VOL.

319, NOVEMBER 29, 1999 413

Bustamante vs. Rosel

*
G.R. No. 126800. November 29, 1999.

NATALIA P. BUSTAMANTE, petitioner vs. SPOUSES RODITO F.

ROSEL and NORMA A. ROSEL, respondents.

Civil Law; Contracts; Pactum Commissorium; Article 1306 of the Civil

Code is one of the exceptions to the rule that contracts have the force of law
between the contracting parties and must be complied with in good faith.—
Respondents argue that contracts have the force of law between the
contracting parties and must be complied with in

_____________

* FIRST DIVISION.

414

414 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bustamante vs. Rosel

good faith. There are, however, certain exceptions to the rule, specifically
Article 1306 of the Civil Code, which provides: “Article 1306. The
contracting parties may establish such stipulations, clauses, terms and
conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they are not contrary to
law, morals, good customs, public order, or public policy.” A scrutiny of the
stipulation of the parties reveals a subtle intention of the creditor to acquire
the property given as security for the loan. This is embraced in the concept
of pactum commissorium, which is proscribed by law.
Same; Same; Same; Elements of Pactum Commissorium.—“The
elements of pactum commissorium are as follows: (1) there should be a
property mortgaged by way of security for the payment of the principal
obligation, and (2) there should be a stipulation for automatic appropriation
by the creditor of the thing mortgaged in case of non-payment of the
principal obligation within the stipulated period.”
PETITION for review on certiorari of a decision of the Court of
Appeals.

The facts are stated in the resolutions of the Court.

     Emerico B. Lomibao for petitioner.
     Julio C. Contreras for private respondents.

RESOLUTION

PARDO, J.:
1
The case before the Court is a petition for review
2
on certiorari to
annul the decision of the Court of Appeals, reversing and setting
3
aside the decision of the Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Branch
84, in an action for specific performance with consignation.

___________________

1 Under Rule 45, 1964 Revised Rules of Court.

2 In CA-G.R. CV No. 40193, promulgated on July 8, 1996.
3 In Civil Case No. Q-90-4813, dated November 10, 1992, Judge Teodoro P.
Regino.

415

VOL. 319, NOVEMBER 29, 1999 415

Bustamante vs. Rosel

On March 8, 1987, at Quezon City, Norma Rosel entered into a loan

agreement with petitioner Natalia Bustamante and her late husband
Ismael C. Bustamante, under the following terms and conditions:

“1. That the borrowers are the registered owners of a parcel of

land, evidenced by TRANSFER CERTIFICATE OF TITLE
No. 80667, containing an area of FOUR HUNDRED
TWENTY THREE (423) SQUARE Meters, more or less,
situated along Congressional Avenue.
“2. That the borrowers were desirous to borrow the sum of
ONE HUNDRED THOUSAND (P100,000.00) PESOS
from the LENDER, for a period of two (2) years, counted
from March 1, 1987, with an interest of EIGHTEEN (18%)
PERCENT per annum, and to guaranty the payment
thereof, they are putting as a collateral SEVENTY (70)
SQUARE METERS portion, inclusive of the apartment
therein, of the aforestated parcel of land, however, in the
event the borrowers fail to pay, the lender has the option to
buy or purchase the collateral for a total consideration of
TWO HUNDRED THOUSAND (P200,000.00) PESOS,
inclusive of the borrowed amount and interest therein;
“3. That the lender do hereby manifest her agreement and
conformity to the preceding paragraph, while the borrowers
4
do hereby confess receipt of the borrowed amount.”

When the loan was about to mature on March 1, 1989, respondents

proposed to buy at the pre-set price of P200,000.00, the seventy (70)
square meters parcel of land covered by TCT No. 80667, given as
collateral to guarantee payment of the loan. Petitioner, however,
refused to sell and requested for extension of time to pay the loan
and offered to sell to respondents another residential lot located at
Road 20, Project 8, Quezon City, with the principal loan plus interest
to be used as down payment. Respondents refused to extend the
payment of the loan and to accept the lot in Road 20 as it was
occupied by squatters and petitioner and her husband were not the
owners thereof but were mere land developers entitled

________________

4 Exhibit “A,” RTC Record, p. 142.

416

416 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bustamante vs. Rosel

to subdivision shares or commission 5if and when they developed at

least one half of the subdivision area.
Hence, on March 1, 1989, petitioner tendered payment of the
loan to respondents which the latter refused to accept, insisting on
petitioner’s signing a prepared deed of absolute sale of the collateral.
On February 28, 1990, respondents filed with the Regional Trial
Court, Quezon City, Branch 84, a complaint for specific
6
performance with consignation against petitioner and her spouse.
Nevertheless, on March 4, 1990, respondents sent a demand letter
asking petitioner to sell the collateral pursuant to the option to buy
embodied in the loan agreement.
On the other hand, on March 5, 1990, petitioner filed in the
Regional Trial Court, Quezon City a petition for consignation, and
deposited the amount of P153,000.00 with the City Treasurer of
7
Quezon City on August 10, 1990.
When petitioner refused to sell the collateral and barangay
conciliation failed, respondents consigned the amount of P47,500.00
8
with the trial court. In arriving at the amount deposited, respondents
considered the principal loan of P100,000.00 and 18% interest per
9
annum thereon, which amounted to P52,500.00. The principal loan
and the interest taken together amounted to P152,500.00, leaving a
10
balance of P 47,500.00.

___________________

5 Regional Trial Court Decision, Rollo, p. 31.

6 Civil Case No. Q-90-4813.
7 Exhibit “2,” RTC Record, p. 182.
8 Under Official Receipt No. 0719847 dated February 28, 1990, issued by the City
Treasurer, Quezon City, with the Clerk of Court, Regional Trial Court, National
Capitol Judicial Region, Quezon City, as payee, RTC Record, p. 162.
9 (P100,000.00 x 18%) 2 years and 11 months (March 8, 1987 up to February 9,
1990) P18,000 x 2 years and 11 months = P 52,500.
10 Comment, Rollo, pp. 41-45.

417

VOL. 319, NOVEMBER 29, 1999 417

Bustamante vs. Rosel

After due trial, on November 10, 1992, the trial court rendered
decision holding:

“WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered as

follows:

“1. Denying the plaintiff’s prayer for the defendants’ execution of the
Deed of Sale to Convey the collateral in plaintiffs’ favor;
“2. Ordering the defendants to pay the loan of P100,000.00 with
interest thereon at 18% per annum commencing on March 2, 1989,
up to and until August 10, 1990, when defendants deposited the
amount with the Office of the City Treasurer under Official Receipt
No. 0116548 (Exhibit “2”); and
“3. To pay Attorney’s Fees in the amount of P 5,000.00, plus costs of
suit.

“SO ORDERED.
“Quezon City, Philippines, November 10, 1992.
“TEODORO P. REGINO
11
“Judge”

On November 16, 1992, respondents appealed from the decision to

12
the Court of Appeals. On July 8, 1996, the Court of Appeals
rendered decision reversing the ruling of the Regional Trial Court.
The dispositive portion of the Court of Appeals’ decision reads:

“IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the judgment appeal (sic) from is

REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a new one entered in favor of the plaintiffs
ordering the defendants to accept the amount of P47,000.00 deposited with
the Clerk of Court of Regional Trial Court of Quezon City under Official
Receipt No. 0719847, and for defendants to execute the necessary Deed of
Sale in favor of the plaintiffs over the 70 SQUARE METER portion and the
apartment standing thereon being occupied by the plaintiffs and covered by
TCT No. 80667 within fifteen (15) days from finality hereof. Defendants, in
turn, are allowed to withdraw the amount of P153,000.00 deposited

________________

11 Decision, Regional Trial Court, Quezon City, Rollo, pp. 30-39.

12 Docketed as CA-G.R. CV No. 40193.

418

418 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bustamante vs. Rosel

by them under Official Receipt No. 0116548 of the City Treasurer’s Office
of Quezon City. All other claims and counterclaims are DISMISSED, for
lack of sufficient basis. No costs.
13
“SO ORDERED.”
14
Hence, this petition.
On January 20, 1997, we required respondents 15
to comment on
the petition within ten (10) days from 16
notice. On February 27,
1997, respondents filed their comment.
On February 9, 1998, we resolved to deny the petition on the
ground that there was no reversible error on the part of respondent
court in ordering the execution of the necessary deed of sale in
conformity with the parties’ stipulated agreement. The contract is
the law between the parties thereof (Syjuco v. Court of Appeals, 172
SCRA 111, 118, citing Phil. American General Insurance v. Mutuc,
17
61 SCRA 22; Herrera v. Petrophil Corporation, 146 SCRA 360).
On March 17, 1998, petitioner filed with this Court a motion for
reconsideration of the denial alleging that the real intention of the
parties to the loan was to put up the collateral as guarantee similar 18
to
an equitable mortgage according to Article 1602 of the Civil Code.
On April 21, 1998, respondents filed an opposition to petitioner’s
motion for reconsideration. They contend that the agreement
between the parties was not a sale with right of repurchase, but a
loan with interest at 18% per annum for a period of two years and if
petitioner fails to pay, the respondent was given the right to purchase
the property or apart-

_________________

13 Court of Appeals Decision, Rollo, pp. 19-26.

14 Petition, filed on November 29, 1996. Rollo, pp. 7-17. On November 27, 1996,
the Court granted petitioner an extension of thirty days from the expiration of the
reglementary period within which to file a petition for review on certiorari (Rollo, p.
14).
15 Rollo, p. 40.
16 Rollo, pp. 41-45.
17 Rollo, p. 55.
18 Motion for Reconsideration, Rollo, pp. 56-58.

419

VOL. 319, NOVEMBER 29, 1999 419

Bustamante vs. Rosel

ment for P200,000.00, which is not contrary

19
to law, morals, good
customs, public order or public policy.
Upon due consideration of petitioner’s motion, we now resolve to
grant the motion for reconsideration.
The questions presented are whether petitioner failed to pay the
loan at its maturity date and whether the stipulation in the loan
contract was valid and enforceable.
We rule that petitioner did not fail to pay the loan.
The loan was due for payment on March 1, 1989. On said date,
petitioner tendered payment to settle the loan which respondents
refused to accept, insisting that petitioner sell to them the collateral
of the loan.
When respondents refused to accept payment, petitioner
consigned the amount with the trial court.
We note the eagerness of respondents to acquire the property
given as collateral to guarantee the loan. The sale of the collateral is
20
an obligation with a suspensive condition. It is dependent upon the
happening of an event, without which the obligation to sell does not
arise. Since the event did not occur, respondents do not have the
right to demand fulfillment of petitioner’s obligation, especially
where the same would not only be disadvantageous to petitioner but
would also unjustly enrich respondents considering the inadequate
consideration (P200,000.00) for a 70 square meter property situated
at Congressional Avenue, Quezon City.
Respondents argue that contracts have the force of law between
21
the contracting parties and must be complied with in good faith.
There are, however, certain exceptions to the rule, specifically
Article 1306 of the Civil Code, which provides:

________________

19 Rollo, pp. 60-65.

20 Article 1181, Civil Code. In conditional obligations, the acquisition of the
rights, as well as the extinguishment or loss of those already acquired, shall depend
upon the happening of the event which constitutes the condition.
21 Article 1159, Civil Code.
420

420 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Bustamante vs. Rosel

“Article 1306. The contracting parties may establish such stipulations,

clauses, terms and conditions as they may deem convenient, provided they
are not contrary to law, morals, good customs, public order, or public
policy.”

A scrutiny of the stipulation of the parties reveals a subtle intention

of the creditor to acquire the property given as security for the loan.
This is embraced in 22
the concept of pactum commissorium, which is
proscribed by law.
“The elements of pactum commissorium are as follows: (1) there
should be a property mortgaged by way of security for the payment
of the principal obligation, and (2) there should be a stipulation for
automatic appropriation by the creditor of the thing mortgaged in
case of non-payment
23
of the principal obligation within the stipulated
period.”
24
In Nakpil vs. Intermediate Appellate Court, we said:

“The arrangement entered into between the parties, whereby Pulong Maulap
was to be “considered sold to him (respondent) x x x in case petitioner fails
to reimburse Valdes, must then be construed as tantamount to pactum
commissorium which is expressly prohibited by Art. 2088 of the Civil Code.
For, there was to be automatic appropriation of the property by Valdes in the
event of failure of petitioner to pay the value of the advances. Thus, contrary
to respondent’s manifestation, all the elements of a pactum commissorium
were present: there was a creditor-debtor relationship between the parties;
the property was used as security for the loan; and there was automatic
appropriation by respondent of Pulong Maulap in case of default of
petitioner.”

_________________

22 Article 2088, Civil Code. The creditor cannot appropriate the things given by
way of pledge or mortgage, or dispose of them. Any stipulation to the contrary is null
and void.
23 Development Bank of the Philippines vs. Court of Appeals, 284 SCRA 14, 26
(1998), citing Tolentino, Arturo M., Commentaries & Jurisprudence on the Civil
Code of the Philippines, Vol. V, pp. 536-537 (1992), citing Uy Tong vs. Court of
Appeals, 161 SCRA 383 (1988).
24 225 SCRA 456, 467 (1993).

421

VOL. 319, NOVEMBER 29, 1999 421

Bustamante vs. Rosel

A significant task in contract interpretation is the ascertainment of

the intention of the parties and looking into the words used by the
parties to project that intention. In this case, the intent to appropriate
the property given as collateral in favor of the creditor appears to be
evident, for the debtor is obliged to dispose of the collateral at the
pre-agreed consideration amounting to practically the same amount
as the loan. In effect, the creditor acquires the collateral in the event
of non-payment of the loan. This is within 25
the concept of pactum
commissorium. Such stipulation is void.
All persons in need of money are liable to enter into contractual
relationships whatever the condition if only to alleviate their
financial burden albeit temporarily. Hence, courts are duty bound to
exercise caution in the interpretation and resolution of contracts lest
the lenders devour the borrowers like vultures do with their prey.
WHEREFORE, we GRANT petitioner’s motion for
reconsideration and SET ASIDE the Court’s resolution of February
9, 1998. We REVERSE the decision of the Court of Appeals in CA-
G.R. CV No. 40193. In lieu thereof, we hereby DISMISS the
complaint in Civil Case No. Q-90-4813.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.

     Davide, Jr. (C.J.), Puno, Kapunan and Ynares-Santiago, JJ.,

concur.

Motion for reconsideration granted; February 9, 1998 resolution

set aside and reviewed decision reversed.

Note.—In determining the nature of a contract, the Court looks at

the intent of the parties and not at the nomenclature used to describe
it. (Lao vs. Court of Appeals, 275 SCRA 237 [1997])

——o0o——

___________________

25 Article 2208, Civil Code, quoted above.

422

© Copyright 2021 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.