BUSINESS LAW LECTURE NOTES Latest
BUSINESS LAW LECTURE NOTES Latest
(Revised)
FOR
AND
© 2007
These are merely Lecture Notes not to be cited as authority
These Lecture Notes have been prepared by: Kisilwa, Zaharani, Business
Laws Instructor, Institute of Accountancy Arusha, 2010
Prelude
This work presents the lecture notes on selected Business Law topics that are common
in most institutions subject outlines and which the students and other related groups
who are subjects to this course, are intended to learn over the stretch of the specified
time. The work is intended to aid students to avail themselves of the guidelines to this
course, usefulness of which it is assumed, will help them create a definite scope on what
they have to learn when they do their library materials exploration. In no way is this
work destined to be an exhaustive and all-in-one facility for every matter in Business
Law required of students to gain knowledge of in this course. Students are called upon
to refer to the Library Materials cited by the Instructors in the class as well as those
provided in the course outline for a better understanding and an ever lasting, well
packed satisfaction.
Kisilwa, Zaharani
These rules emerge in different ways, though in most cases there must be a consensus,
as to whether or not such rules are desirable. On being widely accepted this rule will
become law when a class of persons who are in power (the government, for instance in
present day societies) in any given society enforces it.
The enforcement of a rule makes it a legal rule which status is a condition precedent
before it gains the title of law in its real sense. It follows therefore that not every rule
that has been consented to by the members of a particular society is legal; many of
these rules fall way short of being legal rules. Paul Denham (see references at p.g. 17 of
this work) furnishes an instance of these non -legal rules which he names as conventions
and in his own phraseology he states as follows:
‘It is a convention that a man will normally take his hat off in a church. But it is a legal rule that
one person shall not hit another.’ Or that it is just a convention that the young will normally
respect the elders. But it is a legal rule that the young or any other person should not
abuse another.
You should be able to distinguish between legal rules and non-legal rules. Non legal
rules, when they are breached there may never be enforcement.
The definition of law may also include ‘the process by which these rules are created and
applied’
Collectively, the development of these rules, their substance (content), and the
application together make up a legal system [Denham]. This includes the process of
making of these rules by the relevant organs, interpretation of the rules by courts of law
and enforcement by the police and other organs charged with that duty; all of these are
subject to presence of the rules. If there were no rules what would the courts interpret
or the police enforce?
As it has been shown above, law began as a rule (s) set by people in a given society to
govern their conducts. The law becomes more important when the relations between
persons in a given society are complicated. Usually as the society develops the relations
of production turn out to be more or less of conflicting interests . To understand better
this statement I would , by way of illustration, adopt the “desert island analogy” given
by Gregory Allan in his article titled , The origin of law [refer to pg. 17 for full reference]
He states with my own emphasis that:
“if one man lives alone on a desert island, he has no use for any law to guide his
conduct in which case he can do whatever he pleases without causing any injury to
any other soul. He thus needs no law.”
The situation would be different if another man showed up on the same island. There
would be the two of them now. When two persons live together, it is certain that there
will be disagreements on certain matters and they will always have arguments. It is
likely that the stronger man will take advantage of his strength to dominate the weaker
man who in turn will be submissive. This delicate situation entails requirement of law to
guide them so that no one of them may be disadvantaged.
Whatever the case Gregory Allan states:
“…In the end they will either agree on certain rules of behaviour or conduct.” These rules of
behaviour become customarily binding to the present as well as the men who later
become the members of that society.
If there was this agreement, why is it that only a section of the members of the public
become the makers and enforcers of the law?
This has to do with the influence the development of a society has had on the
development of the law. In its development the human society has passed through five
stages namely, communalism, slavery, feudalism, capitalism and socialism.
During the era of communalism the nature of life the members of these societies were
leading was such that they worked together and shared out the fruits of their labour on
equitable basis. During this time technology was rudimentary (low) and man only
struggled to produce for his subsistence.
Later better technological tools were discovered and those who seized the early
advantage of the advent of this technology began to produce enough food not only for
subsistence but also for surplus. The power of surplus food made them prominent and
superior over others. It was the powerful that later dominated the less powerful, it was
them who later made the rules and the weaker followed.
That was the beginning of the so called centralized governments which later turned out
to be the makers and enforcers of the laws they made. This is the reason why it is the
governments that make law to day.
You will agree with me that it takes one to have enough resources to gain power.
However the dominant law in Tanzania is not customary law, why is this so? The answer
is simple: because our country has been, at some time, the subject of colonial rule.
Though there were two colonial masters in our country namely Germans and the British
I am inclined to discuss the latter (British) only since their influence in country is greater
than that of the former (Germans).
The British who ruled Tanganyika from 1818-1961 imposed the nature of their Legal
System to Tanganyika which we still use to day. Before going further into the effect of
this imposition to Tanzanian Law let me offer an insight into the English Legal System, in
brief so that you may know what kind of system Tanzania has adopted and what is the
extent of this adoption.
1. Common law
Started developing by year 1066 in England where representatives of the King (known as
circuitry courts) visited local courts and decide cases. They would regularly meet for
discussion in London after every other round trip. They discovered a lot about laws
applicable where they went to in local courts including the discrepancies between one
local court and another. Over a period of 200 years, with this practice the diverse laws
of various areas were commonised, thus common law.
2. EQUITY
Equity is another type of law applicable in England. It grew out of weaknesses of
common law. Separate courts were formed known as courts of equity which decided
cases in which the wronged party was not satisfied by the decisions of common law
courts. Thus up to 1870s there were two courts running side by side in England; these
are the Courts of Common law of England and Courts of Equity respectively.
This is the model of English Law which was imposed on Tanganyika during the British
rule. I hope you have gained a clear insight into the kind of legal system that our country
has adopted.
July 22nd 1920 is a very important date in Tanzania. It is referred to as the reception
date. It was the date on which the extent of application of English Law to Tanganyika
was declared by the British Colonial Government by the Tanganyika Order in council of
1920 which met at the Court of Buckingham Palace.
decided by the Common Law and Equity Courts before 1920 apply to Tanganyika and all
those which were decided by the English courts above 1920 are persuasive to local
courts.
WHAT ARE OTHER LAWS APPLICABLE TO TANGANYIKA APART FROM THE ENGLISH
LAW?
By s. 13 (a) (1), the governor of Tanganyika acquired a legal authority to apply to
Tanganyika the Indian Contract Act of 1872 whose application to Tanganyika ended in
1961 and its place was taken by the Law of Contract Ordinance of 1961, Cap 433
hereinafter called the LCO.. Therefore with minor modifications this Act has, since its
application, been the relevant Act directly providing for the matters pertaining to
contracts in Tanzania. The substance of this act is the same as that of its counter part,
The Indian Contract Act of 1872. In law they are called statutes in parimateria. The LCO,
1961, with the general revision of the laws in Tanzania, is now referred to as the Law of
Contract Act, Cap 345 of 2002.
And in 1963 two years later most of the customary Laws that were still applicable to
Tanganyika and which were thought to be not able to conflict with the general law were
codified under a statute known as the Local Customary Law (Declaration) Order of
1963.
You will, thus, notice later that all the laws in Tanzania that relate in one way or another
to business have a more or less direct relation to the English law and Practices. Judicial
Precedents from English courts will, by and large, be of that inevitable significance to
this course. Indian cases might be of some use in the general understanding of some
issues especially in contract cases for we share with them common matters in various
aspects of contract law and due to the fact that some part of their law has at some point
in time been imposed on our legal system.
Therefore this account, in short illustrates the development of the law in Tanzania.
CLASSIFICATION OF LAW
There are various ways of classifying laws; thus it may be classified as one of the
following groups:
i. Public/ Private
ii. Civil/Criminal
iii. Substantive/ Procedural
iv. International/ Municipal
v. Common Law/ Equity
However, to simplify the classification, as the legal systems develop the rules of law it
tend to fall into two major groups [Soulsby] i.e. criminal law and civil law
CIVIL LAW
i. Nature: It is referred to as private law; it deals with the relationships between
individual persons. Instances of this law are company law, contract law, banking Law,
business law etc. the cases under this law are cited as: Yahoo.Com v. Hotmail.Com, IAA
v. NBC.. You might be wondering why it is said that the law governs relationships
between individual persons and a case has its parties as IAA v. NBC. In law there are two
kinds of persons; natural persons, you and I for instance, and legal persons, those which
are established by law like the IAA, the NBC, and the STUDENTS’ LOANS BOARD. You
shall encounter a lot of these as you move forward in this course.
ii. Initiating a case: the wronged party himself institutes a case at a court of law,
containing the wrong done and reliefs sought.
iii. Punishment: The wrong doer in civil law is not punished but he is required to
make good the loss he or she has caused to another.
iv. Objective/ Function: Since civil law involves individual persons, its main function
is to protect these individual persons against the wrongful acts or omissions of other
persons. A simple instance of a wrongful act is breaching a contract. Thus the main
objective of civil law is compensation to the person who has suffered loss by the one
who has caused it.
v. Onus of proof of a wrong done: Lies on the wronged person who has to prove on
a balance of probabilities.
vi. Remedies: Common law remedies e.g. Damages or equitable remedies e.g.
Specific performance, rescission of a contract, Courts injunction.
CRIMINAL LAW
i. Nature: it is referred to as the public law since it deals with the relationship
between the individuals and the state. The wrong when done to individual is presumed
to have been done against the state. So when a wrongdoer has broken the law the state
interferes. That is why you might have seen criminal cases being referred to as R v. Cash
Book, the letter R refers to the Republic (the government of Tanzania while cash book is
the wrong doer.)
ii. Initiating a case: the government through the office of the DPP (Director of
Public prosecutions) initiates a case by prosecuting against the wrong doer.
iii. Punishment: if the wrong doer is found guilty he is punished, the most
common of punishment is serving a term in prison.
iii. Onus of proof of a wrong done: lies with the prosecution who must prove
beyond reasonable doubt.
iv. Remedies: sometimes criminal damages may be awarded.
SOURCES OF LAW
The sources of law in Tanzania are as follows:
i. The Constitution of the United Republic of Tanzania of 1977
This is the Highest Law of the Land; all other laws must be made subject to this law. In
more precise terms other laws of the land must not contravene the provisions of the
constitution, if they do the constitution will prevail and the other law will be declared
null and void [treated as no law].
the powers granted to it. The laws made by delegated power are known as by-laws,
regulations and circulars.
Importance of Delegated legislation
(a) It saves parliamentary time
(b) Allows for a greater flexibility in application
(c) Allows fine details to be added later by minister responsible after the statute
has been passed as law.
(d) Allows very quick passing of a statute in cases of states of emergency
(e) Relieves parliament of excessive work – load
You already know what is and how judicial precedent applies to the courts. However to
consolidate your understanding, the courts in Tanzania use the principles established in
the already decided cases to future cases whose facts are materially the same as of
those cases.
Primary Courts
Tribunals
Court of Appeal
The Court of Appeal of Tanzania, established under Article 108 of the Constitution, is the
highest Court in the hierarchy of judiciary in Tanzania. It consists of the Chief Justice and
other Justices of Appeal. The Court of Appeal of Tanzania is the court of final appeal at
the apex of the judiciary in Tanzania.
The High Court of Tanzania (for mainland Tanzania) and the High Court of Zanzibar are
courts of unlimited original jurisdiction, and appeals there from go to the Court of
Appeal.
High Courts
The High Court of Tanzania was established under Article 107 of the Constitution and it
has unlimited original jurisdiction to entertain all types of cases. The High Courts
Subordinate Courts
These include the Resident Magistrate Courts and the District Courts, which both enjoy
concurrent jurisdiction. These courts are established under the Magistrate Courts Act of
1984. The District Courts, unlike the Resident Magistrates Courts, are found throughout
all the districts in Tanzania (the local government unit.) They receive appeals from the
Primary Courts, several of which will be found in one district. The resident magistrate’s
Courts, which serve as the regional courts, are located in major towns, municipalities
and cities.
Primary Courts
The primary courts are the lowest courts in the hierarchy and are established under the
Magistrates Courts Act of 1984. They deal with criminal cases and civil cases. Civil cases
on property and family law matters which apply customary law and Islamic law must be
initiated at the level of the Primary Court, where the Magistrates sits with lay assessors.
(The jury system does not apply in Tanzania)
Tribunals
There are specialized tribunals, which form part of the judicial structure. These for
example include Ward Land tribunals, District Land and Housing Tribunal1, Tax Tribunal
and the Tax Appeals Tribunal, the Commission for Mediation and Arbitration (CMA)
1
established by s. 22 of the Courts (Land Disputes Settlements) Act, 2002
established under section 12 of the Labour Institutions Act, 2004;, and Military Tribunals
for the Armed forces. Military Courts do not try civilians. A party who feels dissatisfied
with any decision of the Tribunals may refer the same to the High Court for judicial
review.
Think of when you go for shopping in a supermarket, or when you drive, sign an
employment contract etc. all these acts involve legal issues, more so if these are carried
out by a firm, company, or partnership.
All these terms suggest a long list of things that can be found in business practices in our
daily lives. All of these need to be legally valid and therefore enforceable so that they be
of value to the general goodwill of the particular business. The law is one of the vehicles,
through whose objectives, businesses may prosper if they abide.
fine or imprisonment. In civil law any person who has been injured may claim a payment
of compensation from the one who injured him. This personal protection ensures a
reasonable confidence in the business persons and their business operations. The law
inculcates an environment in which people engage in businesses without worries or
fears.
ii. Property protection; The law also has developed to protect property form damage,
destruction, and any other subversive act. Property used in business results in
maximized profits for its owners if they are safe. Sensitive properties that may be
protected include intellectual property rights. Examples of laws that protect property
are the insurance law, Trade and Service Marks Act etc. The importance of these laws in
the business area can not be accorded an over emphasis.
iv. Protection from exploitation, frauds and oppressions; The law seeks to protect
groups of people from exploitation by other groups. One of ways in which people come
in groups is by forming business enterprises such as companies, joint ventures, or
partnerships. When say a partnership which was formed to deal with meat retail
business buys rotten meat from a whole sale company, the partnership as buyers are
given certain rights of protection against the company as the seller. And lastly.
v. Furtherance of trade; the law is important in furtherance of trade. Many actions that
take place in business require legal back up without which they would result in
Conclusively, without clear knowledge of the law the business establishments would
repeatedly suffer loss, if any profitable business ventures its owners undertake was
done without abiding to legal requirements set for it and at the end of the day the
undertaking was nullified.
The Bills of Exchange Act, Cap 215, Volume VI of the Revised Laws 2002
The Insurance Act, Cap 395, Volume 10 of the Revised Laws 2002
The Hire Purchase Act, Cap 14, Volume I of the Revised Laws 2002
Motor Vehicles Insurance Act, Cap. 169, Volume IV of the Revised Laws 2002
The Tanzania Evidence Act no. 6 (R.E 2002)
The Cheques Act, no. 3 of 1969
Usually the development of usages is triggered by failure of the civil law to efficiently
provide for some matters of trade2.
Akhileshwari Pathak (2007) Legal Aspects of Business, 2nd Ed., Tata Mcgraw-Hill
Publishing Company Limited, India
Denham P., (1999), Law: A modern Introduction, 4th Ed.., Redwood Books, UK. pp. 1- 14
Marsh S.B and Soulsby J. (1992), Business Law, 5th Ed., McGraw-Hill Book Company, UK.
pp. 1 – 21
Nditi N.N.N (2004)., General Principles of Contract Law in East Africa, DUP, Dar es
salaam pp. 5-13
Ronald A.A etal (1981) Business Law, 11th Ed., South Western Publishing Company,
Cincinnati, Ohio. pp. 1-39
http://www.nyulawglobal.org/globalex/tanzania.htm
2
See Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia available on line at http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Law_Merchant.
accessed on 17 January 2008, 1500 PM
Law of Contract
Meaning and Nature of Contract
The second topic of our course deals with the Law of contract. Contracts do touch on
every aspect of human life i.e. the contract is every where; more often than not every
human act would involve a contract or series of contracts. A contract is present, for
instance, where there is an employer and employee relationship, or where you buy
something from a market, or where you have paid tuition fees to your college for
studies, or when you take a room in a guest house or even when you board a bus to
take you somewhere. The contract is there even when you do not expect it and
sometimes you live in it, for instance in marriage relationships. Due to its omnipresent
nature, the branch of civil law dealing with contracts in any given legal set up is it self
referred to as a “Mini legal system”.
The content of this part mainly revolves around matters concerning the following:
The concept of contracts: Meaning and nature
Formation of contract : essentials or elements of legally acceptable contract
Terms of the contract
Standard form contract and exemption clauses
Discharge of contract
Cap 433 or as renamed in the revised laws as the Law of Contract Act,
Cap 345 ( RE: 2002)
iii. Case laws: cases that have been decided by the Supreme Courts of
Tanzania i.e. the High Court (H.C) and the Court of Appeal (C.A) and
which have established various principles on contract law are also
sources of contract law. In this case English cases which, substantially,
have been decided on common law may be used in interpreting the
matters provided in the contract Ordinance 3, subject to reception clauses
(emphasis mine).
iv. Common law: the substance of the Contract Act occasions a number of
lacunas on some aspects of contract law i.e. it means it does not provide
for any principles for some of the matters relating to contracts and when
this happens the applicable law would be the common law of England on
contracts.
________________________________________________________________________
BUT WHAT IS A CONTRACT?
The word contract refers to an agreement which can be enforced by law between one
person and another. The two words: “agreement” and “enforced by law” which are
found in the definition are fundamental to the validity and thence presence of any
contract. It follows therefore, if any purported contract can not be enforced by law it is
not a legally valid contract. When an agreement is enforceable by law, it is said to be
binding and to be binding an agreement has to create legal obligations.
BOX 1.
EXAMPLE 1: Juma agrees with his girlfriend that he would take her to a zoo last
3
Nditti, NN (2004), General Principles of Contract Law in East Africa, DUP, DSM. Pg 12. See also
Banana R.S, Business Law Manual, Institute of Accountancy Arusha p.g. 3
weekend, but he did not do it. Can she enforce this agreement? or
EXAMPLE 2: A wife agrees with her husband that if he promises to love her whole
heartedly he would buy him a car. Can he enforce this agreement?
EXAMPLE 1: When you go to the doctor at a hospital telling him that you are sick, there is an
implied agreement created in this circumstance that the doctor can do any medical act to
make you well.
EXAMPLE 2: When you bring goods to a person telling him that if he does not like them he
should return them to you in a stipulated time; if he does not return them and he happens to
do anything in respect of the goods which is inconsistent with what you had told him then a
contract of sale is created by the conducts of the person to whom the goods have been
brought.
The difference between the express and the implied contract usually relates to the
manner each one of them can be proven to exist in which case an express contract
can be proven by the words either spoken or written while an implied contract can
4
Anderson, Fox & Twomey (1987) Business Law (rev. edn.), Cincinnati, Ohio, South Western Publishing
co. pg.192
EXAMPLE: In a situation where a student pays school fees to an academic institution so that
the latter gives him tuition and upon passing grants him an award, an existence of executory
contract between him and the institution is presupposed in the sense that, the student by
paying fees has discharged his obligation and it remains obligatory on the part of the
institution to finish their side of the contracts
Void contract
It is a contract which is not enforceable by law. Usually a void contract is an agreement
which does not meet criteria for a valid contract i.e. an essential element of a valid
contract besides free consent is missing.
BOX NO. 4
EXAMPLE: A enters into agreement to sell a bicycle to B. but before the bicycle is
handed to A, it gets stolen.
Voidable contract
It is an agreement which is enforceable by law only at the option of one side to the
contract. This means contracts of this kind are valid unless one side entitled the option
decides to avoid5 (declare invalid) it. Thus a voidable contract is a mid way contract
between a valid and void contract. Contract of this kind can be resulted into for instance
if one party does not enter into it of his own will, i.e. he is forced.
BOX NO. 5
If Mbuzi sells the car to Simba, it is only because he is threatened so to sell but not
because he wants to sell it. This contract is valid but Mbuzi has in law the option to
avoid this contract. Only when he so declares it invalid that the contract becomes void
in which case Mbuzi shall have to return the money to Simba.
5
The alternative words to the word avoid are: annul, repudiate, rescind, and cancel.
Illegal contracts
If the object for which the agreement is entered into is unlawful the resulting contract is
illegal contracts.
BOX NO. 5
EXAMPLE: If two parties agree to join efforts to rob people of their properties and
share the money after selling them.
Robbing people is illegal thus the agreement is also illegal and thus void.
Unenforceable Contracts
These are agreements which are unenforceable not because they are void but merely
because they have a technical defect in them such as not being written if writing is a
mandatory, an example of this contract is an oral agreement for arbitration.
attached to it. Common law courts have recognized contracts under seal as being
enforceable without consideration on two justifications as follows:
i. For the purposes of authenticity of the document; The object (usually a signet
ring) used to imprint the wax identified its owner, thereby providing (at least
some standard of) proof that the owner was party to the contract
ii. The binding effect of the seal was widely understood, providing evidence of
deliberation6
Contracts under seal have lost favour now with most jurisdictions and the law as it
related on seals has been either abolished or modified by statute.
Contracts of record
These are those agreements which have been recorded by court. When one party
agrees before the court that he owes an obligation another party and the court records
the same as a contract under record of the court.
Negotiable instruments
Negotiable instruments are also contracts; these bind the parties there to only if the
legal requirements have been complied with. These are discussed in this work later.
6
See Wikipedia: The Free Encyclopedia available on line at
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Seal_(contract_law) accessed on 13 January 2008: 2:55 PM
EXAMPLE 1: A situation where there is no contract between the parties but one of them
has enjoyed a benefit under it.
A has sent B to cultivate his farm, B makes a mistake as to the location of the farm and
cultivates C’s farm instead. C has seen B cultivating his farm but he did not tell him that
he was not supposed to do that since they have no contract between them, In this case
C will have to pay B, since the law finds it inequitable that C should keep silent and
gain unjust benefits from B.
EXAMPLE 3: Where there is a contract but it has been held to be void ab initio (void from
the beginning).
This situation may arise when the parties have done everything to enter into the
contract but later on one of them claims that the contract is void for some reason and
thus he does not want to pay for the benefit (s) he has received.
v. Lawful object – object is the purpose why a contract is entered into. The
purpose has to be lawful. According to s. 23 of the LCA any object is
unlawful if it is charecterised by the following, i.e. if
EXAMPLE 1: A calls B and tells him, “I would like to sell to you my plot located at
Tengeru” or
EXAMPLE 2: C writes a letter to D telling him that he wants to buy D’s cow at Tshs.
7500/= Instances number one and number two above are examples of how offers/
proposals are made as done by A and C respectively. We will use these examples
later.
An offer must be clear for if it is not it is likely to result into an agreement that is
ambiguous. In law uncertain agreements are not legally recognized agreements. S. 29 of
the LCO provides that:
“An agreement, the meaning of which is not certain, or capable of being
made certain, is void”
There are a number of cases decided in Tanzania to this effect:
See Alfi E. Africa Ltd v Themi Industries and Distributors Agency Ltd 1984 TLR 256
See also Nitin Coffee Estates Ltd and 4 others v United Engineering Works Ltd And
another 1988 TLR 203 (CA)
In these cases there was a conclusion of the agreement, which did not disclose the
price. Price in a contract of sale was held to be a fundamental term and non disclosure
of which renders the agreement uncertain.
(b) The terms of a proposal must be a final expression of intention to make legal
relationship
An offer must be made with an intention to bind its maker to it and thus to law, thus
legal relationship. Once the made, the maker of it the proposal must not change the
terms and his willingness to be bound by the terms of the proposal he has made
otherwise this would change the subject and the essence of their agreement.
However, if a contract is in writing, its content can only be varied (changed) in writing
and there must be a separate agreement whose function is to change that contract. This
agreement must be supported by consideration.
“It is clear that, according to the ordinary law of contract, the display of an article with a price
on it in a shop window is merely an invitation to treat. It is in no sense an offer for sale the
acceptance of which constitutes a contract”.
Lord Parker, further disputing the contention that display of goods constitutes and
offer, observed that:
“I find it quite impossible to say that an exhibition of goods in a shop window is itself an offer
for sale”.
The law in England made it illegal to sell drugs without supervision of a registered
pharmacist. In this store there was a registered pharmacist but he was usually seated
at the cashier’s desk where the buyers paid for their drugs.
i. That by displaying the drugs Boots Cash offered them for sale.
ii. That by placing the drugs in the basket, the customer accepted the offer.
iii. That a sale was effected between Boots Cash and the customer, by the
obove two acts, and for this sale Boots Cash violated the law which
prohibited selling of drugs without supervision.
ii. Tenders
Advertisements that call for tenders are mere invitation to treaty but they are not
offers. The person who tenders is the one who makes an offer. Acceptance of this offer
is done by the person advertising tenders by considering and accepting one of them.
The court held that the advertisement was not an offer, thus it could not be accepted by
making such a journey.
The principle established in this case:
The three Judges Blackburn, Quain and Archibald, JJ. Who presided over this case
established that an act of advertising that items will be placed up for auction does not
constitute an offer to any person that the goods will actually be put up. The person who
placed the advertisement may withdraw the items for the auction at any time before
the auction.
iv. Mere “puffs or boasts”,
Some commercial advertisements when made can not be taken seriously and thus they
can not be regarded as offers. These are referred to as “mere puffs or boasts”. These
are common in business world especially when a new product is introduced in the
market. Instances of these are a phrase like:
“Tigo, Mtandao unaokupa zaidi” or “Celtel, makes Life better” you can not claim that
this is an offer for which you can sue the company when you do not find any thing
special in its services.
“£100 reward will be paid by the Carbolic Smoke Ball Company to any person
who contracts the increasing epidemic influenza, colds or any disease caused
by taking cold, after having used the ball three times daily for two weeks
according to the printed directions supplied in each ball. £1000 is deposited
with the Alliance Bank, Regent Street, showing our sincerity in the matter”.
Mrs. Carlill trusted the makers of the promises contained in the advertisement, bought
and used their smoke balls after which she still contracted influenza. She sued the
company.
The words “£1000 is deposited with the Alliance Bank, Regent Street, showing our
sincerity in the matter”. Show that these were rigid promises by which the maker of
these words intended to be bound. Any reasonable man would take them seriously
like Mrs. Carlill did.
There are various ways of making an offer depending on circumstances; for instance it
can either be made to the general public, a particular person or to a class of persons.
Offers can be to these persons through various situations as follows:
An offer in unilateral contracts is a general offer since it is not made to a definite person
but to the world at large Illustration of an offer made to the whole world is if the offer is
advertised and intended that some one from the public should fulfill it. These are called
offers of unilateral contracts. They are so called because a promise is made by only one
party; there is no reciprocity of promises. This one party would guarantee to do or not
to do something for another party in absence of that other party’s agreement to that
effect.
In this kind of offers if any one person from the public happens to respond to it, he will
be said to have accepted the offer, by his conduct.
BOX NO. 8
EXAMPLE:
If a company wants to maximize sales for its products and in an advertisement in a
news paper gives a promise in the following words:
“Anyone who buys more than one of our product X at one time
will be given one free Nokia 3310 cell phone on the spot”
This advertisement is a valid offer and the person placing such advertisement has
expressed his willingness to be bound by the terms he has advertised.
If any person buys product X and he is not awarded the promised free Nokia 3310 cell
phone on the spot he has the right to sue the company for breach of a contract.
What distinguishes it from other kinds of contracts is that there are no preceding
negotiations between the two parties prior to acceptance of the offer like there is in
other contracts.
This offer by the person responding to the advertised tender may or may not be
accepted by the advertiser for the law does not compel him to accept it, it does not also
blame him for not accepting that offer. It is upon him to decide whether or not to accept
it.
However if it was advertised that the highest tender would be the one accepted, the
party inviting the tenders has no option but to accept the same.
In Gbl & Associates Ltd v Director Of Wildlife Ministry Of Lands, Natural Resources
And Tourism And Two Others (1989) TLR 195 (HC)
In this case the Central Tender Board for the government of Tanzania advertised in the
Daily News Paper of February 09 1988 inviting tenders for the sale of elephant ivory.
Various persons sent in their offers and the offer made by the plaintiff Co. was
accepted.
The terms which the advertisement specified for the tenderers to include in their offers
were that payment and collection of the ivory must be done within 30 days.
(ii) ...Central Tender Board was not obliged to accept the highest bid or any of
the tenders…
COMMUNICATION OF A PROPOSAL
To be effective an offer must be communicated by the person making it to the offeree.
An offer can only be accepted after it has come to the knowledge of the person to
whom it is made.
One Mr. Clarke gave the information while he was unaware that there was such a
pardon by the government. He only realised later after he gave the information and
claimed that he be given a pardon because he had accepted the offer.
The court held that:
Mr. Clarke could not benefit from the reward because he was not aware of the offer.
It appears therefore that if Mr. Clarke had knowledge of the offer before he tendered
the information to the government, his acceptance would have been valid and he would
have been entitled to benefit from the free government pardon.
Remember therefore that knowledge of the offer is necessary to make ones acceptance
effective.
principles of contract are concerned, whose effect is to end the offer. Generally Such
events are as follows:
i. if the offer is revoked by the offeror
ii. if the offer is rejected by the offeree
iii. if the time set for the offer lapses; for offers which are limited by time.
iv. If the offeror dies or becomes insane.
v. If there is a failure to fulfill a condition; for offers which are contingent upon
fulfillment of such a condition.
vi. If the offer is properly accepted.
vii. Intervening illegality
Termination of an offer is referred to by s. 6 of the Law of Contract Act under one
general word as revocation of a proposal. More or less of the events mentioned above
are enumerated under this section as acts which when done would occasion revocation.
S.6 of the LCA reads as follows:
A proposal is revoked
(a) by the communication of notice of revocation by the proposer to the other
party;
(b) by the lapse of the time prescribed in such proposal for its acceptance, or,
if no time is so prescribed, by the lapse of a reasonable time, without
communication of the acceptance;
(c) by the failure of the acceptor to fulfill a condition precedent to acceptance;
or
(d) by the death or insanity of the proposer, if the fact of his death or insanity
comes to the knowledge of the acceptor before acceptance.
Out of all the events that I have mentioned above only two events are not
mentioned in this section; rejection and acceptance of the offer.
From this thus, the communication of the revocation of the proposal is deemed to be
done when there is any act or omission of the person who revokes. This act or omission
should not only be intended to communicate such revocation but also must have the
effect of communicating it (it must actually come to the knowledge of the offeree).
Case illustration:
In Byrne v Tienhoven [1880] 5 CPD 344
Simple facts of the case:
The facts would be understood well if evaluated in terms of dates specific events
happened as follows:
On October 1st 1880: Vantienhoven, from England by post, sent an offer to sell tin
plates to Byrne in New York
When van Tienhoven refused to sell the tin plates relying on his revocation, the court
held that there was a valid contract made between them because the revocation letter
had not been effective until it was actually communicated which was after the
acceptance had already arrived.
If you look at the dates carefully you will realize that the revocation was sent earlier (8th
October) than the acceptance (11th October); under normal circumstances you would
expect the revocation to take priority over the acceptance but the law does not lay
emphasis on time but rather on knowledge of the particular information required to be
known.
The statute just mentions the phrase reasonable time without providing for its meaning.
The question is:
What constitutes reasonable time in law?
The reasonable time will be deduced from the circumstances of each particular case. It
is the court that normally decides if there was reasonable time from the facts of a
particular case that have been tendered before it.
The case of Ramsgate Victoria Hotel Co. v. Montefiore [1866] illustrates the instance
where the court construed reasonable time.
In November Ramsgate accepted this offer being five months later. But by this time Mr.
Montefiore did not need the shares any more.
Ramsgate sued him, claiming that he breached the contract since they accepted his
offer while Montefiore maintained that his offer had expired and could no longer be
accepted, so his was not an acceptance in the eyes of the law.
Held: Where an offer is stated to be open for a specific length of time, then the offer
automatically terminates when that time limit expires. Where there is no express time
limit, an offer is normally open only for a reasonable time.
Thus the court was of the view that the company accepted the offer as of too late
EXAMPLE: An offer that has been given by a professor of Law the University of Dar es
salaam, who happens to die before it is accepted, can not be accepted by the offeree who
does not know of this death, if his identity as the professor of Law the University of Dar es
salaam is vital to the contract.
This means that if the offer was for a performance of something that could be done by
any person other than the professor in his professional capacity, then his personal
representatives can act on his behalf.
TERMINATION OF OFFER BY THE FAILURE TO FULFIL A CONDITION
Some offers are coupled with a condition(s). Offers of this kind are valid only as long as
these conditions are fulfilled.
The nature of these conditions:
The conditions may be of two kinds:
i. express terms- made orally or in writing
ii. Implied- these are neither made orally nor in writing. They are inferred from
studying each particular situation
In Financing Ltd v Stimson [1962]
Stemson offered to buy a car on a hire purchase arrangement from Financing Ltd. prior
to acceptance of this offer the car was stolen. Uninformed of this theft Financing Ltd
“accepted” this offer.
Held: it was held that the company could not accept the offer as they did, since the offer
was subject to the implied condition that the car would there prior to acceptance.
See also s. 6 (c) of the LCA.
A proposal is revoked-
(c) by the failure of the acceptor to fulfill a condition precedent to
acceptance
ACCEPTANCE OF AN OFFER
Meaning and nature
An acceptance is an unconditional assent to the terms of the proposal. The word
unconditional means that the terms of the acceptance must not set new conditions
apart from those stated in the offer. If the acceptance does so it is termed a counter
offer.
Statutory meaning:
S. 2(1) (b) of the LCA states
(b) When the person to whom the proposal is made signifies his assent thereto, the proposal is
said to be accepted, and a proposal, when accepted, becomes a promise;
E.g. If the offer is for sale of a motor cycle at Tshs. 2/=, the acceptance must not be for
buying a car at Tshs 3/=
7
Nditti p.27. see also s. 7 (a) of the LCA
I hope you remember what a counter offer is; this happens when the offeree in his
acceptance of the offer either introduces a new term or varies the existing terms of
the offer.
When this case happens the original offeror may or may not accept the counter offer.
A counter offer has two effects:
a. It amounts to rejection of an offer. See Hyde v Wrench Refer to pg. 46 of this work.
b. It cancels the original offer, in which case it is useless even if you accept it later on the
original terms.
ii. Conditional assent
If the offeree places any condition in his acceptance, the acceptance will be shorn of its
central feature which is it should be an unconditional assent to the terms of the
proposal.
In Butler Machine Tool Co Ltd v. Ex-Cell-O Corporation (England) Ltd [1979] WLR
401introduced the rule to be applicable in this situation as the traditional offer-
acceptance analysis in which the last counter-offer prior to the beginning of
performance voided all preceding offers. The absence of any additional counter-offer or
refusal by the other party is understood as an implied acceptance.
(b) An offer can only be accepted by the offeree, that is, the person to
whom the offer is made. Except under agency, the offeree is not usually bound if
another person accepts the offer on his behalf without his authorisation,
(c) Acceptance must follow the manner of acceptance stated by the offer;
i. if the proposal prescribes the manner in which it is to be accepted, eg.
by email or post etc. and the acceptance does not follow this manner, the proposer
must insist that his proposal be accepted in the manner prescribed and only that. If he
fails do so he is deemed to have accepted that acceptance. See the case of Yates
Building Co. Ltd v. R.J. Pulleyn & Sons (York) Ltd (1975) 119 Sol. Jo. 370
ii. . . the proposal does not prescribe the manner in which it is to be
accepted, the acceptance must be expressed in some usual and reasonable manner.
(d) Acceptance must be communicated
The general rule in contract law is that an acceptance must be communicated. Silence
does not amount to acceptance except under certain situations.
This was stated in the case of Felthouse v Bindley [1862] 11 CB (NS) 869, or 142 ER
1037
Simple facts of the case:
Felthouse offered in writing to buy a horse from his nephew John in which he sated
that: “If I hear no more about him, I consider the horse is mine at £30 15s.’ There was no
reply form his nephew. Later the uncle claimed that there was a binding contract
between the nephew and him.
The court held that there was no contract because silence did not amount to
acceptance.
The fact that an acceptance must be communicated to make it effective is only a general
rule; there are exceptions to this general rule as in the following two circumstance:
Exceptions to requirement to communicate
i. When the offeror dispenses with acceptance.
There are two ways this can be done by the offeror;
(a) Dispensation done expressly i.e. [made orally or in writing]
This is when the offeror states in the terms of the offer to the offeree that, if the latter
wishes to accept this offer he may just undertake to do what it is there in offered
without any prior information to the offeror.
Illustration;
The president of the student organization at IAA offers to hire A’s mini bus on Tuesday
Morning October 2nd 2007 to take ADA I A to Muccobs, for Tshs. 7500/=, if you wish to
accept the offer bring over your bus on the time and specified day. A may accept the
offer by bringing the bus to IAA on that morning.
(b) Implied
This is used generally in unilateral contracts e.g. advertisements which amount to
offer. The offeror need not always expressly prompt the offeree to accept the offer as
The acceptor need not tell A he has accepted the offer, he will be deemed to have
accepted the offer only by bringing the lost passport to him.
ii. When communication is done by post [application of post rule/Mail box rule]
The post rule states that a contract is concluded once the acceptance has been posted.
The rule was stated in the English case of Adam v Lindsell [1818] 1B & Ald 681 or 106
ER 250
On September 5
The letter of offer reached Adam, and he immediately sent his acceptance as asked. By
the time this letter of acceptance arrived Lindsell had sold the wool to another person;
he thought the offer had been rejected.
This means that once the letter of acceptance has been sent whether or not it reaches
the offeror a binding contract is formed and both the proposer and the acceptor
therefore are bound on that spot.
This section implies that once the acceptance has been posted and the letter of
acceptance is out of the power of the person sending the acceptance, only the proposer
will be bound but not the acceptor and the acceptor will be bound when it comes to the
knowledge of the proposer.
Q. What do you think is the significance of this slight departure from the common Law
to the proposer and the acceptor?
A. If they change their minds on the contract they revoke the offer or the acceptance
within legal limits.
Exceptions: there are a number of circumstances in which though post is used, post
rule may not apply.
i. It applies only when the parties contemplated it as a means of
communication of acceptance. For instance if all the negotiations have taken place by
telephone post rule may not be said to have been contemplated by the parties.
ii. You know that, in common law, once the letter of acceptance is posted it
binds both the offeror and the offeree; this will not apply if the offeror states clearly
that he is ready to be bound only if he knows of the acceptance.
Eg. If the offeror states that acceptance be made ‘by notice in writing to him’8. If this
notes does not reach him there will be no contract.
8
see Holwell Securities Ltd v Hughes [1974] 1 All ER 161. in this case Hughes made an offer to sell in
which he stated that an acceptance to this offer should be made “by notice in writing to him” [emphasis
mine]. Holwell Securities, who sought to find cover under post rule, had posted their acceptance by the
prescribed mode but it did not reach Hughes. The court held that there was no contract since Hughes
expressed a clear intention to be bound after he received the notice in writing.
9
see Paul Denham, op cit pg.418
INSTANTANEOUS COMMUNICATION
Instantaneous communication is done when the speedier means of communication,
than the post office, are employed; such means are like fax, telephone, mobile phones
or the internet.
When electronic approach is used the post rule can not apply and under this situation
a contract is formed only when the acceptance is received by the offeror. The courts in
England have developed the principles regarding this kind of communication in the
famous English of case of:
Entores Ltd v Miles Far East Corporation [1955] 2 All ER 493 or [1955] 2 QB 327
The issue that was to be resolved was whether the contract was made in England or
Holland?
The court held that: The postal rule does not apply to instantaneous communications.
The contract was only complete when the acceptance was received by the offeror.
Q. What if the acceptor has sent his acceptance by say e-mail or fax and the offeror
has not seen it?
Answer.
The answer to this legal issue was provided in the same case by Lord Denning in an
extensive obiter dictum, in which he opined that under this situation a contract can be
formed even if the offeror (through his own fault) does not actually receive the
acceptance.
Application of Lord Denning’s obiter dicta was done in the following case:
The Brimnes: Tenax Steamship Co Ltd v The Brimnes (Owners) [1975] QB 929 (CA)
Simple facts of this case: The Brimnes (Owners) hired a ship from the plaintiff Co. Their
agreement was such that The Brimnes (Owners) could terminate the agreement if the
defendants defaulted in payment of the regular hire charge.
The defendants failed to pay and the plaintiffs sent them a telex to terminate the
contract.
The telex was sent during normal office hours, but the defendants did not see it until
the next day.
It was held that: the termination Telex was effective from the time it arrived, not
the time it was read. Note that this was a case relating to withdrawals of offers, not
acceptances, but it is a useful analogy.
Lord Fraser expressly approved the decision in Entores as it ‘seems to have worked
without leading to serious difficulty or complaint from the business community.’
REVOCATION OF ACCEPTANCES
Generally the revocation of an acceptance can be done at any time before it binds the
acceptor.
Section 5 (2) reads as follows:
An acceptance may be revoked at any time before the communication of the
acceptance is complete as against the acceptor, but not afterwards.
Therefore, in other words, an acceptance can be revoked at any time before it comes
to the knowledge of the proposer.
FREE CONSENT:
To consent to something, generally, means to agree to it. Remember s. 10 of LCA free
consent is an important element to contract.
When two or more persons are said to consent when they agree upon the same thing in the
same sense
The following example illustrates the statement above
A has two cars both of them are Nissans (one is pick up and the other is a saloon). A
makes an offer in the following words: “I wish to sell you my car at Tshs. 2/-”. B
accepts this offer in the following statement: “I accept to buy your car at Tshs. 2/-”
The two persons will not be said to have agreed upon the same thing and in the same
sense If A while making the offer has pick-up in mind and B while accepting the offer
has saloon; there will be no consent between them.
Free consent has its special meaning in the law of contract. S. 14 defines it as follows:
(1) Consent is said to be free when it is not caused by coercion, fraud,
misrepresentation, or mistake.
Contracts which are made with taints of the above factors are voidable contracts i.e.
the affected party known as the innocent party may avoid it if he wishes see s. 19 (1).
However according to the same section the contract is not voidable if the innocent party
had the means to discover the truth by due diligence.
Let us examine each one of t hem.
(a) Coercion,
According to s. 15 of the LCA coercion exists when:
One person commits or threatens to commit
i. any act forbidden by the penal code or
ii the unlawful detaining or
iii threatening to detain any property
With the intention of causing any person to enter into contract
Example:
The Regional Traffic Officer made an offer to buy Ds car at Tshs 1/= to which D did not
accept. He then tells him I will make sure I always find faults in your car and detain it
until you sell it to me.
(b) Undue influence,
According to s. 16 undue influence exists between two persons when:
The relationship between them is such that
i. one of them is in a position to dominate the will of the other
ii. and he uses that position to obtain an unfair advantage over the other
Q. When can a person be said to be in a position to dominate the will of another?
The answer is provided by subsection (2) of the same section as follows:
A person is deemed to be in a position to dominate the will another if:
i. Where he holds a real or apparent (ostensible) authority over the other, or a person
has apparent authority if for example he had power at one point of time and he no
longer has that power but the person with whom he deals does not know of this.
Or, when a person in power does any thing which suggests to the public that the person
under him may do the responsibilities of this person in power.
ii. Where he stands in a fiduciary relation to the other [eg. Doctor and patient, teacher
and student, father and son etc] or
iii. Where he makes a contract with a person whose mental capacity is temporarily or
permanently affected by reason of age, illness, or mental or bodily distress.
(c) Fraud,
According to s. 17 fraud exists when one or more of the following acts:
(a) The suggestion, as to a fact, of that which is not true by one who does not believe it
to be true;
(b) The active concealment of a fact by one having knowledge or belief of the fact;
(c) Promise made by the without the intention of performing it;
(d) Any other act fitted to deceive
(e) Or any such act or omission as the law specially declares to be fraudulent
i. by a party to a contract, or
the intention of the party doing these acts must be directed to either;
The mind of the High Court of Tanzania represented by Msumi J, in Joseph Mapama v.
Republic (1986) at pg. 155, on the meaning of the word “deceive” concurred with that
of Buckley, J. in Re London and Globe Finance Corporation [1903], in which the meaning
of the mentioned word was referred to as:
“…to induce a man to believe that a thing is true which is false, and which the person
practicing the deceit knows and believes to be false…”
(d) Misrepresentation
At the time when the parties to contract are negotiating so much is spoken. Much as
one can speak, there are only three types of talk in law; one can talk of facts, opinions,
and law. Under these types of talk, some statements (only those that fall under facts not
law or opinion)which make part of contract will be termed as misrepresentations if they
are intended to induce the other to enter into a contract and they are not but false.
i. innocent misrepresentation: when one gives a statement which is false but you
believe it to be true. One usually does not intend to do this. This kind of
misrepresentation can not render a contract voidable.
Therefore when one gives a statement which is not true, or he does not believe it to
be true or recklessly, carelessly as to whether it is true or not; and he knows it10 one is
said to have misrepresented. This is the kind of misrepresentation which renders a
contract voidable.
In both the above types a misrepresentation should be of fact and not of law or opinion.
10
This definition was provided in Derry v Peak [1887]
Example
For instance you are about to enter into contract to sell chicken and you tell your
offeree that: This specie of chicken lays five eggs per day. While they only lay two. If
you make this statement and it ultimately induces another party to enter into
contract, it is misrepresentation.
If what is said is not true but you believed it to be true, it is innocent misrepresentation
and if it is not true and you knew it, then it falls under fraudulent misrepresentation.
11
Nditti, opcit 116
(b) Breach of duty to speak. This is when there is a failure to speak in circumstances
where you has to speak; Generally, though, silence does not amount to
misrepresentation.
iv. When there is a fiduciary relationship eg. Lawyer-client. This is when one
party is in a position of trust with regard to the other12. The lawyer, on being
asked for legal advice must disclose every thing to his client.
v. When you have given half truth.
Example
You are selling a car whose engine you are expecting to break down any time for some
problem, the buyer asks if the car is running perfectly you say yes. Here you have
given a half truth and under this circumstance you are supposed to tell him that
though it is running the engine has problems.
Example
If a party to contract does not disclose one or more facts about the subject matter so
much so that the other party thinks the subject matter is what it is not. To have effect,
here the party must actually have been induced and must have acted on that
inducement to his disadvantage.
Illustration:
Bugerere Tea Estates v Walji’s Ltd [1967]
12
Denham,475
Simple facts: Walji made representations which induced a mistake to Bugerere about a
building which they said was a lease for 3 years renewable while it was a lease for 2
years non renewable. Walji wished to exchange this building for Bugerere’s tea estate.
The court held that there was inducement.
(e) Mistake, subject to s. 20, 21, 22.
Mistake happens if both the parties had not entered into an agreement except for a
mistake as to a matter of fact that is essential to an agreement.
MISTAKE GENERALLY
A mistake of fact occurs when a person believes that a condition or event exists when it
does not.
Mistake when existent makes a contract void. BUT For a mistake to affect the validity of
a contract it must be an "operative mistake", i.e., that which operates to make the
contract void.
Types of mistakes:
There are three types of mistake.
i. common mistake
ii. mutual mistake and
iii. Unilateral mistake.
COMMON MISTAKE
A common mistake happens when both parties to an agreement make the same error
with regard to a matter of fact that is essential to the agreement.
(a) Res extincta (situation where both parties do not know that the subject
matter does not exist)
A contract will be void at common law if the subject matter of the agreement is, in fact,
non-existent. See for example:
The case concerned the contract to sell a cargo of wheat/maize which did not at the
time of this contract exist.
Parties entered into contract for sale of maize. Both the parties knew the maize was on
a ship from a place called Solaninka to England where they were. In fact, before they so
made the agreement, the maize had began to deteriorate and so it had been unloaded
and sold at Tunis.
The issue was whether the seller was entitled to recover the purchase price of the maize
from the buyer as agreed in the contract.
The court held that since both parties had contemplated the existence of the subject
matter (maize) to be sold and bought respectively; the seller had nothing to sell and the
buyer had nothing to buy. Thus the contract was held to be void ab initio.
Where there is a contract for the sale of specific goods, and the
goods without the knowledge of the seller have perished at the time
when the contract is made, the contract is void.
At 11am on 24 June 1902 the plaintiff had entered into an oral agreement for the hire of
a room to view the coronation procession on 26 June. A decision to operate on the King,
which rendered the procession impossible, was taken at 10am on 24 June. Wright J held
the contract void. The agreement was made on a missupposition of facts which went to
the whole root of the matter, and the plaintiff was entitled to recover his £100.
Read some of these cases in Nditti at page 123-124 visit also your portal, I have sent a
collection of cases on mistakes.
(B) Res Sua (common mistake as to title in the subject matter of the contract)
Where a person makes a contract to purchase that which, in fact, belongs to him, the
contract is void. This usually when both parties are mistaken on the fact that ownership
of the goods is to the seller. For example see:
An uncle told his nephew that he owned a fishery. The nephew believed him and after his
uncle’s death, he entered into an agreement to rent the fishery from the uncle's
daughters. However, the fishery actually belonged to the nephew himself, it had only
been left in the uncle’s custody after the boy’s father died.
"If parties contract under a mutual mistake and misapprehension as to their relative and
respective rights, the result is that that agreement is liable to be set aside as having
proceeded upon a common mistake"
A mistake as to the quality of the subject matter of a contract has been confined to very
narrow limits. According to Lord Atkin: "A mistake will not affect assent unless it is;
ii. it concerns quality without which the subject matter is rendered essentially different
from what the parties believed it to be." See:
In cases since Bell v Lever Bros the courts have not been over-ready to find a mistake as
to quality to be operative.
IN TANZANIA
When it is evident that there has been a mutual mistake between the parties to contract
s. 20 states that the contract is void. s. 65 of the LCA requires the party who gained
advantage under that void contract to:
AT COMMON LAW
Where a contract is void for identical mistake, the court exercising its equitable
jurisdiction, can:
Cooper v Phibbs (1867) LR 2 HL 149, Solle v Butcher [1949] 2 All ER 1107, Grist v Bailey
[1966] 2 All ER 875, Magee v Pennine Insurance [1969] 2 All ER 891
Rescission for mistake is subject to the same bars as rescission for misrepresentation.
UNILATERAL MISTAKE
Unilateral mistake is said to be present where only one party to the agreement is
mistaken. The categories of mistake may be as follows:
Where one party is mistaken as to the nature of the contract and the other party is
aware of the mistake, or the circumstances are such that he may be taken to be aware
of it, the contract is void.
For the mistake to be operative, the mistake by one party must be as to the terms of the
contract itself.
The defendants, Colin & Shields, were London hide merchants who were sued by a
Belgian furrier, Herr Hartog. They had discussed selling him 30,000 Argentinian hare
skins at “10d per skin” (which would have come to £1,250), but when they put the final
offer in writing they mistakenly wrote “30,000 skins @ 10d per lb”. As hare skins weigh
around 5oz, this was a third of the price previously discussed and orally agreed upon.
Hartog tried to hold them to it.
A mere error of judgement as to the quality of the subject matter will not suffice to
render the contract void for unilateral mistake.
REMEDY
Equity follows the law and will rescind a contract affected by unilateral mistake or
refuse specific performance as in:
Here A, one party makes a contract with a C, second party, believing him to be A, third
party (ie, someone else). If you refer to s. 2 (1)(a) and (b) of the LCA there will be no
contract between A and C since his acceptance has no effect in law. The law makes a
distinction between contracts where the parties are inter absentes and where the
parties are inter praesentes.
Where the parties are not physically in each others presence, eg, they are dealing by
correspondence, and one party is mistaken as to the identity, not the attributes, of the
other and intends instead to deal with some identifiable third party, and the other
knows this, then the contract will be void for mistake. Usually this happens when there
is a thief who poses as a different identity. See:
The rogue here was a man called Blenkarn. He sent an offer to buy some thing from
Cundy which was accepted. The name that appeared in the offer was Blenkiron and
Co., 37 Wood Street. There existed in the same street, a famous a company known as
Blenkiron & Co.
Blenkanrn received the goods and quickly sold them to Lindsay. Having discovered the
trick Cundy sued Lindsay for recovery of goods. He argued that he made a mistake as to
the identity of the person with whom they were dealing.
Held: since the plaintiffs never knew Blenkarn before, they never intended to deal with
him and between them there is no contract since there was no consensus ad idem
(meeting of the minds)
Mistake as to attributes of a person does not render the contract void but voidable.
The rogue under this case was one Mr. Wallis. He sent an offer to buy some goods in
which he described himself as the owner of a very reputable company going by the
name of Hallam & Co. in fact there was no Co. in the area with that name. Having
believed him King's Norton Metal Co Ltd accepted his offer and sent him goods.
Hallam sold the goods to Edrige Merret Co Ltd.
The plaintiffs claimed that there was no contract since they dealt with Hallam and Co.
under a mistake as to identity.
The court held that: There was a contract between kings and Hallam; this decision was
based on the following two conclusions by the court.
ii. the mistake must be as to identity and not to attributes. (Kings here were so
impressed by the attribute)
Where the parties are inter praesentes (face to face) there is a presumption that the
mistaken party intends to deal with the very person who is physically present and
identifiable by sight and sound, irrespective of the identity which one or other may
assume. For such a mistake to be an operative mistake and to make the agreement void
the mistaken party must show that:
(i) he intended to deal with someone else apart from the one present;
(ii) the party they dealt with knew of this intention;
(iii) he regarded identity as a matter of crucial importance; and
(iv) he took reasonable steps to check the identity of the other person
(see Cheshire & Fifoot, Law of Contract, p257-263).
Even where the contract is not void, it may be voidable for fraudulent misrepresentation
but if the goods which are the subject-matter have passed to an innocent third party
before the contract is avoided, that third party may acquire a good title. The main cases
are as follows:
Phillips v Brooks [1919] 2 KB 243, Ingram v Little [1960] 3 All ER 332 (a controversial
case), Lewis v Avery [1971] 3 All ER 907
The exception to the above rule is that if a party intended to contract only with the
person so identified, such a mistake will render the contract void: Lake v Simmons
[1927] AC 487 and a more recent case is: Citibank v Brown Shipley [1991] 2 All ER 690
MUTUAL MISTAKE
A mutual mistake is one where both parties fail to understand each other. This is
provided by s. 13 of the LCA.
Two or more persons are said to consent when they agree to the same thing and in the
same sense.
When two persons do not agree to the same thing in the same sense they are said to
be at cross purposes and this is what is referred to as mutual mistake.
In cases where the parties misunderstand each other's intentions and are at cross
purposes, the court will apply an objective test and consider whether a 'reasonable
man' would take the agreement to mean what one party understood it to mean or
what the other party understood it to mean:
i. If the test leads to the conclusion that the contract could be understood in one
sense only, both parties will be bound by the contract in this sense.
ii. If the transaction is totally ambiguous under this objective test then there will
be no consensus ad idem (agreement as to the same thing) and the contract will
be void:
see these on cases on mistake: Wood v Scarth (1858) 1 F&F 293, Raffles v Wichelhaus
(1864) 2 H&C 906 and Scriven Bros v Hindley & Co [1913] 3 KB 564
REMEDY
If the contract is void at law on the ground of mistake, equity "follows the law" and
specific performance will be refused and, in appropriate circumstances, the contract will
be rescinded. However, even where the contract is valid at law, specific performance
will be refused if to grant it would cause hardship. Thus the remedy of specific
performance was refused in Wood v Scarth (above).
SIGNING DOCUMENTS UNDER MISTAKE AND THE DEFENCE OF NON EST FACTUM (it
was not my deed)
Sometimes, the plea of non est factum, namely that 'it is not my deed' may be available.
A successful plea makes a document void. The plea was originally used to protect
illiterate persons who were tricked into putting their mark on documents. It eventually
became available to literate persons who had signed a document believing it to be
something totally different from what it actually was. See, for example:
The use of the rule in modern times has been restricted. For a successful plea of non est
factum two factors have to be established:
The following decision of the House of Lords is the leading case on this topic:
Note: Because of the strict requirements, it may be better for the innocent party to
bring a claim based on undue influence.
In Tanzania, the age of majority Ordnance, cap 431 age of majority is 18 years.
A person is said to be of sound mind for the purpose of making a contract if, at the
time when he makes it he is capable of;
i. Understanding it
ii. capable of forming a rational judgment to its effect upon his interests.
If this is the fact then, the person who is not of sound mind and does not belong
to the age of majority is not competent to contract.
By s. 11(2) if the minor or the insane has entered into contract the contract is void.
Though the law restricts these persons to enter into contracts, in the present life
situation we are living, the matter of entering into contracts is unavoidable. People of all
walks of life do get themselves bound in contracts; majors as well as minors, sane as
well as the insane. Think of a man who is mentally challenged who goes to a shop
offering to buy something. Think too of a small boy who buys an exercise book for
school.
This does not end with the practices of buying only; in present day desperate life
situation where killer diseases such as AIDS leave children orphaned, we see a lot of
them roaming the streets selling various items to elders etc.
By s. 11(2) of the LCA the simple answer would be that they are void. But taking a
more concerned look into the matter you may find that, this kind of contracts have a
greater effect just as much as they are irresistible in our daily life. Since the minors and
the insane are not legally allowed to contract, when there is a dispute, the adults who
deal with them would then be economically the losers. The business activities would
always be at this risk of losing when they deal with the forbidden groups.
Nield was minor who sold hay and straw. He received cash from Cowern in
consideration for his promise to deliver to him the hay and straw but he subsequently
failed to so deliver the goods. Cowern sued him for recovery of the purchase price from
the minor for the goods he failed to deliver.
The court held that: the minor was not liable to repay the money
Q. Should the owners of the shops opt for an absolute refusal to dealing with them?
On minors:
Though the minor is completely not liable on contracts, he is, both at common law and
under the law in Tanzania, liable if he enters into the so called arrangements
resembling contracts known as quasi-contracts.
This liability is only when the minor enters into contracts for necessaries (goods suitable
to the condition in life of an infant or minor or other person an to his actual
requirement at the time of sale and deliver y 13) and not other wise.
This section does not mean the minor is liable on contract. It only imposes a liability on
the minor to pay a reasonable price for goods he has enjoyed. And by s. 68 of the
contract Act another liability to reimburse the provider from the property of the minor
or any person, is imposed.
This means the person who supplies the goods to the minor is entitled to two things;
ii. Reimbursement form the property of the minor (if he can not pay the
reasonable price and has this property).
The condition here is that the goods must be necessaries and must be provided
when the minor is actually in requirement of them.
13
see s. 4 of the Sale of Goods Ordinance.
Inman the minor, whose father was rich, ordered expensive clothes from Nash the
tailor.
Held: The court held that, though the clothes were suitable to the minors condition in
life, these goods were not necessaries because the minor was well provided with
clothes by his rich father.
Therefore according to s. 4 of the sale of goods and s. 68 of the LCA provide a separate
set of liabilities on the minor apart from contractual liability. However always remember
to answer the following things before you decide to deal with a minor;
On the insane:
s. 12(2), the law partly allows a person of an unsound mind to enter into contract in
that;
i. if he usually is of unsound mind, but occasionally, of sound mind i.e. for some insane
persons there are times when they are sane, it is during this time that they are allowed
to enter into contract.
ii. the person who is most of the time of sound mind, at a time when he is of unsound
mind the law does not allow him to enter into contracts. See s. 12(3)
CONSIDERATION
Make reference to Ss. 2(1)(d) s.10 as well as to s. 25 (1) of the same law.
General concept:
It is the price for the promise. Every simple contract must be supported by
consideration and under common law the basis of consideration lies in the legal maxim
known as QUID PRO QUO [nothing should go for nothing].
If A has promised to sell an item to B, B must give or promise to give something (this
something is what is known as consideration) for this promise.
These two promises given by each one of them form a consideration for each others
promise.
The most recent English case to have given the most appropriate definition of the term
consideration is the Dunlop v Selfridge [1915] in which consideration was defined as :
i the promisee or
TYPES OF CONSIDERATION
i. executed consideration
This denotes the completed performance by one party to the agreement. This is usually
given when the promise is made in return for such performance of an act. Note the
present perfect tense used in s. 2 (1)(d) of the LCA, “….has done or abstained form
doing…”
The act of buying and using the smoke balls by Mrs. Carlill, for instance, in the case of
Carlill v Carbolic Smoke Ball Co. is an example of executed consideration.
14
Its meaning is given by S. 2(1)(c) of LCA
Illustration:
Juma offers to sell and deliver goods on 5th of July 2007 and Anthony promises to pay
when these goods are delivered.
RULES OF CONSIDERATION
This means consideration need not be enough, it should only be sufficient before the
law. It must be something whose worth can be measured against money. In this case it
does not matter how small this value is.
If you have promised to give your house, which you bought for 2 million shs just for
2000 shs. It does not matter. The 2000 shs is enough for a consideration.
Nestle who were specialists in making chocolates, among other products, offered to
sell some records to the public for 1.6 shillings + three wrappers of their chocolates for
each record.
Held: the chocolate wrappers despite their inferior value formed part of the
consideration for the records, the other part being made by the 1.6 shillings.
If consideration can not be measured in terms of its value it can not amount to
consideration:
In this case a son promised to stop complaining to his father. This was held to be no
consideration because it could not be measured in value.
When a person has a duty under the law to do or to abstain from doing something, he
can not be said to have furnished consideration when he does that duty.
E.g. If you promise a police officer that you will give him some money if he arrests a
person who has committed an offence against you. Your promise to give him some
money can not be a consideration in exchange for the arrest he has done because he
has done what he was legally required to do.
Godfrey promised to pay Collins, a witness, who was legally required by court to give
evidence if he so gave that evidence. Collins gave the evidence and sued Godfrey for the
promised money.
Held: the court held that he provided no consideration since what he did was done
under the requirement of law
A B
E.g. Mary and Maria entered into contract in which Mary has to build Maria’s house for
one week. When only 2 days remain and the work does not seem to end, Maria
promises to give Marry extra money to finish the job on time and she so does finish on
time.
Her finishing the job in time is not consideration, since she had that duty under the
contract.
Some sea men deserted a ship. The Captain promised the remaining men an extra pay
if they finished the journey. They were not given the extra pay and they sued
The court held that: they could not be paid the extra money since they did nothing
more than what they were legally required to do.
However, if there was practical benefit on the party offering the money, the act of
building on time by Marry and that of completing the journey by the sea men would be
consideration sufficient in the eyes of the law.
Illustration:
Unlike in Myrick, here a number of sea men left the ship so many in number that the
ship was on the brink of subsiding. The remaining crew were offered extra pay if they
did not follow the others who deserted.
Held: when the journey was completed the seamen could recover extra pay because
they did more than they were contractually obliged to do. Their act was consideration
for the promise of extra pay.
Lancey Shadwell, who was engaged to be married to Ellen Nicholl, was promised a
payment by his uncle Charles Shadwell if he went through with the wedding. When the
uncle died, the executor stopped the payments on the grounds that Lancey, since he
was engaged with Ellen, he was contractually bound to marry her anyway, and thus he
had provided no consideration to the late uncle for his promise only by doing so.
The court held that: the act of promising a third party that you will go through with the
contract is good consideration.
In Scotson v Pegg (1861) 6 H & N 295. the judges applied the principle in Shadwell.
New Zealand Shipping Co Ltd v A M Satterthwaite, The Eurymedon [1975] AC 154 (PC)
A was bound under a contract with B to unload goods from B’s ship. Some of the goods
belonged to C, who promised not to sue A if the goods were damaged during the
unloading. It was held that this promise was bound to unload the goods under his
contract with B.
Acts or promises by both parties must be exchanged at one time and must form the
same transaction. If Mammilla does an act now and after finishing Alice promises to
give her some money, the act by mammilla does not constitute consideration for Alice
promise since they happened at different times. This is what is referred to as the past
consideration.
The general rule is that past consideration is insufficient in the eyes of the law.
A man and his brothers and sisters were the owners of a building. The man made some
improvements on the building and after he completed his brothers and sisters promised
to repay the costs he had incurred which they did not; the man sued them
Held: Since the work had been undertaken before the promise was made it was past
consideration and past consideration is no consideration.
That past consideration is no consideration is a general rule. There are some exceptions
to it as follows:
ii. Where the act done has been requested by the promisor.
This is the essence of s. 2 (i) (d) “when at the desire (request) of the promisor the
promisee or any other person has done (these words suggest that the act has already
been done at the promisor’s request)
Any person who seeks to enforce a contract must establish that he personally furnished
consideration to the other in that agreement. This suggests that, though consideration
can be given by a third party on behalf of a party to the contract, this consideration can
not be effective. See illustration below:
A repairs B’s house in exchange for B’s promise to pay for A’s son college fees for one
year.
There are three parties involved here; A, B and C. the party who has furnished
consideration here is A and it is him only who can sue B for his failure to honour his
promise and not A’s son. This is what it means by the consideration must move from
the promisee. See the following case:
The court held that: the groom was unable to enforce the promise since he had not
furnished consideration, even though the promise was made for his benefit.
consideration can not sue, the person who is not part to the contract (a stranger to the
contract) can not sue also.
The following cases illustrate how the doctrine works:
Beswick v Beswick [1968] AC 58 (HL)
By a written agreement, a nephew contracted with his uncle to pay his aunt £5 a week
after the uncle’s death. When he refused to pay the aunt sued, and The House of Lords
decided the case in favour of the aunt, on the grounds that she was the administratrix of
her husband’s estate. It follows therefore that, if she had not been the administatrix of
her husband estate she would not have won the case i.e. if she had sued as wife of the
uncle, since she was not party to contract.
There was husband and wife. The husband promises the wife an allowance (in amity), in
his absence to Ceylon (Sri Lanka). When the wife divorced the husband, he stopped
effecting further payment and the wife sued him.
The court was primarily concerned with the issue as to whether the promise of the
husband was intended to create legal relations.
It was held that: promises between wife and husband, alongside others, are not
intended to result into the contract, even though they may constitute consideration
because the parties did not intend that they be attended by legal consequences.
Comment: Any thing done out of “Natural love and affection” (i.e. when a couple is at
happy times) can not be said it was intended to make the parties legally bound.
After sometime the mother took back her house and the daughter sued for the
allowances that the mother had promised but failed to pay.
The court held that: the mother could recover the house because the arrangement was
one falling within the category of domestic arrangements.
The presumption that domestic arrangements are not intended to create legal relation
is in law referred to as a rebuttable presumption i.e. it can be defeated by the
following acts
i. If the court has a reason to believe that the circumstances and the words
used in the domestic or social arrangement are to the effect that this
intention was intended by the parties.
To be effective the circumstances and or the words must be that clear and unambiguous
so that the court can clearly read from them if there was any intention couched in them.
See the following case:
Parker v. Clark [1960] 1 All ER. 93
Mrs. Clarke asked in writing her niece Mrs. Parker to sell her matrimonial home and go
to live with Mrs. Clarke and her husband which was big enough to accommodate the
two families. The letter carried with it a promise that the Clarks would prepare a will
which would devise the house to Mrs. Parker who accepted the offer in writing also.
They later quarreled and the Parkers left. They sued for the promises
Although this was one of domestic arrangements the court held that:
(a) There was intention to form legal relation evidenced by the act of the Parkers
selling their home while relying on the enforceability of the promises.
(b) The changing of their will by the Clarks had an effect of intending the
agreement to be legally binding.
ii. If there is reliance on and formalization of the arrangement between the
parties i.e. put the arrangement in writing.
Like the Clarks did by offering in writing and the Parkers who had relied on their promise
to do what they had done accepting in writing in the above case.
iii. When a couple are about or have separated.
See Merrit v Merrit [1970] 1W.L.R 1211
The couple had separated while there was an outstanding debt arising out of mortgage
on their matrimonial home. The husband told the wife if she discharged this debt he
would transfer the house to her. When the wife was done with discharging the debt the
husband refused to transfer the house to her as he had promise; he claimed theirs was a
domestic arrangement thus there was no intention to create legal relations.
The court held that: there was this intention to create legal relations since the general
presumption that there is no this intention is not available for spouses who are not
living together peacefully or are about to separate or have separated already.
iv. where there is evidence of joint enterprise (activity) between the parties.
See Simpkins v pays [1955] 3 All ER. 10
There was an old woman who shared a house with her grand daughter and a lessee.
They collectively entered into a competition in some Sunday news paper using the name
of the old woman. Later when the name of the old woman won she refused to share out
the prize to others. Then the daughter and the lessee sued;
The court held that; the rest were too entitled to share the prize since their agreement
was intended to be legally binding, regard being had of the circumstances of the case.
B. IN COMMERCIAL AGREEMENTS
Unlike in domestic and social arrangements where the law generally, presumes absence
of intention to create legal relation, the parties in commercial arrangements are
presumed to have intended the legal consequences unless the court finds that the
terms of a particular contract suggest otherwise. See the following cases:
Rose and Frank Co. v. J.R. Crompton and Bros. Ltd., [1923] 2 K.B. 261 (Engl. C.A.).
Simple facts of the case:
In this case an English company entered into an agreement to sell carbon paper to a firm
in New York. The agreement, inter alia, expressly provided that:
“ This arrangement is not entered into…as a formal or legal agreement, and shall not
be subject to legal jurisdiction in the law courts…”
later J.R Crompton, the English Company withdrew from the contract and Rose and
Frank sued them for breaching the contract.
The court: the issue which the court dealt with was whether the parties in a
commercial agreement can expressly agree not to form legal relations for business
purposes?
Unlike in standard form contract, all simple contracts it is possible for the parties
thereto to negotiate as to what should be the terms of a particular contract.
The negotiation, as revealed above, is however not possible when one party is
economically stronger than the other. The chances that there may be a fair negotiation
and bargaining is so much diminished.
For instance in the following situations:
i. When the one party has a strong monopoly over supply of goods and/ or
services. Take an example of any mobile telephone companies in Tanzania. It may not
be simple for an ordinary citizen to negotiate the terms with them.
ii. Paucity in suppliers may cause the same situation.
iii. The party who needs to borrow money and the lender. Like the banker and
his customer.
Since there is no chance for a fair bargaining with these big, well established economic
ventures the ordinary or less strong folks find themselves entering into contracts based
on the terms that are set by them. You have either to accept or to reject them. These
are what are called standard form contracts.
This means in order to be legally accepted the exclusion clause must have formed part
of the contract before it was signed and not thereafter. If the terms are contained in
the contract later they are not effective.
See Olley v Marlborough Court [1949]
Olley lodged a room in a hotel. As he entered into the room fixed for him he found a
notice on the wall posted by the management in which they excluded liability arising out
of loss or damage to guests’ belongings. When his property was stolen he sued the
hotel.
The court held that: the exclusion clause was ineffective because the contract between
them had been made and signed at the reception desk.
This means anything that comes ahead of signing the contract is not recognized as being
part of the signed contract.
(ii) Incorporation into the contract (by way of notice)
Parker v. SE Railways (1877) 4 CPD 416 an exclusion clause can be incorporated into
the contract by way of notice if the party relying on it has taken reasonable steps to
bring it to the other parties attention. The notice according to Olley v Marlborough
(cited above) must be brought to the other party before the contract is signed.
(iii) Incorporation into the contract (by way of drawing inference from
previous course of dealings)
iii. He must prove that he has done everything possible to bring those terms to
the knowledge of the party he wished the terms to bind.
The requirement of doing every reasonable thing to bring the terms to the notice of the
other party is presumed not to exist if the parties have dealt on usual terms for over a
period of time (legally termed as “a course of dealing”) in which there is a similar
exclusion clause. In this case the other party as well as the maker of the clause are
presumed to know its existence thence there is no need to give prior notice.
DISCHARGING A CONTRACT
Once it has been made the contract is not infinite: it can be brought to an end by
various ways. This is what is referred to as discharge of a contract. In more explicit terms
discharge of a contract happens when the rights and obligations accrued under a
contract are extinguished. There are, thus, various ways by which the contract can be
discharged.
i. by performance (part V of the LCA)
The general rule of contract law is that parties must completely and precisely perform
what they have undertaken to do (promises) or not to do under a particular contract,
unless there is a reason not to so perform it (s. 37 (1) of the LCA).
“The parties to a contract must perform their respective promises, unless such performance is
dispensed with or excused under the provisions of this Act or any other law”
If the party performs a contract in a different way from that by which he promised to
perform, the contract will not be discharged. Performance must be complete and
precise.
See also Re Moore & Co. and Landauer & Co. (1921)
The agreement was to deliver a consignment of canned fruits in cases of 30 tins each.
The seller delivered instead mixed cases packed in 30 tins and others in 24 tins.
The court held that: the buyer was entitled to reject the whole consignment. If it is
rejected, a contract is not discharged.
Death of the promisor does not excuse him from performance unless the contract
itself suggests so; otherwise his representatives will have to finish up his obligations
(see s. 37 (2) of the LCA). Only once a contract is performed correctly the parties are
thus discharged from their liabilities under such contract.
The act you promised under a contract must be done at the right time and place as
agreed , short of that the contract of this kind is voidable at the option of the
promisee and the promisor will not be discharged.
See s. 55 (1) (2) of the LCA. See analysis of this section below
Subsection 1
When a party to a contract promises to do
a. a certain thing at or before a specified time or
b. certain things at or before specified times (series of events)
and fails to do any such thing at or before the specified time the contract, or so
much of it as has not been performed, becomes voidable at the option of the
promisee if the intention of the parties was that time should be of essence to
the contract .
Subsection 2
If it was not the intention of the parties that time should be of essence of the contract
i. the contract does not become voidable at the failure to do such thing at or before the
specified time; but
ii. the promisee is entitled to compensation from the promisor for any loss occasioned
to him by such failure.
The court held: that he could recover the money for that part of the contract he had
performed.
Under the law in Tanzania (s. 55 (2)) Mr. Atkinson would be entitled to compensation
for any loss occasioned by Mr. Ritchie.
The innocent party under an anticipatory breach has two courses of action
i. he may treat the contract as at an end and claim for damages for breach or for
compensation for the party he has performed
When De La Tour who had promised to employ Hochster with effect from 1st june
repudiated the agreement in May, the court held that Hochster had the right to sue
from the date the repudiation was done i.e. from May.
ii. he may continue to press for its performance until the due date arrives, if it passes
without such performance he may sue for damages
iii. If the basis of the contract does not occur (if performance of a contract
depends on some event)
see Chandler v. Webster [1904]
The basis of contract was the coronation of the queen; it did not happen thus it
was held the contract was frustrated
iv. Radical change in the commercial purpose of the contract
This is when there is an event which is such that because of which the parties are
forced to perform something that is different from what they originally intended.
See Metropolitan Water Board v Dick, Kerr & Co. [1918]
There was a contract of construction of a dam; the Government ordered them to stop.
The court held that there was frustration of the contract. However according to
Tsakiroglou Ltd v Noblee & Thorl [1962]
A contract is not frustrated merely because it is made more difficult to perform it
Effects of frustration
A frustrated contract is a void contract; thus frustration brings a contract to an end.
The general rule is that, once a contract is frustrated
i. All the sums paid by both parties before the frustration are recoverable
ii. All the sums not yet paid should not be paid
See s. 65 of the LCA provides for the effects of frustration.
When an agreement is discovered to be void, or when a contract becomes void, any
person who has received any advantage under such agreement or contract is bound to
i. restore it or
ii. Make compensation for it to the person under the agreement from whom he received
it. Provided that where a contract becomes void by reason of the provisions of
subsection 2 of s, 56 and a party thereto incurred expenses before the time when that
occurs in , or for the purposes of the performance of the contract, the court may if it
considers it just.
(a) allow such part to retain the whole or any part of any such advantage as
aforesaid received by him or
(b) Discharge him whole or in part from making compensation therefore or
(c) may make an order that such party recover the whole or any part of any
payments or other advantage which would have been due to him under the
contract if it had not become void.
The advantage or the payment should not be greater than the expenses incurred by that
part.
Read, Business Law, by Marsh & Soulsby (5th edition) Pg. 168-169
ii. If there is a new contract entered by the same parties which is to the effect that it
discharges the former contract. This other contract must, however be supported by
consideration. Discharge of this kind is called discharge by accord and satisfaction
(accord refers to agreement and satisfaction refers to consideration)
The court held that: since the agreement was not supported by consideration D&C could
claim the arrears.
See also s. 62 of the LCA
If the parties to a contract agree to
i. substitute a new contract for it or
ii. to rescind (cancel/ annul) or
iii. alter (change) it
the original contract need not be performed.
The law of sale of goods in Tanzania is a slightly modified replica of the English law. All
the principles pertaining to sale of goods in Tanzania are reduced to one statute known
as The Sale of Goods Ordinance (Laws of Tanganyika, Revised Laws, 1955 Cap 214.)
However the application of this Law applies only to mainland Tanzania, in Zanzibar the
law applicable is the Contract Decree (Laws of Zanzibar, Revised Edition, 1959, Cap
149). The sale of Goods Ordinance, Cap 214 came into being as a result of application, in
Tanzania, of The English Sale of Goods Act, 1893, Cap 71 which was a statute of general
application in England as at the date of passing of the Tanganyika Order in Council,
1920.
Due to this reason there is a little insignificant difference in the two statutes. The cases
decided in England basing on the English Act are useful under this part.
By s. 3 (1) of the Sale of Goods Act, a contract of sale of goods is defined as:
Since the contacts for sale of goods, as the name it self suggests, are contracts, they are
also subject to the general principles of the law as provided by the Law of Contact Act.
Thus the legal principles which are provided by the Law of Contract Act are also
applicable in a contract of sale of goods; these principles are as follows:
i. Free consent
ii. Capacity to contract
iii. Lawful consideration and object and lastly
iv. Intention to create legal relation.
The unique aspect as regards capacity to contract under the sale of goods contract can
be traced at S. 4 of the Sale of Goods Ordinance which reads as follows:
“Capacity to buy and sell is regulated by the general law concerning capacity to contract, and to
transfer and acquire property.
Provided that where necessaries are sold and delivered to an infant, or minor, or to a person who
by reason of mental incapacity or drunkenness is incompetent to contract, he must pay a
reasonable price therefore”.
Necessaries in this section mean goods suitable to the condition in life of such infant or
minor or other person, and to his actual requirements at the time of the sale and
delivery”.
However, a contract for sale of goods has certain unique features (that are not provided
in the law of contract Act) such as,
i. transfer of title (ownership) to the goods,
ii. delivery of goods
iii. Rights and duties of the buyer and seller,
iv. Remedies for breach of contract of sale,
v. conditions and warranties implied under a contract for sale of goods, etc.
These unique features are what form the substance of the provisions of the Sale of
Goods Ordinance, Cap 214.
THE EFFECT OF PASSING THE PROPERTY FROM THE SELLER TO THE BUYER IN A
CONTRACT OF SALE
Once the property has passed the contract is known as a sale. If
i. The transfer of such property is to take place later or
ii. If it is subject to some conditions which have to be fulfilled later the contract is called
an agreement to sell.
According to s. 3 (4) the agreement to sell will become a sale once the time elapses or
the conditions have been fulfilled.
Since, according to the above sections it is evident that a sale is a contract just like any
other except for a few unique features; most of the legal tests necessary for a contract
to meet in order that it becomes valid will also apply to sales and agreements to sell.
FORMATION OF A CONTRACT OF SALE
Just like an ordinary contract, a contract of sale can be made by the following ways:
i. it can be made in writing with or without seal or
ii. The whole of it may be made orally or
iii. Part of it may be made orally and another part may be made in writing or
3.2 TERMS OF THE CONTRACT OF SALE: condition, warranties and innominate terms
A contract of sale is usually present with a number of terms some of which are set in by
the parties to such contract while others are implied by the law.
The word condition refers to any one of these terms which is fundamental to that
contract so that if it is breached the right to repudiate (reject) the contract and claim
for damages accrues to the promisee
Warranties: these are ancillary (supplementary) terms in the contract which if they are
breached only the right to claim for damages accrues to the promisee.
Innominate terms are terms of the contract that fall mid way between conditions and
warranties with the outcome of any breach being uncertain. In this situation the court
has the ability to render the contract terminated or alternatively to award damages
whichever is the most appropriate remedy given the effect of the breach and this will in
most cases depend on whether the injured party has effectively been denied the benefit
of the contract. See Hong Kong Fir Shipping Co. Ltd v Kawasaki Kisen Kaisha Ltd (1962)
(b) An implied warranty that the buyer shall have and enjoy quiet possession of the
goods:
(c) An implied warranty that the goods shall be free from any charge or encumbrance
in favour of any third party, not declared or known to the buyer before or at the time
when the contract is made.
All these warranties are concerned with the importance of the seller to have a good
title to the goods he is selling.
Where there is a contract for the sale of goods by description, there is an implied
condition that the goods shall correspond with the description; and if the sale be by
sample, as well as by description, it is not sufficient that the bulk of the goods
corresponds with the sample if the goods do not also correspond with the description.
Here sample and description of the goods have equal importance.
If, according to the contract of sale, the goods ordered were to be of a particular
description the goods delivered must not be otherwise than described.
Illustration:
i. If, say you ordered a black car and red was delivered; or
ii. Seven cars and six were delivered or
iii. 1000 bags of maize of, say 100 kgs each, and 600 bags of maize weighing 100 kgs and
400 bags weighing 80 kgs each were delivered.
Under this circumstance if what is delivered does not correspond with the description
it is a breach of an implied condition (as per s. 15) therefore, you may repudiate the
contract.
ii. Buyer’s prior disclosure of a particular purpose: If the buyer knows nothing
of the goods for his particular purpose but brings to the knowledge of the
seller, either expressly or impliedly, the purpose for which the goods are
required so that due to his lack of knowledge the buyer relies on the seller’s
skills of judgment. See section 16 (a) (i) of the SGA.
iii. Evidence of usage of trade: s. 16 (c) of the SGA there may be implied
conditions as to quality or fitness that are annexed by usage of trade15
15
Any system, custom, or practice of doing business used commonly in a given place so that an
expectation arises that it will be observed in a particular transaction. The concept of trade usage
recognizes that words and practices in that area have specialized meanings in different areas of
business. Though these common understandings may not be set out explicitly in a written sales or
service agreement, the courts will generally employ them when construing a commercial contract.
The essence of this statement is that some goods do not have many uses so it is not
difficulty to know what their specific use is, think of bottled water (say Kilimanjaro
brand), food varieties, clothes etc.
Unlike with the quality of fitness, there is an implied condition that the goods shall be of
merchantable quality if the goods are bought by description from a seller who deals in
goods of that description (whether he manufactures them or not).
The obligation that the goods shall be of merchantable quality does not bind the seller
if
i. he brought the defects in the goods into the notice of the buyer before the contract is
concluded
see Bartlett v Sidney Marcus Ltd [1965] All ER 753
a car which was sold with a defective clutch, of which the seller informed the buyer,
was held to be of merchantable quality , though it cost the buyer more than he had
contemplated only
ii. if the buyer examines the goods before the contract is made as regards defects which
that examination ought to reveal.
Note if he does not examine the goods, the buyer according to this section will be
bound by the obligation that the goods will be of merchantable quality.
Note: section 16 en bloc is a sweeping provision; it includes all the goods that form the
basis of the contract as well as those which are supplied together with those goods
under the same contract of sale.
This means the implied conditions will include these other goods too.
See the following illustrations:
The soda companies usually supply soda in bottles which the buyer is supposed to
return to the company later, unless he buys them too. In this case the company is said
to supply soda and the bottles though the bottle is just used to simplify the delivery of
soda which is the subject matter of the contract of sale.
If the bottle is defective there can be breach of a contract, despite the fact that the soda
is just in good order.
See the case of Geddling v. Marsh [1920] 1 KB 668
Mineral water was sold to the buyer so that the buyer was required to return the
bottles to the manufacturer. When one of the bottles was defective (it burst) the buyer
was injured. He sued the manufacturers
The court held that the buyer could recover damages under s. 14 of the Sale of Goods
Act of England, 1893 (equivalent to s. 16 of the Sale of Goods Act of Tanzania) the
contract even though the bottle was not sold under the contract of sale.
See also Wilson v Rickett &Co. [1954] 1QB 598
In this case a bomb was supplied together with goods delivered under a contract of
sale of goods. When the bomb exploded the buyer sued the suppliers for damages.
Suppliers: claimed that they supplied the bomb by mistake, since it was not part of the
goods sold.
The court held that the bomb had been supplied under that very contract, no matter
how erroneously.
According to subsection (2) of this section, when there is a contract for sale by sample
there are the following implied conditions:
(a) There is an implied condition that the bulk (the whole mass of goods) shall
correspond with the sample in quality;
(b) There is an implied condition that the buyer shall have a reasonable opportunity of
comparing the bulk with the sample;
(c) There is an implied condition that the goods shall be free from any defect, rendering
them unmerchantable, which would not be apparent on reasonable examination of
the sample.
For this purpose the goods are categorized into two groups and thus the transfer shall
be discussed under those groups:
i. transfer of property in specific goods16 The general rule as to how this transfer is
done is provided by s. 19 of the SGA. There are two situations here:
(a) Title in the specific goods will pass at the intention of the parties
According to this section
16
These are goods which at the time the contract of sale is made the buyer has seen and on which he has
agreed to buy.
Where there is a contract for the sale of specific or ascertained goods, the property in
them is transferred to the buyer at such time as the parties to the contract intend it to
be transferred.
Subsection 2 of the same section states the factors that are useful in determining the
intention of the parties; these are terms of the contract, the conduct of the parties and
the circumstances of the case.
Note: any time such thing is not done yet the goods will remain at the sellers risk until
the thing is done.
The rule thus reads
Where there is a contract for the sale of specific goods and the seller is bound to do
something to the goods, for the purpose of putting them into a deliverable state, the
property does not pass until such thing be done, and the buyer has notice thereof.
The property does not pass unless such thing has been done.
The rule thus reads:
Where there is a contract for the sale of specific goods in a deliverable state, but the
seller is bound to weigh, measure, test, or do some other act or thing with reference to
the goods for the purpose of ascertaining the price, the property does not pass until
such act or thing be done, and the buyer has notice thereof.
In this case the property will pass only when the buyer
i. The buyer so approves or does any act that has the effect of adopting the goods.
ii. has not approved and keeps retaining the goods, beyond the time allowed for him to
approve, without giving notice of rejecting them to the seller. If the seller had not
allowed him a fixed time for his approving the goods then the property will pass on the
expiration of reasonable time.
The section thus reads
When goods are delivered to the buyer on approval or "on sale or return" or other
similar terms the property therein passes to the buyer:-
(i) When he signifies his approval or acceptance to the seller or does any other act
adopting the transaction;
(ii) If he does not signify his approval or acceptance to the seller but retains the goods
without giving notice of rejection, then, if a time has been fixed for the return of the
goods, on the expiration of such time, and, if no time has been fixed, on the expiration
of a reasonable time. What is a reasonable time is a question of fact.
17
These are those goods which the buyer has not seen and agreed on at the time when the contract of sale is
made.
18
By appropriating goods to the contract it means setting aside or naming the goods after the buyer or do
any thing that will single out the goods as covered by the contract.
ii damage etc
There are three possible times the mentioned risks may happen:
a. if it happens before the contract is made:
The risk falls upon the seller and the buyer may recover damages if he fails to deliver
unless when the goods have perished and the seller is unaware of it.
See s. 8 of SGA
Where there is a contract for the sale of specific goods, and the goods without the
knowledge of the seller have perished at the time when the contract is made, the
contract is void.
b. if it happens when the contract has been made but before the property passes
(example when there is only an agreement to sell)
The risk falls upon the seller and the buyer may recover damages if the goods are not
delivered
Title is only transferable to the buyer by the owner of the goods and if the seller is not
the owner then for title to pass he must have sold the goods either
i. under the authority of the owner or
ii. with the consent of the owner
Short of this the buyer can not gain a better title than the person who gave him. This
is a common law principle imbedded in the legal maxim nemo dat quod non habet.
ii. Goods sold in market overt: Section 24 of SGA provides for another
exception to the nemo dat rule. Under s.24, where goods are openly sold in a
shop or market in Tanzania in the ordinary course of its business, a buyer
who buys the goods in good faith and without knowledge that the seller is
not the true owner acquires ownership of the goods.
To be benefited under s.24, the buyer is rested with the burden to show the existence of
the following conditions:
iii. When after the lapse of time he retains the goods without intimating to the seller
that he has rejected them.
Any thing beyond this is not deemed on the part of the buyer as acceptance.
RIGHTS OF UNPAID SELLER (s. 41 (1) (a) and (b))
As long as the seller is not yet paid he has two rights arising out of the contract of sale of
goods; these rights are follows.
i. s. 41 (1) (a) right of lien on the goods; This is the right to retain the goods for the price
while he is in possession of them.
ii. s. 41 (1) (b): in cases of insolvency of the buyer the seller has the right to stop the
goods in transitu . This may happen, for instance when the seller has handed over the
goods to a transporter to take them to the buyer and before goods reach him it comes
to his knowledge that the buyer is insolvent and can not pay for the goods transported
to him.
iii. s. 41 (1) (c) : the right to resell the goods
iv. s. the right to repossess the goods if there are “Romalpa clauses”
These were established in the case of Aluminum Industrie Vaasen BV v Romalpa
Aluminum LTD [1976] 1 WLR 676 CA.
These clauses are to the effect that, the supplier of goods on credit may express in the
contract of sale that title to the goods will not pass to the purchaser until they are fully
paid for.
This means that as long as the goods are not paid for, they remain the property of the
supplier despite the fact that they are in the possession of the company.
MEANING OF AGENCY
An Agency can be defined as a legal relationship in which one person acts for another in
a business dealing with a third party.
19
Michael B.M [et al], (1986) Business Law and the Regulatory Environment: Concepts and Cases, Irwin
Homewood, USA. Pg. 334
FORMATION OF AGENCY
Appointment of an agent
An agency is created by appointing an agent. The agent is said to have been appointed if
he has been conferred authority to act on behalf of another either expressly or
impliedly. Thus any person who acts for another without his authority is not an agent.
Thus, an agency is created by the principal giving an authority to an agent to do an act
or acts in business dealings with third parties.
S. 140 of the LCA provides that an agent who has authority to do an act has authority to
do every lawful thing which is necessary to which is necessary in order to do such act.
Illustration
For instance when you appoint a lawyer to represent you in a court of law, you are
considered to have authorised him to do any act associated with such representation
unless you expressly restrict him to do them. All that he does as they arise from what
you have authorised him to do are said to have been done under implied authority.
ii. Apparent or ostensible Authority (as between the principle and third party)
Ostensible authority arises when at any time the principle gives the agent the
appearance of authority. Thus there will be an apparent/ ostensible authority when an
agent appears to the third party to be acting within his authority. In most cases
ostensible authority arises when agent acts on usual or implied authority. The act of the
agent done in this situation will bind the principal even if he has actually exceeding his
authority.
The following situation shows an example of the circumstances in which an agent may
be caused to appear to the third party to have power in respect of some things and thus
appear to be acting within his authority.
For instance
When the principle does not want the agent to act on his ‘usual authority’ but he does
not openly restrict him not to act on them.
Why?
Because the type of agency in which the principle put the agent to act usually, in the
eyes of the public, carries with it the powers to do the main act which is selling plus
certain other associated acts like engaging in negotiations on price.
The principle would not be bound if he disclosed to the world at large his restriction so
that every body has knowledge of it.
CLASSES OF AGENTS:
i. Universal Agents/ General Agent (GA): These are those who are authorized
to transact every kind of business for the principal. They usually hold a broad
authority to act, e.g. they may hold a power of attorney (also known as a
mandate in civil law jurisdictions) or have a professional relationship, say, as
lawyer and client.
ii. Special agent: Are authorized to conduct either only a single transaction or a
specified series of transactions over a limited period of time.
iv. Commission agent: is the one who is paid commission for the transactions
done.
v. Del credere agent: One who agrees to guarantee the obligations of a third
party (or parties). Example an agent who sells products for a principal to a
third party undertakes to guarantee to principal that this third party will pay
for the goods. In other words it can be said that a del credere agent, besides
acting for the principal, he also acts for the third party but as his guarantor.
vi. Employee: Agent whose actions are under the direct control of the principal
(employer). Traditionally known as a "servant."
TYPES OF AGENCY
1. Agency by Agreement:
An agency relationship based on an express or implied agreement that the agent will
act for the principal.
2. Agency by Ratification:
Ratification is a process whereby the principle binds himself to unauthorized act done
by an agent or by a person claiming to act as an agent. This happens when the principal
confirms an act or contract performed or entered into by another person on his behalf,
without his authority, to act as his agent. See s. 148 of the LCA.
This implies that when an agent does an act without authority, the Principal may ratify
the transaction and accept liability on the transactions as negotiated. Ratification may
be express or implied (see s. 149 of the LCA) from the Principal's behavior, e.g. if the
Agent has purported to act in a number of situations and the Principal has knowingly
acquiesced, the failure to notify all the concerned of the Agent's lack of authority is an
implied ratification to those transactions and it is regarded also as an implied grant of
authority for future transactions of a similar nature.
v. Ratification must be wholly and not partial. The principal can not
choose those that benefit him and leave those that are not beneficial to
him.
3. Agency by Estoppels:
If a principal holds out to a third party that another is authorized to act on the
principal’s behalf and the third party deals with the other person accordingly, the
principal may not later deny that the other was the principal’s agent for purposes of
dealing with that third party.
4. Agency by Operation of Law: this is when the law presumes that a certain
relation is that of agency.
Agencies recognized by courts – e.g., family relationships, Emergency situations – in the
absence of any formal agreement, confirmation, or act or omission by the principal that
implied the agent’s authority
5. Agency by necessity
Any person may be an agent by acquiring an authority from the pressure arising out of
necessity. This usually happens when the agent has been put in control of other
person’s property. There are four conditions to it
i. The agent must have been placed in control of principal’s property.
ii. There must be a situation which puts the property in danger.
For instance, when a person who has been put in control of the property is a transporter
and the property is perishable goods.
iii. It must be impossible for the person in control to seek instructions from the
owner in time.
iv. If the person in control of the property does any thing, he must do it in good
faith and it must be done in an attempt to protect the property.
And s. 170 reads “…the agent is bound to pay to his principal all sums received on his
account”
ii. Reimbursement:
Whenever an agent disburses sums of money to fulfill the principal’s request or to pay
for necessary expenses incurred in the reasonable performance of his or her duties, the
principal must reimburse the agent.
iii. Indemnification:
Subject to the terms of the agency agreement, the principal must compensate, or
indemnify, the agent for liabilities arising from the agent’s lawful and authorized acts on
the principal’s behalf. Indemnification can only be done if the agent does in good faith
lawful acts whose consequences he suffers. It does not matter if the act causes
consequences to third persons. See s. 174 and 175 of the LCA.
iv. Cooperation:
A principal must cooperate with the agent and assist the agent in performing his or her
duties.
Safe Working Conditions: A principal must:
(a) Provide its agents and employees with safe working premises, equipment,
and conditions, and
(b) Inspect working conditions and warn agents and employees of unsafe areas.
If the agent sustains any injuries at the place of work and in respect of the whole
agreement of agency the principal is liable for neglect to compensate him. See s. see s.
177 of the LCA.
“The principal must make compensation to his agent in respect of injury caused to
such agent by the or want of skill.
AGENT’S REMEDIES
Most principal-agent relationships are governed by some actual or implied contract;
therefore, most of the remedies available to an agent are the same available to any
plaintiff in a breach of contract case. See part VII of the Law of Contract Act on
consequences of breach of contract (s. 73-s.75)
Additionally, in the event that the principal violates a duty owed to the agent, the agent
may
i. Withhold further performance, and
ii. Demand an accounting.
PRINCIPAL’S REMEDIES
In the event that the agent violates her fiduciary duties to the principal, the principal
may, in addition to any remedies provided for in his contract with the agent, seek:
i. Constructive Trust:
Anything an agent obtains by virtue of the agency relationship belongs to the principal;
therefore, a principal may sue to recover any benefits retained by the agent.
ii. Avoidance:
In the event that the agent breaches her contract with the principal, the principal may
elect to avoid any contract he entered into with the agent. S. 180 LCA when the
principal declines to recognize the agent’s unpermitted act.
iii. Indemnification:
To the extent that the agent’s breach causes harm to some third party, who then sues
the principal, the principal may seek indemnification from the agent. See s. 184 of the
LCA. “ in cases where the agent is personally liable, a person dealing with him may hold
either him or his principal, or both of them, liable.
This section is subject to s.185 which bars a person who induces either the principal or
the agent that he will not sue him but the other from suing he whom he so induces.
(2) Meaning and liability of an undisclosed principal see. S. 183 (1) of the LCA.
Undisclosed principal is the one who the third party, while entering into contract with
the agent, neither knows of his existence nor his identity. Under this circumstance both
the principal and the agent are liable to this third party on contracts. See s. 183 below.
Upon learning of principal’s existence and identity, third party must elect whether to
hold principal or agent liable.
Impliedly, the provision suggests that if the third party does not refuse to fulfill the
terms of the contract despite his lack of knowledge of the principal, or even after the
principal has disclosed himself, then he has intended the agent to be a party to that
contract.
(b) When the agent does any act or omission beyond the authority of his
principal and circumstances are such that the whole of the act comprises of
permitted and an unauthorized act, if the permitted act can not be separated
from the unauthorized act, the principal is not bound to recognize the
transaction. This means if the principal declines to recognize it the agent will
personally be liable. See s. 180 of the LCA.
TERMINATION OF AGENCY
Either party may terminate the agency relationship at any time, even if this breaches a
contract between them. The circumstances that may cause an agency to terminate are
as provided by s. 153 of the LCA as follows: s. 153 of the LCA provides circumstances
under which an agency can be revoked;
“An agency is terminated by the principal revoking his authority; or by the
agent renouncing the business of the agency; or by the business of agency
being completed; or by either the principal or agent dying, becoming of
unsound mind or being adjudged bankrupt under the provisions of any law for
the time being in force relating to bankruptcy”
An analysis of this section discloses that agencies can be terminated by any of the
following ways;
Note: that revocation of an authority granted to the agent can not be done when the
agent has exercised the authority in partly, see section 156 of the LCA.
ii. By expiration of the term of the agency. This is true for agencies that have
been created for a specified period of time.
iii. By fulfillment of the purpose of the agency (by the business of agency being
completed) /performance
Note:
I. Effect of this breach of agency contract
The victim of such breach has remedies provided by contract law; see section 157 of the
LCA (it provides for compensation for revocation by the principal or renunciation by the
agent.)
Both revocation and renunciation require the giving of a reasonable notice other wise
the party that renounces or revokes must make good the damages that may be caused
by his act to the other.
v. Death of the principal or agent (by either the principal or agent dying…)
vi. Insanity of the principal or agent (by either the principal or agent… becoming
of unsound mind…)
According to s. 161 LCA When an agency terminates by the death or insanity of the
principal a duty is placed upon the agent to take reasonable steps to protect and
preserve, on behalf of his principal’s representatives, all the interests of his principal
that were entrusted to him.
agencies or agencies coupled with interest. Usually interminable agencies are those
agencies in whose property (the subject matter of agency) the agent has some interest.
See also M/S SOUTHERN HIGHLAND v M/S TANZANIA OXYGEN LIMITED (1989) TLR 187
(HC) it was held in this case that:
“In terms of section 160 of the Law of Contract Act, Cap. 345 termination of
the authority of an agent does not so far as regards the agent, take effect
before it becomes known to him. The onus of proving that such notice of
termination of the agency had come to the knowledge of the agent, in this
case the plaintiff company, rests with the principal, in this case the
defendant company;
In another case; MERALI HIRJI AND SONS v GENERAL TYRE (E.A.) LTD (1983) TLR 175
(HC)
In this case the respondent had entered into an agency contract with the appellant for
sale of motor vehicle tyres. This relationship persisted for five years but then abruptly,
the respondent, unilaterally terminated the five-year-old commercial relationship
without notice and without giving any reason for doing so.
Makame J. held that, so long as the appellant was not a commission agent, he was
entitled to a reasonable notice of the termination of the contract and that the
respondent was legally obliged to give such notice.
Therefore notice to the agent when the principal terminates the agency is very
important. This notice must come to the knowledge of the agent and in case of any
dispute the principal will be required to prove that this knowledge really came to the
notice of the agent.
i. Actual notice is required for creditors and persons who have at some time
dealt with the agent. Actual notice is that which in order to be properly given
a person is notified by letter or in person.
ii. Constructive notice is required for other third parties (besides creditors or
those who have at some time dealt with the agent). For them notice in a
newspaper or public record is presumed to be legally sufficient notice.
Conclusively these are the general principles relating to agency, therefore when one
acts as an agent he must observe the same principles otherwise they will incur liabilities
as herein discussed.
5. COMPANY LAW
Definition and Nature of the Company: General
A company is an incorporated association which is an artificial person created by law,
having as separate entity, with a perpetual succession and a common seal20.
TYPES OF COMPANIES
Companies are categorised on the following bases;
1. Incorporation
There are three types under this part namely;
i. Statutory company; if it is established by statute or act of parliament e.g. the
Institute of Accountancy Arusha. it is established by the IAA Act, no. 1 of 1990.
ii. Registered company; any company that is registered through the Companies
Act, Cap 212
20
Tulsian, PC (2007) Business and Corporate law: For CA PE-II 2nd edn. Mc Graw-Hill Companies, New
Delhi.
2. LIABILITY
Generally s. 3 of the Companies Act provides for types of companies basing on liability in
that companies may be formed with or without limited liability;
B. Unlimited Companies
According to s. 3 (2) (c), these are companies that do not have any limit on the liability
of its members. This means there is no limit on liability of the members to contribute to
the assets of the company on winding up. An unlimited company must be a private
company.
C. Public Companies
According to s. 3 (3), a public company is a company limited by shares or limited by
guarantee and having a share capital, being a company the memorandum of which
states that it is to be a public company,
D. Private Companies
According to s. 27 (1)
A private company means a company which by its articles
(a) Restricts the right to transfer its shares; and
(b) limits the number of its members to fifty, not including persons who are in
the employment of the company and persons who, having been formerly in the
employment of the company, were while in that employment, and have
continued after the determination of that employment to be, members of the
company, and
(c) Prohibits any invitation to the public to subscribe for any shares or
debentures of the company.
3. CONTROL
Companies which acquire their names on basis of control are such as;
(a) Foreign company; it is any company that has been established outside
Tanzania and which opens up business in Tanzania. Under s. 434 of cap 212To operate
in Tanzania legally this company, 30 days after establishing business in Tanzania, must
deliver to the registrar the following documents for registration;
(1) a certified copy of the charter, statutes or memorandum and articles of
the company or other instrument constituting or defining the constitution of the
company written in the English language, or its certified translation.
(2) a list of the directors and Secretary of the company containing the
particulars mentioned in subsection (2);
(3) a statement of all subsisting charges created by the company, being
charges of the kinds set out in section 99 and not being charges comprising solely
property situate outside Tanzania;
(4) the names and addresses of one or more persons resident in
Tanzania authorised -
(i) to accept on behalf of the company service of process and any
notices required to be served on the company, and
(ii) to represent the company as its permanent representative for
the place of business, and, in the case of subsection (ii), a
statement as to the extent of the authority of the permanent
representative, including whether he is authorised to act alone or
jointly.
(5) the full address of the registered or principal office of the company,
and the full address of the place of business in Tanzania;
(6) a statutory declaration made by a director or Secretary of the company
stating the date on which the company's place of business on Tanzania was established,
the business that is to be carried on and, if different from the registered name of the
company, the name under which that business is to be carried on;
(7) a copy of the most recent accounts and related reports of the
company including, where such are not in English, a translation of the same.
(b) Holding company and Subsidiary Company; A holding company means any
company that controls another company while a subsidiary company is the one that is
controlled by another company.
Under s. 487 (I) of Cap 212, a company is deemed to be a subsidiary of another only if
(a) that other either-
(i) is a member of it and controls the composition of its board of
directors; or
(ii) holds more than half in nominal value of its equity share capital; or
(b) the first-mentioned company is a subsidiary of any company which is that
other's subsidiary.
Registration
Registration is subsequent to promotion. After it has been registered a company is
issued with a special certificate known as “certificate of incorporation” and after this
the company is considered incorporated and it is ready to do business.
21
ibid
A promoter was defined as a person who undertakes to form a company with reference
to a given project and to set it going and who takes the necessary steps to accomplish
that purpose.
This necessarily implies that, before a company is registered, there are a number of
tasks related to such establishment and thus the people who set them going and who
render them accomplished are the ones referred to as the promoters.
i. Any persons who act in professional capacity for the persons who are
engaged in procuring the formation of a company such as lawyers for
drafting documents, accountants or bankers who give financial advice.
The contribution of these people is just in helping the main actors who
are the actual promoters in the whole process of forming a company See
s. 50 (7) of the Companies Act.
ii. One can not be a promoter merely by signing the memorandum or by his
having provided money to foot formation costs.
The promoter in any thing and at any time he engages in promotion of a company he
stands in a fiduciary relationship22 with that company. This specifically begins from the
moment the company commenced to be formed.
i. He must, always, act in the best interest of the company and not to his own interests.
In what ever he does the welfare of the company must be prioritized.
ii. Though the promoter, in the whole activity of promotion, is not prohibited from
making and retaining profit, he must not make a secret profit from offering for sale to
the company, his own property.
iii. if a promoter has any interest or makes any profit out of any business transactions
has engaged himself with the company, he has one principle duty to disclose to the
independent board of directors and or members of the company such interest or profit.
The disclosure must be such that the promoter’s every interest is made known to the
company.
If the directors or the members complete the purchasing of that property, the law
relating to companies presumes that the company has agreed that the promoter gain
profit from the sale.
NATURE OF DISCLOSURE
i. it must be a full disclosure of interests including the direct and the indirect interests.
22
Is a position which entails utmost trust and competence.
The court held that: the promoter failed to make proper disclosure of his interests by
hiding the second interest.
ii. Disclosure of profit does not mean to account for the profit.
The promoter is not required by law to account for (give reasons for) his profit but
merely to disclose it. This was held in the case of;
iii. Disclosure is required only if the property was acquired during the period of
promotion.
This duty binds the promoter only when he is selling to the company a property which
he has obtained after the promotion has begun. The promoter is not bound to disclose if
he obtained the property any time before the promotion and the company is, in this
situation, not entitled to claim for disclosure.
It was held in the same case of Omnium Electric Palaces v Baines as cited above that:
If the profit which the promoter gains was made out of selling a property which was
acquired before the promotion began the company can not claim this profit even if the
promoter does not make proper disclosure.
iii. Retain the contract and recover any profit made by the promoter during the currency
of his promotion
BURDEN OF PROOF
The burden of proof lies with the company i.e. it is the company which is supposed to
provide proof of its claim in order to recover the profit made by the promoter. Such
proof is usually of the following matters
i. That the promoter concealed the fact that he made secret profit it; i.e. he
failed to make proper disclosure of the same to the company.
ii. That the profit that needs to be recovered was obtained by the promoter
during the time of promotion. Refer to the case of Omnius discussed above
LIABILITIES OF PROMOTERS
Promoters have statutory liabilities due to their misconducts as shown below. this is
regardless of what time the misconduct was done;
i. Disqualification from taking part in management of the company; Under s.
197.-(I) (a) of the companies Act, Cap 212, where a person is convicted of any offence in
connection with the promotion, formation or management of a company such person
may be disqualified from being a director of the company or from taking up in any way a
management position, except with leave of court, for a period not exceeding 15 years.
ii. At winding up; Under s. 382.-(I) of Cap 212 a Promoter may be liable (a)
to repay, restore or account for the money or property or any part of it,
with interest at such rate as the court thinks just, or
(b) to contribute such sum to the company's assets by way of compensation
in respect of the misfeasance23 or breach of any fiduciary or other duty as
the court thinks just.
If has misapplied or retained, or become accountable for, any money or other property
of the company, or been guilty of any misfeasance or breach of any fiduciary or other
duty in relation to the company.
23
Doing a proper act in a wrongful or injurious manner
PAYING A PROMOTER
i. He can be allowed to sell property to company at a higher price than its
value, after disclosing
ii. He may be given fully paid-up shares in the company.
iii. He may be given commission on shares sold
B. REGISTRATION OF COMPANY
Meaning:
To register a company and to incorporate a company mean the same thing; they refer to
the act whereby one or more business men would wish to legally formalize their
activities into the form of a company. In short registering a company or incorporating a
company refers to everything done with the view to forming a company.
(c) The form provided under Table D: for the memorandum and articles of
association of a company limited by guarantee and having a share capital;
(d) The form provided under Table E: for the memorandum and articles of
association of an unlimited company having a share capital,
NOTE: types of companies are discussed later in this work.
2. Modified forms
If a person who wishes to form a company does not want to use any of the statutory
forms provided above, he may modify them and come up with a different form of
Memorandum of Association provided that the resulting Memorandum is as near to the
statutory forms as possible.
On registration, non-profit companies enjoy all the privileges and all the obligations of
limited companies.
See also s. 4 (3). The liability clause serves to define nature of liability of the members.
V. CAPITAL CLAUSE
If the company has a share capital, under its capital clause, the memorandum of
Association is supposed to state, in respect of the shares the following things;
(a) The total amount of share capital of that company, which is referred to as
Authorised, Nominal or Registered capital.
(b) Division of the total share capital into share units of specified value, known as per or
nominal value of a share. E.g. Total share capital is T shs. 500/= is divided into units of
500 shares, each of which has nominal or per value of Tshs 1/=
For a company limited by guarantee must state that each member of the company
guarantees to contribute to a certain amount not exceeding a mentioned value to the
companies’ assets when it is wound up while he is still a member or one year after he
has ceased to be a member. See section 4 (3)
Every company must have a memorandum and articles of association. These are
prepared by the company and are delivered to the registrar when the company applies
for registration.
However, companies limited by shares (private or limited), may not have to prepare
articles of association and instead adopt Table A which is provided by the companies
Act.
The articles must contain the regulations of the company.
See s. 9 (1) of the companies Act.
There may in the case of a company limited by shares, and there shall in the case of a
company limited by guarantee or unlimited, be registered with the memorandum and
articles of association, which shall be signed by the subscribers to the memorandum
and shall contain the regulations for the company.
i. The matters therein included can be enforced by the company against its
members
ii. Members can enforce them against the company.
Note: the company acts as a contract only as between the company and members. The
articles can not be enforceable by any person who is not a member (e.g. lawyers,
accountants, directors if they are not members etc.) This is so even when these persons
have been named and their rights have alongside their names been mentioned.
ii. No more liability; should not increase liability of the members to contribute to
the share capital to the company.
Section 20 of the Companies Act, 2002 reads;
Notwithstanding anything in the memorandum or articles of a company, no
member of the company shall be bound by an alteration made in the
iii. Any alteration must be made in good faith for the benefit of the company as a
whole: This was held in the case of Sidebottom v Kershaw, Leese & Co [1920] 1
Ch 154, CA.
These cases suggest that any alteration must be done in good faith and for the benefit
of the company as “an entity” or the company as “an individual hypothetical member”
iv. The articles should not conflict with the memorandum of association
In Guinness v Land Corporation of Ireland Ltd (1882) 22 ChD. 349 at page 376 it was
held that
“The articles are subordinate to the memorandum; any clause in them which is
inconsistent with the memorandum, is overruled”
(a) an advocate of the High Court engaged in the formation of the company,
or
(b) by any person named in the articles as a director or secretary of the
company,
This document has to be delivered to the registrar of companies together with the
memorandum and articles of association.
On top of keeping the record of these particulars, the company is under a duty placed
on it by s. 210 (4) to deliver a return that contains these particulars to the Registrar for
registration.
Subsection 4 reads as follows:
PAYMENT OF FEES
S. 452 of Companies Act requires payment of necessary fees for registration purposes.
Once these fees have been paid the registrar then can go forward to register the
company.
INCORPORATION OF A COMPANY
See s. 15 of the Act
On the registration of the memorandum of a company the Registrar shall certify under
his hand that the company is incorporated and, in the case of a limited company, that
the company is limited, and, in the case of a public company, that the company is a
public company.
Generally the company once incorporated gains a corporate personality. The doctrine of
incorporation of companies states that, once a company is incorporated becomes a
legal person independent from its members.
This doctrine was established in the case of Salomon v Salomon & Co Ltd [1897] AC 22
Facts of Solomon’s case are as follows:
Mr. Solomon had owned a business which he later turned into a company in
which he held more shares. The rest of the shares were owned by his family.
Each member of his family held one share. He loaned some money to the
company on the security of the assets of the company, thus becoming one of
the creditors of the company. When the company was wound up, the other
creditors claimed that they be treated with preference over Mr. Solomon in
repayment of their money from the assets of the company, because Mr.
Salomon was the owner of the company and thus he and his company were one
thing.
The court held that Mr. Salomon could have preference because he and the company
were different persons. Each one of them could have liabilities of ones own and none of
them is responsible for another’s liabilities.
Existence of the company does not depend on the life of the members to say that if the
members die the company will also die. What ever happens to members will not affect
existence of the company. So the management may be changed, so may the members
but these do not affect the company.
The court held that: he could not claim on it because it was not his property but that of
the company.
ii. An act may be ultra vires the Memorandum of Association of the company
Any act that has been undertaken while not authorised by the objects clause of the
memorandum of Association is said to be ultra vires the Memorandum of association.
iii. An act may be ultra vires the Articles of Association of the company
An act is ultra vires the Articles of association if it has been done against stipulations of
the Articles.
iv. An act may be ultra vires the directors.
An act is ultra vires directors if it is undertaken while the directors are devoid of power
respecting such act.
BOX NO. 10
EXAMPLE: when a director of a company has applied for a loan from a bank without company
resolution for the same if the articles requires it. In this case failure to pass a resolution by
the company under the doctrine of indoor management does not concern the outsider and
thus the contract resulting into the transaction for the loan can not be nullified.
Thus, though an outsider is presumed to know what is in the memorandum and articles,
he is not so presumed to know if the same has been followed or not.
The following acts may make the directors and all those who manage the company to be
personally liable instead of the company:
I. LIABILITIES ARISING FROM ACTS ULTRA VIRES THE COMPANIES ACT, CAP 212
(a) When company operates with less than minimum number of members
s. 26 of the Act creates a several liability for all the members if the company
operates with the number of members below two for a period of more than six
months. If the company enters into any contracts after the six months the
members will personally be liable. The section reads;
The liability
For the acts done in a manner prohibited as in the circumstances above, any officer shall
be liable to;
a fine and
shall further be personally liable to the holder of the bill of exchange,
promissory note, negotiable instrument or order for money or
goods for the amount thereof unless it is duly paid by the
company.
(d) When Trading is wrongful; the directors would be liable if they engage
themselves into any wrongful trading for the company. See s 384 of cap 212.
JUDICIAL LIABILITIES
iv. During wars it is not allowed to trade with the enemy country
WHAT IS A SHARE?
Generally, a share is a unit of the total initial capital of the company. It usually does have
a specific value expressed in terms of money. This is to say a company’s capital is built
up on these shares.
According to Farewell J in the case of Borland’s Trustee v Street (1901) 1 Ch 279 at 288
a share was defined as
"A share is the interest of a shareholder in the company measured by a sum of money,
for the purpose of liability in the first place, and of interest in the second…. A share is
not a sum of money… but is an interest measured by a sum of money and made up of
various rights contained in the contract (the effect of articles is a contract between
shareholders and a company), including the right to a sum of money of a more or less
amount."
iv. SIGNED BY DIRECTORS: It must be signed by every person who has been
named therein as the director, or his agent who has been authorised in writing.
See s. 49 (1) of the Act.
Only after the above requirements have been met and the offer document registered
then it can be issued to the public to invite them to offer for shares in a particular
company.
NOTE:
The shares offered to the public must not exceed the capital authorised by the capital
clause in the company’s memorandum of Association.
FORMS OF SHARES
A share capital can be expressed in any of the following categories as per each
transaction of issue.
EXAMPLE: A nominal capital (authorised capital) of a company is, say, 500 shs divided into
500 shares of shs 1 each. If the company, out of 500 shares, issues 250 shares of 1 sh. each,
the 250 shares amount to issued share capital.
vi. Issue of shares at discount must not be done within a year after the company
commences business. the company was entitled to commence business;
(c) Issue of shares as fully paid up bonus shares eg. Those given to promoters after
establishing the company.
iii. Paid up capital
Once the shares have been issued to a shareholder he may not be required to pay for
them to their full value. E.g. if he has subscribed for 20 shares @ 2 shs, he may pay
initially 1 sh. fore each share he has taken and he may pay for the rest later. Thus he
may pay only 20 shs instead of 40.
The uncalled share capital is the liability on the part of the share holder to contribute to
the assets of the company in case it is being wound up. If the share capital is called at
the time of winding up it is referred to as reserve capital and in any other circumstance
it is known as the uncalled share capital.
NATURE OF SHARES
i. a share as an expression of interest of shareholder
Every share represents the interests of its holder (shareholder) in the company which
issued the share or shares. The reason why a share is defined in terms of money is two
fold:
(a) for the purpose of establishing liability of that member to that particular
company
(b) for the purpose of defining the shareholder’s rights in the company. Refer
to Borland’s case discussed above.
Usually shares carry with it some rights which a member can enforce against a company.
These rights may vary from one share holder to the other depending on their classes of
shares they belong.
iii.. A share as a movable property.
As a movable property as share can be transferred and transmitted.
TRANSFER OF SHARES
A share is transferred when a share holder voluntarily conveyances his ownership rights
to a person who wishes to be a member in the company.
TRANSMISSION OF SHARES
A is transmitted when it is transferred by the operation of law e.g. when a shareholder
dies, become insolvent or liquidated. see regulation 26 of table A to Cap 212.
SHAREHOLDERS RIGHTS
You should understand that class rights and shareholders rights are two different rights
of members in a company.
These rights are equal to all share holders only if there is only one class of shares and in
a situation where there are in a company more than one class of shares, there could
possibly be varied rights of shareholder determined by a particular class of shares that
they belong to.
So the rights to vote, to dividends and attend meetings will automatically differ from
one class to another. These are what are known as class rights.
CLASS RIGHTS
Class rights, as distinguished from shareholders rights, are derived from different types
of shares a company can offer. Shareholders who take a particular type of shares will
belong to that particular group and automatically the rights obtaining there under are
the rights he can enjoy under his class of shares.
CLASSES OF SHARES
There can be issued by the company, the following types of shares but such provision
must be guided by the memorandum and articles of association.
A. Dividends
Dividends are calculated out of the paid up share capital e.g. If a shareholder paid up for
250 shares, a percentage for dividend is fixed o n this amount; it may be 10% of the paid
up capital that is 25 shs will be preferential dividend which will be paid out of profit
before any shareholder is paid.
(b) If priority is not conferred by the articles (i.e. the articles is silent on such priority)
the preference shares will not have any priority over ordinary shares in return of capital.
Note: so the test is if the priority is conferred by the articles of association to the
preference shareholders. Silence of the articles implies no such right.
If the articles confer on the preference shares the priority on winding up, how much will
each class receive if the company has assets amounting to:
Solution:
(a) Preference shareholders= 450
Ordinary shareholders= nil
In addition if articles do not say anything on the priority of preference shares then each
of the two cases the assets will be returned on equal basis.
iii. They can be cumulative, in the sense that, if dividends on preference shares
are at any given time not declared and paid, they will accumulate and be given
later and alongside all the other preference dividends before they are shared out
to any ordinary share holders.
If the dividends have accumulated but not yet paid and the company is liquidated, the
arrears will not be paid unless they had been declared or it is provided in the articles of
association that the arrears can be paid out of existing assets at winding up.
3. REDEEMABLE SHARES
These are the shares to which the right to redeem (buy back) by the company is
attached. Redeemable shares can be made out of ordinary or preference shares, of
importance is that the articles must authorise the issuing of such type of shares.
REGISTRATION OF CHARGES
Introduction
Capital of the company is not only raised by shares but also by other means. When there
is need to raise money more than by shares the company subject to powers granted to
it by its articles can borrow some money from banks or any other financial institutions.
The borrowing may be done through loans, overdrafts, debentures etc.
A bank can not give an advance unless it is dead sure that the borrower has sufficient
security to offer to the bank. Banker’s securities take many forms but under this part
only a charge as a security is discussed.
Meaning of a charge
This is an interest that a company creates on its assets in favour of any lender of money
to secure the latter’s loan to the company. To charge is to create a claim (interest)
against ones property in favour of a particular person to secure a loan, which that other
person (a banker or any other person) advances to you.
Therefore a can be defined as a form of security which gives a creditor the right to
receive payment from a specific fund or from the proceeds of the sale of a specific
property or assets of a business, upon default by the borrower.
When the lender has a charge over an asset of a company, he may have the power to
sell that asset and recover his debt upon the borrower’s default on a repayment of such
debt.
A charge may be created out of a mortgage of any property of the company, say, land or
even shares. See s. 97 (5) of the companies Act, it reads
Under a fixed charge the company remains in possession of the company’s assets but it
is restricted by the terms under which the charge was created to be specific the
company can not deal with the charged property in any way unless with the lender’s
consent.
The most important characteristic of a fixed charge is that it attaches to the property
once it has been created.
FLOATING CHARGE
Any charge is a floating charge if it has the following characteristics:
(iii) The company is free to deal with the assets in the ordinary course of its
business until some further step is taken by or on behalf of those in whose
favour the charge was created.
These characteristics were laid down in the milestone case of; Re Yorkshire
Woolcombers Association [1903] 2 Ch. 284
Subsequent cases have determined that the third characteristic is the most significant
feature of a floating charge and which distinguishes a floating charge from a fixed
charge.
Usually, while the company goes on dealing with the assets in their business; buying and
disposing of them, a floating charge does not attach to relevant assets until the charge
crystallizes.
Meaning of crystallization
It refers to a point at which a floating charge can be treated as if it had been created as
a fixed charge, in other words, a floating charge at this point is turned into a specific
charge.
REGISTRATION OF CHARGES
A charge whether fixed or floating that has been created in Tanzania to be effective it
must be registered with the registrar of companies within 42 days of its creation.
S. 96(1) of the companies Act reads; ‘…every charge created by a company registered in
Tanzania shall, so far as any security on the company's …property is conferred thereby,
be void against the liquidator or administrator and any creditor of the company, unless
the prescribed particulars of the charge, together with the instrument, if any, by which
the charge is created or evidenced are delivered to or received by the Registrar for
registration …within forty two days after the date of its creation.
For the purposes of companies Act, the intellectual property is defined at s. 97 (5) (c) as
follows:
Who has the duty to register charges, the company or the chargee?
By s. 100 the duty to register a charge is placed upon the company but in casse the
company fails to so register any interested person may do so with the consequences
upon the company.
however if any person who is interested applies to register himself the company will be
liable to pay him the charges he incurred in respect of such registration see s. 100 (2).
1. This section creates liability on the part of any person who has been part to that
default to pay a fine.
2. According to s. 96 (1) the charge becomes void against any creditor whatsoever of
the company.
3. Once a charge is declared void by subsection (1) of s. 96 the money secured
immediately becomes payable. See s. 96 (2)
These must be made available at any time to creditors of the company as well as
members. Usefulness of this practice is that a lender can know his position in respect of
that property if he decides to give a loan to the company.
The company to serve this purpose is required to keep statutory registers at its
registered office so that every person can access them. These registers are such as the
following:
i. Register of all members of the company as required by s. 115 of the Act.
ii. Register of debenture holders as required by section 88 (1) of the Act
iii. Register of charges as discussed above, see s. 108 (1) of the Act
iv. Register of directors and secretaries see s. 210 (1) of the Act
v. Register of directors share holding see s. 205 (1) of the Act
vi. Accounts and audit records see chapter V of the companies Act.
These records are subject of this part of the course
Every company is supposed to keep proper books of account in either English or Swahili.
According to s. 151 (4) the period in which the company is so supposed to keep these
books of account is six months after the have been prepared.
According to s. 151 (3) the directors usually determine whether the records have to be
kept at the registered office of the company or any other place but within Tanzania.
By s. 158 (7) these books are also known as “Annual Accounts” of the company
THE NATURE OF THESE BOOKS
These books are supposed to disclose and explain such things as:
i. the company’s transactions
ii. accurate financial position of the company
These records must be capable of helping the directors of the company ensure that the
prepared
i. Company’s balance sheet
ii. Profit and loss account
iii. Cash flow statement
Have complied with the provisions of this Act
STATUTORY REPORTS
There are two types of reports, relating to affairs of the company during the accounting
period, the company is supposed to prepare:
i. The Directors’ Report
This report is supposed to give an insight into the general affairs of the company. It must
also be approved by the board of directors and signed by any director on behalf of the
company. After approval it shall also be delivered to the registrar of companies for
records.
The directors have a duty to make investigation to help them get facts to prepare a fair
report. See s. 163.
s. 162 (1) requires the auditors report to bear their names and signatures.
An AGM is generally held every year to inform their members of previous and future
activities.
This meeting is supposed to be called every year and no period of more than fifteen
months may pass between one annual meeting and another. See s. 133 (3) of the Act
The same section, i.e. s. 133 (1) paragraphs (a)(b)(c)(d)(e) lists a number of businesses
which a company can transact at any general meeting as follows:
i. By s. 133 (4), any member may apply to the minister responsible for companies to
call or direct that the meeting be called in such a manner that the director may see fit.
ii. failure to call a meeting as directed by section 4 creates a liability on the company
and every officer of the company who was responsible for calling the meeting, to pay
a fine.
S. 133 (1) of the companies Act requires a company to hold an annual General Meeting
in addition to any other meeting.
The term is usually used where the company would ordinarily hold an AGM, but where
an issue arises which requires the immediate attention of the entire membership and is
too serious or urgent to wait until the next AGM.
i. Directors
Usually the directors are responsible for calling meetings of the company.
According to s. 134 (1) a duty is placed upon the directors of a company to call a
meeting at any time members of the company have requested such meeting. This is a
compulsory duty and it does not matter if the articles of association of the company
provides against it.
Not any bunch of members may require the directors to call a meeting. To qualify for
this the members must be such that:
i. For the company having share capital: at the time they deposit the requisition for a
meeting, the members must be holding not less than 1/10 of all the paid up share
capital and their shares must carry the right of voting at general meetings of the
company. See s. 134 (2) (a)
ii. For a company not having a share capital: at the time they deposit their request for a
meeting, the members must be representing not less than 1/10 of the total voting rights
of all members having the right to vote at the general meetings of the company. See s.
134 (2) (b)
Auditors may also call an extra ordinary meeting (by filing a signed requisition for a
meeting (s.178 (2)) when they have deposited notice at the company’s registered office
for that purpose as required by section 177 (1).
If the company for any reason has failed to call a meeting at the time when it was
supposed to have called one, the courts of law have powers to convene a meeting upon
application either by the directors or by any member of the company. See s. 137 (1) of
the Act.
The requisition must state the objects of requiring such meeting be called. It must also
be signed by all the members of the company who required such requisition and be
deposited at the registered office of the company. See subsection (3) f the same
section.
They are supposed to call the demanded meeting within a period of 21 days after
deposit of the requisition and if they fail the members (either all of them or those who
represent more than ½ of all the voting rights of all the requisitionists) who required the
meeting may proceed to call the meeting on their own within a period not exceeding
three months after the 21 days.
Note: of importance is that you should always note that any meeting can not be called
unless sufficient notice has been given to all the members of the company. The length of
notice for calling meetings should always be not less than 21 days. See s. 135 (1) of the
Company Act.
There are three types of resolutions that a company can arrive at in any meeting be it
an AGM or EGM.
i. Ordinary resolution
Is the resolution which can be passed by a simple majority (more than half of the valid
votes cast but less than ¾ ) of the members having voting rights. Usually every one
share carries one vote.
According to s. 142 (1) of the Companies Act a resolution is special if it has been passed
by a majority of not less than ¾ of member having voting rights.
The voting must be done at the general meeting whose notice contained an intention to
propose the resolution as a special resolution.
A process that entails selling all the assets of a business entity, paying off creditors,
distributing any remaining assets to the principals, and then dissolving the business.
Law of Partnerships
The law regulating partnerships in Tanzania is the LCA and by s. section 190
the same is defined as:
A business can be any form of activity which involves buying, producing and selling. It is
not necessary that it should be a permanent activity; it may be only a single business/
commercial transaction. What matters is it should be a business. The moment such
business transaction takes place marks the beginning of the partnership.
In Winsor v Shroeder (1979) 129 NLJ 1266 a woman who wished to establish a business
in which she would buy and sell real property but did not have enough money, engaged
Winsor, a property dealer, to purchase the property and share the profits jointly.
Though it was only one transaction the court declared that there was partnership
between them and went further to point out that the factor determining existence of
partnership is not whether it is a single venture but whether it is a commercial
venture.
In Keith Spicer Ltd v Mansell (1970) 1 All ER 462 the court defeated a purported
partnership because there was no evidence that there was a business carried on in
common with the view of making profit. So there was no partnership.
Mr Mansell and Mr. Bishop decided to form a company together which would carry on a
restaurant business. Mr. Bishop ordered goods from the Mr. Keith Spicer so that they
could be used by the company after it had been formed. When the goods were not paid
for Mr. Spicer sued Mr Mansell and Bishop for the price on the ground that a
partnership existed between them.
Facts illustrated:
The Court of Appeal held that there was no evidence that Mansell and Bishop were
carrying on business together with a view to profit. Harman, LJ found evidence that the
parties "…were (only) preparing to carry on business as a company as soon as they
could. I think…therefore they were not partners because they never carried on business
as such." (emphasis mine)
The members must be doing the business with the view to sharing profits, and it should
not be for any other purpose.
See Stewart v Buchanan (1903) 6 F 15; Scottish Cases on Partnerships and Companies
Facts Illustrated:
The city Stockroom Co
Stewart (was not
paid and he sued both) &
Saunders and Buchanan** (the owners)
**Buchanan claimed that he was released from debts and obligations by an agreement
he entered into with Saunders though he shared profits.
The holding of the court: The court said that He was liable for the price of the goods, on
the ground that he was sharing in the profit of the business which makes him a partner
in that business.
Formation of Partnership
Partnerships are in most cases created by agreement among the prospective
partners. The agreement can be either
i. oral or
ii. written
if the agreement of partnership is in writing the partners must do it by preparing
a document known as a partnership deed
NAMING A PARTNERSHIP
In the formation process partners decide on a name for partnership. They can
use the collective surnames or any other name of their choice. If they use any
other name they must make sure that the names of all partners and an address
for legal correspondence is quoted on all stationery and displayed prominently at
the business address of the partnership.
i. General partners,
This is the type of partnership in which each partner has the right to participate in the
management of the partnership and a right to share its profits. He partakes in the day
to day activities of running a business. In general partnership the general partner is
liable up to the full extent of his personal assets.
A limited partner has the right to share the profit, but has no right to participate in the
management of the firm or entering into contracts with third parties on behalf of the
firm. His liability is limited to the amount of capital he originally agreed to contribute.
According to Mercantile Credit Ltd v Garrod (1962) 3 All ER 103 a sleeping partner is a
general partner who wishes to have no active role in the management of the firm.
However he has a right to a share of profits and responsible for liabilities of the firm.
This is a kind of partner who contributes nothing to the capital of the firm and has no
right to a share of profits but only entitled to a fixed amount of wages or salary. They do
not have a say in the decision making of a company.
According to the case of Stikel v Ellice this partnership is only for professional parties
such as accountants and solicitors (lawyers)
See Tower Cabinet Co. Ltd v Ingram (1949) 2 KB 397; [1949] 1 All ER 1033
Ingram and Christmas were partners for some time. Later Ingram resigned but
Christmass did not give notice of this resignation to all the public. When Christmass
ordered goods from tower cabinet company and failed to pay, the latter sued the
partnership.
The question before the court was whether Ingram was liable to the debt to which the
answer was he was not because he did not suffer to represent himself as a partner
after retirement.
It follows therefore that had he done so he would have been liable and, in this case,
would have been referred to as an apparent partner.
ABSOLUTE DUTIES
In case there is no contract the duties provided by the LCA prevail and thus according to
s. 192 of the LCA the general duties of partners are in a partnership are as follows;
i. To carry on the business of the partnership for the greatest common
advantage of all partners.
The duty among partners involves a very high standard of conduct for the best
interest of the firm.
iv. Duty to render full information of all things affecting the partnership to any
partner or his legal representative.
William and James Law were partners. James offered to buy William's share for £21,000.
William later discovered that the business was worth much more; his partner had failed
to disclose a number of assets to him.
QUALIFIED DUTIES
These are duties that though they are provided by the law, permission is given under
the same law to qualify them by contract. Upon qualification the duties have the effect
of posing a bar to the operation of all duties provided by law. Likewise if they are not
qualified the law prevails. The qualified duties are;
i. Not to receive remuneration for conducting firms business (s. 194 (d))
ii. Duty to indemnify the firm for losses caused by partner’s fraud or willful
neglect while conducting the firms business (s. 194 (g))
iii. Duty to contribute equally towards the losses sustained by the firm. (s. 194
(e))
RIGHTS OF PARTNERS
Like with the duties of partners, their rights are also determined by a contract or in its
absence by the LCA. When there is no contract to so determine the partners rights then
section 194 of the LCA, enumerates rights and obligations of partners as follows;
i. right to take part in the management of the partnership (s. 194 (a))
ii. right to have access to and to inspect and copy any of the books of the firm
(194 (c))
iii. right to share equally in the capital and profits of the business. (194 (e))
iv. right to be indemnified by the firm for payments and liabilities incurred by
him
(a) in the ordinary and proper course of the business of the partnership
PARTNERSHIP PROPERTY
The ultimate question here is whose property is the property brought in to the
partnership? To answer this question there are three instances used to determine
whether the property belongs to the partnership or to the partners as personal
property.
i. If the property was brought in to the partnership at the time of forming it. It
is partnership property.
ii. If it was acquired by the money from the partnership, and it was intended to
be partnership property it will be partnership property. If no such intention it
will be personal property of the partners according to their arrangement.
iii. If the property is land or hereditary (inheritable) interest in land used in the
partnership, it shall be the partnership property if it is so intended, otherwise
it is a personal property of partners.
See section 195 (1) (2)(3) of LCA
ii. Acts done with authority from the firm; a partner must have authority to act
for the firm since some deeds are strictly forbidden for a partner to act in
absence of a mandate from the firm to so act.
s. 201 (2) outlines businesses which can not be carried by a partner in any kind of
partnership, in absence of any express provision in the partnership deed, or
usage of trade or custom.
iii. Acts done through usage or custom of trade; any act done through usage or
custom of trade bind the firm. (s. 201 (2))
In absence of the above conditions the firm and the partners will not be bound by acts
of individual partners.
DISSOLUTION OF PARTNERSHIP
There are various modes of dissolving partnerships as follows
i. Dissolution by expiration or notice; see section 212 of the LCA
ii. Dissolution by death, bankruptcy or charge; see section 213 of the LCA
v. When a partnership incurs persistent loss and there is evidence that there is
a practical impossibility that the business would make profit in future.
For this see Handyside v Campbell (1901) 17 TLR 623 in which a partner applied for
dissolution of partnership on basis of loss in business and the court decided as above.
vi. Partnership may be dissolved if its members are citizens of countries between which
war has broken out. See R v Kupfer (1915) 112 LT 1138
i. Ceasing of the Agency capacity; The partners lose power to act as agents of
the firms and the other partners, though partners retain their authority for
the purposes of winding up.
The manner in which such distribution is done is provided by s. 219 of the LCA as shown
hereunder.
Three persons GARNER, WILKINS & MURRAY started a partnership in which they would
share profits and losses equally. Sometime later the firm was facing loss and Wilkins
became insolvent and nothing amount could be realised from his private estate. On
disagreement on distribution of loss so, they filed a case in the court. A decision was
given in what is to day known as Garner vs. Murray Rule.
The rule: If on dissolution there is a loss and the loss is such that it puts any partner's
capital account into Debit, that partner must bring to that account some cash from his
own resources. If the partner whose capital account is in debit can not bring in the cash
to the amount of his loss, then the other partners must bear the resulting loss in the
ratio of their Capital accounts immediately prior to this settlement.
Whenever there are human beings, there are various risks associated with their
productive activities since the day to day activities of human beings necessarily involve
risks. In better words we can say that these risks are inherent in the society; i.e. they are
part and parcel of a human society.
Usually the nature of productive activities a particular society engages itself in will
determine the extent of risks inherent in that society. Risks usually develop in a direct
proportion trend to the development of this society.
It follows therefore that the risks that were common during the primitive societies’
period are in no way similar to those that are in place in present day societies. However
risks, despite discrepancies of levels of development of a society, affect economies in
the same way, big or small.
The law of insurance is all concerned with providing protection for misfortunes such as
fire, accidents, etc. Usually the protection is done by insurance companies and the
protected are the individual persons and business establishments. Evidence of a
relationship between parties is done through a contract known as the contract of
insurance. Insurance law generally concerns itself with providing rules and principles on
how risks in the society can be handled. In the primitive societies they used traditional
methods of handling the risks, but to day, the modern insurance employs economic
devices to handle risks, since to day insurance is a business.
Definition of insurance
Defining what is and is not a contract of insurance, is more difficult than might at first
appear. Most of cases are not clear enough since they tend to reiterate definitions as
provided by statutes that have existed over time. These cases24 are like
ii. Hall D’Ath v British Provident Association for Hospital and Additional Services
(1932)26 and
iii. Hampton v Toxteth Co-operative Provident Society Ltd [1915]27. New cases have
taken on the new definitions as they are provided by the new statutes. Some of
definitions only deal with insurance on very specific issues of the discipline. This has
brought into existence a number of definitions which sometimes do tend to conflict with
one another.
ATTEMPTED DEFINITIONS
(a) Abbot K et al (2007), Business Law, 8th Ed. Thomson Learning, UK at page 299
24
The Encyclopaedia of Forms and Precedents 5th edn. 1998 (reissue), volume 20.
25
84 LT 565
26
48 TLR 240, 76 Sol Jo 111
27
1 Ch 721, 84 LJ Ch 633, CA
Insurance is a contract whereby the insurer , in return for a sum of money called the
premium, contracts with the insured to pay a specified sum on the happening of a
specific event, for example death or accident or to indemnify the insured against any
loss caused by the risk insured against, for example fire.
(b) Vance W.R, (1930) Vance on Insurance, 3rd Ed. The West Publishing Company,
Washington at pg. 82
“Any contract, by which any party, for a valuable amount known as premium, assumes
risks or liabilities that rest upon the other pursuant to a plan for the distribution of such
risks, is a contract of insurance, what ever the form it takes or the name it bears”.
(a) In Lucena v.Crauford, insurance was defined as: ….a contract by which one party in
consideration of a price paid to him adequate to the risk becomes security to the other
that he (the other) shall not suffer loss, damage, or prejudice by the happening, of the
perils specified to certain things which may be exposed to them.
(b) Prudential Insurance Co v IRC [1904] 2 KB 658, 73 LJKB 734 sums it all.
Channel J in Prudential Insurance Co v IRC pointed out in this case that the essential
elements of a contract of insurance are:
i. the periodical payment of sums of money (usually called ‘the premium’) by the
insured;
ii. a promise by the insurer to pay a sum of money on the happening of a specified
event;
iii. the event must be one which is adverse (undesirable) to the interests of the policy
holder.
i. General characteristics
GENERAL CHARACTERISTICS
A contract of insurance bears all essential elements of a binding contract such as offer,
acceptance, competence, consideration, legality and free consent. The contract of
insurance also has some features additional to the mentioned ones, which distinguish it
from any other contracts as it will be shown hereunder on the presumption that you are
conversant with the essentials of a valid contract:
Recent developments
Current practice in insurance business shows that An insurance contract can be made
orally; instances are where proposer and insurer communicate over the phone. Offer
and acceptance are given and accepted respectively in conversation. These policies are
valid however proof of the fact that they were actually made is difficult; the only
manner of proof that an insurance contract exists is the evidence of payment of
premium.
ii. Acceptance;
Acceptance of the above mentioned offer is done by the insurance company after the
insured has submitted the forms and the company has had enough time to assess the
information therein presented and agreed to them.
iii. Consideration
DISTINCTIVE CHARACTERISTICS
This means it is not a commutative contract (that which the parties exchange equal
values to each other). In an aleatory contract of insurance the contracting parties are
aware that each party will not give equal sums of money; in this contract the insured
pays premium in expectation that if he suffers loss he may receive a much larger
amount from the insurer than he paid in the premium and if he does not suffer any loss,
that he will get nothing. There is therefore in the contract of insurance an element of
chance; first on the happening of the risk and/ or chance to get something or nothing
(to lose the premium)
There is also an element of chance when loss is suffered by insured that he may not
recover because of non observance of the conditions stated in the policy or because
the policy does not cover the loss that he has suffered.
ii. An insurance contract is a contract of ‘adhesion’ (i.e. a standard form contract: one
which an insured person either takes it or leaves it) and therefore distinguishable from a
bargain contract. An insurance contract provides no room for the insured to bargain on
the terms and conditions stated therein. The insured can not make a counter proposal
or even suggest that the document of insurance should be altered in certain aspects.
There is a reserved right to alteration of a contract of insurance for the insurer only. The
insurer may alter the terms of this contract by way of indorsement, meaning that the
insured has no room to negotiate.
In case there is any dispute between the parties as to the meaning of the content of the
contract, the court will usually apply the contra preferentum rule; this rule is applicable
generally to contracts and it states as follows:
‘where a contract is drawn up by a party, to the exclusion of the other party, it shall
be construed against the other party that has drawn it where it is vague, i.e. capable
of more than one meaning’.
An insurance contract by its nature is always an executory contract, in the sense that,
once the insured has paid his premium he is counted as having done his part and on the
part of the insurer the contract will remain executory until loss occurs or the contract
expires.
Unlike in a bilateral contract which binds both parties to the contract and which creates
reciprocal rights and obligations, an insurance contract is a unilateral contract and it
binds only the insurer; i.e. for the insurer it creates obligations and for the insured it
creates rights or privileges.
It usually loaded with a lot of conditions and implied warranties. The insurer has to
include these because these conditions are the only means by which the insured risks
are defined.
(a) The policy shall only run from the time the premium is paid.
(b) The condition that notice of loss by the insured must be given forthwith/
immediately/ or as soon as possible to the insurer.
The law has interpreted the words forthwith, immediately and as soon as possible, to
mean within reasonable time. The question as to what is reasonable time is a question
of fact in each particular case.
(a) There are various terms which are implied by statutory law, common law, doctrines
of equity etc.
There is an implied term that an insurance contract does not cover certainty of events.
It only covers losses. Due to this therefore if:
In this case if the ship causes the cargo to be destroyed because of defects in the ship
it will not be the problem of the insurer but that of the shipping company.
ii. The same presumption will be applied if the goods are transported by lorry in
which case the road worthiness of the same will be presumed, by rail; the
railworthness and by air the airworthiness etc.
(b) There is an implied warranty that the insured must have in the property he insures
against a risk an interest known as ‘insurable interest’ (discussed herein fore).
Besides the mentioned principles above insurance also operates under the umbrella of
other more specific principles as follows;
i. insurable interest
ii. utmost good faith
iii. indemnity
iv. subrogation
v. contribution
For a person to establish he has insurable interest in a given property or in case of a life
insurance in a given life, or venture or any other thing there are rules in respect of real
property insurance and life assurance as follows:
A. In General Insurance:
In this case Macaura who insured timber against fire was not entitled to benefit
from the insurance when he had sold the property to his company. The court
held that, Macaura ceased to have an insurable interest in the property he had
transferred to the company since he and the company had separate
personalities.
i. Ownership:
Is there a direct legal or equitable ownership? If the insured has a legal ownership then
he is said to have a right in rem, and if he has an equitable ownership then he has a
right in personam.
ii. Possession:
If the insured has a possession based on a rightful claim, he has an insurable interest
in what he possesses, since loss in possession would be a loss in an advantage. Like
the cases of hirer, builder or contractor.
In the case of North British and Mercantile Insurance Company v Moffat [1871] LR 7 CP
25)
It was held that, possession even when it is improper supports existence of insurable
interest; however in this case possession must be associated with some sort of
responsibility.
Presence of a contract is a good basis for insurable interest. Thus a creditor can claim
insurable interest in any property given to secure a loan
These relationships can also give rise to insurable interest e.g. trustee vis-à-vis trust
property, or beneficiary vis-à-vis trust property. The cases of bailor and bailees also
apply.
See the case of Waters v Monarch Fire & Life Assurance Company [1856] 5 EL & BL and
Co.
This case made it possible for bailors to insure goods they keep against any loss since
they have an insurable interest in the goods by keeping them.
Not only is this an implied warranty but also a statutory requirement. S. 108 (1) of the
Tanzania Insurance Act, 1996.
This section is to the effect that an insurance made without an insurable interest is ‘null
and void ab initio’
B. IN LIFE POLICIES
There is always an insurable interest in one’s own life: According to Wainewright (or
Wainwright) v Bland (1835) 1 Mood & R 481, (1836) 1 M & W 32 a person always has
an unlimited insurable interest in his own life. Thus, he may insure his own life for any
amount he chooses, the only constraint being his ability to pay the premiums.
interest, that is to say that the interest exists without the need to prove
any financial loss in the event of the death of the life assured.
(b) Spouses
The only situation in which it has been held that there is automatic
insurable interest is that of husband and wife. Reed and Royal Exchange
Assurance Co (1795) Peake Add Cas 70, NP.is usually treated as
establishing that a wife has an automatic interest in the life of her
husband, though in fact the point never came to be decided in that case.
In Griffiths v Fleming [1909] 1 KB 805, CA. It was held that the converse
also applied. See s. 72 (2) (b) (c) of the Tanzania Insurance Act, 1996
where it provides that
“…insurable interest is deemed to be present in
(b) a husband on the life of his wife;
(c) a wife on the life of the husband;”
Section 82 reads
Life insurance of minors
(1) A minor or a parent or the guardian of a minor may effect a life
insurance and pay the premiums due under the policy with money lawfully at
the disposal of the minor, his parent guardian:
Provided that–
(i) no benefit shall be paid other than as a result of death of the
minor, parent or a guardian if the minor has not attained sixteen years of age;
(ii) the total sums payable against all life insurance policies
outstanding at that time of the life of a minor who dies before he attains the
age of sixteen years shall not exceed one million or the sum of the total of the
premium paid under that policy, whichever is greater, and there are more
policies than one outstanding at that time where a contribution shall be due
against each policy to make up the total sum of one million shillings or any
greater sum as the case may be in proportion to the sum for which the policy is
effected;
(iii) a minor who has attained the age of sixteen years may without
the consent of his parent or guardian effect a life policy upon his own life and
shall be as competent in all respects to be a policy owner and to have and
exercise all the powers as if he were of adult age, except that he shall not while
he is still a minor pledge or cede the policy without the written consent of his
parent or guardian.
s. 72 (2) (d) (e) and (f) allows other categories of persons to take life
policies on lives of others in the following manner;
Insurable interest is deemed to be had by
(d) any person on the life of another upon whom he is wholly or in part
dependent for support or education;
(e) a company or other person, on the life of an officer or employee;
and
(f) a person who has a pecuniary interest in the duration of the life of
another person in the life of that person to the extent only of that
pecuniary interest at the outset.
There fore in life assurance one does not automatically have an insurable interest in the
life of another except in the circumstances provided by cases and the Insurance Act,
1996
This principle developed from the case of Carter v Boehm (1766) 3 Burr 1905, 1 Wm B1
593 in which it was stated that:
‘Insurance is a contract upon speculation. The special facts, upon which the contingent
chance is to be computed, lie most commonly in the knowledge of the insured only; the
underwriter trusts to his representation, and proceeds upon confidence that he does
not keep back any circumstance in his knowledge, to mislead the underwriter into a
belief that the circumstance does not exist, and to induce him to estimate the risk as if it
did not exist.’
In the case of Rozanes v Bowen [1928] 32 LL.L.R.98, Lord Scrutton stated that;
‘…it is the duty of the assured, the man who desires to have a policy to make a full
disclosure to the underwriter without being asked of all the material circumstances
because the underwriter knows nothing and the assured knows everything…’
According to the case of Urquhart v Macpherson (1878) 3 App Cas 831 when the
prospective insured misrepresents even innocently, causes the contract to voidable at
the option of the insurer unlike in the ordinary contract where innocent
misrepresentation does not render contract voidable.
This position was reiterated again in the recent case of Pan Atlantic Insurance Co Ltd v
Pine Top Insurance Co Ltd [1995] 1 AC 501, [1994] 3 All ER 581, HL.
The principle of indemnity embraces such doctrines as, insurable interest, subrogation,
contribution and abandonment and salvage.
Compensation for loss. In a property and casualty contract, the objective is to restore an
insured to the same financial position after the loss that he or she was in prior to the
loss. But the insured should not be able to profit by damage or destruction of property,
nor should the insured be in a worse financial position after a loss.
This is the right of the insurer to step into the shoes of the insured and enforce any
claim, which originally accrued to the insured, against third parties.
According to Midland Insurance Co v Smith (1881) 6 QBD 561.As a general principle, the
insurer must have complied with his obligation to indemnify the insured. This involves
admitting the legitimacy of the insured’s claim and actually paying the money to him. It
does not follow that the insured must have received a full indemnity for all his losses,
only that the insurer must have done all that he was obliged to do under the contract of
insurance. Thus, the existence of the right of subrogation is not precluded by the fact
that the insured must bear an excess on the policy, nor by the fact that there is an upper
limit on the cover provided.
According to the case of Yorkshire Insurance Co Ltd v Nisbet Shipping Co Ltd [1962] 2
QB 330, [1961] 2 All ER 487 subrogation is the right of any insurer once they have
settled the insured’s claims as seen above. Recovery should be apportioned between
the two insurers and if there is any excess it should be given back to the insured.
Where there is more than one enforceable policy at the time of loss of the same subject
matter the insurer may recover total loss from the either insurer and any insurer who
pays more than his share may claim his contribution from the others in proportion to
the sum insured with each other.
As a matter of principle when the dully filled out proposal form has been accepted:
We have seen that insurance operates as a contract. As a general rule an insurance
contract is formed by acceptance of a proposal from insured by the insurer in which
case a cover has to begin and both parties to it are bound. The following case is an
authority that a binding contract is resulted to when the proposal has been accepted.
Facts of the case: The proposer correctly stated on the proposal form for life assurance
that he had always been in good health. After medical examination he was proved to so
be in good health. When he consulted another doctor he was diagnosed as being
dangerously ill. He nonetheless tendered the first premium without disclosing any of
this and, after a few months’ premiums had been paid, he died. The receipt issued by
the insurer on payment of the first premium stated that the policy would be void if
there had been any material alteration in his health since the proposal form.
Holding of the court: It was held that there had been fraudulent non-disclosure and that
the policy was void.
Observation: this shows that annulment of the cover from the time of the acceptance of
the proposal means the contract began then not after the payment of the first
premium.
As a matter of practice when the first premium has been paid: most insurance
companies would wait until the first premium has been paid and consider this time as
being the beginning of cover.
In Canning v Farquhar a proposal for life assurance was accepted subject to payment of
the first premium. The proposal form contained a ‘basis of the contract’6 clause. Before
the premium was tendered the life suffered an accident, of which he soon died. The
premium was then tendered but was refused.
Holding: It was held that the company was entitled to refuse the premium because the
circumstances had altered. Where there is a ‘basis of the contract’ clause the
representations must remain true up to the time of contract, and in this case that meant
the tender of premium, since cover was expressly stated not to commence until that
time. The court suggested, obiter, that the position might be different if there had been
no change in material circumstances: it might be that in such a case the company would
be bound to accept the premium when tendered.
LIFE INSURANCE
There are four questions which have to be dealt with under this party;
At a general level, one may observe that the legislation in Tanzania is characterized by a
number of factors revolving around registration and regulation of the insurance
business under the conditions including:
s. 8 of the Insurance Act, 1996 requires that for an insurer to operate legally he must
be a body corporate incorporated under the Companies Act of Tanzania.
(b) Regulations relating to capital base requirement; (margin of solvency and security
deposit)
An insurer must have a certain amount of capital money to support business locally. The
underwriting business involves paying off of premiums. The margin of solvency is the
amount of money which must be maintained in the business. The company can not
operate below this amount.
The security fund ought to secure the payment of premiums if there are more claims in
a year than the company planned.
s. 12 of the Insurance Act deals with the margin of solvency and regulation 16 and 17
shows how to calculate it.
Legislation requires that insurance companies must keep books of accounts plus having
them audited every year.
ii. The principle of transparency; that which requires the accounts to be audited.
(e) Regulations relating to the requirement of general observance of the laws of the
country.
If at any time insurance company does not follow the law of the country, license may be
withheld or not granted at all.
See. S. 20 (f) of the insurance Act, 1996. The commissioner may give a notice to the
insurer expressing his intention to cancel his registration certificate.
Only those with requisite insurable interest. Concepts on insurable interest have already
been discussed above.
This is primarily a question of privity of contract. The general answer would be:
iv. Also the beneficiary third parties who have expressly been mentioned in the
policy through the party who can enforce it (a policy of this kind is known as
third party insurance policy).
The law that governs the third party motor insurance is known as the Motor Vehicles
Insurance Ordinance, Cap.169.
According to section 4 (1) of the ordinance, there is a duty to every person who owns a
motor vehicle in Tanzania to insure his car. Exceptions are stated in this law as all the
cars belonging to the government of the united republic of Tanzania as well as the
Tanzania Railways Corporation.
‘... it shall not be lawful for any person to use, or to cause or permit any other person to
use, a motor vehicle on a road unless there is in force in relation to the use of the
vehicle by that person or that other person, as the case may be, such a policy of
insurance or such a security in respect of third party risks as complies with the
requirements of this Ordinance’.
Generally section 5 of the ordinance provides for the categories of third parties who are
the third parties as follows:
iii. Those are inside the vehicles which are habitually used for hire.
The injuries covered are, according to s. 5 are fatal injuries and personal
injuries.
Where he is expressly declared to be beneficiary, usually the third party will not recover
payment directly though he is entitled to the same. He has two options:
i. either to sue the holder of a policy of insurance who in turn will sue the
insurance company or
ii. To team up with the owner of the motor vehicle and sue the insurance
company.
See the case of Tarlock Singh Nayar & Another v Sterling General Insurance Co.
Ltd [1966] E.A 144
In this case Tarlock Singh Nayar had taken an insurance policy in which the authorised
drivers were covered. The second plaintiff was the authorised driver who was involved
in accident injuring the passengers; one of the passengers sued the driver in which case
the driver paid damages for such injuries. The driver wanted the insurance company to
indemnify him for the damages he had paid the passenger. As a beneficiary under the
contract, he could not be said to be a party to that contract of insurance.
The court said that the driver could not sue in person; however he could sue if teamed
up with the holder of the policy who is Mr. Tarlock.
At any time the insured risk occurs the insured is supposed to give immediate notice of
such loss to the insurer and the insurer is supposed to compensate the insured.
However the insurer, prior to compensation studies if the loss is that which had been
insured. Due to this not every loss will be covered by an insurance policy.
CATEGORIES OF RISK
Ordinary wear and tear is one of the risks that are not covered by an insurance policy.
Instances of wear and tear are not covered because they are not contingent events in
the sense that they occur in the ordinary course of things.
Under common law the reason given for non coverage of wear and tear is that under a
contract of insurance:
‘ the casualty must be a fortuitous one, and not damage such as could be expected to
occur in normal circumstances’ such as ordinary wear and tear through normal use
(emphasis mine)
In Kant & Co. v British Traders Insurance Co. [1965] E.A 108
The insurance contract was one termed as an ‘all risks policy’ i.e. which could cover all
risks; however the court did not imply wear and tear as one of the risks.
An example of all risks policy is a comprehensive motor vehicle insurance policy. As the
name suggests, this policy is supposed to cover all risks except the following;
Lord Herschel in The Xantho [1887] App. CAS. 503 at pg. 509 stated that:
‘The purpose of a policy is to secure an indemnity against events which may happen
and not against events which must happen’. Wear and tear must happen
(depreciation)
Along those lines it has been held in Hunter v Potts [1815] 4 Camp 203 that, damage to
a ship by rats is not covered by a marine insurance policy. Or
In Austin v Drewel [1814] 4 Camp 360 and in Harris v Poland [1941] 1 K.B 462 that:
Damage of property by smoke and heat as distinct from flames is not included in the
risks covered by a fire insurance policy.
Lord Sumner in British Marine Insurance Co. v Gaunt [1921] AC 41 pg 51, stated that:
(a) In Taylor v Dumbar [1869] L.R 4 CP 206 putrescence of meat through delaying was
held to be an inherent vice which can not be covered by an insurance contract.
v. LOSS OF PROFIT
Unless specifically provided in the policy, loss of profit is not covered by an insurance
contract. However loss of value (cost price of goods) can be covered.
In Shelbourne Co. v Law Investment & Insurance Co. [1898] 2 QB 626 where the
insured claimed for loss of profit in a goods policy was informed by the court that loss
of profit is not covered under such a policy.
In Brunton v Marshall [1922] KB 10 LL. L.L L.R 689 and in City Taylors v Evans [1921] 91
L.J 379; 38 T.L.R 230 loss of profit was specifically mentioned in the policy thus the
applicants won.
vi. Consequential Loss are not covered: these are discussed herein after soon.
There are two rules or principles as regards attachment of risk and recovery of insurance
money as follows:
When loss is suffered and the insured claims to recover from an insurance company a
very basic issue arises; the questions such as
ii. Is that cause the risk covered under the policy of insurance?
In determining these two questions the rule used states: causa proxima non remota
spectatur which means that only the proximate cause of a loss is relevant for
consideration and not any remote cause of such a loss.
This is a practical and a discriminatory rule between the losses that are capable of
compensation and those which are not. All losses which are remote or indirect to the
risk insured against are not recoverable.
THEREFORE
As a general rule, losses which are not direct and therefore not proximate to the loss of
property are regarded as consequential losses. Consequential loss is not covered unless
specifically mentioned in any policy.
In Pyralli v Kuverji an insured claimed to recover from the destroyed lorry as well as
the loss he incurred due to the fact that the lorry had not generated money.
In Re Wright and Pole [1834] 1 Ad. & El. 621 where an insured pub was burnt down
the court held that consequential losses such as rent during all the time while the pub
was rebuilt were not recoverable.
The meaning of the term proximate cause has been given by decisions made in various
cases. The combination of these cases gives us the following characteristics of a
proximate cause as follows:
i. it should be a direct cause as per Lord Sumner in Becker & Gray v London
Assurance [1918] A.C 101
ii. it must be a dominant cause as per Lord Dunedin in Leyland v Norwich Union
[1918] A.C 350 363
iii. It must be an operative and efficient one as per Viscount Cave in Samuel v
Dumas [1924] A.C
Celebrated writers on insurance by the names Preston and Collinvaux have summed up
these characteristics in one sentence as follows:
‘By proximate cause is not meant the latest, but the direct, dominant, operative and
efficient one. If this cause is within the risks covered, the insurers are liable in respect of
the loss; if it is within the perils excepted the insurers are not liable’.
Sidney Preston and Raoul P. Colinvaux, (1950) The Law of Insurance, Sweet & Maxwell,
Ltd, London. At pg. 74
According to Preston and Colinvaux a loss may have two proximate causes.
have been suffered because the insured has had to take preemptive measures to
prevent risk insured against from happening are not recoverable because the proximate
cause in this case would not be the risk insured against but the fear of its occurrence.
ii. Once the risk operates, damage to the subject matter due to efforts to check the
progress of the casualty, is covered. Here the proximate cause is the risk insured
against
In Symington v Union Insurance of Canton [1928] 97 L.J.K.B 646, efforts were made to
restrain spread of fire by throwing cork, the subject matter of the insurance policy, into
the sea because fire had already broken out. Loss of cork by throwing into the sea was
held to be compensable.
loss, such intervention is the proximate cause and not the risk (unless it
was done to mitigate the loss)
The running down of a man in a fit of death was a proximate cause of his loss of life and
not the fit itself.
ii. Where human action happens at the same time with the natural
cause:
According to Liverpool and London v Ocean S.S. Co. [1948] A.C. 243 it was stated that:
‘ There is a wider rule that where a cause brought about by a human agency is
competing with a cause brought about by a natural cause; the one brought about by
human agency is dominant and therefore the proximate cause since man by his will
dominates the world”.
v. The death- blow cases (where human act begins and is followed by a
natural cause)
The death-blow cases are a reverse of the principle of novus actus interverniens. Under
the death-blow cases where a casualty due to human agency is followed by natural
causes which contribute to the loss, the chain of causation is not broken i.e. it is the
human agency and the natural cause together that are the proximate cause, with the
one completing the loss dominating.
In Leyland v Norwich Union [1918] A.C. 350, therefore, where a ship which was
capsizing due to a storm was hit by a torpedo (a very fast boat) thus facilitating the
destruction it was held that the torpedo gave the boat her death blow i.e. the torpedo
was the proximate cause of the loss boat.
(b) APPLICATION OF THE PRINCIPLE OF ‘INDEMNITY’ (NATURE OF THE LOSS) AND THE
‘RULE OF THUMB’
Once the loss has been proved to be proximate the insurance company will apply the
principles of indemnity before compensation of the loss.
The measure of indemnity in respect of the loss of any property is not determined by
its cost but by its value at the date and at the place where loss occurred.
The indemnity grows in a direct proportion to the increase in value of the subject matter
and so does it diminish at the decrease of the value of the subject matter.
i. insurable interest
The law requires that the insured person must have in the subject matter of insurance
an insurable interest at the time of the loss. No recovery of insurance money if the
insured at this time does not have the interest.
An insured person is entitled only the value of the injury done to the insured property. If
he wants to recover the full value he is supposed to surrender the remains of the
subject matter destroyed to the insurer. The salvage principle runs solely with property.
According to the case of Rankin v Potter [1873] L.R, 6 H.L. 83, the assured must agree
to treat the subject matter, in cases it is not whole destroyed, as whole destroyed
other wise he can not claim the whole value of it from the insurance company.
According to Brett L.J. in Kaltenbach v Mackenzie [1878] 3 C.P.D 467, this principle
applies to any contract of indemnity and in his own phraseology he said that:
Under this principle the insured person is supposed to relinquish every right he has
against third parties to the insured company after he has been compensated.
This usually happens when the risk has been caused by a third party which means the
insured party has the right to claim damages from this third party. The fact that he may
claim from the insured company does not bar him from claiming from this third person;
under this circumstance he has two rights but once the company has paid him he is
supposed to relinquish his rights in respect of the third party to the insurer. This goes
with every other right the insured has from the third party.
Why?
Because the aim of insurance is not to make any person richer than he was before the
loss occurred or to make him any poorer than he used to be prior to such loss.
The insurance company will employ the rule of thumb principle to measure recovery of
money by the assured.
The measure of recovery is the actual loss suffered or the insured sum whichever is the
less’ i.e one is paid the actual loss so long as it does not exceed the insured sum.
ILLUSTRATION:
I. If A has insured his car against accident for 10, 000/=. If when the car gets accident
and is damaged to the value of 2000/= only then the insured is paid only 2000/= enough
to restore him and not more.
II. If the cost of restoration exceeds 10,000/= say comes to 15000/=, he shall only be
paid 10,000/=
(a) i. Over insurance (of valued policies28): this is the situation where an insured person
insures his property at a more sum than the actual value of the same example when a
house of 5 shs/= is insured against fire at 10/= shs; therefore
a. if there is an over insurance and the property has been totally destroyed the
insurance company will compensate for the value agreed.
This will neither make the insured gain more nor lose.
b. If there is partial loss the insured shall recover such proportion of the
agreed value as is represented by the depreciation in the actual value:
28
A policy is a valued one if the parties agreed what should be the value of the subject matter of insurance.
Depreciation
ILLUSTRATION:
In Elcock V Thomson (1949) a house was insured against fire. The value of the house in
the policy was agreed to be 106, 850 pounds while its actual value was only 18,000
pounds; the value of the house after the fire came down to 12600/= pounds. The court
held that the recovery was as per the following calculation;
5400 (Depreciation)
c. Over insurance (unvalued policy): if the policy is not valued the measure of
indemnity is governed by the following two principles;
i. in case of total loss the insured is paid the market value of the property at
the time and place of loss.
ILLUSTRATION
In Leppard v Excess Insurance Co (1979) the insured who paid 10000 pounds as
insurance against his house could recover only 3000 when it was totally destroyed by
fire.
ii. in the event of partial loss the insured is paid the cost of repairs
(b) The reverse of over insurance is underinsurance: this is a situation where the
insured sum is less than the actual value of the subject matter. If an application of rule
of thumb is done the insurer will only pay the insured sum.
i. if there is a total loss of the subject matter, the insured will be paid the whole of the
value insured and the remaining part will be a responsibility of the insured person.
ii. If there is partial loss of the subject matter: the rule of thumb will apply.
(d) Full insurance: this is a situation when the value of the subject matter insured is
equal to the insured sum.
i. If there is a total loss, the insurer applying the rule of thumb will pay the 2 million
ii. if there is partial loss the insurer will pay only that part which is equal to the loss
sustained.
A contract of insurance can be brought to an end if the parties agree to this effect.
Usually there is a clause in a contract of insurance allowing either party to give notice
seeking to end the contract to the other party within stipulated time. If the notice is
followed by an agreement to replace the old contract with a new one then this is
refereed to as discharge of the contract of insurance by NOVATION.
Therefore this is a highlight of the law relating to insurance, providing only general
matter. You are advised to read more books for more specific matters on this part.
Introduction
The payment system the world over is commonly featured with three agents of
payment as follows:
To negotiate in the legal sense means: to transfer a title in the document from one
person to the other. Such transfer can be done either by mere delivery (handing over
the instrument to another) or by indorsement and delivery.
To indorse means: to write the name of a person (other than the original owner of the
instrument) to be paid at the back of the instrument and sign it.
Is the instrument whose full and legal title is transferable by mere delivery or
endorsement of the instrument with the legal result that the complete ownership of the
instrument and all the properties it represents passes free from equity to the transferee
providing that the latter takes the instrument in good faith and for value.
negotiation between the drawer of the negotiable instrument and the payee of the
same.
For a negotiable instrument to be fully negotiable the following features have been
noted:
i. It must be such that a complete transfer of it can be made by its mere delivery with or
without endorsement although by the transferor may be necessary.
ii. A full and a legal title in the instrument must pass with such transfer; this implies
that the transferee can sue in his own name as possessing all the rights to the
instrument and to the property it represents.
iii. The title must pass to the transferee, who takes the instrument for value and in good
faith29, free from all equities (interests).
In conclusion these are features that distinguish a negotiable instrument from other
instruments; no need of drawing up a deed or registration of the same to render the
passing of title in a negotiable instrument and other negotiable instruments
Forms of negotiations
(a) It may be by way of indorsement (signing or initialing at the back of the negotiable
instrument) and delivery used in respect of order negotiable instruments.
Types of endorsement
29
According to s. 96 of BEA a thing is deemed to be done in good faith,… where it is infact done
honestly… If he takes it honestly and in complete ignorance of any equity affecting the title of the
transferor,it does not matter, according to this section that the thing is done negligently.
(a) S. 34(1) an endorsement in blank; the one which specifies no indorsee and a
negotiable instrument so indorsed becomes payable to bearer. Here only the signature
of the indorser is seen without the name of the endorsee.
Illustration:
Sangara
(ii) s. 34(2) special indorsement; the one which specifies the one to whom it is payable:
Illustration:
Sangara
An indorsement is irregular if it differs from the form of the order to pay e.g. if A has
drawn a negotiable instrument in favour of KISIWA (the name being spelt wrongly, it
was supposed to be KISILWA). In this case KISILWA may indorse this negotiable
instrument as KISIWA the wrongly spelt name and add his right signature. The
discrepancy between the order to pay and the indorsement results in an irregular
indorsement. See s. 32 (d)
v. Restrictive indorsement
an indorsement is restrictive which prohibits the further negotiation of the bill or which
expresses that it is a mere authority to deal with the bill as thereby directed and not a
transfer of the ownership thereof, as, for example, if a bill be indorsed “pay D. only”, or
“pay D for the account of X”, or “pay D or order for collection”
According to s.35 (2) of the BEO, the indorsee in this case acts as an agent and in no
way the owner of the negotiable instrument. He has the right to receive payment to the
bill and the power to sue as that of his employer. However he does not have the power
to transfer such rights as indorsee.
(b) It may be effected by mere delivery to the third party used in respect of bearer
negotiable instruments.
S.31 (3) a bill payable to order is negotiated by the endorsement of the holder
completed by delivery.
i. Bills of exchange
S. 3 (1) of the Bills of Exchange Ordinance, Cap 214 defines a bill of exchange as; an
unconditional order in writing addressed by one person to another, signed by the
person giving it, requiring the person to whom it is addressed to pay on demand or at a
fixed or determinable future time a sum certain in money to or to the order of a
specified person or to bearer.
An unconditional order
In writing
Addressed by one person to another
Signed by the person giving it
Requiring the person to whom it is being addressed
To pay on demand or order at a fixed or determinable future time
A sum certain in money
To or to the order of a specified person or to bearer
ii. A cheque
Section 73 of the BEA defines a cheque as a bill of exchange drawn on a banker payable
on demand.
The differences between a cheque and an ordinary bill of exchange are as follows;
i. Drawee; the drawee in a cheque must be the bank while the drawee can be
any person in a bill of exchange.
ii. Time of payment: A cheque is payable on demand only while a bill of exchange
may be payable either on demand or at a fixed or determinable future time.
iii. Acceptance; the bill of exchange is accepted by the drawee on which the bill is
drawn. A cheque does not have to be accepted by the drawee bank before being paid.
iv. Liability on drawer for late presentment for payment; in bills of exchange the
drawer of it is discharged from liability if the holder of it delays in presenting the same
for payment to the acceptor while the drawer of a cheque is liable for six years from the
date of dishonour or from the date it was issued depending on whichever is the later
date.
v. Crossing; Crossing is reserved for cheques only while bills of exchange can not
be crossed.
vi. Relationship between drawer and drawee; between the drawer of a cheque
and the drawee bank there is a contractual relationship, the former being the customer
to the latter. In a bill of exchange there is no such relationship of a banker and
customer.
Creation of a bill of exchange will be right only when the features, of the same,
described in the definition are properly reflected. These features are as follows:
When you make this instrument, make sure that it is, first of all, an order. The drawer
must order someone to pay. This order must be unconditional, by being unconditional
means it must be entirely unqualified in its application to a drawee. In more explicit
terms it must not depend on something to happen or circumstances obtaining at the
time of payment.
Paka Mapepe pay Panya Mstaarabu Shs. 2000/= (two thousand only) if you can do that.
Date: 10/07/2007
Here the words if you can do that are conditional; the law requires that the order must
not be coupled with a condition, it must be unqualified.
Paka Mapepe pay Panya Mstaarabu Shs. 2000/= (two thousand only) on demand.
Date: 10/07/2007
And an order must be distinguished from a request. A bill of exchange must not be a
request as illustrated here under;
Paka Mapepe will you please pay Panya mstaarabu shs. 2000/= (two thousand only) on
demand.
Date: 10/07/2007
The words ‘will you please’ have the effect of making the contents of the instrument a
request.
At any time if the order in an instrument is conditional, the instrument is not recognized
as a bill of exchange. See section 3 (2) of BEO.
If the parties to a bill are not mentioned, the court will usually disqualify it as a bill of
exchange.
‘On demand pay to Mrs. Zoi Bickos or Order the sum of 1000/= money received by cash’
The court held that: this is neither a promissory note, a bill of exchange nor a bill of
exchange.
A bill drawn must show certainty as to parties to that instrument. The bill of exchange
must have the drawer according to s. 3 (1) of the BEO.
It is his signature; without this signature the instrument is not a bill. The signature is
required by s. 3 (1)
The signature of the drawer determines his liabilities to any person regarding the
instrument – see section 23 of BEO. It follows therefore that if his signature is missing he
has no liability whatsoever.
The drawer may sign the instrument by using his usual signature.
If he is a tradesman he can sign using his business name eg. Massawe and
Company Ltd.
In case of a firm, the signature of the firm may be used. See section 23 of the
BEO. In case it one person signs, in case of a firm, the signature will bind all the
partners of a firm.
The drawer may authorise another person to sign in his behalf i.e. procuration
signature.
If the instrument is not signed by the drawer or under the authority of the drawer the
document can not qualify as a bill of exchange.
(b) The words ‘to another’ referred to under s. 3(1) refer to the drawee
The drawee is the person to whom the drawer addresses his order.
s. 6 (1) of BEO requires that the drawee must be named or otherwise indicated in the
bill with reasonable certainty.
‘The drawee must be named or otherwise indicated in a bill with reasonable certainty’.
s. 6 (2) allows the drawer to address the bill to more than two drawees but when this
happens it must not be such that the bill is addressed to them in the alternative or in
succession.
In this case the drawee was not mentioned in the document that is why the court
disqualified it as a bill of exchange.
(iii) Requiring the person to whom it is addressed to pay some certain in money to or
to the order of a specified person
The words ‘…to or to the order of a specified person’ appearing in the definition refer
to the payee of a bill of exchange.
According to s. 7 (1) where a bill is not payable to bearer the payee must be named or
otherwise indicated therein with reasonable certainty. Therefore the law requires that
the payee must be certain if it is Juma, then Juma must he be.
Types of payees
Where the payee is a fictitious or non existing person the bill may be treated as payable
to bearer.
If the drawer knows of the existence of the payee at the time he signs the bill and in fact
he intends the payee to receive payment, then the payee in this case is referred to as
the existing payee. Knowledge and intention on the party of the drawer must be
present.
If the drawer did not know of the existence of the payee when he signs the bill, but
nevertheless intends that the payee should receive the payment, then the payee is
known as the non existing payee.
Fictitious payee comes into being when the requirement of acceptance of the bill by the
drawee before it is payable is effected. Usually after the drawer has drawn a bill, he has
to present it to the drawee for acceptance of liabilities. Once drawee has accepted the
liability he becomes liable to pay. According to s. 54 of BEA once the acceptor of a bill
has accepted the bill he can not revoke his acceptance.
It follows therefore that if the drawer knows that the payee exists but he does not
intend him to receive payment. The payee under this circumstance is a fictitious
payee.
There were three persons in this case; Vagliano, a merchant banker who used to accept
foreign bills, Gylka, his cleark who knew how to deal with these bills exactly in the same
way as Vagliano did, Vusina, the purpoted drawer and lastly Petrid, the purpoted
payee.
Gylka, the cleark, making use of the knowledge he had on bills he drew a number of
instruments using Vusina as the name of the drawer and Petrid as the name of the
payee, on Vagliano (i.e. Vagliano was the drawee who was supposed to pay)
See the following illustration: Gylka made the instrument appear as if it had been
drawn by Vusina.
Vusina Vagliano
Petrid
The document was a forgery in which Vusina, though he existed, had nothing to do with
the preparation of it.
Gylka after drawing it did everything that Vagliano would do in such a situation. i.e. he
made it accepted by Vagliano and made notification to a banker for payment to Petrid.
The bank debited the account of Vagliano, when he discovered the forgery he notified
the bank not to pay but they had already paid and subsequently debited his account.
Gylka who was the drawer of the bill knew the existence of the payee, Petrid but he did
not intend him to receive the money. Petrid was inserted as fiction so that Gylka can
obtain the money for himself.
What is the legal effect where the payee in a bill is a fictitious person?
s. 7 (3) states that; where the payee is a fictitious or non- existing person the bill may
be treated as payable to bearer.
Because, By. 54 of BEA until the bill has come all the way to the point of being paid the
drawee is required to accept it first and by accepting it he can not deny his
acceptance.
To be a genuine bill a document is supposed to dully signed by the person who gives or
draws it. According to s. 3 (1) signature is essential, it is this signature which gives
authenticity to a bill of exchange.
Under this part before establishing the liabilities it is essential that relevant terms are
introduced as would be used in this discussion:
i. Holder
Section 2 of the BEA defines a holder as the payee/ indorsee in possession of the bill or
bearer thereof
Drawer Drawee
Payee
a holder
Indorsee
A holder who had taken a bill, complete and regular on the face of it, under the
following conditions, namely:
(a) that he became the holder of it before it was overdue, and without notice that it had
been previously dishonoured if such was the fact;
(b) that he took the bill in good faith and for value, and that at the time the bill was
negotiated to him he had no notice of any defect in the title of the person who
negotiated it.
The title of a person who negotiates a bill can be defective if he obtained the bill in one
of the following circumstances;
(i) By fraud
(ii) By duress or
(v) for an illegal consideration e.g. If it was given in payment of illicit drugs.etc
Therefore, for a holder to be a “holder in due course” and thus enjoy the full protection
of the law he must have taken a bill that is:
(b) Must have taken it before it was over due and he was
unaware that the bill was previously dishonoured.
(c) He must have taken it in good faith and for value without
notice of any defect in title of his transferor.
Any person who has become the holder of a bill of exchange and who has not himself
given value to the instrument, but previously value had been given to it by some one.
A B
C PAYEE
D 1 st INDORSEE
E 2nd INDOSEE
Suppose in t his illustration D gave the bill of exchange to E as a gift (which means E has
not given value for it), E is nonetheless a holder for value and not the holder in due
course.
s. 27(2) reads:
Where value has at any time been given for a bill, the holder is deemed to be a holder
for value as regards the acceptor and all parties to the bill who become parties prior to
such time.
According to this section it is not necessary that value must have been given by him.
A bill is forged if any party to it purports to be any person who did not make it or on
behalf of any person who did not authorise the making of it. This is usually done when a
person signs a bill in the name of another or on his behalf without his authority in order
that the bill may be issued or negotiated, the signature is a forgery.
Example; when a person signs a BILL in the name or on behalf of another without such
other person’s authority in order that the bill may be issued or negotiated, the signature
is the forgery.
Remember the parties to a bill of exchange are drawer; drawee and payee, there may
be indorsers and indorsees. This party discusses liabilities of each one of them when
their signatures have been forged.
A B
D indorser
E indorsee
Under this illustration the last person to whom the bill of exchange is negotiated is E,
suppose the forged bill passed to D unnoticed and finally to E who is denied payment
on the ground that it was forged.
Answer:
According to s. 3(1), signature on the part of drawer is essential to make the instrument
a bill of exchange. It follows therefore that a person’s liability depends on whether or
not he has signed on the bill of exchange (whoever signs).
s. 3(2) the bill of exchange with a forged signature does not qualify as a bill of exchange.
s. 23, the drawer is not liable for a forged signature, i.e. he is not liable on the bill of
exchange that he has not signed.
As we have seen, the liability of the drawer is dependent on the whether he has put his
signature on the document or not. If his signature is not there then in no way can he
liable.
(a) Engages that on due presentment it shall be accepted and paid according to its
tenor, and that if it be dishonoured he will compensate the holder or any indorser who
is compelled to pay it…”
(b) he is precluded from denying to a holder in due course the existence of the payee
and his then capacity to indorse.
Suppose the drawer’s signature on a bill of exchange has been forged, and the indorser
has negotiated it to another person in such state.
We have already seen that the drawer is not liable on the bill of exchange in which his
signature has been forged. What then is the liability of the indorser?
Before answering this question it is worth reminding you the various modes of
negotiating a bill of exchange:
The indorser will not be liable on a bearer bill of exchange, simply because it does not
bear his signature.
This is the substance of s.58 (1) of the BEO, which reads as follows:
“Where the holder of the bill payable to bearer negotiates it by delivery without
indorsing it, he is called a “transferor by delivery”
Subsection 2 of the same section declares him not liable on the instrument.
(ii) that he (the immediate transferee) has the right to transfer it to another person
(iii) that at the time of such transfer he is unaware of any fact which renders the bill of
exchange valueless.
This implies that the “transferor by delivery” will be liable only to his immediate
transferee and only in respect of the above three guarantees as laid down by sub-
section 3 of this section. The immediate transferee can not claim to all the transferee
prior to the “transferee by delivery”
Problems usually arise with order bill of exchanges which have to be negotiated by
indorsement and delivery.
No definition of indorser is given in the BEO. How ever ss. 31(3) and 32 of BEO are
important to imply the meaning of indorser.
s. 31(3) defines indorsement. S. 32 lays down conditions for which a valid indorsement
is effected in that it;
‘It must be written on the bill itself and be signed by the indorser. The simple
signature of the indorser without additional words is sufficient’.
This person who signs on the bill to effect an indorsement is thus the indorser.
His signature is, therefore, very essential for without which the bill of exchange will not
have been negotiated.
When the signature of indorser is missing or has been forged, it means then that the bill
of exchange, according to s.32 above mentioned, has not been negotiated and thus title
has not passed from him.
But under this circumstance where only the drawer’s signature is a forgery, but that of
the indorser is real (not forged) then the indorser will be liable for the following reason:
When the bill of exchange reaches the indorsee, he believes that it is a real bill since it
bears indorsement.
The indorsement by the indorser acts as a guarantee to the subsequent holders that
both the signatures of the drawer and payee are in order.
This guarantee precludes the indorsers from later denying the truth of their
representation.
This is the general picture provided by s. 55(2) of the BEO, which reads as follows:
(a) engages that on due presentment it shall be accepted and paid according to its
tenor, and that if it is dishonoured he will compensate the holder or a subsequent
indorser who is compelled to pay it…”
(b) is precluded from denying to a holder in due course the genuineness and regularity
in all respects of drawer’s signature and all previous indorsements;
(c) is precluded from denying to his immediate or a subsequent indorsee that the bill
was at the time of his indorsement a valid and subsisting bill, and that he had then a
good title thereto.
Read also s. 24 of the BEO, on the situation where the signature of the indorser is
forged.
Conclusively, the holder in due course will be entitled to sue all those who have
guaranteed the genuineness of the bill of exchange and not those whose signatures
have been forged as we have seen signature if it is not forged is very much essential to
liability of the parties to a bill/bill of exchange.
Assume that the forged bill has been presented to B and he has accepted liability to pay
Answer
According to s. 3 (1) of the BEA signature on the bill is an essential feature without
which a bill is not a bill
According to s. 3 (2) if this and any other essential feature provided under s. 3 (1)
The acceptance of a bill is the signification by the drawee of his assent to the order of
the drawer.
(a) It must be written on the bill and be signed by the drawee and the mere signature of
the drawee without additional word is sufficient
(b) It must not express the drawee will perform his promise by any other means than
the payment of money
Problem
s. 17 says that drawer must write on the bill, but since the signature of drawer is forged
it is not a bill.
Thus the drawee by accepting it he has given an impression that the document is a real
‘bill’
2. Since the document is not a bill thus under it no title has passed
But the guarantee to pay by drawee thereby constitutes him the acceptor made those
who receive the instrument to acquire the rights to be paid. Through the acceptor’s
guarantee all the indorsees were put in a position as if the document was a ‘bill’.
KUKU JOGOO
YAI
KIFARANGA
KUNGURU
MBUZI
Assume that a valid BILL OF EXCHANGE was drawn by KUKU on JOGOO in favour of
YAI. YAI indorses it to KIFARANGA. After his indorsement KUNGURU steals the bill of
exchange and forges the signature of KIFARANGA and subsequently indorses it to
MBUZI.
Under this situation where the signature of the indorser (KIFARANGA) has been forged
no title will have passed from KIFARANGA to KUNGURU and thus KIFARANGA is still
regarded as the holder of the bill of exchange.
Therefore, since KUNGURU who negotiated the bill of exchange to MBUZI had no title
over it, then MBUZI acquired no title too.
Though it is in possession of MBUZI after being negotiated to him, the bill is still
payable to KIFARANGA.
According to s. 55(2) those who indorse subsequently (i.e. after the forgery) do
guarantee that indorsement is in order. Though MBUZI has given value for it he can
proceed against KUNGURU and in no way against KIFARANGA since title had not
passed from him.
The fact is, if MBUZI negotiated the defective bill of exchange further to NG’OMBE and
NG’OMBE to FARASI and lastly FARASI to PUNDAMILIA, who presents the bill of
exchange for payment and it is dishonoured, then PUNDAMILIA can proceed only
against all those who guaranteed it to be a bill by negotiating it, of course after the
forgery. This is the substance of s. 55(2)
Generally a bill of exchange is discharged when the purpose for which it had been drawn
has been fulfilled.
There are various ways by which a bill may be discharged according to the Bills of
exchange Act as follows:
(2) Subject to the provisions hereinafter contained, when a bill is paid by the
drawer or an indorser it is not discharged; but–
(a) where a bill payable to, or to the order of, a third party is paid by the
drawer, the drawer may enforce payment thereof against the acceptor, but may not
re-issue the bill;
(1) When the holder of a bill at or after its maturity absolutely and
unconditionally renounces his rights against the acceptor the bill is discharged and the
renunciation must be in writing, unless the bill is delivered up to the acceptor.
(2) The liabilities of any party to a bill may in like manner be renounced by the
holder before, at, or after its maturity; but nothing in this section shall affect the rights
of a holder in due course without notice of the renunciation.
iii. By s. 63 a bill may be discharged by cancellation on the part of the holder of it.
(1) Where a bill is intentionally cancelled by the holder or his agent, and the cancellation
is apparent the bill is discharged.
(2) In like manner any party liable on a bill may be discharged by the intentional
cancellation of his signature by the holder or his agent and in such case any indorser
who would have had a right of recourse against the party whose signature is cancelled,
is also discharged.
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