The Limits of the Church

Georges Florovsky, Church Quarterly Review, 1933 1

Few Orthodox theologians have had such an impact on the ecumenical movement as Fr. Georges
Florovsky. At least as remarkable is the fact that few Orthodox theologians other than Fr. Georges
have attempted to set out perspectives on the nature of the canonical and sacramental boundaries of
the Church. Fr. Georges asserts that the Church’s canonical boundaries are not contiguous with her
sacramental boundaries, i.e., that sacramental grace exists beyond the canonical limits of the
Orthodox Church. He rejects a simple "economic" explanation, as oikonomia cannot create something
that did not exist in the first place.

The "ecclesiological challenge" that has vexed the modern ecumenical movement is entirely bound up
with the question of how the various Christian bodies relate to the Una Sancta, and Florovsky’s
position lends a significant nuance to the Orthodox position. But can the Orthodox churches today all
agree with Florovsky on these questions?

The Limits of the Church

It is very difficult to give an exact and firm definition of a ‘sect’ or ‘schism’ (I distinguish the theological
definition from the simple canonical description), since a sect in the Church is always something
contradictory and unnatural, a paradox and an enigma. For the Church is unity, and the whole of her
being is in this unity and union, of Christ and in Christ. ‘For in one Spirit were we all baptized into one
body’ (1 Cor. 12.13), and the prototype of this unity is the consubstantial Trinity. The measure of this unity
is catholicity or communality (sobornost), where the impenetrability of personal consciousness is softened
- and even removed - in complete unity of thought and soul, and the multitude of them that believe are of
one heart and soul (cf. Acts 4.32). A sect, on the other hand, is separation, solitariness, the loss and
denial of communality. The sectarian spirit is the direct opposite of the Church spirit.

The question of the nature and meaning of divisions and sects in the Church was put in all its sharpness
as early as the ancient baptismal disputes of the third century. At that time St Cyprian of Carthage
developed with fearless consistency a doctrine of the complete absence of grace in every sect, precisely
as a sect. The whole meaning and the whole logical stress of his reasoning lay in the conviction that the
sacraments are established in the Church. That is to say, they are effected and can be effected only in
the Church, in communion and in communality. Therefore every violation of communality and unity in
itself leads immediately beyond the last barrier into some decisive ‘outside’. To St Cyprian every schism
was a departure out of the Church, out of that sanctified and holy land where alone there rises the
baptismal spring, the waters of salvation, quia una est aqua in ecclesia sancta (Epist. lxxi, 2).

The teaching of St Cyprian as to the gracelessness of sects is only the opposite side of his teaching
about unity and communality. This is not the place or the moment to recollect and relate Cyprian’s
deductions and proofs. Each of us remembers and knows them, is bound to know them, is bound to
remember them. They have not lost their force to this day. The historical influence of Cyprian was
continuous and powerful. Strictly speaking, in its theological premises the teaching of St Cyprian has
never been disproved. Even Augustine was not very far from Cyprian. He argued with the Donatists, not
with Cyprian himself, and did not try to refute Cyprian; indeed, his argument was more about practical
measures and conclusions. In his reasoning about the unity of the Church, about the unity of love as a
necessary and decisive condition for the saving power of the sacraments, Augustine really only repeats
Cyprian in new words.
But the practical conclusions drawn by Cyprian have not been accepted and supported by the
consciousness of the Church. One may ask how this was possible, if his premisses have been neither
disputed nor set aside. There is no need to enter into the details of the Church’s canonical relations with
sectarians and heretics; it is an imprecise and an involved enough story. It is sufficient to state that there
are occasions when, by her very actions, the Church gives one to understand that the sacraments of
sectarians - and even of heretics - are valid, that the sacraments can be celebrated outside the strict
canonical limits of the Church. The Church customarily receives adherents from sects - and even from
heresies - not by the way of baptism, thereby obviously meaning or supposing that they have already
been actually baptized in their sects and heresies. In many cases the Church receives adherents even
without chrism, and sometimes also clergy in their existing orders. All the more must this be understood
and explained as recognizing the validity or reality of the corresponding rites performed over them
‘outside the Church’.

If sacraments are performed, however, it can only be by virtue of the Holy Spirit, and canonical rules thus
establish or reveal a certain mystical paradox. In what she does the Church bears witness to the
extension of her mystical territory even beyond her canonical borders: the ‘outside world’ does not begin
immediately. St Cyprian was right: The sacraments are accomplished only in the Church. But he defined
this ‘in’ hastily and too narrowly. Must we not rather argue in the opposite direction? Where the
sacraments are accomplished, there is the Church. St Cyprian started from the silent supposition that the
canonical and charismatic limits of the Church invariably coincide, and it is his unproven equation that has
not been confirmed by the communal consciousness of the Church.

As a mystical organism, as the sacramental Body of Christ, the Church cannot be adequately described
in canonical terms or categories alone. It is impossible to state or discern the true limits of the Church
simply by canonical signs or marks. Very often the canonical boundary determines the charismatic
boundary as well, and what is bound on earth is bound by an indissoluble bond in heaven. But not
always. And still more often, not immediately. In her sacramental, mysterious being the Church surpasses
all canonical norms. For that reason a canonical cleavage does not immediately signify mystical
impoverishment and desolation. All that Cyprian said about the unity of the Church and the sacraments
can be and must be accepted. But it is not necessary to draw with him the final boundary around the body
of the Church by means of canonical points alone.

This raises a general question and a doubt. Are these canonical rules and acts subject to theological
generalization? Is it possible to ascribe to them theological or dogmatic grounds and motivation? Or do
they rather represent only pastoral discretion and forbearance? Ought we not to understand the canonical
mode of action as a forbearing silence concerning gracelessness rather than as a recognition of the
reality or validity of schismatic rites? And if so, is it then quite prudent to cite or introduce canonical facts
into a theological argument?

This objection is connected with the theory of what is called ‘economy’ (oikonomia). In general
ecclesiastical usage ‘economy’ is a term of very many meanings. In its broadest sense it embraces and
signifies the whole work of salvation (cf. Coloss. 1.25; Eph. 1.10; 3.2, 9). The Vulgate usually translates it
by dispensatio. In canonical language ‘economy’ has not become a technical term. It is rather a
descriptive word, a kind of general characteristic: ‘economy’ is opposed to ‘strictness’ (akribeia) as a kind
of relaxation of Church discipline, an exemption or exception from the ‘strict rule’ ous strictum) or from the
general rule. The governing motive of ‘economy’ is precisely ‘philanthropy’, pastoral discretion, a
pedagogical calculation - the deduction is always from practical utility. ‘Economy’ is an aspect of
pedagogical rather than canonical consciousness. ‘Economy’ can and should be employed by each
individual pastor in his parish, still more by a bishop or council of bishops. For ‘economy’ is pastorship
and pastorship is ‘economy’. In this is the whole strength and vitality of the ‘economic’ principle - and also
its limitations. Not every question can be asked and answered in terms of ‘economy’.

One must ask, therefore, whether it is possible to treat the question of the baptism of sectarians and
heretics as a question only of ‘economy’. Certainly, in so far as it is a question of winning lost souls for
Catholic truth, of bringing them to ‘the word of truth’, then every course of action must be ‘economic’; that
is, pastoral, compassionate, loving. The pastor must leave the ninety and nine and seek the lost sheep.
But for this very reason the need is all the greater for complete sincerity and directness. Not only is
unequivocal accuracy, strictness and clarity - in fact, akribeia - required in the sphere of dogma (how
otherwise can unity of mind be obtained?), but accuracy and clarity are above all necessary also in
mystical diagnosis. Precisely for this reason the question of the rites of sectarians and heretics must be
asked and answered in terms of the strictest akribeia. For here it is not so much a quaestio iurisas
a quaestio facti, and indeed of mystical fact, of sacramental reality. It is not a matter of ‘recognition’ so
much as of diagnosis; it is necessary to identify and to discern mystical realities.

Least of all is the application of ‘economy’ to such a question compatible with the radical standpoint of St
Cyprian. If beyond the canonical limits of the Church the wilderness without grace begins immediately, if
schismatics have not been baptized and still abide in the darkness that precedes baptism, then perfect
clarity, strictness, and firmness are even more indispensable in the acts and judgements of the Church.
Here no ‘forbearance’ is appropriate or even possible; no concessions are permissible. Is it in fact
conceivable that the Church should receive sectarians or heretics into her own body not by way of
baptism simply in order thereby to make their decisive step easy? This would certainly be a very rash and
dangerous complaisance. Instead, it would be connivance with human weakness, self-love, and lack of
faith, a connivance all the more dangerous in that it creates the appearance of a recognition by the
Church that schismatic sacraments and rites are valid, not only in the minds of schismatics or people from
outside, but in the consciousness of the majority of people in the Church and even of its leaders.

Moreover, this mode of action is applied because it creates this appearance. If in fact the Church were
fully convinced that in the sects and heresies baptism is not accomplished, to what end would she reunite
schismatics without baptism? Surely not in order simply to save them by this step from false shame in the
open confession that they have not been baptized. Can such a motive be considered honorable,
convincing, and of good repute? Can it benefit the newcomers to reunite them through ambiguity and
suppression of truth? To the reasonable question whether it would not be possible by analogy to unite
Jews and Moslems to the Church ‘by economy’ and without baptism Metropolitan Anthony (Khrapovitsky)
replied with complete candor: ‘Ah, but all such neophytes - and even those baptized in the name of
Montanus and Priscilla - would not themselves claim to enter the Church without immersion and the
utterance of the words, ‘In the name of the Father, etc.’ Such a claim could only be advanced through a
confused understanding of the Church’s grace by those sectarians and schismatics whose baptism,
worship and hierarchical system differ little externally from those of the Church. It would be very insulting
to them, on their turning to the Church, to have to sit on the same seat with heathens and Jews. For that
reason the Church, indulging their weakness, has not performed over them the external act of baptism,
but has given them this grace in the second sacrament’ (Faith and Reason, 1916, 8-9, pp.887-8).

From the Metropolitan Anthony’s argument common sense would draw precisely the opposite conclusion.
In order to lead weak and unreasoning ‘neophytes’ to the ‘clear understanding of the Church’s grace’
which they lack, it would be all the more necessary and appropriate to perform over them the external act
of baptism, instead of giving them, and many others, by a feigned accommodation to their
‘susceptibilities’, not only an excuse but a ground to continue deceiving themselves through the equivocal
fact that their ‘baptism, worship and hierarchical system differ in little externally from those of the Church.’

One may ask who gave the Church this right not merely to change, but simply to abolish the external act
of baptism, performing it in such cases only mentally, by implication or by intention at the celebration of
the ‘second sacrament’ (i.e. chrismation) over the unbaptized. Admittedly, in special and exceptional
cases the ‘external act’, the ‘form’, may indeed be abolished; such is the martyr’s baptism in blood, or
even the so-called baptisma flaminis. But this is admissible only in casu necessitatis. Moreover, there can
hardly be any analogy between these cases and a systematic connivance in another’s sensitiveness and
self-deception. If ‘economy’ is pastoral discretion conducive to the advantage and salvation of human
souls, then in such a case one could only speak of ‘economy in reverse’. It would be a deliberate
retrogression into equivocation and obscurity for the sake of purely external success, since the internal
enchurchment of ‘ineophytes’ cannot take place with such concealment. It is scarcely possible to impute
to the Church such a perverse and crafty intention. And in any case the practical result of this ‘economy’
must be considered utterly unexpected. For in the Church herself the conviction has arisen among the
majority that sacraments are performed even among schismatics, that even in the sects there is a valid,
although forbidden, hierarchy. The true intention of the Church in her acts and rules would appear to be
too difficult to discern, and from this point of view as well the ‘economic’ explanation of these rules cannot
be regarded as convincing.

The ‘economic’ explanation raises even greater difficulties when we consider its general theological
premises. One can scarcely ascribe to the Church the power and the right, as it were, to convert the ‘has-
not-been’ into the ‘has-been’, to change the meaningless into the valid, as Professor Diovuniotis
expresses it (Church Quarterly Review, No.231 [April 1931], p.97), ‘in the order of economy.’ This would
give a particular sharpness to the question whether it is possible to receive schismatic clergy ‘in their
existing orders.’ In the Russian Church adherents from Roman Catholicism or from the Nestorians, etc.,
are received into communion ‘through recantation of heresy’, that is, through the sacrament of
repentance. Clergy are given absolution by a bishop and thereby, the inhibition lying on a schismatic
cleric is removed. One asks whether it is conceivable that in this delivery and absolution from sin there is
also accomplished silently - and even secretly - baptism, confirmation, ordination as deacon or priest,
sometimes even consecration as bishop, without any ‘form’ or clear and distinctive ‘external act’ which
might enable us to notice and consider precisely what sacraments are being performed.

Here there is a double equivocation, both from the standpoint of motive and from the standpoint of the
fact itself. Can one, in short, celebrate a sacrament by virtue of ‘intention’ alone and without some visible
act? Of course not. Not because there belongs to the ‘form’ some self-sufficient or ‘magic’ effect, but
precisely because in the celebration of a sacrament the ‘external act’ and the pouring-forth of grace are in
substance indivisible and inseparable. Certainly, the Church is the ‘steward of grace’ and to her is given
power to preserve and teach these gifts of grace. But the power of the Church does not extend to the very
foundations of Christian existence. It is impossible to conceive that the Church might have the right, ‘in
the order of economy’, to admit to the priestly function without ordination the clergy of schismatic
confessions, even of those that have not preserved the ‘apostolic succession’, while remedying not only
all defects but a complete lack of grace while granting power and recognition by means of an
unexpressed ‘intention’.

In such an interpretation the Church’s whole sacramental system becomes too soft and elastic.
Khomiakov, too, was not sufficiently careful, when, in defending the new Greek practice of receiving
reunited Latins through baptism, he wrote to Palmer that ‘all sacraments are completed only in the bosom
of the true Church and it matters not whether they be completed in one form or another. Reconciliation
(with the Church) renovates the sacraments or completes them, giving a full and Orthodox meaning to the
rite that was before either insufficient or heterodox, and the repetition of the preceding sacraments is
virtually contained in the rite or fact of reconciliation. Therefore, the visible repetition of baptism or
confirmation, though unnecessary, cannot be considered as erroneous, and establishes only a ritual
difference without any difference of opinion’ (Russia and the English Church, ch. vi, p.62). This is
impossible. The ‘repetition’ of a sacrament is not only superfluous but impermissible. If there was no
sacrament and what was previously performed was an imperfect, heretical rite, then the sacrament must
be accomplished for the first time - and with complete sincerity and candor. In any case, the Catholic
sacraments are not just ‘rites’ and it is not possible to treat the external aspect of a sacramental
celebration with such disciplinary relativism.

The ‘economic’ interpretation of the canons might be probable and convincing, but only in the presence of
direct and perfectly clear proofs, whereas it is generally supported by indirect data and most often by
indirect intentions and conclusions. The ‘economic’ interpretation is not the teaching of the Church. It is
only a private ‘theological opinion’, very late and very controversial, which arose in a period of theological
confusion and decadence in a hasty endeavor to dissociate oneself as sharply as possible from Roman
theology.

Roman theology admits and acknowledges that there remains in sects a valid hierarchy and even, in a
certain sense, the ‘apostolic succession’, so that under certain conditions sacraments may be
accomplished - and actually are accomplished - among schismatics and even among heretics. The basic
premises of this sacramental theology have already been established with sufficient definition by St
Augustine, and the Orthodox theologian has every reason to take the theology of Augustine into account
in his doctrinal synthesis.

The first thing to notice in Augustine is the organic way in which he relates the question of the validity of
sacraments to the doctrine of the Church. The reality of the sacraments celebrated by schismatics
signifies for Augustine the continuation of their links with the Church. He directly affirms that in the
sacraments of sectarians the Church is active: some she engenders of herself, others she engenders
outside herself, of her maid-servant, and schismatic baptism is valid for this very reason, that it is
performed by the Church (de bapt. i, 15, 23). What is valid in the sects is that which is in them from the
Church, that which remains with them as their portion of the sacred inner core of the Church, that through
which they are with the Church. In quibusdam rebus nobiscurn sunt.

The unity of the Church is based on a twofold bond - the ‘unity of the Spirit’ and the ‘bond of peace’ (cf.
Eph. 4.3). In sects and schisms the ‘bond of peace’ is broken and torn, but the ‘unity of the Spirit’ in the
sacraments is not brought to an end. This is the unique paradox of sectarian existence: the sect remains
united with the Church in the grace of the sacraments, and this becomes a condemnation once love and
communal mutuality have withered and died.

With this is connected St Augustine’s second basic distinction, the distinction between the ‘validity’ or
‘reality’ of the sacraments and their ‘efficacy’. The sacraments of schismatics are valid; that is, they
genuinely are sacraments, but they are not efficacious by virtue of schism and division. For in sects and
schisms love withers, and without love salvation is impossible. There are two sides to salvation: the
objective action of God’s grace, and man’s subjective effort or fidelity. The holy and sanctifying Spirit still
breathes in the sects, but in the stubbornness and powerlessness of schism healing is not accomplished.
It is untrue to say that in schismatic rites nothing is accomplished, for, if they are considered to be only
empty acts and words, deprived of grace, by the same token not only are they empty, they are converted
into a profanation, a sinister counterfeit. If the rites of schismatics are not sacraments, then they are a
blasphemous caricature, and in that case neither ‘economic’ suppression of facts nor ‘economic’ glossing
over of sin is possible. The sacramental rite cannot be only a rite, empty but innocent. The sacrament is
accomplished in reality.

Nevertheless it is impossible, Augustine argues, to say that in the sects the sacraments are of avail, are
efficacious. The sacraments are not magic acts. Indeed, the Eucharist itself may also be taken ‘unto
judgement and condemnation’, but this does not refute the reality or ‘validity’ of the Eucharist. The same
may be said of baptism: baptismal grace must be renewed in unceasing effort and service, otherwise it
becomes ‘inefficacious’. From this point of view St Gregory of Nyssa attacked with great energy the
practice of postponing baptism to the hour of death, or at least to advanced years, in order to avoid
pollution of the baptismal robe. He transfers the emphasis. Baptism is not just the end of sinful existence,
rather it is the beginning of everything. Baptismal grace is not just the remission of sins, but a gift or
pledge. His name may be entered in the army list, but the honor of a soldier lies in his service, not in his
calling alone. What does baptism mean without spiritual deeds?

Augustine wishes to say the same thing in his distinction between ‘character’ and ‘grace’. In any case,
there rests on everyone baptized a ‘sign’ or ‘seal’, even if he falls away and departs, and each will be tried
concerning this ‘sign’ or ‘pledge’ in the Day of Judgement. The baptized are distinguished from the
unbaptized even when baptismal grace has not flowered in their works and deeds, even when they have
corrupted and wasted their whole life. That is the ineffaceable consequence of the divine touch. This clear
distinction between the two inseparable factors of sacramental existence, divine grace and human love, is
characteristic of the whole sacramental theology of St Augustine. The sacraments are accomplished by
grace and not by love, yet man is saved in freedom and not in compulsion, and for that reason grace
somehow does not burn with a life-giving flame outside communality and love.
One thing remains obscure. How does the activity of the Spirit continue beyond the canonical borders of
the Church? What is the validity of sacraments without communion, of stolen garments, sacraments in the
hands of usurpers? Recent Roman theology answers that question by the doctrine of the validity of the
sacraments ex opere operato. In St Augustine this distinction does not exist, but he understood the
validity of sacraments performed outside canonical unity in the same sense. In fact ex opere
operato points to the independence of the sacrament from the personal action of the minister. The Church
performs the sacrament and, in her, Christ the high priest. The sacraments are performed by the prayer
and activity of the Church, ex opere orantis et operantis ecclesiae. It is in this sense that the doctrine of
validity ex opere operato, must be accepted. For Augustine it was not so important that the sacraments of
the schismatics are ‘unlawful’ or ‘illicit’ (illicita); much more important is the fact that schism is a
dissipation of love. But the love of God can overcome the failure of love in man. In the sects themselves -
and even among the heretics - the Church continues to perform her saving and sanctifying work. It may
not follow, perhaps, that we should say that schismatics are still in the Church. In any case this would not
be precise and sounds equivocal. It would be truer to say that the Church continues to work in the
schisms in expectation of that mysterious hour when the stubborn heart will be melted in the warmth of
God’s prevenient grace, when the will and thirst for communality and unity will finally burst into flame. The
‘validity’ of sacraments among schismatics is the mysterious guarantee of their return to Catholic
plenitude and unity.

The sacramental theology of St Augustine was not received by the Eastern Church in antiquity nor by
Byzantine theology, but not because they saw in it something alien or superfluous. Augustine was simply
not very well known in the East. In modern times the doctrine of the sacraments has not infrequently been
expounded in the Orthodox East, and in Russia, on a Roman model, but there has not yet been a creative
appropriation of Augustine’s conception.

Contemporary Orthodox theology must express and explain the traditional canonical practice of the
Church in relation to heretics and schismatics on the basis of those general premises which have been
established by Augustine.

It is necessary to hold firmly in mind that in asserting the ‘validity’ of the sacraments and of the hierarchy
itself in the sects, St Augustine in no way relaxed or removed the boundary dividing sect and
communality. This is not so much a canonical as a spiritual boundary: communal love in the Church and
separatism and alienation in the schism. For Augustine this was the boundary of salvation, since grace
operates outside communality but does not save. (It is appropriate to note that here, too, Augustine
closely follows Cyprian, who asserted that except in the Church even martyrdom for Christ does not
avail.) For this reason, despite all the ‘reality’ and ‘validity’ of a schismatic hierarchy, it is impossible to
speak in a strict sense of the retention of the ‘apostolic succession’ beyond the limits of canonical
communality. This question has been investigated exhaustively and with great insight in the remarkable
article of the late C.G. Turner, ‘The Apostolic Succession’, in Essays on the Early History of the Church
and the Ministry, edited by H.B. Swete (1918).

From this it follows without a doubt that the so-called ‘branch’ theory is unacceptable. This theory depicts
the cleavages of the Christian world in too complacent and comfortable a manner. The onlooker may not
be able immediately to discern the schismatic ‘branches’ from the Catholic trunk. In its essence,
moreover, a schism is not just a branch. It is also the will for schism. It is the mysterious and even
enigmatic sphere beyond the canonical limits of the Church, where the sacraments are still celebrated
and where hearts often still burn in faith, in love and in works. We must admit this, but we must remember
that the limit is real, that unity does not exist. Khomiakov, it seems, was speaking of this when he said:
‘Inasmuch as the earthly and visible Church is not the fullness and completeness of the whole Church
which the Lord has appointed to appear at the final judgement of all creation, she acts and knows only
within her own limits; and (according to the words of Paul the Apostle to the Corinthians, 1 Cor. 5.12)
does not judge the rest of mankind, and only looks upon those as excluded, that is to say, not belonging
to her, who have excluded themselves. The rest of mankind, whether alien from the Church, or united to
her by ties which God has not willed to reveal to her, she leaves to the judgement of the Great Day’
(Russia and the English Church, ch. xxiii, p.194).
In the same sense Metropolitan Philaret of Moscow decided to speak of Churches which were ‘not purely
true’:

Mark you, I do not presume to call false any Church which believes that Jesus is the Christ. The Christian
Church can only be either purely true, confessing the true and saving divine teaching without the false
admixtures and pernicious opinions of men, or not purely true, mixing with the true and saving teaching of
faith in Christ the false and pernicious opinions of men’ ( Conversation between a Seeker and a Believer
Concerning the Orthodoxy of the Eastern Greco-Russian Church, Moscow 1831, pp.27-29).
‘You expect now that I should give judgement concerning the other half of present Christianity,’ the
Metropolitan said in the concluding conversation,
but I just simply look upon them; in part I see how the Head and Lord of the Church heals the many deep
wounds of the old serpent in all the parts and limbs of his Body, applying now gentle, now strong,
remedies, even fire and iron, in order to soften hardness, to draw out poison, to clean wounds, to
separate out malignant growths, to restore spirit and life in the numbed and half-dead members. In this
way I attest my faith that, in the end, the power of God will triumph openly over human weakness, good
over evil, unity over division, life over death (ibid. , p.135).
These statements of Metropolitan Philaret are a beginning only. Not everything in them is clearly and fully
expressed. But the question is truly put. There are many bonds, still not broken, whereby the schisms are
held together in a certain unity with the Church. The whole of our attention and our will must be
concentrated and directed towards removing the stubbornness of dissension. ‘We seek not conquest,’
says St Gregory of Nazianzen, ‘but the return of our brethren, whose separation from us is tearing us
apart.’

Note

1. The views in this essay were expressed in a similar form seventeen years later, in ‘The Doctrine of the Church and the
Ecumenical Problem’, The Ecumenical Review (1950), 152-161 (Ed.).