazareth.”97 Dunkelman—
mulling the fate of “one of the most sanctified shrines of the Christian world”
and wary of the “severe international repercussions” of rash action98 —
asked for higher authorization. His immediate superior thus asked the IDF
General Staff for a ruling: “Tell me immediately, urgently, whether to expel
the inhabitants from the city of Nazareth. In my view all, save for clerics,
should be expelled.”99 Ben-Gurion vetoed the expulsion, and the inhabitants
remained.
Dunkelman’s scruples in the case of Nazareth (apparently stemming from
fears of diplomatic fallout over the expulsion of Christians) did not prevent
him from participating in the depopulation of Palestinian communities else-
where. Just prior to the attack on Nazareth, for example, Dunkelman and
his 7th Brigade had taken the lead in capturing the predominantly Muslim
village of Saffuriyya, whose population of over 4,000 had been swollen by
an additional 2,500 refugees from Shafa `Amr. Historian Nafez Nazzal quotes
one of the villagers, the quartermaster of the Saffuriyya militia, describing
the nighttime assault of 15–16 July:
Three Jewish planes flew over the village and dropped bar-
rels filled with explosives, metal fragments, nails and glass.
They were very loud and disrupting . . .  They shook the whole
village, broke windows, doors, killed or wounded some of the
villagers and many of the village livestock.We expected a war
but not an air and tank war.100
The advancing ground forces also targeted the village with artillery, and
most of its inhabitants fled under the pressure of these attacks. (Those who
remained were also eventually expelled.)101

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Mahal and the Dispossession of the Palestinians 55

Indeed, far from being a model of restraint, Dunkelman’s 7th Brigade in

due course positioned itself alongside the 89th Battalion as one of the crueler
combat forces of the period. Ilan Pappé writes: “In many of the Palestinian
oral histories that have now come to the fore, few brigade names appear.
However, Brigade Seven is mentioned again and again, together with such
adjectives as ‘terrorist’ and ‘barbarous.’”102 While Operation Dekel had its
devastating components, worse from the 7th Brigade was still to come.

Aerial Cleansing in the South, “Mass Murder” in the North

Prominent Mahal participation in various components of the emerging
Israeli military system continued until the signing of the 1949 armistice agree-
ments, which set Israel’s de facto borders until June 1967. Two significant
episodes from October–November 1948 will serve as
examples: IAF participation in establishing the territo- Prominent Mahal participa-
rial and demographic reality that is the contemporary tion in various components
Gaza Strip; and 7th Brigade participation in the con- of the emerging Israeli
quest of the Upper Galilee. military system continued
In the south, the summer ended with Egyptian until the signing of the
forces still in control of a significant swath of terri- 1949 armistice agreements,
tory along Palestine’s coast up to Isdud and linked to which set Israel’s de facto
the West Bank through a corridor to the Hebron area borders until June 1967.
(to the southwest of which Israeli forces controlled
much of the Negev). This situation, combined with UN proposals that Israel
forgo claims to the Negev in return for annexation of the Galilee, threatened
to halt Israeli expansion in the south. Israel’s response was to launch a major
offensive in mid-October. Operation Yoav hammered away at the sizeable
Gaza district, reducing it to the current dimensions of the Gaza Strip while
tripling the Strip’s population through the large-scale cleansing of adjacent
areas.103 Here the IAF—predominantly a Mahal force—was deployed on an
unprecedented scale.
The aerial component of the campaign, at its height from 15 to 19 October,
involved relentless attacks on Palestinian population centers and Egyptian
forces alike. Israeli bombers dropped a total of 151 tons of explosives, includ-
ing napalm.104 Various communities that were ultimately conquered (e.g.,
Majdal) were in large part depopulated by aerial (alongside naval) attacks;
communities within the contemporary Gaza Strip itself were no less ruthlessly
bombarded.105 The IAF then turned its attention to the north, where it helped
complete the conquest of the Galilee with literally no aerial opposition.
By this time, most of northern Palestine was already under Israeli control.
But a pocket of resistance remained in the Upper Galilee. This was the target
of Operation Hiram. After a week of heavy aerial bombardment of villages in
the remaining pocket (beginning 22 October), the main ground operation
was launched by the 7th Brigade, which over the next three days carried out
operations marked by widespread expulsions, massacres, and rape.

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56 Journal of Palestine Studies

The plan for Operation Hiram centered on Sa`sa`, a village located at a

particularly strategic junction. “If you control these crossroads,” a leading
Haganah planner had earlier advised Dunkelman, “you control the whole of
Galilee!”106 Beginning the night of 28–29 October, units from four brigades
were deployed in the assault, with the three 7th Brigade battalions under
Dunkelman operating on the northeastern front of a pincer movement aimed
at conquering Sa`sa` and enclosing the major part of the resisting “pocket”
to its south. Pushing northwest from Safad, the 7th Brigade rapidly occu-
pied the villages of Qaddita, Mirun, Safsaf, and Jish.107 Nafez Nazzal relays a
Palestinian woman’s recollection of the aftermath of the overnight shelling
and Safsaf’s occupation on 29–30 October:
As we lined up, a few Jewish soldiers ordered four girls to
accompany them to carry water for the soldiers. Instead, they
took them to our empty houses and raped them. About 70
of our men were blindfolded and shot to death, one after
the other, in front of us. The soldiers took their bodies and
threw them on the cement covering of the village’s spring
and dumped sand on them.108
Jish was also subjected to large-scale killing and looting.109
After these initial conquests, the 7th Brigade split. The 71st Battalion
occupied al-Ras al-Ahmar, Rihaniya, `Alma, and Dayshum, and the 72nd and
79th battalions moved west to occupy Sa`sa` itself (where they again com-
mitted “mass murder,” according to Israel Galili, former head of Haganah
National Staff).110 The 72nd and 79th then attacked a series of points along
the border with Lebanon, conquering a string of Palestinian villages as far
east as al-Malikiyya and making cross-border incursions as far into Lebanon
as the Litani River. In Saliha, they committed another massacre; the diary of
Jewish National Fund official Yosef Nahmani, writes Benny Morris, “refers
to ‘60–70’ men and women murdered after they ‘had raised a white flag’.”111
More than 50,000 refugees are reported to have been pushed out of Palestine
by Operation Hiram.112
In internal IDF discussions as the operation concluded, Dunkelman
expressed continued reservations about expelling Christians.113 Meanwhile,
he and the hundreds of Mahal recruits under his command emerged with
impunity from a campaign that subjected predominantly Muslim villages to
mass killings and expulsion into Lebanon.

Conclusion
The record of Mahal recruits forms an important part of the history of
cross-continental participation in the Zionist enterprise, extending from its
inception to the present. This history cannot be separated from the processes
of colonization and dispossession that have devastated Palestine. In recent
decades, much progress has been made in challenging the “heroic” narrative

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Mahal and the Dispossession of the Palestinians 57

of the Zionist war effort of 1948. In light of the research that is now available,
the expulsions and other atrocities that characterized many of the operations
in which these recruits participated should be impossible to ignore.
Indeed, the persistence of coercive Israeli “demographic” policies and the
renewed salience of transfer proposals within Israeli political discourse over
the past decade necessitate serious examination of this history as more than
a scholarly exercise.114 In 1948, Mahal involvement formed part of an inter-
national setting that proved conducive to the displacement and exclusion of
Palestinians by the force of Israeli military power. This history may serve as
a reminder of the need to develop an international climate more obstructive
of such policies in the years ahead.

Endnotes
1. David Bercuson, The Secret Army of Independence, Internet Edition
(Toronto: Lester and Orpin Dennys, (Tel Aviv: Ministry of Education Israel
1983), p. 233. Information Center, 2007), p. 7.
2. Craig Weiss and Jeffrey Weiss, I 9. Avi Shlaim suggests “a peak of
Am My Brother’s Keeper: American 96,441” by December 1948; “Israel and
Volunteers in Israel’s War of the Arab Coalition in 1948,” in Eugene
Independence, 1947–1949 (Atglen: L. Rogan and Avi Shlaim, eds., The War
Schiffer Publishing, 1998), p. 5. for Palestine: Rewriting the History of
3. Weiss and Weiss, I Am My 1948 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Brother’s Keeper, p. 21. Press, 2007), p. 81. Amitzur Ilan records
4. See for example Ben Dunkelman, an Israeli “Formal Order of Battle” in
Dual Allegiance: An Autobiography October 1948 of 88,000; see The Origin
(Toronto: Macmillan of Canada, 1976); of the Arab-Israeli Arms Race: Arms,
Harold Livingston, No Trophy, No Sword: Embargo, Military Power and Decision
An American Volunteer in the Israeli in the 1948 Palestine War (New York:
Air Force During the 1948 War of New York University Press, 1996), p. 67.
Independence (Chicago: Edition Q, Inc., This source is cited in David Tal, War in
1994); Gordon Levett, Flying Under Two Palestine 1948: Strategy and Diplomacy
Flags: An Ex-RAF Pilot in Israel’s War (London: Routledge, 2004), p. 5. For
of Independence (London: Frank Cass, further figures, see Walid Khalidi,
1994); Boris Senior, New Heavens: My From Haven to Conquest: Readings in
Life as a Fighter Pilot and a Founder Zionism and the Palestine Problem
of the Israeli Air Force (Washington: Until 1948 (Washington: Institute for
Potomac Books, 2005). See also A. Joseph Palestine Studies, 2005), pp. 861–66.
Heckelman, American Volunteers and 10. David Ben-Gurion, Israel: A
Israel’s War of Independence (New Personal History (New York: Funk &
York: Ktav Publishing House, 1974). Wagnalls/Sabra Books, 1971), p. 267.
5. Dunkelman, Dual Allegiance, p. 11. Avi Shlaim’s designation of the nar-
xii. rative nurtured by official Zionist histori-
6. Netanel Lorch, Israel’s War of ography, “Israel and the Arab Coalition,”
Independence, 1947–1949, 2nd ed. p. 79. Autobiographical Mahal accounts
(Hartford: Hartmore House, 1968), p. and focused studies such as those cited
388. above have supplemented more frag-
7. Bercuson, The Secret Army, p. xiii; mented treatment of the topic by Israeli
Benny Morris, 1948: A History of the military historians. See for example
First Arab-Israeli War (New Haven and Lorch, Israel’s War of Independence,
London: Yale University Press, 2008), p. 1947–1949; Ezer Weizman, On Eagles’
85. Wings: The Personal Story of the
8. Yaacov Markovitzky, Mahal: Leading Commander of the Israeli
Overseas Volunteers in Israel’s War Air Force (London: Weidenfeld and

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58 Journal of Palestine Studies

Nicolson, 1976); David Eshel, Chariots Shabtai Teveth, in Ben-Gurion and the
of the Desert: The Story of the Israeli Palestinian Arabs: From Peace to War
Armored Corps (London: Brassey’s (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1985);
Defense Publishers, 1989); Uri Milstein, for example, “We must expel Arabs and
trans. Alan Sacks, History of Israel’s War take their places.” (p. 189).
of Independence (New York: University 19. Masalha, Expulsion of the
Press of America, 1998). Palestinians, pp. 107–8.
12. This article relies on existing stud- 20. Teveth, Ben-Gurion and the
ies of the character and effect of Zionist Palestinian Arabs, p. 193. See the dis-
military action against Palestinians, cussion in Walid Khalidi, “Revisiting
notably Nafez Nazzal, The Palestinian the UNGA Partition Resolution,” in
Exodus from Galilee, 1948 (Beirut: Ilan Pappé, ed., The Israel/Palestine
Institute for Palestine Studies, 1978); Question: A Reader (New York:
Walid Khalidi, ed., All that Remains: Routledge, 2007), p. 99.
The Palestinian Villages Occupied 21. Allon Gal, David Ben-Gurion and
and Depopulated by Israel in 1948 the American Alignment for a Jewish
(Washington: Institute for Palestine State (Jerusalem: The Magnes Press,
Studies, 1992); Benny Morris, The Birth 1991), p. 40.
of the Palestinian Refugee Problem 22. Gal, David Ben-Gurion, p. 201.
Revisited (Cambridge: Cambridge 23. Gal, David Ben-Gurion, p. 154,
University Press, 2004); and Ilan Pappé, based on a review of the U.S. Zionist
The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestine press from 1930 to 1941.
(Oxford: Oneworld Publications, 2006). 24. Stock, Partners, p. 127.
This article extends in part from a 25. The classic (if wholly uncritical)
piece published by ZNet. See “60 Years work on this subject is Leonard Slater,
Later: Canada and the Origins of the The Pledge (New York: Simon and
Israel-Palestine Conflict,” ZNet, 4 May Schuster, 1970).
2008, accessed at www.zmag.org/znet/ 26. Ricky-Dale Calhoun, “Arming
viewArticle/17552. David: The Haganah’s Illegal Arms
13. For an analysis of this process, see Procurement Network in the United
Khalidi, From Haven to Conquest, p. States, 1945–1949,” JPS 36, no. 4 (Summer
x1viii. 2007), pp. 22–32.
14. Ernest Stock, Partners and 27. Gal, David Ben-Gurion, p. 202.
Pursestrings: A History of the United 28. Amikam Nachmani, Great
Israel Appeal (New York: University Power Discord in Palestine: The Anglo-
Press of America/Jerusalem Center for American Committee of Inquiry into
Public Affairs, 1987), pp. 35, 127. the Problems of European Jewry and
15. For details, see Alysa Dortort Palestine, 1945–1946 (London: Frank
and Daniel Elazar, Understanding the Cass, 1987), p. 256.
Jewish Agency: A Handbook (Jerusalem: 29. Tal, War in Palestine 1948, p. 24.
Jerusalem Center for Public Affairs, 30. Tal, War in Palestine 1948, p. 31.
1985). 31. Thousands of Jews from Palestine
16. See for example David Ben-Gurion, had enlisted with the British army during
“Britain’s Contribution to Arming the World War II.
Haganah,” in Khalidi, From Haven to 32. Bercuson, The Secret Army, pp.
Conquest, pp. 371–74. 53, 72. In April, the Committee’s activi-
17. This preference was clearly mani- ties were subsumed under the authority
fest in 1948. See Yigal Allon, “Learning of the Haganah’s Manpower Department.
from Experience,” in Yigal Allon, ed., 33. Bercuson, The Secret Army, p. 36.
The Making of Israel’s Army (London: 34. Markovitzky, Mahal, p. 16;
Vallentine, Mitchell & Co.), pp. 222–24. Bercuson, The Secret Army, p. 53.
18. Nur Masalha, Expulsion of the Bercuson suggests that South African
Palestinians: The Concept of “Transfer” recruitment initially fell outside the main
in Zionist Political Thought, 1882–1948 international structure.
(Washington: Institute for Palestine 35. Dunkelman, Dual Allegiance, p.
Studies, 1992). Ben-Gurion’s blunt 151; Bercuson, The Secret Army, p. 61.
statements favoring transfer are also 36. Hannah Torok-Yablonka, “The
recorded by his sympathetic biographer, Recruitment of Holocaust Survivors

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Mahal and the Dispossession of the Palestinians 59

during the War of Independence,” Journal and ethically, as important as cleansing-

of Israeli History 13, no. 1 (1992), p. 43. as-intention.” The Returns of Zionism:
37. Brian Cull, Shlomo Aloni and Myths, Politics and Scholarship in Israel
David Nicolle, Spitfires over Israel: (London: Verso, 2008), p. 56.
The First Authoritative Account of 54. Walid Khalidi, “Text of Plan
Air Conflict During the Israeli War of Dalet (Plan D), 10 March 1948: General
Independence, 1948–1949 (Boston, MA: Section,” Journal of Palestine Studies
Grub Street, 1994), pp. 287-88. 18, no. 1 (Autumn 1988), p. 29.
38. Lorch, Israel’s War of 55. Gunther E. Rothenberg, The
Independence, 1947–1949, p. 285. Anatomy of the Israeli Army (London:
39. See for example Bercuson, The BT Batsford), p. 48.
Secret Army, pp. 58–59, 99. 56. Yigal Allon, Shield of David: The
40. Certain recruits designated as Story of Israel’s Armed Forces (London:
Mahal arrived earlier, some joining the Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1970), p. 196.
Haganah and Palmach on naval vessels 57. See map in Khalidi, All that
challenging British immigration restric- Remains, p. 264.
tions and others helping to develop the 58. Senior, New Heavens, p. 154;
Haganah Air Service. Dunkelman, Dual Allegiance, pp.
41. Eshel, Chariots of the Desert, p. 213–14.
17; Bercuson, The Secret Army, p. 183; 59. Dunkelman, Dual Allegiance,
Lorch, Israel’s War of Independence, p. 213.
1947–1949, p. 390. Nazzal, The 60. Pappé, The Ethnic Cleansing of
Palestinian Exodus from Galilee, 1948, Palestine, p. 140.
refers (p. 22) to the 7th in its entirety as 61. Dunkelman, Dual Allegiance,
the “Anglo-Saxon Brigade.” p. 195.
42. Bercuson, The Secret Army, p. 52. 62. Dunkelman, Dual Allegiance
43. Lorch, Israel’s War of pp. 224–25.
Independence, 1947–1949, p. 222; 63. Ben-Gurion, Israel, p. 116.
Milstein, History of Israel’s War of 64. For details, see Bercuson, The
Independence, p. 219. Secret Army, pp. 99–101.
44. Weiss and Weiss, I Am My 65. Giv‘ati Brigade commander
Brother’s Keeper, p. 132. Shimon Avidan served as overall com-
45. Cull, Aloni and Nicolle, Spitfires, mander of Operation Nachshon; Morris,
p. 71. The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee
46. Weizman, On Eagles’ Wings, Problem Revisited, p. 233.
p. 48; Senior, New Heavens, p. 103. 66. The attack on `Aqir precipitated
47. Bill Norton, Air War on the Edge: the exodus of approximately 3,000
A History of the Israel Air Force and its Palestinians, according to a New York
Aircraft Since 1947 (Leicestershire, UK: Times report cited in Khalidi, All that
Midland Publishing, 2002) pp. 12–13. Remains, p. 360.
48. See Lon Nordeen, Fighters Over 67. Morris, The Birth of the
Israel (New York: Orion Books, 1990), Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited,
p. 14. p. 256.
49. For details, see Khalidi, “Revisiting 68. Mahal accounts of this attack are
the UNGA Partition Resolution.” detailed in Bercuson, The Secret Army,
50. For the English text, see Walid pp. 102–6.
Khalidi, “Plan Dalet: Master Plan for 69. The IDF was formally estab-
the Conquest of Palestine,” Journal of lished on 28 May, and it absorbed the
Palestine Studies 18, no. 1 (Autumn Revisionist militias. Many Mahal recruits
1988), pp. 20–23. sympathized with the Revisionists; nota-
51. Pappé, The Ethnic Cleansing of bly, when Ben-Gurion moved against
Palestine, p. 267 (n. 16). an Irgun naval arms shipment in June
52. Masalha, Expulsion of the in order to establish full authority over
Palestinians, especially pp. 181–99; the Zionist armed forces (in what is now
Khalidi, “Plan Dalet.” known as the Altalena affair), it was
53. “It might be asked,” writes Gabriel partly the outright refusal of Mahal air-
Piterberg of this debate, “whether ethnic- crew to obey orders to prepare for action
cleansing-as-result . . . is not, empirically against the Irgun vessel that forced

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60 Journal of Palestine Studies

Ben-Gurion to employ artillery from the 85. Morris, The Birth of the
shore. Cull, Aloni and Nicolle, Spitfires, Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited,
p. 176. For more details on the Mahal and p. 428.
the Altalena affair—including foreign 86. Allon, Shield of David, p. 217.
recruits on the Irgun side, for example 87. Munayyer with Khalidi, “The Fall
the Altalena’s American captain and of Lydda,” p. 82.
Canadian gun captain—see Bercuson, 88. The 82nd Brigade appears to have
The Secret Army, pp. 149–51; Weiss and participated in the occupations of Dayr
Weiss, I Am My Brother’s Keeper, pp. Tarif (where its advance was delayed
143–52. early in Operation Dani) and Barfiliya,
70. For examples, see Cull, Aloni and and in the destruction of al-Tira and
Nicolle, Spitfires, p. 100; Eliezer Cohen, ‘Inabba. Khalidi, All that Remains, pp.
Israel’s Best Defense: The First Full Story 356, 361, 379. Following the expulsions,
of the Israeli Air Force (New York: Orion it was under orders from Yitzhak Rabin
Books, 1993), pp. 12, 14. to respond to any returning villagers
71. Cull, Aloni and Nicolle, Spitfires, with live fire, and it was additionally
p. 148. accused by the local Israeli military gov-
72. Lorch, Israel’s War of ernor of unauthorized looting. Morris,
Independence, 1947–1949, p. 264. The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee
73. Cull, Aloni and Nicolle, Spitfires, Problem Revisited pp. 442, 459 (n. 176),
pp. 154, 165. 454 (n. 86).
74. Cull, Aloni and Nicolle, Spitfires, 89. Some of their reactions as wit-
pp. 73, 149. nesses are recorded in Bercuson, The
75. Cull, Aloni and Nicolle, Spitfires, Secret Army, pp. 166–67.
p. 173; Bishara A. Bahbah, “Israel’s Private 90. Amos Kenan, “The Legacy
Arms Network,” MERIP Middle East of Lydda: Four Decades of Blood
Report, no. 144 (Jan.–Feb. 1987), p. 9. Vengeance,” The Nation, February 6
76. On the basis of interviews with 1989, pp. 155–56. Discussed in Norman
Palestinian refugees, Birzeit University’s Finkelstein, “Rejoinder to Benny Morris,”
Saleh Abdel Jawad concludes that “aerial Journal of Palestine Studies 21, no. 2
bombardment was one of the deadli- (Winter 1992), pp. 70–71.
est forms of killing since July 1948, 91. Cull, Aloni and Nicolle, Spitfires,
especially in southern Palestine and p. 182.
the central Galilee.” “Zionist Massacres: 92. Dunkelman, Dual Allegiance, p.
The Creation of the Palestinian Refugee 244; Nazzal, The Palestinian Exodus
Problem in the 1948 War,” in Eyal from Galilee, 1948, p. 24.
Benvenisti et al., eds., Israel and the 93. Nazzal, The Palestinian Exodus
Palestinian Refugees (New York: from Galilee, 1948, pp. 72–73.
Springer, 2007), p. 66. 94. Khalidi, All that Remains, p. 22.
77. Eshel, Chariots of the Desert, pp. 95. Khalidi, All that Remains, p. 19.
13–14, 17. 96. Referring in particular to the
78. Eshel, Chariots of the Desert, role of his subordinate Joe Weiner—“a
p. 19. former permanent force sergeant-major
79. Markovitzky, Mahal, p. 31. in the Canadian artillery who had been
80. Lorch, Israel’s War of with me in the mortars”—Dunkelman
Independence, 1947–1949, p. 334. describes his tactical reliance on this
81. Spiro Munayyer, with an intro- planned circumventing of village
duction by Walid Khalidi, “The Fall of defenses: “Everything went according
Lydda,” Journal of Palestine Studies 27, to plan. While the Moslem section was
no. 4 (Summer 1998), p. 88. being shelled, the assault force—the 79th
82. Munayyer with Khalidi, “The Fall Armored Battalion under Joe Weiner,
of Lydda,” p. 81. with two companies from Arele Yariv’s
83. Lorch, Israel’s War of 21st Battalion—approached the walls.
Independence, 1947–1949, p. 335. They and the Druze defenders fired
84. Munayyer with Khalidi, “The Fall harmlessly over each other’s heads. The
of Lydda,” p. 92; Morris, The Birth of the attackers quietly passed through the
Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited Druze lines, entering the village and
p. 426. taking the Moslems from the rear. Within

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Mahal and the Dispossession of the Palestinians 61

a short time, the whole village was and Faber, 1956), pp. 186–87; Morris,
securely in our hands.” Dual Allegiance, The Birth of the Palestinian Refugee
pp. 247, 261. See also Laila Parsons, The Problem Revisited, p. 473.
Druze between Palestine and Israel, 108. Nazzal, The Palestinian Exodus
1947–1949 (London: Macmillan Press, from Galilee, 1948, quoting Umm
2000), pp. 78–83. Shahadah al-Salih, p. 95.
97. Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian 109. Morris cites Gershon Gil‘ad,
Refugee Problem Revisited, p. 419. IDF intelligence officer for the northern
98. Dunkelman, Dual Allegiance, p. front, who reported that “‘150–200’
266. Arabs, ‘including a number of civilians,’
99. Morris, The Birth of the died in the battle for Jish.” The Birth
Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, of the Palestinian Refugee Problem
p. 419. Revisited, p. 474. “Two days after the
100. Nazzal, The Palestinian Exodus seizure of Jish,” a member of the Knesset
from Galilee, 1948, quoting Salih from the (Arabic) Nazareth Democratic
Muhammed Nassir, p. 75. List reported, “the army surrounded the
101. Khalidi, All that Remains, p. 352. village and carried out searches. In the
102. Pappé, The Ethnic Cleansing of course of the search soldiers robbed sev-
Palestine, p. 158. eral of the houses and stole 605 pounds,
103. Strictly speaking, a further nar- jewelry and other valuables. When the
rowing of the Strip occurred even after people who were robbed insisted on
the armistice agreements of 1949. See being given receipts for their property,
Salman Abu-Sitta, The Atlas of Palestine they were taken to a remote place and
1917–1966 (London: Palestine Land shot dead.” Tom Segev, with Arlen Neal
Society, 2010), p. 98. Concerning popula- Weinstein, English ed., 1949: The First
tion increase, “tripling” is the calcula- Israelis (New York: The Free Press,
tion of Sara Roy, The Gaza Strip: The 1986), p. 72.
Political Economy of De-development 110. Morris, The Birth of the
(Washington: Institute for Palestine Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited,
Studies, 1995), p. 15. Morris, in The Birth pp. 473–74; Khalidi, All that Remains,
of the Palestinian Refugee Problem p. 497.
Revisited, suggests (pp. 472–473) an 111. Another Israeli official refers
increase of 100,000 to 230,000. to “94 in Saliha blown up in a house.”
104. Cull, Aloni and Nicolle, Spitfires, Morris, The Birth of the Palestinian
pp. 273, 263. Refugee Problem Revisited, p. 500 (n.
105. Morris, The Birth of the 118).
Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited, 112. Morris, The Birth of the
p. 472; Pappé, The Ethnic Cleansing of Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited
Palestine, p. 194. Intensive bombing of p. 473.
the area is chronicled in nearly all histori- 113. Morris, The Birth of the
cal accounts which address the use of air Palestinian Refugee Problem Revisited,
power in 1948 Palestine. p. 477.
106. Dunkelman, Dual Allegiance, 114. See Daryl Li, “The Gaza Strip
p. 237. (The planner in question was as Laboratory: Notes in the Wake of
Prof. Yohanan Ratner.) It is perhaps not Disengagement,” Journal of Palestine
coincidental that Sa`sa` was the target of Studies 35, no. 2 (Winter 2006), pp.
one of the earliest Haganah atrocities in 38–55; Jonathan Cook, Blood and
the area, committed the night of 14–15 Religion: The Unmasking of the Jewish
February. Pappé, The Ethnic Cleansing and Democratic State (London: Pluto
of Palestine, pp. 77–78. Press, 2006).
107. Edgar O’Ballance, The Arab-
Israeli War, 1948 (London: Faber

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