International Journal of Philosophy and Theology

March 2014, Vol. 2, No. 1, pp. 35-44

ISSN: 2333-5750 (Print), 2333-5769 (Online)
Copyright © The Author(s). 2014. All Rights Reserved.
American Research Institute for Policy Development
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Defending A Dogma: Between Grice, Strawson and Quine

Elvis Imafidon1

Abstract

One of Quine’s most important legacies is the theorization of two dogmas of

empiricism and these dogmas have served as the most severe challenge to the
empiricist/positivist tradition. In fact, if not replied to, the dogmas could threaten
the very foundation of any meaningful discourse in the sciences. For this reason,
Grice and Strawson in “In Defence of a Dogma” attempt a reply to the charge of
dogmatism in the analytic-synthetic distinction, showing that the charge does not
hold. This essay pays attention to the arguments raised by Grice and Strawson in
justifying their stance showing that although it is not foolproof, it provides
reasonable grounds for not entirely rejecting the analytic-synthetic distinction.

Keywords: Analytic-synthetic distinction, Quine, Grice, Strawson, empiricism

Introduction

The analytic/synthetic distinction brought to prominence by Immanuel Kant

in his Critique of Pure Reason, in his distinction between analytic and synthetic
judgments, occupies an essential place in the empiricist view of knowledge as lucidly
reflected in the views of the logical positivists. Before Kant, Leibniz and Hume had
made similar distinction between “truth of reason/truth of fact” and “”relations of
ideas/matters of fact” respectively1 W. V. O. Quine in his paper; “Two Dogmas of
Empiricism” has subjected this distinction to criticisms by identifying two dogmas in
it which, he says, are not justifiable.

1Department of Philosophy, Faculty of Arts, Ambrose Alli University, Ekpoma, Nigeria.

E-mail: [email protected]
36 International Journal of Philosophy and Theology, Vol. 2(1), March 2014

The first of these dogmas insists on a “fundamental cleavage between truth

which are analytic or grounded in meaning independently of matters of fact, and truth
which are synthetic, or grounded in fact. The other dogma is reductionism; the belief that
each meaningful statement is equivalent to some logical experience?2 One major
reasons for supposing this distinction right is that: “A statement is analytic if it can be
shown to be ultimately reducible to a form governed by the logical law of identity. ‘A
is A’ (and) a statement is synthetic if it cannot be shown to be reducible to a statement
that is basically of the form of an identity statement.”3 Quine, on examining this
distinction, says it cannot be justified since it is not a clear one and therefore seems
unwarranted and useless. He therefore outrightly rejects it.

In their paper “In Defence of a Dogma” H. P. Grice and P. F. Strawson

attack Quine’s position by arguing that the criticisms raised by Quine do not, at all
“justify the rejection, as illusory, of the analytic synthetic distinction and the notions
which belong to the same family.”4 Put differently, Grice and Strawson opines that
the criticisms given by Quine against the distinction, or simply because the distinction
falls short of Quine’s expectations does not justify the rejection of the distinction
neither does it imply that the distinction does not exist. They also contend that even
the criticisms and points raised by Quine for the rejection of the distinction tend to
allow for or accommodate the distinction itself.

It is important at this point that we examine more vividly the reason(s) for
Quine’s rejection of the distinction, and also to see if Grice and Strawson are right to
say that they are not enough for the rejection of the analytic/synthetic distinction.

Quine’s Reasons for Rejection of the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction

The major reason why Quine rejects the distinction is due to the nature of
analyticity. He distinguishes: between two types of analytic statements, that of logical
truths and those believed to be convertible to logical truths. 5 The former are
statements that are true under all reinterpretation of their components with the
exception of the logical particles, which should be left unuttered. e.g. “no married
man is unmarried” or “A triangle has three angles.” The later are those that depend
on synonymity; e.g., “no married man is a bachelor” which could be turned into a
logically true statement by substituting “unmarried man” for it synonym “bachelor.”
Elvis Imafidon 37

Quine contends that the major difficulty with analyticity lies with this second
clarification of analytic statements and not with the first because it depends on
synonymity which itself cannot be clarified.

He says thus that, We still lack a proper characterization of the second class of
analytic statements and therewith of analyticity generally inasmuch as we have … to
learn on a notion of “synonymy” which is no less in need of clarification than
analyticity itself.6

In other words, it is not clear what is meant when two expressions are said to
be synonymous. This is because whenever an attempt is made to explain synonymy, it
is done with the concept of analyticity which is in turn in need of clarification, and
whatever clarification that is sought for analyticity is again based on synonymy. This
therefore tends to lead to a circular form of reasoning. Hence, there is no adequate
clarification of synonymy and analyticity. The problem Quine is trying to bring out
here, says Grice and Strawson, is this; “There is a certain circle or family of
expressions of which “analyticity” is one of such that if any one member of the circle
could be taken to be satisfactorily understood or explained, then other members of
the circle could be verbally, and hence satisfactorily explain in terms of it.

Other members of the family include “self-contradictory,” (in a broad sense),

“necessary,” “synonymous,” “semantical rule” and perhaps definition (but again in a
broad sense). Unfortunately, each member of the family is in as great need of
explanation as any other… To make “satisfactory sense” of one of these expressions
would seem to involve two things: (1) it would seem to involve providing an
explanation which does not incorporate any expression belonging to the family circle
(2) it would seem that the explanation provided must be of the same general character
as those rejected explanations which do incorporate members of the family–circle
(i.e., it must specify some features common and peculiar to all cases to which, for
example, the word “analytic” is to be applied; it must have the same general form as
an explanation beginning “a statement is analytic if and only if …” … if we take these
two conditions together and generalize the results, it would seem that Quine requires
of a satisfactory explanation of an expression that it should take the form of a pretty
strict definition but should not make use of any member of a group of interdefinable
terms to which the expression belongs.”7 Since this seems impossible to come by in
the case of the analytic/synthetic distinction, Quine feels justified to reject it.
38 International Journal of Philosophy and Theology, Vol. 2(1), March 2014

Quine says, for instance, that though “definition” seems to solve the problem
of synonymy faced by the second class of analytic statements, it, on a very careful
examination, doesn’t but rather reaffirms it. He remarks that definition does not, as
some have supposed, hold the key to synonymy and analyticity since definition––
except in the extreme case of the explicitly conventional introduction of new
notations––hinges on prior relations of synonymy.8 He also attempts to see how
cognitive synonymy not presupposing analyticity can help reduce the problem. 9 He
however, sees this as difficult to achieve since there can be no adequate explanation of
cognitive synonymy that would not incorporate directly or indirectly the notion of
analyticity.10 This is because interchangeability without change in the truth value of the
resultant statements is meaningless until it is relativised to a language whose extent is
specified in relevant respects.11

The reason being that it is easy to construct truths which become false under
substitution, say of “unmarried ,man” for “bachelor” for example with the aid of
phrases like “bachelor of arts” etc., and with the aid of single quotes to mention either
of both of such pairs of words or expressions, e.g., “bachelor has four letters.”12 By
specifying an extensional language with one and many place predicates, truth
functions, and quantifications as its primitives, we could, according to Quine, obtain
such interchangeability. But then, the best that such interchangeability (salva veritate) in
such an extensional language can guarantee for us is the truth of the resultant
statements, not their analyticity. In other words it would not guarantee the necessity
of their truth because all that such interchangeability entails in such a language is
extensional isomorphism. And, as Quine is quick to point out, mere extensional
agreement falls short of cognitive synonymy. On the other hand, language that
contains intentional adverbs like “necessarily” guarantee cognitive synonymy.
However, the interchangeability in such a language presupposes the understanding of
the concept of analyticity. So we are back to where we started.13

Quine also makes an attempt to explain analyticity by drawing on the

resources of the verification theory of meaning. On this theory, two statements would
supposedly be held synonymous if they are susceptible to identical mode of empirical
confirmation or disconfirmation. If that supposition is true, it seems that the notion
of analyticity is saved after all. For then we could explain the notion of analyticity in
terms of synonymy of statements together with logical truths.
Elvis Imafidon 39

But Quine holds that the verification principle is fundamentally wrong; its
supposed validity rests on a defective conception of meaning which regards individual
statements as independent or primary units of meaning. Quine maintains that it is this
defective conception of meaning which in turn produces the two problematic results,
the two dogmas of empiricism.14

For the above reasons, Quine insists that the distinction made between
analyticity and synthetic statements and the reason given for such, are not clear and
are totally misunderstood by those who use the expressions; that the stories they tell
themselves about the distinction are full of illusions.15 Hence he says it is a distinction
which he rejects as insensible, useless and illusory. But, how plausible are these
criticism against the distinction and, even if plausible, do they amount to such a
rejection of it?

Replies from Grice and Strawson

The reason why Quine sees the analytic/synthetic distinction as inadequately

clarified, hence useless and although illusory, the reason why he says the belief in the
existence of such a distinction is a philosophical mistake, an unempirical dogma of
empiricism, a metaphysical article of faith,16 as we have seen above, is the circular
nature of explaining analyticity, synonymy and other members of the circle of
interdefinable concepts. To make satisfactory sense of analyticity or any other
member of the family, Quine has insisted above, involves two conditions which are:
providing an explanation which does not incorporate any expression belonging to the
family circle, and that the explanation provided must specify some features common
and peculiar to all cases to which thee expression is to be applied. According to Grice
and Strawson, we may begin to feel that such a satisfactory explanation is hard to
come by. But how does it follow that not having a satisfactory explanation of X is
enough reason to say X doesn’t make sense?17 It would seem fairly clearly
unreasonable to insist in general that the availability of a satisfactory explanation in the
sense sketched above is a necessary condition of an expression making sense. It is
perhaps dubious whether any such explanation can ever be given (the hope that there
can be is, or was, the hope of reductive analysis in general). Even if such explanation
can be given in some cases, it would be pretty generally agreed that there are other
cases in which they cannot.
40 International Journal of Philosophy and Theology, Vol. 2(1), March 2014

One might think, for example, of the group of expressions which include
“morally wrong,” “blameworthy,” “breach of moral rules,” etc., or of a group which
include the propositional connections and the words “true,” and “false,” “statement,”
“fact,” “denial,” “assertion.” Few people would want to say that the expression
belonging to either of these groups were senseless on the ground that they have not
been formally defined (or even on the ground that it was impossible formally to
define them) except in terms of members of the same group.18

Besides, according to Grice and Strawson, simply because the expression

cannot be explained in Quine’s terms does not mean that they cannot be explained at
all. They can be, and are explained, though in other and less formal ways than that
required by Quine, which implies that, though there is no one way of explaining them,
there is a generally agreed philosophical (and ordinary usage for them. 19 To illustrate
this point, they (Grice and Strawson) use a member of the analyticity family namely
logical impossibility which Quine regards as not clearer than the others, by bringing out
the contrast between logical and natural impossibility. They use the instance of the
logical impossibility of a child of three’s being an adult, and the natural impossibility
of a child of three’s understanding Russell’s theory of types.20 Ultimately, the
distinction between such statements, they claim, will amount to the distinction
between not believing something and not understanding something.

In other words, the distinction is between lack of belief and lack of

understanding,21 or between incredulity yielding to conviction and incomprehension
yielding to comprehension. It would be rash to maintain that this distinction does not
need clarification, but it would be absurd to maintain that it does not exist. In the face
of the availability of this informal type of explanation for the notions of the analyticity
group, the fact that they have not received another type of explanation seem a wholly
inadequate grounds for conclusion that the notions are pseudo-notions, that the
expressions which purport to express them have no sense. Hence, Quine’s argument
that the notions of the analyticity group have not been satisfactorily explained does
not justify his extreme position for their rejection.22 This is because even though the
distinction demands for better clarification, there is a strong presumption in favour of
the existence of the distinction which he challenges, a presumption resting both on
philosophical and ordinary usage.23
Elvis Imafidon 41

Another point of criticism raised by Grice and Strawson against Quine is on

his notion of definition and synonyms. As noted earlier, in criticizing definition as
depending on synonymy, he, however, excluded what he calls extreme cases of
explicitly conventional introduction of new notations. In the extreme case, the
definiendom becomes synonymous with the definiens simply because it has been expressly
created for the purpose of being synonymous with the definiens. This is, however,
incoherent according to Grice and Strawson. As they say, it is like the position of a
man to who you are trying to explain, say, an idea of one thing fitting into another
thing, or two things fitting together, and who says, “I can understand what it means to
say that one thing fits into another, or that two things fit together, in the case where
one was specifically made to fit to the other but I cannot understand what it means to
say this in any other case.24 This is because Quine’s extreme case are in reality
indifferent from those he condemns and hence, it will be improper for him to accept
one and reject the others. For these and other reasons, they conclude that Quine’s
case against the analytic/synthetic distinction is not well made out, it is incoherent and
unjustified. This is seen once more in their attack on Quine’s positive theory or
scientific holism as affirming, rather than refuting the distinction, though Quine insist
that it is incompatible with the distinction.

Quine’s Positive Theory and the Affirmation of the Analytic/Synthetic

Distinction

Having rejected the analytic/synthetic distinction, Quine boldly sketches his

own positive theory that will aid in determining the relation between the statements
we accept as true or reject as false on the one hand, and the experiences in the light of
which we do so, on the other. His positive theory can be summarized in these five
propositions.

(1) Taken collectively, science has its double dependence upon language and
experience; (though) … this duality is not significantly traceable into the
statement of science.
(2) (our) statements about the eternal world face the tribunal of sense experience
not individually but only as a corporate body
(3) thus, the unit of empirical significance is the whole of science
(4) consequently, any statement can be held true, come what may, if we make
drastic enough adjustment elsewhere in the system.
42 International Journal of Philosophy and Theology, Vol. 2(1), March 2014

(5) And conversely, by the same token, no statement is immune to revision. 25

These five propositions are what constitute Quine’s positive theory or

scientific holism which advocates a new theory of meaning not predicated on
individual words or statements, but on science as a whole. It can be summarized as
follows. Whatever our experiences maybe, it is in principle possible to hold on to, or
reject any statement we like, so long as we are prepared to make extensive enough
revisions elsewhere in our system of beliefs. In practice, our choices are governed
largely by consideration of convenience. We wish our system to be as simple as
possible, but we also wish disturbances to it as it exists to be as small as possible.

Quine maintains that his positive theory is in no way compatible with the
analytic/synthetic distinction. Grice and Strawson, however, contends that Quine’s
position is compatible with, and gives room for the kind of explanation that he rejects
of analytic/synthetic distinction. Grice and Strawson say, for instance, concerning
Quine’s supposition that “no statement is immune to revision” that;

Since it is an illusion to suppose that the characteristics of immunity in

principle from revision, come what may, belongs or could belong to any statement, it
is an illusion to suppose that there is a distinction to be drawn between statements
which posses this characteristics and statement which lacks it . Yet Quine suggest, this
is precisely the distinction which those who use the terms “analytic” and synthetic”
suppose themselves to be drawing. Quine’s view would perhaps be… that those who
believe in the distinction are inclined, at least sometimes to mistake the characteristics
of strongly resisting revision (which belongs to beliefs very centrally situated in the
system) for the mythical characteristics of total immunity from revision. 27

Therefore, Quine, while positing his own dogma of revisability, endorses the
distinction in contention in the sense that even though this implies that there is no
absolute necessity about the adoption or use of any conceptual scheme whatever or
more narrowly in terms that he would reject, that there is analytic proposition such
that we must gave linguistic forms bearing just the sense required to express that
proposition, it is not possible to deny the existence of necessities within any
conceptual scheme we adopt or use or, more narrowly again, that there are no
linguistic forms which do express analytic propositions.
Elvis Imafidon 43

It is therefore the conclusion of Grice and Strawson that Quine’s rejection of

the analytic/synthetic distinction is not justified by his criticism of the distinction.
Hence, the distinction still remains, even in the light of not being able to satisfy
Quine’s ideals.

Conclusion

The analytic/synthetic distinction has been an essential one used in both

philosophical and ordinary discourse. Though Quine’s criticisms and positive theory
draws our attention to the revisability of expression based on the conceptual scheme
or linguistic form being used at the point in time, or the context-based nature of
expressions rather than thinking that such (analytic) expressions are universal, hence
immune from revision, it is not enough to reject the distinction. This is the point
Grice and Strawson raise; that even in different conceptual schemes or linguistic
forms, the distinction still exist within them and understanding such distinction will
be based on understanding the semantic rules of such a linguistic form though, such
may be revised when viewed from a different conceptual scheme.

Also, Quine stated that the difficulty of analyticity is with the second class of
analytic statement (those depending on synonymy) not with the first (logical truths).
So it is really out of place for him to at the long-run, reject the whole distinction after
opining that he has no problems with part of it (the logical truth).28 It is one thing to
epistemologically trivialize analytic statements and another to completely condemn
and reject it as non-existent. It is the latter that Grice and Strawson contend against
while endorsing the possibility of the former. The main problem with Grice and
Strawson, however, is that they base most of their criticisms on the example they give
on logical impossibility with the conclusion that some sort of explanation is possible
for analyticity which may be different from Quine’s requirement but, they do not as
well give any adequate explanation of it. However they draw our attention to the
usefulness of the distinction which Quine rejects in discourses, at least, within a
conceptual framework.
44 International Journal of Philosophy and Theology, Vol. 2(1), March 2014

Notes

J. Oladosu, “Quine on the Analytic/Synthetic Distinction,” The Nigerian Journal of

Philosophy, Vol. 21, Nos. 1 & 2, (2004/2005), pp. 91-11
W. V. O. Quine, From a Logical Point of View: Logical-Philosophical Essays, (Cambridge: Harvard
University Press, 1961), p. 20
M. K. Munitz, Contemporary Analytic Philosophy, (New York: Macmillan Pub. Comp. Inc., 1981),
p. 358.
H. P. Grice, P. F. Strawson, “In Defence of a Dogma,” Philosophical Review, LXV (1959), pp.
141-58.
See W. V. O. Quine, op. cit., pp. 22-23.
Ibid., p. 23
H. P. Grice, P. F. Strawson, op. cit., pp. 147-48
W. V. O. Quine, op. cit., p. 27
Ibid., p. 29
Ibid., p. 24
Ibid., p. 30
See J. Oladosu, op. cit., p. 97
Ibid., p. 97-8
Ibid., p. 98-9
H. P. Grice, P. F. Strawson, op. cit., p. 143
Ibid., p. 142
Ibid., p. 148
Ibid.
Ibid., p. 149
Ibid., p. 150
J. Oladosu, op. cit., p. 103
H. P. Grice, P. F. Strawson, Op. cit., pp. 151-52
Ibid., p. 147
Ibid., p. 152-53
This concise summary is given by J. Oladosu, op. cit., p. 100. For a detailed explanation see W.
V. O. Quine, op. cit., pp. 37-46
H. P. Grice, P. F. Strawson, Op. cit., p. 155
Ibid
See J. Oladosu, op. cit., p. 105