INTERNATIONAL COURT OF JUSTICE

______________________________________________________________________________

INTERPRETATION AND APPLICATION OF

THE INTERNATIONAL CONVENTION ON THE ELIMINATION
OF ALL FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

(THE STATE OF QATAR v. THE UNITED ARAB EMIRATES)

MEMORIAL OF THE STATE OF QATAR

VOLUME I

25 APRIL 2019
TABLE OF CONTENTS

CHAPTER I INTRODUCTION ............................................................................. 1

Section I. Overview of the Case .................................................................. 1

Section II. Structure of the Memorial ........................................................ 13

CHAPTER II THE FACTS UNDERLYING QATAR’S CLAIMS ..................... 17

Section I. The Context of the Dispute ....................................................... 18

Section II. The Imposition of the UAE’s Discriminatory Measures ......... 22
A. THE 5 JUNE DIRECTIVE AND COLLECTIVE EXPULSION OF
QATARIS ...................................................................................... 22
B. THE TRAVEL BAN AND RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT ................ 33
C. THE ATTACK ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND
INCITEMENT OF ANTI-QATARI SENTIMENT .................................. 41
1. The Criminalization of “Sympathizing” with Qatar...... 41
2. The Suppression of Qatari Media .................................. 45
3. The UAE’s Campaign of Misinformation and Anti-
Qatari Hate Speech ....................................................... 48
Section III. The UAE’s Escalation of the Crisis and Qatar’s Response.... 59
Section IV. The International Condemnation of the Discriminatory
Measures ............................................................................................ 67

CHAPTER III JURISDICTION ............................................................................ 75

Section I. The UAE’s Discrimination Against Qataris Falls Within the

Scope Ratione Materiae of the CERD ............................................... 77
A. THE CERD’S PROTECTIVE SCOPE ENCOMPASSES ALL
FORMS OF RACIAL DISCRIMINATION ........................................... 78
B. THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF BY QATAR FALL WITHIN THE
CERD’S PROTECTIVE SCOPE ....................................................... 85
1. The UAE’s Measures Explicitly Targeting “Qatari
Residents and Visitors” and “Qatari Nationals” Fall
within CERD’s Scope Ratione Materiae Based on
their Discriminatory Purpose ........................................ 88

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2. The Discriminatory Measures Fall Within the
CERD’s Scope Ratione Materiae Based on Their
Discriminatory Effect on Qataris ................................ 126
Section II. The Dispute “Is Not Settled” for the Purposes of Article 22 . 141
A. ARTICLE 22 ESTABLISHES ALTERNATIVE, NOT
CUMULATIVE, REQUIREMENTS .................................................. 142
1. Article 22’s Requirements Cannot Be Cumulative
When Read in Light of the “Logic and Purpose” of
CERD and in Context with its Other Provisions ........ 142
2. The Preparatory Works of CERD Confirm that
Article 22’s Requirements are Alternative ................. 150
3. None of the UAE’s Reasons Why Article 22’s
Requirements Should Be Read Cumulatively Has
Merit............................................................................ 155
B. THE NEGOTIATION REQUIREMENT HAS BEEN SATISFIED ........... 165

CHAPTER IV QATAR’S CLAIMS ARE ADMISSIBLE ................................. 183

SECTION I. THE LOCAL REMEDIES RULE DOES NOT BAR QATAR’S

CLAIMS ............................................................................................. 184
A. THE LOCAL REMEDIES RULE DOES NOT APPLY TO QATAR’S
CLAIMS ...................................................................................... 184
1. The Local Remedies Rule Does Not Apply in
Circumstances of Widespread Harm or Generalized
State Policies and Practices......................................... 187
2. The Local Remedies Rule Does Not Apply in View
of Qatar’s Claims of Direct Injury to Its Own
Interests under the CERD ........................................... 192
B. THE UAE HAS FAILED TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF ANY
EFFECTIVE AND REASONABLY AVAILABLE REMEDIES THAT
HAVE NOT BEEN EXHAUSTED ................................................... 201
1. The “Hotline” Is Not a Legal Remedy ........................ 206
2. The UAE’s Courts Are Neither Effective nor
Reasonably Available ................................................. 216
Section II. Qatar’s Recourse to the CERD Procedure Does Not
Constitute a Bar to the Admissibility of Qatar’s Claims.................. 227

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CHAPTER V THE UAE HAS VIOLATED THE CERD .................................. 235

Section I. The UAE Violated Article 2(1), Article 5(a) and Article 6 of
the CERD by Collectively Expelling Qataris................................... 236
A. THE CERD REQUIRES STATES PARTIES TO ENSURE THAT
THEY DO NOT EXPEL NON-NATIONALS FROM THEIR
TERRITORY ON A COLLECTIVE BASIS ........................................ 237
B. THE UAE COLLECTIVELY EXPELLED QATARIS FROM ITS
TERRITORY IN VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2(1) .............................. 245
1. The Purpose of the Expulsion Order and Absolute
Travel Ban Was to Collectively Expel Qataris from
the UAE ...................................................................... 246
2. The Expulsion Order and Absolute Travel Ban Had
the Effect of Expelling Qataris on a Collective Basis 254
C. THE COLLECTIVE EXPULSION OF QATARIS ALSO VIOLATED
ARTICLE 5(A) AND ARTICLE 6 OF THE CERD ............................ 265
Section II. The UAE’s Maintenance of the Absolute Travel Ban
Violated and the Modified Travel Ban Continues to Violate
Articles 2(1), 5(a), 5(d)(iv), 5(d)(v), 5(e)(i), 5(e)(v) and 6 of the
CERD ............................................................................................... 268
A. THE ABSOLUTE TRAVEL BAN WAS NEITHER LEGITIMATE
NOR PROPORTIONAL .................................................................. 269

B. THE MODIFIED TRAVEL BAN IS NEITHER LEGITIMATE NOR

PROPORTIONAL .......................................................................... 272
C. THE UAE’S ABSOLUTE TRAVEL BAN VIOLATED AND ITS
MAINTENANCE OF THE MODIFIED TRAVEL BAN CONTINUES
TO VIOLATE ARTICLES 2(1), 5, AND 6 OF THE CERD ................ 289

1. Interference with the Right to Family Life .................. 292

2. Interference with the Right to Education and
Training ....................................................................... 299
3. Interference with the Right to Property ....................... 307
4. Interference with the Right to Work............................ 313
5. Interference with Right to Equal Treatment Before
Tribunals ..................................................................... 314
Section III. The UAE’s Interference with Qataris’ Right to Freedom of
Opinion and Expression Violates Articles 2(1), 5(d)(viii) and 6 of
the CERD ......................................................................................... 317
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Section IV. The UAE’s Propagation and Incitement of Discriminatory
Anti-Qatari Propaganda and Ideas Violate Articles 2, 4, 6 and 7 of
the CERD ......................................................................................... 322
A. THE UAE IS VIOLATING THE CERD THROUGH ITS ANTI-
QATARI INCITEMENT CAMPAIGN ............................................... 323
B. THE UAE IS VIOLATING THE CERD BY FAILING TO TAKE
EFFECTIVE MEASURES TO ERADICATE INCITEMENT TO
RACIAL DISCRIMINATION .......................................................... 335

CHAPTER VI THE UAE’S ONGOING VIOLATION OF THE

PROVISIONAL MEASURES ORDER ....................................................... 343

Section I. The Order’s Binding and Autonomous Legal Character ........ 344
Section II. The UAE’s Intransigent and Inadequate Response to the
Order ................................................................................................ 346

CHAPTER VII REMEDIES ............................................................................... 353

Section I. The Applicable Principles ....................................................... 353

Section II. The Relief Sought .................................................................. 361

SUBMISSIONS................................................................................................... 367

CERTIFICATION ............................................................................................... 371

LIST OF ANNEXES ........................................................................................... 373

iv
GLOSSARY OF ACRONYMS, ABBREVIATIONS AND DEFINED
TERMS

African Charter on Human and

ACHPR
Peoples’ Rights

American Convention on Human

ACHR
Rights

AFC Asian Football Confederation

Convention against Torture and Other

CAT Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading
Treatment or Punishment

CCC Compensation Claims Committee

International Convention on the

CERD Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination

CRC Convention on the Rights of the Child

International Law Commission Draft

Draft Articles on Expulsion
Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens

ECHR European Convention on Human Rights

ECtHR European Court of Human Rights

GCC Gulf Cooperation Council

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Member States of the GCC: Bahrain,
GCC States Kuwait, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia and
the UAE

IACtHR Inter-American Court of Human Rights

International Covenant on Civil and

ICCPR
Political Rights

International Law Commission Draft

ILC Articles Articles on Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts

NAPS National ATM and POS Switch system

Qatar National Human Rights

NHRC
Committee

NOTAM Notice to Airmen

Request for the Indication of

Order Provisional Measures, Order of 23 July
2018

PoA Power of Attorney

Qatar The State of Qatar

Application Instituting Proceedings of

Qatar Application
the State of Qatar dated 11 June 2018

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Request for the Indication of
Qatar RPM Provisional Measures of Protection of
the State of Qatar dated 11 June 2018

QNA Qatar News Agency

UAE The United Arab Emirates

Request for the Indication of

Provisional Measures to Preserve the
United Arab Emirates’ Procedural
UAE RPM
Rights and to Prevent Qatar from
Aggravating or Extending the Dispute
dated 22 March 2019

Exhibits from Oral Proceedings on the

Request for the Indication of
UAE PM Exhibit
Provisional Measures of Protection of
the State of Qatar dated 11 June 2018

UDHR Universal Declaration of Human Rights

United Nations Educational, Scientific

UNESCO
and Cultural Organization

Vienna Convention on Consular

VCCR
Relations

Vienna Convention on the Law of

VCLT
Treaties

vii
CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

Section I. Overview of the Case

1.1 The State of Qatar (“Qatar”) and the United Arab Emirates (“UAE”) are
both parties to the 1965 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms
of Racial Discrimination (the “CERD”) 1. On 11 June 2018, Qatar instituted
proceedings before the Court against the UAE under Article 22 of the CERD. On
the same day, in view of the real and imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to its
rights and the fundamental rights of Qataris, Qatar requested the indication of
Provisional Measures of Protection. On 23 July 2018, the Court delivered its
Order indicating provisional measures (the “Order”). Qatar now submits its
Memorial pursuant to the Court’s Order of 25 July 2018.

1.2 The CERD embodies a fundamental tenet of human rights law: that racial
discrimination undermines the inherent dignity and equality of human beings. The
Court has squarely stated that the right to equality constitutes a “binding
customary norm” 2. The CERD thus requires States parties to pursue “by all

1
See Vol. III, Annex 92, UN General Assembly, International Convention on the Elimination
of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, 21 December 1965, United Nations, Treaty Series
(UNTS) vol. 660, p. 195 (hereinafter “CERD”). The CERD entered into force on 4 January
1969. Qatar acceded to the CERD on 22 July 1976; the UAE on 20 June 1974. See United
Nations Treaty Collection, Status of Treaties, International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination, [Link]
TREATY&mtdsg_no=IV-2&chapter=4&clang=_en.
2
See Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia
(South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion of
21 June 1971, Separate Opinion of Judge Ammoun, I.C.J. Reports 1971, para. 6 (“One right
which must certainly be considered a pre-existing binding customary norm which the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights codified is the right to equality, which by common
consent has ever since the remotest times been deemed inherent in human nature.”).

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appropriate means and without delay a policy of eliminating racial discrimination
in all its forms and promoting understanding among all races” 3, and to ensure that
discrimination, including on the basis of national origin, does not interfere with
the enjoyment of a broad array of rights and freedoms 4. Among the wrongs that
the CERD aims to prevent is collective punishment: the stripping away or
practical denial of rights and privileges from a group of people defined not by
their individual conduct, but by some group characteristic such as skin color,
ethnicity, or, as in this case, national origin.

1.3 Notwithstanding its obligations under the CERD, in the early morning of
5 June 2017 in the holy month of Ramadan, without any prior warning, the UAE
launched a comprehensive campaign of punitive measures, which in both purpose
and effect targeted Qataris as a people on a discriminatory basis, in violation of
the CERD.

1.4 Specifically, pursuant to a directive from the UAE’s Ministry of Foreign

Affairs (the “5 June Directive”), the UAE announced that it was immediately
severing all diplomatic ties with Qatar, expelling Qatari diplomats and recalling its
own diplomats within 48 hours. 5 In the same Directive, the UAE further enacted a
series of measures to effect a policy and practice of collective punishment aimed
at the Qatari people.

3
Vol. III, Annex 92, CERD, Art. 2(1).
4
Vol. III, Annex 92, CERD, Art. 1(1).
5
Vol. II, Annex 1, UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UAE supports statements of Kingdom of
Bahrain and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on Qatar (5 June 2017).

2
1.5 First, in the Directive, the UAE ordered “Qatari residents and visitors”
within the UAE to leave within 14 days for “precautionary security reasons” (the
“Expulsion Order”) 6. The Expulsion Order provided no exceptions, did not allow
consideration of individualized circumstances, and identified the sole basis for its
coverage as the status of a person as “Qatari”.

1.6 Second, the UAE simultaneously announced the closure of UAE airspace
and seaports to “Qataris” within 24 hours and declared that all “Qatari nationals”
would be barred from entering or transiting through the UAE (the “Absolute
Travel Ban”) 7. Like the Expulsion Order, this ban on travel of Qataris in or
through the UAE was absolute; there were no exceptions or consideration of
individual circumstances. The UAE simultaneously banned UAE nationals from
entering or staying in Qatar. While the UAE subsequently announced revisions to
the Absolute Travel Ban—largely in the form of a security channel being paraded
as a “humanitarian” “hotline” (the “Modified Travel Ban”)—Qataris’ entry into
the UAE continues to be impeded on an arbitrary and discriminatory basis.

1.7 Third, in the days that followed the 5 June Directive, the UAE, separately,
and at times surreptitiously, also enacted measures perpetuating, condoning, and
encouraging anti-Qatari hate propaganda, while at the same time suppressing
Qatari media and speech deemed to support Qatar. In particular, the UAE
orchestrated and funded a coordinated anti-Qatari propaganda campaign on
various media platforms to inspire prejudice against Qataris, just for being Qatari

6
Vol. II, Annex 1, UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UAE supports statements of Kingdom of
Bahrain and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on Qatar (5 June 2017).
7
Vol. II, Annex 1, UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UAE supports statements of Kingdom of
Bahrain and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on Qatar (5 June 2017).

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(the “Anti-Qatari Incitement Campaign”). Simultaneously, to stifle free
expression, the UAE blocked Al Jazeera and other Qatari media outlets in UAE
territory (the “Block on Qatari Media”) and subjected conduct it deemed to be
“sympathizing” with Qatar to substantial criminal penalties, including
incarceration, under the UAE’s existing cybercrime law (the “Anti-Sympathy
Law”).

1.8 These actions by the UAE (collectively, the “Discriminatory Measures”)

constitute clear violations of the protections against racial discrimination based on
national origin in the CERD. They are as vicious in their disregard of fundamental
human rights as they are transparent in their political motivation. The UAE made
their punitive purpose clear from the outset, explicitly stating in the 5 June
Directive that the measures are “based on the insistence of the State of Qatar to
continue to undermine the security and stability of the region and its failure to
honour international commitments and agreements” 8. And the UAE has been
equally unwavering before the Court, stating plainly that “the present crisis was
caused by Qatar’s own unlawful conduct” 9, which the UAE decided “could not
remain without consequences” 10.

1.9 The method the UAE chose to attempt to coerce the Qatari Government—
the collective punishment of the Qatari people—constitutes an impermissible
purpose under the CERD, and, as intended, has had and continues to have severe
consequences for the rights of individual Qataris. The UAE radically disrupted the

8
Vol. II, Annex 1, UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UAE supports statements of Kingdom of
Bahrain and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on Qatar (5 June 2017).
9
CR 2018/13, p. 12, para. 8 (Alnowais).
10
CR 2018/15, p. 38, para. 10 (Shaw).

4
lives of Qataris, who, prior to the enactment of the Discriminatory Measures, led
lives that were deeply intertwined with the UAE and Emiratis. As nationals of the
Gulf Cooperation Council (“GCC”), Qataris and Emiratis moved freely between
the UAE and Qatar, and within the UAE, Qataris enjoyed many of the same rights
and benefits as Emiratis. As a result, many Qataris lived, worked, studied, and
owned property in the UAE, some of them with ties going back decades. Mixed
families of Qatari and Emirati origin were commonplace, and often spanned the
two countries, with individuals travelling between them to work, go to school,
manage property and businesses, and visit close relations. All of this changed
abruptly and drastically following the imposition of the Discriminatory Measures.

1.10 By these Measures, the UAE violated both the letter and spirit of the
CERD. Specifically, the UAE has violated and, in some instances continues to
violate, the basic protections against racial discrimination set forth in the CERD,
including Articles 2, 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the CERD.

1.11 First, by promulgating its Expulsion Order and Absolute Travel Ban, the
UAE has engaged in the collective expulsion of all individuals from Qatar, solely
on the basis of their national origin. Qataris living for years—sometimes
decades—in the UAE learned overnight that they had only two weeks to leave the
UAE and abandon the lives they had built there, leaving behind family,
educational opportunities, and property. The Expulsion Order and Absolute Travel
Ban collectively expelled Qataris on the basis of their national origin without the
provision of basic due process, and thereby, constituted racial discrimination on
the basis of national origin under Article 1(1) of the CERD and prohibited under
Article 2(1), Article 5(a) and Article 6. In particular, the UAE’s collective
expulsion of Qataris violated the CERD in two ways: first, based on the UAE’s
discriminatory purpose of expelling all Qatari nationals as a group, evidenced on
5
the face of the Expulsion Order and Absolute Travel Ban; and second, based on
the discriminatory effect of nullifying or impairing the fundamental human right
of Qataris to due process.

1.12 This discrimination is not excused under Article 1(2) of the CERD, as the
collective expulsion did not draw legitimate distinctions between citizens and non-
citizens. Instead, it singled out one group of non-citizens by national origin for
discriminatory treatment. Nor did the collective expulsion fall within a State’s
discretion to regulate matters relating to legal provisions governing citizenship or
nationality under Article 1(3), since that provision expressly does not allow
discrimination “against any particular nationality”.

1.13 Second, as a result of the imposition of the Absolute Travel Ban and the
UAE’s continued maintenance of the Modified Travel Ban (in its various
iterations), Qataris who were expelled, as well as Qataris who were not living in
the UAE but nonetheless had significant aspects of their lives located in the UAE,
were collectively cut off from immediate and extended family, education, work,
and property in the UAE. To this day, under the Modified Travel Ban, Qataris’
entry into the UAE continues to be implemented on an arbitrary and
discriminatory basis. Thus, nearly two years later, the UAE’s wrongful conduct
impacting the fundamental rights of these Qataris is ongoing. Like the collective
expulsion, each of the Absolute Travel Ban and Modified Travel Ban constituted
and continues to constitute discrimination against Qataris on the basis of national
origin under Article 1(1) in both purpose and effect, and likewise are not excused
under Articles 1(2) or 1(3). The UAE’s Absolute Travel Ban violated, and the
Modified Travel Ban continues to violate, Articles 2(1), 5(d)(iv), 5(d)(v), 5(e)(i),
5(e)(v), 5(a), and 6 of the CERD, which set out specific instances of fundamental

6
rights secured by the prohibition on racial discrimination related to family life,
education, property, and work.

1.14 Third, the UAE’s Block on Qatari Media violates the prohibition in Article
5(d)(viii) on discriminatory interference with freedom of opinion and expression,
rights that are “indispensable for the articulation of human rights” 11, as well as
Articles 2(1) and 6 of the CERD.

1.15 Fourth, as a result of the UAE’s Block on Qatari Media and the Anti-
Qatari Incitement Campaign (including the Anti-Sympathy Law), anti-Qatari hate
speech and abuse are becoming increasingly normalized, with the tragic result that
any association with Qatar in the UAE is the subject of harassment, ridicule, and
even violence. As the UAE becomes further entrenched in its position, its
discriminatory treatment of Qataris and corresponding incitement of racial hatred
against Qataris threatens to inflict lasting wounds of division. This conduct
constitutes discrimination against Qataris on the basis of their national origin
under Article 1(1), and violates Articles 4 and 7, as well as Articles 2(1) and 6 of
the CERD.

1.16 Finally, the UAE stands in violation of the Court’s order of provisional
measures, which stands as an autonomous legal obligation separate and apart from
the UAE’s obligations under the CERD. The UAE persistently has denied its
violations, relying upon a patently ineffective “hotline” mechanism as its means of
“compliance”, while continuing to promote discriminatory sentiment against

11
Vol. IV, Annex 113, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 35: Combating
Racist Hate Speech, document CERD/C/GC/35 (2013), para. 29.

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Qatar and Qataris through its Anti-Qatari Incitement Campaign and restriction of
Qatari expression.

1.17 Upon a finding and declaration of breach by the Court, Qatar will be
entitled to specific remedies as a consequence of the UAE’s violations of the
CERD, including the obligations of the UAE to: cease its ongoing wrongful acts;
make reparation for the injury resulting from its wrongful acts; and provide
assurances and guarantees of non-repetition.

1.18 To date, the UAE’s consistent response to its violations of the CERD has
been outright denial. For example, at the oral hearings on Provisional Measures
before the Court, the UAE maintained—wrongly—that “Qatari citizens were not
expelled ‘en masse’ from the UAE, families are not separated, Qatari students
remain studying in UAE universities in large numbers, Qatari-owned businesses
and properties in the UAE remain in operation and under their owners’ control,
and Qatari citizens are able to travel to and from the United Arab Emirates.” 12 The
UAE’s argument that nothing happened is entirely divorced from reality, as
Qatar’s evidence demonstrates. Not only have Qataris been forced to leave behind
lives, families, work, property, and schools as a result of the UAE’s targeted acts
of discrimination, they have also been victims of the UAE’s campaign of anti-
Qatari propaganda, rhetoric, and incitement to violence, which the UAE has
engineered to suppress and denigrate the character, heritage, personal stories, and
ultimately, the dignity of Qataris. The struggle of Qataris since 5 June 2017
epitomizes the insidiousness of subjecting individuals to prejudice and

12
CR 2018/15, p. 26, para. 1 (Buderi); see also CR 2018/15, p. 43, para. 2 (Alnowais) (“[the
UAE’s] dispute with Qatar has no impact on the rights of Qatari citizens”) (emphasis added);
CR 2018/13, p. 55, para. 98 (Olleson) (“no Qatari nationals were in fact expelled” from the
UAE”) (emphasis added).

8
intimidation on the basis of a characteristic attributable to a group—the very harm
the CERD was designed to eradicate.

1.19 There can be no doubt that the UAE intended the very impact on Qatari
individuals that the evidence Qatar submits demonstrates. In the same breath as
the UAE attempted to disclaim the impacts of the Discriminatory Measures on
individuals and families, the UAE acknowledged that they are punitive measures
designed to coerce and pressure Qatar. The UAE even attempted to affirmatively
rely on this point to justify its coercive actions, stating “[the] difficulties [faced by
families] flow from Qatar’s behavior and the responsibility for the circumstances
as they are now must be placed firmly at the door of [Qatar]” 13. This admission
exposes the UAE’s actions for what they truly are: the arbitrary and
uncompromising use of State power in a manner calculated to adversely affect
individuals, conducted without notice, without process, without regard for
individual circumstances, and without any concern for the fundamental human
rights of thousands of individuals, in order to achieve political gains.

1.20 There can also be no doubt that the Court is competent to resolve the
dispute Qatar submits, which is a “dispute between two . . . States Parties”, a
dispute “with respect to the interpretation or application” of the CERD, and a
dispute “which is not settled by negotiation or by the procedures expressly
provided for in this Convention” under Article 22.

13
CR 2018/15, p. 42, para. 27 (Shaw); see also CR 2018/13, p. 12, para. 8 (Alnowais) (“the
present crisis was caused by Qatar’s own unlawful conduct”); CR 2018/15, p. 38, para. 10
(Shaw) (citing “the blatant violation by Qatar of the Riyadh Agreements” as the “real reason
for the instability and concern” and stating that “[s]uch actions by Qatar could not remain
without consequences, as it had been informed”).

9
1.21 The Court has previously held that Article 22’s reference to “any dispute
. . . not settled by negotiation or by the procedures expressly provided for in this
Convention” creates preconditions to its jurisdiction, but has not ruled on whether
they are alternative or cumulative 14. Given Qatar’s repeated attempts to negotiate
with the UAE, and the UAE’s blanket refusal to engage with Qatar, there is no
doubt that Qatar has satisfied any precondition of negotiations that Article 22 may
impose. This alone is sufficient to confer jurisdiction: requiring Qatar to satisfy
both a precondition of negotiation and use of the CERD Article 11–13 procedures
would be contrary to the ordinary meaning of Article 22 and the travaux
préparatoires.

1.22 There is also no barrier to the admissibility of the claims presented,

including because under generally recognized principles of international law, there
is no need to exhaust domestic remedies in a case of systematic, generalized
policies and practices in breach of the CERD such as this one.

1.23 Further, the Court has jurisdiction ratione materiae. Each of the acts
complained of falls within Article 1(1)’s prohibition on discrimination on the
basis of national origin, as they have both the purpose and effect of discriminating
against Qataris. The dispute is thus “with respect to the interpretation or
application” of the CERD. The UAE’s attempt to argue otherwise during the
provisional measures phase—on the basis that its actions are categorically
excluded from the scope of the CERD’s protections because they “appl[y] solely
on the basis of an individual’s present nationality” 15—is flawed as a matter of

14
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2011, para. 20.
15
CR 2018/13, p. 39, para. 21 (Olleson).

10
both law and fact, and itself confirms that there is a dispute “with respect to the
interpretation” of the CERD.

1.24 First, the UAE is wrong that Article 1(1) excludes discrimination on the
basis of present nationality. To the contrary, “national origin” interpreted in
accordance with Article 31(1) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties
(“VCLT”) clearly encompasses nationality—including present nationality. This is
evident from the context of Article 1 as a whole, and in particular the exception
and preservation clauses of Article 1(2) and 1(3), respectively. Further, in
interpreting human rights treaties in general, the Court has stressed the importance
of giving effect to their specific object and purpose, which weighs heavily in favor
of taking account of the CERD’s overriding purpose to eliminate racial
discrimination in all its forms, including based on a group feature such as
nationality. To do otherwise would be both artificial and deeply troubling, as the
dominant means of imposing racial discrimination against foreign persons today is
by means of measures that turn on present nationality. An analysis of the travaux
préparatoires of the CERD pursuant to Article 32 of the VCLT confirms that the
CERD encompasses nationality-based discrimination.

1.25 Second, the UAE’s attempt to frame the issue as solely one of “present
nationality” ignores a critical dimension of the CERD, namely that it is not limited
to the explicit purpose of challenged State conduct, but equally and explicitly
concerns actions that have the “effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition,
enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental
freedoms” 16. In Qatar, as in other States of the Gulf, nationality follows a jus
sanguinis model—meaning that nationality is conferred by parentage—and

16
Vol. III, Annex 92, CERD, Art. 1(1).

11
naturalization is rare. The UAE’s attempt to carve out “present” nationality is thus
a distinction without a difference: the vast majority of Qatari nationals, including
those affected by the measures, were born Qatari nationals and are Qatari in the
sense of heritage—in other words, of Qatari “national origin” in the historical-
cultural sense that the UAE acknowledged in its submissions to the Court on
provisional measures would confer protection under the CERD. The
discriminatory effects of the Measures on these individuals thus equally bring the
UAE’s acts within the scope of the CERD, regardless of whether “national origin”
in Article 1(1) encompasses “present nationality”.

1.26 Instead of fostering tolerance, the UAE is promoting fear and hostility.
Instead of educating those within its territory against xenophobia and racial
animus, it is encouraging it. The longer these policies and practices continue, the
more prejudice against Qataris engendered by the UAE Government embeds itself
into everyday life in the UAE. That is exactly what the CERD was put in place to
prevent—indeed, to eradicate. Qatar thus seeks the Court’s intervention to bring
an end to the UAE’s violations and to seek redress for the harms suffered.

12
Section II. Structure of the Memorial

1.27 Qatar’s Memorial consists of six Chapters which follow this Introduction.

1.28 Chapter II provides the Court with a detailed recitation of the facts
underlying Qatar’s claims. This includes the context necessary for the Court to
understand the present dispute (Section I), the Discriminatory Measures taken by
the UAE against Qataris beginning on 5 June 2017 (Section II), the UAE’s
subsequent escalation of the crisis (Section III), and the international
condemnation of the detrimental human rights impacts of those measures
(Section IV).

1.29 Chapter III establishes the basis for the Court’s jurisdiction and the
admissibility of Qatar’s claims. This includes a detailed assessment of two points
challenged by the UAE during the Provisional Measures phase; namely, that the
dispute falls within the scope ratione materiae of the CERD (Section I), and that
Qatar has satisfied any necessary preconditions to the Court’s jurisdiction
pursuant to Article 22 of the CERD (Section II).

1.30 Chapter IV demonstrates that Qatar’s claims before the Court are
admissible and, in particular, that neither the local remedies rule (Section I) nor
Qatar’s resort to the CERD Committee Procedure (Section II) constitutes a bar to
the admissibility of Qatar’s claims.

1.31 Chapter V establishes the content of the UAE’s obligations under the
CERD and its violations of those obligations. These include the UAE’s violation
of Articles 2(1), 5(a), and 6 by collectively expelling Qataris from its territory
(Section I); the discriminatory nullification and impairment of the enjoyment of

13
protected rights under Articles 5(d)(iv), 5(d)(v), 5(e)(i), 5(e)(v), and 5(a), through
implementation of the Absolute Travel Ban and subsequently the Modified Travel
Ban, including by interfering with the rights to family life, education and training,
property, work, and the right to equal treatment before tribunals, constituting
violations of Articles 2(1), 5 and 6 (Section II); its interference with freedom of
opinion and expression on racially discriminatory lines in violation of Articles
2(1), 5(d)(viii) and 6 (Section III); and its violation of the CERD’s protections
against propagating and tolerating racially discriminatory propaganda, prejudice
and ideas under Articles 2(1), 4, 6 and 7 (Section IV).

1.32 Chapter VI demonstrates that the UAE’s violations are ongoing and in
violation of the Court’s Order of Provisional Measures dated 23 July 2018.

1.33 Chapter VII sets forth the relief sought by Qatar.

1.34 Finally, the Memorial concludes with Qatar’s Submissions.

1.35 In presenting its evidence to the Court, Qatar has taken into account the
Court’s general approach to assessing the weight and probity of the evidence 17.
Qatar’s Memorial draws from a wide range of evidentiary sources. Qatar submits
independent third-party reporting, including from: organs of the United Nations
and other respected international organizations; non-governmental organizations
with a reputation as neutral and experienced human rights observers, such as
Human Rights Watch and Amnesty International; and reputable news outlets.
Qatar also submits primary source material, including contemporaneous

17
See, e.g., Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (Democratic Republic of the Congo
v. Uganda), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, paras. 57–58.

14
documents and statements issued by the UAE or its agents and instrumentalities,
as well as material from Qatari government agencies and other Qatari institutions
whose mandate includes the collection and maintenance of relevant information in
the regular course of their activities.

1.36 Most importantly, Qatar submits 109 first-hand witness accounts of the
Discriminatory Measures, detailing the detrimental impacts that the UAE’s
violations have had on the enjoyment of the fundamental rights guaranteed by the
CERD. The first-hand claimant accounts were compiled by the Compensation
Claims Committee (“CCC”), a body established by the State of Qatar after the
imposition of the Discriminatory Measures 18. The mandate of the CCC is to
receive complaints from Qataris adversely affected by the Discriminatory
Measures and investigate and verify the complaints, with an eye towards securing
legal reparations. In order to implement this broad mandate, the CCC works in
coordination with all relevant government ministries and conducts outreach to
other Qatari entities and non-governmental organizations as necessary. The CCC
is comprised of members of various ministries, including the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Ministry of Justice 19. The CCC also maintains a record of all
complaints related to the Discriminatory Measures, including complaints initially
submitted to the Qatar National Human Rights Committee (“NHRC”) and the
Qatar Chamber of Commerce. 20 As part of its claims process, the CCC has
compiled verified complaints of 975 Qataris evidencing the measures taken by the
UAE, as well as the resulting harm.
18
Vol. II, Annex 56, Letter from Amiri Diwan to HE Sheikh Abdullah bin Nasser bin Khalifa
Al–Thani establishing the CCC (14 June 2017).
19
Vol. II, Annex 56, Letter from Amiri Diwan to HE Sheikh Abdullah bin Nasser bin Khalifa
Al–Thani establishing the CCC (14 June 2017).
20
Vol. XII, Annex 272, Affidavit, State of Qatar Compensation Claims Committee.

15
1.37 Included with Qatar’s Memorial are eleven additional volumes of
Annexes, which include materials relied upon in the Memorial. The annexed
materials are arranged in the following order: (i) UAE government documents,
statements, and legislation, as well as local UAE news media documents
demonstrating the enactment of the Discriminatory Measures (Vol. II, Annexes
1–49); (ii) Qatari government documents, statements, and legislation (Vol. II,
Annexes 50–69); (iii) United Nations documents, including from the CERD
Committee (Vol. III, Annexes 70–101); (iv) CERD Committee documents and
proceedings (Vol. IV, Annexes 102–122); (v) documents from international
organizations and non-governmental organizations (Vol. IV, Annex 123); (vi)
documents, reports and statements from non-governmental organizations (Vol. V,
Annexes 124–143); (vii) relevant excerpts from books, academic articles, and
news articles (Vol. V-VI, Annexes 144–153); and (viii) other documents (Vol.
VI, Annexes 154–161). The Annexes also include as Vol. VI, Annex 162, the
Expert Report of Dr. J.E. Peterson, which addresses the socio-historical
background of the Qatari people and their distinct national origin.

1.38 The Annexes relating to the evidence collected by the CCC are comprised
of: (i) the 109 witness declarations, notarized by the Qatari Ministry of Justice and
certified by the Qatari Ministry of Foreign Affairs (Vols. VII–XII, Annexes 163–
271); (ii) an affidavit of the CCC including a summary of the 975 verified claims
processed by the CCC in relation to the UAE’s Discriminatory Measures (Vol.
XII, Annex 272); and (iii) primary source statistics and data relating to the
impacts of the Discriminatory Measures, including affidavits authenticating such
data, as appropriate (Vol. XII, Annexes 273–278).

16
CHAPTER II
THE FACTS UNDERLYING QATAR’S CLAIMS

2.1 This Chapter sets forth the factual background to the dispute with a view
to understanding the UAE’s imposition of the Discriminatory Measures and the
devastating impact such Measures have had upon the Qataris targeted. The sudden
imposition of the Measures beginning on 5 June 2017 created chaos, which was
augmented by the UAE’s fomenting of a climate of hatred against Qatar and
Qataris. Panicked Qataris scrambled to understand their new reality, in which they
were expelled and then barred from access to a State that many had considered a
home. The UAE’s imposition of the Discriminatory Measures wreaked havoc
upon the close economic and social ties between Qataris and Emiratis in one fell
swoop, leaving Qatar to mitigate the damage caused as best it could.

2.2 The UAE, for its part, remains seemingly indifferent to the undeniable
impact of the Discriminatory Measures upon the human rights of ordinary Qataris.
It has spurned all of Qatar’s attempts at negotiation, continuing to insist on a
series of illegitimate demands that would vitiate Qatar’s sovereignty as its non-
negotiable conditions for ending the Measures.

2.3 This Chapter is organized as follows: Section I explains the broader

context for the UAE’s Discriminatory Measures, including the source of the
UAE’s animosity toward Qatar and the previously close ties between the two
States. Section II describes the UAE’s imposition of the Measures in breach of
the CERD: namely, the 5 June Directive and Expulsion Order (Part A); the
Absolute and Modified Travel Bans along with other restrictions on movement
(Part B); and the UAE’s attack on freedom of expression and incitement of Anti-
Qatari sentiment, namely through the Anti-Sympathy Law, the Block on Qatari
Media, and the Anti-Qatari Incitement Campaign (Part C).
17
2.4 Section III next explains the UAE’s escalation of the crisis by
conditioning the end of the Discriminatory Measures upon Qatar’s acceptance of a
series of unlawful and unwarranted demands designed to infringe Qatar’s
sovereignty.

2.5 Finally, Section IV provides an overview of the destructive impacts of the

Discriminatory Measures and their condemnation by the international community.

Section I. The Context of the Dispute

2.6 Qatar and the UAE are both members of the GCC, an intergovernmental
political and economic union established in 1981, which also includes Saudi
Arabia, Bahrain, Kuwait, and Oman (together, the “GCC States”) 21. The GCC
was founded on the common characteristics and Islamic faith that bind the six
member States. The main objective of the GCC is to establish coordination among
its member States in order to achieve unity between them and strengthen relations
between their peoples 22. Qatar and the UAE are also both parties to the GCC
Economic Agreement, 23 as well as members of the GCC Customs Union24, which
have fostered their economic integration and interdependence. Prior to the

21
See Secretariat General of the Gulf Cooperation Council, Member States, [Link]
[Link]/en-us/AboutGCC/MemberStates/Pages/[Link].
22
See Charter of the Gulf Cooperation Council, 25 May 1981, Preamble, Art. 4.
23
See Economic Agreement Between the GCC States, 31 December 2001.
24
See generally Secretariat General of the Gulf Cooperation Council, The Customs Union:
Practical procedures for the establishment of the GCC Customs Union, [Link]
[Link]/en-us/CooperationAndAchievements/Achievements/EconomicCooperation/TheCusto
msUnion/Pages/[Link] (noting implementation of Common
Customs Law by all member states and establishment of GCC Customs Union).

18
imposition of the Discriminatory Measures, Qatar’s bilateral trade relationship
with the UAE was the largest, by value, of its relationships with any GCC
country 25. For example, Qatar delivers over two billion cubic feet of liquid natural
gas (“LNG”) to the UAE per day via the Dolphin Pipeline, and Qatar has made
clear from the outset of the crisis its commitment to continue to do so despite the
imposition of the Discriminatory Measures, given the serious disruption any gas
stoppage would cause to the people of the UAE 26.

2.7 Generally speaking, the UAE and Saudi Arabia, as the two largest States in
the GCC in terms of population and GDP 27, have historically pushed to direct a
unified policy agenda of the GCC on their own terms. However, Qatar has
maintained an independent foreign policy, guided by the touchstones of building
relationships with international partners and the peaceful resolution of conflicts,
even where this approach has put it at odds with its neighbors 28. This has included

25
See Andrew Torchia & Tom Arnold, “Qatar and its neighbors may lose billions from
diplomatic split”, Reuters (5 June 2017), [Link]
economy/qatar-and-its-neighbors-may-lose-billions-from-diplomatic-split-idUSKBN18W1
MJ (“The UAE is Qatar’s biggest trading partner from the GCC”).
26
See, e.g., Tom Finn & Raina El Gamal, “Qatar has no plan to shut Dolphin gas pipeline to
UAE despite rift: sources”, Reuters (6 June 2017), [Link]
qatar-gas/qatar-has-no-plan-to-shut-dolphin-gas-pipeline-to-uae-despite-rift-sources-
idUSKBN18X1WA (“A shutdown of the Dolphin pipeline would cause major disruptions to
the UAE’s gas system”).
27
See International Monetary Fund, DataMapper: Population, [Link]
/datamapper/LP@WEO/QAT/SAU/KWT/BHR/OMN/ARE; International Monetary Fund,
DataMapper: GDP, Current Prices, [Link]
@WEO/QAT/SAU/KWT/BHR/OMN/ARE
28
See, e.g., Council on Foreign Relations, A Conversation With Sheikh Mohammed bin
Abdulrahman Al-Thani (30 November 2018), [Link]
mohammed-bin-abdulrahman-al-thani (video recording). In this regard, Qatar has worked to
resolve disputes in Lebanon (2008), Yemen (2008-2010) and Darfur (2008-2010), as well as
between Sudan and Chad (2009), and Djibouti and Eritrea (2010).

19
maintaining amicable relationships with States viewed as antagonists or
competitors by the UAE such as Iran—with whom Qatar shares the world’s
largest natural gas field 29—and Turkey30.

2.8 Qatar has also—notwithstanding the stark opposition of the UAE—

supported independent media in the region, as evidenced by the award-winning Al
Jazeera network, which is based in Qatar. Funded in part by Qatar 31, Al Jazeera is
widely recognized as the region’s leading independent media outlet, and
acknowledged for its editorial impartiality by independent third parties, including
international non-governmental organizations devoted to freedom of expression
and free media 32. Al Jazeera has long been a source of tension between Qatar and

29
Tom Finn, “Qatar restarts development of world’s biggest gas field after 12-year freeze”,
Reuters (3 April 2017), [Link]
30
See Republic of Turkey Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Bilateral Political Relations between
Turkey and Qatar, [Link] Selin Girit, “Why is
Turkey standing up for Qatar?”, BBC News (14 June 2017), [Link]
s/world-middle-east-40262713. Emirati officials often attempt to smear Qatar by linking it
disparagingly to Iran or Turkey, and indeed the UAE has conditioned lifting the
Discriminatory Measures upon Qatar cutting or downgrading ties with Iran and Turkey. See
infra Chapter II, Section III.
31
Al Jazeera Satellite Network was established by in 1996 as a hybrid public-private entity with
initial funding provided by HH Sheikh Hamad bin Khalifa Al-Thani in the form of a grant.
See Law No. 1 of 1996 on the Establishment of the Al Jazeera Satellite Network, 8 February
1996, Art. 1, [Link]
=2536&language=en.
32
See Vol. V, Annex 126, Reporters Without Borders, Al Jazeera—collateral victim of
diplomatic offensive against Qatar (7 June 2017), [Link]
collateral-victim-diplomatic-offensive-against-qatar; see also UNESCO, UNESCO and Al
Jazeera to promote freedom of expression in the Arab World (12 September 2010),
[Link]
promote_freedom_of_expression_in_th/ (noting that UNESCO and Al Jazeera signed a
Memorandum of Understanding to formalize the partnership to research freedom of
expression in the Arab world and beyond, and quoting the UNESCO Director-General as
stating, “as a leading source of news and information about the Arab world and beyond,
Al Jazeera is well-positioned to uphold these principles [human rights and fundamental
20
the UAE, and the UAE has sought to silence and vilify the network by labeling it
a conduit of “hate speech” and “pro-terrorist output”, including before the Court 33.
These tensions culminated at the flashpoint of the award-winning coverage of the
Arab Spring by Al Jazeera (English), 34 which provided a rare voice to opposition
viewpoints in the region, and accordingly was viewed as a threat by the UAE and
others 35.

2.9 Qatar’s foreign policy independence and support for independent media
have led to regional tensions between Qatar and the UAE (acting along with Saudi
Arabia), including a brief severing of diplomatic ties in 2014. However, these
previous disputes remained at the diplomatic level, and thus Qatar was able to
diffuse them through diplomatic negotiations, in the interest of maintaining peace
and stability in the closely-knit region.

freedoms] in this region”); Vol. V, Annex 131, Article 19, Qatar: Demands to close Al
Jazeera endanger press freedom and access to information (30 June 2017),
[Link]
dom-and-access-to-information/ (“organisations like Al Jazeera . . . enable the free flow of
information . . . and are key to enabling free expression across the region”).
33
CR 2018/13, p. 14, para. 19 (Alnowais); ibid. p. 66, para. 39 (Shaw).
34
See, e.g., Royal Television Society, Television Journalism Awards 2012, [Link]
.uk/award/television-journalism-awards-2012.
35
See Amena Bakr, “Defiant Al Jazeera faces conservative backlash after Arab Spring”,
Reuters (2 July 2014), [Link]
N0F70F120140702; Vol. V, Annex 126, Reporters Without Borders, Al Jazeera - collateral
victim of diplomatic offensive against Qatar (7 June 2017), [Link]
collateral-victim-diplomatic-offensive-against-qatar (“[Al Jazeera] distinguished itself above
all during its coverage of the Arab Spring but enraged many of the region’s governments,
which regard it as a Qatari foreign policy tool.”).

21
Section II. The Imposition of the UAE’s Discriminatory Measures

2.10 As noted above, the UAE’s campaign has taken the form of a series of
coordinated and interconnected measures against Qataris, which, separately and
together, have had a serious impact on their fundamental rights. These principally
include the collective expulsion of “Qatari residents and visitors” pursuant to the
5 June Directive (Section II.A), the absolute and modified travel bans against
“Qatari nationals” and other restrictions on movement (Section II.B), and the
promotion and encouragement of anti-Qatari hate speech and false information
coupled with the suppression of Qatari media and speech contrary to the UAE’s
anti-Qatar narrative (Section II.C).

A. THE 5 JUNE DIRECTIVE AND COLLECTIVE EXPULSION OF QATARIS

2.11 At 4 a.m. in the morning of 5 June 201736, in the midst of the holy month
of Ramadan, the UAE’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued and broadcast a
Directive proclaiming that the UAE:

“affirms its complete commitment and support to

the Gulf Cooperation Council and to the security
and stability of the GCC States. Within this
framework, and based on the insistence of the State
of Qatar to continue to undermine the security and
stability of the region and its failure to honour
international commitments and agreements, it has
been decided to take the following measures that are
necessary for safeguarding the interests of the GCC

36
In a story time-stamped 5 June 2017 at 4:00 a.m., Emirati news outlet The National stated
that the directive had been “just released” by the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs. See “UAE
Ministry of Foreign Affairs Statement on Qatar ties”, The National (5 June 2017),
[Link]
1.637077.

22
States in general and those of the brotherly Qatari
people in particular:

1-In support of the statements issued by the sisterly

Kingdom of Bahrain and sisterly Kingdom of Saudi
Arabia, the United Arab Emirates severs all
relations with the State of Qatar, including breaking
off diplomatic relations, and gives Qatari diplomats
48 hours to leave UAE.

2-Preventing Qatari nationals from entering the

UAE or crossing its points of entry, giving Qatari
residents and visitors in the UAE 14 days to leave
the country for precautionary security reasons. The
UAE nationals are likewise banned from traveling
to or staying in Qatar or transiting through its
territories.

3-Closure of UAE airspace and seaports for all

Qataris in 24 hours and banning all Qatari means of
transportation, coming to or leaving the UAE, from
crossing, entering or leaving the UAE territories,
and taking all legal measures in collaboration with
friendly countries and international companies with
regards to Qataris using the UAE airspace and
territorial waters, from and to Qatar, for national
security considerations.

The UAE is taking these decisive measures as a

result of the Qatari authorities’ failure to abide by
the Riyadh Agreement on returning GCC diplomats
to Doha and its Complementary Arrangement in
2014, and Qatar’s continued support, funding and
hosting of terror groups, primarily Islamic
Brotherhood, and its sustained endeavours to
promote the ideologies of Daesh and Al Qaeda
across its direct and indirect media.

[. . .]

23
While regretting the policies taken by the State of
Qatar that sow seeds of sedition and discord among
the region’s countries, the UAE affirms its full
respect and appreciation for the brotherly Qatari
people on account of the profound historical,
religious and fraternal ties and kin relations binding
UAE and Qatari peoples.” 37

2.12 In addition to the severing of diplomatic and consular ties with Qatar, the
5 June Directive thus also enacted a broad series of measures against or affecting
Qataris. Namely, it (i) ordered “Qatari residents and visitors in the UAE” to leave
the country within 14 days for “precautionary security reasons”; (ii) enacted an
unconditional travel and entry ban against “Qatari nationals”; (iii) banned “UAE
nationals” from travel or entry into Qatar; and (iv) closed UAE airspace and
seaports “for all Qataris” within 24 hours.

2.13 On the same day, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain took parallel measures,
effectively leaving Qatar isolated and cut off by land, air and sea 38. Qatar’s only
land border is with Saudi Arabia, and it is surrounded on all other sides by the
Persian Gulf.

2.14 Immediately after the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued the 5 June
Directive, official and unofficial media platforms began to widely publicize,
discuss, and distribute the measures imposed against Qatar and Qataris. Much of
this took place on social media, a highly effective means of disseminating

37
Vol. II, Annex 1, UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UAE supports statements of Kingdom of
Bahrain and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on Qatar (5 June 2017).
38
Taimur Khan, “UAE and Saudi Arabia cut ties with Qatar and shut air, land and sea access”,
The National (5 June 2017), [Link]
with-qatar-and-shut-air-land-and-sea-access-1.68221.

24
information in the region 39, and placed a particular emphasis on the UAE’s order
expelling Qataris from the country within 14 days.

2.15 For example, approximately two hours after issuance of the 5 June
Directive, the Emirates News Agency, the official source for UAE state media,
issued a tweet highlighting the expulsion order and the UAE’s stated basis of
“security and precautionary reasons”, relaying the message that every Qatari was
regarded as a threat to the “security” of the UAE 40:

2.16 The 5 June Directive was also published on the website of the widely read
Dubai-based online news source Al Arabiya, which highlighted the Directive’s

39
In recent years, the use of social media within the region “has increased tremendously”, with
97% of Qataris and 92% of Emiratis enjoying internet access, amongst the highest rates of
internet penetration in the Middle East. See University of Southern California, Center on
Public Diplomacy Blog, A Snapshot of How Foreign Ministers in the Gulf Use Twitter,
(2 May 2017), [Link]
gulf-use-twitter.
40
Vol. II, Annex 45, Twitter Post, @wamnews (5 June 2017 at 5:57 a.m.) (with certified
translation). The @wamnews account has over 451,000 followers, and the tweet was
retweeted 1,391 times.

25
“warning” to Qatari citizens to leave the UAE within the next fortnight 41. Emirati
news channels similarly broadcast the 5 June Directive to the public at large on
television. For example, the news anchor of Akhbar Al Emarat read out the full
Directive on television, including the order for all Qataris to leave the UAE within
14 days 42. State-owned media channel Abu Dhabi TV aired and featured similar
coverage of the 5 June Directive throughout the day 43.

2.17 A popular Emirati news platform, “3meed_news”, which has 1.2 million
followers, similarly published the 5 June Directive on its Instagram account 44.
Like other media outlets, “3meed_news” highlighted the mandatory nature of the
requirement that all Qataris leave, characterizing the 14 days as a “grace period”
and reiterating the “security” rationale 45.

41
See “UAE announces it is cutting all diplomatic ties with Qatar”, Al Arabiya (5 June 2017),
[Link]
[Link].
42
See Vol. II, Annex 44, “UAE News – The official statement of the UAE boycott of the State
of Qatar”, Akhbar Al Emarat (5 June 2017), [Link]
43
See Vol. II, Annex 43, “UAE cuts diplomatic ties with Qatar – Special Coverage”, Abu
Dhabi TV (5 June 2017), [Link]
44
See Vol. II, Annex 49, Instagram Post, @3meed_news (5 June 2017 at 7:47 a.m.) (with
certified translation).
45
See Vol. II, Annex 49, Instagram Post, @3meed_news (5 June 2017 at 7:47 a.m.) (with
certified translation); see also, e.g., Fakhrul Islam, “Qatar crisis: The boycott decision and its
aftermath”, Khaleej Times (5 June 2018), [Link]
crisis/qatar-crisis-the-boycott-decision-and-its-aftermath (“The UAE gives Qatari residents
and visitors 14 days - starting from June 5 - to leave the country for precautionary security
reasons.”).

26
2.18 Qatari news media operating in the UAE also circulated news of the 5 June
Directive. As discussed below, in the weeks leading up to the 5 June Directive, Al
Jazeera Media Network detected a blocking of access to its satellite distribution
website for users in the UAE 46. However, on 5 June 2017, access to the website
was apparently temporarily unblocked, allowing Qataris in the UAE to access
information about the Expulsion Order from Al Jazeera 47.

2.19 The Expulsion Order continued to be prominently reported in local media

coverage in the days that followed 5 June and leading up to the 19 June
deadline 48. For example, on 7 June 2017, Gulf News, an Emirati paper, published
an article entitled, “Ways you might be affected by the Qatar situation”, which
publicized the 5 June Directive and provided guidance in response to frequently
46
See paras. 2.43, 5.144–5.145, below.
47
See para. 5.30, below; Vol. XII, Annex 264, DCL-181 Witness Declaration, Al Jazeera
Media Network Representative, para. 8.
48
See, e.g., “Latest: UAE among 4 Arab nations to sever ties with Qatar”, Khaleej Times
(6 June 2017) (“The UAE has given Qatari residents and visitors 14 days to leave the
country”), [Link]

27
posed questions 49. For “Qatari national[s] living in the UAE”, the response to the
question “What do I do?” was simple and clear: “You have 14 days to leave,
starting from Monday, June 5, 2017.” 50

2.20 Nothing about the terms of the UAE’s 5 June Directive to leave was
precatory. To the contrary, as the wide dissemination and consistent messaging of
the Directive by the UAE Government demonstrated, Qataris had a very specific
time period of 14 days to leave the UAE, the period was characterized as a “grace
period” and the UAE had invoked “precautionary security reasons” to justify the
Discriminatory Measures. As intended by the UAE, the Directive was crystal
clear: Qataris had to leave the UAE or face the consequences for their liberty and
safety, as well as that of their families and friends, should they contravene a
directive issued by the UAE Government.

2.21 Accordingly, the UAE’s sudden announcement of the 5 June Directive and
its narrow 14-day window instilled widespread panic among Qataris in the UAE.
The language of the 5 June Directive made it clear that the presence of Qataris in
the UAE after 19 June, the end of the 14-day period would be seen as a threat to
the UAE’s security and leave them susceptible to abuse in the sense of police
harassment, interrogation, arbitrary arrest, or detention without any respect for

49
See Paul Crompton & Aya Sadek, “Ways you might be affected by Qatar situation”, Gulf
News (7 June 2017), [Link]
qatar-situation-1.2039817.
50
See Paul Crompton & Aya Sadek, “Ways you might be affected by Qatar situation”, Gulf
News (7 June 2017), [Link]
qatar-situation-1.2039817.

28
their rights 51. Emiratis themselves advised their Qatari friends to leave the UAE
within the 14-day period, because they feared for their safety, being versed in the
potential consequences of ignoring a State diktat 52.

2.22 The panic of Qataris forced to leave was compounded by the knowledge
that Qataris would no longer have a diplomatic presence in the UAE capable of
protecting them 53. After 5 June 2017, all Qatari diplomatic personnel left as
ordered by the UAE, within the 48-hour period allowed for evacuation 54. Qatari
diplomats had to surrender their diplomatic IDs and papers and were forced to
leave without even being able to shut off water or electricity in the Consulate
building 55. Many Qatari diplomats were forced to abandon valuable property,

51
See Vol. II, Annex 1, UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UAE supports statements of
Kingdom of Bahrain and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on Qatar (5 June 2017) (referencing
“precautionary security reasons”).
52
See, e.g., Vol. VII, Annex 180, DCL-028, paras. 21–22, 24 (“My [Emirati] friends were also
increasingly scared for me to stay in the country. . . . [they] knew that their ability to protect
me [in the event that someone found out I was Qatari] was limited . . . based on the concerns
of my parents, fiancé, and friends and the fact that the situation was not improving, it became
clear to me that I needed to leave. . . . [My friends] drove me to the airport, but they were
terrified of what their government might do to them for this kindness.”); Vol. XI, Annex 253,
DCL-168, para. 10 (“I contacted a close Emirati friend and business associate who was
working in Dubai. I asked him what I was supposed to do about my company, . . .
[redacted] . . . I remember his words – ‘you have to go.’”).
53
Before 5 June 2017, Qatar maintained both an Embassy in Abu Dhabi and a Consulate in
Dubai.
54
See Vol. VII, Annex 164, DCL-002, para. 10. (“On the morning of 5 June 2017, the Director
of the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs Office in Dubai . . . called the Qatari Consul in for a
meeting. This was at around 9:30 a.m. . . . The UAE Director asked the Consul whether he
had seen the news that morning, to which the Consul responded that he had seen the news
and that he understood the order that Qatari diplomats in the UAE had 48 hours to leave the
country . . . The Consul left the UAE later that day to return to Qatar.”).
55
See Vol. XI, Annex 246, DCL-153, para.10 (“I was informed that . . . the members of the
Qatari diplomatic delegation to the UAE must surrender their diplomatic IDs and papers”).

29
including personal vehicles that had to be left on the Consulate premises 56. They
did not even have time to arrange for the shipping of sensitive government
documents, and had to destroy them 57. An official at the Qatari Consulate in
Dubai described the chaos surrounding the UAE’s announcement: “[t]he office
was bedlam on 5 June 2017. . . . There were so many questions left unanswered.
. . . Would we be able to keep paying salaries? Would the Consulate building be
accessible? We simply did not know.” 58

2.23 Even as Qatari diplomats were evacuating, the Qatari Embassy and
Consulate, fearing for the safety of Qataris in the UAE, reached out to Qataris
through their Twitter accounts to warn them about the 5 June Directive:

“Citizens of Qatar must leave the United Arab

Emirates within 14 days in accordance with the
statement issued by the competent Emirati
authorities”;

“The competent authorities in the United Arab

Emirates stated that all land, sea and air passages
shall be closed before the traffic arriving from and
departing to Qatar within 24 hours”;

If the citizens of Qatar cannot travel directly from

the United Arab Emirates to Qatar, the Embassy

56
See Vol. VII, Annex 164, DCL-002, para. 24 (“My understanding is that the UAE authorities
have not taken anything from the Consulate; but, it is only accessible on foot, no cars can go
in or out and nothing is supposed to leave. Therefore, even though the cars that I stored at the
Consulate are owned personally and are not consular property, I have not been able to
retrieve them to this day.”).
57
See Vol. VII, Annex 164, DCL-002, para. 14.
58
See Vol. VII, Annex 164, DCL-002, para. 14.

30
advises them to travel through the State of Kuwait
or the Sultanate of Oman”;

“If you wish to inquire about other issues, please

contact the following number: [phone number]” 59.

2.24 Qatari diplomats reported that, once the 5 June Directive and other
measures were announced, Qataris living in the UAE began frantically calling for
advice as to what they should do to protect themselves 60. Since all Qatari
diplomats were forced to return to Qatar and the Consulate and Embassy were to
be closed, Qatari officials told Qataris that they could not guarantee consular
assistance in the UAE to ensure their safety61. In the words of one Qatari official,

“My duty was to keep Qataris safe. After the UAE

ordered Qataris to leave the UAE, the atmosphere
within the UAE became hostile towards Qataris.
The UAE’s 5 June 2017 statement . . . was being
broadcast widely by the Emirati media, in a tone and
manner as if it was a threat of war against the Qatari
people. I and other Qataris that I spoke to
understood it in the same way—why else would
they have asked Qataris to leave?” 62

2.25 While the Qatari government has not been able to verify the precise
number of Qataris remaining in the UAE, it appears that some Qataris did not flee

59
Vol. II, Annex 52, Twitter Posts, @qatarembassyUAE (5 June 2017) (with certified
translation)
60
See Vol. VII, Annex 164, DCL-002, paras. 13, 16–23.
61
See Vol. VII, Annex 164, DCL-002, para. 18.
62
Vol. VII, Annex 164, DCL-002, para. 15.

31
the UAE within the 14-day period allotted 63. Qataris who were not among those
able to leave the UAE immediately witnessed acts of harassment and violence
against Qataris. 64 One Qatari reported hearing a constant barrage of anti-Qatari
statements in public places 65. Others reported that their cars, which had Qatari
plates, had been vandalized or confiscated by the Emirati police 66. A Qatari
student was told by his friends who were attempting to arrange to leave the UAE

63
For example, out of a total 975 complaints, two complaints were submitted on behalf of
Qataris residing in the UAE at the time the complaint was made. See Vol. XII, Annex 272,
Affidavit, State of Qatar Compensation Claims Committee, Exhibit B (Portion of CCC
Claims Database related to the UAE).
64
See, e.g., Vol. X, Annex 243, DCL-148, para. 1 (“As I was waiting, a group of Emiratis in
traditional Emirati clothing made rude comments about my traditional Qatari clothing.”);
Vol. VII, Annex 247, DCL-161, para. 14 (“[Redacted] changed their attitudes immediately,
and began sending [redacted] harassing messages in the hours following the UAE’s
announcement, bullying [redacted] because of [redacted] Qatari identity. One of the messages
told [redacted] to pack [redacted] things and leave the UAE.”); see also Vol. VIII, Annex
187, DCL-038, para. 12; Vol. X, Annex 236, DCL-139, para. 9; Vol. XI, Annex 253, DCL-
168, para. 15.
65
See Vol. VII, Annex 180, DCL-028, para. 20. (“I would overhear a lot of anti-Qatar and anti-
Qatari statements. People would swear at Qataris or make comments about the Emir of
Qatar.”); see also Vol. XI, Annex 253, DCL-168, para. 15 (“I was seated very close to a table
of Emiratis, who were loudly saying terrible things about Qatar . . . I knew they recognized
me as a Qatari because I was wearing my Qatari dress; they clearly wanted me to hear their
conversation. I felt a great deal of hostility was being directed towards me simply because of
my Qatari identity.”).
66
See Vol. VII, Annex 172, DCL-013, para. 13 (“After the exam, I saw that my car, which had
a Qatari license plate . . . was damaged. It looked like it had been hit by another car and then
attacked by hand…I could tell by the damage that it had been caused deliberately, which
made me feel very unsafe. I did not report this to the police, because I was not sure if it was
safe for a Qatari to go to Emirati police, given the news and anti-Qatari climate that
morning.”); ibid, para. 32 (“One of my . . . friends in the UAE who used to park his car
outside of his building told me that the police took away his car for no reason one or two
months after the measures were imposed. The car had a Qatari license plate . . . . When he
went to the police station to ask for his car back, the police officer told him to thank god that
he was . . . not Qatari, because if he had been Qatari, he would never had given him the car
back. The police officer then told my friend that it was mandatory to change the license plate
to an Emirati one.”).

32
that they had stopped wearing their traditional clothes: they were afraid and did
not want to look Qatari 67.

B. THE TRAVEL BAN AND RESTRICTIONS ON MOVEMENT

2.26 In addition to the Expulsion Order, the 5 June Directive also established an
unconditional ban on travel and entry of “Qatari nationals” in the UAE (the
“Absolute Travel Ban”), as well as measures restricting Qataris and “Qatari
means of transportation” from UAE airspace and seaports. It likewise restricted
Emiratis from entering or transiting through Qatar. These actions were particularly
significant in light of the previously existing ease of movement between Qatar and
the UAE under the GCC framework. Prior to 5 June 2017, the volume of travel
between the two countries was extremely high, with 321,088 Qatari entries into
the UAE between January 2016 and 4 June 2017 68. Emirati travel to Qatar was
also frequent, with 188,927 entries by Emiratis into Qatar from January 2016 to
May 2017 69.

2.27 Almost immediately after the announcement of the 5 June Directive, UAE
agencies and authorities began taking additional steps to effectuate the Absolute
Travel Ban. On 5 June 2017 at 8:37 a.m., several hours after issuance of the
5 June Directive, the UAE General Civil Aviation Authority issued a Notice to
Airmen (“NOTAM”) stating “ALL ACFT [AIRCRAFT] REGISTERED IN THE
67
Vol. VII, Annex 172, DCL-013, para. 31 (“My Qatari friends who remained in the UAE for
a few days after 5 June almost completely stopped wearing the Qatari traditional outfit. They
told me that they did not want to look Qatari because they were afraid. They were afraid of
the Emirati police and authorities, but also of Emirati people.”).
68
Vol. XII, Annex 276, Affidavit, Airport Passports Department, State of Qatar Ministry of
Interior.
69
Vol. XII, Annex 273, Affidavit, State of Qatar Planning and Statistics Authority, para. 3.

33
STATE OF QATAR ARE NOT AUTHORIZED TO OVERFLY EMIRATES FIR
[Flight Information Region] DEPART OR LAND AT UAE AERODROMES” 70.
On the same day, the Ministry of Interior’s General Directorate of Residency and
Foreign Affairs issued a circular stating that “according to a new regulation which
will be in affect [sic] starting from today 05 June 2017 in all of United Arab
Emirates borders (Sea Land and Airports) . . . Qatari nationals . . . [were
prevented] . . . from entry through all the UAE Airports, land and seaports
. . . [and] . . . UAE citizens . . . [were prevented from] . . . travel to Qatar or transit
through its territory.” 71 Etihad Airways, the flag carrier of the UAE, and Emirates,
the largest UAE airline, likewise confirmed the ban on travel to Qatar, tweeting in
the morning of 5 June 2017 that they were suspending all flights to and from Doha
as of 6 June 72:

70
Vol. II, Annex 3, United Arab Emirates General Civil Aviation Authority, NOTAM LYA7213
(5 June 2017).
71
Vol. II, Annex 2, United Arab Emirates Ministry of Interior, General Directorate of
Residency & Foreigners Affairs - Dubai, Ban on Travelers from and to Qatar (5 June 2017)
(with certified translation).
72
Twitter Post, @EtihadAirways (5 June 2017 at 10:05 a.m.),
[Link] Twitter Post, @emirates
(5 June 2017 at 2:51 p.m.), [Link]

34
2.28 Three days later, on 8 June, the UAE General Civil Aviation Authority
announced on Twitter that it had closed the airspace for all air traffic to and from
Doha 73:

2.29 The UAE General Civil Aviation Authority subsequently confirmed on

13 June that it was “committed to its decision issued on [5 June 2017], banning all
Qatari aviation companies and aircraft registered in the State of Qatar from
landing at the State’s airports or transiting its sovereign airspace” 74.

73
Twitter Post, @gcaauae (8 June 2017 at 10:00 a.m.), [Link]
status/872694715933523969.
74
“General Civil Aviation Authority bans aviation companies registered in UAE to operate
direct and indirect flights to Qatar”, Emirates News Agency (13 June 2017),
[Link]

35
2.30 Similarly, immediately following the 5 June Directive, multiple UAE
ports, including in Abu Dhabi, Fujairah, Sharjah, and Ras Al Khaimah, took
measures in furtherance of the Directive’s orders to restrict access to seaports and
territorial waters. 75 On 11 June 2017, the UAE Federal Transport Authority
unified this approach via a country-wide order issued to all ports and shipping
agents carrying three stark prohibitions: (i) not to receive any Qatari-flagged
vessel, or indeed any vessel owned by a Qatari company or individual; (ii) not to
load or unload any cargo of Qatari origin in any port or water of the UAE; and
(iii) not to allow ships to load any cargo of UAE origin bound for Qatar 76. The
individual port authorities quickly followed suit 77.

75
See, e.g., Vol. II, Annex 4, Chief Harbour Master, Abu Dhabi Ports, Restriction to vessels
and cargo Coming from / going to Qatari ports (5 June 2017); Vol. II, Annex 5, Harbour
Master, Port of Fujairah, Entry Restrictions to Vessels Flying Qatar Flag, Vessels Destined to
or Arrival from Qatar Ports (5 June 2017); Vol. II, Annex 6, General Manager Ras Al
Khaimah Ports, Saqr Port Authority, “Restrictions for vessels flying Qatari flag and vessels
loading for Qatar” (6 June 2017); Vol. II, Annex 7, Director - Operations, Government of
Sharjah Department of Seaports & Customs, Restrictions to All Qatar Vessels and Cargoes
(6 June 2017); Vol. II, Annex 8, Harbour Master, RAK Ports, Notice to Mariners No. 10 (7
June 2017); Vol. II, Annex 9, Abu Dhabi Petroleum Ports Authority, Enforcement of
Blockade with Qatar (undated).
76
See Vol. II, Annex 11, United Arab Emirates Federal Transport Authority, Circular No.
2/2/1023: Implementation Process of the decision related to Qatar sanctions (11 June 2017).
77
See, e.g., Vol. II, Annex 12, DP World, Circular: Entry Restrictions to All Qatar Vessels and
Cargoes - FTA (11 June 2017) (implementing Federal Transport Authority Circular No.
2/2/1023 as operator of Jebel Ali Port, Mina Rashid Port, and Mina Al Hamriya Port); Vol.
II, Annex 12, DP World, Circular: Entry Restrictions to All Qatar Vessels and Cargoes -
FTA (11 June 2017); Vol. II, Annex 14, Chief Harbour Master, Abu Dhabi Ports,
Implementation Process of the Decision related to Qatar Sanctions (12 June 2017); Vol. II,
Annex 15, Harbour Master, Port of Fujairah, Notice to Mariners No. 225: Implementation
Process of the Decision Related to Qatar Sanctions (12 June 2017); Vol. II, Annex 21,
Dubai Maritime City Authority, Circular MO/MSE/CO11/2017: Restriction to vessels and
cargo coming from/going to Qatari ports (6 July 2017). On 12 February 2019, the Abu Dhabi
Ports authority appeared to amend its directive implementing the Federal Transport Authority
Circular by lifting the restrictions on Qatari cargo, though Qatari-owned or -flagged vessels
remained barred from Abu Dhabi ports. Vol. II, Annex 32, Chief Harbour Master, Abu
36
2.31 Further, as with the Expulsion Order, UAE State and other media broadly
publicized the Absolute Travel Ban, in some cases providing additional
information and context to the stark terms of the 5 June Directive. For example,
on 7 June 2017, Emirates News Agency, the official state media source, issued a
news bulletin that stated in full: “The United Arab Emirates authorities has [sic]
announced that all travellers holding Qatari passports are currently prohibited
from travelling to, or transiting through, the UAE. In addition, expatriates residing
in Qatar and in possession of a Qatari Residence Visa shall not be eligible for Visa
on Arrival in the UAE. This ruling applies to all airlines flying into the UAE.” 78 7F

2.32 On 11 June 2017, faced with mounting pressure from international human
rights organizations such as Amnesty International, and widespread media
coverage and concern over the effects of the measures, as discussed below 79, the 78F

UAE announced that its President had “instructed the authorities concerned to
take into consideration the humanitarian circumstances of Emirati-Qatari joint
families . . . [I]n implementation of these directives, the Ministry of Interior has
set up a telephone line (+9718002626) to receive such cases and take appropriate

Dhabi Ports, CHM Direction No. 02/2019: Update on Implementation Process of the
Decision related to Qatar Sanctions (12 February 2019). However, the UAE’s Federal Land
& Maritime Transport authority subsequently announced that its policy remained unchanged.
See Vol. II, Annex 33, “Federal Land & Maritime Transport Authority: No change in boycott
measures against Qatar at UAE sea ports”, Emirates News Agency (21 February 2019),
[Link]
78
“Qatari nationals and residents banned from travelling to or via UAE”, Emirates News
Agency (7 June 2017), [Link]
79
See Chapter II, Section IV, below; see also, e.g., Margherita Stancati, “Qatar Crisis Takes
Toll on Families Caught Between Countries”, Wall Street Journal (8 June 2017),
[Link]
1496958822.

37
measures to help them.” 80 The UAE then announced a purported exception to the
Absolute Travel Ban, for only a subset of Qataris affected, to allow for the entry,
in certain undisclosed circumstances, of individuals in joint Emirati-Qatari
families (the “Modified Travel Ban”). In practice, however, this modification had
little effect, including due to its limited scope, as the UAE proposed no similar
modification with respect to all other affected Qataris, meaning that Qataris who
had, for example, studied or worked in the UAE still remained subject to an
absolute ban on travel—even if they previously had lived in the UAE but were
forced to leave by the Expulsion Order. In addition, the “hotline” was actually a
security channel run by the Abu Dhabi Police and the lack of functionality of the
telephone line, the failure to provide any transparency as to the method or criteria
for granting entry, the haphazard and inconsistent decisions, and the general
climate of uncertainty and fear amongst Qataris rendered the “hotline” not only
ineffective but affirmatively arbitrary, as discussed in greater detail below. 81

2.33 Due to the frequency and freedom of movement between the two countries
prior to 5 June 2017, the impacts of the travel bans—both the original Absolute
Travel Ban and the subsequent Modified Travel Ban—were immediate and
severe. In particular, individual citizens of the two countries have historically
maintained close ties, spurred by the historical and GCC framework of free
movement across the borders. Prior to the Discriminatory Measures, thousands of

80
Vol. II, Annex 13, United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs, President issues
directives to address humanitarian cases of Emirati-Qatari joint families (11 June 2017),
[Link]
.[Link].
81
See paras. 4.41-4.53, below; see also Christopher Davidson, “The Making of a Police State”,
Foreign Policy (14 Apr. 2011), [Link]
police-state-2/; Vol. III, Annex 101, OHCHR, Press briefing note on United Arab Emirates
(4 January 2019).

38
Qataris lived, studied, worked, owned property, and traveled in the UAE, 82 with
Emiratis doing the same in Qatar. Family ties likewise often cut across national
boundaries, and as of June 2017, there were a reported 3,694 marriages between
Qataris and Emiratis 83. A total of 767 children with one Qatari and one Emirati
parent were born in Qatar from January 2015 to January 2019 alone 84. The UAE
has also been a top choice for Qatari students seeking to study abroad, third only
to the United Kingdom and the United States, with hundreds of Qataris pursuing
university and post-graduate studies there every year prior to 5 June 2017 85.

82
See Chapter V, below. See, e.g., Vol. IX, Annex 206, DCL-079, para. 10 (“Traveling to the
UAE was very easy: the process was very fast, we used to travel without delay and it was not
expensive to travel . . . . We used to travel with only our ID cards and did not need our
passports. At the Dubai and Sharjah airports, there was a line for ‘GCC nationals’ and a line
for others.”); Vol. VIII, Annex 193, DCL-048, para. 10 (“It was easy to travel to the UAE
prior to June 5, 2017. The flight tickets were cheap . . . and I would stay at a hotel in Dubai. I
also sometimes drove there. I would travel alone for business or with my family for
weekends and vacation.”); Vol. IX, Annex 224, DCL-108, para. 8 (“I travelled to Qatar often
to see my family and for business . . . These trips were easy to make because I did not even
need to book a flight; I would usually drive to Doha through Saudi Arabia.”).
83
See Vol. III, Annex 97, Joint Communication from the Special Procedures Mandate Holders
of the Human Rights Council to the United Arab Emirates, document AU ARE 5/2017
(18 August 2017), pp. 1–2; Vol. V, Annex 135, National Human Rights Committee, 100
Days Under the Blockade: NHRC Third report on hum an rights violations caused by the
blockade imposed on the state of Qatar (30 August 2017), p. 19 (citing nearly 6,500 mixed
marriages between Qataris and Emiratis, Saudis or Bahrainis as of June 2017).
84
See Vol. XII, Annex 273, Affidavit, State of Qatar Planning and Statistics Authority, para. 3.
85
See UNESCO, Global Flow of Tertiary-Level Students, [Link]
flow (showing 389 Qataris studying in post-secondary institutions in the UAE in 2016);
“Middle Eastern Students Abroad: In Numbers”, TopUniversities (10 April 2015),
[Link] (reporting
434 Qataris studying at universities in the UAE in 2012, based on UNESCO data); Vol. XII,
Annex 273, Affidavit, State of Qatar Planning and Statistics Authority, para. 3; Vol. V,
Annex 128, National Human Rights Committee, First Report Regarding the Human Rights
Violations as a Result of the Blockade on the State of Qatar (13 June 2017), [Link]
[Link]/wp-content/uploads/2017/06/First-Report-of-the-Qatar-National-Human-Rights-
[Link], p. 9 (showing that as of June 2017, there were approximately 4,600 students
from the UAE, Saudi Arabia and Bahrain studying in Qatari public schools).

39
Commercial ties were extensive as well, with about 4,200 Qatari companies
operating in the UAE and 1,074 Emirati companies operating in Qatar as of May
2016 86.

2.34 The Modified Travel Ban remained in place unchanged until several weeks
prior to the Court’s Order of Provisional Measures, when, following questioning
from the Court, the UAE issued another statement. In its 5 July 2018 statement—
issued exactly one year and one month following the imposition of the
measures—the UAE claimed that “[s]ince its announcement on June 5, 2017”, it
“has instituted a requirement for all Qatari citizens overseas to obtain prior
permission for entry into the UAE. Permission may be granted for a limited-
duration period, at the discretion of the UAE government”. The statement further
said it “confirm[ed] that Qatari citizens already resident in the UAE need not
apply for permission to continue residence in the UAE. However, all Qatari
citizens resident in the UAE are encouraged to obtain prior permission for re-entry
into UAE territory. All applications for entry clearance may be made through the
telephone hotline announced on June 11, 2017 (+9718002626).” 87

2.35 Although presented as a clarification, the UAE’s 5 July 2018 statement

insisted that Qataris living in the UAE “need not apply for permission to continue
residence”, while at the same time providing that entry permits “may be granted
for a limited-duration period” only. At some point following the 5 July 2018

86
Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Qatar - UAE Joint Higher Committee Holds Session
(2 May 2016), [Link]
higher-committee-holds-session.
87
Vol. II, Annex 29, United Arab Emirates, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, An Official Statement
by The UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and I nternational Cooperation (5 July2018),
[Link]
[Link].

40
statement, the UAE further appears to have established an online system, but only
informed certain Qataris of its availability on an ad hoc basis 88. None of these
modifications have addressed the inherently arbitrary and discriminatory manner
of application of these methods, nor relieved the impacts on Qataris 89.

C. THE ATTACK ON FREEDOM OF EXPRESSION AND INCITEMENT OF ANTI-QATARI

SENTIMENT

2.36 Simultaneously with the 5 June Directive, the UAE also took a series of
actions designed to broadly suppress speech critical of its actions against Qataris;
namely, by criminalizing expressions of “sympathy” for Qatar (C.1) and by
blocking Qatari news media in the UAE (C.2). This allowed the UAE to pursue its
anti-Qatar narrative unfettered, and the UAE openly pursued and encouraged anti-
Qatari hate speech and propaganda, leading to the creation and perpetuation of a
climate of fear and hostility against Qatar and Qataris (C.3).

1. The Criminalization of “Sympathizing” with Qatar

2.37 On 7 June 2017, the UAE took a further step in its discriminatory targeting
of Qatar and its people by announcing that it would criminalize “sympathizing”
with Qatar 90. The UAE Ministry of Justice posted the following statement on its
Twitter account 91:

88
See paras. 5.72–5.73, below.
89
See para. 5.80, below.
90
See Vol. II, Annex 10, Twitter Post, @MOJ_UAE (6 June 2017) (with certified translation)
(official account of the UAE Ministry of Justice); Vol. II, Annex 46, “Attorney General
Warns against Sympathy for Qatar or Objecting to the State’s Positions”, Al-Bayan Online
(7 June 2017) [Link]
1.2969979 (certified translation); “UAE bans expressions of sympathy towards Qatar –
41
2.38 The Attorney General’s statement was subsequently published in the
government-owned Emirati newspapers Al Bayan and Al Ittihad, on 7 and 8 June
2017, respectively. The news agency UAE BARQ similarly publicized the
statement to its 1.92 million followers on Twitter 92.

media”, Reuters (7 June 2017), [Link]

expressions-of-sympathy-towards-qatar-media-idUSL8N1J40D2; Vol. V, Annex 127,
Committee to Protect Journalists, UAE threatens 15 y ears in prison for expressions of
‘sympathy’ with Qatar (7 June 2017), [Link]
[Link]; Sam Wilkin, “Support for Qatar Could Land You in Jail,
U.A.E. Warn Residents”, Bloomberg (7 June 2017),
[Link]
jail-u-a-e-warns-residents; see also Vol. II, Annex 38, United Arab Emirates Federal Decree-
Law No. (5) of 2012 on Combating Cybercrimes (13 August 2012) (hereinafter “Federal
Decree on Combating Cybercrimes”).
91
Vol. II, Annex 10, Twitter Post, @MOJ_UAE (6 June 2017) (certified translation) (official
account of the UAE Ministry of Justice).
92
See Vol. II, Annex 47, Twitter Post, @UAE_Barq (7 June 2017) (certified translation) (“The
Attorney General warns against any participation, verbal or written, on social media websites
or any other medium, that expresses any sympathy for the State of Qatar or opposition to the
decisive stance that the UAE and other states have taken with decisive positions against the
government of Qatar, under penalty of 3 to 15 years in prison and a fine of no less than AED
500,000.”).

42
2.39 The criminalization of “sympathizing” had an immediate chilling effect on
any potential domestic backlash to the Discriminatory Measures, and further
alienated Qataris from their Emirati friends and family, who now feared uncertain
punishment if they maintained the same relationship with or took steps to assist
their Qatari brethren 93. They were also well aware of the risks to friends and
family and those who assist them, such as lawyers and educational authorities, and
in many cases would not engage out of fear that such contact would put these
individuals in danger 94.

93
See Vol. VII, Annex 170, DCL-011, para. 22 (“I feel that a gap has opened up between my
wife’s Emirati family and me since 5 June 2017. I can tell that some members of our family
have bad feelings towards me solely because I am Qatari and despite the fact that we used to
be close.”); Vol. VIII, Annex 195, DCL-053, para. 11 (“This situation has created a rift
within my Emirati family.”); Vol. IX, Annex 206, DCL-079, para. 29 (“However, when it
was announced by the UAE Attorney General that Emiratis would be imprisoned or fined for
showing sympathy to Qatar and Qataris, we stopped joking on our WhatsApp family group.
Some of my cousins have removed me from social media. They told me that they feared
getting in trouble because of their Qatari family.”); Vol. IX, Annex 218, DCL-097, para. 17
(“We barely even speak with our Emirati family now. They only call us when they travel
abroad from non-UAE numbers”); Vol. VII, Annex 165, DCL-004, para. 22; Vol. VIII,
Annex 186, DCL-036, para. 33; Vol. VIII, Annex 186, DCL-037, paras. 13, 25; Vol. VIII,
Annex 189, DCL-041, paras. 18–20; Vol. IX Annex 204, DCL-076, para. 23; Vol. IX,
Annex 207, DCL-080, para. 28; Vol. IX, Annex 208, DCL-082, para. 30; Vol. IX, Annex
209, DCL-083, para. 29; Vol. X, Annex 237, DCL-140, para. 11; Vol. XI, Annex 253, DCL-
168, para.25.
94
See, e.g., Vol. XI, Annex 256, DCL-172, para. 16 (“I believe the registrar’s office had
realized that I was Qatari and therefore did not want to help me. In [redacted] I called the
registration department again, and that time I was asked to pay a fee for my transcript. I
therefore sent an [redacted] friend who is a graduate of [redacted] to the registration
department to pay the fee on my behalf. However, when he tried to do so, he was told to visit
the registration department's director, at which point I told him to stop helping me. I was
worried that he could be punished under the UAE’s law punishing sympathy with Qataris,
and he agreed”); Vol. IX, Annex 211, DCL-086, para. 11 (“Before then I used to
communicate regularly with my Emirati friends in the UAE, however we have not spoken to
each other since. Given the risk of fines or imprisonment, I believe that my friends are too
afraid to call me, and I do not want to get them into trouble by calling them. We do not even
wish each other Eid Mubarak.”); Vol. VIII, Annex 194, DCL-51, para. 13; Vol. X, Annex
227, DCL-113, para. 14.

43
2.40 And this threat was not idle: on 6 July 2017, the application of the
cybercrimes law to “sympathizing” with Qatar claimed its first public victim 95. An
Emirati man, Ghanem Abdullah Mattar, disappeared, apparently arrested by UAE
security forces hours after posting a series of videos on the popular social media
site Snapchat, expressing his opinion that Emiratis should not vilify Qataris 96.
Following his disappearance, Amnesty International called for his immediate
release, tweeting that if the grounds for his arrest were his peaceful remarks
regarding the Gulf crisis, then he would be considered a prisoner of conscience 97.

2.41 Most recently, the UAE’s brutal repression of any support for Qatar
manifested during the 2019 Asian Cup, hosted in the UAE from 5 January to
1 February 2019. Ali Issa Ahmad, a British national, wore a Qatari football shirt
to the Qatar-Iraq match on 22 January 2019, reportedly “not knowing that doing
so in the UAE is an offence punishable with a large fine and an extended period of

95
See “Fears grow for UAE citizen arrested after Snapchats ‘sympathetic’ to Qatar”, Middle
East Eye (11 July 2017), [Link]
showing-sympathy-qatar-snapchat-1752665935; Vol. V, Annex 142, Amnesty International,
Report 2017/18: The State of the World's Human Rights (2018),
[Link] (“In June,
UAE’s Attorney General announced that anyone expressing sympathy with Qatar could face
up to 15 years’ imprisonment and fines. In July, Ghanim Abdullay Matar was detained for a
video he posted online in which he expressed sympathy towards the people of Qatar.”).
96
In his videos, Mr. Mattar challenged his country’s Discriminatory Measures by stating that
Emiratis should “[s]top swearing and cursing. We have kinship ties with our people in
Qatar”, and concluding with a message of support for Qatar, saying: “[s]ome people lead and
others are led. Here is Qatar proving that it will never be led. It leads its people but it nobody
leads it.” Vol. VI, Annex 160, Snapchat Video, Ghanem Abdullah Mattar (12 July 2017)
(certified translation).
97
See Vol. V, Annex 133, Twitter Post, @AmnestyAR (10 July 2017 at 2:14 a.m.) (certified
translation), [Link]

44
imprisonment” 98. Security officials confronted him after the match and followed
him to his hotel in Dubai. The next morning they “forced him into the back of his
car, handcuffed him, cut the shirt from him inflicting several knife wounds to his
arm and chest, punched him in the face [knocking out a tooth] and put a plastic
bag over his face” 99. After receiving treatment at a hospital for his severe injuries,
Mr. Ahmad was transferred to a police cell in Sharjah and was held there until his
release on 12 February 2019, 21 days after the game he attended. Upon arriving
back in the United Kingdom after his release, Mr. Ahmad said: “I thought 100%
that I was going to die in the UAE” 100.

2. The Suppression of Qatari Media

2.42 At the same time that it sought to suppress individual voices of dissent, the
UAE took even broader moves to block the expression of independent views that
could provide a counterpoint to the UAE’s state-controlled narrative regarding the
imposition of the 5 June Directive and other measures. Beginning even before the
issuance of the 5 June Directive, the UAE launched an assault on freedom of

98
“British man detained in UAE after wearing Qatar football shirt to match”, The Guardian
(5 February 2019), [Link]
uae-after-wearing-qatar-football-t-shirt-to-match.
99
Diane Taylor, “I was sure I’d die: UK football fan detained in UAE feared for his life”, The
Guardian (15 February 2019), [Link]
would-die-ali-issa-ahmad-uk-football-fan-detained-in-uae-feared-for-his-life.
100
Diane Taylor, “I was sure I’d die: UK football fan detained in UAE feared for his life”, The
Guardian (15 February 2019), [Link]
would-die-ali-issa-ahmad-uk-football-fan-detained-in-uae-feared-for-his-life. The UAE
denies that Mr. Ahmad was tortured for supporting Qatar; instead, it has claimed,
unbelievably, that his injuries were self-inflicted and that he admitted to wasting police time
and making false statements. Ibid.

45
expression by blocking access to news websites and television stations operated
by Qatari entities, including Al Jazeera 101.

2.43 As early as 24 May 2017, Al Jazeera reported that it began to detect

interference with its digital distribution platforms for the UAE 102. Al Jazeera has
concluded that the UAE blocked access to its websites and news content on
mobile applications—a significant part of its platform—beginning on that date 103.
Approximately six weeks later, the UAE openly took additional steps to sever
traditional broadcasting. In particular, on 6 July 2017, the Abu Dhabi Department
of Economic Development issued a circular prohibiting the broadcast and display
of Qatari service supplier beIN Media Group’s audio-visual channels beIN Sports
French and beIN Sports Arabic, as well as audio-visual channels from Qatari
service suppliers, including Al Jazeera, Qatar TV, Shaer Al-Rasul, Al Mujtama,
and Al-Rayyan, in commercial establishments in the Emirate of Abu Dhabi 104.
The circular, pictured below, stipulates that legal action will be taken if
commercial establishments do not comply. A 12 June 2018 letter from the UAE

101
See Vol. V, Annex 125, Committee to Project Journalists, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain block
Qatari news websites (25 May 2017), [Link]
[Link]; see also “Blocked in Dubai: Qatar cartoon and soccer channels,
CNN Media (8 June 2017), [Link]
blocked/[Link].
102
Vol. XII, Annex 264, DCL-181 Witness Declaration, Al Jazeera Media Network
Representative, para. 9.
103
Vol. XII, Annex 264, DCL-181 Witness Declaration, Al Jazeera Media Network
Representative, para. 11.
104
See Vol. II, Annex 20, Abu Dhabi Department of Economic Development, Circular
prohibiting the broadcasting/playing of a num ber of satellite channels (6 July 2017)
(certified translation); Vol. II, Annex 22, Abu Dhabi Tourism and Culture Authority,
Circular No. (33) 2017 (26 July 2017); see also Vol. II, Annex 17, Sharjah Commerce and
Tourism Development Authority, Ban of bein [sic] Sports Channels Display (15 June 2017).

46
National Media Council to the UAE Ministry of Economy confirmed that beIN
channels on a “list” provided by the UAE National Media Council are
“banned” 105.

105
See Vol. II, Annex 28, Letter from United Arab Emirates National Media Council to United
Arab Emirates Ministry of Economics, beIN Sports Receivers and C ards (6 June 2018)
(certified translation).

47
2.44 The UAE also has continued to block online access to Al Jazeera. The
UAE blocked Al Jazeera’s Snapchat channel entirely on 18 September 2017;
traffic immediately plummeted from 350,000 daily views to zero 106. The UAE
also blocked access to other Qatari media online, the Peninsula, and the Qatari
State News Agency, QNA 107.

3. The UAE’s Campaign of Misinformation and Anti-Qatari Hate Speech

2.45 The UAE’s attempts to silence support for Qatar and Qatari voices have
been coupled with an affirmative campaign of anti-Qatari propaganda, which the
UAE has created, encouraged, and condoned, including through a shadow
campaign of misinformation and false news conducted by state-sponsored and
promoted hate speech. The roots of this campaign pre-date the 5 June Directive,
and indeed, served to foreground its acts to come.

2.46 In the weeks leading up to the UAE’s well-orchestrated measures against

Qataris, the UAE promoted an incendiary fake news story that attempted to paint
the Qatari government as undermining its allies and supporting terrorist groups—a
move that served to inflame hatred against Qataris and heighten tensions between
Qatar and the UAE. Specifically, on 23 May 2017, cyber hackers posted a fake
news story on the website of Qatar News Agency (“QNA”), falsely attributing to

106
Vol. XII, Annex 264, DCL-181 Witness Declaration, Al Jazeera Media Network
Representative, para. 11.
107
See Vol. II, Annex 125, Committee to Project Journalists, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain block
Qatari news websites (25 May 2017), [Link]
[Link]; “The Peninsula Qatar website blocked in UAE”, The Peninsula (10
June 2017), [Link]
blocked-in-UAE; Ahmed Al Omran, “Gulf media unleashes war of words with Qatar”,
Financial Times (3 August 2017), [Link]
90a9d1bc9691.

48
H.H. Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani, the Amir of the State of Qatar,
incendiary statements that “criticized renewed tensions with Tehran, expressed
understanding for Hezbollah and Hamas, and suggested U.S. President Donald
Trump might not last long in power.” 108 QNA and Qatar immediately and publicly
confirmed that the QNA website had been hacked and that the statements
attributed to H.H. the Amir were false, calling it a “shameful cybercrime” that was
“instigated and perpetrated with malicious intent.” 109 Independent third parties
confirmed that the QNA website had been hacked, with intelligence sources from
the United States and elsewhere attributing the hack to the UAE 110. U.S.
intelligence agencies reportedly confirmed that the day prior to the hack, senior
members of the UAE government discussed the plan and its implementation.111

108
See William Maclean, “Gulf rift reopens as Qatar decries hacked comments by emir”,
Reuters (23 May 2017), [Link]
qatar-decries-hacked-comments-by-emir-idUSKBN18K02Z.
109
See Vol. II, Annex 51, Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, An Official Source at the Ministry
of Foreign Affairs: the Perpetrators of the Electronic Piracy against Qatar News Agency
website will be prosecuted (24 May 2017), [Link]
news/details/2017/05/24/an-official-source-at-the-ministry-of-foreign-affairs-the-
perpetrators-of-the-electronic-piracy-against-qatar-news-agency-website-will-be-prosecuted;
Vol. II, Annex 64, Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister: ‘Qatar Will Address
the Media Campaign Targeting It’ (25 May 2017), [Link]
news/details/2017/05/25/foreign-minister-%27qatar-will-address-the-media-campaign-
targeting-it%27; Vol. II, Annex 60, Letter from Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of State of Qatar, to Abdul Latif Bin Rashid Al-Ziyani, Secretary-
General of GCC (7 August 2017).
110
Karen DeYoung & Ellen Nakashima, “UAE orchestrated hacking of Qatari government sites,
sparking regional upheaval, according to U.S. intelligence officials”, The Washington Post
(16 July 2017), [Link]
government-sites-sparking-regional-upheaval-according-to-us-intelligence-
officials/2017/07/16/00c46e54-698f-11e7-8eb5-cbccc2e7bfbf_story.html.
111
Karen DeYoung & Ellen Nakashima, “UAE orchestrated hacking of Qatari government sites,
sparking regional upheaval, according to U.S. intelligence officials”, The Washington Post
(16 July 2017), [Link]
government-sites-sparking-regional-upheaval-according-to-us-intelligence-officials/2017/07/
16/00c46e54-698f-11e7-8eb5-cbccc2e7bfbf_story.html.

49
Qatar’s own investigation confirmed reports that the cyber hacking was
perpetrated with assistance from individuals with connections to the UAE 112. In
particular, Qatar uncovered that the QNA website experienced an unusual and
extraordinarly large surge in the number of visits originating from the UAE on 23
May 2017, just before and after the hack—demonstrating that individuals in the
UAE were waiting for the false story to be planted so that they could immediately
disseminate it 113.

2.47 The UAE Government’s conduct in response to the hacking is telling:

instead of following up on the international reports confirming the hack,
addressing the situation with Qatar through diplomatic channels, or even taking
the matter up at the GCC, the UAE—within hours—broadcast the false statements
widely to foment hostility against Qatar in the run-up to imposing the
Discriminatory Measures.

2.48 For example, on the same day as the cyberattack on 23 May 2017, Sky
News Arabia, a media outlet co-owned by H.H. Sheikh Mansour bin Zayed Al
Nahyan, the Deputy Prime Minister of the UAE and the brother of H.H. Crown
Prince Sheikh Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan, ran a report in which the news
anchor repeated the false statements as if they were true, attributing them to a
report published by QNA with no mention of the hack, despite the fact that QNA

112
See Peter Salisbury, “The fake-news hack that nearly started a war this summer was designed
for one man: Donald Trump”, Quartz (20 October 2017), [Link]
story-of-the-hack-that-nearly-started-another-middle-east-war/.
113
See Peter Salisbury, “The fake-news hack that nearly started a war this summer was designed
for one man: Donald Trump”, Quartz (20 October 2017), [Link]
story-of-the-hack-that-nearly-started-another-middle-east-war/.

50
had already confirmed that its website had been hacked 114. In the days that
followed, high-ranking UAE officials, other prominent Emirati commentators, and
local media sources continued to circulate the fake statements on social media,
again dismissing Qatar’s clear disavowal of the statements by alleging that the
reports of the hack—including by independent, international sources—as
“fake” 115. A hashtag, #Tamim_Statements, was created on Twitter and then used
to disseminate widely similar doctored news clips purporting to be from Qatar
TV 116.

114
Vol. II, Annex 39, Video, Sky NEWS Arabia (23 May 2017).
115
Vol VI, Annex 161, Compendium of Social Media Posts, Tweet by Dhahi Khalfan on 23
May 2017, Index No. 8 (“Qatar’s preference for the Muslim Brotherhood and Iran over Saudi
Arabia, the UAE, Kuwait, and Bahrain, is a political disaster!!!”); ibid., Tweets by Ali Al-
Noaimi, Index Nos. 60–61 (“There will be a lot of fake news to prove that #Tamim’s
statements are fake.”). The day after the hack, on 24 May 2017, Sky NEWS Arabia once
again broadcast the fake news by posting a video on its website purporting to be a clip from
Qatari TV, but doctored to include a scrolling banner including the alleged statements. Vol.
II, Annex 39, Video, “Watch the Emir of Qatar’s Speech on Official Television”, Sky NEWS
Arabia (24 May 2017); see also Vol. II, Annex 40, Ahmad Ashour, “Analysts: Qatar Drives
a Wedge in the Gulf and Arab Ranks”, Emirates Today (25 May 2017),
[Link] (“the statements by the
Emir of Qatar, Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani, which are critical of the positions taken
by the GCC countries, ‘are in line with Qatar’s inclination towards supporting the Muslim
Brotherhood and other terrorist groups’ . . . [UAE political writers and analysts] considered
that ‘the allegation that the Qatar News Agency (QNA) was hacked is a lie that no one will
fall for’”); Vol. II, Annex 42, “‘A deluge of rage’ strikes the emirate of treason and
criminality”, Al-Youm7 (25 May 2017) (“Mohamad Al-Hamady, Editor-in-Chief of the
Emirates Itihad Newspaper, considered that the declarations by the Emir of Qatar, Tamim
Bin Hamad Al Thani, in which he challenged the Gulf and praised the Iranian role, are a
break from the ranks and not the result of a break-in by hackers . . . [N]o Gulf Arab citizen
can believe that statements published by the official news agency of Qatar are fabricated, and
that the Agency’s website was hacked.”); Vol. II, Annex 41, “Tamim Isolates Qatar by
Turning Against Enduring Gulf and Arab Principles”, Al-Khaleej (25 May 2017); Vol VI,
Annex 161, Compendium of Social Media Posts, Tweet by Majed al-Raeesi (prominent UAE
political analyst), Index No. 62 (28 May 2017).
116
Vol VI, Annex 161, Compendium of Social Media Posts, Tweets by Ali Noaimi and Majed
Taha, Index No. 60 (circulating video and stating “the Qatari TV broadcasts
51
2.49 The QNA hacking is but one example; a broad campaign of anti-Qatari
hatred that the UAE has orchestrated and funded has proliferated since the onset
of the Discriminatory Measures. In the wake of the 5 June Directive, a number of
anti-Qatar websites appeared, spreading false news and misinformation about
Qatar intended to be picked up and broadly circulated by social media users. Some
of the most prolific of these anti-Qatar websites and accounts are directly linked to
the UAE government.

2.50 For example, one such website, “Qatar Crisis News”, was created by a
United States-based public affairs firm registered as an “agent” of the UAE
Government in the United States 117. Several other similar websites list a UAE-
based public affairs firm as their website subscriber and a UAE-based individual
as their customer contact 118. Similarly, in 2017, a British communications
company revealed in its public disclosures that the UAE’s National Media
Council had paid it US$333,000 to launch a public relations campaign against
Qatar on social media 119. The contract reportedly required the creation of

#Tamim_Statements in the news ticker in the bottom of the screen… was the Qatari TV
hacked as well?”).
117
Vol. VI, Annex 159, Government Communications Office for State of Qatar v. John Does 1-
10 (Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Kings): Documents obtained in U.S.
proceedings, pp. 2, 9.
118
Vol. VI, Annex 159, Government Communications Office for State of Qatar v. John Does 1-
10 (Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of Kings): Documents obtained in U.S.
proceedings, pp. 15–30.
119
Vol. VI, Annex 158, United States Department of Justice, FARA Registration Unit, Exhibit
A to SCL Social Limited Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration
Act (6 October 2017), [Link] p. 9.

52
advertisements for social media sites like Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube that
linked Qatar with terrorism using the hashtag #boycottqatar 120.

2.51 Against this backdrop, the UAE’s campaign of anti-Qatari incitement

flourished. The United Nations Office of the High Commissioner of Human
Rights (the “OHCHR”) described a “widespread defamation and hatred campaign
against Qatar”, with hundreds of anti-Qatar press articles and caricatures
published in Emirati and other GCC media since June 2017 121. This anti-Qatari
propaganda campaign includes media attacks on Qatar by Emirati officials and
other prominent Emiratis, as well as the establishment of fake news sites and
social media accounts that disseminate false news accusing Qatar of support for
terrorism and other nefarious behavior. Taken together, the UAE’s campaign has
resulted in a torrent of hateful and discriminatory posts against Qataris across
social media platforms.

2.52 Qatar has created a compendium representing a small sample of the social
media posts inciting hatred against Qatar and Qataris, appended to this Memorial
as Annex 161.

2.53 Senior Emirati government officials have directly spearheaded the media
campaign against Qatar, circulating incendiary and provocative attacks that have
led to an outpouring of discriminatory sentiment against Qataris. The attacks run

120
Julia Ainsley et al., “The Mueller effect: FARA filings soar in shadow of Manafort, Flynn
probes,” NBC News (18 January 2018), [Link]
news/muellereffect-fara-filings-soar-shadow-manafort-flynn-probes-n838571.
121
Vol. III, Annex 98, OHCHR Technical Mission to the State of Qatar, Report on the impact
of the Gulf Crisis on hum an rights (December 2017), [Link]
content/uploads/2018/01/[Link], paras. 14, 15; see, e.g.,
Vol. VI, Annex 161, Compendium of Social Media Posts, Index No. 045.

53
the gamut from painting Qatar and Qataris as terrorist sympathizers, to directing
degrading insults at the Qatari royal family and the Qatari people, to calling for
violence against Qataris. Attacking the royal family—whose identity is deeply
intertwined with that of the Qatari people and the Qatari State 122—as a way of
denigrating all Qataris appears to have become a weapon of choice for some
prominent Emirati tweeters.

2.54 UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs H.E. Dr. Anwar Gargash, for
example, is a prolific Twitter user with 935,000 followers, who frequently posts
tweets spreading the false and inflammatory narratives that Qatar supports
terrorism and promotes the interests of regional rivals Iran and Turkey above
those of its GCC neighbors. Among others, Minister Gargash has tweeted support
for #TheBlacklist, a hashtag created by an advisor to the Saudi royal court to
“out” Qataris and others accused of “conspiracy” with Qatar against the UAE and
other States. In support of this “movement”, Minister Gargash described it as an
“extremely important” way to expose individuals sympathetic to Qatar, adding
that #TheBlacklist tweets “open the eyes to those who were tempted by money
and sold out their countries” 123.

2.55 Similarly, Hamad Al Mazrouei, a high-ranking Emirati intelligence official

and Crown Prince H.H. Mohammed bin Zayed Al Nahyan’s right-hand man, who
has over 260,000 Twitter followers, frequently tweets crude public insults lodged

122
See paras. 3.97–3.100, below; see also Vol. VI, Annex 162, Expert Report of Dr. J. E.
Peterson, paras. 21–22.
123
“Tweet names of Qatar sympathisers to ‘blacklist’: Saudi royal aide”, Middle East Eye (18
August 2017), [Link]
blacklist-qatar-sympathisers-1564107564.

54
against the Qatari royal family and other hateful material 124. H.E. Lieutenant
General Dhahi Khalfan Tamim, Deputy Chairman of Police and General Security
for the Emirate of Dubai, also frequently disseminates anti-Qatar rhetoric to his
over 2.6 million followers, including violent statements such as ““[s]mashing the
ego of Qatar has now become a national duty” 125, and calling for the bombing of
Al Jazeera 126. The UAE has neither responded to nor censured these officials, nor
has it prosecuted them under its anti-hate speech laws.

2.56 The UAE’s public attacks on Qatar have targeted and threatened not just
the ruling family or the Qatari people, but the very existence of the Qatari State,
calling for the annexation of Qatar to the UAE, Saudi Arabia, or Bahrain 127. The
UAE’s desire to wipe Qatar off the map has even been manifested literally. On
19 January 2018, visitors to the Louvre Museum in Abu Dhabi pointed out that
the museum’s curators had exhibited a map of the region omitting Qatar. As the
below picture of the map demonstrates, the peninsula of Qatar is entirely
missing128. Following the controversy, the Louvre Museum in Abu Dhabi
announced on 22 January 2018 that it had replaced the map, claiming that the

124
See Vol. VI, Annex 161, Compendium of Social Media Posts, Index Nos. 036–043.
125
Vol. VI, Annex 161, Compendium of Social Media Posts, Index No. 015.
126
“Dubai security chief calls for bombing of Al Jazeera”, Al Jazeera (25 November 2017),
[Link]
[Link].
127
See, e.g., Vol. VI, Annex 161, Compendium of Social Media Posts, Index Nos. 012, 019,
021.
128
Image Source: Twitter Post, @Gaith_Ab (19 January 2018 at 6:41 a.m.),
[Link] (notation added to indicate
location of Qatar); see also Elsie Dusting, “Qatar and Omani Border Absent in Louvre Abu
Dhabi Map”, ArtAsiaPacific (24 January 2018), [Link]
OmaniBorderAbsentInLouvreAbuDhabiMap.

55
obliteration of an entire country was somehow merely an “oversight” that had
been rectified 129.

2.57 The UAE has also publicized and encouraged support for an incendiary,
alleged Saudi plan to dig a 60 kilometer long and 200 meter wide canal between it
and Qatar, which would literally cut off Qatar and turn it into an island 130. Both
UAE Minister Gargash and UAE intelligence official Mazrouei tweeted in support
of the canal 131.

2.58 The hateful messages spread by official UAE sources, and the proliferation
of anti-Qatari messaging through UAE-funded “news” websites, have had a ripple
effect across social media, encouraging waves of hatred from ordinary

129
See “Louvre Abu Dhabi replaces Gulf map that omitted Qatar”, Daily Mail (22 January
2018), [Link]
[Link].
130
“Saudi Arabia may dig canal to turn Qatar into an island”, The Guardian (1 September 2018),
[Link]
into-an-island.
131
See Vol. VI, Annex 161, Compendium of Social Media Posts, Index Nos. 040, 056.

56
individuals—including high-profile Emiratis—directed towards Qataris, including
statements encouraging violence 132.

2.59 The UAE’s campaign of incitement, coupled with the total silencing of any
independent viewpoints, has only deepened as the UAE’s Discriminatory
Measures have extended into their second year. Most recently, during the semi-
final match between the UAE and Qatar in Abu Dhabi, the booing of Emirati
supporters inside the stadium drowned out Qatar’s national anthem and turned to
violence as the match progressed 133. Video footage shows bottles and hard leather
sandals raining down on Qatari players during the match 134. Qataris were barred
from attending to support their team in person; while almost 2,000 Qatari fans
would have normally attended, stadiums were empty of Qataris given their
inability to enter the UAE 135 and fear as to what would happen if they did: “This
is hurting us emotionally . . . . But even if they actually allowed us to go, I
wouldn’t go to the UAE because we are just so scared of being in that place. It’s

132
Vol. VI, Annex 161, Compendium of Social Media Posts, Index Nos. 011, 015, 033–035,
068–069.
133
See “Soccer-AFC to probe sandal throwing at Asian Cup semi-final”, Reuters (30 January
2019), [Link]
throwing-at-asian-cup-semi-final-idUKL3N1ZU4G7.
134
See Vol. VI, Annex 161, Compendium of Social Media Posts, Index No. 051.
135
“Soccer-AFC to probe sandal throwing at Asian Cup semi-final”, Reuters (30 January 2019),
[Link]
-at-asian-cup-semi-final-idUKL3N1ZU4G7. Almost 2,000 Qatari fans would have ordinarily
made the trip, according to a Qatar soccer federation spokesman. In contrast, this year Qatar
had “almost none”; the Qatar cheering section was comprised of a small and motley
collection of supporters from other countries. See Tariq Panja, “Qatar Cuts Through Tension
and Defenders to Beat Saudi Arabia”, N.Y. Times (17 January 2019),
[Link] (“Almost no
Qatari fans have traveled to the tournament amid the blockade…that has made travel
extremely difficult—and entry into the UAE close to impossible.”).

57
so dangerous for us” 136. A five-member delegation of journalists from Qatar
Sports Press Committee was also prevented from entering the UAE on the eve of
the tournament 137. In one incident following the final match, a group of Omani
nationals carrying the Qatari flag were pursued by Abu Dhabi police, who seized
and destroyed the flag 138.

2.60 Following these incidents, the Asian Football Confederation (“AFC”)

subsequently sanctioned the UAE Football Association with a fine of
USD 150,000 for violations of the AFC’s Disciplinary and Ethics Code and its
Safety and Security Regulations. 139

2.61 The UAE’s incitement and perpetuation of this climate of racial hatred and
xenophobia, and its silencing of both Qatari voices and any potentially dissenting
voices, in addition to causing harm in their own right, have also exacerbated the
effects of the UAE’s other measures against Qataris, and made their impacts
particularly devastating for Qataris and their families.

136
Saba Aziz, “Qatar set for hostile crowd in Asian Cup semi-final against UAE”, Al Jazeera
(29 January 2019), [Link]
[Link].
137
See “Qatar at Asian Cup: ‘No need to mix politics with football’”, Al Jazeera (7 January
2019), [Link]
[Link]; “Qatar Sports Press panel slams UAE entry denial to delegation”, Gulf
Times (5 January 2019), [Link]
slams-UAE-entry-denial-to.
138
See Vol. VI, Annex 161, Compendium of Social Media Posts, Index No. 047.
139
See Vol. V, Annex 143, Asian Football Confederation (AFC), AFC DEC issues USD
$150,000 fine on UAE FA (11 March 2019), [Link]
usd-150-000-fine-on-uae-fa. The AFC also ordered the UAE to play one match without
spectators. Ibid.

58
Section III. The UAE’s Escalation of the Crisis and Qatar’s Response

2.62 Since the imposition of the Discriminatory Measures, Qatar has worked to
mitigate their detrimental impacts, has refused to retaliate in kind, and has
continually held itself out as open to negotiation to resolve the dispute (and indeed
has pursued attempts at negotiation through a variety of fora). Qatar’s Minister of
Foreign Affairs, H.E. Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-Thani, publicly
highlighted this policy of non-retaliation, stating: “we never reciprocate to the
measures being taken against the Qatari people” 140. The UAE, on the other hand,
has rejected or denied the glaring human rights violations caused by its
Discriminatory Measures, refused to engage constructively with Qatar, and
instead conditioned resolution of the dispute on a series of unlawful and
unreasonable demands that would essentially turn Qatar into a vassal state.

2.63 On 23 June 2017, the UAE escalated the crisis it had created by issuing a
threat to maintain the Discriminatory Measures indefinitely if Qatar did not
accede to a list of thirteen political demands (the “Thirteen Demands”). Given the
termination of diplomatic relations, the Thirteen Demands were delivered to Qatar
by Kuwait, and Qatar was given ten days to respond, subsequently extended by 48
hours at the request of H.H. the Emir of Kuwait.

2.64 The Thirteen Demands contemplate remarkable, unprecedented intrusions

into Qatar’s internal and external affairs and purport to dictate Qatar’s military,
political, social and economic policy, as well as its relations with third States.
Specifically, the demands include:

140
Council on Foreign Relations, A Conversation with Sheikh Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al-
Thani (30 November 2018), [Link]
abdulrahman-al-thani.

59
1. “Qatar must officially announce the reduction of
diplomatic representation with Iran, and close all
Iranian diplomatic missions in Qatar. Qatar must
expel all Iranian Revolutionary Guard elements
from Qatar and sever any military cooperation
with Iran. Only the commercial exchange with
Iran that is compliant with the US and
international sanctions shall be allowed, on the
condition that it does not endanger the security
of the GCC member states. All military or
intelligence cooperation with Iran must be
severed.

2. Qatar must immediately shut down the Turkish

military base that is currently being established,
and cease all military cooperation with Turkey
on Qatari soil.

3. Qatar must sever all relations with “terrorist,

sectarian, and ideological groups”, especially the
Muslim Brotherhood, Daesh, Qaeda, Fateh Al-
Sham (previously known as Al-Nosra Front),
and Lebanese Hezbollah. Qatar must officially
designate such entities as terrorist groups, in
accordance with the terrorism list announced by
Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, the United Arab
Emirates, and Egypt, and to update its list of
such terrorist groups in line with any future list
announced subsequently by the four states.

4. Cease all means of financing the individuals,

groups, or organizations designated as terrorist
by the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia, the United
Emirates, Egypt, Bahrain, the United States of
America, and other countries.

5. Extradite “terrorist personas”, fugitives, and

wanted individuals from Saudi Arabia, the
United Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Bahrain to

60
their original countries of origin, as well as
freezing their assets and provide any required
information about their accommodations,
movements, and funds.

6. Shut down Al-Jazeera network and its affiliate

broadcasting channels.

7. Stop meddling in the internal affairs of

sovereign countries. Stop the naturalization of
wanted citizens from Saudi Arabia, the United
Arab Emirates, Egypt, and Bahrain. Withdraw
the Qatari nationality from the current citizens
who, by granting them the Qatari citizenship,
violate the laws of these states.

8. Qatar must pay compensations for the lives lost

and the other financial losses resulting from
Qatar’s policies in recent years. The amount
shall be determined in coordination with Qatar.

9. Qatar must align with the Gulf states and the

other Arab states military-wise, politically,
socially, and economically in accordance with
the agreement reached with the [2014 Riyadh
Agreement].

10. Qatar must provide all personal details of

opposition members supported by Qatar, and
details of all the support offered to them by
Qatar in the past. Qatar must cease all
communications with the political opposition in
Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates, Egypt,
and Bahrain. Qatar must hand over all the files
that show information about Qatar’s
communication with opposition groups and the
support it provides them.

61
11. Qatar must shut down all news platforms that it
directly or indirectly funds, including “Arabi
21”, “Rasd”, “Al-Arabi Al-Jadid”,
“Mekameleen”, “Middle East Eye”, and others
(just to name a few examples). In this regard, we
mean all platforms funded by Qatar.

[Link] all demands within 10 days from

submitting them to Qatar, otherwise the list shall
be deemed null and void.

13. Approve to be reviewed on [a] monthly basis

during the first year after accepting the demands,
then once every quarter during the second year
and throughout the following ten years. Qatar’s
compliance shall be monitored annually.” 141

2.65 Following the issuance of the Thirteen Demands, on 5 July 2017 the
UAE’s Foreign Minister met his Saudi, Bahraini and Egyptian counterparts in
Cairo to consult on their ongoing isolation of Qatar. In a joint statement, the
foreign ministers attempted to further subjugate Qatar’s sovereignty by insisting
that the nation abide by six general principles (the “Six Principles”), in addition to
the Thirteen Demands. The UAE and the other States made clear that the Six
Principles were intended to supplement, not supplant, the original Thirteen
Demands 142.

141
Vol. II, Annex 18, “Here is the Full List of Demands Requested from Qatar”, CNN Arabic
(24 June 2017), [Link]
demands; see also Jack Moore, “Qatar Crisis: Here Are The 13 Things Saudi Arabia Has
Demanded From Its Gulf Neighbor,” Newsweek (23 June 2017), [Link]
.com/qatar-crisis-here-are-13-things-saudi-arabia-has-demanded-gulf-state-628473.
142
See, e.g., “Boycotting quartet reaffirms its demands on Qatar”, The Economist
Intelligence Unit (3 August 2017), [Link]
&Country=Qatar&topic= Politics&subtopic=Forecast&subsubtopic=International+relations&
u=1&pid=1325726316&oid=1325726316&uid=1.

62
2.66 Those Six Principles were as follows:

1. “Commitment to combat extremism and

terrorism in all its forms and to prevent their
financing or the provision of safe havens;

2. Prohibiting all acts of incitement and all forms

of expression which spread, incite, promote or
justify hatred and violence;

3. Full commitment to Riyadh Agreement 2013

and the supplementary agreement and its
executive mechanism for 2014 within the
framework of the Gulf Cooperation Council
(GCC) for Arab States;

4. Commitment to all the outcomes of the Arab-

Islamic-US Summit held in Riyadh in May
2017;

5. To refrain from interfering in the internal affairs

of States and from supporting illegal entities;
[and]

6. The responsibility of all States of international

community to confront all forms of extremism
and terrorism as a threat to international peace
and security. 143

143
Vol. II, Annex 19, Taimur Khan, “Arab countries’ six principles for Qatar ‘a measure to
restart the negotiation process’”, The National (19 July 2018), [Link]
world/gcc/arab-countries-six-principles-for-qatar-a-measure-to-restart-the-negotiation-proces
s-1.610314.

63
2.67 The Ministers clearly signaled that the Thirteen Demands and the Six
Principles were non-negotiable; Qatar must accept the demands as stated, or
continue to suffer the consequences 144.

2.68 The content of these demands laid bare that the UAE’s stated justifications
for the Discriminatory Measures were pretextual, and an attempt to coerce Qatar
into submitting to an extraordinary level of interference in its internal affairs and
relinquish control over its foreign policy. Despite their frequent invocation,
neither the so-called “Riyadh Agreements” nor the baseless allegations related to
terrorism provide any basis for the UAE’s current conduct. The Riyadh
Agreements were a series of confidential agreements entered into in 2013 and
2014 between the GCC countries, which contain basic commitments to promote a
policy of non-interference in the domestic affairs of the signatory nations 145. In
that sense, they effectively memorialized Qatar’s existing policies: contrary to the
UAE’s unsupported and purposely inflammatory claims, Qatar is an active
participant in the global fight against terrorism. Qatar is a party to numerous
international and regional agreements relating to combatting terrorism 146. Qatar

144
Vol. II, Annex 19, Taimur Khan, “Arab countries’ six principles for Qatar ‘a measure to
restart the negotiation process’”, The National (19 July 2018), [Link]
world/gcc/arab-countries-six-principles-for-qatar-a-measure-to-restart-the-negotiation-pro
cess-1.610314.
145
See UAE RPM, Annex 2, First Riyadh Agreement, (23 and 24 November 2013); UAE
RPM, Annex 3, Mechanism Implementing the Riyadh Agreement (17 April 2014); UAE
RPM, Annex 4, Supplementary Riyadh Agreement (16 November 2014).
146
These include: Convention on Offences and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board
Aircraft, 14 September 1963, 704 United Nations, Treaty Series (UNTS) 219 (accession on 6
August 1981); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft, 16 December
1970, 860 UNTS 105 (accession on 26 August 1981); Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 23 September 1971, 974 UNTS 177
(accession on 26 August 1981); Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at
Airports Serving Civil Aviation annexed to the Montreal Convention for the Suppression of
64
also provides significant support to the United States and coalition forces in
combating terrorism in the region, including by hosting the Al Udeid Air Base, the
biggest United States military facility in the Gulf region and the primary base of
United States air operations against the Islamic State (“ISIL” or “Daesh”).

2.69 Despite raising the Riyadh Agreements as a justification for its actions, the
UAE never attempted to utilize the available conflict resolution mechanisms
contained within the Riyadh Agreements themselves to resolve its allegations.
Further, despite mounting evidence that the UAE was acting to undermine Qatar’s
sovereignty for years prior to the imposition of the Discriminatory Measures,

Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Civil Aviation, 24 February 1988, 1589 UNTS 473
(accession on 17 June 2003); Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Material, 3
March 1980, 1456 UNTS 101 (accession on 9 March 2004); International Convention for the
Suppression of Acts of Nuclear Terrorism, 13 April 2005, A/59/766 (ratified 15 January
2014); Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes against Internationally
Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, 14 December 1973, 1035 UNTS 167
(accession on 3 March 1997); International Convention against the Taking of Hostages, 17
December 1979, 1316 UNTS 205 (accession on 11 September 2012); Convention on the
Marking of Plastic Explosives for the Purpose of Detection, 1 March 1991, 30 I.L.M. 721
(accession on 9 November 1998); International Convention for the Suppression of Terrorist
Bombings, 15 December 1997, 2149 UNTS 284 (accession on 27 June 2008); International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism, 9 December 1999, U.N. Doc.
A/RES/54/109 (accession on 27 July 2008); Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful
Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 10 March 1988, 1678 UNTS 221 (accession
on 18 September 2003); Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of
Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, 10 March 1988, 1678 UNTS 304
(accession on 18 September 2003); Protocol of 2005 to the Convention for the Suppression of
Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Maritime Navigation, 14 October 2005, LEG/CONF.
15/21 (accession on 10 January 2013); Protocol of 2005 to the Protocol for the Suppression
of Unlawful Acts against the Safety of Fixed Platforms Located on the Continental Shelf, 14
October 2005, LEG/CONF. 15/22 (accession on 10 January 2003). Regional antiterrorism
agreements to which Qatar is a party include: Convention of the Organisation of the Islamic
Conference on Combatting International Terrorism, 1 July 1999, Annex to Resolution No.
59/26-P; Arab Convention for the Suppression of Terrorism (ratification document issued 10
September 2003); GCC Cooperation Agreement on Combating Terrorism (ratified on 15 May
2008); Arab Convention Against Money Laundering and the Financing of Terrorism
(ratification document issued on 8 April 2012); Security Agreement Between the GCC States
of 2012 (ratification document issued on 8 July 2013).

65
Qatar continued to uphold both the Riyadh Agreements and its obligations under
the GCC Charter. Indeed, in February 2017, Qatar’s Minister of Foreign Affairs
invited the UAE to discuss the Agreements, including the possibility that “it may
be necessary that the GCC Member States take necessary measures to amend the
GCC Charter in line with their aspirations”—to no avail. 147 The UAE did not
respond—in any way, either publicly or through available diplomatic channels—
before imposing the Discriminatory Measures.

2.70 Similarly, the UAE’s focus on Qatar’s foreign policy—and in particular,

relations with Iran and Turkey—makes clear that the UAE’s objective in imposing
the measures is wholly political. And the UAE’s demand that Qatar close Al
Jazeera and other Qatari media outlets globally, as well as hand over “wanted
individuals”, comprised largely of political dissidents, as conditions for lifting the
Measures, further illustrates that the UAE’s motivations are far from legitimate.
In this respect, it is particularly telling that high-level Emirati officials have linked
the UAE’s actions not to its stated pretext of “terrorism”, but rather to Qatar’s
successful bid to host the 2022 FIFA World Cup. For example, on 8 October
2017, H.E. Lieutenant General Dhahi Khalfan Tamim—a very senior security
official in the UAE—posted on Twitter that “If Qatar is deprived from hosting the
World Cup, the crisis of Qatar will come to an end” 148.

147
See Vol. II, Annex 50, Letter from Mohamed Bin Abdul Rahman Bin Jassim Al Thani,
Minister of Foreign Affairs of State of Qatar, to Abdul Latif Bin Rashid Al-Ziyani, Secretary-
General of GCC (19 February 2017) (with certified translation).
148
See Vol. VI, Annex 161, Compendium of Social Media Posts, Index No. 009. This statement
was followed by a tweet from UAE Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, H.E. Anwar
Gargash, who wrote that Qatar should not be allowed to host the World Cup if it did not stop
supporting terrorism and extremism. See Vol. VI, Annex 161, Compendium of Social Media
Posts, Index No. 002–003.

66
Section IV. The International Condemnation of the Discriminatory Measures

2.71 The UAE’s Discriminatory Measures as a whole, and in particular the

expulsion of Qataris from the UAE and the ban on travel between the two
countries, have been widely condemned by the international community due to
their detrimental impact on human rights. For example, Human Rights Watch
reported that “[o]n June 5, 2017, Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and the UAE cut off
diplomatic relations with Qatar and ordered the expulsion of Qatari citizens and
the return of their citizens from Qatar within 14 days. The three countries applied
the travel restrictions suddenly, collectively, and without taking individual
situations into account.” 149 It found that Qatar’s isolation by its neighbors “is
precipitating serious human rights violations”, including by “infringing on the
right to free expression, separating families, interrupting medical care . . .
interrupting education, and stranding migrant workers without food or water” 150.

2.72 Amnesty International condemned the Discriminatory Measures, noting

that:

“Thousands of people in the Gulf face the prospect

of their lives being further disrupted and their
families torn apart as new arbitrary measures
announced by Saudi Arabia, Bahrain and the United
Arab Emirates (UAE) in the context of their dispute
with Qatar are due to come into force from
today. . . . The three Gulf states had given their
citizens the deadline of 19 June to leave Qatar and
return to their respective countries or face fines and
149
Vol. V, Annex 134, Human Rights Watch, Qatar: Isolation Causing Rights Abuses (12 July
2017), [Link] p. 3.
150
Vol. V, Annex 134, Human Rights Watch, Qatar: Isolation Causing Rights Abuses (12 July
2017), [Link] p. 3.

67
other unspecified consequences. They had given
Qatari nationals the same deadline to leave Bahrain,
Saudi Arabia and the UAE and have refused entry to
Qatari nationals since 5 June.” 151

2.73 James Lynch, Deputy Director of Amnesty International’s Global Issues

Programme, stated, “[t]he situation that people across the Gulf have been placed
in shows utter contempt for human dignity. This arbitrary deadline has caused
widespread uncertainty and dread amongst thousands of people who fear they will
be separated from their loved ones” 152.

2.74 The United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al
Hussein stated shortly after the imposition of the Discriminatory Measures that he
was “alarmed” by the possible human rights impact of the measures being adopted
and their “potential to seriously disrupt the lives of thousands of women, children
and men” 153. The High Commissioner noted that his office was “receiving reports
that specific individuals have already been summarily instructed to leave the
country they are residing in, or have been ordered to return home by their own
government. Among those likely to be badly affected are couples in mixed
marriages and their children; people with jobs or businesses based in States other
than that of their nationality; and students studying in another country.” 154

2.75 International human rights organizations have also decried the UAE’s
attacks on freedom of expression. Reporters Without Borders condemned the
demand to close Al Jazeera as a “grave attack on press freedom and pluralism, and
the right of access to information in the region” 155. The United Nations Special

151
Vol. V, Annex 129, Amnesty International, Gulf / Qatar dispute: Human dignity trampled
and families facing uncertainty as sinister deadline passes (19 June 2017),
[Link]
and-families-facing-uncertainty-as-sinister-deadline-passes/, p. 1.

68
Rapporteur on freedom of opinion and expression has also stated that the UAE’s
draconian demand that Qatar close Al Jazeera was a “major blow to media
pluralism” in the region 156.

2.76 On 18 August 2017, six United Nations Special Rapporteurs wrote jointly
to the UAE to bring to its attention the “adverse situation and the violations of
human rights of Qatari migrants in the United Arab Emirates . . . as a result of the
United Arab Emirates government’s decision to suspend ties with the State of
Qatar, particularly their right to movement and residence, family unity, education,
work, freedom of expression, health and the right to property, without
discrimination on any basis” and explicitly referenced the CERD and specific

152
Vol. V, Annex 129, Amnesty International, Gulf / Qatar dispute: Human dignity trampled
and families facing uncertainty as sinister deadline passes (19 June 2017), p. 1,
[Link]
and-families-facing-uncertainty-as-sinister-deadline-passes/.
153
Vol. V, Annex 96, OHCHR, Qatar diplomatic crisis: Comment by UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein on i mpact on human rights (14 June 2017),
[Link]
=E.
154
Vol. III, Annex 96, OHCHR, Qatar diplomatic crisis: Comment by UN High Commissioner
for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein on i mpact on human rights (14 June 2017),
[Link]
=E.
155
Vol. V, Annex 141, Reporters Without Borders, Unacceptable Call for Al Jazeera’s Closure
in Gulf Crisis (28 June 2017), [Link]
gulf-crisis.
156
Vol. III, Annex 95, OHCHR, Demand for Qatar to close Al-Jazeera “a major blow to media
pluralism”- United Nations expert, (28 June 2017) (hereinafter, “OHCHR Report”),
[Link]
E.

69
rights protected thereunder 157. The joint communication further urged the UAE to
take all necessary steps to respect the rights of persons affected 158. In response, on
18 September 2017, the UAE stated it was “highly displeased” that the
communication was issued as an urgent appeal and declined to address the
asserted violations in any detail, stating only that it “continues to uphold” the
CERD, and that it is “fully aware of its obligations and commitments in that
regard” 159.

2.77 The OHCHR subsequently dispatched a Technical Mission to Qatar in

November 2017, with a mandate to gather information on the Discriminatory
Measures’ detrimental impacts on human rights and to report recommendations
back to the United Nations High Commissioner. The Technical Mission met with
ministries and government institutions, the NHRC, and civil society
representatives, including educators, journalists, and business people, as well as
with representatives of the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural
Organization (“UNESCO”) 160. The Mission also interviewed about forty victims

157
Vol. III, Annex 97, Joint Communication from Special Procedures Mandate Holders of the
Human Rights Council to the United Arab Emirates, document AU ARE 5/2017 (18 August
2017) (hereinafter “Joint Communication of Special Procedures Mandate Holders”), pp. 1, 4.
158
Vol. III, Annex 97, Joint Communication from Special Procedures Mandate Holders, p. 7.
159
Vol. II, Annex 23, Reply of the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the
United Nations Office and Other International Organizations at Geneva to the Joint
Communication from Special Procedures Mandate Holders of the Human Rights Council,
HRC/NONE/2017/112 (18 September 2017), pp. 2, 3.
160
Vol. III, Annex 98, OHCHR Report, para. 5.

70
of the Discriminatory Measures, and reviewed “a large number of other cases,
documents and data provided by various entities.” 161

2.78 The Technical Mission’s Report described the first category of victims of
the crisis as “Qatari individuals who were residing in [Saudi Arabia], UAE,
Bahrain (and studying in Egypt), and were compelled to rapidly exit these
countries, leaving behind their family, businesses, employment, property, or being
forced to interrupt their studies.” 162 The Report documented multiple negative
human rights impacts resulting from the Discriminatory Measures, including
restrictions on movement and communication, the separation of families, and
interference with property, health, and education rights 163. The Mission noted with
concern the “potentially durable effect on the enjoyment of the human rights and
fundamental freedoms of those affected”, observing that “the majority of the
measures were broad and non-targeted, making no distinction between the
government of Qatar and its population” 164.

2.79 For its part, the UAE continues to violate the CERD and assert—without
any legal basis—that such measures are justified, while at the same time ignoring
or outright denying the existence of the ongoing human rights violations. For
example, before embarking upon the Technical Mission, the Middle East and
North Africa section of the OHCHR informed the UAE and expressed its

161
Vol. III, Annex 98, OHCHR Report, para. 6.
162
Vol. III, Annex 98, OHCHR Report, para. 13.
163
See Vol. III, Annex 98, OHCHR Report, para. 13.
164
Vol. III, Annex 98, OHCHR Report, para. 61.

71
readiness to conduct a similar mission there 165. But rather than engage with the
OHCHR Technical Mission, the UAE has attempted to impugn the bona fides of
the Mission and has attacked Qatar for “leaking” the Mission’s Report 166. In
January 2018, the UAE, along with Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, and Egypt, issued a
“joint statement” attacking the conclusions of the OHCHR Report, expressing
“their denunciation of the report’s methodological failure that included a
misleading description of the political crisis”, and taking the position that “the
boycott . . . of Qatar is part of the exercise of their sovereign right to protect and
defend their national security”, without making any attempt to address the
substantive violations raised in the Report 167. The UAE’s Permanent
Representative to the United Nations in Geneva subsequently wrote to the United
Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights, demanding that the OHCHR
denounce or withdraw the Report 168. The OHCHR has not done so.

2.80 The High Commissioner instead informed the UAE that his “[o]ffice has
been very keen to constructively engage with all relevant stakeholders, including
the UAE, to ensure that the potential human rights impacts of the crisis are
properly considered and dealt with accordingly”, and has expressed his “regret
that my Office[’s] various communications, including requests to conduct a

165
Vol. III, Annex 98, OHCHR Report, para. 3.
166
Vol. IV, Annex 115, State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates, ICERD-ISC-2018/2, Response
of the United Arab Emirates (7 August 2018), paras. 74–76.
167
Vol. II, Annex 25, “Joint Statement issued by four boycotting States denouncing report of
UNHCHR’s technical mission on its visit to Qatar”, Saudi Press Agency (30 January 2018),
[Link]
168
See Vol. II, Annex 27, Letter from the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the
United Nations in Geneva, to the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights (16
May 2018), p.4.

72
similar mission to the UAE and other countries, went unanswered” 169. He
appealed to the UAE to “allow me to renew my Office[‘s] readiness to continue its
constructive dialogue with the UAE on issues that relate to the potential human
rights impacts of the Gulf crisis as well as future technical cooperation” 170, an
appeal that, to Qatar’s knowledge, remains unanswered.

2.81 Since the Court’s indication of provisional measures, the United Nations
and other rights monitors have continued to document the ongoing detrimental
impacts of the Discriminatory Measures. In an August 2018 report, the United
Nations Special Rapporteur on the negative impact of unilateral coercive measures
on the enjoyment of human rights stated that he “continues to monitor the impact
of the restrictive measures initiated in June 2017 by a group of countries targeting
Qatar, which remain in force” and “continues to share the concerns expressed by
the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights in June 2017 that the
measures adopted are overly broad in scope and implementation, and agrees that
they have the potential to seriously disrupt the lives of thousands of women,
children and men, simply because they belong to one of the nationalities involved
in the dispute” 171.

169
Vol. III, Annex 99, Letter from the United Nations High Commissioner on Human Rights to
the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations (29 June 2018),
p. 1.
170
Vol. III, Annex 99, Letter from the UN High Commissioner on Human Rights to the
Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the United Nations (29 June 2018), p. 1.
171
United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the negative
impact of unilateral coercive measures on t he enjoyment of human rights, document
A/HRC/39/54 (30 August 2018), p. 4 (emphasis added).

73
2.82 In sum, the UAE’s conduct has shattered the lives of Qataris with ties in
the UAE. The UAE has taken these actions with no legitimate justification and its
disingenuous exhortation of national security concerns has been revealed as
pretext. The UAE’s conduct places it squarely in violation of the CERD and under
the jurisdiction of the Court, as the following chapters will discuss.

74
CHAPTER III
JURISDICTION

DO NOT DELETE - Chapter III

3.1 As stated, the jurisdiction of the Court in the present case is based on
Article 22 of the CERD. Article 22 provides that:

“Any dispute between two or more States Parties

with respect to the interpretation or application of
this Convention, which is not settled by negotiation
or by the procedures expressly provided for in this
Convention, shall, at the request of any of the
parties to the dispute, be referred to the International
Court of Justice for decision, unless the disputants
agree to another mode of settlement.” 172

3.2 Thus, in order for the Court to have jurisdiction, there must be a dispute
between two States Parties to the CERD, the dispute must be “with respect to the
interpretation or application of [the CERD]”, and the dispute must not have been
settled by negotiations or by the “procedures expressly provided” in the CERD.

3.3 It is not contested that both Qatar and the UAE are States Parties to the
CERD, with no relevant reservations, understandings or declarations relevant to
Article 22 173, and thus that the first condition is satisfied. With respect to the
existence of a “dispute,” the Court has previously defined a “dispute” as “a
“‘disagreement on a point of law or fact, a conflict of legal views or of interests’
between parties” 174, and has held that “[a] dispute between States exists where

172
Vol. III, Annex 92, CERD, Art. 22.
173
Qatar acceded to the CERD on 22 July 1976; the UAE on 20 June 1974.
174
Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to
Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. India), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment,
75
they hold clearly opposite views concerning the question of the performance or
non-performance of certain international obligations.” 175 In order for there to be a
dispute, “the claim of one party must be ‘positively opposed’ by the other.”176
Whether a dispute exists “is a matter of substance, and not a question of form or
procedure,” 177 which must be objectively determined by the Court based on the
facts 178. Here, there is clearly a dispute with respect to interpretation or
application of the CERD 179.

3.4 In the following Chapter, Qatar will demonstrate that each of the
remaining requirements to seize the Court’s jurisdiction is met in this case. In

I.C.J. Reports 2016, para. 34 (citing Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Judgment No. 2.,
1924, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 2, p.11).
175
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Order, I.C.J.
Reports 2018, para. 18; Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of
the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on t he Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures,
Order, I.C.J. Reports 2017, para. 22.
176
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Order, I.C.J.
Reports 2018, para. 18; Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of
the Financing of Terrorism and of the International Convention on t he Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures,
Order, I.C.J. Reports 2017, para. 22.
177
Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to
Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. India), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2016, para. 35.
178
Obligations Concerning Negotiations Relating to Cessation of the Nuclear Arms Race and to
Nuclear Disarmament (Marshall Islands v. India), Jurisdiction and Admissibility, Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2016, para. 36.
179
See Application of the International Convention on t he Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Order, I.C.J.
Reports 2018, paras. 27–28.

76
particular, Qatar will demonstrate that: the UAE’s discrimination against Qataris
falls within the scope ratione materiae of the CERD, and thus the parties’
“dispute” is with respect to the “interpretation or application” of the CERD
(Section I); and the dispute “is not settled by negotiation or by the procedures
expressly provided for” in Articles 11–13 of the CERD (Section II).

Section I. The UAE’s Discrimination Against Qataris Falls Within the Scope
Ratione Materiae of the CERD

3.5 During the provisional measures phase of the proceedings, the majority of
the Court found that the acts Qatar complains of “are capable of falling within the
scope of CERD ratione materiae”, and thus found there was prima facie “a
dispute between the Parties concerning the interpretation or application of the
CERD.” 180 At this stage of the proceedings, there is no reason to revise this prima
facie conclusion, and the Court should conclude that Qatar’s claims definitively
fall within the CERD. The CERD’s broad protective scope is designed to combat
all forms of racial discrimination, including discrimination in both purpose and
effect on the basis of national origin (Section I.A). The acts complained of by
Qatar—including the collective expulsion of “Qatari residents and visitors” from
Qatar, the Absolute and Modified Travel Bans targeted at “Qatari nationals,” and
the UAE’s Anti-Sympathy Law and Qatari Media Block, coupled with the
incitement of racist anti-Qatari hate speech as part of the Anti-Qatari Incitement
Campaign—plainly fall within the CERD’s scope, as they discriminate on the
basis of national origin in both purpose and effect (Section I.B). Accordingly, the

180
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Order, I.C.J.
Reports 2018, paras. 27–28.

77
dispute before the Court is plainly a dispute with respect to the interpretation or
application of the CERD.

A. THE CERD’S PROTECTIVE SCOPE ENCOMPASSES ALL FORMS OF RACIAL

DISCRIMINATION

3.6 The CERD is premised upon and embodies a fundamental tenet of human
rights law: racial discrimination based on, among other grounds, national origin,
undermines the inherent dignity and equality of human beings. The right to
equality is captured in the foundational documents of the post-Second World War
legal order—the Charter of the United Nations and the Universal Declaration of
Human Rights—both of which are referred to in the preamble to the CERD. As
Judge Ammoun explained in 1971:

“One right which must certainly be considered a

pre-existing binding customary norm which the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights codified is
the right to equality, which by common consent has
ever since the remotest times been deemed inherent
in human nature.” 181

3.7 The prohibition of racial discrimination as embodied in the CERD not only
prohibits racial discrimination, it requires States parties to eliminate racial
discrimination through an interwoven fabric of mutually-reinforcing obligations.
To that end, and as the inclusion of “Elimination” in the title of the treaty makes
clear, States parties “[r]esolved to adopt all necessary measures for speedily
eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms and manifestations, and to prevent

181
Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence of South Africa in Namibia (South
West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution 276, Advisory Opinion of 21 June
1971, Separate Opinion of Judge Ammoun, I.C.J. Reports 1971, para. 6(b).

78
and combat racist doctrines and practices in order to promote understanding
between races and to build an international community free from all forms of
racial segregation and discrimination.” 182

3.8 Article 2 of the CERD sets out “the Convention’s broadest portfolio of
State ‘undertakings’ or obligations . . . on the basis of which racial discrimination
is prohibited across a spectrum of human rights.” 183 Pursuant to Article 2(1)(a),

“[e]ach State Party undertakes to engage in no act or

practice of racial discrimination against persons,
groups of persons or institutions and to ensure that
all public authorities and public institutions, national
and local, shall act in conformity with this
obligation.” 184

3.9 As such, Article 2(1) addresses racial discrimination by the State itself,
and distils “the basic message that the State itself shall not discriminate, directly
or indirectly.” 185

3.10 By its explicit terms, the CERD is a broad, progressive instrument, and its
substantive obligations require the parties to refrain from and undertake to
eliminate “racial discrimination in all its forms” 186. The wrong that the CERD

182
Vol. III, Annex 92, CERD, Preamble.
183
Vol. V, Annex 150, P. Thornberry, The International Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Racial Discrimination: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 160.
184
Vol. III, Annex 92, CERD, Art. 2(1).
185
Vol. V, Annex 150, P. Thornberry, The International Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Racial Discrimination: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 180.
186
Vol. III, Annex 92, CERD, Preamble.

79
aims to prevent is one of collective punishment—of denying individuals of rights
and privileges simply because of, for example, their race, ethnicity, or national
origin. To that end, Article 1(1)’s definition of “racial discrimination” provides:

“racial discrimination shall mean any distinction,

exclusion, restriction or preference based on race,
colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which
has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing
the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal
footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms
in the political, economic, social, cultural or any
other field of public life” 187.

3.11 As already noted, the definition encompasses discrimination based on

colour, descent, national origin, or ethnic origin “which has the purpose or effect”
of impairing the enjoyment of human rights. As explained by Judge Crawford in
Ukraine v. Russian Federation,

“[T]he definition of ‘racial discrimination’ in Article

1 of CERD does not require that the restriction in
question be based expressly on racial or other
grounds enumerated in the definition; it is enough
that it directly implicates such a group on one or
more of these grounds. Moreover, whatever the
stated purpose of the restriction, it may constitute
racial discrimination if it has the ‘effect’ of
impairing the enjoyment or exercise, on an equal
footing, of the rights articulated in CERD.” 188

187
Vol. III, Annex 92, CERD, Art. 1(1) (emphasis added).
188
Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order of 19 A pril
2017, Declaration of Judge Crawford, I.C.J. Reports 2017, para. 7.

80
3.12 The CERD Committee, the “independent body that was established
specifically to supervise the application” 189 of the CERD and that “monitors
implementation of the [CERD] by its States parties” 190, has similarly made clear
that the CERD prohibits both “purposive or intentional discrimination and
discrimination in effect” 191, and advised that “[i]n seeking to determine whether
an action has an effect contrary to the Convention, [the Committee] will look to
see whether an action has an . . . unjustifiable disparate impact upon a group
distinguished by race, colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin.” 192

3.13 Further, the CERD Committee has stressed that the CERD applies not only
to measures that are discriminatory on their face, but also “where an apparently
neutral provision, criterion or practice would put persons of a particular racial,
ethnic or national origin at a disadvantage compared with other persons” 193. To
this end, the CERD Committee has consistently recommended to States parties
that they take steps to address indirect discrimination as well as direct 194.

189
Vol. III, Annex 92, CERD, Art. 8(1) (“There shall be established a Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination consisting of eighteen experts. . . ”).
190
United Nations, Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
[Link]
191
Vol. IV, Annex 112, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 32 on the meaning
and scope of special measures in the International Convention on t he Elimination of All
Forms Racial Discrimination, document CERD/C/GC/32 (2009), para. 7.
192
Vol. IV, Annex 105, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 14 on article 1,
paragraph 1, of the Convention contained in document A/48/18 (1993), para. 2.
193
CERD Committee, Concluding observations on t he fourth to sixth periodic reports of the
United States of America, document CERD/C/USA/CO/6 (8 May 2008), para 10.
194
See, e.g., CERD Committee, Concluding observations on the combined seventh to ninth
periodic reports of the United States of America, document CERD/C/USA/CO/7–9
(25 September 2014), para. 5 (calling on United States government to “take concrete steps to
81
3.14 The CERD’s protections thus are not limited to intentional or purposive
discrimination, but also cover actions that have an unjustifiable disparate impact
on a protected group. These aspects of Article 1(1) work in tandem to ensure that
the CERD protects against “all forms” of racial discrimination, both in terms of
the group targeted and the group impacted.

3.15 Inherent to Article 1(1) is a concept of legitimacy and proportionality:

Article 1(1) defines discrimination not as every distinction but only those
distinctions which have the purpose or effect of impairing the equal enjoyment of
“human rights and fundamental freedoms”. Thus, not every difference in
treatment will engage a State’s responsibility under the CERD. Indeed, the CERD
Committee has noted that “[t]he term ‘non-discrimination’ does not signify the
necessity of uniform treatment when there are significant differences in situation
between one person or group and another, or, in other words, if there is an
objective and reasonable justification for differential treatment.” 195 Rather,
“differential treatment will constitute discrimination if the criteria for such
differentiation, judged in the light of the objectives and purposes of the
Convention, are not applied pursuant to a legitimate aim, and are not proportional
to the achievement of this aim” 196.

. . . [p]rohibit racial discrimination in all its forms in federal and state legislation, including
indirect discrimination . . . in accordance with article 1, paragraph 1, of the Convention”); see
also Vol. V, Annex 150, P. Thornberry, The International Convention on the Elimination of
all Forms of Racial Discrimination: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2016),
pp. 114–116.
195
Vol. IV, Annex 112, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 32 on the meaning
and scope of special measures in the International Convention on t he Elimination of All
Forms Racial Discrimination, document CERD/C/GC/32 (2009), para 8.
196
Vol. IV, Annex 112, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 32 on the meaning
and scope of special measures in the International Convention on t he Elimination of All
82
3.16 This approach to non-discrimination mirrors that under general
international law and human rights law. Although varying in the precise manner
of application, the concepts of legitimacy and proportionality are a key feature of
non-discrimination in human rights law, including in the context of racial
discrimination.

3.17 For example, the European Court of Human Rights (“ECtHR”) takes the
longstanding approach that “a distinction is discriminatory if it has no objective
and reasonable justification, that is, if it does not pursue a legitimate aim or if
there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means
employed and the aim sought to be realised.” 197

3.18 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights (“IACtHR”) has similarly

noted that “not all differences in treatment are in themselves offensive to human
dignity”, taking the approach that distinctions will not constitute discrimination if
“the difference in treatment has a legitimate purpose” and where “there exists a
reasonable relationship of proportionality between these differences and the aims
of the legal rule under review.” 198 Such aims must further not be “unreasonable,

Forms Racial Discrimination, document CERD/C/GC/32 (2009), para 8 (internal quotations

omitted).
197
ECtHR, Marckx v. Belgium, Application No. 6833/74, Judgment (Plenary) (13 June 1979),
para. 33 (emphasis added) (internal quotations omitted) (citing Case Relating to Certain
Aspects of the Laws on t he Use of Languages in Education in Belgium, Application Nos.
1474/62, 1677/62, 1769/63, 1994/63, 2126/64, Judgment (23 July 1968), para. 10).
198
IACtHR, Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-
18/03 (17 September 2003), paras. 89, 91; see also IACtHR, Marcelino Hanríquez et al. v.
Argentina, Report No. 73/00, Case 11.784 (3 October 2000), para. 37 (stating that a
“distinction” involves discrimination when “the treatment in analogous or similar situations is
different; . . . the difference has no objective and reasonable justification; [and] the means
employed are not reasonably proportional to the aim being sought.”).

83
that is, they may not be arbitrary, capricious, despotic or in conflict with the
essential oneness and dignity of humankind.” 199

3.19 United Nations human rights committees, including the Human Rights
Committee, the Committee on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, and of
course the CERD Committee itself, likewise distinguish between a permissible
“distinction” and unlawful discrimination on the basis of legitimacy and
proportionality200. This approach is also consistent with principles of non-
discrimination under general international law 201.

199
IACtHR, Juridical Condition and Rights of Undocumented Migrants, Advisory Opinion OC-
18/03 (17 September 2003), para. 91.
200
See Human Rights Committee, General comment No. 18, Non-discrimination, document
HRI/GEN/1/Rev.9 (1989), para. 13 (“not every differentiation of treatment will constitute
discrimination, if the criteria for such differentiation are reasonable and objective and if the
aim is to achieve a purpose which is legitimate under the Covenant”); Committee on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, General comment No. 20, Non-discrimination in
economic, social and c ultural rights (art. 2, para. 2, of the International Covenant on
Economic, Social and Cultural Rights), document E/C.12/GC/20 (2009), para. 13
(“Differential treatment based on prohibited grounds will be viewed as discriminatory unless
the justification for differentiation is reasonable and objective. This will include an
assessment as to whether the aim and effects of the measures or omissions are legitimate,
compatible with the nature of the Covenant rights and solely for the purpose of promoting the
general welfare in a democratic society. In addition, there must be a clear and reasonable
relationship of proportionality between the aim sought to be realized and the measures or
omissions and their effects.”); see also generally J. Clifford, “Equality” in Oxford Handbook
of International Human Rights (Oxford University Press, 2013); Y. Arai-Takahasi,
“Proportionality” in Oxford Handbook of International Human Rights (Oxford University
Press, 2013).
201
See, e.g., Vol. V, Annex 147, J. Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law
(Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 645 (“[A]ny distinction drawn must have an objective
justification; the means adopted to establish different treatment must be proportionate to the
justification for differentiation[.]”). Equally, while specific to the regional context of the
ECHR, in Belgian Linguistics the ECtHR, interpreting Article 14 of the ECHR referred to the
practice across “a large number of democratic States” as requiring distinguishing on this
basis. See ECtHR, Case “Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in
Education in Belgium” v. Belgium, Application No. 1474/62; 1667/62; 1691/62; 1769/63;
84
3.20 In short, then, a State party’s responsibility will be engaged under Article
2(1)(a) where it has effected a distinction, restriction or exclusion on the basis of,
inter alia, national origin, that has nullified or impaired the recognition,
enjoyment or exercise of an open-ended list of human rights and fundamental
freedoms. Further, while not all distinctions are unlawful, differential treatment on
the basis of national origin that is not applied pursuant to a legitimate aim, and
proportional to the achievement of that aim, constitutes unlawful discrimination in
violation of the CERD.

B. THE ACTS COMPLAINED OF BY QATAR FALL WITHIN THE CERD’S PROTECTIVE

SCOPE

3.21 As described below, each of the acts complained of by Qatar constitutes

discrimination on the basis of national origin falling within the scope of CERD’s
prohibitions 202. However, at the provisional measures phase, the UAE attempted
to argue that the impacts of its measures were “based purely on the fact of
[individual’s] current Qatari nationality or citizenship,” and thus categorically
outside of CERD’s protective scope, on the ground that “current nationality” or
“present nationality” does not constitute a protected ground for discrimination

1994/63; 2126/64, Judgment (23 July 1968), p. 31, para. 10 (“On this question the Court,
following the principles which may be extracted from the legal practice of a large number of
democratic States, holds that the principle of equality of treatment is violated if the
distinction has no objective and reasonable justification. The existence of such a justification
must be assessed in relation to the aim and effects of the measure under consideration, regard
being had to the principles which normally prevail in democratic societies. A difference of
treatment in the exercise of a right laid down in the Convention must not only pursue a
legitimate aim: Article 14 (art. 14) is likewise violated when it is clearly established that there
is no reasonable relationship of proportionality between the means employed and the aim
sought to be realised.”) (emphasis added).
202
See Chap. V, below.

85
based on Article 1(1)’s use of the term “national origin” 203. The UAE is wrong on
this score—indeed, its constructs of “current” or “present” nationality do not
appear anywhere in the CERD—and its argument cannot be reconciled with either
the CERD’s explicit text or the intent of its drafters. Both in fact demonstrate that
“nationality”-based discrimination falls within Article 1(1), and provides no
meaningful basis to carve out “present” nationality from that definition.

3.22 But the UAE is equally wrong in artificially construing its discriminatory
acts as limited to “current nationality” or “present nationality”. The term “Qatari”
does not simply represent a “present nationality”, but it reflects the identity of a
group of individuals with shared heritage and historical and cultural ties to the
same national community—in other words, that are of Qatari national origin, an
identity that is distinct from other national communities in the region. And as
detailed below, this is consistent with the statements of the UAE in its
submissions to the Court on provisional measures and to the CERD Committee.
Qatar, like other Gulf States, follows a jus sanguinis model of nationality, in
which naturalization is extremely rare, and the overwhelming majority of persons
with Qatari nationality are also “Qatari” in this sense of heritage or parentage, and
their “original” nationality at birth and “present nationality” are one and the same.

3.23 The UAE’s attempt to retroactively construe the purpose of its measures as
targeting only individuals of “current” Qatari nationality is thus irrelevant and
fundamentally flawed: even if that were the case, the acts complained of also
unequivocally fall within the CERD because of their discriminatory effects on

203
CR 2018/13, p. 38, para. 18 (Olleson) (emphasis added).

86
persons of Qatari origin 204. Thus, as detailed in this Section, the UAE’s
Discriminatory Measures violate the CERD in at least two ways. First, the
Expulsion Order and Travel Bans discriminate on their face against Qataris based
on their nationality, in violation of the CERD’s prohibition on national origin-
based discrimination. The factual predicate for this violation is not in dispute: the
UAE has affirmatively characterized its measures as targeted against Qatari
nationals 205. Moreover, the conclusion that “nationality”-based discrimination—
including on the basis of what the UAE refers to as “present” or “current”
nationality—falls under the CERD’s prohibition of discrimination is fully
warranted by the interpretation of the term “national origin” in accordance with
Article 31 of the VCLT (Part 1). And were there any doubt on the point, it is
readily dispelled by an examination of the travaux préparatoires of the CERD, in
accordance with Article 32 of the VCLT.

3.24 Second, the UAE’s Discriminatory Measures independently violate the

CERD because they have an unjustifiable disparate impact on individuals of
Qatari origin, in the sense of their heritage and culture (Part 2). While this
discriminatory effect alone suffices to form the basis of the CERD violation, the

204
See generally Chap. III, Sec. I.B.2., below. It is also factually inaccurate, as the UAE’s
unlawful acts in fact directly target and impact upon Qataris of “current” nationality. As
noted already, CERD’s scope is not constrained by a State’s own characterization of its
discriminatory acts. Moreover, several of the acts complained of—namely, the Anti-
Sympathy Law, Block on Qatari Media, and the Anti-Qatari Incitement Campaign—are
entirely unrelated to the possession of “current” Qatari nationality. Rather, these measures are
targeted at the Qatari community as a whole, and at individuals and entities due to their real
or perceived membership in that community, irrespective of “current” nationality. As a
consequence, the question whether the UAE’s actions in these respects discriminate against
Qataris on the basis of national origin does not depend on whether the term “national origin”
under Article 1(1) encompasses nationality.
205
CR 2018/13, p. 38, para. 18 (Olleson); see also CR 2018/13, p. 39, para. 21 (Olleson)
(measures apply “solely on the basis of an individual’s present nationality”).

87
facts and circumstances here suggest that the UAE’s discrimination, while
characterized as based on “nationality”, actually seeks to achieve the collective
punishment of Qataris as a people.

1. The UAE’s Measures Explicitly Targeting “Qatari Residents and Visitors” and
“Qatari Nationals” Fall within CERD’s Scope Ratione Materiae Based on their
Discriminatory Purpose

3.25 As noted above, the Expulsion Order on its face is directly targeted at
“Qatari residents and visitors” in the UAE, and the Absolute and Modified Travel
Bans at “Qatari nationals.” The UAE has conceded that these measures target
Qataris on the basis of nationality, but has attempted to limit this to “present”
nationality. 206 Even accepting this questionable limitation, the UAE’s admission
that its measures discriminate against Qataris on the basis of their “current Qatari
nationality or citizenship” is alone sufficient for the Court to conclude that the
Discriminatory Measures fall within the scope of its jurisdiction ratione materiae.

3.26 Article 31(1) of the VCLT provides: “A treaty shall be interpreted in good
faith in accordance with the ordinary meaning to be given to the terms of the
treaty in their context and i n the light of its object and pur pose.” 207 The CERD
prohibits discrimination based on “national origin”. The ordinary meaning of this
term (Part a), read in its context (Part b) and in the light of the CERD’s object
and purpose (Part c), makes clear that nationality-based discrimination, including

206
CR 2018/13, p. 38, para. 18 (Olleson); see also CR 2018/13, p. 39, para. 21 (Olleson)
(measures apply “solely on the basis of an individual’s present nationality”).
207
Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, 1155 UNTS 331 (23 May 1969), Art. 31(1)
(hereinafter “VCLT”) (emphasis added).

88
based on a person’s present nationality, falls within the CERD’s prohibition on
racial discrimination in Article 1(1).

3.27 Thus, based solely on its text, the CERD applies to discrimination on the
basis of nationality, and the Court need not resort to supplementary means of
interpretation to so decide. However, pursuant to Article 32 of the VCLT, the
Court may also refer to “supplementary means of interpretation, including the
preparatory work of the treaty and the circumstances of its conclusion” 208 in order
to “confirm the meaning resulting from the application of [A]rticle 31.” 209 The
travaux préparatoires of the CERD and the circumstances under which it was
concluded confirm that nationality is included within the scope of “national
origin” in Article 1(1) (Part d).

(a) Ordinary Meaning of the Term “National Origin”

3.28 As stated above, Article 1(1) establishes a broad definition of “racial

discrimination”:

“[A]ny distinction, exclusion, restriction or

preference based on race, colour, descent, or
national or ethnic origin which has the purpose or
effect of nullifying or impairing the recognition,
enjoyment, or exercise, on an equal footing, of
human rights and fundamental freedoms in the
political, economic, social, cultural or any other
field of public life”.

208
VCLT, Art. 32.
209
VCLT, Art. 32.

89
3.29 The composite term “national origin” is not itself defined in the CERD,
nor is it a term that has a specialized meaning among sociologists or
ethnographers. 210 “National origin” is also generally undefined by the leading
dictionaries, which instead separately define “national” and “origin”.

3.30 The Oxford and the Cambridge Dictionaries define “national” as

“[r]elating to or characteristic of a nation” 211 and “relating to or typical of a whole
country and its people” 212. “Nation,” in turn, is defined by the Oxford and
Cambridge Dictionaries, respectively, as “a large body of people united by
common descent, history, culture, or language, inhabiting a particular state or
territory,” 213 and a “country, especially when thought of as a large group of people
living in one area with their own government, language, and traditions.” 214 As to
the term “origin”, the Cambridge Dictionary explains that the term refers to “the
country from which [a] person comes” (“[t]he population is of Indian or Pakistani
origin”) 215, whereas the Oxford Dictionary defines it as a “person’s social
background or ancestry” (giving as an example “a voice that betrays his Welsh

210
See Vol. VI, Annex 162, Expert Report of Dr. J.E. Peterson, para. 2.
211
Oxford Dictionaries, Definition of “National”,
[Link]
212
Cambridge Dictionary, Definition of “National”, [Link]
dictionary/english/national.
213
Oxford Dictionaries, Definition of “Nation”, [Link]
/nation.
214
Cambridge Dictionary, Definition of “Nation”, [Link]
english/nation.
215
Cambridge Dictionary, Definition of “Origin”, [Link]
english/origin.

90
origins”) 216. Taken together, these characteristics suggest that the ordinary
meaning of “national origin” relates to the country or nation where a person is
from, and where a person’s ancestors were from.

3.31 The official French, Spanish, Chinese and Russian versions of Article 1(1)

of the CERD, which refer to “l’origine nationale”, “origen nacional”, “原属国”

(yuán shǔguó), and “национального происхождения” (natzionalnoye

proiskhozhdeniye), are consistent with this understanding, as they also equate to
the belonging of individuals or their ancestors to a given country or nation,
without exclusion based on present nationality status. For example, the Larousse
dictionary defines “origine” as the “social class, background, group, country of
which someone comes from” 217 and “nationale” as “relating to a nation; which
belongs to a nation, as opposed to international”. 218 It further defines “nation” as
“all human beings living on the same territory, sharing a community of origin,
history, culture, traditions, sometimes language, and constituting a political
community”. 219 Similarly, the Real Academia Española dictionary defines

216
Oxford Dictionaries, Definition of “Origin”, [Link]
/origin.
217
Larousse Dictionnaires de Français, Definition of “Origine”, (“classe sociale, milieu, groupe,
pays dont quelqu’un est issu”).
218
Larousse Dictionnaires de Français, Definition of “Nationale”, [Link]
dictionnaires/francais/national/53861?q=Nationale# (“relatif à une nation ; qui appartient à
une nation, par opposition à international”).
219
Larousse Dictionnaires de Français, Definition of “Nation”, [Link]
/dictionnaires/francais/nation/53859?q=Nation#53503 (“[l’] ensemble des êtres humains
vivant dans un même territoire, ayant une communauté d'origine, d'histoire, de culture, de
traditions, parfois de langue, et constituant une communauté politique”).

91
“nacional” as “belonging or relative to a nation” 220, and in turn defines “nación”
as a “group of persons of a same origin who generally speak the same language
and have a common tradition” 221. “Origen” is defined as “homeland, country
where a person was born or his/her family is originally from” 222. The Xinhua
Online dictionary defines “原” to mean “initial, beginning” or “original”223,
“属”(shǔ) to mean “be under, be subordinate to, belong to” 224 and “国” (guó) to
mean “a government with land, people, and sovereignty.” 225 Together, the term
“原属国” translates as “country of origin”, which encompasses both present and
past belonging to a particular country. Finally, the Russian Ozhegov Dictionary
defines “Национальный” (natzionalniy) as “characteristic of a particular nation,
peculiar to [such nation] only” 226, and in turn defines “Нация” (natziya) as “a
historically formed and settled community of people established in the process of
formation of their territory, economical links, literature, cultural characteristics

220
Vol. VI, Annex 156, Real Academia Española, Diccionario de la lengua española, Definition
of “Nacional”, [Link] (“perteneciente o relativo a una nación”).
221
Vol. VI, Annex 156, Real Academia Española, Diccionario de la lengua española, Definition
of “Nación”, (“[c]onjunto de personas de un mismo origen y que generalmente hablan un
mismo idioma y tienen una tradición común”).
222
Vol. VI, Annex 156, Real Academia Española, Diccionario de la lengua española, Definition
of “Origen”, [Link] (“patria, país donde alguien ha nacido o donde
tuvo principio su família”).
223
Vol. VI, Annex 154, Xinhua Online Dictionary, Definition of “原”, [Link]
/html3/[Link] (“最初的，开始的”; “本来 ”). ”).)

224
Vol. VI, Annex 154, Xinhua Online Dictionary, Definition of “属”, [Link]
/html3/[Link] (“归属;隶属”).
225
Vol. VI, Annex 154, Xinhua Online Dictionary, Definition of “国”, [Link]
/html3/[Link].(“有土地、人民、主权的政体”).
226
Vol. VI, Annex 155, Ozhegov Dictionary, Definition of “Национальный”,
[Link] (“Характерный для данной нации,
свойственный именно ей”).

92
and spiritual identity. Sometimes used as country or state” 227. Ushakov’s
Dictionary defines “Происхождение” (proiskhozhdeniye) as “denoting a
belonging to a certain nation or class by birth.” 228

3.32 The term “national origin” has also been analyzed as a composite term in
the context of regional human rights regimes. For example, the European Court of
Human Rights (“ECtHR”) has found violations of Article 14 of the European
Convention on Human Rights (“ECHR”)—which like Article 1(1) of the CERD,
prohibits discrimination on the basis of “national . . . origin” 229—in cases where
State authorities did not provide “any reasonable justification for the practice of
excluding non-nationals . . . from entitlement to certain allowances on the sole
basis of their nationality.” 230

227
Vol. VI, Annex 155, Ozhegov Dictionary, Definition of “Нация”, [Link]
.[Link]/[Link]?id=17956&sl=oj (“Исторически сложившаяся устойчивая общность
людей, образующаяся в процессе формирования общности их территории,
экономических связей, литературного языка, особенностей культуры и духовного
облика. В некоторых сочетаниях: страна, государство”).
228
Vol. VI, Annex 155, Ushakov’s Dictionary, Definition of “Происхождение”,
[Link] (“Принадлежность по рождению к какому-либо
сословию, нации или классу”).
229
See ECHR, Art. 14 (“The enjoyment of the rights and freedoms set forth in this Convention
shall be secured without discrimination on any ground such as sex, race, colour, language,
religion, political or other opinion, national or social origin, association with a national
minority, property, birth or other status.”) (emphasis added).
230
See ECtHR, Dhahbi v. Italy, Application No. 17120/09, Judgment (Second Section) (8 April
2014), para. 50 (emphasis added) (citing ECtHR, Niedzwiecki v. Germany, Application No.
58453/00, Judgment (25 October 2005); ECtHR, Okpisz v. Germany, Application No.
59140/00, Judgment (25 October 2005); ECtHR, Weller v. Hungary, Application No.
44399/05, Judgment (31 March 2009); ECtHR, Fawsie v. Greece, Application No. 40080/07,
Judgment (28 October 2010); ECtHR, Saidoun v. Greece, Application No. 40083/07,
Judgment (28 October 2010)).

93
3.33 In Rangelov v. Germany, for example, the ECtHR assessed whether the
applicant, a Bulgarian national, “ha[d] been treated differently . . . on the grounds
of his national origin, namely his Bulgarian nationality”, ultimately finding a
violation of Article 14 on those grounds 231. Similarly, in Bah v. United Kingdom,
the ECtHR assessed whether the differential treatment claimed by the applicant, a
Sierra Leonean national on behalf of her minor son, was based “on the nationality
of her son, which equates to ‘national origin’ for the purposes of Article 14”232.
Likewise, in Kuric v. Slovenia, the ECtHR determined that “the differential
treatment complained of was based on the national origin of the persons
concerned—as former SFRY citizens were treated differently from other
foreigners.” 233

3.34 Likewise, the IACtHR found violations of multiple provisions of the

American Convention on Human Rights “in relation to non-compliance with the
obligation to respect the rights established in Article 1(1)”, which prohibits
discrimination on the basis of “national . . . origin” 234—where the Dominican

231
See ECtHR, Rangelov v. Germany, Application No. 5123/07, Judgment (Fifth Section) (22
March 2012) paras. 89, 105 (emphasis added).
232
ECtHR, Bah v. United Kingdom, Application No. 56328/07, Judgment (Fourth Section)
(27 September 2011), para. 43 (emphasis added).
233
ECtHR, Kuric v. Slovenia Application No. 26828/06, Judgment (Grand Chamber) (16 June
2012), para. 394.
234
American Convention on Human Rights, Art. 1(1) (“The States Parties to this Convention
undertake to respect the rights and freedoms recognized herein and to ensure to all persons
subject to their jurisdiction the free and full exercise of those rights and freedoms, without
any discrimination for reasons of race, color, sex, language, religion, political or other
opinion, national or social origin, economic status, birth, or any other social condition.”)
(emphasis added).

94
Republic had expelled a number of Haitian nationals from the country. 235 The
African Commission on Human and People’s Rights has also found violations of
Article 2 of the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights—which prohibits
discrimination on the basis of “national or social origin,” among others 236—based
on the targeting and expulsion of 13 Gambian nationals by the government of
Angola. 237

3.35 The ordinary meaning of “national origin” may thus be said to refer to the
belonging of a person (or her or his ancestors) to a given country or nation, i.e., a
political community organized around a shared sense of history or culture. This
includes such belonging: in a historical sense, i.e., by ancestry or descent; in the
sense of birth and provenance, i.e., one’s nationality at birth or the country from
which one originates; as well as in a present or legal sense, i.e., one’s current
nationality or national affiliation.

235
IACtHR, Case of Expelled Dominicans and H aitians v. Dominican Republic, Judgment
(August 28, 2014), para. 380; see also ibid. p. 126, n. 447 (noting that a number of the
presumed victims were “of Haitian nationality”).
236
African Charter on Human and People’s Rights, Art. 2 (“Every individual shall be entitled to
the enjoyment of the rights and freedoms recognised and guaranteed in the present Charter
without distinction of any kind such as race, ethnic group, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or any other opinion, national and social origin, fortune, birth or any status.”)
(emphasis added).
237
ACmHPR, Communication 292/04, Institute for Human Rights and Development in Africa /
Angola (22 May 2008), para. 79 (“‘a state’s right to expel individuals is not absolute and it is
subject to certain restraints,’ one of those restraints being a bar against discrimination based
on national origin”).

95
(b) “National Origin” in Its Context

3.36 The context of Article 1 as a whole further makes clear that “nationality”
falls within the ordinary meaning of “national origin” as the term is used in Article
1(1) of the CERD.

3.37 Article 1(1) begins by providing the broad definition of “racial

discrimination” provided above, which includes discrimination based on “national
origin”. As is evident from the plain text, this definition is far-reaching,
encompassing discrimination on a variety of enumerated grounds, which overlap
to create a latticework of protections designed to eliminate “all forms” of racial
discrimination. Article 1(2) then creates an exception to this broad definition;
namely, that:

“[t]his Convention shall not apply to distinctions,

exclusions, restrictions or preferences made by a
State Party to this Convention between citizens and
non-citizens.”

3.38 In other words, Article 1(2) carves out differences of treatment between
citizens and non-citizens from Article 1(1)’s broad definition of racial
discrimination. In so doing, the drafters of the CERD sought to ensure that
differences of treatment between the citizens of a given State and all non-citizens
of that State—which were and remain common practice when it comes to, for
example, voting rights, access to high-ranking public positions, and other political
rights—would not, on their own, amount to discrimination within the meaning of
the CERD. However, Article 1(2) does not create any express permission for
distinctions to be made between different categories of non-nationals on the basis

96
of nationality. Further, as an exception to the general definition of discrimination
enumerated in Article 1(1), Article 1(2) “should be construed narrowly”. 238

3.39 Article 1(3) then provides that:

“[n]othing in this Convention may be interpreted as

affecting in any way the legal provisions of States
Parties concerning nationality, citizenship, or
naturalization, provided that such provisions do not
discriminate against any particular nationality.”

3.40 Like Article 1(2), Article 1(3) implicates the treatment of non-citizens, but
in a different context. While Article 1(2) addresses distinctions between citizens
and non-citizens, Article 1(3) addresses treatment which is inherently directed
only at non-citizens; namely, it clarifies that Article 1(1) does not prohibit a State
from dictating how individuals—necessarily non-citizens—acquire or lose its
nationality and become its citizens. However, Article 1(3) then further clarifies
that the State’s regulatory freedom in this respect is not unrestricted: a State
cannot discriminate “against any particular nationality” in doing so.

3.41 Articles 1(2) and 1(3) cannot be read as excluding nationality-based

discrimination from the CERD’s ambit by allowing distinctions to be made in the
case of non-citizens, as the UAE argued during the provisional measures phase239.

238
Vol. V, Annex 150, P. Thornberry, The International Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Racial Discrimination: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2016) p. 158 (“In
terms intrinsic to the text, the technical point that exceptions to a principle should be
construed narrowly is important: in functional terms, paragraph 2 of Article 1 is an exception
to a wider principle. Further, the potentially restrictive provisions in 1(2) and 1(3) have been
set against Article 5 (and other generalist provisions), with the latter generally treated as
dominant.”).
239
See CR 2018/13, pp. 40–41, para. 31 (Olleson) (stating that Article 1(2) “expressly qualifies
and informs the definition in paragraph 1, and indeed, limits the scope of the Convention as a
97
In fact, the opposite is true: the inclusion of Articles 1(2) and 1(3) makes clear that
nationality-based discrimination already falls within Article 1(1)’s protections. If
it did not, neither of these two provisions would be necessary. Both Articles 1(2)
and 1(3) arise from an assumption that discrimination based on “national origin”
includes nationality-based discrimination, thus potentially implicating the
treatment of non-nationals or non-citizens of a given State based solely on an
individual’s status as a non-national or non-citizen—and thus creating the need for
Article 1(2)’s express exception, and for Article 1(3)’s clarification that States
may continue to regulate how an individual attains status as a national or citizen.

3.42 The specific language used to introduce Article 1(3)—“[n]othing in this

Convention may be interpreted as affecting . . .”—further demonstrates that
nationality-based discrimination falls under Article 1(1). This language indicates
that Article 1(3) as a whole operates as a “without prejudice” clause, which does
not itself add to the definition of racial discrimination or identify additional
prohibited types of conduct not already included in Article 1(1). As such, Article
1(3)’s explicit reference to nationality-based discrimination must be read as a
preservation of an already existing prohibition, not as an additional basis for
discrimination. It follows that in order for the prohibition on nationality-based
discrimination to be preserved, it must already exist in Article 1(1).

3.43 Finally, Articles 1(2) and 1(3) remain subject to the general mandate of
Article 1(1). As such, States must exercise their rights to distinguish between
citizens and non-citizens and to dictate their internal laws relating to nationality,

whole. Article 1, paragraph 2, expressly recognizes, and carves out from the scope of
application of the Convention, the right of States to make distinctions between ‘citizens and
non-citizens’, and therefore to accord differential treatment on the basis of present
nationality.”).

98
citizenship, and naturalization in a manner that is consistent with their overarching
obligations under the CERD, as defined by Article 1(1).

3.44 This reading of the relationship between Articles 1(1), 1(2), and 1(3) has
been repeatedly and clearly confirmed by the CERD Committee. The CERD
Committee’s purpose is to ensure that States parties give effect to the CERD, and
it necessarily interprets the provisions of the CERD in pursuit of this purpose. As
the UAE itself recognized in the provisional measures phase of the proceedings,
the CERD Committee “was assigned the role of principal custodian of the
Convention” 240. The Court has previously recognized the specialized function of
United Nations treaty bodies, stating in Diallo that:

“Although the Court is in no way obliged, in the

exercise of its judicial functions, to model its own
interpretation of the [ICCPR] on that of the
Committee, it believes that it should ascribe great
weight to the interpretation adopted by this
independent body that was established specifically
to supervise the application of that treaty. The point
here is to achieve the necessary clarity and the
essential consistency of international law, as well as
legal security, to which both the individuals with
guaranteed rights and the States obliged to comply
with treaty obligations are entitled” 241.

240
CR 2018/13, p. 21, para. 8(6) and p. 26, para. 20 (Pellet) (noting also that the Committee is
“the organ that the authors of the Convention established as its guardian”).
241
Case Concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the
Congo), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010, para. 66 (emphasis added); see also
Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, paras. 100–101; Application of the Convention on t he
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Serbia and
Montenegro), Judgment of 11 July 1996, Separate Opinion of Judge Weeramantry, pp. 653–
654; see also Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
99
3.45 The imperatives of achieving clarity and essential consistency of
international law are equally significant here. In its General Recommendation XI,
issued in 1993, the CERD Committee clearly described the relationship between
the various clauses of Article 1:

“Article 1, paragraph 1, of the International

Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination defines racial discrimination.
Article 1, paragraph 2, excepts from this definition
actions by a State party which differentiate between
citizens and non-citizens. Article 1, paragraph 3,
qualifies article 1, paragraph 2, by declaring that,
among non-citizens, States parties may not
discriminate against any particular nationality.” 242

Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, paras. 109–112; ECtHR, Mamatkulov and
Abdurasulovic v. Turkey, Application Nos. 46827/99 and 46951/99, 2003-I, paras. 29–40
(citing decisions of the Human Rights Committee and the Committee against Torture);
International Law Association (ILA), Committee on Human Rights Law and Practice, Final
Report on t he Impact of Findings of the United Nations Human Rights Treaty Bodies, in
International Law Association, Report of the Seventy-First Conference 621, 664 (2004)
(noting that the Inter-American Court of Human Rights had “referred to the practice of the
Human Rights Committee in [a number of] cases.”); ibid. (noting that the International
Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia and the International Criminal Tribunal for
Rwanda “have drawn on treaty body jurisprudence [in the areas] of evidence and
procedure”); Vol. V, Annex 144, M. Banton, International Action Against Racial
Discrimination (Oxford University Press, 1996) (noting statement by a representative of the
UN Office of Legal Affairs that the CERD Committee “was not a subsidiary body of the
General Assembly but an autonomous treaty body . . . the right to give authoritative
interpretations of the Convention, and the powers of the Committee thereunder, rested not
with the General Assembly but, in the first instance, with CERD itself, as the body
responsible for monitoring compliance with the Convention, and ultimately with States
parties.”).
242
Vol. IV, Annex 104, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 11 on non-citizens,
document A/48/18 (1993), para. 1; see also ibid., para. 3 (“The Committee further affirms
that article 1, paragraph 2, must not be interpreted to detract in any way from the rights and
freedoms recognized and enunciated in other instruments, especially the Universal
Declaration of Human Rights, the International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural
Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights.”).

100
3.46 In General Recommendation 30, the Committee further elaborated on the
relationship between Article 1(2) and Article 1(1):

“Article 1, paragraph 2 must be construed so as to

avoid undermining the basic prohibition of
discrimination; hence, it should not be interpreted to
detract in any way from the rights and freedoms
recognized and enunciated in particular in the
Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the
International Covenant on Economic, Social and
Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights.” 243

3.47 Accordingly, there is no question that Article 1(2) allows States to

differentiate between citizens and non-citizens. However, such distinctions are
still subject to a general prohibition against discrimination, including
discrimination based on national origin, in Article 1(1). As a result, a State may
not single out a particular group of foreign nationals for discriminatory treatment,
including on the basis of national origin. This interpretation has shaped the CERD
Committee’s evaluation of State party compliance with the CERD for decades,
and it has thus repeatedly called on States parties to address instances of
discrimination against non-citizens on the basis of their nationality. 244

243
Vol. IV, Annex 109, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 30 on discrimination
against non-citizens, document CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (2004), para. 2; see also ibid.,
para. 3 (“Article 5 of the Convention incorporates the obligation of States parties to prohibit
and eliminate racial discrimination in the enjoyment of civil, political, economic, social and
cultural rights. Although some of these rights, such as the right to participate in elections, to
vote and to stand for election, may be confined to citizens, human rights are, in principle, to
be enjoyed by all persons. States parties are under an obligation to guarantee equality
between citizens and non-citizens in the enjoyment of these rights to the extent recognized
under international law[.]”).
244
See also CERD Committee, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of
Racial Discrimination, Australia, document CERD/C/AUS/CO/15-17 (27 August 2010),
101
3.48 For example, in its 1998 concluding observations on Switzerland, the
CERD Committee “express[ed] disquiet” at Switzerland’s “three-circle-model”
immigration policy of the time 245. The three-circle-model was designed “around
three categories of source countries”:

para. 24 (recommending that Australia “expedite the removal of the suspension on processing
visa applications from asylum seekers from Afghanistan” and implement measures to
standardize asylum assessment “regardless of country of origin”, thus reiterating that the
CERD does not allow for distinctions to be made on the basis of present nationality (in this
case, Afghani)); CERD Committee, Concluding observations of the Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Algeria, document CERD/C/DZA/CO/20-21 (21
December 2017), para. 20 (noting the Committee’s concern about the “situation of non-
nationals”, in particular sub-Saharan migrants, and recommending that the State party “[t]ake
the necessary steps to ensure that migrants have effective access to their economic, social and
cultural rights”, “[p]revent racial discrimination against migrants” and “[p]rovide information
regarding current laws on irregular migration[.]”); CERD Committee, Concluding
observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Pakistan,
document CERD/C/PAK/CO/21-23 (3 October 2016), paras. 37–38 (The Committee
expressed concern at the “growing hostility and violence” towards Afghan nationals who had
come to the country as refugees, and urged the State to “take effective measures to mitigate
the intensified hostility towards Afghan refugees” and to “ensure their right to access
employment, health-care services, education, water and sanitation and other public
services”); CERD Committee, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination
of Racial Discrimination, Peru, document CERD/C/PER/CO/22-23 (3 May 2018), paras. 36–
37 (The Committee expressed concern about discrimination against “migrants, asylum
seekers and refugees, in particular members of the Venezuelan population”, and
recommended that the State party “take the necessary action to ensure the protection of
foreign nationals, a majority of whom are Venezuelan”, including by removing barriers to
health services, education and employment); CERD Committee, Concluding observations of
the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Tajikistan, document
CERD/C/TJK/CO/6-8 (24 October 2012), para. 16 (The Committee expressed concern
regarding Tajikistan’s Family Code, which restricts the right of foreigners and stateless
persons to marry Tajik women; the Committee recalled General Recommendation XXX and
recommended that the State take into account its “duty to ensure that legislative guarantees
against racial discrimination apply to non-citizens regardless of their immigration status” and
“avoiding discrimination on ethnic or national ground”); D.R. v. Australia, Communication
No. 42/2008, Opinion, document CERD/C/75/D/42/2008 (14 August 2009); Benon Pjetri v.
Switzerland, Opinion adopted by the Committee under article 14 of the Convention,
concerning communication No. 53/2013 (5 December 2016).
245
CERD Committee, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, Switzerland, document CERD/C/304/Add.44 (30 March 1998), para. 6.

102
“The first circle, or inner circle, is made of EU and
EFTA member countries with which the aim is to
reach free mobility and abolish the status of the
seasonal worker in the medium term. The second
circle, or median circle, is made of countries
economically and culturally close to Switzerland
such as North America, Oceania, and Eastern
Europe. . . . Finally, the third circle, or outer circle,
is made of all other countries from which new
immigrants can be accepted only under exceptional
circumstances.” 246

3.49 The CERD Committee explained that its concerns over the three-circle-
model stemmed from the fact that it “classifies foreigners on the basis of their
national origin”—a term it clearly interpreted to include nationality. 247 The
Committee considered “the conception and effect of this policy to be stigmatizing
and discriminatory, and therefore contrary to the principles and provisions of the
Convention.” 248

3.50 The CERD Committee also expressed concerns in its concluding

observations to the Dominican Republic about “information received according to
which migrants of Haitian origin” were subjected to collective deportations back
to their country of nationality, Haiti. The Committee referred to its General

246
D. M. Gross, Immigration Policy and Foreign Population in Switzerland, World Bank Policy
Research Working Paper 3853 (2006); see also CERD Committee, Initial reports,
Switzerland, document CERD/C/270/Add.1. (14 March 1997), para. 56 (In its report,
Switzerland describes the “three-circle” model as a “restrictive policy towards the admission
of foreigners to the increasingly specialized Swiss labour market”).
247
CERD Committee, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, Switzerland, document CERD/C/304/Add.44 (30 March 1998), para. 6
(emphasis added).
248
CERD Committee, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, Switzerland, document CERD/C/304/Add.44 (30 March 1998), para. 6.

103
Recommendation 30 on non-citizens, and recommended that the Dominican
Republic “ensure that laws concerning deportation or other forms of removal of
non-citizens from the jurisdiction of the State party do not discriminate in purpose
or effect among non-citizens on the basis of race, colour or ethnic or national
origin” 249.

3.51 The CERD Committee has also criticized the United States’ now-defunct
National Security Entry-Exit Registration System, established in the wake of 9/11.
The system required visitors to the United States who were nationals of certain
countries to register with immigration officers upon arrival at a port of entry and
undergo enhanced immigration processing including fingerprinting,
photographing, and interrogation regarding their background 250. The Committee,
invoking CERD Article 2.1(c) and General Recommendation 30, called upon the
United States to put an end to the program 251.

3.52 Again in 2012, the CERD Committee affirmed that nationality falls within
the scope of Article 1(1) in concluding observations to Canada, wherein it
expressed concerns about Bill C-11, The Balanced Refugee Act, which proposed
to establish a list of “safe countries” and to expedite asylum requests for
individuals arriving from these countries. The Committee recommended that
Canada “take appropriate measures to ensure that procedural safeguards will be

249
CERD Committee, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, Dominican Republic, document CERD/C/DOM/CO/12 (16 May 2008),
para. 13 (emphasis added).
250
Rights Working Group, The NSEERS Effect: A Decade of Racial Profiling, Fear, and
Secrecy (May 2012), [Link]
251
CERD Committee Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, document CERD/C/USA/CO/6 (8 May 2008), para. 14.

104
guaranteed when addressing asylum requests of persons considered coming from
‘safe countries’, without any discrimination based on their national origin” 252.

3.53 As recently as September 2018, the Committee highlighted a problematic

case of discrimination against non-nationals in its concluding observations to
Japan. In that case, the Committee stated it was “concerned that Koreans who
have lived for multiple generations in Japan remain foreign nationals” and that
“many Korean women suffer multiple and intersecting forms of discrimination
based on nationality and gender” 253. Referring once more to its General
Recommendation 30, the Committee recommended that Japan take steps to
prevent discrimination against Koreans.

3.54 This approach is consistent with the treatment of entry restrictions under
general international law, pursuant to which states, while maintaining broad
latitude to control entry into their territory, are required to respect certain
fundamental tenets of international human rights law, including their obligation
not to engage in acts or practices of racial discrimination that in purpose or effect
undermine fundamental human rights and freedoms. For example, in 1986, in its
General Comment No. 15 to the ICCPR, the UNHRC noted that the ICCPR:

“does not recognize the right of aliens to enter or

reside in the territory of a State party. It is in
principle a matter for the State to decide who it will
admit to its territory. However, in certain
circumstances an al ien may enjoy the protection of

252
CERD Committee Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, document CERD/C/CAN/CO/19-20 (4 April 2012), para. 15.
253
CERD Committee, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, Japan, document CERD/C/JPN/CO/10-11 (26 September 2018), para. 21.

105
the Covenant even in relation to entry or residence,
for example when considerations of
nondiscrimination, prohibition of inhuman
treatment and respect for family life arise.” 254

3.55 Likewise, the UN Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism,

racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance has identified
immigration regulations as liable to engage foundational principles of
international human rights law, namely equality and non-discrimination.
Differential treatment afforded to different groups, “for example between citizens
and non-citizens or between different groups of non-citizens, are permissible only
if they serve a legitimate objective and are proportional to the achievement of that
objective.” 255 On this basis, the UN Special Rapporteur has expressed concern
about attempts by States to enact entry bans that disproportionately affect certain
groups, stating that “[u]nder the . . . International Convention on the Elimination
of all Forms of Racial Discrimination, blanket bans on specific nationalities and
other immigration measures that exclude on the basis of . . . national origin are
unlawful” 256.

254
Vol. III, Annex 93, Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 15: The
Position of Aliens Under the Covenant (11 April 1986), para. 5 (emphasis added).
255
Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism,
racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, document A/HRC/38/52 (25 April
2018), para. 16 (emphasis added).
256
Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism,
racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, document A/HRC/38/52 (25 April
2018), para. 67 (emphasis added); see also Donald J. Trump v. Hawaii, Case No. 17-965
(2018), Amici Curiae Brief of International Law Scholars and Nongovernmental
Organizations in Support of Respondents, p. 3, [Link]
/DocketPDF/17/17-965/41737/20180330125852277_2018-03-30%20Amici%20Curiae%20
Brief%20of%20International%20Law%[Link] (the amicus brief was filed by eighty-
one international law scholars and a dozen non-governmental organizations with expertise in
civil rights law, immigration law or international human rights law; it describes a proposed
106
3.56 In the provisional measures phase of the proceedings, Judge Crawford
noted that certain types of differentiation on the basis of nationality are reflected
“in widespread State practice giving preferences to nationals of some countries
over others in matters such as the rights to reside, entitlement to social security,
university fees and many other things, in peace and during armed conflict”257.
Other members of the Court concluded that, if nationality were a protected ground
of discrimination, such preferences would be unlawful under the CERD, requiring
that “with regard to the wide array of civil rights that are protected under CERD,
all foreigners must be treated by the host State in the same way as nationals of the
State who enjoy the most favourable treatment” 258.

3.57 But that conclusion does not flow necessarily from the inclusion of
nationality-based discrimination. As noted above, inherent in Article 1(1)’s
definition of discrimination is a concept of legitimacy and proportionality, as the
CERD Committee has repeatedly affirmed. The types of positive preferences
described above would thus in most cases be unlikely to give rise to a CERD

ban on entry to the United States by individuals coming from particular countries as “a
prohibited distinction in immigration policy based on national origin [that] violates the
human right to freedom from discrimination based on national origin under the . . .
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, and
customary international law.”). The former UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, Mr.
Zeid Ra’ad al-Hussein, took the same stance on the ban at issue in Donald J. Trump v.
Hawaii, tweeting that “[d]iscrimination on nationality alone is forbidden under
#humanrightslaw”. Vol. III, Annex 94, Twitter Post, @UNHumanRights (30 January 2017 at
3:47 a.m.).
257
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Dissenting Opinion
of Judge Crawford, para. 1.
258
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Joint Declaration of Judges Tomka, Gaja,
and Gevorgian, para 4.

107
violation, provided that they were enacted in a fashion that was both legitimate
and proportional. And indeed, the CERD Committee has not characterized such
positive preferences based on nationality as necessarily violating the CERD 259.

3.58 The approach of the ECtHR, which similarly recognizes “nationality” as

falling under the rubric of “national origin”-based discrimination, is instructive on
this point. As discussed above, the ECtHR has interpreted ECHR Article 14’s
prohibition on national origin-based discrimination to include nationality-based
discrimination. It has further held that, in assessing whether a distinction is
legitimate and proportionate, “very weighty reasons would have to be put forward
before the Court could regard a difference of treatment based exclusively on the
ground of nationality as compatible with the Convention” 260. At the same time,
however, the ECtHR has noted that distinctions between the treatment of non-
nationals from European Community or European Union member states and other
non-nationals may be justified by virtue of the “special legal order” between those
States 261. Nor does it view the prohibition on nationality-based discrimination as

259
See, e.g., D.F. v. Australia, Communication No. 39/2006 (2008), para. 4.1 (finding no CERD
violation where limitations were imposed on New Zealanders’ access to certain benefits
based on their non-citizen status; New Zealanders who were in Australia on the date the
changes were enacted or who fulfilled certain “transitional arrangements” continued to
receive the benefits at issue, and the legislative changes did not “affect the ability of New
Zealand nationals residing in Australia to have automatic access to other benefits such as
employment services, health care, public housing and primary and secondary education.”);
see also D.R. v. Australia, Communication No. 42/2008, document A/64/18 ( 2009) (same).
260
See ECtHR, Koua Pourrez v. France, Application. No. 40892/98, Judgment (Second Section)
(30 September 2003), para. 46.
261
See ECtHR, Moustaquim v. Belgium, Application. No. 12313/86, Judgment (Chamber) (18
February 1991), para. 49.

108
in conflict with a State’s general right “to control the entry of aliens into its
territory and their residence there” 262, though again, such right is not absolute 263.

3.59 Where a State implements policies that in either purpose or effect

compromise the fundamental human rights of a particular group of non-citizens—
for example, the collective expulsion of all nationals of a particular country—such
policies are, by definition, neither legitimate nor proportional, and thus constitute
prohibited discrimination under the CERD 264. This is especially true of policies
that have the purpose not only to distinguish between, but affirmatively to
discriminate against individuals of a particular nationality—for example, as a
means of retaliating against their country of origin. 265 For this reason, even to the
extent that States may differentiate between particular nationalities in
implementing visa or immigration policies—for example, pursuant to regional
free-movement zones or other agreements—their ability to do so is not absolute,
as detailed above.

3.60 The full context of Article 1 thus demonstrates that discrimination against
a particular nationality falls within Article 1(1)’s definition of discrimination, and
is further not removed from the scope of CERD’s protection by Article 1(2)’s
exception for distinctions between citizens and non-citizens.

262
See ECtHR, Taddeucci and McCall v. Italy, Application No. 51362/09, Judgment (First
Section) (30 June 2016), para. 55.
263
See, e.g., ECtHR, Moustaquim v. Belgium, Application No. 12313/86, Judgment (Chamber)
(18 February 1991), paras. 46–47.
264
See Chap. V, Sec. I.B., Sec. II, below.
265
See Chap. V, Sec. I.B., below.

109
(c) “National Origin” in Light of Object and Purpose

3.61 A reading of Article 1(1) that would allow for discrimination against a
specific sub-group of non-nationals on the basis of their nationality would
contradict the principle of universality of fundamental human rights that underlies
the United Nations Charter and the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
(“UDHR”), both of which are cited in the CERD’s Preamble 266. Indeed, the
“architecture of international human rights law is built on the premise that all
persons, by virtue of their essential humanity, should equally enjoy all human
rights” 267. To that end, the United Nations Charter “reaffirm[s] faith in
fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, [and] in
the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small” 268. Similarly,
the UDHR recognizes that “[a]ll human beings are born free and equal in dignity
and rights” 269 and grants to “[e]veryone” 270 all of the rights and freedoms it sets
forth. These instruments shaped the drafting of the CERD and provide context for
understanding its object and purpose.

266
Vol. V, Annex 150, P. Thornberry, The International Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Racial Discrimination: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 140
(“The entitlements of ‘everyone’ or ‘all persons’ to enjoy human rights are set out in the core
human rights texts from the [UDHR] onwards.”).
267
Vol. V, Annex 150, P. Thornberry, The International Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Racial Discrimination: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 140; see
Vol. V, Annex 151, D. Weissbrodt, The Human Rights of Non-Citizens (Oxford University
Press, 2008), p. 34.
268
UN Charter, Preamble.
269
UDHR, Art. 1.
270
UDHR, Art. 2 (“Everyone is entitled to all the rights and freedoms set forth in this
Declaration, without distinction of any kind, such as race, colour, sex, language, religion,
political or other opinion, national or social origin, property, birth or other status.”).

110
3.62 Permitting discrimination on the basis of nationality would also contradict
the CERD’s broad and prophylactic purpose of not only eliminating existing
discrimination based on race, but also preventing it, by “adopt[ing] all necessary
measures for speedily eliminating racial discrimination in all its forms and
manifestations”, eliminating the “existence of racial barriers” as “repugnant to the
ideals of any human society”, and “prevent[ing] and combat[ing] racist doctrines
and practices” 271. It would also render the CERD underequipped in the
contemporary protection of human rights, and require the CERD Committee to
abandon its work against certain forms of racial discrimination that it has
identified in its past reports.

3.63 In light of the CERD’s object and purpose, any interpretation according to
which discrimination based on nationality is permitted would be manifestly
unreasonable and cannot be reconciled with the object and purpose of the CERD.
As Professor Thornberry has explained,

“A reading of 1(2) that rules out from the

Convention any concern with non-citizens could be
classified in [VCLT] terms as a ‘manifestly absurd
or unreasonable’ reading of ICERD, and as not
corresponding to its object and purpose. In light of
the ambition expressed in the Convention to
eliminate racial discrimination, and a human rights
approach pro homine and pro femina, it is
reasonable to prefer effective interpretations that
protect the widest span of potential victims.” 272

271
Vol. III, Annex 92, CERD, Preamble.
272
Vol. V, Annex 150, P. Thornberry, The International Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Racial Discrimination: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 158; see
also B. Çali, “Specialized Rules of Treaty Interpretation: Human Rights” in D.B. Hollis (ed.)
The Oxford Guide to Treaties (Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 538 (“Effectiveness is an
111
3.64 The UAE’s suggested approach eviscerates the protections of the CERD,
leading to absurd results directly contrary to its object and purpose. For example,
such an interpretation would suggest that, prior to the break-up of the Soviet
Union, discrimination in any given State against persons of Kazakh origin was
impermissible, but not against those exact same persons once Kazakhstan secured
Statehood (so long as the State framed the discrimination as based on nationality
alone). Such an interpretation assigns the term “national origin” an arbitrary
meaning—one that protects groups of persons, unless the discrimination against
them is framed in terms of present nationality.

3.65 Instead, the CERD must account for the protective purpose of human
rights treaties as a general matter. That this protective purpose must govern the
interpretation of human rights treaties is now universally recognized by the ICJ
and other courts created to monitor the application of regional instruments for the
protection of human rights. The Court itself endorsed this approach in its 1958
Advisory Opinion on Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, where it stated
that:

“[t]he object and purpose of the Genocide

Convention imply that it was the intention of the
General Assembly and of the States which adopted
it that as many States as possible should participate.
The complete exclusion from the Convention of one
or more States would not only restrict the scope of
its application, but would detract from the authority
of the moral and humanitarian principles which are

overarching approach to human rights treaty interpretation . . . [O]ther more . . . specific

interpretive principles developed in the context of each human rights treaty . . . all derive
from the interpretive consensus that interpretations that are devoid of actual effect for human
rights protections do not cohere with good faith interpretations of the wording and context of
human rights treaties in the light of their object and purpose.”).

112
its basis. It is inconceivable that the contracting
parties readily contemplated that an objection to a
minor reservation should produce such a result. . . .
The object and purpose of the Convention thus limit
both the freedom of making reservations and that of
objecting to them.” 273

3.66 Regional human rights courts have followed suit, holding in analogous
contexts that “the object and purpose of the [European] Convention as an
instrument for the protection of individual human beings require that its
provisions be interpreted and applied so as to make its safeguards ‘practical and
effective’” 274.

3.67 These concerns are no less pressing when the application of a universal
instrument for the protection of basic human rights such as the CERD is at stake;
the requirement to make this instrument’s safeguards “practical and effective”
applies equally here. The CERD Committee itself emphasized that “[t]he

273
Reservations to the Convention on Genocide, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1951, p. 24;
see also Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, paras. 86, 114–115 (interpreting the Convention Against
Torture); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, [Link]. Reports 2004, paras. 94–95 (interpreting the Fourth
Geneva Convention); ibid., paras. 108–109 (interpreting the ICCPR).
274
ECtHR, Soering v. the United Kingdom, Application No. 14038/88, Judgment (7 July 1989),
para. 87 (references omitted). Likewise, the Inter-American Court of Human Rights held that
human rights conventions must be interpreted “to give it its full meaning and to enable the
system for the protection of human rights entrusted to the Commission and the Court to attain
its ‘appropriate effects’”. IACtHR, Velásquez Rodriguez v. Honduras, Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, (26 June 1987), para. 30. The words “appropriate effects” are a
reference to the following passage of the Permanent Court of International Justice’s Order of
August 1929 in the Free Zones case: “Whereas, in case of doubt, the clauses of a special
agreement by which a dispute is referred to the Court must, if it does not involve doing
violence to their terms, be construed in a manner enabling the clauses themselves to have
appropriate effects.” Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex, Order of 19 August
1929, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 22, p. 13.

113
Convention . . . is a living instrument that must be interpreted and applied taking
into account the circumstances of contemporary society” 275. Over the years, the
CERD Committee has repeatedly affirmed the broad nature of the CERD’s
protections in interpreting Article 1(1), consistent with the drafters’ aim of
“avoid[ing] any lacunae” 276. It has reiterated this in its most recent sessions,
“impelling States to implement real solutions to racism, so that all people,
regardless of their background, could fully exercise their human rights” 277. In so
doing, the CERD Committee has also consistently recognized the need to take into
account contemporary forms of racial discrimination to ensure that the CERD
remains effective. This includes with respect to discrimination against non-
nationals, which the Committee has characterized as “one of the main sources of
contemporary racism” 278.

3.68 These various elements therefore converge to confirm that the term
“national origin” in Article 1(1) of the CERD encompasses nationality, including
present nationality in line with the CERD’s object and purpose of eliminating “all

275
Vol. IV, Annex 112, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 32 on the meaning
and scope of special measures in the International Convention on t he Elimination of All
Forms Racial Discrimination, document CERD/C/GC/32 (2009), see also Stephen Hagan v.
Australia, Communication No. 26/2002, Opinion, document CERD/C/62/D/26/2002 (2003),
para 7.3 (“the Convention, as a living instrument, must be interpreted and applied taking into
the circumstances of contemporary society”).
276
Vol. V, Annex 150, P. Thornberry, The International Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Racial Discrimination: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 119
(emphasis added).
277
CERD Committee, Ninety-Third Session, Opening Statement of the Human Rights Council
and Treaty Mechanisms Division, document CERD/C/SR.2547 (2017), para. 2 (emphasis
added).
278
Vol. IV, Annex 109, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 30 on discrimination
against non-citizens, document CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (2004), Preamble.

114
forms” of racial discrimination. An interpretation of Article 1(1) as categorically
excluding present nationality would undermine this object and purpose, leading to
gaps in its comprehensive scope of protection and absurd results. This is
particularly true given that, as noted above, discrimination against non-nationals is
a particularly insidious form of contemporary racial discrimination, as the CERD
Committee has explicitly recognized.

(d) Supplementary Means of Interpretation Confirm That the CERD Applies to

Discrimination on the Basis of Nationality

3.69 Should the Court find that application of Article 31 of the VCLT leaves
the meaning of “national origin” ambiguous or obscure, or leads to a result which
is manifestly absurd or unreasonable, it may, pursuant to Article 32 of the VCLT,
have recourse to the travaux préparatoires and the circumstances of the CERD’s
conclusion as supplementary means of interpretation. The travaux préparatoires
of the CERD and the circumstances under which it was concluded confirm that
nationality is included within the scope of “national origin” in Article 1(1).

3.70 At the hearing on provisional measures, the UAE referenced selectively

excerpted statements by the drafters of the CERD, which the UAE argued showed
that “‘national origin’ was not to be equated with ‘nationality’, and that the
purpose of inclusion of the term was so as to preclude discrimination on the basis
of historic national origin, rather than present nationality” 279. Yet read in their full
context, these statements do nothing of the sort. Instead, they demonstrate that at
each stage of drafting, the delegates made clear that they viewed the ordinary

279
CR 2018/13, p. 47, para. 56 (Olleson).

115
meaning of “national origin” as capable of encompassing nationality-based
discrimination.

3.71 Indeed, it was this very fact that led to the main debate over the term—a
debate overwhelmingly motivated not by a desire to exclude nationality-based
discrimination, but rather by States’ desires to maintain the ability to make
legitimate distinctions between citizens and no n-citizens in the enjoyment of
certain political rights. And in determining how to address these concerns, the
CERD’s drafters rejected the approach of excluding nationality-based
discrimination from Article 1(1).

3.72 During the provisional measures hearing, the UAE highlighted statements
by the drafters of the CERD that, it argued, made “clear that ‘national origin’ did
not encompass citizenship” 280. For example, the UAE pointed to the fact that an
early draft of the convention prepared by the Commission on Human Rights’
defined racial discrimination as:

“any distinction, exclusion, restriction or preference

based on race, colour, [national] or ethnic origin
which has the purpose or effect of nullifying or
impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on
an equal footing, of human rights and fundamental
freedoms in the political, economic, social, cultural
or any other field of public life. [In this paragraph
the expression “national origin” does not cover the
status of any person as a citizen of a given
State]” 281.

280
CR 2018/13, p. 46, para. 52 (Olleson).
281
CR 2018/13, p. 46, para. 51 (Olleson); see Vol. III, Annex 91, United Nations, Official
Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Draft International Convention on the
116
3.73 In fact, this early draft suggests the opposite: the drafters of the CERD
included the bracketed language in this text, and generally deliberated the
“advisability of retaining the words ‘national or’ in paragraph 1” at this stage,
precisely because they understood that “national origin” could encompass
nationality or citizenship 282. As the summary report of the Commission on Human
Rights twentieth session debates explained, delegates had expressed the view that
“inclusion of the words [‘national origin’] in the operative part of the Convention
was undesirable since their meaning and scope were so vague” 283. Some delegates
recognized that the term could be understood as inclusive of nationality,
suggesting “that the difficulty arose out of the term ‘national’ in the English and
French languages, since in those languages the word was not necessarily related to
country of origin but referred to citizenship” 284.

3.74 This understanding persisted in the subsequent discussion of “nationality”

and “national origin” during the General Assembly’s twentieth session, during
which the final text of the CERD was considered and unanimously adopted 285. It

Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Report of the Third Committee, document
A/6181 (18 December 1965) (brackets in original).
282
Vol. III, Annex 77, United Nations, Official Records of the Economic and Social Council,
Commission on H uman Rights, Report on the Twentieth Session, document E/3873,
E/CN.4/874 (1964), pp. 24–25, para. 85.
283
Vol. III, Annex 78, United Nations, Official Records of the Economic and Social Council,
Commission on Human Rights, Twentieth Session, document E/CN.4/SR.809 (14 May 1964),
p. 5.
284
Vol. III, Annex 77, United Nations, Official Records of the Economic and Social Council,
Commission on H uman Rights, Report on the Twentieth Session, document E/3873,
E/CN.4/874 (1964), p. 27, para. 100.
285
See Vol. III, Annex 91, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth
Session, Draft International Convention on t he Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Report of the Third Committee, document A/6181 (18 December 1965).

117
is clear from these discussions that the delegates equally viewed the term
“national origin” as capable of a broad scope of meanings, including
encompassing nationality, based in varying experiences and contexts. For
example, the Hungarian delegate, Mr. Beck, explained that the specific meaning
of “national origin” was dependent on context and culture; he “had learnt from
informal discussions with various delegations that the term ‘national origin’ was
open to different interpretations, even among countries speaking the same
language” 286. Several other delegates expressed that the term could be interpreted
variously as “nationality, in the sense of another mother tongue, different cultural
traditions, and so forth” 287 or as referring to either “persons of foreign birth who
had become nationals of their country of residence” or “foreign minorities within
a State” 288 Some of the drafters of the CERD articulated clear differences between
the two terms, while others used them interchangeably 289.

286
Vol. III, Annex 81, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth
Session, Third Committee, document A/C.3/SR.1304 (14 October 1965), p. 85, para. 21.
287
Vol. III, Annex 81, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth
Session, Third Committee, document A/C.3/SR.1304 (14 October 1965), p. 85, para. 21.
288
Vol. III, Annex 81, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth
Session, Third Committee, document A/C.3/SR.1304 (14 October 1965), p. 84, para. 16.
289
See, e.g., Vol. III, Annex 81, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly,
Twentieth Session, Third Committee, document A/C.3/SR.1304 (14 October 1965), p. 85,
para. 23 (statement of the United States delegate that “[n]ational origin differed from
nationality in that national origin related to the past—the previous nationality or geographical
region of the individual or his ancestors—while nationality related to the present status); c.f.
ibid., p. 84, para. 13 (statement of the Austrian delegate that “[f]or half a century the terms
‘national origin’ and ‘nationality’ had been widely used in literature and in international
instruments as relating, not to persons who were citizens of or held passports issued by a
given State, but to those having a certain culture, language and traditional way of life peculiar
to a nation”).

118
3.75 The fact that “national origin” on its face was understood as capable of
encompassing nationality in the politico-legal sense of citizenship (what the UAE
refers to as “current” nationality) is precisely why the delegates extensively
debated the term’s inclusion at each stage of drafting, motivated by the concern
that the term would be interpreted to restrict States from making legitimate
distinctions between citizens and non-citizens (e.g., for the purpose of granting
political rights typically reserved to citizens, such as voting). For example, during
the debates of the Commission on Human Rights, the delegate from Lebanon
argued that “[t]he convention should apply to nationals, non-nationals, and all
ethnic groups, but it should not bind the parties to afford the same political rights
to non-nationals as they normally granted to nationals.” 290 Mr Gueye, the delegate
from Senegal, similarly summarized the main point of contention during the
General Assembly’s twentieth session as follows:

“the expression ‘national origin’ had given rise to

controversy, apparently because some delegations
feared that its use would confer on aliens living in a
State equality of rights in areas, political or other,
which under the laws of the State were reserved
exclusively to nationals.” 291

3.76 There is thus little question that, from the perspective of the delegates,
“national origin” was capable of encompassing “nationality.” And indeed, the
decision to include the term in the CERD’s final text was made with full
awareness and lengthy discussions of this fact.

290
Vol. III, Annex 78, United Nations, Official Records of the Economic and Social Council,
Commission on Human Rights, Twentieth Session, document E/CN.4/SR.809 (14 May 1964),
p. 5.
291
Vol. III, Annex 81, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth
Session, Third Committee, document A/C.3/SR.1304 (14 October 1965), p. 84, para. 16.

119
3.77 The extensive debates over the meaning and scope of “national origin” and
“nationality” make clear that the delegates’ primary concern was not whether the
categories in general should be considered a form of discrimination falling under
the scope of the CERD. At the same time that the delegates struggled to define the
full scope of the term “national origin”, which clearly was understood as capable
of encompassing nationality in the politico-legal sense, they recognized that the
aim of the CERD was to prohibit discrimination in the enjoyment of fundamental
rights to all persons. For this reason, the delegates broadly agreed that some form
of the term “national origin” or “nationality” would be a necessary addition to the
definition of “racial discrimination”, because the terms captured a segment of the
population that was both clearly at risk for discrimination and not adequately
covered by the other characteristics mentioned in Article 1(1), such as “ethnic
origin”. 292

3.78 Thus, the primary concern continued to be whether referencing these

categories might prevent States from denying certain political rights and other
benefits of citizenship to non-citizens. This concern is, indeed, explicitly reflected
in the Human Rights Commission definition highlighted by the UAE and
discussed above. It is also reflected in another excerpt of the travaux highlighted
by the UAE during the provisional measures phase, namely, an amendment
proposed by the United States and French delegates. This amendment “aimed at
clarifying the meaning of the expression ‘national origin’ by specifying that there

292
See, e.g., Vol. III, Annex 81, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly,
Twentieth Session, Third Committee, document A/C.3/SR.1304 (14 October 1965), pp. 83-84,
para 5 (Mr. Resich, delegate from Poland: “[t]he deletion of the word ‘national’ from the
Convention would imply that the Committee rejected the principle that all persons should be
protected from any type of racial discrimination”); ibid., p. 84, para. 13 (Mr. Villgrattner,
delegate from Austria: “[d]eletion of the word [national] might lead to uncertainty concerning
the rights of certain groups and perhaps, eventually, to their denial.”).

120
was nothing in that expression to prevent States from making a distinction
between their treatment of their own citizens and nationals and their treatment of
aliens.” 293 As the French delegate explained, “[t]he word ‘nationality’ had a strict[
] and . . . specific meaning in French legal terminology” and was “understood to
cover all that concerned the rules governing the acquisition or loss of nationality
and the rights derived there from.” 294 The United States-France amendment, had it
been adopted, would have resulted in a new Article 1(2) that provided:

“In this Convention the expression ‘national origin’

does not mean ‘nationality’ or ‘citizenship’, and the
Convention shall therefore not be applicable to
distinctions, exclusions, restrictions, or preferences
based on differences of nationality of [sic]
citizenship” 295.

3.79 The Indian delegate, Mr. K. C. Pant, took a different approach: instead of
altering the definition of “national origin,” he proposed deleting the words “the
right of everyone” in Article V, which would leave States “free to decide for
themselves whether the same guarantees should be afforded to aliens and

293
Vol. III, Annex 80, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth
Session, Third Committee, document A/C.3/SR.1299 (11 October 1965), p. 58, para. 10.
294
Vol. III, Annex 80, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth
Session, Third Committee, document A/C.3/SR.1299 (11 October 1965), p. 60, para. 37.
295
Vol. III, Annex 91,United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth
Session, Draft International Convention on t he Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination, Report of the Third Committee, document A/6181 (18 December 1965),
p. 12, para. 32 (citing United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth
Session, Third Committee, document A/C.3/L.1212).

121
nationals.” 296 He noted that “[m]any delegations had stressed and criticized the
text’s ambiguity on that point.” 297

3.80 However, neither the Indian delegate’s amendment, nor the amendment of
the United States and France delegates, was adopted as proposed. Instead, those
amendments were withdrawn in favor of a compromise amendment that provided
the final text of Articles 1(1)–1(3) of the CERD:

“(1) In this Convention the term ‘racial

discrimination’ shall mean any distinction,
exclusion, restriction or preference based on race,
colour, descent, or national or ethnic origin which
has the purpose or effect of nullifying or impairing
the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal
footing, of human rights and fundamental freedoms
in the political, economic, social, cultural or any
other field of public life.

(2) This Convention shall not apply to distinctions,

exclusions, restrictions or preferences made by a
State Party between citizens and non-citizens.

(3) Nothing in the present Convention may be

interpreted as affecting in any way the legal
provisions of States Parties concerning nationality,
citizenship or naturalization, provided that such

296
Vol. III, Annex 80, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth
Session, Third Committee, document A/C.3/SR.1299 (11 October 1965), p. 59, para. 30. The
final text of Article 5 reads as follows: “In compliance with the fundamental obligations laid
down in article 2 of this Convention, States Parties undertake to prohibit and to eliminate
racial discrimination in all its forms and to guarantee the right of everyone, without
distinction as to race, colour, or national or ethnic origin, to equality before the law, notably
in the enjoyment of [certain enumerated rights].” Vol. III, Annex 92, CERD, Art. 5.
297
Vol. III, Annex 80, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth
Session, Third Committee, document A/C.3/SR.1299 (11 October 1965), p. 59, para. 30.

122
provisions do not discriminate against any particular
nationality.” 298

3.81 Thus, that the CERD’s inclusion of “national origin” is meant to protect
individuals from discrimination on the basis of nationality in the politico-legal
sense is evident from the fact that the drafters of the CERD definitively rejected
the approach of explicitly excluding nationality-based discrimination from Article
1(1) 299. Instead of adopting the French and United States amendment to this
effect, which would have narrowed the definition of “racial discrimination” in
Article 1(1), the drafters dealt with the concern that citizens and non-citizens
would be guaranteed the same rights through express exceptions outlined in
Articles 1(2) and 1(3).

3.82 As explained by Miss Tabbara, the representative from Lebanon and one
of the sponsors of the compromise amendment, “[t]he amendment made it clear
that the Convention would not apply to non-citizens or effect nationality,
citizenship or naturalization, provided that there was no discrimination against any

298
Vol. III, Annex 91, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Draft
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Report of
the Third Committee, document A/6181 (18 December 1965), para. 37 (describing the
compromise amendment put forward by Ghana, India, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania,
Morocco, Nigeria, Poland and Senegal, document A/C.3/L.1238); Vol. III, Annex 92,
CERD, Arts. 1(1)–1(3).
299
E.g., Vol. III, Annex 81, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly,
Twentieth Session, Third Committee, document A/C.3/SR.1304 (14 October 1965), para. 6
(quoting Polish delegate’s statement that the French and United States amendment went “too
far”).

123
particular nationality.” 300 Articles 1(2) and 1(3) were therefore meant to narrow
the very broad application of Article 1(1).

3.83 By adopting the compromise amendment and retaining the word

“national” in the definition of “racial discrimination”, the drafters of the CERD
sought to maintain the primary goal of the Convention: to eliminate discrimination
“in all its forms”. And they did this in full recognition of the fact that the scope of
“national origin” was not clearly delineated, and could be interpreted in different
ways. In that sense, the inclusion of “national origin” in Article 1(1) of the CERD
was meant to contribute to a definition of “racial discrimination” that was both
broad and flexible enough to account for different regional contexts. This is fully
in keeping with the drafters’ desire to ensure that the CERD would be “a timeless
one, applicable . . . to every kind of racial discrimination” 301. As Miss King, the
representative from Jamaica, explained, “[t]he Convention was intended to

300
Vol. III, Annex 83, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth
Session, Third Committee, document A/C.3/SR.1307 (18 October 1965), para. 1.
301
Vol. III, Annex 84, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth
Session, Third Committee, document A/C.3/SR.1313 (21 October 1965), p. 121, para. 6. See
also the declaration made by Mr. Saario in the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, when he stressed that the draft should also be
general in scope “in order to remain valid for the longest possible time; care should therefore
be taken not to mention phenomena limited to a particular area or to the present time.”
Vol. III, Annex 73, United Nations, Official Records of the Economic and Social Council,
Sixteenth Session, document E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.408 (5 February 1964), p. 5 (emphasis added).
He later elaborated to observe that “once an international convention was adopted it became
an integral part of international law; it should therefore state rules which were of lasting
value”. Ibid., p. 7.

124
condemn and provide against not only the present forms of racial discrimination
but any future forms as well” 302.

3.84 Scholars have acknowledged, in the words of Professor Thornberry, a

“fundamental ambiguity in ‘national origin’ and ‘nationality’”, as both terms were
used to “refer not only to legal nationality or citizenship but also to a concept of
community in a spectrum that includes ethnicity” 303. What is clear from the
travaux is that “national or ethnic origin”, like the CERD’s definition of racial
discrimination more generally, should have the widest application possible.

3.85 In conclusion, for the reasons described above, the CERD clearly
encompasses discrimination against a particular group of non-nationals on the
basis of their nationality, including present nationality, within Article 1(1)’s
prohibition on discrimination based on “national origin”. As such, the UAE’s
measures explicitly and intentionally discriminating against “Qatari nationals” and
“Qatari residents and visitors”—in particular, the Expulsion Order as well as the
Absolute and Modified Travel Bans—violate the CERD solely based on this
discriminatory purpose 304.

302
Vol. III, Annex 84, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth
Session, Third Committee, 1313th Meeting, document A/C.3/SR.1313 (21 October 1965),
p. 122, para. 13.
303
Vol. V, Annex 150, P. Thornberry, The International Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Racial Discrimination: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 125.
304
See generally Chap. V, Sec. I, below.

125
2. The Discriminatory Measures Fall Within the CERD’s Scope Ratione Materiae
Based on Their Discriminatory Effect on Qataris

3.86 As discussed above, the Expulsion Order and Absolute Travel Ban—
executed against “Qatari residents and visitors” and “Qatari nationals,”
respectively—fall within the scope of the CERD even on the UAE’s
acknowledged basis of targeting Qataris on the basis of “current nationality.”
However, equally, the UAE’s ex post facto attempt to characterize these measures
as so limited is not only without basis, but also irrelevant to the Court’s
conclusion.

3.87 In Qatar, as in its Gulf neighbors, any attempt to carve out “current” Qatari
nationals as a group wholly separate and distinct from individuals who were born
with Qatari nationality is utterly artificial, as the former group is comprised almost
entirely of the latter. And this group is itself largely comprised of individuals who
are of “Qatari” origin in the historical-cultural sense of parentage or heritage—
they were born Qatari, to Qatari parents, and have historical family ties to Qatar.

3.88 The UAE’s targeting of “Qataris” and “Qatari nationals” pursuant to the
Expulsion Order and the Absolute Travel Ban thus discriminate against persons of
Qatari “national origin” in each of these senses, by disproportionately impacting
their enjoyment of fundamental rights. Moreover, the UAE’s Anti-Sympathy Law,
Block on Qatari Media, and Anti-Qatari Incitement Campaign—which the UAE
tellingly avoids in this context—is entirely unrelated to “current” nationality, but
rather, directly targets Qatari identity.

3.89 That the CERD’s definition of racial discrimination protects historical and
cultural national groups like Qataris is evident from the CERD’s text and the

126
circumstances surrounding its drafting. In particular, and as already discussed
above, the prohibition of discrimination on the basis of “national origin” plainly
encompasses discrimination based on an individual’s affiliation with a particular
national community in the historical-cultural sense of parentage or heritage (Part
a), “Qataris” are members of one such national community under Article 1(1)
(Part b), and the UAE’s measures have the effect of discriminating against
Qataris, in violation of the CERD (Part c).

(a) The Term “National Origin” Includes a Person’s Affiliation with a “Nation”
in a Historical-Cultural Sense

3.90 Discrimination against individuals based on membership in a community

as defined by characteristics such as descent or ancestry, heritage, and shared
cultural traditions falls within the scope of the CERD’s definition of
discrimination based on “national origin”. As explained above in Section I.A.1(a),
the ordinary meaning of “national origin” connotes the country or nation where a
person is from, or where or a person’s ancestors came from—in other words, a
sense of belonging to a given country or nation. This sense of belonging could be
in the present, based on current national affiliation, in the past, as in the sense of
ancestry or historical or family ties, or based on one’s country or nationality of
birth. Indeed, the UAE has acknowledged this before the CERD Committee,
arguing that “[f]or example, a person born in Canada to Canadian parents would
be considered as having a Canadian national origin” 305.

305
Vol. IV, Annex 122, State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates, ICERD-ISC-2018/2,
Comments on Qatar’s Response on Issues of Jurisdiction and Admissibility (19 March 2019)
(responding to Vol. IV, Annex 121, State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates, ICERD-ISC-
2018/2, Response of the State of Qatar (14 February 2019)).

127
3.91 Professor Thornberry has explained that, given their essentially broad
scope, the two terms “national origin” and “ethnic origin” often function “as a
yoked pair of workhorses, employed whenever issues of colour (‘visible
minorities’) are not the most prominent markers of discrimination” 306. The term
“descent” in Article 1(1) is similarly related, and “overlap[s] with other terms in
Article 1, especially where they include ‘origin’” 307. Like “national origin,” for
example, “descent” in ordinary terms refers to “a person’s origin or nationality” or
“transmission by inheritance” 308. Descent is also commonly related to the terms
“ancestry, extraction, family tree, genealogy, heredity, lineage, origin, and
parentage” 309. “Ethnic origin” likewise evokes historical-cultural connections, and
“ethnicity” is ordinarily defined as the “state of belonging to a social group that
has a common national or cultural tradition” 310 or a “group of people who have
the same national, racial, or cultural origins” 311. Together, these three separate but
related terms—“descent, national or ethnic origin”—operate to ensure that the full

306
Vol. V, Annex 150, P. Thornberry, The International Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Racial Discrimination: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 126
307
Vol. VI, Annex 150, P. Thornberry, The International Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Racial Discrimination: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 119.
308
Vol. VI, Annex 150, P. Thornberry, The International Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Racial Discrimination: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2016), p.119.
309
Vol. VI, Annex 150, P. Thornberry, The International Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Racial Discrimination: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 119. As
such, individuals of Qatari national origin in the historical-cultural sense may also be
characterized as individuals of “Qatari descent,” and protected under the CERD as such, as
they are Qatari by parentage and lineage.
310
Oxford Dictionaries, Definition of “Ethnicity”, [Link]
/ethnicity.
311
Cambridge Dictionary, Definition of “Ethnicity”, [Link]
english/ethnicity.
128
range of an individual’s national, cultural, historical and ancestral, and
ethnographical affiliations will fall within the scope of the CERD’s protections.

3.92 Further, as described above, the travaux préparatoires of the CERD, and
the circumstances in which it was drafted, confirm that the term “national origin”
refers to a range of characteristics that is inclusive of both nationality and
historical-cultural affiliations with a people linked to a particular State 312. Indeed,
the drafters of the CERD made it clear that they intended the Convention to apply
to all vulnerable groups that might be defined by such characteristics. It also was
clear among the delegates that the term “national origin” was context- and culture-
specific, and could contain within it both “nationality” and aspects of “national
origin” tied to cultural heritage and descent. For example, the drafters of the
CERD explained at varying points that “national origin” might cover “persons . . .
having a certain culture, language and traditional way of life peculiar to a nation
but who lived within another State” 313, “persons of foreign birth who had become
nationals of their country of residence” or “foreign minorities within a State”.

3.93 Thus, it is clear from the ordinary meaning and the travaux that a group of
people defined by certain historical-cultural “national” affiliations—for example,
a “mother tongue” 314, national traditions or beliefs 315, or ancestry tied to a

312
See Chap. III, Sec. I.B.1., above.
313
Vol. III, Annex 81, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth
Session, Third Committee, document A/C.3/SR.1304 (14 October 1965), p. 84, para. 9; ibid.,
p. 84, para. 13.
314
Vol. III, Annex 81, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth
Session, Third Committee, document A/C.3/SR.1304 (14 October 1965), p. 85, para. 21.
315
Vol. III, Annex 74, United Nations, Official Records of the Economic and Social Council,
Sub-Commission on P revention of Discrimination and P rotection of Minorities, Sixteenth
Session, document E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.411 (5 February 1964), p. 5.

129
particular geographical region 316— was meant to fall within the scope of the
CERD’s protections. In practical terms, such a people might exist across different
States, might exist as a minority group living within a State, or might be tied to a
particular State, either presently or historically, including by nationality. The
drafters retained the term “national origin” not in spite of, but because of its
expansive scope, which could encompass the totality of these connections.

(b) Qatari National Origin within the Meaning of CERD Article 1(1)

3.94 “Qatari” is not simply a nationality—it is a national identity tied to

membership in a longstanding historical-cultural community defined by shared
heritage or descent, particular family or tribal affiliations, shared national
traditions and culture, and geographic ties to the peninsula of Qatar. This
community pre-dates the modern State of Qatar, but coalesced around the Qatari
state following independence in 1972. It is distinct from other national
communities, and easily recognizable to other peoples living in the Gulf region,
based on, for example, dialect, traditional dress, family affiliations, and other
factors. For example, as one Qatari declarant explained, “the traditional Qatari
dress . . . is very distinct from the other GCC States so the fact that I am Qatari [is]
easily recognizable.” 317

3.95 Other Qatari declarants explained that their accents would easily identify
them as Qatari. One student stated, for example, that to avoid being targeted after

316
Vol. III, Annex 81, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth
Session, Third Committee, document A/C.3/SR.1304 (14 October 1965), p. 85, para. 23.
317
Vol. VII, Annex 177, DCL-024, para. 10; see also Vol. IX, Annex 215, DCL-092, para. 11
(“[M]y traditional Qatari dress would very distinctly identity me as a Qatari.”); Vol. VII,
Annex 166, DCL-005, para. 15 (“I recognized . . . other passengers on the flight as fellow
Qataris because of the way they were dressed.”).

130
5 June, “[w]hen out in public, I would change my accent so that people would not
realize I was Qatari” 318. Today, as with most States of the Gulf and as the UAE
well knows, the vast majority of persons with Qatari nationality are in fact
associated with this community—leaving nationality-based distinctions as an easy
proxy for discrimination against Qataris in general.

3.96 Dr. J.E. Peterson, a historian and political analyst specializing in the
Arabian Peninsula, describes the origins of this distinct Qatari community and its
connections with the modern Qatari state, in the context of social organization and
state formation in the Gulf region. Historically, the principal units of social
organization in the Gulf were tribal, though there are also longstanding non-tribal
communities in the region. The Qatari peninsula was home to a number of tribes
of diverse origin, some of which contained nomadic elements, but many of which
have long been settled in Qatar’s territory, and “also constitute the great majority
of Qataris today” 319.

3.97 Tribal leadership was vested in the “shaykh,” who acted as both the
“father” of the tribal community and as the representative of the community in
external relations 320. In the mid- to late-nineteenth century, Muhammad bin Thani,
a prominent shaykh of the Al Thani tribe—of which the current Qatari Amir is a
member—began to operate as de facto ruler of Qatar 321. In 1868, the British

318
Vol. VII, Annex 180, DCL-028, para. 20; see also Vol. XI, Annex 253, DCL-168, para. 17
(“I tried to avoid speaking in public, and, if I did, spoke more quietly, so that people were
less likely to hear my Qatari accent.”).
319
See Vol. VI, Annex 162, Expert Report of Dr. J.E. Peterson, para. 19; see also J.E. Peterson,
“Tribes and Politics in Eastern Arabia,” 31 Middle East Journal (1977) 3, pp. 297-312.
320
See Vol. VI, Annex 162, Expert Report of Dr. J.E. Peterson, para. 16.
321
See Vol. VI, Annex 162, Expert Report of Dr. J.E. Peterson, paras. 15–16.

131
entered into a treaty with this shaykh, Muhammad bin Thani, as head of a distinct
political entity322, recognizing him as the primary local authority of Qatar and as
representative of the Qatari people 323. This resulted in an “affirmation of [the Al
Thani’s] legitimacy as rulers of a proto-state in Qatar in addition to their status as
paramount shaykhs of the peninsula’s tribes” 324. And this authority became tied to
the territory, rather than a particular tribal community, as they “gradually required
the allegiance of everyone in their territory . . . while also acquiring responsibility
for everyone resident in their domain.” 325 In 1916, Muhammed bin Thani’s son
signed a treaty placing Qatar under British protection 326. This formal treaty of
protection, whereby Britain assumed responsibility for foreign affairs and defense,
not only made Qatar a protected state within Britain’s informal empire but also
further solidified the rule of the Al Thani family as “supratribal leaders” over the
proto-Qatari state 327.

3.98 The discovery of oil in the region in the 1950s led to major political,
economic, and social changes in the Gulf region, which accelerated throughout the
1960s and 1970s. The influx of oil revenues strengthened the role of the State and

322
See Vol. VI, Annex 162, Expert Report of Dr. J.E. Peterson, para 15; see also M. Gray,
Qatar: Politics and the Challenges of Development (Lynne Rienner Publishers, 2013), p. 26.
323
See Vol. VI, Annex 162, Expert Report of Dr. J.E. Peterson, para 16; see also R. Said
Zahlan, The Making of the Modern Gulf States (Routledge 1989), p. 84–85 .
324
See Vol. VI, Annex 162, Expert Report of Dr. J.E. Peterson, para. 16.
325
See Vol. VI, Annex 162, Expert Report of Dr. J.E. Peterson, para. 16.
326
See Vol. VI, Annex 162, Expert Report of Dr. J.E. Peterson, para. 15.
327
See Vol. VI, Annex 162, Expert Report of Dr. J.E. Peterson, para. 16.

132
spurred the formation of a citizenry connected to that State 328. Indeed, the
transition from a traditional leadership structure—in which the shaykh cum ruler
was “father” of the community—to a more modern structure—in which the State
provides benefits and opportunities—deepened the sense of an identity as a
national of a particular State 329. Thus, whereas “[i]n the past, identity in the
Middle East was local and typically derived from tribe, place, and religion . . .
since the twentieth century state citizenship has increasingly become the most
important identity.” 330

3.99 By the 1970s, a sense of Qatari identity as the primary point of self-
identification for the people crystallized and solidified around the formation of the
modern independent Qatari State, and has continued to evolve over the course of
the last forty years 331. Today, there is a strong sense of Qatari identity, coalesced
around membership in family, clan, tribe, and a connection to the modern Qatari
State and its leaders 332. Historians have explained that the “Khalijis”—people

328
See Vol. VI, Annex 162, Expert Report of Dr. J.E. Peterson, para 17; see also L.G. Potter,
“Society in the Persian Gulf: Before and After Oil”, Center for International and Regional
Studies, Georgetown University in Qatar (2017), pp. 21–22.
329
See Vol. VI, Annex 162, Expert Report of Dr. J.E. Peterson, para 23.
330
L. Potter, “Society in the Persian Gulf: Before and After Oil”, Center for International and
Regional Studies, Georgetown University in Qatar (2017), p. 23; see also Vol. VI, Annex
162, Expert Report of Dr. J.E. Peterson, paras. 17, 24.
331
See Vol. VI, Annex 162, Expert Report of Dr. J.E. Peterson, para. 23 ff.
332
The collective “Qatari” identity is expressed voluntarily by Qataris and is celebrated on Qatar
National Day, an annual holiday that began in 2007 and which marks the founding of the
State of Qatar and its first emir. As scholars have explained, Qatar’s National Day “seeks to
commemorate the ascendency of a levelling nationalism over the varied pre-statal social
topography.” On National Day, large tents are erected for each tribe, and celebrations include
“performance[s] of tribal belonging” such as poetry readings and ceremonial performances.
See A.M. Gardner & A. Alshawi, “Tribalism, Identity and Citizenship in Contemporary
Qatar”, 8:2 Anthropology of the Middle East (2013) 46, p. 54.

133
from the Gulf—now “share a similar lifestyle but not a common identity, except
perhaps in the eyes of outsiders” 333. As Dr. Peterson observes:

“While Qatari national identity shares the Arab

Muslim ethos with its Gulf neighbors, it is distinct,
centered on these elements of shared Qatari heritage
or descent, historical ties, and shared national
myths. . . . [I]ndividuals considered to be of Qatari
origin today are part of a community whose origins
pre-date the nation-state era in the Gulf, and which
over the last sixty years or so crystallized into a
distinct Qatari national identity that is deeply
connected to the modern Qatari state. As such, and
as is the case throughout the region, Qatari national
origin and nationality are closely intertwined.” 334

3.100 The existence of a Qatari people thus long pre-dates the modern
independent State of Qatar. Qatari national identity has developed over the years
in a unique political, historical and cultural context 335. The modern Qatari identity
is centered on these historical-cultural roots to the region, as well as to strong ties
to the Qatari State and the Al Thanis 336.

333
L. Potter, “Society in the Persian Gulf: Before and After Oil”, Center for International and
Regional Studies, Georgetown University in Qatar (2017); see also Vol. VI, Annex 162,
Expert Report of Dr. J.E. Peterson, paras. 24–27.
334
See Vol. VI, Annex 162, Expert Report of Dr. J.E. Peterson, para. 30.
335
See generally Vol. VI, Annex 162, Expert Report of Dr. J.E. Peterson.
336
See Vol. VI, Annex 162, Expert Report of Dr. J.E. Peterson, para. 22.

134
3.101 Social scientists have similarly described identity in the Gulf in terms of “a
political system based on kinship, real or presumed” 337. In the particular context
of the Gulf, “the defining feature [of such systems] is not race, language or
religion but citizenship conceived in terms of shared descent” 338. This is reflected
in nationality laws throughout the region, including Qatar’s, which follow a jus
sanguinis model to confer nationality through parentage, rather than birth in the
territory, and which reflect an understanding of such historical-cultural ties 339.
Qatar’s nationality law ties nationality to the historical Qatari community
predating the state. Specifically, Qatari law recognizes as citizens individuals who
are part of or descend from this historical community, namely “[t]hose residents
of Qatar who have been resident in the country since 1930 and who maintained
regular legal residence in the country until the enforcement date of . . . Law No. 2
of 1961” 340. It also recognizes other persons “proved to be of Qatari descent”, as
well as individuals “born to a Qatari father” 341.

337
A. Longva, “Neither Autocracy Nor Democracy but Ethnocracy: Citizens, Expatriates and
the Socio-Political System in Kuwait” in Dresch and Piscatori, eds., Monarchies and
Nations: Globalisation and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf (I.B. Tauris, 2005), p. 119.
338
A. Longva, “Neither Autocracy Nor Democracy but Ethnocracy: Citizens, Expatriates and
the Socio-Political System in Kuwait” in Dresch and Piscatori, eds., Monarchies and
Nations: Globalisation and Identity in the Arab States of the Gulf (I.B. Tauris, 2005), p. 119.
339
See, e.g., P. Dresch, “Debates on Marriage and Nationality in the United Arab Emirates” in
Paul Dresch and James Piscatori, eds., Monarchies and Nations: Globalisation and Identity
in the Arab States of the Gulf (I.B. Tauris, 2005), p. 141 (describing Kuwait’s nationality law,
which set the pattern followed by other Gulf States and defined Kuwaitis as those who were
normally resident in Kuwait before 1920).
340
Vol. II, Annex 69, Qatar Law No. 38 of 2005 on the acquisition of Qatari nationality
38/2005 (30 October 2005), Art. 1 (emphasis added).
341
Vol. II, Annex 69, Qatar Law No. 38 of 2005 on the acquisition of Qatari nationality
38/2005 (30 October 2005), Art. 1 (emphasis added).

135
3.102 These individuals constitute the vast majority of Qatari citizens, as Qatar’s
Nationality Law of 2005 provides for “naturalization” under only relatively
limited circumstances, each of which requires strong ties to the state and its
people. These circumstances include individuals who resided in Qatar for at least
25 years and have been granted nationality by Emiri decree, or wives of Qatari
men in certain cases 342.

3.103 Qatari nationality in the politico-legal sense is generally thus restricted to

individuals who are also members of the historical-cultural community of Qataris,
in that it defines a Qatari for citizenship purposes as anyone normally resident in
Qatar during the period of 1930 to 1961 and their descendants. As is typical in the
Gulf region, the overlap between individuals possessing Qatari nationality and
those of Qatari origin—defined by ancestry or historical geographic ties—is
therefore significant. Indeed, this qualification embraces the great majority of
Qatari nationals today343.

3.104 During the provisional measures phase of the proceedings, the UAE
argued that “given the geographical proximity, the common cultural and social
background and the close ties and interconnectedness of the populations of Qatar
and the UAE,” that “any allegation of discrimination on the basis of race . . .
would have been unsustainable.” 344 Yet of course, CERD is not limited to
discrimination based on “race” alone, and the close ties between Emiratis and
Qataris do not alter the fact that Qataris have a distinct national identity as

342
Vol. II, Annex 69, Qatar Law No. 38 of 2005 on the acquisition of Qatari nationality
38/2005 (30 October 2005), Arts. 2, 4, 5, 8.
343
See Vol. VI, Annex 162, Expert Report of Dr. J.E. Peterson, para. 27.
344
CR 2018/13, p. 39, paras. 23–24 (Olleson) (emphasis added).

136
Qataris, and that the Qatari population shares a distinct national origin. To read
“national origin” as coterminous with “race” or “ethnic origin”, as the UAE seems
intent upon doing, would read the term out of Article 1(1) and deny an important
aspect of CERD’s protections.

3.105 Indeed, the existence of a distinct community of Qatari origin is explicitly

recognized in the UAE’s own nationality laws. In particular, Article 5 of the
UAE’s Federal Law No. (17) of 1972 concerning Nationality and Passports
provides that:

[t]he nationality of the State may be granted

to…[a]n Arab individual from Omani, Qatari or
Bahraini origin residing in the State on continuous
and lawful basis for at least three years directly
before the date of submitting [a] naturalization
application. 345

3.106 This reference to “Qatari origin” in the UAE’s nationality law is clearly
intended to refer to the historical-cultural community of Qataris.

(c) The UAE’s Measures Disproportionately Impact Qataris

3.107 As discussed, the plain meaning of Article 1(1) makes clear that the CERD
explicitly encompasses unlawful measures discriminatory in either purpose or
effect, in line with CERD’s general protective purpose of eliminating “all forms”
of racial discrimination 346. This comprehensive approach recognizes that

345
Vol. II, Annex 37, United Arab Emirates: Federal Law No. (17) of 1972 on Citizenship and
Passports (18 November 1972), Art. 5.
346
See Chap. III, Sec. I.A., above.

137
addressing discrimination in effect is essential to realizing CERD’s object and
purpose of eliminating all forms of racial discrimination.

3.108 As the United Nations Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of

racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance explained in her
April 2018 report:

[T]he prohibition on racial discrimination in

international human rights law aims at much more
than a formal vision of equality. Equality in the
international human rights framework is
substantive . . . . [T]he Committee on the
Elimination of Racial Discrimination clarifies that
the prohibition of racial discrimination under the
Convention cannot be interpreted restrictively. It not
only aims to achieve formal equality before the law,
but also substantive (de facto) equality in the
enjoyment and exercise of human rights. The
Committee emphasizes that the Convention applies
to purposive or intentional discrimination as well as
discrimination in effect and structural
discrimination. . . . . The Special Rapporteur stresses
that this substantive, non-formalistic approach to
equality applies even in the context of citizenship,
nationality and immigration laws and policies 347.

3.109 Thus, even if the distinctions drawn by the Expulsion Order and the
Absolute and Modified Travel Bans against “Qatari residents and visitors” and
“Qatari nationals” on their face can be characterized as based on “current” Qatari
nationality as the UAE alleges—though this is by no means clear—the
indisputable effect of these measures, and of the UAE’s chosen demarcation, is a

347
United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Human Rights Council, Thirty-
eighth Session, document A/HRC/38/52, paras. 18–19.

138
disproportionate impact on the rights of individuals who are Qatari by heritage,
origin, or descent. These effects independently bring these measures within the
jurisdiction ratione materiae of the CERD as discrimination based on national
origin. Moreover, the Anti-Sympathy Law, the Block on Qatari Media, and the
Anti-Qatari Incitement Campaign single out Qataris as a community—not based
on “current” nationality, but as a distinguishable cultural national group—in both
purpose and effect, and thus equally fall within CERD’s protective scope.

3.110 Were the UAE simply allowed to evade responsibility by characterizing its
actions as limited to “current” nationality—notwithstanding the clear
discriminatory effects arising from that demarcation— it would create a clear
lacuna in CERD’s protective coverage that is at odds with the CERD’s object and
purpose. The UAE is well aware that nationality and citizenship in Qatar, as is the
case throughout the Gulf region are correlated with, and in fact are often
dependent upon, an individual having longstanding historical-cultural ties to the
national community348. Article 1 of the CERD must be interpreted in light of this
particular context. As a practical matter, “current” Qatari nationals—like the
nationals of many other Gulf States—are not only Qataris by citizenship law, but
are generally also “Qataris” in another sense, defined by shared heritage or
lineage, particular family or tribal affiliations, geographical ties to what is now
Qatar, and participation in national traditions and culture. The vast majority are
also persons “originally” of Qatari nationality349.

348
See Vol. VI, Annex 162, Expert Report of Dr. J.E. Peterson, para. 27.
349
There can be little dispute that “original” nationality falls within the scope of the CERD. For
example, Schwelb concludes that while there was “no clear agreement whether the term
‘national origin’ was to be understood in the political-legal or in the ethnographic sense”, “for
the practical purposes of the interpretation of the Convention,” it covered both “distinctions .
139
3.111 The UAE’s characterization of the Discriminatory Measures as limited to
Qatari nationals solely in a “current nationality” sense thus masks the reality that
the measures target and discriminate against “Qataris” as a historical-cultural
community. Indeed, this experience is borne out in the testimony of individuals
impacted, who clearly describe impacts that relate to cultural identification of
being “Qatari” rather than related to possession of a Qatari passport. 350 Many
Qataris residing in the UAE on 5 June 2017 described an intense fear of returning
to the UAE after the imposition of the Discriminatory Measures, noting that they
would be easily distinguishable from Emiratis based on their uniquely Qatari dress
and accent. 351

. . on the ground of present or previous ‘nationality’ in the ethnographical sense and on the
ground of previous nationality in the ‘politico-legal’ sense of citizenship.” E. Schwelb, “The
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination”, 15 The
International and Comparative Law Quarterly (1966) 4, pp. 1006–1007. This suggests that,
at a minimum, nationality-based discrimination against persons for whom “past” and
“present” nationality are the same falls within the CERD.
350
Indeed, some individuals who are not Qatari nationals, but who identify as “Qatari” in a
cultural sense due to longstanding residence in Qatar, reported impacts of the measures due to
Emirati’s perception of them as Qatari based on, e.g., accent or dress. Vol. IX, Annex 210,
DCL-084, para. 5, (“[T]he customs official . . . looked at my passport, and he commented on
the fact that I was born in Qatar . . . It is because I was born in Qatar that they take me for
interrogation in the security office.”); Vol. IX, Annex 223, DCL-107, para. 10 (“The
immigration officer . . . told me that I was “not welcome” in the UAE. I understood him to
mean that Qataris were not welcome—and that he knew I am Qatari because I was dressed in
the traditional Qatari thobe.”).
351
See, e.g., Vol. IX, Annex 205, DCL-078, paras. 11–12 (“[My family] asked me . . . to change
my clothes—that is, to stop wearing Qatari dress—so that I wouldn’t be readily identifiable
as Qatari. . . . For the ten days that we stayed in the UAE after the announcement that Qataris
had to leave . . . I stopped wearing Qatari dress, and wore jeans instead. I also stopped
listening to Qatari music, like the theme song from Qatar’s National Day celebrations”);
Vol. IX, Annex 206, DCL-079, para. 17 (“I remember a video that [my mother’s relative in
the UAE] sent me after the UAE’s measures started in which he was saying that, although he
used to wear the Qatari dress, he would have to purchase an Emirati traditional thobe to avoid
getting in trouble.”); Vol. VIII, Annex 191, DCL-046, para. 20 (“I have a Qatari friend who .
. . returned to Qatar sometime closer to the end of the 14-day period. Whilst in the UAE, he
140
3.112 By allegedly targeting “Qatari nationals,” the UAE imposed measures that
inevitably would affect persons of Qatari origin as a means of coercing the Qatari
government and as a punishment for alleged wrongdoings.

3.113 In conclusion, the UAE’s Discriminatory Measures have adversely

impacted a group of people defined by their Qatari heritage, ancestry or descent,
and traditions and culture. That such a historical-cultural community falls within
the scope of “national origin” as it is used in Article 1(1) of the CERD is
indisputable. This interpretation is evident from the ordinary meaning of “national
origin” in its context and in the light of the CERD’s object and purpose, and is
further supported by the travaux of the CERD. As a consequence, the
discriminatory effects of the measures on individuals of Qatari national origin in
this sense are alone sufficient to constitute violations under the CERD.

Section II. The Dispute “Is Not Settled” for the Purposes of Article 22

3.114 The second requirement for jurisdiction under Article 22 of the

Convention is that the dispute “is not settled by negotiation or by the procedures
expressly provided for in this Convention” 352. This requirement is met in this case
because Article 22 establishes alternative, not cumulative, requirements (Section
II.A) and the negotiation requirement has been satisfied (Section II.B).

chose not to wear the distinctive Qatari dress out of fear for his safety.”); see also Vol. VIII,
Annex 192, DCL-047, para. 16.
352
Vol. II, Annex 92, CERD, Art. 22.

141
A. ARTICLE 22 ESTABLISHES ALTERNATIVE, NOT CUMULATIVE, REQUIREMENTS

1. Article 22’s Requirements Cannot Be Cumulative When Read in Light of the

“Logic and Purpose” of CERD and in Context with its Other Provisions

3.115 Qatar notes as a preliminary matter that the phrase “is not settled by
negotiation or by the procedures expressly provided for in this Convention” does
not explicitly state preconditions that must be fulfilled before the seisin of the
Court. Indeed, in its Order on provisional measures in Georgia v. Russian
Federation, the Court observed that “the phrase … does not, in its plain meaning,
suggest that formal negotiations in the framework of the Convention or recourse
to the procedure referred to in Article 22 thereof constitute preconditions to be
fulfilled before the seisin of the Court” 353.

3.116 Nevertheless, in its Judgment on Preliminary Objections in Georgia v.

Russian Federation, the Court, by ten votes to six, interpreted the phrase to
establish “preconditions to be fulfilled before the seisin of the Court” 354. Qatar

353
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order, I.C.J Reports
2008, para. 144.
354
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2011, para. 141. All six dissenting Members of the Court issued opinions disagreeing
with this interpretation. Then-President Owada, Judges Simma, Abraham and Donoghue, and
Judge ad hoc Gaja issued a joint dissenting opinion observing that: (a) interpreting Article 22
to impose preconditions “does not accord with the literal meaning of the text”; (b) the
drafters’ choice of the phrase “which is not settled” over “which cannot be settled” shows
that Article 22 does not impose preconditions; and (c) the drafters were aware of, yet
declined to adopt, other formulations that would have expressly imposed preconditions.
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Joint Dissenting
Opinion of President Owada, Judges Simma, Abraham and Donoghue and Judge ad hoc
Gaja, I.C.J. Reports 2011, paras. 14-38. In his own dissenting opinion, Judge Cançado
Trindade noted that: (a) nothing in the Convention’s preparatory works suggests that Article
22 was intended to impose preconditions; (b) interpreting Article 22 to impose preconditions
142
acknowledges the Court’s decision on this point, which necessarily gave rise to a
second question, namely, whether these preconditions are cumulative (that is, they
both need to be satisfied) or alternative (that is, only one of them needs to be
satisfied).

3.117 The Court did not have to decide this issue in Georgia v. Russian
Federation because it concluded that Georgia had not satisfied either of the two
requirements 355. The Court also declined to decide the issue at the provisional
measures stage in Ukraine v. Russian Federation and in this case, observing in its
respective Orders on provisional measures that “it need not make a
pronouncement on the issue at this stage of the proceedings” 356.

3.118 Although the Court itself has yet to decide the issue, 13 Judges of the
Court, including five current Judges, have already expressed the view that the
requirements are alternative, not cumulative. At the provisional measures phase of
Georgia v. Russian Federation, all seven dissenting judges—Vice-President Al-

does not take into account the nature and substance of the Convention as a core human rights
treaty; and (c) Article 22 “is a statement of pure verification of facts, and nowhere is there a
‘precondition’ implied or suggested in its wording, and certainly not in its spirit”. Application
of the International Convention on t he Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Dissenting Opinion of Judge
Cançado Trindade, I.C.J. Reports 2011, paras. 89-115.
355
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2011, para. 187(2).
356
Application of the International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of
Terrorism and of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order, I.C.J.
Reports 2017, para. 60; Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures,
Order, para. 39.

143
Khasawneh and Judges Ranjeva, Shi, Koroma, Tomka, Bennouna and
Skotnikov—issued a joint dissenting opinion in which they referred to the CERD
procedures requirement as an “alternative precondition” 357. At the preliminary
objections phase of the same case, five dissenting judges—President Owada,
Judges Simma, Abraham and Donoghue and Judge ad hoc Gaja—jointly stated
the view that the two requirements are alternative, not cumulative 358. The sixth
dissenting judge—Judge Cançado Trindade—issued a separate dissenting opinion
in which he also took the view that the two requirements are alternative 359.

3.119 By contrast, not a single judge, in either Georgia v. Russian Federation,

Ukraine v. Russian Federation, or this case expressed the view that the two
requirements are cumulative. Accordingly, even though the Court has yet to hold
that the two requirements are alternative, there is unanimity among the Judges
who have opined on this issue that they are indeed alternative.

357
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Joint Dissenting
Opinion of Vice-President Al-Khasawneh and J udges Ranjeva, Shi, Koroma, Tomka,
Bennouna and Skotnikov, I.C.J. Reports 2008, para. 17 (emphasis added).
358
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Joint Dissenting
Opinion of President Owada, Judges Simma, Abraham and Donoghue and Judge ad hoc
Gaja, I.C.J. Reports 2011, paras. 39-47.
359
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Dissenting Opinion
of Judge Cançado Trindade, I.C.J. Reports 2011, para. 116.

144
3.120 This is entirely unsurprising given the many reasons why the Article 22
requirements can only be read as alternative. 360

3.121 As cogently explained by the five joint dissenting Judges at the

preliminary objections phase in Georgia v. Russian Federation, in the context of
Article 22, negotiation and the CERD procedures are “two different ways of doing
the same thing, that is to say, seeking an agreement premised on the parties’
ability to reconcile their positions” 361. The Judges’ reasoning in this respect is
compelling and worth reproducing in extenso. They wrote:

“In our opinion, the conclusive argument draws on

the logic and purpose of the text under
consideration. The point of this text cannot be to
require a State to go through futile procedures solely
for the purpose of delaying or impeding its access to
the Court. The end sought is not purely one of form;
if we look at it from the perspective taken by the
Court, the rule has a reasonable aim, to reserve
judicial settlement for those disputes which cannot
be settled by an out-of-court means based on

360
The appropriate framework of analysis is Articles 31 to 33 of the VCLT. However, as
explained in the joint dissenting opinion of five Judges at the preliminary objections phase in
Georgia v. Russian Federation, examining the “ordinary meaning” of the relevant terms of
the treaty is of little assistance, since the word “or” in a negative clause has an inherently
inconclusive meaning. See Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary
Objections, Joint Dissenting Opinion of President Owada, Judges Simma, Abraham and
Donoghue and Judge ad hoc Gaja, I.C.J. Reports 2011, para. 42. The context and the object
and purpose, on the other hand, are conclusive in establishing the two requirements as
alternative, not cumulative. This conclusion is confirmed by reference to the preparatory
works, as explained below. See Section II.A.2, below.
361
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Joint Dissenting
Opinion of President Owada, Judges Simma, Abraham and Donoghue and Judge ad hoc
Gaja, I.C.J. Reports 2011, para. 44.

145
agreement between the parties. Still, for this
condition to be met, the applicant must have made
the necessary efforts to attempt to settle the dispute,
if it seems reasonably possible, by recourse to
means enabling the parties to reach agreement,
leaving the Court to act as the last resort.

If the text is understood in these terms, it becomes

illogical to consider the two modes referred to in
Article 22 as necessarily cumulative. Each mode
ultimately depends on an understanding between the
parties and their desire to seek a negotiated solution.
This is obvious in the case of “negotiation” and it is
equally true for the “procedures expressly provided
for” in part II of CERD. The Committee established
by the Convention has no power to impose a legally
binding solution on the disputing States. It can only
encourage the States to negotiate with each other
(Art. 11); then, where there have been no
negotiations or unsuccessful negotiations, it can
appoint a conciliation commission to make
recommendations (Art. 13) to be communicated to
the parties, which then make known whether or not
they accept them. Ultimately, a favourable out-come
depends on the readiness of the parties to come to an
agreement, in other words, on their willingness to
negotiate.

Consequently, where a State has already tried,

without success, to negotiate directly with another
State against which it has grievances, it would be
senseless to require it to follow the special
procedures in Part II, unless a formalism
inconsistent with the spirit of the text is to prevail. It
would make even less sense to require a State which
has unsuccessfully pursued the intricate procedure
under part II to undertake direct negotiations
destined to fail before seising the Court.

146
In short, as direct negotiation and referral to the
Committee are two different ways of doing the same
thing, that is to say, seeking an agreement premised
on the parties’ ability to reconcile their positions, it
is enough, even under the strict interpretation upheld
in the Judgment, to entitle the applicant to come
before the Court if one of these two modes has been
pursued, for it would be highly unreasonable to
require the applicant then to try the other.” 362

3.122 This final point bears emphasis. Article 22 deals with the settlement of
disputes between States Parties with respect to the interpretation or application of
CERD. The capacity of negotiations and the CERD procedures to achieve such
settlement is entirely dependent on the parties’ willingness and ability to
compromise. If either mode has become futile in terms of such capacity, reading
Article 22 to also require recourse to the other before seeking settlement of the
dispute from the Court would be, in the words of the dissenting Judges,
“illogical” 363, “senseless” 364, “highly unreasonable” 365, and “inconsistent with the
spirit of the text” of the Convention 366.

362
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Joint Dissenting
Opinion of President Owada, Judges Simma, Abraham and Donoghue and Judge ad hoc
Gaja, I.C.J. Reports 2011, paras. 43-44.
363
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Joint Dissenting
Opinion of President Owada, Judges Simma, Abraham and Donoghue and Judge ad hoc
Gaja, I.C.J. Reports 2011, para. 43.
364
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Joint Dissenting
Opinion of President Owada, Judges Simma, Abraham and Donoghue and Judge ad hoc
Gaja, I.C.J. Reports 2011, para. 43.
365
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Joint Dissenting
147
3.123 To illustrate this, Qatar recalls that the CERD procedures can last a
considerable period of time: at least six months if neither party elects to refer the
matter again to the CERD Committee under Article 11(2) and potentially longer if
one does. If the recalcitrant attitude of one of the parties has caused negotiations
to become “futile or deadlocked”, as is the case here, 367 requiring the parties to
seek settlement of the dispute from the CERD procedures before having recourse
to the Court for purposes of obtaining a legally binding resolution would
unreasonably delay the vindication of rights under the Convention, which cannot
have been the intention of the drafters of an instrument prohibiting any derogation
from its provisions.

3.124 The Article 22 requirements cannot be deemed cumulative for the

additional reason that if they were, the negotiation requirement would be rendered
redundant and thereby deprived of effet utile. As the joint dissenting Judges at the
preliminary objections phase in Georgia v. Russian Federation pointed out 368,
negotiation constitutes an element of the CERD procedures. In particular, Article
11(2) provides that, after the initial communication and response have been
exchanged, “[i]f the matter is not adjusted to the satisfaction of both parties, either

Opinion of President Owada, Judges Simma, Abraham and Donoghue and Judge ad hoc
Gaja, I.C.J. Reports 2011, para. 44.
366
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Joint Dissenting
Opinion of President Owada, Judges Simma, Abraham and Donoghue and Judge ad hoc
Gaja, I.C.J. Reports 2011, para. 43.
367
See generally Chap. III, Sec. II.B, below.
368
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Joint Dissenting
Opinion of President Owada, Judges Simma, Abraham and Donoghue and Judge ad hoc
Gaja, I.C.J. Reports 2011, para. 43.

148
by bilateral negotiations or by any other procedure open to them, … either State
shall have the right to refer the matter again to the Committee” 369. There would
therefore be no reason to have a separate negotiation requirement if the two
requirements were cumulative.

3.125 Finally, reading Article 22 to create cumulative requirements, such that the
CERD Committee procedures must be exhausted before the seisin of the Court,
would lead to the unreasonable result that some disputes subject to Article 22
could never be referred to the Court. This is because there are disputes “with
respect to the interpretation or application of [CERD]” 370 that could not possibly
be subject to the CERD procedures because they do not concern whether a State
Party “is not giving effect to the provisions of this Convention” 371 (the only
matters that may be submitted to the CERD Committee under Article 11(1)).

3.126 The principles of pacta sunt servanda and good faith require that the terms
of a treaty have a single consistent meaning. It cannot be that the same words in
the same treaty provision have a different meaning depending on the nature of the
“dispute … with respect to the interpretation or application of th[e]
Convention” 372. Only a reading of the two requirements as alternative ensures
consistency of meaning and thereby protects the Parties’ expectations and the
effectiveness of the provision as a whole.

369
Vol. III, Annex 92, CERD, Art. 11(2) (emphasis added).
370
Vol. III, Annex 92, CERD, Art. 22.
371
Vol. III, Annex 92, CERD, Art. 11(1).
372
Vol. III, Annex 92, CERD, Art. 22.

149
2. The Preparatory Works of CERD Confirm that Article 22’s Requirements are
Alternative

3.127 The fact that the two requirements are alternative is confirmed by the
travaux préparatoires of the Convention.

3.128 The language of Article 22 originates from the United Nations Secretary-
General’s working paper, dated 17 February 1964, presenting alternative options
for the so-called “final clauses” of the Convention 373. Clause VIII of the working
paper concerned the settlement of disputes 374, and contained four options. The
first three of the four options referred only to negotiation; the fourth included
references to other peaceful means of dispute settlement 375.

3.129 The first option (labeled “Article 8-A”), which subsequently served as the
basis for Article 22, provided:

“Any dispute which may arise between any two or

more Contracting States concerning the
interpretation or application of this Convention,
which is not settled by negotiation, shall at the

373
Vol. III, Annex 76, United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human
Rights, Twentieth Session, Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination: Final Clauses: Working paper prepared by the Secretary-General,
document E/CN.4/L.679 (17 February 1964).
374
Vol. III, Annex 76, United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human
Rights, Twentieth Session, Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination: Final Clauses: Working paper prepared by the Secretary-General,
document E/CN.4/L.679 (17 February 1964), pp. 15-16.
375
Vol. III, Annex 76, United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human
Rights, Twentieth Session, Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination: Final Clauses: Working paper prepared by the Secretary-General,
document E/CN.4/L.679 (17 February 1964), pp. 15-16.

150
request of any of the parties to the dispute be
referred to the International Court of Justice unless
they agree to another mode of settlement.” 376

3.130 Thus, the negotiation requirement was originally intended to be the only
procedural precondition in Article 22.

3.131 On 15 October 1965, roughly two months before the adoption of the
Convention, the Officers of the Third Committee for the General Assembly used
the Secretary-General’s working paper to propose the final clauses of the
Convention 377. For Clause VIII, they selected the first option (Article 8-A)
presented by the Secretary-General, making only minor edits. Their Clause VIII
provided:

“Any dispute between two or more Contracting

States over the interpretation or application of this
Convention, which is not settled by negotiation,
shall at the request of any of the parties to the
dispute be referred to the International Court of
Justice for decision, unless the disputants agree to
another mode of settlement.” 378

376
Vol. III, Annex 76, United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human
Rights, Twentieth Session, Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination: Final Clauses: Working paper prepared by the Secretary-General,
document E/CN.4/L.679 (17 February 1964), p. 15.
377
Vol. III, Annex 82, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth
Session, Third Committee, Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination: Suggestions for final clauses submitted by the Officers of the Third
Committee, document A/C.3/L.1237 (15 October 1965).
378
Vol. III, Annex 82, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth
Session, Third Committee, Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination: Suggestions for final clauses submitted by the Officers of the Third
Committee, document A/C.3/L.1237 (15 October 1965), p. 4.

151
3.132 The Officers of the Third Committee thus also intended negotiation to be
the sole procedural requirement for recourse to the Court.

3.133 On 30 November 1965, just three weeks before the adoption of the
Convention, Ghana, Mauritania, and the Philippines proposed an amendment to
Clause VIII inserting the words “or by the procedures expressly provided for in
this Convention” 379. (This was known in the Third Committee as the “three-Power
amendment” 380.)

3.134 Just over a week later, on 7 December 1965, the Chairman of the Third
Committee invited the Committee to consider the three-Power amendment 381. The
remarks of the delegates show that it was not intended to effect a material change
by adding a separate, mandatory procedural requirement to Article 22. The
Ghanaian representative noted that the amendment was “self-explanatory”, as it
“simply referred to the procedures provided for in the Convention” 382. The
Belgian representative similarly added that the amendment “introduced a useful

379
Vol. III, Annex 89, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth
Session, Third Committee, Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination: Ghana, Mauritania and Philippines: amendments to the suggestions
for final clauses submitted by the officers of the Third Committee (A/C.3/L.1237), document
A/C.3/L.1313 (30 November 1965).
380
See, e.g., Vol. III, Annex 90, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly,
Twentieth Session, Third Committee, 1367th Meeting, document A/C.3/SR.1367 (7
December 1965), p. 453, paras. 26, 29, 31.
381
Vol. III, Annex 90, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth
Session, Third Committee, 1367th Meeting, document A/C.3/SR.1367 (7 December 1965), p.
453, para. 23.
382
Vol. III, Annex 90, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth
Session, Third Committee, 1367th Meeting, document A/C.3/SR.1367 (7 December 1965), p.
453, para. 29.

152
clarification” 383. Several other representatives expressed their support for the
amendment in passing 384, after which it was adopted unanimously 385. There was
virtually no debate over the proposal, which shows that States did not understand
it to introduce any significant changes to Clause VIII.

3.135 The treatment of the three-Power amendment stood in stark contrast with
another proposed amendment to Clause VIII that was being considered at the
same time. In particular, Poland proposed that the phrase at the request of “any” of
the parties be changed to at the request of “all” of the parties 386. The proposal
sparked considerable debate, precisely because many States opposed this attempt
to restrict access to the Court 387. Poland’s proposal was defeated. Had the three-
Power amendment been similarly understood to restrict access to the Court (as a

383
Vol. III, Annex 90, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth
Session, Third Committee, 1367th Meeting, document A/C.3/SR.1367 (7 December 1965), p.
454, para. 40.
384
Vol. III, Annex 90, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth
Session, Third Committee, 1367th Meeting, document A/C.3/SR.1367 (7 December 1965), p.
453, paras. 26 (Canada), p. 453, para. 31 (Colombia), p. 454, para. 39 (Italy).
385
Vol. III, Annex 90, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth
Session, Third Committee, 1367th Meeting, document A/C.3/SR.1367(7 December 1965), p.
455.
386
Vol. III, Annex 85, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth
Session, Third Committee, Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination: Poland: amendments to the suggestions for final clauses submitted by
the Officers of the Third Committee (A/C.3/L.1237), document A/C.3/L.1272 (1 November
1965) (emphasis added).
387
See, e.g., Vol. III, Annex 90, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly,
Twentieth Session, Third Committee, 1367th Meeting, document A/C.3/SR.1367 (7
December 1965), p. 453, paras. 24-25, 28 (Canada), p. 453, para. 31 (Colombia), pp. 453-
454, para. 32 (USA), p. 454, para. 38 (France), p. 454, para. 39 (Italy).

153
cumulative interpretation would entail), it surely would have engendered similar
opposition and debate.

3.136 After reviewing these travaux, the five joint dissenting Judges at the
preliminary objections stage in Georgia v. Russian Federation reached the same
conclusion. They wrote:

“The clear impression … emerges that the three

Powers’ intent in proposing their amendment was
not to impose a further condition resulting in more
limited access to the Court than under the earlier
text. There is nothing to indicate that the
amendment was aimed at making resort to the
special procedures under Part II mandatory where
direct negotiations had failed. More likely, the
amendment was intended to make clear that
recourse to these special procedures figured among
the possible avenues for negotiated settlement. That
is why it was regarded by the delegates as merely a
‘useful addition or clarification’ and was easily
adopted, not as a change in the text to make it more
restrictive but as a natural, and almost self-evident,
clarification.” 388

3.137 Analysis of the preparatory works therefore confirms the conclusion that
the two Article 22 requirements are alternative, not cumulative.

388
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Joint Dissenting
Opinion of President Owada, Judges Simma, Abraham and Donoghue and Judge ad hoc
Gaja, I.C.J. Reports 2011, para. 47.

154
3. None of the UAE’s Reasons Why Article 22’s Requirements Should Be Read
Cumulatively Has Merit

3.138 In the oral proceedings on provisional measures in this case, the UAE
unconvincingly argued that the two requirements are cumulative. It began by
acknowledging that the conjunction “or” can have an alternative or a cumulative
meaning 389, but argued that it would not have made sense to use the conjunction
“and” in Article 22 390. The UAE was unable, however, to put forth any argument
based on the text and/or the context of Article 22 for why the “or” in Article 22
has a cumulative rather than an alternative meaning. Instead, the UAE relied on
four arguments divorced from the text, none of which has merit.

3.139 The UAE’s first argument was based on a misreading of the travaux. The
UAE argued that Article 22 “is the direct result of a proposal made by Mr. Ingles,
the Philippine member of the Human Rights Sub-Commission” 391, pursuant to
which negotiations and the CERD procedures were supposedly cumulative
requirements 392. The UAE was referring to Mr. Ingles’s “proposed measures of
implementation” 393, which were presented to the Sub-Commission on Prevention

389
CR 2018/13, p.19, para. 8(2) (Pellet).
390
CR 2018/13, p. 20, para. 8(3) (Pellet).
391
CR 2018/13, p. 20, para. 8(4) (Pellet).
392
CR 2018/13, p. 20, para. 8(4) (Pellet) (quoting United Nations Economic and Social Council,
Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, Sixteenth Session, Summary Record of the 427th Meeting,
document E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.427 (12 February 1964), p. 12).
393
Vol. III, Annex 71, United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human
Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,
Sixteenth Session, Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination: Mr. Ingles: Proposed Measures of Implementation, document
E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.321 (17 January 1964).
155
of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities (a subsidiary body of the
Commission on Human Rights, which in turn was a subsidiary body of the United
Nations Economic and Social Council) on 12 February 1964 394.

3.140 The UAE’s interpretation of Mr. Ingles’s proposal is, however, wrong on
multiple levels. As a preliminary matter, Article 22 was not the “direct result” of
Mr. Ingles’s proposal. Rather, as explained above 395, Article 22 originated from
Article 8-A of the U.N. Secretary-General’s working paper on the final clauses of
the Convention (which became Part III of the Convention) 396. Mr. Ingles’s
proposal, on the other hand, served as the basis for Part II of the Convention,
including the CERD procedures in Articles 11 to 13 397.

394
Vol. III, Annex 79, United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human
Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,
Sixteenth Session, Summary Record of the Four Hundred and Twenty-Seventh Meeting (28
January 1964), document E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.427 (12 February 1964), pp. 11-13.
395
See paras. 3.128–3.131, above.
396
The UAE may have been confused because both Mr. Ingles’s “proposed measures of
implementation” and the United Nations Secretary-General’s working paper were submitted
to the Commission on Human Rights (and subsequently to the Third Committee of the
General Assembly). See infra, n. 397.
397
Indeed, the reason why both documents were submitted to the Commission on Human Rights
was precisely because they were considered to relate to different parts of the Convention. In
January 1964, at its sixteenth session, the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination
and Protection of Minorities submitted to the Commission on Human Rights the draft
Convention it had prepared, and in addition: (i) with respect to the “final clauses”, the Sub-
Commission requested the Secretary-General to submit to the Commission a working paper
presenting alternative forms for final clauses; and (ii) with respect to the “measures of
implementation”, the Sub-Commission incorporated the first article of Mr. Ingles’s
“proposed measures of implementation” into the draft Convention, and then separately
transmitted the remaining articles to the Commission as a “preliminary draft”. See Vol. III,
Annex 75, United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights,
Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Report of the
Sixteenth Session of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
156
3.141 Even setting that critical point aside, the UAE is wrong that Mr. Ingles’s
proposal suggests that Article 22 creates cumulative, not alternative, requirements.

3.142 The UAE focuses on Article 17 of Mr. Ingles’s “proposed measures of

implementation”. That provision reads:

“The States Parties to this Convention agree that any

State Party complained of or lodging a complaint
may, if no solution has been reached within the
terms of article 14, paragraph 1, 398 bring the case
before the International Court of Justice after the
report provided for in article 14, paragraph 3, has
been drawn up.” 399

Minorities to the Commission on H uman Rights (New York, 13 t o 31 J anuary 1964),

document E/CN.4/873 (11 February 1964), paras. 115-122; Vol. III, Annex 72, United
Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Report of the Sixteenth Session of
the Sub-Commission on P revention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to the
Commission on H uman Rights (New York, 13 t o 31 January 1964): Addendum, document
E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.345/Add.4 (30 January 1964), pp. 4-18.
398
Article 14, paragraph 1, provided: “Subject to the provisions of article 12, the Committee,
after obtaining all the information it thinks necessary, shall ascertain the facts, and make
available its good offices to the States concerned with a view to an amicable solution of the
matter on the basis of respect for the Convention”. Vol. III, Annex 71, United Nations
Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Sixteenth Session, Draft
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination: Mr.
Ingles: Proposed Measures of Implementation, document E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.321 (17 January
1964), p. 5.
399
Vol. III, Annex 71, United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human
Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,
Sixteenth Session, Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination: Mr. Ingles: Proposed Measures of Implementation, document
E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.321 (17 January 1964), p. 6.

157
3.143 The proposed Article 17 therefore applied only to complaints submitted to
the CERD Committee whereby a State Party “considers that another State party is
not giving effect to a provision of the Convention” 400. The very next article of Mr.
Ingles’s “proposed measures of implementation”, Article 18, made clear that this
would not hamper direct recourse to the Court for disputes arising out of the
interpretation or application of the Convention:

“The provisions of this Convention shall not prevent

the State Parties to the Convention from submitting
to the International Court of Justice any dispute
arising out of the interpretation or application of the
Convention in a matter within the competence of the
Committee; or from resorting to other procedures
for settling the dispute, in accordance with general
or special international agreements in force between
them.” 401

3.144 This is confirmed by Mr. Ingles’s own explanation of his “proposed

measures of implementation”, as recorded in the official summary record of the
Sub-Commission. The UAE quoted the following excerpt from the summary
record (mistakenly referring to it as the text of the proposal itself) before the Court
at the provisional measures phase:

400
Vol. III, Annex 71, United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human
Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,
Sixteenth Session, Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination: Mr. Ingles: Proposed Measures of Implementation, document
E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.321 (17 January 1964), p. 4.
401
Vol. III, Annex 71, United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human
Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,
Sixteenth Session, Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination: Mr. Ingles: Proposed Measures of Implementation, document
E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.321 (17 January 1964), p. 6 (emphasis added).

158
“Under the proposed procedure, States Parties to the
Convention should first refer complaints of failure
to comply with that instrument to the State Party
concerned; it is only when they are not satisfied
with the explanation of the State Party concerned
that they may refer their complaint to the Committee
… The Committee, as its name implied, would
ascertain the facts before attempting an amicable
solution to the dispute … If the Committee failed to
effect conciliation within the time allotted, either of
the parties may take the dispute to the International
Court.” 402

3.145 The UAE used the first ellipsis in the passage above to conceal the
following sentence: “Direct appeal to the International Court of Justice … was
also envisaged in his draft” 403. This was a clear reference to Article 18 of Mr.
Ingles’s draft. It is therefore clear that Mr. Ingles himself considered that, under
his proposal, a party’s recourse to the Committee was not intended to hamper a
“[d]irect appeal” to the Court for disputes arising out of the interpretation or
application of the Convention like this case.

3.146 In any event, even if it could be said that Mr. Ingles intended any and all
recourse to the Court to be conditioned on recourse to the CERD Committee
(quod non), the fact would remain that his proposal was ultimately rejected by the

402
CR 2018/13, p. 20, para. 8(4) (Pellet) (quoting United Nations Economic and Social Council,
Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, Sixteenth Session, Summary Record of the Four Hundred and
Twenty-Seventh Meeting (28 January 1964), document E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.427 (12 February
1964), p. 12).
403
Vol. III, Annex 79, United Nations Economic and Social Council, Commission on Human
Rights, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,
Sixteenth Session, Summary Record of the Four Hundred and Twenty-Seventh Meeting (28
January 1964), document E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.427 (12 February 1964), p. 12 (emphasis added).

159
Third Committee of the U.N. General Assembly, to which it was transmitted next.
In the deliberations in the Third Committee, the idea of compulsory recourse to
the Court after the CERD Committee was not well received 404. As a result, the
Third Committee proceeded on the basis of a text submitted by Ghana, Mauritania
and the Philippines 405, which borrowed aspects from Mr. Ingles’s “proposed
measures of implementation” 406. The text notably kept a revised version of Article
18 (labeled as Article XIII), which provided:

“The provisions of this Convention concerning the

settlement of disputes or complaints shall be applied
without prejudice to existing constitutional or other
binding provisions of agencies related to the United
Nations dealing with the settlement of disputes or
complaints in the field of discrimination, and shall
not prevent the States Parties to the Convention
from resorting to other procedures for settling a

404
See, e.g., Vol. III, Annex 86, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly,
Twentieth Session, Third Committee, 1344th Meeting (16 November 1965), document
A/C.3/SR.1344, pp. 316-317; Vol. III, Annex 87, United Nations, Official Records of the
General Assembly, Twentieth Session, Third Committee, 1345th Meeting, document
A/C.3/SR.1345 (17 November 1965), p. 327.
405
Vol. III, Annex 91, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth
Session, Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination: Report of the Third Committee, document A/6181 (18 December 1965),
para. 6.
406
Vol. III, Annex 88, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth
Session, Third Committee, Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination: Ghana, Mauritius and Philippines: articles relating to measures of
implementation to be added to the provisions of the draft International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination adopted by the Commission on Human
Rights (A/5921, annex), document A/C.3/L.1291 (18 November 1965).

160
dispute in accordance with the general or special
international agreements in force between them.” 407

3.147 This provision ultimately became Article 16 of CERD.

3.148 In conclusion, Article 17 of Mr. Ingles’s “proposed measures of

implementation” is of no assistance to the UAE because: (i) contrary to what the
UAE alleged at the oral proceedings on provisional measures, Article 22 of CERD
was not the “direct result” of Article 17 of Mr. Ingles’s proposal; (ii) Mr. Ingles’s
“proposed measures of implementation” themselves provided for direct recourse
to the Court for disputes arising out of the interpretation or application of the
Convention; and (iii) Mr. Ingles’s attempt to have recourse to the Court
conditioned on recourse to the CERD Committee for certain matters was
ultimately rejected by the Third Committee.

3.149 The UAE’s second argument in support of its theory that Article 22 creates
cumulative requirements was based on a misreading of the Court’s Judgment on
preliminary objections in Georgia v. Russian Federation. The UAE claimed that
the Judgment “supports the argument that the two conditions are cumulative” 408. It
based this argument on the Court’s observation that

“at the time when CERD was being elaborated, the

idea of submitting to the compulsory settlement of

407
Vol. III, Annex 88, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Twentieth
Session, Third Committee, Draft International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination: Ghana, Mauritius and Philippines: articles relating to measures of
implementation to be added to the provisions of the draft International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination adopted by the Commission on H uman
Rights (A/5921, annex), document A/C.3/L.1291 (18 November 1965), p. 5.
408
CR 2018/13, p. 21, para. 8(5) (Pellet).

161
disputes by the Court was not readily acceptable to a
number of States. Whilst States could make
reservations to the compulsory dispute settlement
provisions of the Convention, it is reasonable to
assume that additional limitations to resort to
judicial settlement in the form of prior negotiations
and other settlement procedures without fixed time-
limits were provided for with a view to facilitating
wider acceptance of CERD by States.” 409

3.150 This statement shows only that the ten-Judge majority considered the
preconditions to be “additional limitations to resort to judicial settlement”. This
observation was made in the context of examining the travaux for the purposes of
supporting the majority’s conclusion that Article 22 imposes preconditions to the
seisin of the Court. It therefore cannot be read as an indication that the majority
considered the requirements to be cumulative rather than alternative, particularly
since the majority expressly reserved its opinion on that issue 410. In this respect, it
should be recalled that five of the ten Judges who made up the majority had also
signed on to the joint dissenting opinion at the provisional measures stage, which
expressed the view that the CERD procedures requirement was an “alternative
precondition” 411.

409
CR 2018/13, p. 20, para. 8(5) (Pellet) (quoting Application of the International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011, para. 147 (emphasis added by the
UAE)).
410
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2011, para. 183 (“considering the factual finding that neither of these two modes of
dispute settlement was attempted by Georgia, the Court does not need to examine whether the
two preconditions are cumulative or alternative”).
411
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Joint Dissenting
162
3.151 The UAE’s third argument was that CERD “resembles some [other
universal human rights treaties] which contain compromissory clauses that also
make provision for a procedure of three steps—or more”, citing first and foremost
the Convention against Torture (“CAT”) 412.

3.152 In fact, Article 22 of CERD is very different from the dispute settlement
clause in CAT, Article 30(1) of which provides:

“Any dispute between two or more States Parties

concerning the interpretation or application of this
Convention which cannot be settled through
negotiation shall, at the request of one of them, be
submitted to arbitration. If within six months from
the date of the request for arbitration the Parties are
unable to agree on t he organization of the
arbitration, any one of those Parties may refer the
dispute to the International Court of Justice by
request in conformity with the Statute of the
Court.” 413

3.153 This language is a good example of how procedural preconditions can be

expressly stated as cumulative (and successive) requirements that must be
satisfied before recourse may be had to the Court. Indeed, the Court interpreted

Opinion of Vice-President Al-Khasawneh and J udges Ranjeva, Shi, Koroma, Tomka,

Bennouna and Skotnikov, I.C.J. Reports 2008, para. 17 (emphasis added). The five judges
from this joint dissenting opinion who were in the majority at the preliminary objections
stage were Judges Tomka, Koroma, Al-Khasawneh, Bennouna, and Skotnikov.
412
CR 2018/13, p. 21, para. 8(6) & n. 33 (Pellet).
413
Convention against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or
Punishment (concluded 10 December 1984, entered into force 26 June 1987), 1465 UNTS
85, Art. 30(1) (emphasis added).

163
the requirements of negotiations and prior attempt to arbitrate in Article 30(1) of
CAT as such in Belgium v. Senegal 414.

3.154 If anything, Article 30(1) of CAT thus provides an example of express

cumulative dispute resolution requirements in an international human rights treaty,
which stands in stark contrast to Article 22. Had the drafters intended to include a
similar requirement in CERD, they could have used a formulation similar to that
used in CAT; they did not. The UAE therefore cannot rely on Article 30(1) of
CAT to advance its argument about Article 22 of CERD. In this respect Qatar
notes that such requirements necessarily delay access to remedies for human
rights violations. If they are to apply, they should be stated explicitly, as they are
in CAT.

3.155 The UAE’s fourth and final argument that the Article 22 procedural
requirements are cumulative was that “the compulsory and successive character of
the conditions set out in Article 22 is confirmed by the Handbook on the Peaceful
Settlement of Disputes between States, published by the United Nations in
1992” 415. The Handbook states:

“the dispute settlement clauses of many multilateral

treaties provide that disputes which cannot be
settled by negotiation shall be submitted to another
peaceful settlement procedure. Various patterns of
successive steps can be found in practice …

414
Questions relating to the Obligation to Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, paras. 56-63.
415
CR 2018/13, p. 22, para. 8(7) (Pellet).

164
(e) Negotiation; procedures provided by the treaty;
resort to ICJ (art. 22 of the 1965 International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination)[.]” 416

3.156 This argument is unavailing because the Introduction to the Handbook

itself makes clear that it “is not a legal instrument” 417. The Introduction also
states: “Although drawn up on consultation with Member States, it does not
represent the views of Member States” 418. The Handbook is moreover general in
its approach, rather than focused on CERD in particular. As a result, it does not
constitute an authoritative interpretation of Article 22, and does not add anything
to the UAE’s argument.

3.157 The UAE has not put forth any credible argument that the two Article 22
requirements are cumulative. Rather, for the reasons discussed above, the only
tenable view is that the two requirements are alternative.

B. THE NEGOTIATION REQUIREMENT HAS BEEN SATISFIED

3.158 The Court has explained the content of negotiation requirements like that
stated in Article 22 of CERD on many occasions. In Georgia v. Russian

416
CR 2018/13, p. 21, para. 8(7) (Pellet) (quoting United Nations Office of Legal Affairs,
Codification Division, Handbook on the Peaceful Settlement of Disputes between States,
document OLA/COD/2394, UN Publication Sales No. E.92.V.7 (1992), para. 70 (emphasis
added by the UAE)).
417
United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, Codification Division, Handbook on the Peaceful
Settlement of Disputes between States, document OLA/COD/2394, UN Publication Sales No.
E.92.V.7 (1992), p. 1.
418
United Nations Office of Legal Affairs, Codification Division, Handbook on the Peaceful
Settlement of Disputes between States, document OLA/COD/2394, UN Publication Sales No.
E.92.V.7 (1992), p. 1.

165
Federation, the Court held that such requirements call for “at the very least … a
genuine attempt by one of the disputing parties to engage in discussions with the
other disputing party, with a view to resolving the dispute” 419. The Court added
that where “negotiations are attempted or have commenced … the precondition of
negotiation is met only when there has been a failure of negotiations, or when
negotiations have become futile or deadlocked” 420.

3.159 Article 22 thus does not require that negotiations have actually taken place.
As the Court stated, the requirement may be satisfied by a genuine attempt by one
of the disputing parties to engage in discussions with the other disputing party
with a view to resolving the dispute even if that attempt fails or becomes futile 421.

3.160 A negotiation requirement can also be discharged when a disputing party

is confronted with an “immediate and total refusal” to negotiate on the other side.
Such a blanket refusal plainly excludes any possibility for an amicable settlement.

419
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2011, para. 157 (emphasis added).
420
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2011, para. 159 (emphasis added) (citing to Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions
(Greece v. Great Britain), Jurisdiction, Judgment, PCIJ Reports 1924, Series A, No. 2, p. 13;
South West Africa (Ethiopia v. South Africa; Liberia v. South Africa), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1962, pp. 345-346; United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1980,
para. 51; Applicability of the Obligation to Arbitrate under Section 21 of the United Nations
Headquarters Agreement of 26 June 1947, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 1988, para. 55).
421
“[W]hether negotiations ... have taken place, and whether they have failed or become futile or
deadlocked, are essentially questions of fact ‘for consideration in each case’”. (Application of
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011,
para. 160 (quoting Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions, Jurisdiction, Judgment, P.C.I.J.
Reports 1924, Series A, No. 2, p. 13)).

166
This was precisely the situation in United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran. In that case, the Court held that the Iranian Government’s “refusal … to
enter into any discussion on the matter” despite the United States’ protests was
sufficient to discharge the negotiation requirement under Article XXI, paragraph 2
of the Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights between the
United States and Iran 422. Indeed, the Court’s Judgment makes no mention of any
attempts by the United States to negotiate after its efforts to make its views known
to Iran were rebuffed 423.

3.161 This result makes perfect sense. A contrary rule would mean that one party
to a dispute would always be able to frustrate the other’s access to a dispute
settlement mechanism conditioned on negotiations merely by refusing to engage
with it.

3.162 In addition to making good practical sense, this result is also consistent
with what is expected of States when they negotiate. In the North Sea Continental
Shelf cases, the Court explained that:

422
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1980, para. 51. Article XXI, paragraph 2 reads: “Any dispute
between the High Contracting Parties as to the interpretation or application of the present
Treaty, not satisfactorily adjusted by diplomacy, shall be submitted to the International Court
of Justice, unless the High Contracting Parties agree to settlement by some other pacific
means”. The text of this provision is reproduced in United States Diplomatic and Consular
Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1980, para. 51.
The Court does not differentiate between the requirement in Article XXI, paragraph 2 and
other negotiation requirements found in treaties. See Application of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian
Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2011, para. 133.
423
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1980, para. 47; see also ibid., para. 48.

167
“parties are under an obligation to enter into
negotiations with a view to arriving at an agreement,
and not merely to go through a formal process of
negotiation as a sort of prior condition for the
automatic application of a certain method of
delimitation in the absence of agreement; they are
under an obl igation so to conduct themselves that
the negotiations are meaningful, which will not be
the case when either of them insists upon its own
position without contemplating any modification of
it …” 424

3.163 If a State refuses even to come to the negotiation table, still less with the
open mind that international law requires, there is obviously no chance for
meaningful exchanges and no chance that the dispute can be resolved by
negotiation.

3.164 As for the negotiation itself, the Court has made clear that it “has come to
accept less formalism in what can be considered negotiations” 425. In Mavrommatis
Palestine Concessions, the Court’s predecessor held:

“Negotiations do not of necessity always presuppose

a more or less lengthy series of notes and
despatches; it may suffice that a discussion should
have been commenced, and this discussion may
have been very short; this will be the case if a dead
lock is reached, or if finally a point is reached at
which one of the Parties definitely declares himself
unable, or refuses, to give way, and there can

424
North Sea Continental Shelf (Germany/Denmark; Germany/Netherlands), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1969, para. 85(a) (emphasis added).
425
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2011, para. 160.

168
therefore be no doubt that the dispute cannot be
settled by diplomatic negotiation.” 426

3.165 Finally, it is important to note that, in Georgia v. Russian Federation, the

Court held that for the negotiation requirement to be satisfied:

“it is not necessary that a State must expressly refer

to a specific treaty in its exchanges with the other
State to enable it later to invoke that instrument
before the Court …. [T]he exchanges must refer to
the subject-matter of the treaty with sufficient
clarity to enable the State against which a claim is
made to identify that there is, or may be, a dispute
with regard to that subject-matter.” 427

3.166 In this case, Qatar plainly attempted—on multiple occasions—to negotiate

with the UAE regarding the subject-matter of the dispute, but those attempts failed
because the UAE at all times refused to negotiate with Qatar, including with
respect to the Parties’ dispute under CERD.

3.167 As recounted above 428, on 5 June 2017, the UAE announced, without prior
notice, that it was “sever[ing] all relations with the State of Qatar, including
breaking off diplomatic relations, and [was giving] Qatari diplomats 48 hours to

426
Mavrommatis Palestine Concessions (Greece v. Great Britain), Jurisdiction, Judgment,
P.C.I.J. Reports 1924, Series A, No. 2, p. 13. The Court continued: “But it is equally true that
if the diplomatic negotiations between the Governments commence at the point where the
previous discussions left off, it may well happen that the nature of the latter was such as to
render superfluous renewed discussion of the opposing contentions in which the dispute
originated. No general and absolute rule can be laid down in this respect. It is a matter for
consideration in each case”. Ibid.
427
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2011, para. 30 (emphasis added).
428
See Chap. II, Section II.A, above.

169
leave the UAE” 429. The UAE closed Qatar’s embassy in Abu Dhabi and expelled
Qatar’s diplomats, and closed its own embassy in Doha and withdrew its
diplomats. It simultaneously closed all air, sea and land routes between Qatar and
the UAE.

3.168 The message from the UAE was clear from the outset: it had no interest in
talking, let alone negotiating, with Qatar on any front, including with respect to
the UAE’s Discriminatory Measures.

3.169 That message was soon made explicit. Just two days after the imposition
of the Discriminatory Measures, the Minister of State for Foreign Affairs of the
UAE stated that there was “nothing to negotiate” with Qatar 430. Then, as discussed
above 431, on 22 June 2017, the UAE, along with Bahrain, Egypt and Saudi Arabia,
issued the so-called Thirteen Demands 432. These were considered an absolute
precondition to any dialogue relating to the withdrawal of the Discriminatory
Measures and included demands that Qatar “[c]urb diplomatic ties with Iran”;
“shut down al-Jazeera and its affiliate stations”; “terminate the Turkish military
presence in Qatar”; and “align itself with the other Gulf and Arab countries

429
Vol. II, Annex 1, UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UAE supports statements of Kingdom of
Bahrain and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on Qatar (5 June 2017).
430
Jon Gambrell, “Emirati diplomat to AP: ‘Nothing to negotiate’ with Qatar”, Associated Press
(7 June 2017), [Link]
431
See Chap. II, Sect. III, above.
432
“Arab states send Qatar 13 demands to end crisis, official says”, Reuters (23 June 2017),
[Link]
end-crisis-official-says-idUSL8N1JK07H; “Qatar crisis: What you need to know”, BBC (19
July 2017), [Link]

170
militarily, politically, socially and economically” 433. Qatar was also instructed to
“[a]gree to all the demands within 10 days”, and “[c]onsent to monthly audits in
the first year after agreeing to the demands, then once per quarter during the
second year [and] [f]or the following 10 years, Qatar would be monitored
annually for compliance.” 434

3.170 Qatar considered the Thirteen Demands to be patently unreasonable 435. It

was not alone. The Secretary of State of the United States publicly stated that the
demands were “difficult to meet” 436 and urged the UAE and the other States to be
“reasonable” 437. The United Kingdom’s Foreign Secretary similarly suggested that

433
Patrick Wintour, “Qatar given 10 days to meet 13 sweeping demands by Saudi Arabia”, The
Guardian (23 June 2017), [Link]
saudi-arabia-issues-qatar-with-13-demands-to-end-blockade.
434
Patrick Wintour, “Qatar given 10 days to meet 13 sweeping demands by Saudi Arabia”, The
Guardian (23 June 2017), [Link]
saudi-arabia-issues-qatar-with-13-demands-to-end-blockade.
435
Vol. II, Annex 57, Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Qatari, German Foreign Ministers:
Dialogue Only Option to Resolve Crisis (4 July 2017), [Link]
news/details/2017/07/04/qatari-german-foreign-ministers-dialogue-only-option-to-resolve-
crises.
436
“Qatar demands difficult to meet, says US”, BBC (25 June 2017), [Link]
[Link]/news/world-middle-east-40399770.
437
“Qatar demands difficult to meet, says US”, BBC (25 June 2017), [Link]
[Link]/news/world-middle-east-40399770.

171
the demands were not “realistic” 438. And the German Foreign Ministry
characterized them as “very provocative” 439.

3.171 On 27 June 2017, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia

confirmed, on behalf of all four discriminating States, that the 13 Demands were
“non-negotiable”. 440 He added:

“It’s very simple. We made our point. We took our

steps and it’s up to the Qataris to amend their
behaviour. Once they do, things will be worked out.
But if they don’t, they will remain isolated. … If
Qatar wants to come back into the [Gulf
Cooperation Council] pool, they know what they
have to do.” 441

3.172 The same day, the UAE’s Ambassador to the Russian Federation
explained what would happen if Qatar did not capitulate to the Thirteen Demands
within the ten days they gave it: “[W]e’d no longer be interested in bringing Qatar
back into the Gulf and the Arab fold” 442.

438
“Qatar demands difficult to meet, says US”, BBC (25 June 2017),
[Link]
439
“Saudi demands from Qatar “very provocative”: Germany”, Reuters (26 June 2017),
[Link]
ocative-germany-idUSKBN19H2A3.
440
“Qatar condemns Saudi refusal to negotiate over demands”, BBC (28 June 2017),
[Link]
441
“Qatar condemns Saudi refusal to negotiate over demands”, BBC (28 June 2017),
[Link]
442
Frank Gardner, “Qatar facing indefinite isolation, UAE says”, BBC (27 June 2017),
[Link]

172
3.173 The following day, the UAE’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs
expressly reiterated what the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Saudi Arabia had said
the day before: “Our demands on Qatar are non-negotiable” 443.

3.174 It is unclear to Qatar how the UAE can in good faith take the view that
Qatar failed to discharge its obligation to negotiate when the UAE itself, after
severing diplomatic relations, took the view that there was “nothing to negotiate”
unless Qatar adhered to its demands, which themselves were “non-negotiable”. A
fortiori, just as it did in the Hostages case, the Court can find the negotiation
requirement satisfied even without examining the details of Qatar’s specific
attempts to negotiate.

3.175 That said, the record shows that in spite of the severance of all diplomatic
channels of communication and the UAE’s refusal to negotiate short of Qatar’s
capitulation to its demands, Qatar repeatedly and publicly asserted its openness to
dialogue and negotiation 444.

443
Naser Al Wasmi, “UAE and Saudi put pressure on Qatar ahead of demands deadline”, The
National (28 June 2017), [Link]
qatar-ahead-of-demands-deadline-1.92119.
444
Vol. II, Annex 53, Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister ‘Willing to Talk’ to
Resolve Diplomatic Crisis (6 June 2017) [Link]
news/details/2017/06/06/foreign-minister-qatar-'willing-to-talk'-to-resolve-diplomatic-crisis;
Vol. II, Annex 54, Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister: Qatar Committed to
Approach of Dialogue in Resolving Differences with Neighboring Countries (10 June 2017)
[Link]
committed-to-approach-of-dialogue-in-resolving-differences-with; Vol. II, Annex 55, Qatar
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister: Qatar Focuses on Sol ving Humanitarian
Problems of Illegal Siege (12 June 2017) [Link]
news/details/2017/06/12/foreign-minister-qatar-focuses-on-solving-humanitarian-problems-
of-illegal-siege; “Qatar condemns Saudi refusal to negotiate over demands”, BBC (28 June
2017), [Link] Vol. VI, Annex 152, “Emir
of Qatar calls for negotiations to ease Gulf boycott”, The Independent (21 July 2017)
173
3.176 As one of many examples, on 22 July 2017, H.H. the Amir of Qatar
delivered his first public address following the imposition of the Discriminatory
Measures, in which he expressly stated that Qatar is “ready for dialogue and for
reaching settlements on all contentious issues in this context” 445. In response, the
UAE’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs reiterated that the UAE would not
engage in dialogue with Qatar until it acceded to the 13 Demands 446.

[Link]
[Link]; Vol. II, Annex
58, Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Qatar Committed to Dialogue to Solve GCC Crisis-
Ambassador to Austria (25 July 2017) [Link]
news/details/2017/07/26/qatar-committed-to-dialogue-to-solve-gcc-crisis---ambassador-to-
austria; Vol. II, Annex 59, Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister: No Response
from Siege Countries to US Proposals on Crisis (27 July 2017)
[Link]
from-siege-countries-to-us-proposals-on-the-crisis; Vol. II, Annex 61, Qatar Ministry of
Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister Reiterates: Qatar Welcomes Any Effort Supports Kuwait
Mediation to Resolve Gulf Crisis (30 August 2017) [Link]
news/details/2017/08/30/foreign-minister-reiterates-qatar-welcomes-any-effort-supports-
kuwaiti-mediation-to-resolve-gulf-crisis; Vol. II, Annex 63, United Nations General
Assembly, General Debate at the 72nd Session: Address by HH Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al
Thani, Amir of the State of Qatar (19 September 2017), [Link]
(certified translation); “Tillerson Faults Saudi-Led Bloc for Failing to End Qatar Crisis”
Bloomberg (19 October 2017) [Link]
19/tillerson-faults-saudi-led-bloc-for-failing-to-end-qatar-crisis-j8yqqibp; Vol. II, Annex 65,
Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister: Qatar Sees Any GCC Meeting Golden
Opportunity for Civilized Dialogue (22 October 2017) [Link]
news/details/2017/10/22/foreign-minister-qatar-sees-any-gcc-meeting-golden-opportunity-
for-civilized-dialogue; Vol. II, Annex 66, Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Foreign
Minister Stresses Qatar’s Commitment to Resolving GCC Crisis (18 November 2017)
[Link]
qatar's-commitment-to-resolving-gcc-crisis.
445
“Emir speech in full text: Qatar ready for dialogue but won’t compromise on sovereignty”,
The Peninsula (22 July 2017), [Link]
in-full-text-Qatar-ready-for-dialogue-but-won%E2%80%99t-compromise-on-sovereignty.
446
“UAE minister: no dialogue with Qatar until it revises policies”, Reuters (22 July 2017),
[Link]

174
3.177 On 30 July 2017, the UAE, along with Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Bahrain
reaffirmed this position 447. As stated by the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Saudi
Arabia, “there is no negotiation over the 13 demands” 448.

3.178 On 11 September 2017, Qatar’s Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of

Foreign Affairs stated before the Human Rights Council that Qatar was ready to
enter dialogue to settle the dispute over the Discriminatory Measures 449. Then, on
19 September 2017, H.H. the Amir of Qatar spoke before the United Nations
General Assembly, saying:

“[W]e have taken an open attitude towards dialogue

without dictation, and have expressed our readiness
to resolve differences through compromises based
on common undertakings. Resolving conflicts by
peaceful means is actually one of the priorities of
our foreign policy. From here, I renew the call for
an unconditional dialogue based on mutual respect
for sovereignty and I highly value the sincere and
appreciated mediation that the State of Qatar has
supported since the outbreak of the crisis, and which
was initiated by my brother, His Highness Sheikh

447
“Four Arab countries say they are ready for Qatar dialogue with conditions”, Reuters (30 July
2017), available at [Link]
F03T.
448
“Foreign Ministers of Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE and Egypt: Measures taken against Qatar
are sovereign, and we all are negatively impacted when terrorism and extremism become
stronger”, MENAFN (30 July 2017), [Link]
cache:fok0LkFJiVsJ:[Link]/1095672454/Foreign-Ministers-of-Saudi-Arabia-Bah
rain-UAE-and-Egypt-Measures-taken-against-Qatar-are-sovereign-and-we-all-are-negatively
-impacted-when-terrorism-and-extremism-become-stronger%3Fsrc%3DRSS+&cd=1&hl=en
&ct=clnk&gl=qa&lr=lang_en%7Clang_fr.
449
Vol. II, Annex 62, Permanent Mission of the State of Qatar to the United Nations Office in
Geneva – Switzerland, HE the Foreign Minister delivers a statement before the 36th Session
of the Human Rights Council (11 September 2017).

175
Sabah Al-Ahmad Al-Jaber Al-Sabah, the Emir of
the sisterly State of Kuwait. I also thank all the
countries that have supported this mediation.” 450

3.179 Although the UAE could have exercised its right to reply to Qatar’s
address (as Qatar did with respect to the UAE’s address 451), the UAE remained
silent 452.

3.180 The pattern continued at the annual GCC Summit in Kuwait in December
2017. GCC members typically send their Heads of State or Government to the
Summit. Qatar therefore viewed it as a “golden opportunity” to negotiate with the
UAE, as stated by the Qatari Foreign Minister at the time.453 Expressly included
on the list of subjects for talks was the “bad humanitarian situation … such as
separation of families”, the very subject-matter of the dispute now before the
Court 454. Kuwait too hoped that the Summit would give the leaders of Qatar and
the UAE the opportunity to meet face-to-face 455.

450
Vol. II, Annex 63, United Nations General Assembly, General Debate at the 72nd Session:
Address by HH Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani, Amir of the State of Qatar (19
September 2017), [Link] (certified translation), p. 4.
451
See Vol. II, Annex 63, United Nations General Assembly, General Debate at the 72nd
Session: Address by HH Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani, Amir of the State of Qatar (19
September 2017), [Link] (certified translation)
452
See Vol. II, Annex 24, United Nations General Assembly, General Debate at the 72nd
Session: Address by HH Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan, Minister for Foreign Affairs
of the United Arab Emirates, [Link]
453
Vol. II, Annex 65, Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Qatar, “Foreign Minister: Qatar Sees Any
GCC Meeting Golden Opportunity for Civilized Dialogue” (22 October 2017),
[Link]
any-gcc-meeting-golden-opportunity-for-civilized-dialogue.
454
Vol. II, Annex 65, Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister: Qatar Sees Any
GCC Meeting Golden Opportunity for Civilized Dialogue (22 October 2017),
176
3.181 Qatar was again disappointed. H.H. the Amir of Qatar traveled to Kuwait
to attend the Summit, which H.H. the Emir of Kuwait also attended 456. But neither
the UAE nor any of the other Quartet States sent their Heads of State 457. Although
the Summit was initially supposed to last two days, it was called to an end within
hours. Qatar’s overture was rebuffed and the “golden opportunity” was lost.

3.182 Subsequent efforts similarly failed to bear fruit and only served to
illustrate the existence of deadlock. In February 2018, Qatar’s Deputy Prime
Minister and Minister for Foreign Affairs once again addressed the Human Rights
Council, noting the many human rights violations against the Qatari people 458. In
response, the Permanent Representative of the UAE, while nominally
acknowledging that the crisis “must be resolved within the framework of the
existing Kuwaiti mediation efforts”, stated that the UAE would “continue to

[Link]
any-gcc-meeting-golden-opportunity-for-civilized-dialogue.
455
Ahmed Hagagy, “Gulf rulers boycotting Qatar skip annual summit”, Reuters (5 December
2017), [Link]
skip-annual-summit-idUSKBN1DZ15U.
456
Ahmed Hagagy, “Gulf rulers boycotting Qatar skip annual summit”, Reuters (5 December
2017), [Link]
skip-annual-summit-idUSKBN1DZ15U.
457
Ahmed Hagagy, “Gulf rulers boycotting Qatar skip annual summit”, Reuters (5 December
2017), [Link]
skip-annual-summit-idUSKBN1DZ15U.
458
Vol. II, Annex 67, Permanent Mission of the State of Qatar to the United Nations Office in
Geneva – Switzerland, Statement of HE Deputy Prime Minister of Foreigh Affairs ta the 37th
Human Rights Council (25 February 2018) [Link]
/02/28/statement-of-he-deputy-prime-minister-of-foreigh-affairs-ta-the-37th-human-rights-
council .

177
exercise [its] sovereign right to boycott the Government of Qatar”, showing once
again that the UAE was not willing to reconsider its position459.

3.183 In April 2018, there was an Arab League summit to which the Permanent
Representative of Qatar traveled hoping to discuss all issues—obviously including
the human rights issues—implicated in the Gulf crisis 460. Even before his arrival,
however, the UAE and other States involved decided that the crisis would not be
on the agenda. To the contrary, they insisted that any solution would have to take
place under the auspices of the GCC 461.

3.184 The irony will not be lost on the Court: at the Arab League Summit, the
UAE insisted that the dispute be settled in the GCC; yet at the GCC Summit, the
UAE refused even to attend.

3.185 Despite the UAE’s unyielding intransigence, on 25 April 2018, Qatar took
the step of formally requesting negotiations to address its grievances under
CERD 462. Qatar’s Minister of State for Foreign Affairs sent to his counterpart in
the UAE a communication that the transmittal letter described as an “invitation to

459
Vol. II, Annex 26, “Arab Quartet responds to Qatar’s remarks at the UN Human Rights
Council”, Al Arabiya English (28 February 2018).
460
See Nawal Sayed, “6 Arab leaders absent from 29th Summit, Syria not on table”, Egypt
Today (15 April 2018), [Link]
from-29th-Summit-Syria-not-on.
461
See “Saudi FM says Qatar crisis not on the table at Arab League Summit”, Baghdad Post (13
April 2018), [Link]
not-on-the-table-at-Arab-League-summit.
462
Vol. II, Annex 68, Request for Negotiation from the Permanent Delegation of the State of
Qatar to the United Nations in Geneva to the Emirati Minister of State for Foeign Affairs (25
April 2018) (certified translation).

178
negotiate” 463. The Minister expressly referred to the specific provisions of the
Convention implicated by the UAE’s actions, and called on the UAE “to enter into
negotiations in order to resolve these violations and the effects thereof” 464. The
UAE never even bothered to reply to Qatar’s invitation.

3.186 At the hearing on provisional measures, the UAE attempted to dismiss all
of the aforementioned events, with the exception of the invitation to negotiate, on
the ostensible grounds that the attempted negotiations did not concern violations
of CERD 465. While it may be true that Qatar did not expressly invoke the
Convention each and every time, the Court has, as explained above, made clear
that that is not necessary to satisfy the negotiation requirement 466. On multiple
occasions, Qatar invoked the underlying subject-matter of the dispute.

3.187 Every step of the way, Qatar sought negotiations with the UAE without
any preconditions on its part. And every step of the way, the UAE refused to talk
on any issue. Its refusal to negotiate on any subject necessarily entailed a refusal
to negotiate on the issues of discrimination under CERD. Moreover, as discussed
above, there were occasions when Qatar specifically attempted to engage with the

463
Vol. II, Annex 68, Request for Negotiation from the Permanent Delegation of the State of
Qatar to the United Nations in Geneva to the Emirati Minister of State for Foeign Affairs (25
April 2018) (certified translation).
464
Vol. II, Annex 68, Request for Negotiation from the Permanent Delegation of the State of
Qatar to the United Nations in Geneva to the Emirati Minister of State for Foeign Affairs (25
April 2018) (certified translation).
465
CR 2018/13, p. 23, para. 12 (Pellet).
466
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2011, para. 30.

179
UAE on the human rights matters that are the subject of this case. Those efforts
too met with refusal. Article 22 can require nothing more.

3.188 At the hearing on provisional measures, the UAE also tried to discredit
Qatar’s invitation to negotiate by arguing that it was not made in good faith. The
UAE sought solace in the fact that Qatar had, on 8 March 2018, sent a
communication to the CERD Committee under Article 11 of CERD and, on 11
June 2018, submitted its Application instituting proceedings before the Court
without waiting for the outcome of the Article 11 procedure 467.

3.189 But these acts show only that Qatar was looking for any and all possible
ways to settle the dispute. They cannot and do not in any way undermine the good
faith character of the invitation to negotiate. Once again, Qatar cannot help but
observe the irony of the UAE claiming that it was Qatar’s invitation that was not
made in good faith even as it has persistently refused to even consider negotiating
with Qatar until all of its demands are met. Qatar, on the other hand, has
repeatedly reiterated its openness for dialogue.

3.190 In light of Qatar’s 25 April 2018 communication to the UAE, the Court
stated in its Order on provisional measures that:

“… the letter contained an offer by Qatar to

negotiate with the UAE with regard to the latter’s
compliance with its substantive obligations under
CERD. In the light of the foregoing, and given the
fact that the UAE did not respond to that formal
invitation to negotiate, the Court is of the view that
the issues raised in the present case had not been

467
CR 2018/13, pp. 24-25, para. 16 (Pellet); CR 2018/15, p. 14, para. 12 (Pellet).

180
resolved by negotiations at the time of the filing of
the Application.” 468

3.191 On this record, there can be no question that Qatar has genuinely
attempted to negotiate with the UAE regarding the dispute before the Court. It
repeatedly called for negotiations to address the violations in a wide variety of
fora and the UAE has never responded, except to say that there is nothing to
negotiate. The negotiation requirement under Article 22 is plainly satisfied.

3.192 To conclude this section, the dispute “is not settled” for the purposes of
Article 22 since the two requirements therein are alternative, and Qatar satisfied
the negotiation requirement.

468
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order, I.C.J.
Reports 2008, para. 38.

181
182
CHAPTER IV
QATAR’S CLAIMS ARE ADMISSIBLE

4.1 At the hearing on provisional measures, the UAE objected to the Court’s
competence to indicate provisional measures by alleging that (i) Qatar “ha[d] not
shown and cannot show that domestic remedies were exhausted prior to the
institution of proceedings” 469; and (ii) the institution of proceedings was
“incompatible with both the electa una v ia principle and the lis pendens
exception, since the same claim ha[d] been submitted in turn to two organs by the
same applicant against the same respondent” 470.

4.2 The Court rejected these arguments in its Order on Provisional

Measures 471. Because its determinations were without prejudice to the merits,
however, the Order left “unaffected the right of the Governments of Qatar and the
UAE to submit arguments”, at a later date, in respect of “any questions relating to

469
CR 2018/13, p. 28, para. 1 (Treves).
470
At the hearing on provisional measures, the UAE raised this objection to the Court’s
competence to indicate provisional measures in the context of discussing the Court’s
jurisdiction. See CR 2018/13, p. 19, para. 23 (Pellet). Qatar nonetheless submits that the
objection in reality concerns the admissibility of Qatar’s claims, as belatedly recognized by
the UAE in the context of a similar objection raised before the CERD Committee. See, e.g.,
Vol. IV, Annex 118, State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates, ICERD-ISC-2018/2,
Supplemental Response of the United Arab Emirates (29 November 2018), paras. 74–75
(framing its lis pendens and electa una via arguments as concerning the admissibility of
Qatar’s claims rather than the CERD Committee’s jurisdiction over them).
471
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Order, I.C.J.
Reports 2018, paras. 39, 42.

183
the admissibility of the Application” 472. In the sections that follow, Qatar will
show why the Court’s conclusion stands.

Section I. THE LOCAL REMEDIES RULE DOES NOT BAR QATAR’S CLAIMS

4.3 At the hearing on provisional measures, the UAE argued that the local
remedies rule bars Qatar’s claims as a matter of general international law 473. The
UAE is mistaken. In fact, as explained below, the local remedies rule does not
even apply to Qatar’s claims (Section I.A). But even if it did, the UAE has failed
to discharge its burden of proving that there are any effective and reasonably
available remedies that have not been exhausted (Section I.B).

A. The Local Remedies Rule Does Not Apply to Qatar’s Claims

4.4 The analytical starting point for determining whether the local remedies
rule applies to Qatar’s claims is the text of Article 22 of the CERD, the title of
jurisdiction in this case.

4.5 Article 22 does not state that the local remedies rule applies to a “dispute
between two or more States Parties with respect to the interpretation or application
of this Convention”474. Qatar recognizes that this, by itself, is not determinative.
In the ELSI case, a Chamber of the Court held that silence in a jurisdictional
clause with respect to the local remedies rule does not, without more, render it

472
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Order, I.C.J.
Reports 2018, para. 78.
473
CR 2018/13, pp. 28–35, paras. 1–26 (Treves).
474
Vol. III, Annex 92, CERD, Art. 22.

184
inapplicable. The Chamber held that it was “unable to accept that an important
principle of customary international law should be held to have been tacitly
dispensed with, in the absence of any words making clear an intention to do
so” 475. This case is different from ELSI, however. While no such words existed in
the applicable treaty in that case, they do exist here.

4.6 Article 22’s silence on the exhaustion issue stands in contrast to Articles
11(3) and 14(7), which expressly make the exhaustion of “all available domestic
remedies” a condition of the CERD Committee’s power to consider an inter-State
or individual complaint. This is significant; the Court has previously held that the
presence of a term in one part of a treaty, combined with its absence in another,
suggests that the omission was intentional.

4.7 In the Frontier Dispute between Burkina Faso and Niger, for example, the
Court noted that the instrument at issue twice specified that specific points along
the boundary between Burkina Faso and Niger were to be connected by a “straight
line” 476. The Court considered that the use of this express language in two parts of
the instrument was evidence that the same “straight line” requirement should not
automatically be read into another part of the instrument that contained no such

475
Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States v. Italy), Judgment I.C.J. Reports 1989,mpara.
50.
476
Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Niger), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2013, para. 88; ibid.,
Separate Opinion of Judge Ad Hoc Daudet, I.C.J. Reports 2013, para. 116.

185
language 477. In Military and Paramilitary Activities, the Court applied the same
logic even when comparing the provisions of two different treaties 478.

4.8 Similar logic has been applied in numerous other cases by other
international courts and tribunals 479. It also applies here. The fact that Articles
11(3) and 14(7) expressly require that “all available domestic remedies” be
exhausted while Article 22 does not, plainly suggests that no such requirement
was intended for disputes falling within the scope of the latter provision.

4.9 In any event, even if the local remedies rule could be read into Article 22
(quod non), it still would not apply in the circumstances of this case for at least
two reasons.

4.10 First, the UAE’s Discriminatory Measures constitute a systematic,

generalized policy and practice that has caused, and continues to cause,
widespread violations of the CERD. 480 Under generally recognized principles of

477
Frontier Dispute (Burkina Faso/Niger), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2013, paras. 87–88.
478
See, e.g., Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United
States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, para. 222.
479
See, e.g., Provident Mutual Life Insurance Company and Others (United States) v. Germany
(Life-Insurance Claims), Award of 18 September 1924, 7 United Nations, Reports of
International Arbitral Awards (RIAA) 111 (1924); Tokios Tokeles v. Ukraine, ICSID Case
No. ARB/02/18, Decision on Jurisdiction (29 April 2014) (Weil, Bernardini, Price), para. 30;
Prosecutor v. Duško Tadič, ICTY Case No. IT-94-1-A, Judgment (Appeals Chamber, 15
July, 1999), paras. 283–284, 305; World Trade Organization, European Communities and Its
Member States – Tariff Treatment of Certain Information Technology Products, Report of the
Panel, documents WT/DS375/R, WT/DS376/R, WT/DS377/R (16 August 2016), para.
7.517.
480
See para. 4.18, n. 496; para. 4.20, below.

186
international law, there is no need to exhaust local remedies in cases involving
breaches of this nature. 481

4.11 Second, Qatar is making claims in its own right that are interdependent
with its claims brought on behalf of its nationals. 482 Qatar’s claims are also
preponderantly based on direct injury to it, not its nationals. 483 There is no need to
exhaust domestic remedies in cases involving “mixed” claims of either kind. 484

4.12 Each of these reasons confirms the conclusion that the local remedies rule
does not apply in this case and is discussed in turn below.

1. The Local Remedies Rule Does Not Apply in Circumstances of Widespread

Harm or Generalized State Policies and Practices

4.13 In no case, before any court or body in any jurisdiction, has the local
remedies rule been applied in circumstances involving widespread and systematic
harms like those before the Court. There is no reason why this case should be
different.

4.14 To insist on an assessment of the availability and effectiveness of local

remedies in cases of widespread and systematic harm would erect an
insurmountable hurdle. Quite reasonably, the Court has only applied the local
remedies rule when the claims involved a discrete number of easily identifiable

481
See paras. 4.13-4.20, below.
482
See paras. 4.21-4.26, below.
483
See paras. 4.27-4.30, below.
484
See para. 4.31, below.

187
individuals 485. By contrast, the local remedies rule has not been applied—and has
repeatedly not even been mentioned by litigant States—in cases involving, in the
words of counsel for the UAE at the hearing on provisional measures, “a high
number of persons” 486.

4.15 Thus, in Georgia v. Russian Federation—a case also involving the

CERD—Georgia argued that Russia had committed violations of the CERD
against the entire “ethnic Georgian, Greek and Jewish populations in South
Ossetia and Abkhazia” 487. Yet even though Georgia had explicitly brought claims
“as parens patriae for its citizens” 488, just like Qatar is doing in this case489,

485
See, e.g., Interhandel case (Switzerland v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1959, p. 29 (finding that “one interest, and o ne alone, that of Interhandel […]
induced the Swiss Government to institute international proceedings.”) (emphasis added);
Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United States v. Italy), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1989, para.
52 (noting that “the matter which colours and pervades the United States claim as a whole, is
the alleged damage to Raytheon and Machlett [two U.S. companies]”) (emphasis added); see
also Ahmadou Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, para. 35.
486
CR 2018/15, p. 18, para. 12 (Treves).
487
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2011, para. 16.
488
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2011, para. 16 (emphasis added).
489
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Application Instituting Proceedings, I.C.J.
Reports 2018, para. 65.

188
Russia did not even argue that Georgian citizens had failed to exhaust local
remedies. Nor did the Court raise the issue proprio motu 490.

4.16 Similarly, in the Case Concerning Armed Activities on the Territory of the
Congo, the Democratic Republic of the Congo accused Rwanda of “massive,
serious and flagrant violations of human rights” under several treaties, including
the CERD 491. Admissibility and jurisdiction were vigorously contested. Yet
neither the parties nor the Court raised the local remedies rule 492.

4.17 Human rights bodies similarly “attach different consequences to

systematic breaches, e.g., in terms of the non-applicability of the rule of

490
The Court has made clear that it “must first take up, proprio motu, any preliminary question,
whether of admissibility or of jurisdiction”, that “might constitute a bar to any further
examination of the merits of the Applicant's case”. See, e.g., United States Diplomatic and
Consular Staff in Tehran (United State of America v. Islamic Republic of Iran), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1980, para. 33 (emphasis added).
491
Armed Activities on t he Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002) (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility of the
Application, I.C.J. Reports 2006, para. 1.
492
See generally Armed Activities on the Territory of the Congo (New Application: 2002)
(Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Rwanda), Jurisdiction of the Court and Admissibility
of the Application, I.C.J. Reports 2006. Cases before the Court not involving the CERD but
involving widespread violations of human rights recognized in other treaties confirm the
inapplicability of the local remedies rule in the circumstances of this case. By way of just one
example, in Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, Bosnia and Herzegovina alleged that Yugoslavia had violated numerous
obligations “toward the People and state of Bosnia and Herzegovina”. Application of the
Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and
Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996,
para. 13. Yugoslavia did not argue that all of the “People” of Bosnia and Herzegovina needed
to first exhaust local remedies before the State could raise claims under the Genocide
Convention. See generally, Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment
of the Crime of Genocide (Bosnia and Herzegovina v. Yugoslavia), Preliminary Objections,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1996. Nor did the Court require such showing.

189
exhaustion of local remedies” 493. In Republic of Ireland v. United Kingdom, for
example, the ECtHR noted:

“A practice incompatible with the Convention

consists of an accumulation of identical or
analogous breaches which are sufficiently numerous
and inter-connected to amount not merely to
isolated incidents or exceptions but to a pattern or
system … The concept of practice is of particular
importance for the operation of the rule of
exhaustion of domestic remedies … [I]n principle,
the rule does not apply where the applicant State
complains of a pr actice as such, with the aim of
preventing its continuation or recurrence, but does
not ask the Commission or the Court to give a
decision on each of the cases put forward as proof
or illustrations of that practice” 494.

4.18 Both the ECtHR and the now-defunct European Commission of Human
Rights have applied this exception to the local remedies rule on multiple
occasions 495, including in a case—analogous to this one—arising from “a

493
Commentary to Art. 40, International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of
States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Yearbook of the International Law Commission
2001, Vol. II (Part Two), p. 113 (“when reacting against breaches of international law, States
have often stressed their systematic, gross or egregious nature. Similarly, international
complaint procedures, for example in the field of human rights, attach different consequences
to systematic breaches, e.g. in terms of the non-applicability of the rule of exhaustion of local
remedies.”) (emphasis added).
494
ECtHR, Case of Ireland v. United Kingdom, Application No. 5130/71, Judgment (18 January
1978), para. 159 (emphasis added).
495
See, e.g., ECtHR, Greece v. United Kingdom, Application No. 176/56, Decision on
Admissibility (2 June 1956) (“the provision of Article 26 concerning the exhaustion of
domestic remedies according to the generally recognised rules of international law does not
apply to the present application, the scope of which is to determine the compatibility with the
Convention of … administrative practices in Cyprus”) (emphasis added).

190
coordinated policy” of “expelling [foreign] nationals” from the territory of the
respondent State 496.

4.19 The Inter-American Commission of Human Rights has similarly found the
local remedies rule inapplicable “in cases in which the existence of a generalized
practice is alleged”, reasoning that “[t]he mechanisms established for examining
isolated instances of alleged violations” are ill-suited “for responding effectively
to cases where it is claimed that the alleged violations occur as part of a
generalized practice” 497.

4.20 It cannot be disputed that the UAE’s Discriminatory Measures complained

of were undertaken as part of a policy ordered and coordinated at the highest
levels of government. It also cannot be disputed that these Measures represent a
generalized policy and practice that has affected all Qataris. Consistent with the

496
ECtHR, Case of Georgia v. Russian Federation (I), Application No. 13255/07, Merits
Judgment (3 July 2014), para. 159 (“Having regard to all those factors, the Court concludes
that from October 2006 a coordinated policy of arresting, detaining and expelling Georgian
nationals was put in place in the Russian Federation which amounted to an administrative
practice for the purposes of Convention case-law. Accordingly, the objection raised by the
respondent Government on grounds of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies must be
dismissed.”). See generally ibid., paras. 111–159.
497
IACtHR, Nicaragua v. Costa Rica, Inter-State Case 1/06, Report N° 11/07 (8 March 2007),
para. 260; see also ibid., para. 258. As also explained by the former President of the Inter-
American Court of Human Rights, and current Judge on the Court, Prof. Cançado Trindade,
“[i]n cases concerning legislative measures and administrative practices the individual,
having shown that such a practice exists, is not under the duty of exhausting local remedies”.
A.A. Cançado Trindade, “Exhaustion of Local Remedies in Relation to Legislative Measures
and Administrative Practices — The European Experience”, 18 Malaya Law Review (1976)
257, p. 278 (emphasis in original). See also Vol. V, Annex 145, A.A. Cançado Trindade,
“The Application of the Rule of Exhaustion of Local Remedies in International Law”
(Cambridge University Press, 1983), p. 181 (“in a case concerning a general prevailing
situation in breach of the Convention, recourse need not be had to local remedies.”).

191
jurisprudence of the Court and other international courts and tribunals, the local
remedies rule simply does not apply in this case.

2. The Local Remedies Rule Does Not Apply in View of Qatar’s Claims of Direct
Injury to Its Own Interests under the CERD

4.21 In addition to its claims “as parens patriae of its citizens”, Qatar brings
before the Court claims of direct injury to its own interests under the CERD that
are not subject to the local remedies rule 498. Such claims for direct injury are both
interdependent with, and preponderant over, Qatar’s claims brought on behalf of
its nationals. The local remedies rule does not apply to mixed claims of either
kind.

498
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Application Instituting Proceedings, I.C.J.
Reports 2018, para. 65. It is axiomatic that the local remedies rule does not apply where a
State “is not acting in the context of protection of one of its nationals”. Arrest Warrant of 11
April 2000 (Democratic Republic of the Congo v. Belgium), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2002,
pp. 17–18, para. 40; see also Armed Activities on t he Territory of the Congo (Democratic
Republic of the Congo v. Uganda), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2005, para. 330; United States-
United Kingdom Arbitration concerning Heathrow Airport User Charges (United States-
United Kingdom), Award of 30 November 1992 (revised 18 June 1993), 24 RIAA 59 (1992)
(“There is wide support for the view that a distinction is to be drawn between cases of
diplomatic protection, on the one hand, and cases of direct injury where the State is
protecting its own interests, on the other hand, and that the applicability of the rule of
exhaustion is excluded in cases in the second category”); The Ambatielos Claim (Greece,
United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland), Award of 6 March 1956, 12 RIAA
118 (1956) (defining the local remedies rule as a rule applicable in situations in which “an
international action is brought for injuries suffered by private individuals”) (emphasis added);
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries
(2006), document A/61/10, p. 71 (“Draft article 14 seeks to codify the rule of customary
international law requiring the exhaustion of local remedies as a prerequisite for the exercise
of diplomatic protection”) (emphasis added); T. Meron, The Incidence of the Rule of
Exhaustion of Local Remedies, 35 Year Book of International Law 83 (1959), p. 94.

192
4.22 Notwithstanding the UAE’s suggestion to the contrary at the hearing on
provisional measures, 499 Qatar, as a State Party to the CERD, has its own distinct
interest in ensuring that the UAE upholds its obligations under the CERD 500. For
example, Qatar has the right to demand that the UAE “prohibit and … eliminate
racial discrimination in all its forms” 501 “in the enjoyment by all persons of civil,
political, economic, social and cultural rights and freedoms” 502; and that the UAE
not only declare incitement to racial discrimination an offence punishable by
law 503, but also “effectively implement[]” 504 and “enforce[]” such prohibition 505.

499
At the hearing on provisional measures, the UAE appeared to deny that it had caused Qatar
direct injuries. See CR 2018/13, p. 28, paras. 2–3 (Treves). According to the UAE, Qatar’s
case was instead one of diplomatic protection and was inadmissible because local remedies
had not been exhausted before Qatar filed its Application. See ibid, p. 30, para. 7.
500
As noted by one representative during negotiations of the CERD, “[e]veryone agreed that
domestic remedies should be exhausted before a case was taken to the international level, but
it should be borne in mind that one State might bring a complaint against another, not with
respect to the treatment of individuals or groups of individuals, but concerning failure to
comply with certain provisions of the Convention”. United Nations, Official Records of the
General Assembly, Third Committee, Twentieth Session, 1353rd Meeting, para. 54 (emphasis
added).
501
Vol. III, Annex 92, CERD, Art. 2(1).
502
Vol. IV, Annex 109, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 30 on Discrimination
Against Non-Citizens, document CERD/C/GC/30 (2004), Preamble (stating that Article 5
“requires States parties to prohibit and eliminate discrimination based on race, colour,
descent, and national or ethnic origin in the enjoyment by all persons of civil, political,
economic, social and cultural rights and freedoms”). The CERD Committee has further noted
that “[w]henever a State imposes a restriction upon one of the rights listed in article 5 of the
Convention which applies ostensibly to all within its jurisdiction, it must ensure that neither
in purpose nor effect is the restriction incompatible with article 1 of the Convention as an
integral part of international human rights standards”. Vol. IV, Annex 108, CERD
Committee, General Recommendation No. 20 on Article 5 of the Convention, document
CERD/C/GC/20 (1996), para. 2.
503
Vol. III, Annex 92, CERD, Art. 4. The same applies to the “provision of any assistance to
racist activities, including the financing thereof”. Ibid. Furthermore, Article 4 requires that
193
4.23 That Qatar has claims in its own right is not only reflected in these and
other obligations under the CERD, which the UAE’s conduct has plainly breached
and caused harm to Qatar distinct from any harm suffered by its nationals. It is
also reflected in Qatar’s interest in preventing future harm to its nationals 506—a
core objective of the CERD 507. The local remedies rule only applies to claims

the UAE “declare illegal and prohibit organizations, and also all other propaganda activities,
which promote and incite racial discrimination”. Ibid.
504
Vol. IV, Annex 113, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 35 on Combating
Racist Hate Speech, document CERD/C/GC/35 (2013), para. 17.
505
Vol. IV, Annex 106, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 15 on Article 4 of the
Convention, document CERD/C/GC/15 (1993), para. 2 (“To satisfy these obligations, States
parties have not only to enact appropriate legislation but also to ensure that it is effectively
enforced.”).
506
See, e.g., Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of
Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Application Instituting Proceedings,
I.C.J. Reports 2018, para. 66 (requesting that the Court order the UAE to “take all steps
necessary to comply with its obligations under CERD”).
507
See, e.g., Vol. IV, Annex 113, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 35 on
Combatting Racist Hate Speech, document CERD/C/GC/30 (2013), para. 10 (“Article 4
comprises elements relating to speech and the organizational context for the production of
speech, serves the functions of prevention and deterrence, and provides for sanctions when
deterrence fails.”) (emphasis added); Vol. IV, Annex 103, CERD Committee, General
Recommendation No. 7 Relating to the Implementation of Article 4, document CERD/C/GC/7
(1985), Preamble. The preventative focus of the CERD is reflected, inter alia, in its reporting
and training requirements. See, e.g., Vol. III, Annex 92, CERD, Arts. 7, 9; Vol. IV, Annex
104, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 11 on N on-Citizens, document
CERD/C/GC/11 (1993), para. 2; Vol. IV, Annex 107, CERD Committee, General
Recommendation No. 13 on the Training of Law Enforcement Officials in the Protection of
Human Rights, document CERD/C/GC/11 (1993), para. 2. Prevention of violations is also a
key component of the Committee’s use of early warning and urgent action procedures; see,
e.g., United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Forty-Eighth Session, Annex
3, document A/48/18; United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Sixty-
Second Session, Annex 3, document A/62/18, paras. 1, 9. The Committee has also repeatedly
reported to the General Assembly on “[p]revention of racial discrimination including early
warning and urgent action procedures”. See e.g., United Nations, Official Records of the
General Assembly, Seventy-Second Session, document A/72/18, pp. 6-10.

194
brought to protect individuals who have already been injured 508. In contrast, it
does not apply to disputes that are not “confined to the past”, and relate to one
State party’s interest in “obtain[ing] a solution which will also relate to the
interpretation and application of [the Treaty] in the future” 509.

4.24 In the present case, of course, as shown at the hearing on provisional

measures and in this Memorial 510, harm is present and ongoing. Critically, as the
Court held in Avena and other Mexican Nationals, in situations where “violations
of the rights of [individuals] may entail a violation of the rights of [their national]
State”, and where “violations of the rights [of the national State] may entail a
violation of the rights of the individual”, there is an “interdependence of the rights

508
See, e.g., Ambatielos Claim (Greece, United Kingdom of Great Britain and N orthern
Ireland), Award of 6 March 1956, 12 RIAA 118 (1956) (the local remedies rule “means that
the State against which an international action is brought for injuries suffered by private
individuals has the right to resist such an action if the persons alleged to have been injured
have not first exhausted all the remedies available to them under the municipal law of that
State.”) (emphasis added); see also, , Interhandel case (Switzerland v. United States of
America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1959, p. 27; Elettronica Sicula S.p.A. (ELSI) (United
States v. Italy), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1989, p. 43, para. 52; International Law
Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts,
Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, Vol. II (Part Two), Article 14(1), p.59;
Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection with commentaries (2006), document A/61/10, p. 45
(stating that paragraph 14(3) of the Draft Articles “provides that the exhaustion of local
remedies rule applies only to cases in which the Claimant State has been injured
‘indirectly’”) (emphasis added).
509
United States-United Kingdom Arbitration concerning Heathrow Airport User Charges
(United States-United Kingdom), Award of 30 November 1992 (revised 18 June 1993), 24
RIAA 60 (1992), Vol. XXIV, para. 6.11 (emphasis added); see also ibid., para. 6.19
(emphasizing that in line with the “general principles of international law underlying the local
remedies rule”, the rule did not apply to such disputes).
510
See, e.g., Chap. II, Sec. II.A, Chap. V, Sec. I (collective expulsion of Qataris); Chap. II,
Sec. II.B, Chap. V, Sec. II (ban on Qatari entry into the UAE and restrictions on entry to and
through Qatar by Emiratis); Chap. II, Sec. II.C.1, Chap. II, Sec. II.C.3, Chap. V, Sec. IV
(propagation and incitement of anti-Qatari sentiment); Chap. II, Sec. II.C.2, Chap. V, Sec. III
(interference with right to freedom of opinion and expression).

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of the State and of individual rights” which precludes the applicability of the local
remedies rule 511.

4.25 Such interdependence exists here: by violating the rights of Qatar as a

State party to the CERD, the UAE has violated the rights of individual Qataris
under the CERD. Conversely, by violating the rights of individual Qataris and by
threatening to continue violating them into the future, the UAE has necessarily
violated Qatar’s own rights under the CERD. Indeed, in cases in which the CERD
has been at issue, the Court has expressly found a “correlation between respect for
individual rights, the obligations of States parties under CERD and the right of
States parties to seek compliance therewith” 512.

511
In Avena and other Mexican Nationals, Mexico sought to protect its nationals on death row
in the United States. It argued that it had “itself suffered, directly and through its nationals”,
injury as a result of the United States’ failure to grant consular access to its nationals under
Article 36(1) of the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations. Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 36,
para. 40. The United States objected to the admissibility of Mexico’s claims, arguing that
Mexico had not exhausted local remedies before bringing its case. Ibid., para. 38. The Court
rejected the United States’ argument, holding that

“violations of the rights of the individual … may entail a violation of the rights of
the sending State, and that violations of the rights of the latter may entail a
violation of the rights of the individual. In these special circumstances of
interdependence of the rights of the State and of individual rights, Mexico may,
in submitting a claim in its own name, request the Court to rule on the violation
of rights which it claims to have suffered both directly and through the violation
of individual rights conferred on Mexican nationals .... The duty to exhaust local
remedies does not apply to such a request.”

Ibid., para. 40 (emphasis added).

512
See Application of the International Convention on t he Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Georgia v. Russian Federation), Provisional Measures, Order, I.C.J.
Reports 2008, pp. 391–392, para. 126 (emphasis added); Application of the International
Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism and of the International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Ukraine v. Russian
196
4.26 At the hearing on provisional measures, the UAE argued that the Court’s
holding in Avena was limited to the specific context of Article 36 of the Vienna
Convention on Consular Relations (“VCCR”), which according to the UAE sets
forth “a sui generis régime that was described by [the] Court in the LaGrand case
as ‘an interrelated régime designed to facilitate the implementation of the system
of consular protection’” 513. This strained attempt to distinguish Avena fails.
Nowhere in its Judgment did the Court limit the “special circumstances of
interdependence of the rights of the State and of individual rights” to Article 36 of
the VCCR. If the Court had wanted to limit the applicability of the rule it stated to
the VCCR, it would have said so. It did not, and wisely so—circumstances of
interdependence are by no means unique to Article 36 of the VCCR.

4.27 But even if it could be said that Qatar’s claims in its own right are not
interdependent with Qatar’s claims as parens patriae on behalf of its nationals
(quod non), the local remedies rule would still not bar the admissibility of Qatar’s
claims. Local remedies need not be exhausted where a claim is based
“preponderantly on an injury to the State and not to a national” 514. The injury to

Federation), Provisional Measures, Order, I.C.J. Reports 2017, para. 81; Application of the
International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v.
United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Order, I.C.J. Reports 2018, para. 51.
513
CR 2018/15, pp. 17–18, para. 11 (Treves) (citing LaGrand (Germany v. United States of
America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, para. 74).
514
See C. F. Amerasinghe, Diplomatic Protection (Oxford University Press, 2008), p. 181. See
also, e.g., International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with
commentaries (2006), document A/61/10, Article 14(11); United States-United Kingdom
Arbitration concerning Heathrow Airport User Charges (United States-United Kingdom),
Award of 30 November 1992 (revised 18 June 1993), 24 RIAA 62, para. 6.18 (“Although
examination of the nature of USG’s claims and of the airlines’ potential claims reveals that
they overlap to a certain extent, at the same time they present significant differences; and
taking the case as a whole and undivided into its constituent parts, the Tribunal is of the
opinion that the predominant element is the direct interest of the US itself.”); Case
Concerning the Air Service Agreement of 27 M arch 1946 B etween the United States of
197
Qatar’s own interests inflicted by the UAE’s measures preponderates here for at
least three reasons.

4.28 First, as explained above, Qatar is entitled to protect its own interests
under the CERD whether or not it also brings claims on behalf of its nationals 515.
Indeed, Qatar not only has its own interests based on the inter-State obligations
entered into by the Parties, but it also has interests flowing from the fact that the
prohibition of racial discrimination constitutes a jus cogens norm. As noted by the
Court a few years after the adoption and entry into force of the CERD, the
protection from racial discrimination forms part and parcel of the “principles and
rules concerning the basic rights of the human person”, which in turn give rise to
obligations erga omnes that transcend the ambit of the CERD and in respect of
which “all States can be held to have a legal interest in their protection” 516. The
prohibition of racial discrimination has since been recognized as a peremptory
norm of international law, the breach of which cannot be justified under any

America and France, Decision of 9 December 1978, 18 RIAA paras. 11, 29-30 (finding that,
even though a private air carrier had allegedly been injured by a breach of rights under the
Air Service Agreement, it was not required to exhaust local remedies before its State of
nationality could bring an international claim).
515
See para. 4.22 & n. 501, above.
516
Barcelona Traction, Light and P ower Company, Limited (Belgium v. Spain) (New
Application: 1962), Second Phase, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1970, paras. 33–35 (adding that
“[o]bligations the performance of which is the subject of diplomatic protection are not of the
same category”) (emphasis added above). See also Questions relating to the Obligation to
Prosecute or Extradite (Belgium v. Senegal), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, paras. 68–69.

198
circumstances, including the circumstances precluding wrongfulness accepted in
general international law 517.

4.29 Second, the UAE itself has asserted that its “targeted measures are aimed
at the Qatari government and not the Qatari people”1518, and that “Qatar
deliberately misrepresents the UAE’s measures against the Qatari government as
measures taken against the people of Qatar”1519. In fact, the UAE’s measures
extend beyond the Qatari government, even beyond the Qatari people, to include
Qatari symbols and institutions, literally anything that can be associated to any
degree with Qatar1520. As such, UAE cannot be heard to argue that the measures it
claims were neither “aimed at” nor “taken against” the people of Qatar
nonetheless give rise to claims “brought preponderantly on the basis of an injury”

517
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally
Wrongful Acts, Yearbook of the International Law Commission 2001, Vol. II (Part Two),
Article 26, p. 85, paras. 5–6.
518
Vol. IV, Annex 118, State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates, ICERD-ISC-2018/2,
Supplemental Response of the United Arab Emirates (29 November 2018), para. 7.
519
Vol. IV, Annex 118, State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates, ICERD-ISC-2018/2,
Supplemental Response of the United Arab Emirates (29 November 2018), para. 11; see also,
e.g., CR 2018/13, p. 14, para. 18 (Alnowais) (“Qatar seeks to conflate the UAE’s legitimate
grievances with the Government of Qatar with opposition to persons of Qatari nationality”);
CR 2018/2015, p.3, para. 4 (Pellet) (“the United Arab Emirates, together with a number of
other States, has taken measures against the State of Qatar”) (emphasis in original).
520
See “British man detained in UAE after wearing Qatar football shirt to match”, The Guardian
(5 February 2019), [Link]
uae-after-wearing-qatar-football-t-shirt-to-match (“A British football fan has been arrested
and detained in the United Arab Emirates after he wore a Qatar national team shirt to a
match.”).

199
to those very same people who suffered as a result of the UAE’s violations of the
CERD 521.

4.30 Third, Qatar’s injury from the UAE’s violations of the CERD
encompasses injury suffered as a result of UAE’s violations of the rights of
individuals of Qatari origin who are not presently Qatari nationals. These
violations relate to individuals who presently do not hold Qatari nationality but
have suffered injury because of their Qatari heritage or past Qatari nationality522.
Because a State may not exercise the right of diplomatic protection in respect of
persons who are not its nationals 523, and no special circumstance justifying
derogation from this rule applies in the present context 524, Qatar does not assert
claims based thereon as parens patriae of its nationals. Qatar instead asserts such
claims in its own right, which reinforces the preponderant nature of Qatar’s direct
injury.

4.31 For all of these reasons, Qatar’s claim plainly passes what the ILC refers to
as the “but for” test: “whether the claim comprising elements of both direct and
indirect injury would have been brought were it not for the claim on behalf of the
injured national” 525. The answer here is clearly “yes”. Qatar’s own rights and

521
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries
(2006), document A/61/10, Art. 14(3).
522
See para. 3.30, above.
523
See International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with
commentaries (2006), document A/61/10, Art. 3, p. 29.
524
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries
(2006), document A/61/10, Art. 8, p. 35.
525
See International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with
commentaries, document A/61/10, p. 46.

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interests under the CERD, which transcend the field of diplomatic protection and
indeed fall under the purview of a higher normative order, have been directly
affected. As a result, Qatar has suffered injury which continues to this day. In such
circumstances, it is impossible to construe Qatar’s claims as having been brought
“preponderantly on the basis of an injury to a national” 526. The local remedies rule
therefore does not apply.

B. THE UAE HAS FAILED TO PROVE THE EXISTENCE OF ANY EFFECTIVE AND
REASONABLY AVAILABLE REMEDIES THAT HAVE NOT BEEN EXHAUSTED

4.32 Qatar explained above why the local remedies rule does not apply to its
claims. But even if it did, it still would not bar them. The UAE cannot prove the
existence of any effective and reasonably available remedies that have not been
exhausted.

4.33 The ILC’s Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection state: “Local remedies
do not need to be exhausted where” there are “no reasonably available local
remedies to provide effective redress, or the local remedies provide no reasonable
possibility of such redress” 527. The Court has made clear that “[i]t is for the
respondent” to prove “that there were effective remedies in its domestic legal
system that were not exhausted” 528. It is thus the UAE—not Qatar—that bears the

526
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries,
document A/61/10, Art.e 14(3).
527
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries,
(2006), document A/61/10, Art. 15(a) (emphasis added).
528
Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, para. 44 (emphasis added).

201
burden of proving that local remedies exist, and also that those remedies are both
reasonably available and effective 529.

4.34 As a substantive matter, the local remedies rule is “riddled with many far-
reaching exceptions” 530. Aside from the circumstances described above 531, local
remedies need not be exhausted where, for example, “the local courts do not have
the competence to grant an appropriate and adequate remedy to the alien” 532, or
where “the respondent State does not have an adequate system of judicial

529
At the hearing on provisional measures, the UAE did not appear to contest this, but instead
made the distinct claim that “the burden to submit sufficient evidence that domestic remedies
have been ‘invoked or exhausted’ falls on Qatar, the Applicant”. CR 2018/13, p. 32, para. 14
(Treves). As such, the UAE does not appear to deny that it bears the initial burden of showing
the existence of effective and reasonably available remedies in the first place.
530
C.P.R. Romano, “The Rule of Prior Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies: Theory and Practice
in International Human Rights Procedures” in International Courts and the Development of
International Law (T.M.C. Asser Press, 2013), p. 564.
531
See paras. 4.14 and n. 488; 4.23 and n. 505, above.
532
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries
(2006) document A/61/10, p. 47; see also, e.g., Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v.
Democratic Republic of the Congo), Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007,
para. 47; The Ambatielos Claim (Greece, United Kingdom of Great Britain and N orthern
Ireland), Award of 6 March 1956, 12 RIAA (1956); Zentralrat Deutscher Sinti und Roma et
al. v. Germany, Communication No. 38/2006, Opinion, document CERD/C/72/D/38/2006
(2008), para. 7.3; L.R. et al. v. Slovak Republic, Communication No. 31/2003, Opinion,
document CERD/C/66/D/31/2003 (2005), para. 9.2; D.R. v. Australia, Communication No.
42/2008, Opinion, document CERD/C/75/D/42/2008 (2009), paras. 6.4–6.5.

202
protection” 533. Relatedly, it is “fundamental to the effectiveness of a remedy that
its independence from the authority being complained against is observed” 534.

4.35 Moreover, the remedies encompassed by the rule include only “legal
remedies” 535. “[R]emedies of a judicial character, whether or not discharged by
courts, are encompassed by the rule, whereas remedies based on the discretionary
action of public organs are not” 536.

4.36 As a practical matter, the exercise of legal remedies “must not be

unjustifiably hindered by the acts or omissions of the authorities of the respondent
State” 537. Such actions or omissions can include, for example, “the closure of

533
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries
(2006), document A/61/10, p. 47.
534
L.R. et al. v. Slovak Republic, Communication No. 31/2003, Opinion, document
CERD/C/66/D/31/2003 (2005), para. 9.2 (emphasis added); see also, e.g., Robert E. Brown
(United States) v. Great Britain, Arbitral Award of 23 November 1923, 7 RIAA 129 (1923).
535
See, e.g., International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with
commentaries (2006), document A/61/10, Art. 14(2) (“‘Local remedies’ means legal
remedies”) (emphasis added); see also, e.g., J. Crawford & T. Grant, “Exhaustion of Local
Remedies” in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford Public
International Law, 2007) (“The rule is limited to legal remedies.”).
536
J. Crawford & T. Grant, “Exhaustion of Local Remedies” in Max Planck Encyclopedia of
Public International Law (Oxford Public International Law, 2007) (emphasis added); see
also, e.g., Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, para. 47; International Law
Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries (2006), document
A/61/10, p. 45 (“The injured alien is, however, only required to exhaust such remedies which
may result in a binding decision. He is not required to approach the executive for relief in the
exercise of its discretionary powers.”) (emphasis added); Habassi v. Denmark,
Communication No. 10/1997, Opinion, document CERD/C/54/D/10/1997 (1999), para. 6.2.
537
ECtHR, Case of İlhan v. Turkey, Application No. 22277/93, Judgment on Merits and Just
Satisfaction (27 June 2000), para. 97; see also, e.g., IACtHR, Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v.
Honduras, Judgment (29 July 1988), Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series C, No.,
para. 68.

203
transport links between the two countries” 538; difficulty in contacting the relevant
authorities of the respondent State 539; and a “widespread climate of
discrimination” 540.

4.37 Credible fear of reprisal can also excuse the need to pursue a remedy541.
Similarly, if individuals’ “indigency or a general fear in the legal community to
represent” them prevents them from “invoking the domestic remedies necessary to
protect a right”, they are “not required to exhaust such remedies” 542.

538
ECtHR, Case of Georgia v. Russian Federation (I), Application No. 13255/07, Merits
Judgment (3 July 2014), para. 156.
539
ECtHR, Case of Georgia v. Russian Federation (I), Application No. 13255/07, Merits
Judgment (3 July 2014), para. 156.
540
IACtHR, Nicaragua v. Costa Rica, Inter-State Case 1/06, Report N° 11/07 (8 March 2007),
para. 256; see also id., para. 257.
541
See, e.g., Human Rights Committee, Irving Phillip v. Trinidad and Tobago, Communication
No. 594/1992, Views, document CCPR/C/64/D/594/1992 (1998), para. 6.4 (“In these
circumstances, given the author’s statement that he had not filed a complaint because of his
fears of the warders, the Committee considered that it was not precluded by [the Optional
Protocol’s local remedies rule] from examining the complaint”) (emphasis added); Human
Rights Committee, Avadanov v. Azerbaijan, Communication No. 1633/2007, Views,
document CCPR/C/100/D/1633/2007 (2010), para. 6.4. Fear of reprisal can also help explain
“[t]he absence or small number of complaints, prosecutions and convictions relating to acts
of racial discrimination in [a] country”. Vol. IV, Annex 110, CERD Committee, General
Recommendation No. 31 on the Prevention of Racial Discriminations in the Administration
and Functioning of the Criminal Justice System, document CERD/C/GC/31 (2005) (para.
1(b)); see also, ECtHR, Case of Georgia v. Russia (I), Application No. 13255/07, Merits
Judgment (3 July 2014), para. 154.
542
IACtHR, Exceptions to the Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (Arts. 46(1), 46(2)(a) and
46(2)(b) American Convention on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-11/90 (10 August
1990), Inter-American Court of Human Rights Series A, No. 11, para. 42; see also, e.g.,
IACtHR, Case of Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Judgment (29 July 1988), Inter-
American Court of Human Rights Series C, No. 4, para. 80.

204
4.38 In short, the existence of reasonably available and effective remedies
“must be sufficiently certain not only in theory but also in practice, failing which
they will lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness” 543. As such, “the State
that alleges non-exhaustion must indicate which domestic remedies should be
exhausted and provide evidence of their effectiveness” 544, including in the form of
“examples of the alleged remedy having been successfully utilized by persons in
similar positions” 545.

543
ECtHR, Case of Vernillo v. France, Application No. 11889/85, Judgment on Merits and Just
Satisfaction (20 February 1991), para. 27. It again “falls to the respondent State to establish
that these various conditions are satisfied”; see also, e.g., IACtHR, Exceptions to the
Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies (Arts. 46(1), 46(2)(a) and 46(2)(b) American Convention
on Human Rights), Advisory Opinion OC-11/90 (10 August 1990), Inter-American Court of
Human Rights Series A, No. 11, para. 17; ECtHR, Case of Georgia v. Russia (I), Application
No. 13255/07, Merits Judgment (3 July 2014), paras. 150–151; J. Crawford & T. Grant,
“Exhaustion of Local Remedies” in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law
(Oxford Public International Law), para. 19; Human Rights Committee, Warsame v. Canada,
Communication No. 1959/2010, Views, document CCPR/C/102/D/1959/2010 (2011), para.
7.4.
544
IACtHR, Nicaragua v. Costa Rica, Inter-State Case 1/06, Report N° 11/07 (8 March 2007),
para. 243 (emphasis added); see also, e.g., IACtHR, Case of the Mayagna (Sumo) Awas
Tingni Community v. Nicaragua, Preliminary Objections, Judgment, Series C, No. 66 (1
February 2000), para. 53.
545
See C.P.R. Romano, “The Rule of Prior Exhaustion of Domestic Remedies: Theory and
Practice in International Human Rights Procedures” in International Courts and t he
Development of International Law (T.N.C. Asser Press, 2013), p. 568 (“the European Court
of Human Rights has specified that the State must not only satisfy the Court that the remedy
was effective, available both in theory and practice at the relevant time, but also frequently
asks the State to provide examples of the alleged remedy having been successfully utilized by
persons in similar positions to that of the applicant.”) (emphasis added above); see also, e.g.,
ECtHR, Kangasluoma v. Finland, Application No. 48339/99, Judgment (20 January 2004),
para. 48 (“Nor did the Government supply any example from domestic practice showing that,
by using the means in question, it was possible for the applicant to obtain such relief. This is
in itself sufficient to demonstrate that the remedies referred to do not meet the standard of
“effectiveness” for the purposes of Article 13 because, as the Court has already said … the
required remedy must be effective both in law and in practice.”) (emphasis added); ECtHR,
Case of Georgia v. Russia (I), Application No. 13255/07, Merits Judgment (3 July 2014),
para. 157.

205
4.39 At the hearing on provisional measures, the UAE failed to discharge this
burden even on a prima facie basis. As the Court observed in its Order of 23 July
2018, “the UAE did not indicate any effective local remedies that were available
to the Qataris that have not been exhausted” 546.

4.40 This finding is unsurprising. As explained below, none of the nominal

remedies the UAE has pointed to is effective and reasonably available 547.

1. The “Hotline” Is Not a Legal Remedy

4.41 At the provisional measures phase, the Court rejected the UAE’s
suggestion that the so-called “hotline”, through which Qatari nationals are
allegedly able to apply for entry to the UAE, is a “remedy” for purposes of the
local remedies rule 548.

4.42 There are at least five independently sufficient reasons to reject this claim
now as well.

546
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Order, I.C.J. 2018,
para. 42.
547
At the hearing on provisional measures, the UAE expressly asserted that the “hotline” is a
remedy for purposes of the exhaustion rule, and only arguably implicitly suggested that its
courts are as well. Compare, e.g., CR 2018/15, p. 18, para. 12 (Treves) (“May I only
underscore that the mechanism of the hotline is more appropriate and expeditious than more
traditional mechanisms, in situations that, as the one under consideration in the present case,
involve a high number of persons”) with CR 2018/15, p. 13, para. 15 (Alnowais) (“Qatari
citizens can seek redress for any legal grievances through counsel of their choosing”). For the
sake of caution and because the UAE argued that court remedies are available and effective
in the proceedings before the CERD Committee, Qatar addresses both below.
548
CR 2018/15, p. 18, para. 12 (Treves); Application of the International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Order of
23 July 2018, paras. 65, 71.

206
4.43 First, the “hotline” is not a legal remedy and as such, it is not an
exhaustible remedy. Indeed, the UAE has itself expressly stated that permission
through the hotline may be granted “at the discretion of the UAE government” 549.
An injured alien is, however, “not required to approach the executive for relief in
the exercise of its discretionary powers” 550, as the Court’s decision in Diallo
makes clear in the specific context of an alleged expulsion551.

4.44 Second, the “hotline” is not a “remedy” at all for any of the measures
Qatar challenges in these proceedings. Instead, the “hotline” forms part of the
manner in which the UAE implements its discriminatory travel restrictions under
the Modified Travel Ban, and is accordingly itself a component of the measures
that violate the UAE’s obligations under the CERD. 552 Needless to say, the
“hotline” cannot be a “remedy” for itself. Much less can it be a remedy for the
UAE’s other unlawful measures. 553 At most, it could mitigate harm caused by the
UAE’s unlawful expulsion. But it cannot remedy past harms, restore the status
quo ante, afford reparation, offer guarantees of non-repetition or adjudge or

549
Vol. II, Annex 29, Ministry of Foreign Affairs & International Cooperation, An Official
Statement by the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and I nternational Cooperation (5 July
2018), [Link]
[Link] (emphasis added).
550
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries
(2006), document A/61/10, p. 45.
551
Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo),
Preliminary Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2007, para. 47.
552
At most, the “hotline” gives individuals an opportunity to apply for admission to the UAE. It
does not give them the right to object to a decision not to admit them – much less to object to
the discriminatory travel restrictions as a whole.
553
The “hotline” does not even purport to address, still less provide a remedy for, the UAE’s
Anti-Qatari Incitement and the Qatari Media Block.

207
declare breach 554. The “hotline” is therefore not a remedy in any sense of the
word.

4.45 Third, the “hotline” is a “police security channel” 555 run in a police
State 556. The channel, which was created prior to the imposition of the
Discriminatory Measures, is “provided by [the] Abu Dhabi Police”. 557 Its “service
objectives” include “[c]onsolidating the concept of ‘Security Is Everybody’s
Responsibility’” 558. Indeed, the service provider gathers information helpful “in
knowing the behaviours and conducts that indicate the commission of the
crime” 559.

554
See, e.g., F. Capone, “Remedies” in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law
(Oxford Public International Law), para. 17 (“The responsible State is also under an
obligation to make reparation for the injury caused by the internationally wrongful act.”);
ibid., para. 15 (“The State responsible for the commission of a wrongful act is under an
obligation to cease the conduct and to offer appropriate assurances, normally given verbally,
and guarantees of non-repetition, such as preventive measures to be taken to avoid repetition
of the breach.”).
555
UAE PM Exhibit 3, Report of Abu Dhabi police on Hotline, Real Estate, Funds, Licenses
and Immigration (25 June 2018).
556
See para. 2.32, above; see, e.g., C. Davidson, “The Making of a Police State” Foreign Policy
(14 Apr. 2011), [Link]
OHCHR, Press briefing note on United Arab Emirates (January 2019).
557
UAE PM Exhibit 3, Report of Abu Dhabi police on Hotline, Real Estate, Funds, Licenses
and Immigration (25 June 2018); see also Vol. IX, Annex 222, DCL-105, para. 17 (“I called
the hotline through WhatsApp, and the number displayed the logo of the Abu Dhabi police”).
558
UAE PM Exhibit 3, Report of Abu Dhabi police on Hotline, Real Estate, Funds, Licenses
and Immigration (25 June 2018).
559
UAE PM Exhibit 3, Report of Abu Dhabi police on Hotline, Real Estate, Funds, Licenses
and Immigration (25 June 2018).

208
4.46 As such, and while the UAE claimed at the hearing on provisional
measures that Qataris had “no fear”, “[n]o trepidation”, and “[n]o reluctance to
contact the line” 560, the truth is to the contrary. Qataris’ fears about contacting the
“hotline”, including their fear that it is merely a mechanism for identifying them
and/or their families as targets in the UAE, are well-documented 561. This fear is
also well-founded: the UAE is monitoring Qataris who remain in the UAE, and
those who maintain relationships with Qataris, closely, and subjects them to
harassment at the hands of UAE security forces. 562 Indeed, some Qataris have
been expressly warned by personal contacts in the Emirati security apparatus that
contacting and sharing information with the hotline “was not safe”. 563

4.47 Given that the UAE ordered the expulsion of every Qatari from its territory
and then criminalized expressions of sympathy towards Qatar, it is as absurd as it
is offensive for the UAE to dismiss the legitimate fears of Qataris to expose
themselves and their loved ones to a “police security channel” of this kind.
560
CR 2018/15, p. 39, para. 13 (Shaw).
561
See Vol. VII, Annex 171, DCL-012, para. 11; Vol. VIII, Annex 185, DCL-036, para.18;
Vol. VIII, Annex 193, DCL-048, para. 24 (“I once called the hotline and was asked to
provide many personal details and documents. That just increased my fear”); Vol. IX, Annex
218, DCL-097, para. 18; see also Vol. V, Annex 129, Amnesty International, Gulf / Qatar
dispute: Human dignity trampled and families facing uncertainty as sinister deadline passes
(19 June 2017), [Link]
dignity-trampled-and-families-facing-uncertainty-as-sinister-deadline-passes/ (“Some
affected families have told Amnesty International that they are too scared to call hot lines and
register their presence, or their family’s presence, in a ‘rival’ country for fear of reprisal.”).
As noted above, credible fear of reprisals can excuse the need to pursue a remedy. See, e.g.,
Human Rights Committee, Irving Phillip v. Trinidad and Tobago, Communication No.
594/1992, Views, document CCPR/C/64/D/594/1992 (1998), para. 6.4; ECtHR, Case of
Georgia v. Russia (I), Application No. 13255/07, Merits Judgment (3 July 2014), para. 154.
See nn. 620, 621, below.
562
See, e.g., Vol. VII, Annex 163, DCL-001, para. 19.
563
Vol. XI, Annex 262, DCL-179, para. 12.

209
4.48 Fourth, even if the “hotline” could properly be considered a “remedy” for
any of the discriminatory measures—and as explained above, it cannot—the
hotline did not exist at all under the Absolute Travel Ban, and has been ineffective
since the day it was established. The UAE’s assertion at the hearing on provisional
measures that the “hotline” has been “highly effective to address applications by
Qatari nationals”, and that “[i]n 2018 alone” there were “at least 1,390
applications”, of which “1,378 … were accepted”, and “a mere 12” rejected 564, is
not only misleading; it is clearly and demonstrably false. Setting aside the obvious
deficiencies in the evidence produced to prove the claim 565—including the fact
that the majority of these “1,390 applications” by “Qatari nationals” were actually
reportedly submitted by Emiratis wishing to visit Qatar 566—the reality is that
applicants wanting to enter the UAE are very frequently unable to reach anyone
through the UAE’s hotline despite calling repeatedly 567. Indeed, the UAE’s own

564
CR/2018/13, p. 34, para. 23 (Treves). See also, e.g., CR/2018/15, p. 32, para. 19 (Buderi);
CR/2018/13, p. 13, para. 13 (Alnowais); CR/2018/13, p. 55, para. 98 (Olleson); CR/2018/15,
p. 42, para. 26 (Shaw).
565
The contents of the single exhibit cited in support of all of these claims appear to have been
selectively curated from a larger document—not on the record—for use in these proceedings.
See generally UAE PM Exhibit 3, Report of Abu Dhabi police on H otline, Real Estate,
Funds, Licenses and Immigration (25 June 2018), p. 4 (indicating that the original document
sent by the Abu Dhabi police contained underlying documentary evidence for a much larger
set of applications, including a number of rejected applications). Moreover, the document
incorporates applications of Qataris and Emiratis to both enter and exit the country. See, e.g.,
ibid., pp. 4, 24, 43. Finally, the exhibit contains only an extremely small number of
documentary examples of Qataris allegedly being granted permission to enter the UAE, and
is accordingly patently insufficient to corroborate the UAE’s statistical claim. See generally
ibid.
566
See UAE PM Exhibit 3, Report of Abu Dhabi police on Hotline, Real Estate, Funds,
Licenses and Immigration (25 June 2018), p. 4 (“The number of UAE Nationals’ requests to
visit Qatar is (828 requests) since the beginning of 2018 AD.”).
567
See, e.g., para. 5.79, below (quoting Vol. IX, Annex 206, DCL-079) ; Vol. VII, Annex 163,
DCL-001, para. 16; Vol. VII, Annex 170, DCL-011, para.16; Vol. VII, Annex 184, DCL-
033, para. 18; Vol. VIII, Annex 185, DCL-036, paras. 12-13, 18, 21; Vol. VIII, Annex 189,
210
evidence indicates that the vast majority of calls go unanswered. 568 Further, of the
Qataris who reported violations to the CCC and had attempted to use the hotline to
travel to the UAE, many were not granted permission to travel to the UAE, either
because their calls went unanswered or their application was never approved. 569

4.49 By design, the system is entirely opaque. The UAE Ministry of Foreign
Affairs has specified that “permissions will be granted ... at the discretion of the
UAE government.” 570 When Qataris have actually managed to apply, their
applications have often not been approved without any explanation 571. No

DCL-041, para.13; Vol. VIII, Annex 197, DCL-058, paras.12, 22; Vol. VIII, Annex 198,
DCL-066, para. 22; Vol. X, Annex 226, DCL-112, para. 14; Vol. X, Annex 234, DCL-135,
para. 25; Vol. X, Annex 239, DCL-144, para. 22; Vol. XI, Annex 257, DCL-173, paras. 14-
16; and Vol. XII, Annex 271, DCL-189, para. 9; see also Vol. V, Annex 129, Amnesty
International, Gulf/Qatar dispute: Human dignity trampled and families facing uncertainty as
sinister deadline passes (19 June 2017).
568
As Qatar noted at the hearing on provisional measures, “the UAE claims that the total
number of incoming calls to the hotline from 11 June 2017 to 10 June 2018 reached 33,383,
but that it received only 1,390 requests in 2018. Besides lacking any context, these figures
also demonstrate the UAE’s failure to mitigate. If 33,383 calls yield only 1,390 requests, as
independent reports have found, calls go unanswered, and the security channel is ineffective.”
CR 2018/14, p. 36, para. 24 (Goldsmith).
569
See, e.g., Vol. VII, Annex 163, DCL-001, para. 16; Vol. VII, Annex 178, DCL-025, para.
20; Vol. VIII, Annex 185, DCL-036, para. 22; Vol. VIII, Annex 189, DCL-041, para.13;
Vol. VIII, Annex 197, DCL-058, paras.12, 22; Vol. X, Annex 226, DCL-112, para. 14; Vol.
X, Annex 234, DCL-135, para. 25; Vol. X, Annex 239, DCL-144, para.23; Vol. XII, Annex
271, DCL-189, para. 9.
570
Vol. II, Annex 29, UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, An official Statement by The UAE
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation (5 July 2018),
[Link]
[Link]#[Link].
571
See, e.g., Vol. VII, Annex 165, DCL-004, para. 20; Vol. VII, Annex 178, DCL-025, para.
20; Vol. VIII, Annex 185, DCL-036, para. 22; Vol. IX, Annex 222, DCL-105, para. 18; Vol.
X, Annex 231, DCL-125, para. 7; Vol. X, Annex 239, DCL-144, para. 23 (“[T]he person
from the hotline I talked to told me that my application had been rejected, without explaining
why”); Vol. XII, Annex 269, DCL-187, para. 12; see also, e.g., Vol. III, Annex 96,
211
information is made available to Qataris about the process afforded to callers, the
criteria that will be applied to their requests for travel, the identity or authority of
the ultimate decision-maker or even what will be done with their personal
information after a determination is made 572. Indeed, applications have sometimes
not been approved even though other applications submitted with the exact same
documents had previously been accepted on different occasions 573. For example, a
Qatari woman with family in the UAE reported that: “I have applied for admission
to the UAE on eight occasions … My applications were not approved five times,
and they were approved three times. I was often given no explanation when my
application was not approved. On at least one occasion, an application was not
approved even though [I] submitted … the exact same documents [that] had
previously been accepted.” 574 These facts highlight the discretionary, arbitrary and
nontransparent nature of the mechanism and contradicts the UAE’s suggestion

OHCHR, Qatar diplomatic crisis: Comment by UN High Commissioner for Human Rights
Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein on impact on h uman rights (14 June 2017) (noting that measures
implemented to address dual nationality families “are not sufficiently effective to address all
cases”); Vol. V, Annex 134, Human Rights Watch, Qatar: Isolation Causing Rights Abuses
(12 July 2017), [Link]
(“[O]f the 12 Gulf nationals who said they tried to contact these hotlines, only two managed
to get permission to go back and forth.”); Vol. V, Annex 129, Amnesty International,
Gulf/Qatar dispute: Human dignity trampled and families facing uncertainty as sinister
deadline passes (19 June 2017), [Link]
dispute-human-dignity-trampled-and-families-facing-uncertainty-as-sinister-deadline-passes/.
As such, even if the hotline were a remedy encompassed local remedies rule—and it clearly
is not—it would be a remedy that has already been exhausted.
572
See e.g., Vol. VIII, Annex 185, DCL-036, para. 13 (“[My wife] was not told how she would
receive the travel permit . . . She received no information beyond the fact that her application
was in process.”); Vol. X, Annex 234, DCL-135, para. 25.
573
See, e.g., Vol. X, Annex 231, DCL-125, para. 7; Vol. X, Annex 239, DCL-144, para. 24.
574
Vol. X, Annex 231, DCL-125, para. 7.

212
that Qataris are permitted to enter whenever there are no “national security or
other legitimate concerns” 575.

4.50 Unsurprisingly, the alleged effectiveness of the hotline is not borne out by
the UAE’s allegation at the hearing on provisional measures that “entry and exit
records for Qatari nationals since the start of the crisis reveals 8,442
movements” 576. It will not escape the Court’s notice that most of the “movements”
recorded 577 actually show Qataris exiting, not entering, the UAE 578. Nor will the
Court fail to notice that the UAE provided no comparative set of data on the
movements of Qataris during the period before the crisis. And in fact, a
comparative picture reveals a steep decline—on the order of a 98% drop—in the
number of Qataris entering the UAE after the 5 June Directive, as compared to the
one-year period prior to June 2017 579.

575
CR/2018/13, p. 13, para. 13 (Alnowais). Qatar notes, moreover, that even many of those who
have received approval to travel have nonetheless been refused entry onto planes run by
Emirati airlines or been prohibited from flying by other authorities as a result of the UAE’s
discriminatory measures. See, e.g., Vol. VII, Annex 164, DCL-004, para. 19; Vol. X, Annex
231, DCL-125, para. 12.
576
CR/2018/13, p. 64, para. 30 (Shaw).
577
Qatar notes that the exhibit actually only records 8,390 “movements,” not 8,442. See
generally, UAE PM Exhibit 14, Immigration – Complete Entry-Exit Records, (25 June
2018).
578
See para. 5.48, below (noting actual breakdown of Qatari movements). See generally, UAE
PM Exhibit 14, Immigration – Complete Entry-Exit Records (25 June 2018). Qatar also
notes that the UAE’s data does not record the dates of each movement. See generally, ibid.
This is obviously because including the dates would have revealed a mass exodus of Qataris
from the UAE in the immediate aftermath of the 5 June 2017 expulsion.
579
See para. 5.48, below; Vol. XII, Annex 277, Affidavit of Youssef Abdullah Al-Kebesi, Chief
of Operations, Ooredoo Qatar, p. 1 (providing comparative data on the “roaming” of Qatari
SIM card holders in the UAE); see also Vol. VII, Annex 179, Affidavit of Hamad bin
Abdullah Al Thani, Chief Executive Officer, Vodafone Qatar Co, Annex A (providing
213
4.51 In light of this data, it is no surprise that the UAE’s next arguments—that
the “[t]he number of Qataris in the UAE today is not substantially different than
the number of Qataris who were present on 5 June 2017” 580, and that “the number
of Qataris in the UAE as of mid-June [2018] is 2,194” 581—also fail to prove its
facially implausible claim about the “hotline’s” supposed effectiveness. The first
problem with these assertions is that the documents the UAE cites again do not
substantiate them 582. Even if these documents asserted the presence of 2,194
Qataris “in the UAE” as of mid-June 2018—and it is not at all clear that they
do 583—they tellingly provide no comprehensive set of comparative data on the
number of Qataris in the UAE “on 5 June 2017” 584.

detailed information on the calls, messages, and internet used by users of Vodafone Qatar
while roaming in the UAE from January 2016 to December 2018, and showing a large and
permanent drop in usage in June 2017).
580
CR/2018/13, p. 13, para. 14 (Alnowais).
581
CR/2018/13, p. 64, para. 27 (Shaw).
582
See CR/2018/13, p. 33, para. 18 (Treves) (citing excerpts from UAE Exhibits 11 and 13 in
support of the proposition that “[t]he total number of Qataris in the UAE as of 5 June 2017
was only a few hundred more than the number of Qataris currently present in the UAE,” and
that “a number of the Qatari nationals that have left the UAE have re-entered the UAE upon
obtaining prior permission from the UAE.”).
583
UAE Exhibit 13 lists only dates of entry into the country. See generally, UAE PM
Exhibit 13, Immigration – Qataris in the UAE (25 June 2018). UAE PM Exhibit 11, which
appears to be a cover letter to UAE Exhibit 13, then states that UAE Exhibit 13 shows “the
number of Qatari nationals who have been in the country”, raising the question of whether
any of those Qataris have since left the country. See UAE PM Exhibit 11, Immigration - ID
& Citizenship Authority Cover Letter Re Excel Immigration Stats (25 June 2018) (emphasis
added).
584
The same considerations apply to the UAE’s claim that there are “some 694 Qatari students
currently studying in the UAE.” CR 2018/13, p. 32, para. 19 (Pellet). Even if these statistics
were accurate—and the UAE’s Exhibit 12 is patently insufficient to prove that they are—the
UAE has provided no comparable data on the number of Qatari students in the UAE before
214
4.52 Finally, even if in spite of the above the “hotline” could be considered
effective—which it cannot—it was established to handle requests for family-
related visits, as the UAE itself made clear before the Court 585. Indeed, at least as
recently as May 2018, “hotline” representatives were still telling applicants that
the “hotline” was only available for those seeking to visit “first degree”
relatives, 586 making clear that it could not have been a “remedy” for anyone else.
While subsequent to the Provisional Measures hearing the UAE has allegedly
implemented an “online” system, this further modification likewise has not
rendered it an effective remedy, as discussed below 587.

4.53 At the hearing on provisional measures, the UAE emphasized “that the
mechanism of the hotline is more appropriate and expeditious than more

the crisis. See generally, UAE PM Exhibit 12 Immigration – Student Entry Records (25 June
2018).
585
See CR 2018/13, p. 66, para. 41 (Shaw) (“a Presidential Directive was issued on 6 June 2017
which instructed the authorities to take into account the humanitarian circumstances of such
mixed families and in implementation a special telephone line was established to receive such
cases and take appropriate action”). See also, e.g., UAE PM Exhibit 3, Report of Abu Dhabi
police on H otline, Real Estate, Funds, Licenses and I mmigration (25 June 2018), p. 4 (“in
terms of taking into consideration the Humanitarian cases of the Emirati-Qatari joint families,
in recognition of the brotherly Qatari people, the Ministry of Interior has set up a toll-free
hotline (009718002626) to receive such humanitarian cases and take appropriate procedures
to help them.”).
586
Vol. XI, Annex 257, DCL-173, para. 16 (“The last time that I called was in May 2018. This
time, the representative told me that they could not help me see my [redacted] in the UAE
because my [redacted] are not ‘first degree’ relatives.”); Vol. VIII, Annex 201, DCL-072,
para. 23 (“The operator . . . informed me that I could not return to the UAE to continue my
studies unless I had a family member in the first degree who lived in the country.”); see also,
e.g., Vol. VII, Annex 169, DCL-010, para. 19; Vol. VIII, Annex 198, DCL-066, paras.21-
22; Vol. IX, Annex 204, DCL-076, para. 14; Vol. IX, Annex 211, DCL-086, para.13; Vol.
IX, Annex 216, DCL-093, para. 28; Vol. IX, Annex 219, DCL-098, para. 15; Vol. X, Annex
234, DCL-135, paras. 24-25; Vol. X, Annex 239, DCL-144, paras. 22, 25; Vol. XI, Annex
258, DCL-174, para. 15; Vol. XI, Annex 260, DCL-177, para. 16.
587
See paras. 5.72–5.74, below.

215
traditional mechanisms” 588. The fact that the most “appropriate” mechanism is an
admittedly discretionary—and demonstrably arbitrary, non-transparent, and
ineffective—“police security channel” 589 speaks volumes to the nature of the other
purported “remedies” available.

2. The UAE’s Courts Are Neither Effective nor Reasonably Available

4.54 At the hearing on provisional measures, the UAE also implied that its
courts offer available and effective remedies that could be pursued by Qatari
nationals either in person or through powers of attorney 590.

4.55 Qatar observes first that the Court rejected this argument in its Order on
Provisional Measures, in which it determined that after 5 June 2017, Qataris
appear to have “been denied equal access to tribunals and other judicial organs in
the UAE” 591. The reality is even grimmer: hundreds of Qataris have been deeply
aggrieved by the UAE’s treatment of them 592, but know that its court remedies are
neither “reasonably available” nor “effective” 593.

588
CR 2018/15, p. 18, para. 12 (Treves).
589
See UAE PM Exhibit 3, Report of Abu Dhabi police on Hotline, Real Estate, Funds,
Licenses and Immigration (25 June 2018), p. 8.
590
CR 2018/13, p. 33, para. 22 (Treves).
591
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Provisional Measures, Order, I.C.J. 2018,
para. 68.
592
See, e.g., Vol. V, Annex 140 National Human Rights Committee, Fifth General Report,
Continuation of human rights violations: A Year of the blockade imposed on Qatar (June
2018), p. 13; Vol. V, Annex 132, National Human Rights Committee, Second Report
Regarding the Human Rights Violations as a Result of the Blockade on the State of Qatar
(1 July 2017); Vol. V, Annex 136, National Human Rights Committee, 6 Months of
216
4.56 To begin with, the UAE’s justice system is deeply and demonstrably
flawed, and has been so well before 5 June 2017. In a 2015 report on the UAE’s
judiciary, the UN Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers
noted, inter alia:

• that she was “especially concerned that the judicial system remains
under the de facto control of the executive branch of government” 594;

• that “important pieces of legislation” contain “vague and broad

definitions of criminal offences, in contravention of international
human rights standards”, and that such provisions “defy the principle
of legality and open the door to arbitrary interpretation and abuse” 595;

• that she was told that “foreigners’ lack of confidence in the justice
system is such that many of them do not report crimes or abuses” 596;

• that it is “often impossible for vulnerable persons to seek remedies for

abuses they suffer, which is a breach of the principle of equality
before the courts” 597;

Violations, What Happens Now? The Fourth General Report on t he Violations of Human
Rights Arising from the Blockade on the State of Qatar (5 December 2017).
593
See International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with
commentaries (2006), document A/61/10, Art. 15(a).
594
United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, Mission to UAE, document
A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (2015), para. 33.
595
United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, Mission to UAE, document
A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (2015), para. 29.
596
United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, Mission to UAE, document
A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (2015), para. 37.

217
• that she was “particularly concerned at reports of serious breaches of
fair trial and due process guarantees, especially regarding, but not
limited to, crimes related to State security” 598, and “that individuals
accused of having committed crimes that jeopardize State security
have extremely limited access to legal counsel” 599;

• that she was “alarmed at reports that some lawyers who take up cases
related to State security have been harassed, threatened and had
pressure exerted on them, including through constant surveillance,
public campaigns of defamation, and the arbitrary deportation of non-
national lawyers” 600;

• that “[i]mpunity surrounding such breaches of the independence of

the legal profession has had a chilling effect on lawyers”, and that it
was reported to the Special Rapporteur “that it has become extremely
difficult to secure a lawyer in State security-related cases”, with

597
United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, Mission to UAE, document
A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (2015), para. 63.
598
United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, Mission to UAE, document
A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (2015), para. 86; see also, e.g., Report of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, document A/HRC/WG.6/29/ARE/2 (2017), para. 31
(“OHCHR stated that, under the pretext of national security, many activists had been
prosecuted for allegations mainly related to a person’s right to express his or her opinion and
criticism of any public policy or institution.”).
599
United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, Mission to UAE, document
A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (2015), para. 56.
600
United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, Mission to UAE, document
A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (2015), para. 79; see also ibid. (noting that the Special Rapporteur was
“alarmed at the long list of obstacles that lawyers working on State security-related cases
encountered on a daily basis while discharging their professional duties and representing their
clients’ interests.”); ibid., para. 86 (noting that the Special Rapporteur was “concerned about
the harassment, pressure and threats to which some lawyers are subjected, in breach of their
independence, especially when they take up cases related to State security crimes.”); ibid.,
para. 80 (“in at least one case, a lawyer was arrested when he was enquiring about the
whereabouts of his clients at the State security prosecution branch.”).

218
“[m]any lawyers refus[ing] such cases or drop[ping] them early on
owing to the pressure placed on them” 601; and

• that she “received credible information and evidence” that many

individuals “were arrested without a warrant and taken to unofficial
places of detention”, and “were also subjected to torture or other
forms of ill-treatment, including in order to extract confessions of
guilt or testimonies against other detainees” 602.

4.57 In 2018, the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights
reiterated the call on the UAE to “[e]nsure the separation of powers and
strengthen the independence of the judiciary, which is under the control of the
executive branch and the State security service” 603.

4.58 UAE courts are also widely perceived as biased against non-nationals. The
same 2015 report on the UAE’s judiciary by the UN Special Rapporteur on the
independence of judges and lawyers notes that “[a]mong foreigners residing in the
United Arab Emirates, there seems to be a perception that the domestic courts

601
United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, Mission to UAE, document
A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (2015), para. 81.
602
United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, Mission to UAE, document
A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (2015), para. 52; see also, e.g., Vol. V, Annex 139, Human Rights
Watch, UAE Continues to Flout International Law (29 June 2018),
[Link]
603
Vol. III, Annex 100, Letter from United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to
the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the United Arab Emirates (7
August 2018), Annex, p. 4; see also, e.g., United Nations, Report of the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights, document A/HRC/WG.6/29/ARE/2 (2017), para. 31. See
also, e.g., Vol. IV, Annex 114, CERD Committee, Concluding observations on the combined
eighteenth to twenty-first periodic reports of the United Arab Emirates, document
CERD/C/ARE/CO/18-21 (13 September 2017), para. 15.

219
cannot be trusted, and more specifically that judges do not treat nationals in the
same way as non-nationals” 604.

4.59 Moreover, the UAE is notorious for using the “pretext of national security”
to prosecute individuals for “criticism of any public policy or institution” 605. As
already discussed, the institution of the Anti-Sympathy Law —itself an egregious
example of incitement of racial hatred against Qataris 606—has only made matters
worse. And again, this new prohibition is not an idle threat: the UAE has already
604
See United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, Mission to UAE, document
A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (2015), para. 37; ibid. (noting that she was “concerned at reported
instances in which judges appear to have lacked impartiality and shown bias, especially with
regard to non-nationals of the United Arab Emirates”); ibid. (adding that “[t]he Special
Rapporteur was told that foreigners’ lack of confidence in the justice system is such that
many of them do not report crimes or abuses.”); see also, e.g., Vol. IV, Annex 105, CERD
Committee, General Recommendation No. 14 on article 1, paragraph 1, of the Convention,
contained in document A/48/18 (1993), para. 1; Vol. IV, Annex 108, CERD Committee,
General Recommendation No. 20 on ar ticle 5 of the Convention, contained in document
A/51/18 (1996), para. 3.
605
United Nations, Report of the United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights,
document A/HRC/WG.6/29/ARE/2 (2017), para. 31. See also, e.g., Vol. V, Annex 142,
Amnesty International, Report 2017/2018: The State of the World's Human Rights (2018),
[Link] Vol. V,
Annex 130, Human Rights Watch, Submission for the Universal Periodic Review of the
United Arab Emirates (29 June 2017), [Link]
universal-periodic-review-united-arab-emirates (“In March 2017, the UAE detained Ahmed
Mansoor, an award-winning human rights defender. He remains detained and is facing
speech-related charges that include using social media websites to ‘publish false information
that harms national unity.’ A coalition of 20 human rights organizations said Mansoor was
the last remaining human rights defender in the UAE who had been able to criticize the
authorities publicly.”); Vol. V, Annex 137, Human Rights Watch, World Report 2018
Country Summary: United Arab Emirates (January 2018), [Link]
report/2018/country-chapters/united-arab-emirates (“The UAE arbitrarily detains and forcibly
disappears individuals who criticize authorities within the UAE’s borders.”); ibid. (“UAE
authorities have launched a sustained assault on freedom of expression and association since
2011. UAE residents who have spoken about human rights issues are at serious risk of
arbitrary detention, imprisonment, and torture”).
606
See para. 3.109, above.

220
harassed, arrested or punished individuals under it 607—including for wearing a
Qatar national team shirt to an Asian Cup football match hosted by the UAE 608.

4.60 There is every reason to believe a judiciary under the control of the very
same executive that ordered the expulsion of Qataris and has criminalized
“sympathy” towards Qatar would not be impartial towards Qataris, 609 all the more
in circumstances the UAE says implicate State security, a setting in which
concerns about fair trials and due process are particularly acute 610. Given that a
Qatari could face criminal prosecution for even “objecting” to the measures1611, it
is facially unreasonable for the UAE to nonetheless demand that Qataris not only
do exactly that, but that they do so before the very same courts the United Nations
High Commissioner for Human Rights has made clear are “under the control of
the executive branch and the State security service” 612.

607
See para. 2.40, above.
608
See para. 2.41, above.
609
The limited evidence available with respect to lawsuits unrelated to challenging the measures
bears this out. See, e.g., Vol. XI, Annex 262, DCL-179, para. 14; see also Vol. X, Annex
232, DCL-130, para. 18.
610
See para. 2.79, above; see also United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special
Rapporteur on the independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, Mission to UAE,
document A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (2015), para. 86 (“The Special Rapporteur is particularly
concerned at reports of serious breaches of fair trial and due process guarantees, especially
regarding, but not limited to, crimes related to State security.”).
611
“Attorney General Warns Against Sympathy for Qatar or Objecting to the State’s Positions”,
Al Bayan Online (7 June 2017) (certified translation) (emphasis added); see also paras. 2.39–
2.40, above.
612
Vol. III, Annex 100, Letter from United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to
the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the United Arab Emirates (7
August 2018), Annex, p. 4. The UAE’s attempt at the hearing on provisional measures to
argue that the anti-sympathy prohibition is “not a law” and is just a “statement” (CR 2018/13,
221
4.61 Several additional facts confirm that there are no “reasonably available”
and “effective” remedies in the UAE to challenge the impugned measures.

4.62 First, even if a Qatari were willing, in spite of the above, to take the
personal risk of bringing a claim, he would be unable to find a lawyer to represent
him. Not only has it “become extremely difficult to secure a lawyer in State
security-related cases” 613 in general but, as the Office of the High Commissioner
made clear, lawyers are particularly “unlikely to defend Qataris”, as “this would
likely be interpreted as an expression of sympathy towards Qatar” 614. Indeed,
many Qataris have found it difficult to find lawyers willing to represent them even
on matters unrelated to challenging the measures. 615 Unsurprisingly,

p. 65, para. 35 (Shaw)) does not detract from the fact that the statement is based on existing
legislation, and the threat of punishment for violating the prohibition is demonstrably real.
See Chap. V, Sec. IV, below.
613
United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the
independence of judges and lawyers, Gabriela Knaul, Mission to UAE, document
A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (2015), para. 81 (“It was reported to the Special Rapporteur that it has
become extremely difficult to secure a lawyer in State security-related cases.”).
614
Vol. III, Annex 98, OHCHR Technical Mission to the State of Qatar, Report on the impact
of the Gulf Crisis on hum an rights (December 2017), ttp://[Link]/wp-
content/uploads/2018/01/[Link], para. 40.
615
See, e.g.,Vol. XI, Annex 257, DCL-173, paras. 17-18; Vol. VIII, Annex 193, DCL-048,
paras. 17–18; Vol. IX, Annex 216, DCL-093, paras. 30-33; Vol. X, Annex 234,,DCL-135,
paras. 14-28; Vol. X, Annex 241, DCL-146, para. 32; Vol. XI, Annex 245, DCL-152, paras.
17–24; Vol. X, Annex 235, DCL-136, para. 9–11; see also, e.g., Vol. X, Annex 242, DCL-
147, paras. 21-23; Vol. VII, Annex 165, DCL-004, para. 13; National Human Rights
Committee, Gulf Crisis: Continuing human rights violations by the United Arab Emirates:
Report on the non-compliance by the United Arab Emirates with the Order of the
International Court of Justice (23 January 2019), p. 11. Indeed, even court-appointed experts
have been afraid of communicating with Qatari litigants by video in relation to proceedings
unrelated to challenging the UAE’s discriminatory measures; see also Vol. XI, Annex 262,
DCL-179, para. 11. This is entirely unsurprising, given that even neighbors, close friends and
family members are often afraid of associating with Qataris. See, e.g., Vol. X, Annex 234,
DCL-135, paras. 22, 25, 28; Vol. IX, Annex 216, DCL-093, paras. 31-11; Vol. IX, Annex
206, DCL-079, paras. 29-30; Vol. VIII, Annex 193, DCL-048, paras. 13, 21; Vol. X, Annex
222
communications between lawyers and the exceedingly small number of Qataris
who have found representation have been seriously impacted, further undermining
their ability to vindicate their rights. 616

4.63 Second, UAE law is demonstrably inadequate to protect Qataris’ rights

under the CERD. Indeed, the UAE has previously made the extraordinary
submission to the CERD Committee that because “daily life is untroubled by
behaviours that are incompatible with noble values”, it “does not need to enact
legislation to deal with any violations of the Convention” 617. The CERD
Committee—which has repeatedly called on States parties to enact legislation,
enforce it and monitor the results 618—disagrees, having expressed concerns
regarding the adequacy of UAE law literally for decades 619. As recently as

241, DCL-146, paras. 13, 17; Vol. X, Annex 235, DCL-136, paras. 10-11; Vol. XII, Annex
266, DCL-183, para. 16; Vol. XI, Annex 253, DCL-168, para. 25; Vol. XI, Annex 255 DCL-
171, para. 15; Vol. VII, Annex 163, DCL-001, para. 19; Vol. VII, Annex 170, DCL-011,
para. 24; Vol. VII, Annex 179, DCL-027, para. 26; Vol. IX, Annex 204, DCL-076, para. 23;
Vol. VIII, Annex 191, DCL-046, para. 24.
616
See, e.g., Vol. XI, Annex 262, DCL-179, para. 11.

617
See Vol. IV, Annex 111, CERD Committee, Reports Submitted by States Parties in
Accordance with Article 9 of the Convention: United Arab Emirates, document
CERD/C/ARE/12-17 (27 March 2009), para. 72.
618
See, e.g., Vol. IV, Annex 102, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 1
concerning States parties’ Obligations, contained in document A/87/18 (1972); Vol. IV,
Annex 103, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 7 r elating to the
implementation of article 4, contained in document A/40/18 (1985), para. 1; Vol. IV, Annex
113, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 35 on Combatting racist hate speech,
document CERD/C/GC/35 (26 September 2013), paras. 13, 17; Vol. IV, Annex 106, CERD
Committee, General Recommendation No. 15 on ar ticle 4 of the Convention, Forty-second
session (1993), para. 2.
619
See, e.g., Vol. IV, Annex 114, CERD Committee, CERD Committee, Concluding
observations on the combined eighteenth to twenty-first periodic reports of the United Arab
Emirates, document CERD/C/ARE/CO/18-21 (13 September 2017), paras. 10-11 (“The
223
September 2017, the Committee recommended that the UAE “enact legislation to
bring its laws fully into line with the Convention” 620.

4.64 Third, even if all of these obstacles could somehow be overcome, the
existing “remedies” are clearly not “reasonably available” 621. To begin with, the
courts were categorically inaccessible to those denied access under the Absolute
or Modified Travel Bans. Moreover, setting aside the arbitrary and discretionary
nature of the “hotline” through which Qataris are now expected to apply in order
to travel to the UAE 622, the closure of transport links between the two countries—
a fact found relevant to the applicability of the local remedies rule in at least one

Committee is concerned that the definition of discrimination in the law is not fully in line
with article 1 of the Convention, as the grounds of descent and national origin are missing.”);
United Nations, Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination,
document A/35/18 (1980), para. 105; United Nations, Report of the Committee on t he
Elimination of Racial Discrimination, document A/39/18 (1984), para. 248; United Nations,
Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, document A/43/18
(1988), para. 194; United Nations, Report of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, document A/50/18 (1998) para. 562. See also, e.g., Jewish Community v.
Norway, Communication No. 30/2003, Opinion, document CERD/C/67/D/30/2003 (2005),
para. 7.2.
620
Vol. IV, Annex 114, CERD Committee, Concluding observations on t he combined
eighteenth to twenty-first periodic reports of the United Arab Emirates, document
CERD/C/ARE/CO/18-21 (13 September 2017), para. 10; see also, Vol. III, Annex 100,
Letter from United Nations High Commissioner for Human Rights to the Minister of Foreign
Affairs and International Cooperation of the United Arab Emirates (7 August 2018), Annex,
p. 1 (calling on the UAE to “[e]nact comprehensive anti-discrimination legislation, which
prohibits discrimination on all grounds, including colour, language, political or other opinion,
descent, national, ethnic or social origin … and is applied not only between citizens but also
to non-citizens”.).
621
International Law Commission, Draft Articles on Diplomatic Protection, with commentaries
(2006), document A/61/10, Art. 15(a).
622
See paras. 4.49–4.51, above.

224
case involving large-scale expulsion in the past 623—means that Qataris must first
take a burdensome and expensive trip through a third country. They must then be
willing to undertake the personal risk of entering the UAE, a country in which
they do not feel safe 624 and cannot rely on their government to protect them 625.

4.65 The UAE’s suggestion that Qataris outside the UAE can “grant a power of
attorney to a lawyer practicing in the UAE” 626 does not assist it. The only two
examples the UAE cited at the hearing on provisional measures were both
allegedly granted by sophisticated Qatari businesses to handle matters entirely

623
ECtHR, Case of Georgia v. Russia (I), Application No. 13255/07, Merits Judgment (3 July
2014), para. 156.
624
See, e.g., Vol. VII, Annex 182, DCL-030, para. 11; Vol. VIII, Annex 193, DCL-048,
para. 23; Vol. IX, Annex 206, DCL-079, para. 16; Vol. IX, Annex 216, DCL-093, paras. 26–
27; Vol. IX, Annex 220, DCL-100, para. 21; Vol. X, Annex 230, DCL-124, para. 24; Vol. X,
Annex 234, DCL-135, para. 24; Vol. X, Annex 241, DCL-146, para. 14; Vol. X, Annex 235,
DCL-136, para. 9; Vol. X, Annex 227, DCL-113, para. 12; Vol. X, Annex 240, DCL-145,
para. 18; Vol. IX, Annex 213, DCL-089, para. 10; Vol. IX, Annex 218, DCL-097, para. 18;
Vol. XI, Annex 252, DCL-167, para. 18; Vol. XII, Annex 266, DCL-183, para. 14; Vol. XI,
Annex 260, DCL-177, para. 16; Vol. XII, Annex 269, DCL-187, para. 13; Vol. XII, Annex
268, DCL-185, para. 12; Vol. XII, Annex 270, DCL-188, para. 11; DCL-144, para. 25; Vol.
I, Annex 163, DCL-001, para. 18; Vol. VII, Annex 164, DCL-002, para. 37; Vol. VII,
Annex 170, DCL-011, para. 21; Vol. VIII, Annex 185, DCL-036, para. 26; Vol. IX, Annex
219, DCL-098, para. 17; Vol. IX, Annex 222, DCL-105, para. 19; Vol. VIII, Annex 194,
DCL-051, para. 10; Vol. VIII, Annex 195, DCL-053, para. 9; Vol. VIII, Annex 196, DCL-
056, para. 29; Vol. VII, Annex 166, DCL-005, para. 17; Vol. VII, Annex 175, DCL-021,
para. 21; Vol. VIII, Annex 191, DCL-046, para. 19; Vol. IX, Annex 205, DCL-078, para.
18.
625
See, e.g., Vol. VII, Annex 182, DCL-030, para. 18; Vol. VIII, Annex 193, DCL-048,
para. 22; Vol. VII, Annex 165, DCL-004, para. 14; Vol. IX, Annex 224, DCL-108, para. 20;
Vol. X, Annex 235, DCL-136, para. 9; Vol. IX, Annex 220, DCL-100, para. 21; Vol. X,
Annex 225, DCL-109, para. 18; Vol. X, Annex 230, DCL-124, para, 24; Vol. VII, Annex
179, DCL-027, para. 12; Vol. IX, Annex 222, DCL-105, para. 9; Vol. VIII, Annex 194,
DCL-051, para. 10; Vol. VIII, Annex 195, DCL-053, para. 9; Vol. VIII, Annex 196, DCL-
056, para. 29; Vol. VII, Annex 175, DCL-021, para. 21; Vol. VIII, Annex 191, DCL-046,
para. 19.
626
CR 2018/13, p. 33, para. 22 (Treves).

225
unrelated to objecting to the UAE’s Discriminatory Measures 627. Equally
important, individuals have the fundamental due process right to attend their own
legal proceedings in person. And even if they did not, many Qataris simply do not
know anyone trustworthy who would be willing to execute a power of attorney628.
Moreover, many of those who do know someone, and who have made the
expensive and difficult trip to a third country in an attempt to acquire a power of
attorney 629, have been rejected expressly because they were Qataris 630. To add
insult to injury, even the very small number of Qataris who have actually received

627
See CR 2018/13, p. 34, para. 22, n. 65 (Treves).
628
See Vol. VIII, Annex 193, DCL-048, para. 21 (“I initially thought about giving a POA to my
Emirati lawyer, but that is not an option anymore, as he has not been responsive. I do not
know anyone else who would accept a POA in the UAE at the moment, as my friend refused
to help me.”); Vol. XI, Annex 258, DCL-174, para. 11; Vol. XII, Annex 266, DCL-183,
para. 15; Vol. XI, Annex 260, DCL-177, para. 12; Vol. IX, Annex 212, DCL-088, para. 14.
Similarly, many of those who do know someone they trust have refrained from asking them
to execute a power of attorney because they fear this could create problems or be a safety
issue for the person involved. See, e.g., Vol. X, Annex 227, DCL-113, para. 14. Experience
shows that such concerns are fully justified. See, e.g., Vol. X, Annex 241, DCL-146,
paras. 27–31.
629
See, e.g., Vol. XI, Annex 260, DCL-152, Muntajat Declaration, paras. 21–22, 25–26;
Vol. VII, Annex 182, DCL-030, paras. 12–13; Vol. IX, Annex 224, DCL-108, para. 13; see
also, e.g., Vol. XI, Annex 257, DCL-173, para. 17.
630
See, e.g., Vol. VII, Annex 182, DCL-030, para. 12 (“[T]he official working at the UAE
Embassy refused to stamp the POA. He told me ‘we’re not stamping it’ and that they ‘don’t
stamp anything involving Qataris.’ He said it was because he had ‘supreme orders’ not to do
so. I tried to argue with him, but he wouldn’t listen—he wouldn’t even look at us or engage
in conversation; he simply waved to the person in line behind us and said ‘next.’”); ibid.,
para. 15; Vol. X, Annex 242, DCL-147, para. 19; Vol. IX, Annex 224, DCL-108, para. 16;
see also Vol. IX, Annex 212, DCL-088, para. 13. In some cases, individuals who were
denied powers of attorney on the basis of their nationality were later able to acquire them by
trying again, thereby highlighting the arbitrary and discretionary nature of the process. See,
e.g., Vol. VII, Annex 182, DCL-030, paras. 12–13; Vol. IX, Annex 224, DCL-108, paras.
16–17; Vol. X, Annex 238, DCL-143, para. 16.

226
valid powers of attorney have often been unable to use them 631. Indeed,
individuals with valid powers of attorney have been harassed, arrested and
interrogated for their association with Qataris 632.

4.66 Given the evidence, the conclusion is inescapable: the UAE’s courts do not
constitute a “reasonably available” remedy, let alone an “effective” one.

4.67 In sum, Qatar has shown that the local remedies rule does not apply to its
claims. But even if it were applicable to Qatar’s claims, the UAE has failed to
prove that any reasonably available and effective local remedies exist. It cannot do
so because there are no such remedies. The local remedies rule accordingly cannot
bar Qatar’s claims.

Section II. Qatar’s Recourse to the CERD Procedure Does Not Constitute a
Bar to the Admissibility of Qatar’s Claims

4.68 The UAE argued at the hearing on provisional measures that Qatar’s
claims are also inadmissible because, prior to the initiation of these proceedings,
Qatar also initiated an inter-State complaint procedure under Article 11 of the

631
See Vol. X, Annex 241, DCL-146, paras. 22, 27–29 (“I executed POAs in the UAE with two
of my employees before the blockade so that they could engage in certain business activities
on my behalf . . . The police refused to honour the POA, threatened him for having come in
to the authorities, and told him that the Qatari has to come himself for his car.”); Vol. XII,
Annex 265, DCL-182, paras. 8–13; Vol. X, Annex 238, DCL-143, paras. 17–21; Vol. VII,
Annex 182, DCL-030, para. 13.
632
See, e.g., Vol. X, Annex 241, DCL-146, paras. 27–31; Vol. VII, Annex 179, DCL-027,
paras. 23–24.

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CERD 633. Qatar’s decision to pursue remedies under both Articles 11 and 22 of
the CERD is, the UAE said, “incompatible with both the electa una via principle
and the lis pendens exception, since the same claim has been submitted in turn to
two organs by the same applicant against the same respondent” 634.

4.69 This is not a serious argument, as evidenced by the fact that the UAE is
simultaneously trying to use it to challenge both these proceedings before the
Court and the proceedings before the CERD Committee.

4.70 Indeed, the UAE has argued before the Court that the CERD Committee
proceedings must end before this case could be admissible. According to the
UAE, Qatar cannot “bypass the organ that the authors of the Convention
established as its guardian”, and it “seems perfectly clear that when a matter is
referred to [the Committee], it must be allowed to fulfil its mission” 635.

4.71 And at the same time, before the CERD Committee, the UAE has argued
precisely the opposite. There, the UAE claims that “Qatar, by commencing the
Pending ICJ CERD Proceedings, has abandoned the [Committee] process in

633
See CR 2018/13, p. 18–19 (Pellet), paras. 19–24. See also Vol. IV, Annex 116, Letter from
the Permanent Mission of the State of Qatar to the United Nations Office and other
international organizations in Geneva to the Secretariat of the United Nations (Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights) referring the matter at issue in ICERD-ISC-2018/2
again to the CERD Committee (29 October 2018); Vol. IV, Annex 117, State of Qatar v.
United Arab Emirates, ICERD-ISC-2018/2, Response of the United Arab Emirates (7
November 2018); Vol. IV, Annex 119, Note Verbale of the Secretariat of the United Nations
(Office of the High Commissioner for Human Rights) to the Permanent Mission of the State
of Qatar to the United Nations Office at Geneva regarding interstate communication ICERD-
ISC-2018/2 (14 December 2018), available at [Link]
CERD/NV_QatarUAE_14Dec2018%20_003.pdf.
634
CR 2018/13, p. 19 (Pellet), paras. 22–24.
635
CR 2018/13, p. 18, paras. 20–21 (Pellet) (emphasis added).

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favour of a judicial procedure before the pre-eminent United Nations World
Court” 636, and that the Committee must therefore “yield to the ICJ procedure” 637.

4.72 Most recently, on 20 March 2019, the UAE reversed its position before the
Court and took the extraordinary step of requesting that the Court exercise its
power to indicate provisional measures in exceptional circumstances actually to
order Qatar to “immediately withdraw its Communication” and “take all necessary
measures to terminate consideration thereof by” the Committee 638.

4.73 The UAE cannot have it both ways 639. But even setting these disingenuous
contradictions aside, the fact is that neither the doctrines of lis pendens nor electa
una via constitute a bar to the admissibility of Qatar’s claims.

4.74 Qatar observes first that both the Court and its predecessor have regularly
entertained cases where the parties were simultaneously pursuing other,

636
Vol. IV, Annex 118, State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates, ICERD-ISC-2018/2,
Supplemental Response of the United Arab Emirates (29 November 2018), para. 54.
637
Vol. IV, Annex 120, State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates, ICERD-ISC-2018/2,
Supplemental Response of the UAE on Issues of Jurisdiction and Admissibility (14 January
2019), para. 41 (emphasis added); see, e.g., ibid. (“It would be inappropriate for the
Committee to proceed in parallel at a time when the ICJ, as the pre-eminent World Court in
the United Nations system, remains seised of the very same question in the Pending ICJ
CERD Proceedings.”); ibid. (“the CERD Committee, as a United Nations Treaty body,
should not act in any way to undermine the integrity of the Court.”); Vol. IV, Annex 118,
State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates, ICERD-ISC-2018/2, Supplemental Response of the
United Arab Emirates (29 November 2018), para. 79.
638
Request for the Indication of Provisional Measures of the United Arab Emirates, Application
of the International Convention on t he Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), 22 March 2019, para. 74.
639
Indeed, if the UAE had its way, both proceedings before the CERD Committee and the Court
would be dismissed. This cannot possibly be the proper result.

229
consensual means for settling their dispute 640. That is all that is happening here.
For the reasons explained more fully above 641, the CERD Committee procedure
effectively constitutes a form of facilitated negotiation. No solution may be
imposed on the parties; any settlement, if there is one, must be adopted by mutual
consent.

4.75 Moreover, neither lis pendens nor electa una via apply in inter-State
litigation or arbitration, absent express treaty language so providing 642.

640
See, e.g., Passage through the Great Belt (Finland v. Denmark), Provisional Measures,
Order, I.C.J. Reports 1991, para. 35 (“[P]ending a decision of the Court on the merits, any
negotiation between the Parties with a view to achieving a direct and friendly settlement is to
be welcomed ....”.); Land and Maritime Boundary (Cameroon v. Nigeria), Preliminary
Objections, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1998, para. 68; Military and Paramilitary Activities in
and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States), Jurisdiction and Admissibility,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1984, para. 108; United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in
Tehran (United States v. Iran), Judgment, ICJ Reports 1980, para. 43; Aegean Sea
Continental Shelf (Greece v. Turkey), Jurisdiction, Judgment, ICJ Reports 1978, para. 29;
Free Zones of Upper Savoy and the District of Gex (France/Switzerland), Judgement,
P.C.I.J. Reports 1932, Series A, No. 22, p. 13.
641
See Chap. III, Sect. II.A, above.
642
See, e.g., Chorzow Factory (Germany v. Poland), Judgment, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 9,
p. 30 (“[T]he Court, when it has to define its jurisdiction in relation to that of another
tribunal, cannot allow its own competency to give way unless confronted with a clause which
it considers sufficiently clear to prevent the possibility of a negative conflict of jurisdiction
involving the danger of a denial of justice”) (emphasis added); Rights of Minorities (Germany
v. Poland), Judgment, 1928, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 15, p. 23 (“This principle [of consent as
sufficient basis for jurisdiction] only becomes inoperative in those exceptional cases in which
the dispute which States might desire to refer to the Court would fall within the exclusive
jurisdiction reserved to some other authority”). None of the four cases cited by the UAE at
the hearing on provisional measures suggest otherwise. See CR 2018/13, p. 19, n. 50 (Pellet).
On the contrary, three involved instruments with express language of a kind not found in
CERD. See Chevron Corporation and Texaco Petroleum Company v. Ecuador, PCA Case
No. 2009-23, Third Interim Award on Jurisdiction and Admissibility (2012), para. 4.73;
Pantechniki S.A. Contractors and Engineers v. Albania, ICSID Case No. ARB/07/21, Award
(30 July 2009) (Paulsson), para. 68; VO v. Norway, Communication No. 168/1984, Decision,
document CCPR/C/25/D/168 (1985), paras. 4.4.–4.5. The fourth case, Polish Upper Silesia,
equally fails to prove the UAE’s point for the reasons explained below.

230
4.76 With respect to lis pendens in particular, Judge Crawford has written:
“Whether there is any international equivalent to the national law doctrine[] of lis
alibi pendens … is controversial” 643. Indeed, neither the Court nor the PCIJ has
ever found lis pendens to apply in international law generally, let alone in the
cases before them.

4.77 The only case the UAE cited during the hearing on provisional measures to
suggest otherwise was the Polish Upper Silesia case 644. But on the very same page
of the judgment the UAE cited, the PCIJ made clear that it did not accept that lis
pendens applies in international law, finding: “It is a much disputed question …
whether the doctrine of litispendance … can be invoked in international relations
…” 645. The PCIJ also made clear that even if the doctrine did apply, the standard
would be high: a) the parties must be the same; b) the actions in both proceedings
must be identical; and c) the bodies hearing the two proceedings must be “of the
same character” 646. None of these elements was present in that case 647.

4.78 In this case, the Parties may be the same but neither of the other two
elements the PCIJ identified is present. The action before the CERD Committee is
not identical to the action Qatar has brought before the Court. Whereas the

643
See Vol. V, Annex 147, J. Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law (8th
ed. Oxford University Press, 2012), p. 701.
644
CR 2018/13, p. 19, n. 50 (Pellet).
645
Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland), Judgement, P.C.I.J.
Reports (1925), Series A, No. 6, p. 20.
646
Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v Poland), Judgment, 1925,
P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 6, p. 20.
647
Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v Poland), Judgment, 1925,
P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 6, p. 20.

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proceedings before the CERD Committee can result only in non-binding
recommendations 648, the Court will issue a legally binding decision 649. The CERD
Committee and the Conciliation Commission, on the one hand, and the Court, on
the other hand, are also not bodies “of the same character” 650. The CERD
Committee is an expert monitoring body 651 and, as the UAE itself submitted
before the Committee, the Conciliation Commission “is not a judicial body but a
fact-finding body” 652. The Court, in contrast, is the “principal judicial organ of the
United Nations” 653.

4.79 In United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v.
Iran), the Court made clear that it can adjudicate a dispute even when there is a
concurrent fact-finding commission:

“The Commission … was established to undertake a

… fact-finding mission …. [The Secretary-General]
created the Commission … as an organ or
instrument for mediation, conciliation or negotiation
…. The establishment of the Commission by the
Secretary-General … cannot, therefore, be

648
CERD, Art. 13(2). See CR 2018/13, p. 18, para. 20 (Pellet) (“Of course, the Committee
cannot take binding decisions”).
649
See Rules of the International Court of Justice, Arts. 59, 60.
650
Certain German Interests in Polish Upper Silesia (Germany v. Poland), Judgment 1925,
P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 6, p. 20.
651
See OHCHR, Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, [Link]
/en/hrbodies/cerd/pages/[Link].
652
Vol. IV, Annex 120, State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates, ICERD-ISC-2018/2,
Supplemental Response of the UAE on Issues of Jurisdiction and Admissibility (14 January
2019), para. 43.
653
Statute of the International Court of Justice, Art. 1.

232
considered in itself as in any way incompatible with
the continuance of parallel proceedings before the
Court. Negotiation, enquiry, mediation, conciliation,
arbitration and judicial settlement are enumerated
together in Article 33 of the Charter as a means for
the peaceful settlement of disputes” 654.

4.80 The UAE’s invocation of the so-called “electa una via principle” 655 fails
for many of the same reasons. Suffice it to say that, like lis pendens, it “does not
find any meaningful support in the international jurisprudence” in the absence of
“explicit treaty language” 656. An example of such express treaty language can be
found in Article IV of the Pact of Bogotá, which provides:

“Once any pacific procedure has been initiated,

whether by agreement between the parties or in
fulfillment of the present Treaty or a previous pact,
no other procedure may be commenced until that
procedure is concluded” 657.

4.81 The contrast with CERD Article 11 cannot be more obvious. Nothing in
Article 11 prioritizes its procedures over any other dispute resolution method, let
alone judicial proceedings before the Court under Article 22 658. The UAE’s

654
United States Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States v. Iran), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 1980, para. 43 (emphasis added).
655
CR 2018/13, p. 19 (Pellet), paras. 22–24.
656
Vol. VI, Annex 149, Y. Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and
Tribunals (Oxford University Press, 2003), p. 229.
657
Organization of American States, American Treaty on Pacific Settlement (“Pact of Bogotá”),
30 April 1948, Treaty Series, No. 17 and 61, Art. 4 (emphasis added).
658
In fact, because the doctrine of electa una via encompasses subsequent proceedings, if it
applied in the present circumstances, it would operate to bar Qatar from instituting
proceedings before the Court even after the proceedings before the CERD Committee are
complete. Needless to say, this cannot be the correct result.

233
argument that the Court should decline to hear this case because Qatar resorted to
the CERD procedures accordingly must fail.

4.82 For the foregoing reasons, there is no bar to the admissibility of Qatar’s
claims in this case.

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CHAPTER V
THE UAE HAS VIOLATED THE CERD

5.1 The UAE’s Discriminatory Measures subvert the CERD’s fundamental

objective to “eliminat[e] racial discrimination in all its forms and promot[e]
understanding among all races” 659. Instead of abiding by its undertaking to pursue
this goal, the UAE has singled out a specific group—Qataris—on the basis of their
national origin and subjected them to measures that, in direct opposition to the
mandate in Article 1(1), have both “the purpose [and] effect of nullifying or
impairing [Qataris’] recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of
human rights and fundamental freedoms” 660.

5.1 The Discriminatory Measures fall into four main categories of racially
discriminatory State conduct prohibited by the CERD. First, the Expulsion Order
required all Qataris to leave the UAE within 14 days, and the Absolute Travel Ban
barred all Qataris from entering the UAE. For those Qataris living in the UAE
prior to 5 June 2017, these actions constituted collective expulsion in violation of
the UAE’s broad obligations under Article 2(1), as well as of their fundamental
procedural rights to due process and access to remedy guaranteed by Articles 5(a)
and 6 (Section I).

5.2 Second, and independent of the collective expulsion, the UAE’s

Absolute Travel Ban and its ongoing maintenance of the Modified Travel Ban,
impacted and continues to impact, respectively, not only the Qataris living in the
UAE who were expelled on 5 June, but all Qataris with substantial family,

659
Vol. III, Annex 92, CERD, Art. 2(1).
660
Vol. III, Annex 92, CERD, Art. 1(1).

235
education, work, and/or property-related ties to the UAE, who remain cut off by
the UAE’s arbitrary and discriminatory actions. In this regard, the UAE’s
Absolute Travel Ban violated, and its Modified Travel Ban continues to violate,
Articles 2(1), 5(a), 5(d)(iv), 5(d)(v), 5(e)(i), 5(e)(v) and 6 of the CERD
(Section II).

5.3 Third, the UAE has suppressed—and continues to suppress—Qatari

media, in violation of the right to free expression and thought contained in Article
5(d)(viii) of the CERD (Section III).

5.4 Fourth, the UAE has instigated, perpetuated and encouraged—and

continues to instigate, perpetuate and encourage—anti-Qatari propaganda by
engineering and promoting “ideas based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement
to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts
against” 661 Qataris in violation of Articles 2(1), 4, 6 and 7 of the CERD
(Section IV).

Section I. The UAE Violated Article 2(1), Article 5(a) and Article 6 of the
CERD by Collectively Expelling Qataris

5.5 The CERD requires States parties to ensure that they do not treat non-
nationals in a racially discriminatory manner—in either purpose or effect 662. As
such, any measures that distinguish between non-nationals on the basis of national
origin must be enacted for a legitimate aim and proportional to achievement of

661
Vol. III, Annex 92, CERD, Art. 4(a).
662
See Chap. III, Sec. I.A, above.

236
that aim; to do otherwise results in an arbitrary deprivation of fundamental rights
and constitutes impermissible racial discrimination as defined in Article 1(1) 663.

5.6 As discussed in the sections that follow, collective expulsion is the act of
expelling a group of people collectively and without consideration of individual
circumstances, and thus, by definition, without due process. By its very nature,
collective expulsion on the basis of a shared national origin can never serve a
legitimate aim, nor constitute a proportional means to achieve that aim, and
thereby violates the obligations of States parties under Article 2(1) of the CERD,
as well as the due process protections contained in Articles 5(a) and 6
(Section I.A).

5.7 The UAE’s Expulsion Order and Absolute Travel Ban constitute the
collective expulsion of Qataris and are “distinction[s]”, “exclusion[s]”, and
“restriction[s]” 664 based on Qataris’ national origin that had both the purpose and
effect of nullifying Qataris’ fundamental due process rights, constituting racial
discrimination under Article 1(1), and thereby violating Article 2(1) (Section I.B),
as well as Articles 5(a) and 6 (Section I.C).

A. THE CERD REQUIRES STATES PARTIES TO ENSURE THAT THEY DO NOT EXPEL
NON-NATIONALS FROM THEIR TERRITORY ON A COLLECTIVE BASIS

5.8 Under the CERD, a State party’s targeting of a group of non-nationals

collectively and on the basis of, inter alia, their national origin for expulsion from
its territory, while failing to take into account individual circumstances and

663
See paras. 3.11–3.20, above.
664
Vol. III, Annex 92, CERD, Art. 1(1).

237
without the provision of due process, constitutes an “act or practice 665” of “racial
discrimination” as defined in Article 1(1) and is prohibited by Articles 2(1), 5(a)
and 6.

5.9 Singling out a group of non-nationals for expulsion represents a

“distinction, exclusion [and] restriction . . . based on” national origin under
Article 1(1). Such an act by definition “has the purpose or effect of nullifying or
impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise, on an equal footing, of human
rights and fundamental freedoms”, because it is inherently arbitrary in substance,
implementation and effect and contravenes basic principles of due process. These
rights and freedoms include the procedural guarantees that are incorporated into
the open-ended litany of rights that are protected from racial discrimination
pursuant to Article 5 666 and Article 6, including: guarantees of the right to
challenge the state action; the opportunity to be heard before a court of competent
jurisdiction; the respect of regular—as opposed to ad hoc—procedures such as
prior notice; equal treatment before the courts; and access to effective remedies 667.

5.10 Accordingly, collective expulsion on the basis of national origin is

categorically prohibited not only by the general requirement in Article 2(1) to
condemn and eliminate “racial discrimination in all its forms”, but also the

665
Vol. III, Annex 92, CERD, Art. 2(1).
666
See paras. 5.95-7 below; see also UDHR, Arts. 6 et seq. setting out inter alia, the rights to
recognition as a person before the law, entitlement of equal protection of the law, access to an
effective remedy, right to a hearing in the determination of rights and obligations.
667
See Vol. III, Annex 92, CERD, Arts. 5(a), 6; paras. 4.4–4.8, above; see also Draft Articles
on the Expulsion of Aliens, with commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law
Commission, 2011, vol. II, Part Two, Arts. 5(3), 26(1) (setting out a list of procedural rights
that all aliens should enjoy prior to expulsion).

238
specific undertaking of each State party “to engage in no act or practice of racial
discriminations against persons, groups of persons or institutions and to ensure
that all public authorities and publ ic institutions, national and local, shall act in
conformity with this obligation” under Article 2(1)(a) 668. Because the deprivation
of due process rights is at the core of collective expulsion, it also runs afoul of the
protections contained in Articles 5(a) and 6.

5.11 Expulsion on a collective basis, which is—by definition—arbitrary, is

categorically prohibited by the CERD and by numerous human rights treaties and
instruments as contrary to human rights and fundamental freedoms 669. Generally

668
Unlike “mass expulsion,” collective expulsion may not be enacted on “even a relatively small
number of aliens . . . if the expulsion of each alien is not considered on an individual case-by-
case basis.” See International Law Commission, Expulsion of Aliens, Memorandum by the
Secretariat, Fifty-Eighth Session, document A/CN.4/565 (10 July 2006), p. 560, para. 985;
see also ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa and O thers v. Italy, Application No. 27765/09, Judgment,
Grand Chambers (23 February 2012), para. 184; IACtHR, Nadege Dorzema et al. v.
Dominican Republic, Judgment (24 October 2012), para. 172. In contrast, “mass” expulsion
is governed by a different legal regime, and can be comprised of a large number of aliens.
International Law Commission, Expulsion of Aliens, Memorandum by the Secretariat, Fifty-
Eighth Session, document A/CN.4/565 (10 July 2006), p. 2 (“The individual expulsion, the
collective expulsion and the mass expulsion of aliens may be viewed as being governed by
separate legal regimes and are treated as such for purposes of the present study.”).
669
The first explicit prohibition of collective expulsion appeared in 1968, in Protocol No. 4 of
the ECHR, one year before the entry into force of the CERD. Council of Europe, Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, 4 November 1950, 213
UNTS. 221, Protocol No. 4, (1963), Art. 4 (“Collective expulsion of aliens is prohibited.”).
The prohibition is also reflected in the ICCPR, the International Convention on the Protection
of the Rights of All Migrant Workers and Their Families, the American Convention on
Human Rights (“ACHR”), the African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights (“ACHPR”),
and the Arab Charter on Human Rights. See Vol. III, Annex 93, Human Rights Committee,
General Comment No. 15: The Position of Aliens Under the Covenant (11 April 1986),
para. 10 (stating that Article 13 “entitles each alien to a decision in his own case and,
hence…would not be satisfied with laws or decisions providing for collective or mass
expulsions.”); International Convention on the Protection of the Rights of All Migrant
Workers and Their Families, 18 December 1990, 2220 UNTS 3, Art. 22(1) (“Migrant workers
and members of their families shall not be subject to measures of collective expulsion. Each
case of expulsion shall be examined and decided individually.”); Organization of American
States, American Convention on Human Rights “Pact of San José, Costa Rica”, 22 November
239
speaking, while States are afforded the power to expel non-nationals from their
territories, that right is subject to limitations, most notably those derived from
States’ human rights obligations 670. The Court, interpreting the prohibition on
collective expulsion contained in Articles 12 and 13 of the ICCPR in Diallo,
emphasized that those provisions demand that “an expulsion must not be arbitrary
in nature, since protection against arbitrary treatment lies at the heart of the rights
guaranteed by the international norms protecting human rights” 671. Article 9 of the
ILC Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens (“Draft Articles on Expulsion”)
provides in relevant part:

“(1) For the purposes of the present draft article,

collective expulsion means expulsion of aliens, as a
group.

(2) The collective expulsion of aliens is prohibited.

1969, 1144 UNTS 123, Art. 22(9) (“The collective expulsion of aliens is prohibited.”);
Organization of African Unity, African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, 27 June
1981, 1520 UNTS 217, Art. 12(5) (“The mass expulsion of non-nationals shall be
prohibited.”); League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights, 2 May 2004, Art. 26(2)
(“Collective expulsion is prohibited under all circumstances.”).
670
“Expulsion” is defined broadly in the ILC Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens as: “[A]
formal act or conduct attributable to a State by which an alien is compelled to leave the
territory of that State . . .”. Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens, with commentaries,
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2011, Vol. II, Part Two, Art. 2(a); ibid., Art.
3 (“Expulsion shall be in accordance with the present draft articles, without prejudice to other
applicable rules of international law, in particular those relating to human rights.”); ibid.,
commentary to Art. 3 (“[T]he specific mention of human rights is justified by the importance
that respect for human rights assumes in the context of expulsion, an importance also
underlined by the many provisions of the draft articles devoted to various aspects of the
protection of the human rights of aliens subject to expulsion.”).
671
Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Merits,
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010, para. 65 (referencing Articles 12 and 13 of the ICCPR).

240
(3) A State may expel concomitantly the members
of a group of aliens, provided that the expulsion
takes place after and on the basis of an assessment
of the particular case of each individual member of
the group in accordance with the present draft
articles” 672.

5.12 Specifically, this assessment requires that the grounds for the expulsion
must be “assessed in good faith and reasonably, in the light of all the
circumstances” for the individual non-national 673, and must be stated in the

672
Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens, with commentaries, Yearbook of the International
Law Commission, 2011, Vol. II, Part Two, Art. 9(1)–(3) (emphasis added). The Introduction
to the Draft Articles generally notes that the articles “involve both the codification and the
progressive development of fundamental rules on the expulsion of aliens”. Ibid., p. 2.
Accordingly, certain Draft Articles specify that they constitute progressive development. See,
e.g., commentary to Arts. 23(2), 27, 29 (clarifying that the provisions reflected the
progressive development of international law). Draft Articles 2, 9 and 26, which are relevant
to the scope of the prohibition on collective expulsion, make no such qualification. Third
report on t he expulsion of aliens, by Mr. Maurice Kamto, Special Rapporteur, document
A/CN.4/581 (19 April 2007), para. 115 (“[I]t seems reasonable to suggest that there is a
general principle of international law on this matter that is ‘recognized by civilized nations’
and prohibits collective expulsion. First of all, it would follow from the fact that if the
admission of an alien is an individual right, the loss or denial of this right can only be by an
individual act. Secondly, this rule against collective expulsion is enshrined in three regional
human rights conventions that, among them, cover most States members of the international
community.”); see also ECtHR, Intervener Brief Filed on Behalf of the United Nations High
Commissioner of Human Rights, Hirsi et al v. Italy, Application No. 27765/09 (4 May 2011),
para. 7 (“It may therefore be observed that the prohibition of collective expulsion has evolved
as a principle of general international law.”); OHCHR, Expulsions of aliens in international
human rights law (September 2006), p. 19 (“The scope of the procedural safeguards suggests
that collective expulsions are unlawful under international and regional human rights law.”);
Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the Human Rights of Migrants,
Jorge Bustamante, Seventh Session, document A/HRC/7/12 (25 February 2008), para. 49,
n. 36 (“The prohibition on the collective expulsion of non-nationals is arguably a recognized
principle of international customary law.”); Vol. V, Annex 146, B. Cheng, General
Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts and Tribunals (Cambridge University
Press, 2006), 32–36.
673
Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens, with commentaries, Yearbook of the International
Law Commission, 2011, Vol. II, Part Two, Art. 5(3).

241
decision 674. In addition, prior notice and a reasoned decision that allows the non-
national to understand the basis on which the decision was made are prerequisites
to allow for the decision to be challenged and to fulfill the non-national’s right to
be heard 675.

5.13 In its General Recommendation No. 30, the CERD Committee specifically
stated that the CERD requires that States parties “[e]nsure that non-citizens are
not subject to collective expulsion, in particular in situations where there are
insufficient guarantees that the personal circumstances of each of the persons

674
Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens, with commentaries, Yearbook of the International
Law Commission, 2011, Vol. II, Part Two, Art. 5(1); ibid., Art. 5(3) (“The ground for
expulsion shall be assessed in good faith and reasonably, in light of all the circumstances,
taking into account in particular, where relevant, the gravity of the facts, the conduct of the
alien in question or the current nature of the threat to which the facts give rise.”). The ECtHR
has found six cases of collective expulsion, based on a failure to “afford sufficient guarantees
demonstrating that the personal circumstances of each of those concerned had been genuinely
and individually taken into account.” ECtHR, Čonka v. Belgium, Application No. 51564/99,
Final Judgment (5 May 2002), para. 63; see also ECtHR, Georgia v. Russia (I), Application
No. 13255/07, Judgment (Merits) (3 July 2014); ECtHR, Shioshvili and Others v. Russia,
Application No. 1935607, Final Judgment (20 March 2017); ECtHR Berdzenishvili and
Others v. Russia, Application Nos. 14594/07, 14597/07, 14976/07, 14978/07, 15221/07,
16369/07 and 16706/07, Judgment (Merits) (20 December 2016) (cases in which the
individuals targeted for expulsion shared an origin – Roma families in the first case and
Georgian nationals in the others); ECtHR, Hirsi Jamaa and Others v. Italy, Application No.
27765/09, Judgment, Grand Chambers (23 February 2012) and ECtHR, Sharifi and Others v.
Italy and Greece, Application No. 16643/09, Judgment (21 October 2014) (cases in which
the applicants were members of a category of people—migrants and asylum-seekers); see
also IACtHR, Expelled Dominicans and H aitians v. Dominican Republic, Judgment (28
August 2014), para. 355; IACtHR, Nadege Dorzema et al. v. Dominican Republic, Judgment
(24 October 2012), para. 163 (enumerating the same procedural safeguards).
675
See Draft Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens, with commentaries, Yearbook of the
International Law Commission, 2011, Vol. II, Part Two, Arts. 5(3), 26(1) (setting out a list of
procedural rights that all expelled aliens should enjoy). The commentary to Art. 26 clarifies
the interdependence between certain rights, inter alia, explaining that prior notice—which
includes the stated ground for expulsion—is a “conditio sine qua non for the exercise by an
alien subject to expulsion of all of his or her procedural rights”.

242
concerned have been taken into account” 676. Notably, the CERD Committee
confirmed that the inherently arbitrary and indiscriminate character of collective
expulsion negates any claim that it could be proportional to achieve a legitimate
objective 677. The CERD Committee has also emphasized that States parties must
ensure that:

“laws concerning deportation or other forms of

removal of non-citizens from the jurisdiction of the
State party do not discriminate in purpose or effect
among non-citizens on t he basis of race, colour or
ethnic or national origin, and that non-citizens have
equal access to effective remedies, including the
right to challenge expulsion orders, and are allowed
effectively to pursue such remedies” 678.

5.14 Likewise, in its practice, the CERD Committee has expressed concerns
over situations of “collective deportations (repatriations)” taking place “without
guarantee of due process” and in that regard, has recommended that States parties

676
Vol. IV, Annex 109, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 30 on discrimination
against non-citizens, Sixty-fifth session (2005), para. 26 (emphases added).
677
See Vol. IV, Annex 109, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 30 on
discrimination against non-citizens, Sixty-fifth session (2005), para. 4.
678
Vol. IV, Annex 109, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 30 on discrimination
against non-citizens, Sixty-fifth session (2005), para. 25 (emphasis added). The CERD
establishes a protective human rights framework that limits the rights of States parties to
expel groups on certain discriminatory grounds. Even outside of a protective framework,
general international law establishes minimum standards that must be respected: these
include protection from an “abrupt expulsion, or expulsion in an offensive manner”, neither
of which would provide minimum due process rights, such as the right to receive notice of
the expulsion, the right to challenge the expulsion, the right to a hearing before a fair and
impartial tribunal, the right to counsel, the right to an appeal or the right to consular
protection. W. Kidane, “Procedural Due Process in the Expulsion of Aliens Under
International, United States, and European Union Law: A Comparative Analysis”, 27 Emory
International Law Review (2013) 285, p. 292.

243
to the CERD “ensure that non-citizens are not subject to collective expulsion.”679
In particular, in Concluding Observations adopted with respect to the Dominican
Republic in 2008, the CERD Committee highlighted that collective expulsion is
incompatible with Articles 5(a) and 6 of the CERD, and called attention to
instances in which “migrants of Haitian origin” were deported to Haiti without
“equal access to effective remedies” such as “the right to challenge expulsion
orders” 680.

5.15 Notably, neither Article 1(2) nor Article 1(3) reserves to a State party the
discretion to compel all nationals of a single country to depart from the host
State’s territory. As set out above, Article 1(2) allows States parties to make
“distinctions, exclusions, restrictions, or preferences . . . between citizens and non-
citizens”, but does not provide a similar privilege for distinctions between
different groups of non-nationals 681. And as confirmed by the CERD Committee,
collective expulsion on the basis of national origin is unlawful under the CERD
precisely because its arbitrary and sweeping nature negates any claim that its
expulsion is in the service of a legitimate aim or constitutes proportional means to
achieve such an aim; in other words, where a State does not assess the particular

679
CERD Committee, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, Dominican Republic, document CERD/C/DOM/CO/12 (March 2008),
para. 13(b).
680
CERD Committee, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, Dominican Republic, document CERD/C/DOM/CO/12 (March 2008),
para. 13.
681
See para. 3.47, above.

244
case of each individual, it has the clear purpose and effect of impairing the non-
nationals’ fundamental due process rights 682.

5.16 Likewise, Article 1(3) preserves for States parties their legal provisions
“concerning nationality, citizenship or naturalization”, but “provided that such
provisions do not discriminate against any particular nationality” 683, which cannot
justify collective expulsion on the basis of national origin.

5.17 In sum, the CERD prohibits the collective expulsion of a group of non-
nationals on the basis of their national origin as impermissible racial
discrimination under Article 1(1), in violation of Articles 2(1), 5(a) and 6. In the
circumstances before the Court of a State directive ordering a particular group of
non-nationals collectively to leave the State’s territory, and cutting them off from
their homes, families, livelihoods and/or property, these rights are even more
significant.

B. THE UAE COLLECTIVELY EXPELLED QATARIS FROM ITS TERRITORY IN

VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 2(1)

5.18 The only basis for the UAE’s differential treatment of Qataris in its
Expulsion Order and Absolute Travel Ban was their national origin. The UAE
made no provision for the consideration of the specific circumstances of

682
See Vol. IV, Annex 109, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 30 on
discrimination against non-citizens, Sixty-fifth session (2005), paras. 25–26; see also Draft
Articles on the Expulsion of Aliens, with commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law
Commission, 2011, Vol. II, Part Two, Arts. 9(1), 26 (stipulating the prohibition of collective
expulsion and the protection of fundamental procedural rights respectively).
683
Vol. III, Annex 92, CERD, Art. 1(3).

245
individual Qataris. And it made no provision for Qataris to exercise their
fundamental due process rights to challenge the order or regarding its application
to their individual cases.

5.19 The UAE’s actions in these respects impacted Qataris who were living in
the UAE prior to 5 June 2017 and who were expelled and prohibited from
returning to the UAE. In most instances, the Qataris expelled by the UAE were
present in their homes in the UAE on 5 June 2017 and forced to flee by virtue of
the Expulsion Order. In some instances, Qataris living in the UAE happened to be
outside the UAE on that day—often visiting family in Qatar in light of the timing
of the UAE’s actions to coincide with the holy month of Ramadan—and could not
return to their homes in the UAE due to the Absolute Travel Ban.

5.20 The UAE’s Expulsion Order and Absolute Travel Ban violate Article
2(1)’s prohibition of any act or practice of racial discrimination for two primary
reasons. First, the purpose of the Expulsion Order and Absolute Travel Ban—on
their face—was to single out and collectively expel Qataris from the UAE on the
basis of their national origin without regard for their fundamental rights of due
process or consideration of the impact on any other rights (Part 1). Second, the
effect of the Expulsion Order and Absolute Travel Ban was the collective
expulsion of Qataris from the territory of the UAE and thus the nullification and
impairment of their right to due process (Part 2).

1. The Purpose of the Expulsion Order and Absolute Travel Ban Was to
Collectively Expel Qataris from the UAE

5.21 The UAE’s Expulsion Order and Absolute Travel Ban issued by the
UAE’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, both individually and taken together,

246
constitute State acts of collective expulsion of all Qataris living in the UAE, in
violation of Article 2(1).

5.22 First, the UAE has committed a textbook act of collective expulsion.
The language used by the UAE in its Expulsion Order and Absolute Travel Ban
was precise, mandatory and directed at all Qataris: “[i]t has been decided to take
the following measures . . . giving Qatari residents and visitors in the UAE
14 days to leave the country for precautionary security reasons” and “preventing”
Qataris “from entering the UAE or crossing its points of entry” 684. The UAE
actually admits that the very purpose of the 5 June Directive was to coerce the
Qatari State to yield sovereign control over internal and external policy by virtue
of acceding to its Thirteen Demands and Six Principles 685. And the chosen means
was the collective punishment of Qataris.

5.23 By issuing the Expulsion Order and Absolute Travel Ban in blanket
terms, the UAE thus made no provision for “the personal circumstances of each of
the persons concerned [to] have been taken into account” 686. No attempt was made
to consider the individual circumstances of a single Qatari in the UAE before
ordering them to leave as a group. Nor did the UAE make provision for any
procedural standards, much less guaranteed “minimum procedural standards” 687.

684
Vol. II, Annex 1, United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UAE supports
statements of Kingdom of Bahrain and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on Qatar (5 June 2017)
(emphases added).
685
CR 2018/13, p. 12, para. 8 (Alnowais); see para 1.19, above.
686
Vol. IV, Annex 109, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 30 on discrimination
against non-citizens, Sixty-fifth session (2005), para. 26.
687
Yeager v. Iran, Partial Award No. 324-10199-1, 1987 WL 503859 (2 November 1987,
Chamber One), paras. 49–50.

247
Qataris were given no notice of what was going to happen, no individualized
reasons for their expulsion, and no legal recourse to challenge either the Expulsion
Order or the Absolute Travel Ban, to contest their application to their particular
situation or to seek effective (or indeed any) remedies. In short, the UAE’s actions
in these respects are plainly arbitrary and indiscriminate and constitute
impermissible racial discrimination.

5.24 Second, and as set out above, collective expulsion by definition is an

illegitimate and disproportionate means of achieving any goal. The UAE’s
actions, therefore, cannot be justified on any grounds. But the UAE’s stated
“national security” justification does not even make sense as the purported basis
for its targeting of Qataris: the UAE has only ever referred, wrongly, to the Qatari
State, and its alleged support for and financing of terrorist groups, to support its
supposed national security concerns, not Qatari civilians.

5.25 Third, the UAE’s various attempts to evade responsibility under the
CERD by mischaracterizing the nature of the Expulsion Order itself—to argue
that it is not actually an order—are unavailing. At the provisional measures
hearing, the UAE alleged that the 5 June Directive was merely a “political
statement” issued by a State organ without authority to order such an expulsion688.
But whether or not the Ministry of Foreign Affairs was acting within its
competence or by supposedly informal means is irrelevant: the 5 June Directive

688
CR 2018/13, p. 64, para. 25 (Shaw).

248
was an act of State issued by a State organ, and as such constitutes an act
engaging the UAE’s international responsibility689.

5.26 The UAE’s further argument that it did not implement “the necessary
legal and administrative orders and regulations” to render the 5 June Directive
“binding” 690 also cannot excuse its conduct. As noted, the UAE ordered Qataris to
leave the UAE in 14 days; there was nothing ambiguous about it. The language
was not precatory, it was not conditioned on further steps to be taken, and there
certainly was no reference to the need for further implementing laws or
regulations, as the UAE has argued post hoc to justify its actions.

5.27 Equally, the context of the 5 June Directive puts a lie to the UAE’s
excuses: by expelling Qatari diplomats and severing all relations with the State of
Qatar 691, eliminating flight paths between the UAE and Doha 692, and banning

689
See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with
commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II (Part Two),
Arts. 4, 7. Further, the level of formality associated with a State’s act is irrelevant, and
international tribunals have held States liable for wrongful expulsion even where an
individual was just told to leave by Government officials rather than subject to a written
expulsion order. See, e.g., Yeager v. Iran, Partial Award No. 324-10199-1, 1987 WL 503859
(2 November 1987, Chamber One); see also Alfred L. W. Short v. Iran, Award No. 312-
11135-3, 1987 WL 503820 (14 July 1987, Chamber Three) (“[A]n alien may . . . be
considered wrongfully expelled in the absence of any order or specific state action, when, in
the circumstances of the case, the alien could reasonably be regarded as having no other
choice than to leave and when the acts leading to his departure were attributable to the
State.”).
690
CR 2018/13, p. 64, para. 25 (Shaw).
691
Vol. II, Annex 1, United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UAE supports
statements of Kingdom of Bahrain and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on Qatar (5 June 2017).
692
Vol. II, Annex 1, United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UAE supports
statements of Kingdom of Bahrain and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on Qatar (5 June 2017).

249
Qataris from re-entering the country693, the UAE made clear that it meant what it
said in the Expulsion Order. Notably, the UAE does not, and cannot, argue that
these other orders—issued in a single statement by the UAE in the 5 June
Directive—were not mandatory. It is simply not credible to suggest that the 5 June
Directive was intended to have mandatory effect with regard to each of its
provisions except for the expulsion of Qataris.

5.28 It is equally not credible for the UAE to suggest that the Expulsion
Order was not mandatory when it explicitly stated that the expulsion was for
“precautionary security reasons”. 694 In other words, the Order clearly was backed
by the full power of the UAE Government’s security apparatus. As noted earlier,
this apparatus is notorious for its human rights abuses, particularly with respect to
what Human Rights Watch has called the UAE’s “brutally repressive” approach to
suppressing any form of political criticism 695, and systemic failure to guarantee

693
Vol. II, Annex 1, United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UAE supports
statements of Kingdom of Bahrain and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on Qatar (5 June 2017).
694
Vol. II, Annex 1, United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UAE supports
statements of Kingdom of Bahrain and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on Qatar (5 June 2017),
p. 2 (emphasis added).
695
Vol. V, Annex 138, Human Rights Watch, UAE: Award-Winning Activist Jailed for 10 Years
(1 June 2018), [Link]
years (concluding that the “UAE has exposed itself as a brutally repressive place more
interested in sending rights defenders to rot in jail than in any real reform”). In its submission
for the 2018 Universal Periodic Review of the UAE, in June 2017, Human Rights Watch
found that “[t]he UAE arbitrarily detains, and in some cases forcibly disappears, individuals
who criticize authorities” within the UAE’s borders. Vol. V, Annex 130, Human Rights
Watch, Submission for the Universal Periodic Review of the United Arab Emirates (29 June
2017), [Link]
arab-emirates; see also United States Department of State Bureau of Democracy, Human
Rights and Labor, United Arab Emirates 2017 H uman Rights Report (2017), p. 5,
[Link] (“The government, however,
reportedly often held persons in custody for extended periods without charge or a preliminary
judicial hearing.”); Reprieve, Reprieve Submission to the United Nations Universal Period
Review (June 2017), n. 5 (“Rights groups have condemned the [counterterrorism] law for its
250
the right to a fair trial and humane conditions in detention, particularly for those
arrested on national security-related charges 696.

5.29 Tellingly, the UAE took no action at the time to retract or clarify the
Expulsion Order as a “non-binding policy”, not to be followed. To the contrary,
the UAE—through its State media platforms, including the official Emirates News
Agency—disseminated the Expulsion Order and Absolute Travel Ban widely in
the days and weeks that followed their issuance 697. The UAE also made certain
that the Expulsion Order was communicated to as many Qataris as possible by
removing—for that one day only—its pre-existing block on Al Jazeera’s satellite

propensity to be applied against perceived political opponents.”); Alkarama Foundation,

Universal Periodic Review: United Arab Emirates (29 June 2017), Sec. 3.2 (“State Security
Forces . . . continue to arrest lawyers, professors, human rights defenders and anyone critical
of the government, without a warrant or informing the individuals of the reason for their
arrest.”); Vol. V, Annex 124, International Federation for Human Rights, United Arab
Emirates: Criminalising Dissent UAE 94 Trial Deeply Flawed, Judicial Observation Report,
(August 2013); Americans for Democracy and Human Rights in Bahrain, Oral Intervention at
the 38th session of the United Nations Human Rights Council (2 July 2018),
[Link]
GD_UAE_YH.pdf (“[T]he UAE frequently arbitrarily detains and forcibly disappears
residents who have spoken about human rights or criticized the Emirati government. While in
detention, they are at severe risk of torture and abuse.”).
696
Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on the independence of judges and
lawyers, document A/HRC/29/26/Add.2 (5 May 2015), paras. 50–51; see Chap. IV, Sec. I.B.,
above; “Why is the UAE’s legal system being criticised?”, BBC News (22 November 2018),
[Link] Alkarama Foundation, Universal Periodic
Review: United Arab Emirates, p. 5 (29 June 2017) (“Following her visit to the UAE in 2014,
the former SRIJL reported that more than 200 complaints of torture and ill-treatment had
been presented before judges and prosecutors, but were not investigated or accounted for in
judicial proceedings.”).
697
See Chap. II, Secs. II.A–B, above.

251
distribution website in the UAE: on 5 June, there were nearly 600 page views, up
from almost zero the day before, and dropping back to zero the day afterwards 698.

5.30 Further, when the Qatari Embassy in Abu Dhabi tweeted that “Qatari
citizens must leave the United Arab Emirates within 14 days according to the
statement issued by Emirati competent authorities”, no clarification or correction
was forthcoming from the UAE 699. That would have been the logical response had
the Expulsion Order truly been issued “without authority” or was intended not to
be binding.

5.31 In fact, the UAE’s statements before the Court denying the mandatory
purpose of the 5 June Expulsion Order contradict its representations to other UN
bodies. In its September 2017 response to UN Special Rapporteurs’ joint letter
expressing concern at the human rights impacts of the UAE’s Discriminatory
Measures, the UAE admitted that:

“the United Arab Emirates severed diplomatic ties

with Qatar on 5 June 2017, at which point all Qatari
residents in the United Arab Emirates were ordered

698
Vol. XII, Annex 264, DCL-181 Witness Declaration, Al Jazeera Media Network
Representative, para. 8.
699
Vol. II, Annex 1, United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UAE supports
statements of Kingdom of Bahrain and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on Qatar (5 June 2017)
(emphasis added).

252
to leave the country within 14 days and all Emirati
residents in Qatar were instructed likewise.” 700

5.32 And finally, contrary to the UAE’s current, self-serving argument, at

the time, Emirati officials themselves viewed the Expulsion Order and Absolute
Travel Ban as binding. For example, on the morning of 5 June, the Qatari
Ambassador was called to a high-level meeting with the UAE authorities, at
which it was confirmed to them that the terms of the 5 June Directive were
mandatory and that all Qataris had to leave the country within 14 days 701.
Individual Qataris were likewise told by Emirati officials that compliance with the
Expulsion Order was mandatory 702.

5.33 In sum, the UAE’s Expulsion Order and Absolute Travel Ban, both
individually and taken together, are explicit acts of racial discrimination on the

700
Vol. II, Annex 23, Reply of the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the
United Nations Office in Geneva to the Joint Communication from the Special Procedures
Mandate Holders of the Human Rights Council, document HRC/NONE/2017/112 (18
September 2017), p. 2 (emphasis added).
701
Vol. XII, Annex 264, DCL-181 Witness Declaration, Al Jazeera Media Network
Representative, para. 8. While the UAE appears to contend that “[m]any of the persons who
left were strongly encouraged to do so by instructions issued by the Embassy of Qatar in the
UAE on 5 June 2017”, CR 2018/13, p. 12, para. 11 (Alnowais), this is misleading and
incorrect. As noted above, the Embassy re-tweeted the UAE’s own announcement of the 5
June Directive to convey information to its citizens, informed them that Qatari diplomatic
staff had been expelled, and tried to assist with information about travel routes for those that
called. The only “instruction” that compelled Qataris to leave the UAE was the UAE’s
Expulsion Order. See Chap. II, Sec. II.A, above.
702
See, e.g., Vol. VII, Annex 170, DCL-011, paras. 11–12, 14 (“The policeman then instructed
my wife that our children . . . would have to leave the UAE as soon as possible because they
are Qatari.”); Vol. IX, Annex 204, DCL-076, paras. 14, 18 (“[T)he official told me that if I
did not leave before the deadline, the government would take action against me.”); Vol. IX,
Annex 222, DCL-105, para. 12 (“[A] police officer approached . . . and reminded me
that . . . I had to leave the territory. . . . [and] that if I decided to stay, the police would “deal
with me”. . . . He ended the conversation by stating that he was executing orders[.]”).

253
basis of national origin as defined by Article 1(1) and constitute the collective
expulsion of all Qataris living in the UAE, in violation of Article 2(1) of the
CERD.

2. The Expulsion Order and Absolute Travel Ban Had the Effect of Expelling
Qataris on a Collective Basis

5.34 Further and in addition, the Expulsion Order and the Absolute Travel
Ban had their intended effect: the collective expulsion of thousands of Qataris
from the UAE without regard for their personal circumstances and without
affording them any fundamental due process rights prior to being expelled.

5.35 First, Qataris were expelled. 72 of the individual complainants to the

CCC stated that they fled the UAE in response to the Expulsion Order. A
representative sample of 38 Qataris submitted declarations documenting their
expulsion as a result of the UAE’s actions and demonstrating that they were not
provided the requisite due process protections 703. These declarants had lived for
years, and in some cases, decades, in the UAE. Those declarants who were in their
homes in the UAE on 5 June 2017 were forced to leave behind their families,
lives, studies, friends and possessions in a matter of days and with no
consideration having been given to their personal circumstances 704. One Qatari,
who had lived in the UAE for almost two decades, stated that:

703
See Vol. XII, Annex 272, Affidavit, State of Qatar Compensation Claims Committee,
Exhibit B (Portion of CCC Claims Database related to the UAE). 52 individuals fled between
5 and 18 June; 4 fled following the 14-day grace period; and another 16 individuals reported
that they were in the UAE on 5 June, but did not specify the date upon which they left the
UAE for Qatar.
704
Vol. VII, Annex 163, DCL-001, paras. 7, 11 (“I was shocked . . . . I was also confused: what
had I done that meant the UAE wanted to kick me out of the country? I did not want to leave
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“I could not believe the news. . . . It was hard to
digest what was happening—I had been living in the
UAE for almost 20 years, and suddenly I was
supposed to leave my family, my home, my
businesses and everything I knew.” 705

5.36 Of those affected, some individuals happened to be outside the UAE on

5 June 2017, and while not forced to flee, they nevertheless experienced the same
painful result of being expelled from their homes and cut off from their lives in
the UAE by virtue of the Expulsion Order and Absolute Ban 706. The UAE’s

the UAE, because my entire life was there. But once I knew that the government had ordered
me to leave, I felt that I needed to return to Qatar as quickly as possible.”); Vol. VII, Annex
180, DCL-028, paras. 9, 24, 30 (“I lost my life in the UAE—the man I was about to marry,
my friends. . . . My life fell apart.”); Vol. XI, Annex 247, DCL-161, paras. 5, 6, 21, 26 (“The
UAE forced me to abandon the independent life I built for myself there. With only two weeks
notice, I had to leave my home, my career, and my friends.”); see also Vol. VII, Annex 166,
DCL-005, paras. 8, 15; Vol. VII, Annex 167, DCL-006, paras. 6–7, 15; Vol. VII, Annex
168, DCL-009, paras. 7, 12; Vol. VII, Annex 172, DCL-013, paras. 7, 16; Vol. VII, Annex
173, DCL-018, paras. 5, 7; Vol. VII, Annex 175, DCL-020; Vol. VII, Annex 175, DCL-021,
paras. 6, 16; Vol. VII, Annex 176, DCL-022, paras. 4–5, 8; Vol. VII, Annex 177, DCL-024,
paras. 6, 15; Vol. VII, Annex 178, DCL-025, paras. 6–7, 11; Vol. VII, Annex 179, DCL-
027, paras. 7–8, 18; Vol. VIII, Annex 187, DCL-038, paras. 6–7, 14; Vol. VIII, Annex 188,
DCL-040, paras. 6, 12–13; Vol. VIII, Annex 190, DCL-043, paras. 6–7, 21; Vol.
VIII, Annex 191, DCL-046, paras. 6, 16–17; Vol. VIII, Annex 200, DCL-070, paras. 7, 15–
17; Vol. VIII, Annex 201, DCL-072, paras. 7, 16; Vol. IX, Annex 204, DCL-076, paras. 13,
20; Vol. IX, Annex 205, DCL-078, paras. 6–7, 14; Vol. IX, Annex 208, DCL-082, paras. 7,
18; Vol. IX, Annex 209, DCL-083, paras. 6–7, 16; Vol. IX, Annex 213, DCL-089, paras. 5–
6, 8–9; Vol. IX, Annex 214, DCL-091, paras.5, 8; Vol. IX, Annex 222, DCL-105, paras. 5,
13; Vol. X, Annex 225, DCL-109, paras. 10–11, 14; Vol. X, Annex 236, DCL-139, paras. 7,
11; Vol. X, Annex 238, DCL-143, paras. 11–12; Vol. X, Annex 239, DCL-144, paras. 8, 16;
Vol. X, Annex 240, DCL-145, paras. 10, 15; Vol. XI, Annex 247, DCL-161, paras. 5, 6, 21;
Vol. XI, Annex 253, DCL-168, paras. 5,18; Vol. XI, Annex 256, DCL-172, para. 7, 8, 14;
Vol. XI, Annex 259, DCL-175, paras. 5–6, 14–15; Vol. XII, Annex 268, DCL-185, paras. 6,
9; Vol. XII, Annex 270, DCL-188, paras. 8–9, 11.
705
Vol. IX, Annex 204, DCL-076, paras. 11, 13.
706
See, e.g., Vol. VII, Annex 169, DCL-010, para. 21 (“The greatest impact of the UAE’s
measures was to deprive me of my home in the UAE. I had a house, a car, and a life there . . .
Suddenly, and without warning, all of that was taken away from me.”); Vol. VIII, Annex
192, DCL-047, para. 22 (“Being separated from life in the UAE and my family has caused
me a lot of stress and emotional pain. The UAE was my second home where I had my work
255
expulsion was not restricted to Qatari individuals, and included Qatari
corporations expelled without notice or other due process, and swiftly enforced by
the authorities, including the police forces 707.

5.37 In their declarations submitted to the Court, Qataris uniformly described

their shock upon hearing of the sudden Expulsion Order on 5 June, and of learning
that they had to leave the UAE within a matter of days 708. Qataris consistently
described the fear of remaining in the UAE contrary to the Expulsion Order 709. As

and my family.”); Vol. IX, Annex 224, DCL-108, paras. 5, 18, 21 (“I moved to [the UAE] in
the mid 1980s . . . On June 5, 2017, I was away home from, travelling in China for business
. . . My family has lost everything as a result of the UAE’s decision to sever ties with Qatar
and order Qataris to leave the country: We lost our home, most of our belongings, and the
lives we had built for ourselves in [the UAE].”); Vol. VIII, Annex 196, DCL-056, paras 25-
26; Vol. X, Annex 226, DCL-112, paras. 11, 19.
707
The CERD protects the rights of legal persons, as well as those of individuals. See para.
5.147, below. Qatar Airways received notification by text that its licences had been
cancelled; that very day and the day following, the UAE authorities – including the police
forces – entered the QA premises to enforce the swift closure of its offices. Vol. XI,
Annex 244, DCL-151 Witness Declaration, Qatar Airways Representative, paras. 14–18.
708
See, e.g., para 5.35, nn. 696, 697, above; Vol. VII, Annex 175, DCL-021, para. 8 (“I was
shocked by the news. . . . When I saw that it was a government body in the UAE that had
issued the order that Qataris had to leave the country, I understood that it was mandatory. I
would have to abandon my apartment and my studies . . .”); Vol. VIII, Annex 190, DCL-
043, paras. 11–12 (“I was shocked. It was hard to believe. How could the UAE do this to its
neighbor, brothers and sisters to one another?”); Vol. XI, Annex 247, DCL-161, paras. 11–13
(“The news confirmed everything[.] … Qataris had 14 days to leave the UAE and would be
banned from reentering and entering the country. It was overwhelming and surreal. Upon
seeing the news broadcast on television, I fainted and became ill.”); see also Vol. VII,
Annex 163, DCL-001, paras. 8–9; Vol. VII, Annex 166, DCL-005, paras. 9–10, 12;
Vol. VII, Annex 167, DCL-006, paras. 10–13; Vol. VII, Annex 174, DCL-020, para. 9;
Vol. VII, Annex 177, DCL-024, paras. 11–12; Vol. VII, Annex 180, DCL-028, paras. 12,
19; Vol. VIII, Annex 187, DCL-038, para. 9; Vol. VIII, Annex 191, DCL-046, paras. 11–
13; Vol. VIII, Annex 195, DCL-053, para. 8; Vol. VIII, Annex 201, DCL-072, paras. 9, 14–
15; Vol. IX, Annex 209, DCL-083, paras. 10–12; Vol. XI, Annex 256, DCL-172, paras. 13–
14; Vol. XI, Annex 259, DCL-175, paras. 10–12.
709
See, e.g., Vol. VII, Annex 163, DCL-001, para. 11 (“I was so scared that I did not leave my
apartment that day until it was time to go to the airport….”); Vol. VIII, Annex 190, DCL-
256
one Qatari student living in the UAE explained: “[s]uddenly, the place I
considered my home had become a scary place to live. Why? Simply because I
was a Qatari” 710.

5.38 Many Qataris fled the UAE on 5 and 6 June 2017, leaving behind
everything but their most essential belongings. As one Qatari student explained:

“As I was leaving in a state of emergency, I packed

my most prized possessions into my car with the
help of my [redacted] friends. I was forced to leave
the majority of my belongings behind, including all
my furniture, a refrigerator, an oven and other
kitchen appliances, cutlery, electronic items, and
video games. I eventually left my apartment at
12:30 a.m. on 6 June, and have not returned to the
UAE since.” 711

043, paras. 12, 15 (“The message that I heard was therefore loud and clear: Qataris are not
welcome in the UAE. I suddenly felt very unsafe and under threat. I felt like I was a Qatari in
‘enemy territory,’ vulnerable to harassment and even attack.”); Vol. VIII, Annex 200, DCL-
070, paras. 11, 16 (“I became terrified that I would be arrested and that my family would
never know where I was taken.”); Vol. X, Annex 259, DCL-175, para. 13 (“The UAE’s
government shows no tolerance to its own people, why would they show mercy to me—
someone they had ordered to leave the country?”); Vol. VII, Annex 166, DCL-005, para. 11;
Vol. VII, Annex 167, DCL-006, paras. 10, 14–15 Vol. VII, Annex 168, DCL-009, para. 11;
Vol. VII, Annex 174, DCL-020, para. 10; Vol. VII, Annex 175, DCL-021, para. 14; Vol.
VII, Annex 176, DCL-022, para. 7; Vol. VII, Annex 177, DCL-024, para. 14; Vol. VII,
Annex 178, DCL-025, para. 8; Vol. VII, Annex 179, DCL-027, paras. 12–13; Vol. VIII,
Annex 187, DCL-038, para. 12; Vol. IX, Annex 204, DCL-076, para. 18; Vol. IX, Annex
205, DCL-078, paras. 11-12 ; DCL-082, para. 16; Vol. VIII, Annex 209, DCL-083, para. 15;
Vol. IX, Annex 213, DCL-089, para. 9; Vol. IX, Annex 214, DCL-091, para. 8; Vol. IX,
Annex 215, DCL-092, para.11; Vol. XI, Annex 247, DCL-161, para. 18; Vol. XI, Annex
253, DCL-168, paras. 16–17.
710
Vol. VIII, Annex 200, DCL-070, para. 11.
711
Vol. VII, Annex 177, DCL-024, para. 15; see also Vol. VII, Annex 178, DCL-025, para. 21
(“Leaving a country that I considered to be my home, after [redacted] years, with only a
small bag of my belongings and the clothes I was wearing, has left me completely broken,
257
5.39 A Qatari who had worked in the UAE for over a decade prior to the
Expulsion Order described the tense atmosphere at his office on the morning of 5
June, as non-Qatari managers called an emergency meeting with the company’s
Qatari employees: “[e]veryone understood that the UAE’s announcement meant
we had to leave the country, and we agreed that [we] . . . would leave the UAE
that same day.” 712 He also described the experience of leaving the UAE to return
to Qatar:

“I packed up as many of my valuables as I could in

the time I had available[.] . . . Then I took a car to
[redacted] airport and boarded the Qatar Airways
flight to Doha . . . [S]everal other Qataris, including
my colleagues . . . were on the same flight. We did
not talk about the situation or the fact that we were
leaving the UAE. Everyone looked tired and upset,
and I could feel that we were all tense and very
stressed” 713

5.40 As another Qatari business-owner explained,

with no sense of purpose. I am very depressed and feel like I have lost everything.”); Vol. X,
Annex 239, DCL-144, para. 16 (“I left of my belongings in my apartment in the UAE. I only
brought my laptop and a few clothes.”); Vol. VII, Annex 163, DCL-001, para. 11; Vol. VII,
Annex 166, DCL-005, para. 22; Vol. VII, Annex 179, DCL-027, para. 17.
712
Vol. VII, Annex 179, DCL-027, para. 15. Other declarants explain their understanding of the
mandatory nature of the Expulsion Order, see, e.g., para. 5.35, n. 696, para. 5.37, nn. 700 and
701; Vol. VII, Annex 167, DCL-006, para. 13 (“All of us knew that we had to obey the order
to leave the country. It was a direct instruction coming from the UAE authorities.”); Vol. XI,
Annex 259, DCL-175, para. 11 (“I immediately understood that this was a mandatory order.
The fact that the government had placed a time limit in which to comply indicated to me that
if I did not follow the terms of the announcement, I would face repercussions from the
government.”).
713
Vol. VII, Annex 179, DCL-027, paras. 17–18; see also Vol. VII, Annex 166, DCL-005 (“I
recognized around [redacted] other [redacted] on the flight [to Doha] as fellow Qataris
…[they] seemed afraid and tense, as if we were all in shock and unable to really process or
discuss what had just happened to us.”).

258
“After June 5, I was so busy putting in place
processes for the company to continue operations in
my absence that I did not have time to think about
what to do with my apartment or personal
belongings in the UAE. When I left the UAE, I
carried a few items that I would need immediately
back to Doha with me, but left everything else . . . in
the apartment.” 714

5.41 Several Qatari students who were living in the UAE in order to study at
Emirati universities fled the UAE in the middle of their exam periods and could
not sit for their exams. 715 Indeed, the Expulsion Order was enforced by the
Universities in the UAE themselves, many of which expelled Qatari students
simply because they were Qatari. According to the OHCHR, writing only six
months after the UAE issued its Expulsion Order and Absolute Travel Ban:

“[t]he expulsion of Qatari students who were

studying in KSA, UAE, Bahrain and Egypt has had
a detrimental effect on the right to education as
Qatari students who were prevented from either
pursuing their studies or passing their exams.
Students in KSA, Bahrain, and reportedly
particularly in UAE, were ordered to immediately
return to Qatar, often by the administration of
universities. According to information collected by
the team, this was generally not followed by any
formal or personalized communication.” 716

714
Vol. XI, Annex 253, DCL-168, para. 19.
715
See, e.g., Vol. VII, Annex 163, DCL-001, para. 12; Vol. VII, Annex 166, DCL-005, para. 6;
Vol. VII, Annex 167, DCL-006, para. 15; Vol. VII, Annex 175, DCL-021, paras. 15–16;
Vol. VIII, Annex 190, DCL-043, para. 15; Vol. IX, Annex 222, DCL-105, para. 15; Vol. X,
Annex 239, DCL-144, para. 15; Vol. XI, Annex 256, DCL-172, para. 13.
716
Vol. III, Annex 98, OHCHR Report, para. 50 (emphasis added).

259
5.42 One Qatari student described how he was removed from campus in the
middle of an exam on 16 June:

“a University security guard accompanied by a

member of the University’s administration walked
into the exam hall. The security guard looked
around the room and pointed at three Qataris,
myself included, and asked us to stand up and leave
the hall . . . The security guard . . . said that we
should no longer enter the University campus, and
that we should leave the UAE given the 5 June
announcement.” 717

5.43 Another Qatari studying in the UAE was informed by an administrator

that she was “no longer a student” of her university 718. A Qatari student
enrolled at a public Emirati institution received an email stating that the
registration of all Qatari students in his program had been frozen 719.

717
Vol. IX, Annex 222, DCL-105, paras. 10-11.
718
Vol. VIII, Annex 200, DCL-028, para. 14; see also Vol. VII, Annex 249, DCL-164, para. 12
(“I received an email to my student account from the head of my college apologizing and
informing me that I would not be able to continue with my [redacted] program.”).
719
Vol. VIII, Annex 202, DCL-073, para. 18; see also European Parliament Subcommittee on
Human Rights, Testimony of Jawaher Al Meer (19 February 2019 at [Link]),
[Link]
TTEE-DROI (describing her experience as a Qatari student at the Sorbonne, Abu Dhabi at
the time of the 5 June Directive: “I emailed the admission saying what can I do, what’s next.
They sent me an email the second day…I open the attachment and found a transfer paper to
Paris. Without any explanation whatsoever. . . . I got the emotional shock, the cultural shock..
all shocks possible in 20 days.…So meanwhile, in the same time of going to classes, I had to
do legal papers, finish my apartment, skyping the shipment company in Abu Dhabi to pick up
my things . . . I put pressure on my family emotionally, financially, god knows how much
they paid. I was always the daughter that they’ll do the best for education… but not that
much, it was too much to handle.”).

260
5.44 Of course, the number of CCC claimants and declarants substantially
understates the number of Qataris impacted, as they include only those who
stepped forward to self-report 720. The actual number of Qataris impacted is far
greater. For example, passenger records maintained by Qatar Airways show
that a total of 2,651 Qataris flew to Doha on Qatar Airways’ flights from the
UAE, Kuwait and Oman during the 14-day grace period between 5 and 18 June
2017 721.

5.45 Before the UAE’s aviation restrictions on direct flights between the two
countries went into effect in the early hours of 6 June, 172 Qataris departed the
UAE on Qatar Airways’ final flights from the country; 107 of those Qataris
purchased their tickets on 5 June in order to leave the country hours later. 722

5.46 As a result of the UAE’s decision to cut direct air routes between the
UAE and Qatar on 6 June, Qataris fleeing the UAE after that date and choosing
to fly could do so only indirectly, many through the traditional transit hubs of
Kuwait and Oman. While Qatar cannot obtain confirmation that all of the
passengers from Kuwait and Oman originated from the UAE, the ticket
purchase timing and anomalous travel patterns of Qataris using these routes
indicate a strong link to the UAE’s actions. Of the Qataris flying from Kuwait
City and Muscat to Doha on Qatar Airways flights during the first two days of

720
Vol. XII, Annex 272, Affidavit, State of Qatar Compensation Claims Committee.
721
Vol. XI, Annex 244, DCL-151 Witness Declaration, Qatar Airways Representative, paras.
25, 29.
722
Vol. XI, Annex 244, DCL-151 Witness Declaration, Qatar Airways Representative, para. 26.

261
the grace period alone, 485 purchased their tickets after the UAE ordered
Qataris to leave the country 723.

5.47 During the entire 14-day evacuation period (including after direct
flights were cut off on 6 June 2017), a total of 2,479 Qataris flew to Doha from
airports in Oman and Kuwait; of this group, the vast majority—1,966 Qataris—
purchased their tickets after the UAE ordered Qataris to leave the country on
5 June 724. These numbers of travelers were exponentially larger than the
number in comparable periods in comparable years. The average number of
Qataris flying from Kuwait City increased by as much as 396% 725, while the
average number of Qataris flying from Muscat increased by as much as
825% 726. On Tuesday, 6 June—the first full day in which there were no direct
flights linking the UAE to Qatar—353 Qataris traveled from Kuwait City to
Doha—an increase of up to 4,313% compared to prior average use of this route
by Qataris 727. Notably, even these numbers depicting the flight of thousands of
Qataris significantly understate the total number of Qataris who fled, as they do
not include individuals who departed on airlines other than Qatar Airways or
by land for the seven-to-eight-hour car trip across Saudi Arabia from Abu
Dhabi or Dubai to Qatar.

723
Vol. XI, Annex 244, DCL-151 Witness Declaration, Qatar Airways Representative, paras.
26, 30, 35–36, 41.
724
Vol. XI, Annex 244, DCL-151 Witness Declaration, Qatar Airways Representative, para. 30.
725
Vol. XI, Annex 244, DCL-151 Witness Declaration, Qatar Airways Representative, para. 32.
726
Vol. XI, Annex 244, DCL-151 Witness Declaration, Qatar Airways Representative, paras.
32, 39.
727
See Vol. XI, Annex 244, DCL-151 Witness Declaration, Qatar Airways Representative,
paras. 30, 34.

262
5.48 The UAE's own evidence from the provisional measures phase—put in
its proper context—also demonstrates the significant decrease in the number of
Qataris in the UAE following the 5 June Directive. By the UAE's own account,
Qataris entered and exited the UAE around 8,000 times in the period 5 June
2017 through 20 June 2018, and taking account that over half were Qatari exits
from the UAE, that amounts to approximately 300 Qatari entries into the UAE
per month 728. But what the UAE omits is the full, comparative picture: Qatari
movements prior to the Expulsion Order and Absolute Travel Ban. During the
period 1 January 2016 to 4 June 2017, the day before the Discriminatory
Measures were imposed, the Qatari Government recorded 321,088 Qatari
entries into UAE 729. This translates to approximately 18,800 Qatari entries per
month. These data demonstrate a 98% decline in the number of Qataris
entering the UAE after the 5 June Directive.

5.49 The fact that the number of Qataris in the UAE plummeted after 5 June
2017 is also evident from phone and banking records that document the
precipitous decline in the number of Qataris present in the UAE after 5 June
2017. As stated, Ooredoo Qatar, the largest telecommunications company in
Qatar, reports that the number of Qatari customers roaming in the UAE
dropped by 96% between May 2017 and July 2017, one month after the
imposition of the measures 730. A second carrier’s data confirms the decline: in

728
See para 4.50, above. The UAE’s Annex shows 8,390 movements that appear to be
comprised of 4,345 exits from the UAE and 4,045 entries into the UAE. Focusing on just
entries, that translates to roughly 300 entries per month. See UAE Exhibit 14 (Immigration –
Complete Entry-Exit Records).
729
Vol. XII, Annex 276, Affidavit, Airport Passports Department, State of Qatar Ministry of
Interior, para. 3.
730
In May 2017, there were 17,400 unique Qatari Ooredoo customers present and utilizing their
network in the UAE. In June 2017, that number plummeted to 1,800 unique customers and in
263
May 2017 there were 1,757 unique Qatari Vodafone customers roaming in the
UAE; that number dropped to 222 in June 2017 and to just 70 in July 2017731.
This, again, represents a decrease of 96% of Vodafone’s Qatari customers 732.

5.50 The level of Qatari debit card transactions in the UAE also steeply
declined after June 2017. The National ATM & POS Switch system (“NAPS”)
processes transactions based on debit cards, which have been issued locally within
Qatar. Its records show transactions made on Qatari debit cards in the UAE

July 2017, the number went down to 700. Vol. XII, Annex 277, Affidavit of Youssef
Abdullah Al-Kebesi, Chief of Operations, Ooredoo Qatar, Annex A.
731
Vol. VII, Annex 179, Affidavit of Hamad bin Abdullah Al Thani, Chief Executive Officer,
Vodafone Qatar Co, Annex A.
732
Vol. VII, Annex 179, Affidavit of Hamad bin Abdullah Al Thani, Chief Executive Officer,
Vodafone Qatar Co, Annex A.

264
ranging from a high of approximately USD 27 million in January 2017 to a low of
approximately USD 2.7 million in June 2017, while, prior to June 2017, NAPS
transactions for each month totaled between USD 18.9 million and USD 27
million733.

5.51 In short, the UAE’s collective expulsion of all Qataris—by which the
UAE targeted Qataris as a group, on the basis of their national origin—is
exemplary of racial discrimination prohibited by the CERD. It is, by definition,
arbitrary, and can never qualify as proportionate to a legitimate aim. It had both
the purpose and effect of undermining Qataris’ fundamental due process rights
and thus constituted an act of racial discrimination contrary to Article 2(1).

C. THE COLLECTIVE EXPULSION OF QATARIS ALSO VIOLATED ARTICLE 5(A) AND

ARTICLE 6 OF THE CERD

5.52 As set out above, the Expulsion Order made no provision for challenge by
individual Qataris before a competent court or tribunal before Qataris were
expelled. As a result, the UAE violated Articles 5(a) and 6 of the CERD.

5.53 Article 5(a) goes to the “right to equal treatment before the tribunals and
all other organs administering justice” 734. Article 6 provides that States parties:

“shall assure to everyone within their jurisdiction

effective protection and remedies, through the
competent national tribunals and other State

733
Vol. XII, Annex 275, Affidavit, Qatar Central Bank, Appendix A.
734
Vol. III, Annex 92, CERD Art. 5(a).

265
institutions, against any acts of racial discrimination
which violate his human rights and fundamental
freedoms contrary to this Convention, as well as the
right to seek from such tribunals just and adequate
reparation or satisfaction for any damage suffered as
a result of such discrimination.” 735

5.54 Both the right to equal treatment before a competent court or tribunal and
access to effective remedies are central components of human rights law in general
and the CERD in particular 736. In other words, as observed by Professor
Thornberry in his commentary of the CERD, Article 6 is not only structural in
nature, “laws must also be effectively implemented through an infrastructure of
mechanisms appropriate to the task” 737.

5.55 Here, the UAE has violated both Article 5(a) and Article 6 for two reasons.

5.56 First, the Expulsion Order and Absolute Travel Ban automatically run
afoul of Article 5(a) and Article 6, because they expelled Qataris, without, on their
face, making any provision for individual recourse against their application on a
collective basis. Qataris therefore were deprived of equal access to effective
remedy (or any remedies) before Emirati courts or other competent public entities
prior to application of the Expulsion Order 738. The discrimination in this case is a

735
Vol. III, Annex 92, CERD, Art. 6.
736
See, e.g., UDHR, Arts. 7, 8; ICCPR, Arts. 14, 2(3).
737
Vol. VI, Annex 150, P. Thornberry, The International Convention on the Elimination of All
Forms of Racial Discrimination (Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 427.
738
See also Vol. IV, Annex 109, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 30 on
discrimination against non-citizens, Sixty-fifth session (2005), p. 4, para. 25.

266
matter of Emirati policy and practice, propagated by Emirati government officials
at the highest levels.

5.57 Second, as described above, the well-documented systemic flaws in the

UAE’s judicial system (particularly in the context of cases involving purported
national security concerns and non-nationals), operate to ensure that, even if
provision had been made for recourse, there could be no effective remedy for
Qataris collectively expelled to challenge the Order 739.

5.58 The CERD Committee, in its practice, has expressed its concern about
violations of Article 5(a) and Article 6 in similar circumstances. As noted already,
in its Concluding Observations to the Dominican Republic calling attention to
instances in which “migrants of Haitian origin” had been collectively expelled,
the CERD Committee noted in particular the failure to provide “equal access to
effective remedies” such as “the right to challenge expulsion orders” 740.

5.59 The same is true here. The UAE violated Article 5(a) and Article 6 by
virtue of its Expulsion Order and Absolute Travel Ban because it failed to provide

739
See paras. 4.56–4.60, above.
740
CERD Committee, Concluding Observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, Dominican Republic, document CERD/C/DOM/CO/12 (March 2008),
para. 13. The ECtHR has found that “[i]n expulsion cases… enforcement of the contested
State measure produce[s] irreversible consequences,” and that persons who have been
collectively expelled “retain[] an interest in having [an expulsion order] quashed, unless their
departure had been voluntary.” ECtHR, Čonka v. Belgium, Application No. 51564/99, Final
Judgment (5 May 2002), para. 72. In Georgia v. Russia, the ECtHR dismissed Russia’s
argument that domestic remedies had not been exhausted, because such remedies were found
not to be available to affected Georgians as a result of, inter alia, the closure of transport
links and all other means of communication between the two States. ECtHR, Georgia v.
Russia (I), Application No. 13255/07, Judgment (Merits) (3 July 2014), paras. 147–158.

267
equal access to recourse against, or remedies for, those orders prior to its
collective expulsion of Qataris.

Section II. The UAE’s Maintenance of the Absolute Travel Ban Violated and
the Modified Travel Ban Continues to Violate Articles 2(1), 5(a), 5(d)(iv),
5(d)(v), 5(e)(i), 5(e)(v) and 6 of the CERD

5.60 For the first week following 5 June 2017, the Absolute Travel Ban was
categorical in nature. No exceptions were made to its terms and no recourse was
provided against its blanket and indiscriminate application. While the UAE has
since made some cosmetic modifications to its Travel Ban, to this day, the UAE
continues to implement its Modified Travel Ban in an arbitrary and discriminatory
manner, contrary to the letter and the object and purpose of the CERD.

5.61 The Absolute Travel Ban—and subsequently the Modified Travel Ban—
operated to keep out of the UAE both Qataris who had been living in the UAE
prior to 5 June 2017, as well as those who were not living in the UAE, but who
had significant links to that country, whether as a result of family ties, their
studies, property that they owned, or their work 741. Accordingly, the UAE’s
Absolute and Modified Travel Bans impacted not only those Qataris who were
expelled as discussed above, but also those Qataris who did not live in the UAE,
but who had built substantial lives there. The rights of these Qataris to family,
education, property, work, and equal treatment before Emirati tribunals were
fundamentally compromised by the UAE’s arbitrary and discriminatory

741
See, e.g., para. 5.35, nn. 704, 706, above; see also Vol. VII, Annex 169, DCL-010, paras. 5–
7; Vol. VII, Annex 170, DCL-011, para. 18; Vol. VII, Annex 171, DCL-012, para. 7; Vol.
VII, Annex 184, DCL-033, paras. 7–8; Vol. VIII, Annex 189, DCL-041, para. 8; Vol. VIII,
Annex 202, DCL-073, para. 12–13; Vol. IX, Annex 218, DCL-097, paras. 7–10; Vol. X,
Annex 228, DCL-121, para. 8–9; Vol. X, Annex 237, DCL-140, paras. 5–6.

268
imposition of the Absolute and Modified Travel Bans. This resulted in
independent violations of Articles 2(1), 5(a), 5(d)(iv), 5(d)(v), 5(e)(i), 5(e)(v) and
6 of the CERD.

A. THE ABSOLUTE TRAVEL BAN WAS NEITHER LEGITIMATE NOR PROPORTIONAL

5.62 As set out above, while States have broad latitude to control entry into and
residence in their territory, in so doing they are required to respect certain
fundamental tenets of international human rights law, including their obligation
not to engage in acts or practices of racial discrimination that in purpose or effect
undermine fundamental human rights and freedoms 742. For the reasons set out
below, the UAE’s Absolute Travel Ban fails on this basis: it does not pursue a
legitimate aim, nor is it proportional to the achievement of a legitimate aim.

5.63 First, as discussed above, the UAE’s aim in putting in place the Absolute
Travel Ban cannot be legitimate, as it admits that it did so in order to coerce the
Qatari State to yield sovereign control over internal and external policy, through
the collective punishment of Qataris 743. Nor does the UAE’s stated aim of
“national security” provide the requisite legitimacy, for the reasons stated
above 744. Invocations of “national security” and “terrorism” do not function as
talisman that shield a State’s measures from scrutiny under international human
rights law.

742
See para. 3.54, above.
743
See para. 1.19, above.
744
See paras. 2.68–2.69, above.

269
5.64 As the CERD Committee clarified in General Recommendation 30, States
Parties must “ensure that any measures taken in the fight against terrorism do not
discriminate in purpose or effect, on the grounds of . . . national [] origin” 745. The
Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia and related intolerance has likewise noted that “States must refrain
from pretextual use of exaggerated economic and national security concerns that
are not grounded in objective reality in order to justify racist and xenophobic
practices in the context of citizenship, nationality and immigration laws and
policies.” 746

5.65 Second, the Absolute Travel Ban was not proportional to achieving the
UAE’s purported (and pretextual) “national security” objective. The 5 June
Directive subjected all Qataris—and only Qataris—to the Absolute Travel Ban,
pursuant to which Qataris were, without exception, “prevent[ed] from entering the
UAE or crossing its points of entry.” As such, the Absolute Travel Ban singled out
one group of non-nationals, and subjected that group to the most restrictive
“immigration” measure imaginable based solely on their membership in a
protected class. The Absolute Travel Ban brooked no exceptions, and provided no
recourse for challenge by Qataris either in general or in relation to each Qatari’s
individual circumstances.

5.66 The UAE cannot seriously argue—and has not attempted to argue—that
all Qataris constituted a national security threat to the UAE. In any event, a

745
Vol. IV, Annex 109, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 30 on discrimination
against non-citizens, Sixty-fifth session (2005), para. 10.
746
United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary
forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, Thirty-eighth
session, document A/HRC/38/52 (25 April 2018), para. 65.

270
blanket ban targeting all Qataris because they are Qatari is inherently unlawful. As
explained above, both the CERD Committee and the UN Special Rapporteur on
contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related
intolerance have identified immigration regulations as liable to engage a State’s
non-discrimination obligations under the CERD and have emphasized that
differential treatment “between citizens and non-citizens or between different
groups of non-citizens, are permissible only if they serve a legitimate objective
and are proportional to the achievement of that objective” 747. In this context, the
Special Rapporteur on contemporary forms of racism, racial discrimination,
xenophobia and related intolerance has opined that “blanket bans on specific
nationalities and other immigration measures that exclude on the basis of race,
colour, ethnicity or national origin are unlawful” under the CERD 748.

5.67 In other words, blanket entrance bans on particular groups of non-citizens,

by definition, cannot satisfy the CERD’s legitimacy and proportionality
requirements. That is because—like collective expulsion orders—such bans are
arbitrary and fundamentally undermine the rights of the targeted individuals
without taking their personal circumstances into account or providing any
recourse. 749

747
See para. 3.48-3.52, 3.55, above.
748
United Nations Human Rights Council, Report of the Special Rapporteur on contemporary
forms of racism, racial discrimination, xenophobia and related intolerance, Thirty-Eighth
Session, document A/HRC/38/52 (25 April 2018), para. 67(b) (emphasis added).
749
See paras. 5.12–5.13, above.

271
B. THE MODIFIED TRAVEL BAN IS NEITHER LEGITIMATE NOR PROPORTIONAL

5.68 Beginning on 11 June 2017, the UAE announced carve-outs to the

Absolute Travel Ban that were simultaneously limited in scope and entirely
cosmetic in effect.

5.69 On 11 June 2017, the UAE announced that its President had “instructed
the authorities concerned to take into consideration the humanitarian
circumstances of Emirati-Qatari joint families . . . [I]n implementation of these
directives, the Ministry of Interior has set up a telephone line (+9718002626) to
receive such cases and take appropriate measures to help them.” 750

5.70 Almost a year later, on 5 July 2018, the UAE issued another statement, in
the context of the hearing on provisional measures:

“Since its announcement on June 5th, 2017,

pursuant to which the United Arab Emirates (UAE)
took certain measures against Qatar for national
security reasons, the UAE has instituted a
requirement for all Qatari citizens overseas to obtain
prior permission for entry into the UAE. Permission
may be granted for a limited-duration period, at the
discretion of the UAE Government.

The UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and

International Cooperation wishes to confirm that
Qatari citizens already resident in the UAE need not
apply for permission to continue residence in the
UAE. However, all Qatari citizens resident in the

750
Vol. II, Annex 13, United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs, President issues
directives to address humanitarian cases of Emirati-Qatari joint families (11
June 2017), [Link]
aspx#[Link].

272
UAE are encouraged to obtain prior permission for
re-entry into UAE territory.

All applications for entry clearance may be made

through the telephone hotline announced on June
11, 2017 (+9718002626). 751”

5.71 Following this announcement, at some point during the late summer or fall
of 2018, the UAE seems to have established an online system for Qataris to apply
for authorization to travel to the UAE. There was no official UAE government
notice or announcement regarding this system; to the contrary, selected Qataris
individually were informed by Emirati security officials, either at the border or
over the “hotline” that they had to apply to an “online” system 752. Qatar
subsequently discovered a travel update posted on the Emirates airline’s website,
ostensibly dated 16 August 2018, which states:

“Qatari nationals will be granted entry into the UAE

on providing proof of first degree relatives (father,
mother, husband, wife and children), who hold valid
UAE citizenship.

In addition, Qatari students enrolled in the UAE as

well as persons in emergency or humanitarian

751
Vol. II, Annex 13, United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs, President issues
directives to address humanitarian cases of Emirati-Qatari joint families
(11 June 2017), [Link]
[Link]#[Link].
752
See, e.g., Vol. VII, Annex 184, DCL-033, para. 18 (“Over the course of a few days, I called
the hotline approximately ten times . . . . The person that answered the [tenth] call directed
me to a website where I could apply for a permit to enter the UAE and visit my family.”);
Vol. X, Annex 231, DCL-125, para. 24 (“When I tried to apply this time, I was told [by the
hotline operator] that I had to apply using a website.”); Vol. VIII, Annex 185, DCL-036,
para. 23 (“The UAE [customs] officers asked my wife to register . . . via a link to the UAE
Ministry of Interior’s website.”).

273
situations will be granted entry provided they
submit a request to the UAE Federal Authority for
Identity and Citizenship through the following link:
[Link]
ent/guest/[Link]#/dashboard

For more information on Qatari nationals traveling

to the UAE, please call the Federal Authority for
Identity and Citizenship’s toll free number 8002626
or +971-8002626.” 753

5.72 Just like the Absolute Travel Ban, the Modified Travel Ban (in all its
iterations) does not pursue a legitimate aim and, even if it did, it is an entirely
disproportionate means of achieving that aim. As already noted, the Modified
Travel Ban serves an illegitimate end and remains pretextual—a means of
collectively punishing the Qatari people for alleged crimes it says have been
committed by the Qatari State 754. Further, and as set out in detail in above, the

753
Vol. VI, Annex 157, Emirates Airline, Help Centre: Travel updates,
[Link]
754
See, e.g., para. 2.68, above; para. 4.46, n. 561, above (quoting Vol. VIII, Annex 193, DCL-
048, para. 24); Vol. VIII, Annex 185, DCL-036, paras. 21–22 (“She answered that she was
going to visit her [redacted] and then was asked to provide his ID, although she had never
been asked for that before . . . [w]hen immigration officers realized that my wife had Qatari
children and was married to a Qatari, they took her to an office and started questioning her. A
man who looked like a soldier asked her about Qatar, how Qataris treated her, and whether
she had been mistreated or insulted. She answered that her only problem was the permit to
travel to the UAE. He replied, ‘You are Emirati, this is your country but because your
children are Qatari, we have to go through this process’”); Vol. VIII, Annex 193, DCL-048,
para. 24 (“I once called the hotline and was asked to provide many personal details and
documents. That just increased my fear”); Vol. IX, Annex 206, DCL-079, para. 24 (“Each
time I spoke to someone, it was someone new. They would ask the same questions: who was
I visiting, with whom, and where we would stay—although I believe that they already had
my file containing my application, the documents I provided, details I already gave, and even
the history of my calls before them because they asked tailored questions on details I had
given to someone else. Yet, they made me repeat my story many times and provide the same
documents over and over…”); Vol. X, Annex 231, DCL-125, para. 15 (“In the airport in
Dubai, I was taken to a special office where I was asked many questions, for example about
why I was visiting, what my address was, how many days I was staying, and what my
274
hotline is run by the Abu Dhabi police as a “security channel” and its true aim
appears to be to collect information in order to identify those who call the hotline
and their families as targets for harassment by UAE officials 755. For this reason
alone, the Modified Travel Ban fails to meet the legitimacy criterion.

5.73 In addition, the Modified Travel Ban cannot be deemed a legitimate

differentiation between different groups of Qataris on the basis of national
security concerns. While the various iterations of the Modified Travel Ban are
inconsistent and unclear, it appears that they fall into the following three
categories of conduct: (i) from 11 June 2017 to 4 July 2018, the UAE maintained
a narrow purported exception to the Absolute Travel Ban, in the form of a
“hotline” available only for Emirati-Qatari “joint families,” while the Absolute
Travel Ban continued to apply to all other Qataris; (ii) from 5 July 2018 to the
present, the UAE maintained the same “hotline,” but stated Qataris could “obtain
prior permission for entry into the UAE” for a “limited-duration period, at the
discretion of the UAE Government,” and that Qatari citizens “already resident” in
the UAE could obtain prior permission for re-entry into the UAE; and (iii) from
sometime during the fall of 2018 to the present, the UAE advised only some
Qataris informally that they could apply through an “online” system for
authorization to enter the UAE if they could provide proof of “first degree
relatives,” or were “students” or “persons in emergency or humanitarian
situations” 756.

grandmother’s telephone number was”.); Vol. VII, Annex 171, DCL-012, paras. 10–11;
Vol. XI, Annex 247, DCL-161, para. 25.
755
See, e.g., paras. 4.45–4.47, above.
756
See Chap. II, Sec. II.B., above.

275
5.74 Accordingly, at various times the UAE has stated that Qataris with a first-
degree Emirati relative, Qataris enrolled at educational institutions in the UAE,
and Qataris who may be suffering from an emergency or humanitarian crisis are
exempted from the Absolute Travel Ban 757. But these categories (and the Qataris
not captured by these categories) have no logical link to the purported “threat” to
the UAE’s national security, and they still involve subjecting Qataris—and only
Qataris—to differential treatment because they are Qatari.

5.75 Indeed, the Modified Travel Ban is illegitimate because it is arbitrary, non-
transparent, ineffective, and itself a violation of the CERD 758. As explained in
further detail above, the “hotline” has been decried by expert observers as nothing
more than a cosmetic response to the outcry from international human rights
organizations against the Absolute Travel Ban 759. It is arbitrary and entirely
opaque, and has resulted in instances of tracking and harassment 760. Calls

757
See Vol. II, Annex 13, United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs, President issues
directives to address humanitarian cases of Emirati-Qatari joint families (11 June 2017),
[Link]
.[Link]; CR 2018/13, p. 13, para. 14 (Alnowais) (“Earlier this year, my Government
asked all post-secondary institutions in the UAE to contact Qatari students who discontinued
their studies to ensure they understood that they were welcome to return.”).
758
See Chap. V, Sec. II.C, below.
759
See para. 2.32, n. 81, above.
760
See paras. 4.45–4.47, 5.72, above; Vol. VII, Annex 165, DCL-004, para.19 (“When my son
finally arrived in [redacted], he was interrogated for four hours before being allowed to exit
the airport…My son was utterly terrified. He is young and had never experienced questioning
like this before.”); Vol. VII, Annex 170, DCL-011, para.20: “My wife noticed that, upon
arrival in the UAE, the immigration officers do not stamp our children's passports at the same
counter as hers, which was not the case prior to 5 June 2017. Each time, they send the
children to another line…”); Vol. IX, Annex 206, DCL-079, para. 21 (“When my mother
arrived at the airport in the UAE, she had to go through a different line than the line for GCC
citizens. She was taken to an office upon arrival by two men wearing civilian clothes, who
she believed were officers. They asked her questions about the purpose of her visit, who she
was visiting, and how she was related to them. They questioned her for an hour”.).

276
frequently go unanswered 761. The UAE authorities operating the “hotline” issue
inconsistent decisions, including with regard to the same callers on the basis of the
same information 762. And even where a Qatari receives authorization to travel,
they are sometimes still denied entry at the border 763.

5.76 While the UAE has made certain cosmetic alterations to the hotline,
namely, it is now formally housed within the Federal Authority for Identity and
Citizenship 764—the nature and process of the hotline has not changed; the hotline
number is the same, it continues to be operated as a security channel apparently
within the Ministry of Interior, and it still operates as arbitrarily and ineffectively
as ever 765.

761
See para. 4.48, above; Vol. IX, Annex 222, DCL-105; para. 18 (“I was asked questions about
my University and the number of courses I had left to graduate. I replied that I . . . was
expelled from the country. The operator objected to the way I had responded and asked
whether I was recording the call given the manner in which I spoke. I replied in the negative.
He advised me to send a copy of my passport to the hotline on WhatsApp, along with a copy
of my plane ticket. However, the operator then said it was actually better for me if I did
neither of these things, because the UAE was not going to allow me to enter the country in
any case. […]”); Vol. X, Annex 231, DCL-125, para. 15 (“That’s when I realized that they
had no idea what they were doing”).
762
See para. 4.49, above.
763
See para. 4.49, above.
764
UAE Cabinet, President Issues Federal Decree Amending Emirates Identity Authority
Establishment, [Link]
amending-emirates-identity-authority-establishment-federal-law. See Federal Law No. (3) of
2017, Article 2, [Link] (“The
Authority also deals with nationality and passports and the entry and residence of foreigners
in the State and shall be responsible for the formulation of the relevant policy and ensure
their implementation in accordance with the provisions of this Decree Law and laws and
regulations and decisions in force in the State.”).
765
See paras. 4.45–4.49, above.

277
5.77 Further, the UAE’s latest iteration, its “e-Channel” system 766, remains
arbitrary 767. And tellingly, as noted, there has been no official announcement of
the application method, nor a description of its interplay with the “hotline,” nor
any of the basic guarantees of due process 768 that would need to be implemented if
the UAE had a genuine wish to make the mechanism effective.

5.78 The hotline process—whether by phone or via the website – is entirely

misconceived for the purpose of complying with the Order. Even if it worked
effectively, the temporary visits that it is designed to facilitate would not qualify

766
Vol. VI, Annex 157, Emirates Airline, Help Centre: Travel updates,
[Link]
767
Vol. VIII, Annex 188, DCL-040, para. 12 (“My [brother] tried to apply on my behalf for
travel authorization using an online application on the UAE’s Federal Authority for Identity
and Citizenship website . . . The application included a prompt for an ID number, but I do not
have an Emirates ID number, so we [redacted] how to complete the form. It was impossible
to submit the form without filling in this field. My family called a phone number in the UAE
for assistance, but no-one picked up the phone.”); Vol. X, Annex 231, DCL-125, para. 26
(“This time I was rejected and told that my [redacted]. I then applied again, but I found out
after reaching back out that my application was again rejected, this time without any
explanation. I asked why it had been rejected, but the person simply told me that maybe there
was something wrong with my application and that I should just apply again”); Vol. XII,
Annex 269, DCL-187, para.12 (“I tried first to get a travel license to travel there by using a
UAE official website during 2018. Because there were a lot of required documents and the
process was long, I quit my application to get a travel license. I decided to try again in early
[ . . . ] 2019. I passed through a long and arduous process on the website that required many
steps from me and I was required to submit many documents. Despite submitting all the
required documents, my application was still pending on the day I planned to travel.
Although my application was not refused, it was not approved either, and I could not travel”).
768
See Chap. IV, Sec. I.B.1., above; Vol. X, Annex 233, DCL-132, para.13 (“When entering the
UAE on each of these trips, I was taken aside and questioned. The pattern was similar each
time - once the immigration officials saw my Qatari passport, they told me to visit the offices
beside customs and passports office at the airport. The officers there reviewed my permission
to enter the UAE, and questioned me for about 30 minutes regarding the purpose of my visit,
who I would be visiting and where I would be staying. They even asked me to provide them
with my mobile phone number. Only after this interrogation was over was I allowed to enter
the UAE”).

278
as “reunification”, nor a genuine “opportunity” to continue with education in the
UAE, nor has it enhanced in any way “access to justice”. Families, for example,
cannot build relationships in the way they choose, they cannot support each other,
and they cannot plan with each other or provide any certainty to their children769.
Students cannot study based on this system—they need a visa for a specific
number of years (not days) and the ability to travel home 770. Access to judicial
mechanisms continues to be undermined by an inability to find a lawyer, and a
lawyer that is free from harassment regardless of the origin of their client, to
communicate with them, transfer documents to them, and change representation if
the lawyer does not prove effective 771.

5.79 Many Qataris who purportedly fall within one of the UAE’s carve-outs
under the Modified Travel Ban remain unable to enter the UAE. For example, one
Qatari woman living in Doha was unable to travel to the UAE for a close
relative’s funeral, or to visit another relative in the UAE—who has since also
passed away—despite numerous attempts to obtain authorization through the
UAE’s hotline. She reported that, in mid-2018, she

“called the hotline at least 50 times a day. Only

around six of these calls were answered. Each time
somebody answered they told me that they were
going to call me back. I received around four calls
back from the hotline. Each time I spoke to
someone, it was someone new. They would ask the
same questions: who was I visiting, with whom, and
where we would stay—although I believe that they

769
See paras. 5.101–5.106, below.
770
See paras. 5.113–5.116, below.
771
See para. 5.140, below.

279
already had my file containing my application, the
documents I provided, details I already gave, and
even the history of my calls before them because
they asked tailored questions on details I had given
to someone else. Yet, they made me repeat my story
many times and provide the same documents over
and over.

As I had booked tickets to travel on [redacted] 2018,

someone from the hotline called me and asked why
we had purchased tickets to travel on the day we
were applying. I explained that I had first applied on
[redacted] 2018. I postponed our plane tickets to
[redacted] 2018 . . . I called the hotline another 70
times between [redacted]; they only answered six
times. During my last discussion with them, they
asked me to stop calling because I was calling too
frequently and told me that someone would call me
back. No one ever did.” 772

As she was unsuccessful in obtaining authorization through the hotline in mid-

2018, the Qatari woman could not attend her relative’s funeral and has not visited
the UAE or seen her Emirati family since before 5 June 2017 773.

5.80 As such, the Modified Travel Ban fails to address the fundamental
illegitimacy at the heart of the discriminatory travel restrictions on Qataris.

5.81 But even if the Modified Travel Ban had been adopted as a legitimate
means of protecting the UAE’s national security, it is still unlawful because it is

772
Vol. IX, Annex 206, DCL-079, paras. 24, 26.
773
See Vol. IX, Annex 206, DCL-079.

280
not proportionate in the sense that “there is not a reasonable relationship of
proportionality between the means employed”, the Modified Travel Ban, “and the
aim sought to be realized,” i.e., the UAE’s national security 774. As articulated by
the ECtHR, when adopting measures that are liable to impact human rights, the
State must achieve a “fair balance” between the interests of the State and those of
the rights-holder in question. In the context of expulsions and travel bans, the
interests of the rights-holder include the length of their stay in, and the closeness
of their ties with, the expelling State 775. “Generally, only the least discriminatory
means available will be proportionate to the aim; superfluous discrimination is
always disproportionate” 776. Further, the more severe the interference with an
individual’s rights, the stronger the State interest required to justify it 777.

5.82 Particularly weighed against the severity of their impact on the rights of
Qataris, there can be no credible argument that the Modified Travel Ban
represents a proportionate means for the UAE to address its alleged national
security concerns for the following reasons.

774
See, e.g., ECtHR, Marckx v. Belgium, Application No. 6833/74, Plenary Judgment (13 June
1979), para. 33 (citing, inter alia, Case ‘Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use
of Languages in Education in Belgium’ v. Belgium, Application Nos. 1474/62, 1677/62,
1769/63, 1994/63, 2126/64, Judgment (Merits) (23 July 1968), para. 10).
775
See ECtHR, Moustaquim v. Belgium, Application No. 12313/86, Judgment (18 February
1991), paras. 44–46; ECtHR, Boultif v. Switzerland, Application No. 54273/00, Judgment
(2 August 2001), paras. 47–56.
776
A. Fellmeth, “Nondiscrimination as a Claiming Paradigm” in Paradigms of International
Human Rights Law (Oxford University Press, 2016), pp. 119–120 (emphasis added).
777
See, e.g., ECtHR, Marckx v. Belgium, 6833/74, Plenary Judgment (13 June 1979), para. 33
(citing, inter alia, Case ‘Relating to Certain Aspects of the Laws on the Use of Languages in
Education in Belgium’ v. Belgium, Application Nos. 1474/62, 1677/62, 1769/63, 1994/63,
2126/64, Merits Judgment (23 July 1968), para. 10).

281
5.83 First, rather than attempting to identify individual Qataris based on
competent evidence, the Modified Travel Ban imposes a blanket ban against all
Qataris, but subject to certain limited carve-outs. In this basic way, the UAE’s
approach turns the fundamental prohibition on discrimination on its head. The
Modified Travel Ban remains essentially indiscriminate in nature, which
undermines any claim that it may have to proportionality.

5.84 Second, the Modified Travel Ban is disproportionate because it takes no

account of the severity of its impact on individual Qataris’ personal
circumstances. Many individuals’ lives have been built upon the rights that
Qataris, as GCC nationals, are entitled to enjoy without differentiation and
discrimination” under UAE law pursuant to the GCC Economic Agreement,
including, inter alia, the enjoyment of equal treatment with respect to movement
and residence, as well as engagement in economic activities such as property
ownership, investment, or work 778.

5.85 Prior to 5 June 2017, Qataris were entitled to move freely between Qatar
and the UAE using only their Qatari ID cards rather than passports 779. As GCC

778
See Economic Agreement Between the GCC States, 31 December 2001, Art. 3 (“GCC
natural and legal citizens shall be accorded, in any Member State, the same treatment
accorded to its own citizens, without differentiation or discrimination, in all economic
activities, especially the following: 1. Movement and residence; 2. Work in private and
government jobs; 3. Pension and social security; 4. Engagement in all professions and crafts;
5. Engagement in all economic, investment and service activities; 6. Real estate ownership; 7.
Capital movement; 8. Tax treatment; 9. Stock ownership and formation of corporations; 10.
Education, health and social services. Member States shall agree to complete implementation
rules sufficient to carry this out and bring into being the Gulf Common Market.”).
779
The website of the UAE Interior Ministry still states that GCC citizens enjoy visa-free entry
to the UAE and need only to “produce their GCC country passport or national ID card at the
point of entry into the UAE”. See Vol. II, Annex 34, United Arab Emirates Government
Portal, Do you need an e ntry permit or visa to visit the UAE?,
[Link]
282
nationals, they were also not required to apply for the same official documentation
or permits to remain in the UAE that apply to individuals of other nationalities; for
example, Qataris did not need a visa or permit to study in the UAE 780.

5.86 Once in the UAE, as a result of their identity as citizens of the GCC,
Qataris were entitled to set up home in the UAE, and access a broad array of
participation rights, on an equal basis, in all spheres of economic activity781, such
as to find employment and receive a pension 782, enroll in UAE schools 783, invest

entry-permit-or-a-visa-to-enter-the-uae (accessed 11 April 2019). This freedom of movement

was a pillar of the GCC, which has hailed the free movement and residence of its citizens as a
significant achievement: “The GCC citizens enjoy equal treatment in respect to the right of
residence and movement among the GCC states.” See Gulf Cooperation Council, Steps have
been taken to achieve economic citizenship, [Link]
AndAchievements/Achievements/EconomicCooperation/TheGCCCommonMarketandEcono
micnationality/Stepshavebeentakentoachieveeconomiccitizenship/Pages/IMovementandresid
[Link].
780
See, e.g., Herriot-Watt Dubai University (“ United Arab Emirates (UAE) law requires all
non-national (except GCC nationals) students to obtain a ‘Student Entry Permit’, followed by
a ‘Student Residence Visa’ for the duration of their studies.”) [Link]
documents/[Link].
781
See Z. Babar, Free Mobility within the Gulf Cooperation Council, Center for International
and Regional Studies, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar (2011),
pp. 3–5 (“Under Article Three of the new Economic Agreement signed in December 2001,
all GCC natural and legal citizens were given the right to participate in all spheres of
economic activity within member-states’ territories. The specific rights stated in the
agreement of December 2001, include amongst other things: the rights to movement and
residence; the right to avail of employment opportunities in both the public and private
sectors; access to pension and social security benefits; and engagement in all professions
including economic, investment, and service activities”).
782
Al Tamimi & Company, “Employment and labour law in the UAE,” Lexology,
[Link]
(noting that UAE and other GCC nationals are not required to “procure or obtain a UAE
residency visa” before obtaining a UAE work permit; UAE and other GCC nationals are also
“entitled to a pension scheme where contributions are made by the employer, the employee
and the government”).

283
in businesses, 784 and own property785. The GCC agreement that establishes the
right to equal treatment in respect of these activities are still in place 786.

5.87 Such unrestricted access to the UAE by Qataris—and to Qatar by

Emiratis—was not only the product of formal GCC agreements, but constituted
the historical norm in the GCC region “[f]or centuries” 787:

“[P]eople in the Arab world moved across different

spatial boundaries . . . to seek employment and

783
See, e.g., Vol. II, Annex 35, The Official Portal of the Dubai Government, Education,
[Link] (“While all
students can enroll at private schools, only UAE nationals, holders of UAE passports, GCC
citizens and the children of holders of decrees issued by UAE President or Vice President are
eligible for public schools.”).
784
Gulf News, “GCC nationals and foreigners can form partnerships without Emirati
sponsorship”, [Link]
ships-without-emirati-sponsorship-1.1138433 (“While the regulations of the GCC Common
Market allows [sic] GCC nationals to set up businesses in Dubai without local partners, the
new initiative grants them a chance to have partnerships with foreigners without local
partners.”).
785
Each Emirate passes its own laws to regulate property ownership. As an example, “[i]n
Dubai, UAE nationals, Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) nationals and companies fully
owned by either of these can own property anywhere in Dubai (Article 4 of Law 7/2006). A
non-UAE/GCC national can own only a freehold, leasehold (up to 99 years) or usufruct (up
to 99 years) in designated areas in Dubai, which are listed in Regulation 3/2006 (as amended
by Regulation 1/2010), or in the free zones.” See Lexology, Real estate rights and
registration in the United Arab Emirates, [Link]
aspx?g=f1cb95d6-bdc1-4a88-83e8-0a6f2663a653.
786
See GCC Secretariat General Joint Action Process – The Economic Agreement 2001,
[Link]
ation/JointActionProcess/Pages/[Link]; see also United Arab
Emirates Federal Customs Authority, Cooperation Council for Arabian Gulf Countries
Secretariat General Economic Agreement among Cooperation Council Countries 2002,
[Link]
787
Z. Babar, Free Mobility within the Gulf Cooperation Council, Center for International and
Regional Studies, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar (2011), p. 6.

284
economic opportunity, to seek improved skills and
education, and to join their families. Movement as
such was the standard, and restricting it was the
exception.” 788

5.88 In reliance upon this legal and cultural framework, many Qataris chose to
make the UAE their home. Qataris living in the UAE raised families there,
studied, worked and established businesses 789. And the flow of residents went
both ways—based on information from the Planning and Statistics Authority of
the Qatari Government, from 2015 to early 2017, an average of over 3,000
Emiratis resided in Qatar 790.

5.89 Thus the rights of Qataris who had been living in the UAE prior to 5 June
2017 were severely and negatively impacted by the Modified Travel Ban. The
UAE’s 11 June 2017 announcement—which referred only to mixed Emirati-
Qatari families that could access a “hotline”—made no provision for those Qataris
who had been living in the UAE, including those who had been studying or
working in the UAE, and whose lives had thus been upended by the Expulsion
Order and remained entirely disrupted by the Modified Travel Ban. These Qataris
had been peacefully living in the UAE for years; it is not credible to suggest—and
the UAE does not suggest—that overnight the UAE discovered that they each
posed a national security threat. It is still less credible to suggest that the Modified
Travel Ban—with its arbitrary functioning in both design and effect—is an
appropriate and proportionate response to such an alleged threat.
788
Z. Babar, Free Mobility within the Gulf Cooperation Council, Center for International and
Regional Studies, Georgetown University School of Foreign Service in Qatar (2011), p. 6.
789
See para. 2.33, above. The Qatari Government has not historically tracked Qataris living in
the UAE, in light of long-standing practice of free movement between the GCC countries.
790
Vol. XII, Annex 273, Affidavit, State of Qatar Planning and Statistics Authority, para. 3.

285
5.90 Indeed, the UAE made no mention of former Qatari residents in the UAE
until almost one year later, its 5 July 2018 announcement which—misleadingly,
since this was for the first time—“confirm[ed]” that “Qatari citizens already
resident in the UAE need not apply for permission to continue residence in the
UAE.” 791 However, this “confirmation” rings hollow. The UAE had expelled
Qataris over a year earlier, and then subjected them to the Absolute and Modified
Travel Ban for the preceding thirteen months. The 5 July announcement is
inconsistent on its face; it followed its purported “permission [for Qatari residents]
to continue residence” with the contradictory recommendation—in the next
sentence—that Qatari residents in the UAE are “encouraged” to apply for
permission to re-enter the UAE 792. Either Qatari residents have permission to
reside in the UAE, and thus are at liberty to enter, exit and reenter its territory, or
they do not. The 5 July announcement is also inconsistent with the Modified
Travel Ban. There is no option on the online system for Qataris to select “valid
residency in the UAE” when they apply for authorization to enter the country—a
restriction that does not appear to apply to any other country793. The “travel

791
Vol. II, Annex 29, United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs, An Official Statement
by The UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and I nternational Cooperation (5 July 2018),
[Link]
[Link]#[Link], p. 2.
792
Vol. II, Annex 29, United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs, An Official Statement
by The UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and I nternational Cooperation (5 July 2018),
[Link]
[Link]#[Link], p. 2.
793
See Vol. II, Annex 36, United Arab Emirates Federal Authority for Identity & Citizenship,
Browse Smart Service, [Link]
[Link]#/dashboard (accessed 30 March 2019).

286
update” on the Emirates airline website likewise did not refer to current residency
in the UAE as grounds for permissible entry into the UAE 794.

5.91 Likewise, a significant number of other Qataris relied upon the freedom of
movement between Qatar and the UAE to build lives that straddled the two
countries. As a result, their ability to see their families, pursue their studies, enjoy
their property, work and run their business were built on that pre-existing
freedom 795. For example, one Qatari man living in Doha relied on the open
borders between Qatar and the UAE in order to visit his Emirati wife, who lives in
the UAE:

“Trips between Qatar and the UAE were quick and

simple. There were many direct flights . . . each day,
and tickets were not very expensive. To enter the
UAE, I simply presented my Qatari ID at
immigration. Living separately between the UAE
and Qatar did not negatively affect our relationship,

794
Vol. VI, Annex 157, Emirates Airline, Help Centre: Travel updates,
[Link] p.1.
795
See, e.g., Vol. VIII, Annex 186, DCL-037, paras. 5–6 (“Living in two different cities did not
affect our relationship because we made sure that we spent lots of time together. My husband
used to visit [redacted] and me in Doha almost every weekend, and [redacted] and I would
visit him in the UAE for weekends or holidays approximately every three months. It was very
easy to travel between Qatar and the UAE, and sometimes my husband would even visit us
for one day.”); Vol. VII, Annex 169, DCL-010, para. 8; Vol. VII, Annex 170, DCL-011,
para. 7; Vol. VII, Annex 171, DCL-012, para. 7; Vol. VIII, Annex 189, DCL-041, para. 8;
Vol. VIII, Annex 194, DCL-051, para. 6; Vol. VIII, Annex 196, DCL-056, para. 5; Vol.
VIII, Annex 198, DCL-066, para. 9; Vol. VIII, Annex 202, DCL-073, para. 12; Vol. IX,
Annex 207, DCL-080, para. 11; Vol. IX, Annex 210, DCL-084, paras. 9–10; Vol. IX,
Annex 216, DCL-093, paras. 5–8; Vol. IX, Annex 220, DCL-100, para. 12; Vol. IX, Annex
221, DCL-102, para. 7; Vol. X, Annex 229, DCL-123, para. 7; DCL-125, para. 5; Vol. X,
Annex 233, DCL-132, para. 6; Vol. XI, Annex 249, DCL-164, paras. 6–7; Vol. XI, Annex
251, DCL-166, para. 7; Vol. XI, Annex 255, DCL-171, paras. 6–7; Vol. XI, Annex 261,
DCL-178, paras. 6, 9; Vol. XII, Annex 263, DCL-180, para. 7; see also n. 789, above.

287
because my wife and I . . . travelled to see one
another several times a month.” 796

5.92 The Modified Travel Ban, as applied to the personal circumstances of

these Qataris, is equally disproportionate. The UAE’s 5 July announcement is
clear that all non-resident Qataris are permitted to enter the UAE only at the
UAE’s discretion and for a “limited duration.” Again, this restriction is
indiscriminate and does not purport to be based upon the threat that particular
individuals are alleged to pose to the UAE’s national security, nor does it take into
account the closeness of their prior ties with the UAE. Further, no explicit carve-
out to the Absolute Travel Ban has ever been made for those Qataris whose rights
to property and to work depend upon their ability to travel to the UAE.

5.93 In short, an inaccessible, broad brush and arbitrary process of this nature
could never qualify as legitimate or proportionate so as to justify the racial
discrimination at its core. Many Qataris relied upon their ability to reside in and
travel freely to the UAE in order to fully realize their fundamental human rights to
family, to study, to work and to own property. As detailed in the next section,
because of these historic close ties and the GCC framework promoting seamless
integration, the Modified Travel Ban has had a devastating impact, nullifying and
impairing these Qataris’ ability to enjoy fundamental human rights in violation of
the CERD.

796
Vol. VII, Annex 184, DCL-033, paras. 7–8.

288
C. THE UAE’S ABSOLUTE TRAVEL BAN VIOLATED AND ITS MAINTENANCE OF THE
MODIFIED TRAVEL BAN CONTINUES TO VIOLATE ARTICLES 2(1), 5, AND 6 OF THE
CERD

5.94 Articles 1(1), 2(1), 5, and 6 neither restrict nor create the civil, political,
economic, social or cultural rights to which States parties must “guarantee the
right of everyone” to equally enjoy797. Instead, the provisions “assume[] the
existence and recognition of these rights” 798 outside of the CERD, under
customary international law, the UDHR 799 and other treaties, such as the
Convention on the Rights of the Child (“CRC”), ratified by the UAE on 3 January
1997 800, and the Arab Charter on Human Rights, which was ratified by the UAE
on 15 January 2008 and Qatar on 11 January 2009 801. As the CERD Committee
has stated, “[t]he list of human rights to which the principle [of the prohibition of
discrimination] applies under the Convention is not closed and extends to any

797
See Vol. III, Annex 92, CERD, Art. 5.
798
Vol. IV, Annex 108, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 20 on article 5 of the
Convention, contained in document A/51/18 (1996), para. 1.
799
Members of the Court have on several occasions recognized the status of rights set out in the
UDHR as customary law. See, e.g., Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence
of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) notwithstanding Security Council Resolution
276, Advisory Opinion, Separate Opinion of Judge Ammoun, I.C.J. Reports 1971, para. 6
(“Although the affirmations of the Declaration are not binding qua international convention
within the meaning of Article 38, paragraph 1 (a), of the Statute of the Court, they can bind
States on the basis of custom within the meaning of paragraph 1 (b) of the same Article,
whether because they constituted a codification of customary law . . . or because they have
acquired the force of custom through general practice accepted as law”.); United States
Diplomatic and Consular Staff in Tehran (United States of America v. Iran), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 1980, para. 91 (relying on the UDHR as a source of “fundamental principles”).
800
See Convention on the Rights of the Child, 1577 UNTS 3 (20 November 1989) (entered into
force 2 September 1990).
801
See League of Arab States, Arab Charter on Human Rights, 12 International Human Rights
Report 893 (22 May 2004) (entered into force 15 March 2008).

289
field of human rights regulated by the public authorities in the State party.” 802 As
such, “[t]he Convention is an ‘open’ Convention” and “[p]ractice does not confine
the scope of the Convention to any particular class or classes of rights.” 803

5.95 The scope of Article 5 is in keeping with the CERD’s object and purpose:
to eliminate the detrimental impact of racial discrimination on the enjoyment of all
fundamental freedoms and human rights, whether listed and “similar rights” 804,
and therefore to avoid the “nullif[ication] or impair[ment]” of all rights afforded.
Further, the pairing of the terms “nullifying” and “impairing” opens up “the
prospectus of discrimination which need not be aimed at or have only nullifying

802
Vol. IV, Annex 112, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 32 on the Meaning
and scope of special measures in the International Convention on t he Elimination of All
Forms Racial Discrimination, document CERD/C/GC/32 (2009), para. 9.
803
Vol. VI, Annex 150, P. Thornberry, The International Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Racial Discrimination: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 128.
804
Vol. IV, Annex 108, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 20 on article 5 of the
Convention, contained in document A/51/18 (1996), para. 5; see also Vol. III, Annex 77,
United Nations, Official Records of the Economic and Social Council, Commission on
Human Rights, Twentieth Session, document E/3873, E/CN.4/874, para. 200 (“It was
emphasized that many of the rights proclaimed in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights
had been left out [of Article 5] but that the word ‘notably’ preceding the list of rights implied
that there had been a selection of the rights to which special attention should be accorded.”);
M. O’Flaherty, “Substantive provisions of the International Convention on the Elimination of
All Forms of Discrimination” in Indigenous Peoples, the United Nations and Human Rights
(Federation Press, 1998), pp. 177–180; Vol. IV, Annex 108, CERD Committee, General
Recommendation No. 20 on article 5 of the Convention, contained in document A/51/18
(1996), para. 1; see also Vol. VI, Annex 150, P. Thornberry, The International Convention
on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Oxford University Press, 2016),
p. 307 (“The equality guarantee applies to the enjoyment of an extensive, unclosed list of
rights—‘notably in the enjoyment of other rights’—so that other, unnamed rights are also
subject to its protection.”).

290
effect on the ‘recognition, enjoyment or exercise’ of rights or freedoms but only
impair them, presumably to some meaningful degree.” 805

5.96 As set out in further detail below, the Absolute and Modified Travel Bans
have nullified or impaired the following rights and freedoms in violation of
Articles 5(d)(iv), 5(e)(v), 5(d)(v), 5(e)(i), and 5(a):

 The right to family life;

 The right to education and training;

 The right to own property alone as well as in association with others;

 The rights to work, to free choice of employment, to just and favorable

conditions of work, to protection against unemployment; and

 The right to equal treatment before the tribunals and all other organs
administering justice.

5.97 By nullifying and impairing the rights of Qataris on the basis of national
origin, in violations of Articles 2(1) and 5, the UAE has not only failed to
“protect” and “prevent against” discriminatory interference with Article 5 rights,
but has also engaged its obligations under Article 6 – to provide an effective
remedial framework to challenge and obtain reparation for those violations. The

805
Vol. VI, Annex 150, P. Thornberry, The International Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Racial Discrimination: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 128.

291
UAE has failed to do so, contrary to its Article 6 commitments, and the protective
framework frequently emphasized by the CERD Committee. 806

1. Interference with the Right to Family Life

5.98 The UAE has impermissibly interfered with the right to protection against
arbitrary interference with family life. The right to family life falls squarely within
the scope of Article 5, despite the fact that it is not explicitly mentioned therein.
807
The integrity of family and family life is laid down as a basic human right in
Articles 12 and 16(3) of the UDHR, and is similarly expressed in other
international law instruments, customary international law and the “general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations” 808. One such instrument is the

806
See A.M.M. v. Switzerland, Communication No. 50/2012, Opinion, document,
CERD/C/84/D/50/2012 (2014), para. 8.2; L.R. v. Slovakia, Communication No. 031/2003,
Opinion, document CERD/C/66/D/31/2003 (2005), para. 10.2. Having found a violation of
Articles 2 and 5, the Committee stated that “[w]ith respect to the claim under article 6, the
Committee observes that, at a minimum, this obligation requires the State party’s legal
system to afford a remedy in cases where an act of racial discrimination within the meaning
of the Convention has been made out, whether before the national courts or in this case the
Committee. The Committee having established the existence of an act of racial
discrimination, it must follow that the failure of the State party’s courts to provide an
effective remedy discloses a consequential violation of article 6 of the Convention.” Ibid.
para. 10.10.
807
See Vol. III, Annex 92, CERD, Art. 5(d)(iv); see also CERD Committee, Concluding
observations of the Committee on t he Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Denmark,
document CERD/C/DNK/CO/18-19, (27 August 2010) para. 14 (regarding the “right to
family life, marriage and choice of spouse”); United Nations, Official Records of the General
Assembly, Fifty-ninth Session, Report of the Committee on t he Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, document A/59/18, para. 17 (observing, in Decision 2(65), the adverse effect
of a Suspension Order on families and marriages); CERD Committee, Concluding
observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial Discrimination, Israel, document
CERD/C/ISR/CO/14-16, para. 18 (expressing concern regarding impediments to family
reunification).
808
Applicability of Article VI, Section 22, of the Convention on the Privileges and Immunities of
the United Nations, Advisory Opinion, Separate Opinion of Judge Evensen, I.C.J. Reports
1989, pp. 210–211; see also Arab Charter on Human Rights, Arts. 21 (“No one shall be
292
CRC, which requires that children are protected against all forms of
discrimination on the basis of the “status” of their parents, that children are not
separated from their parents against their will and that applications for family
reunification are dealt with in a humane manner, as encompassed in Articles 2(2),
9(1) and 10(1) 809.

5.99 The CERD Committee has highlighted the particular risk that
discriminatory travel bans may cause to the right to family life. States are to

subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference with regard to his privacy, family, home or
correspondence, nor to unlawful attacks on his honour or his reputation . . . ”), 33 (“1. The
family is the natural and fundamental group unit of society; it is based on marriage between a
man and a woman. Men and women of marrying age have the right to marry and to found a
family according to the rules and conditions of marriage . . . 2. The State and society shall
ensure the protection of the family, the strengthening of family ties, the protection of its
members and the prohibition of all forms of violence or abuse in the relations among its
members, and particularly against women and children. . . . 3. The States parties shall take all
necessary legislative, administrative and judicial measures to guarantee the protection,
survival, development and well-being of the child in an atmosphere of freedom and dignity
and shall ensure, in all cases, that the child's best interests are the basic criterion for all
measures taken in his regard, whether the child is at risk of delinquency or is a juvenile
offender.”).
809
CRC, Arts. 2(2) (“States Parties shall take all appropriate measures to ensure that the child is
protected against all forms of discrimination or punishment on the basis of the status,
activities, expressed opinions, or beliefs of the child’s parents, legal guardians, or family
members.”), 9(1) (“States Parties shall ensure that a child shall not be separated from his or
her parents against their will, except when competent authorities subject to judicial review
determine, in accordance with applicable law and procedures, that such separation is
necessary for the best interests of the child . . .”), 10(1) (“In accordance with the obligation of
States Parties under article 9, paragraph 1, applications by a child or his or her parents to
enter or leave a State Party for the purpose of family reunification shall be dealt with by
States Parties in a positive, humane and expeditious manner. States Parties shall further
ensure that the submission of such a request shall entail no adverse for the applicants and for
the members of their family.”).

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“avoid expulsions of non-citizens, especially of long-term residents, that would
result in disproportionate interference with the right to family life . . .” 810.

5.100 The UAE, however, has intentionally taken the opposite course through
the maintenance of the Absolute and Modified Travel Bans.

5.101 As noted above, family ties frequently cut across national boundaries in
the Gulf region. As of June 2017, there were with 3,694 recorded marriages
between Qataris and Emiratis 811. These families of mixed nationality often settled
in either the UAE or Qatar, or lived between the two States, with one spouse
commuting between countries for work or children commuting between separated
or divorced Qatari-Emirati parents 812. For these mixed Qatari-Emirati families, the
ability to live and move freely across State lines is essential to maintaining the
family unit and the well-being of the parents and children within those units 813.
These families relied, in particular, on (i) direct flight connections between Qatar
and the UAE of just over an hour; (ii) the freedom of movement provisions
enshrined in the GCC treaties, which allowed Qataris and Emiratis to transit

810
Vol. IV, Annex 109, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 30 on discrimination
against non-citizens, Sixty-fifth session (2005), para. 28. The Draft Articles on Expulsion also
emphasize, at Art. 18 (“The expelling State shall respect the right to family life of an alien
subject to expulsion. It shall not interfere arbitrarily or unlawfully with the exercise of such
right.”).
811
See e.g., para 5.88, n. 789; Vol. VII, Annex 165, DCL-004, paras. 5–6; Vol. VII,
Annex 171, DCL-012, para. 7; Vol. VIII, Annex 189, DCL-041, para. 8–9 (“We would also
see each other almost every weekend because my husband would travel to Doha on
Thursdays and stay until Saturday.”).
812
See e.g., para 5.88, n. 789; DCL-004, paras. 5–6; DCL-012, para. 7; DCL-041, para. 8–9.
813
See n. 795, above.

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between the countries without restrictions; and (iii) the freedom, under the GCC
treaties, for Qataris and Emiratis to reside in either country 814.

5.102 The Absolute and Modified Travel Bans imposed significant and
sometimes insuperable obstacles on Qatari-Emirati family life:

 As of June 2018, one year after the Absolute Travel Ban was first
imposed, Qatar’s NHRC had recorded 82 cases of self-reported family
separation involving the UAE 815.

 Almost half of the individuals interviewed by Human Rights Watch in the

month following the 5 June Directive (22 of 50), which included Qataris,
reported that the travel restrictions had cut them off from immediate
family members 816.

 6.4% of the individual complainants to the CCC cited instances of family

separation as a result of the UAE’s measures 817.

814
See paras. 2.33, 5.86–5.89, above.
815
Vol. V, Annex 140, National Human Rights Committee, Fifth General Report, Continuation
of Human Rights Violations: A Year of the Blockade Imposed on Qatar (June 2018), p. 14.
816
See Vol. V, Annex 134, Human Rights Watch, Qatar: Isolation Causing Rights Abuses (12
July 2017), [Link] p. 4
(interviewing Qatari, Saudi, and Bahraini individuals).
817
Vol. XII, Annex 272, Affidavit, State of Qatar Compensation Claims Committee.
Complaints submitted to the CCC include claims by Qataris who have been separated from
their spouses, children, and immediate family members in the UAE. In several cases, the
claimant was not the only family member affected by the UAE’s Discriminatory Measures;
rather, his or her children have also been separated from family members in the UAE but did
not submit an independent claim.

295
5.103 In short, and as documented by the OHCHR, “[t]he decision of 5 June has
led to cases of temporary or potentially durable separation of families across the
countries concerned, which has caused psychological distress as well as some
difficulties for some individuals to economically support their relatives left in
Qatar or the other countries.” 818

5.104 Individual declarants likewise describe the devastating impacts that the
Travel Bans have had on their family life.

5.105 First, there are some Qatari-Emirati families who have not seen each other
since the Absolute Travel Ban first was adopted almost two years ago, resulting in
enduring hardship and suffering as a result of that separation 819. For one example,
a Qatari mother describes the effect of her family’s prolonged separation on her
child, who she describes as “deeply” affected, and who misses their “father very
much and is also saddened and anxious about the political situation.” After 5 June
2017, her child “was very depressed . . . completely shut down, stopped talking
for a while and gained a lot of weight.” She described her own experience
“heartbreaking” to see her child “in such pain” 820.

5.106 Second, for those families who have been able to meet over the past two
years, their relationships have changed dramatically as a result of the Travel Bans,
both in frequency of contact and substance. For example, a Qatari woman who
lives in Doha with her Emirati child describes the separation she now endures

818
Vol. III, Annex 98, OHCHR Report, para. 32
819
See, e.g., Vol. VII, Annex 171, DCL-012, paras. 15–16 (“As a result of the UAE’s order, I
have not been able to see my [redacted] since [redacted] 2017.”).
820
Vol. VIII, Annex 186, DCL-037, paras. 11, 23–24.

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from her husband, who resides in the UAE 821. Prior to the Travel Bans, her family
would spend time together in Doha “almost every weekend”, and the couple
would use their leave to “spend two, three, or four months together as a family”
every year 822. Since 5 June 2017, the family has seen each other only every two
months and always in a hotel in third countries 823. She explains that “our visits
gain an additional measure of impermanence because we are not in a home. …
Our shared life in Qatar and the UAE simply no longer exists”. 824 She explains
that the “longer term separations forced by the UAE’s measures have also been
very difficult emotionally”. 825

5.107 A Qatari father whose family was separated for almost a year and a half
following the 5 June Directive explained that:

“[t]his is the most difficult situation my family has

ever faced. It has deeply affected me emotionally,
and has had a profound effect on my children.” 826

821
Vol. VIII, Annex 189, DCL-041, paras. 1, 8.
822
Vol. VIII, Annex 189, DCL-041, para. 8.
823
Vol. VIII, Annex 189, DCL-041, para. 16; see also Vol. VII, Annex 184, DCL-033, para. 12
(“For several months, we waited, expecting that the situation would be resolved. . . .
Although my wife and I remained in contact by WhatsApp every day, it was terrible to be
separated for so many months—we had never gone so long without seeing each other in
person. Finally, since I could not enter the UAE and my wife could not travel to Qatar, we
agreed that the family would meet in [redacted].”).
824
Vol. VIII, Annex 189, DCL-041, paras. 17, 23.
825
Vol. VIII, Annex 189, DCL-041, para. 25.
826
Vol. VII, Annex 165, DCL-004, paras. 6 –7, 12, 25.

297
5.108 Third, some Emirati-Qatari families have refused to obey the UAE’s
orders, and decided to stay together in Qatar or in the UAE. But children in such
families remain separated from their grandparents, uncles, aunts and cousins,
while adults are separated from their parents and siblings. This is the case for a
Qatari man whose Emirati wife gave birth to their first child in Doha just a few
days before 5 June 2017. To date, the family has been unable to introduce the
child to the wife’s Emirati family827.

5.109 Notably, while the stated rationale for the Modified Travel Ban was
“humanitarian”—to alleviate the situation of mixed Qatari-Emirati families—it
has failed to do so. Further, for those Qataris in the UAE that were not married to
Emiratis, it has done nothing to alleviate the Expulsion Order’s impact. A Qatari
woman reports that when she called the “hotline”, the official she spoke with
“explained that, because I was not married to an Emirati, he could not help me and
that I would need to leave within 14 days” 828.

5.110 As set out above, many Qataris fear using the “hotline”, for good
reason 829. Many who try to use the hotline do not receive responses, or are denied

827
See, e.g., Vol. VII, Annex 181, DCL-029, paras. 5, 17 (“This situation is extremely difficult
for my family. My wife is . . . really saddened by the fact that her . . . child does not know her
parents and that it will be the same for our [future child], unless the UAE stops imposing
measures against Qatar”); DCL-036, para. 32 (“My children are suffering as well, because
they are losing out on a relationship with their Emirati family.”); Vol. VIII, Annex 197,
DCL-058, para. 21 (“We used to see each other all the time and we were a central part of
each other’s support system. My young children have spent far less time with their
grandmother than we would have hoped.”); see also Vol. VII, Annex 170, DCL-011, para.
28; Vol. IX, Annex 206, DCL-079, para. 34.
828
Vol. IX, Annex 204, DCL-076, para. 15. The woman stated: “I was deeply disappointed. I
had hoped that the ‘hotline’ would be able to help me. How could they only be concerned
with families that had one Emirati parent?” Ibid., para. 15.
829
See paras. 4.45–4.47, above.

298
permission to enter the UAE with no explanation 830. Even Qataris who have been
authorized to travel to the UAE usually are only permitted to travel for a short
period of time—consistent with the UAE’s 5 July 2018 announcement that
“permission may be granted for a limited-duration period”—and have a specific
exit date 831. Moreover, in light of the arbitrary functioning of the “hotline,” they
usually do not know when they will be allowed back into the UAE to see their
families again upon their return to Qatar 832.

5.111 In short, the Travel Ban—in both its Absolute and Modified forms—has
nullified or impaired many Qataris’ realization and enjoyment of their right to
family life.

2. Interference with the Right to Education and Training

5.112 The UAE has also violated Article 5(e)(v) by impermissibly interfering
with Qataris’ right to education and training on the basis of their national
origin 833. As described above, Article 5(e)(v) imposes a series of affirmative

830
See paras. 4.48–4.49, above.
831
See para. 5.79, above; see also Vol. VIII, Annex 197, DCL-058, para. 18 (“While in the
UAE, my wife considered extending her stay to spend more time with her family. Because
the children’s travel authorization was for a period of only [redacted] weeks, however, she
was afraid they would be taken away from her if they stayed longer”).
832
See, e.g., Vol. IX, Annex 206, DCL-079, para. 27 (“We never heard back from the hotline
again, and we all missed [the] . . . funeral. . . . We were not able to be with our family to
mourn”); see also Vol. VII, Annex 170, DCL-011, para. 19.
833
See Vol. III, Annex 92, CERD, Art. 5(e)(v); see also UDHR, Art. 26 (“(1) Everyone has the
right to education . . . (2) Education shall be directed to the full development of the human
personality and to the strengthening of respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms. It
shall promote understanding, tolerance and friendship among all nations, racial or religious
groups, and shall further the activities of the United Nations for the maintenance of peace.”);
Arab Charter on Human Rights, Art. 41 (“1. The eradication of illiteracy is a binding
obligation upon the State and everyone has the right to education.”). The Committee on
299
obligations on the UAE not only not to engage in, but also to protect against and
remedy, discrimination with respect to education and training; ensure effective
access to education 834; ensure that “public educational institutions are open to
non-citizens” 835; and “to the extent that private institutions influence the exercise
of rights or the availability of opportunities . . . ensure that the result has neither
the purpose nor the effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination.”836
The State’s obligations to protect against discrimination perpetrated by private
persons and entities that impairs the enjoyment of other rights 837 likewise flow
from Article 2(1)(d), which requires States parties to “prohibit and bring to an

Economic, Social and Cultural Rights has described education as a “human right in itself and
an indispensable means of realizing other human rights.” See UNCESCR, General Comment
No. 13: The Right to Education (article 13 of the Covenant), contained in document
E/C.12/1999/10, para. 1.
834
CERD Committee, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, Albania, document CERD/C/ALB/CO/5-8 (14 September 2011), para. 16
(requiring “effective access to education”).
835
Vol. IV, Annex 109, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 30 on discrimination
against non-citizens, Sixty-fifth session (2005), para. 30.
836
Vol. IV, Annex 108, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 20 on article 5 of the
Convention, contained in document A/51/18 (1996), para. 5.
837
Vol. III, Annex 92, CERD, Art. 2(1)(a)–(c) (reflecting States parties’ obligations to eliminate
discrimination by the State, public organs and institutions, and State-supported entities), 2(d)
(reflecting States parties’ obligation to “prohibit and bring to an end . . . discrimination by
any persons, group or organization.”); Vol. IV, Annex 108, CERD Committee, General
Recommendation No. 20 on article 5 of the Convention, contained in document A/51/18
(1996), para. 5 (“To the extent that private institutions influence the exercise of rights or the
availability of opportunities, the State party must ensure that the result has neither the
purpose nor the effect of creating or perpetuating racial discrimination.”); Vol. V,
Annex 144, M. Banton, International Action (Oxford University Press, 1995), p. 199
(“Article 2.1(d) is unqualified in its requirement that a State party bring to an end racial
discrimination; it is not limited to the state sector or to governmental action or to the
enactment of laws, but makes the state responsible for bringing to an end racial
discrimination throughout the society.”).

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end, by all appropriate means, including legislation as required by circumstances,
racial discrimination by any persons, groups or organizations.” 838

5.113 The Absolute and Modified Travel Bans (especially when applied to those
previously expelled) gravely impacted the right to education of Qataris who were
studying in the UAE. As noted above, no exception to the Absolute Travel Ban
was made for students enrolled in the UAE until July 2018, over a year after it
was issued, by which point the impact on their educational rights had been
irreversibly damage. Further, the carve-out for students was ineffective for those
who wished to study in the UAE, as permission to enter was uncertain and granted
for limited periods of time 839.

5.114 As of June 2018, the NHRC documented 148 complaints related to

interference with education by the UAE 840. The Qatari Ministry of Education
reports that 137 Qatari students who were studying in the UAE prior to 5 June
2017 self-reported that they were negatively impacted, including by being
displaced, unable to continue studying at their universities, and deprived of their
academic certificates, proof of graduation, and other documents evidencing their
registration and performance 841. 14% of the verified individual complainants to

838
Vol. III, Annex 92, CERD, Art. 2(1)(d).
839
See para. 5.79, above.
840
Vol. V, Annex 140, National Human Rights Committee, Fifth General Report, Continuation
of human rights violations: A year of the blockade imposed on Qatar (June 2018), p. 18.
841
Vol. XII, Annex 274, Affidavit, State of Qatar Ministry of Education and Higher Education,
p. 1.

301
the CCC, cited to interference with their educational rights as a result of the
UAE’s measures. 842

5.115 As the experiences of individual declarants make clear, the UAE has
interfered with Qataris’ right to education and training in the following four ways.

5.116 First, many Qatari students were unable to complete their studies in light
of the application of the Travel Bans. Many had to leave the UAE while they were
studying, including in the middle of exam periods 843. Others were on a study
break in Qatar to celebrate Ramadan and could not return to the UAE to finish
their degrees as a result of the Travel Bans 844. One such student tried diligently to
complete her exams after returning to Qatar, but her university failed to respond to
her multiple requests to make alternate arrangements 845.

5.117 Those universities in the UAE that did not automatically expel or suspend
their Qatari students were unwilling or unable to assist Qatari students with the
sudden interruption to their studies. Some university offices did not pick up the
phone when students called and did not reply to emails 846, others communicated to

842
Vol. XII, Annex 272, Affidavit, State of Qatar Compensation Claims Committee, Exhibit B
(Portion of CCC Claims Database related to the UAE).
843
See para. 5.41, n. 708, above; see e.g., Vol. VII, Annex 172, DCL-013, para. 38; Vol. VII,
Annex 180, DCL-028, para. 19; Vol. VIII, Annex 200, DCL-070, para. 13; Vol. VIII,
Annex 201, DCL-072, para. 12; Vol. XI, Annex 259, DCL-175, para. 9.
844
See e.g., Vol. VII, Annex 183, DCL-031, paras. 9–10; Vol. VIII, Annex 196, DCL-056,
paras. 9, 15–16; Vol. X, Annex 226, DCL-112, paras. 10–12; Vol. XI, Annex 249, DCL-164,
para. 9.
845
See Vol. VIII, Annex 190, DCL-043, paras. 10, 18–20, 25–26, 28, 34.
846
See, e.g., Vol. VIII, Annex 198, DCL-066, para. 13 (“As I did not have the phone number of
the [redacted] University’s [redacted], I called his secretary. She answered the phone, asked
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the students there was nothing they could do to help 847, and some advised Qatari
students to wait and see if the situation resolved itself 848. For instance, a Qatari
student enrolled at a university in the UAE reported that his university did not
provide any support when he and his Qatari classmates asked to take their exams
early in light of the 14-day deadline imposed by the Emirati authorities849.
Another Qatari student reported receiving an error message when trying to access
his online university account to register for an online class in July 2017 850.

5.118 Second, many Qatari students were not able to retrieve properly
authenticated educational records from their UAE universities, which has hindered

me whether I was Qatari, and hung up upon hearing my answer.”); Vol. XI, Annex 249,
DCL-164, para. 10 (“The head of my college responded that the University had not yet
received any instructions from the UAE government . . . he said the University would wait
one month for instructions from the UAE Ministry of Education and would then get back to
me. I did not receive any further updates from the University . . .”); see also Vol. VII, Annex
174, DCL-020, para. 12; Vol. VII, Annex 176, DCL-022, para. 10; Vol. VIII, Annex 202,
DCL-073, para. 20; Vol. IX, Annex 207, DCL-080, paras. 18–19; Vol. IX, Annex 209,
DCL-083, para. 19; Vol. XI, Annex 252, DCL-167, para. 22.
847
See e.g., n. 836, above; Vol. VII, Annex 180, DCL-028, para. 18 (“He said the University
was ‘trying to figure it out,’ but that the decision came ‘from the ministry.’ He said there was
nothing he could do and asked that I give the University more time to figure the situation
out.”); Vol. VIII, Annex 188, DCL-040, para. 17 (“He informed me in confidence that
University staff had been ordered not to communicate with Qataris, nor to provide them with
any documents or information. If they did, he told me they would be disciplined by the
University.”); Vol. VII, Annex 175, DCL-021, para. 12; Vol. VIII, Annex 187, DCL-038,
para. 18; Vol. VIII, Annex 196, DCL-056, para. 12; Vol. VII, Annex 249, DCL-164, para.
12.
848
Vol. VII, Annex 166, DCL-005, para. 16 (“The university responded to my e-mail stating
that they had not received any update from Emirati authorities, and telling me that I should
wait to see how the ‘political situation’ progressed.”); Vol. VII, Annex 172, DCL-013, para.
19; Vol. VIII, Annex 190, DCL-043, para.17.
849
Vol. VII, Annex 175, DCL-021, para. 12.
850
Vol. IX, Annex 209, DCL-083, para. 18.

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their ability to apply to other programs and jobs. One Qatari student called his
university for information on how he could obtain his transcript. He explained
that: “[w]hen someone did answer the phone, they asked me if I was Qatari and
then hung up when I answered the question.” 851 Almost two years later, some
Qatari students are still waiting for transcripts 852.

5.119 Even when Qatari students were able to retrieve their diplomas or
transcripts, not all of them had been authenticated by the competent UAE
Ministry853. Because certified original records are usually required in Qatar, this
has complicated, and sometimes prevented, students from transferring to other
universities or obtaining employment 854.

5.120 Third, where Qatari students were able to transfer to another university,
differences between syllabuses meant that they were sometimes required to study
alternative subjects and the new university did not recognize all of their credits.
Further, some students have traveled further to find equivalent courses or where

851
Vol. VIII, Annex 198, DCL-066, para. 15; see also e.g., para. 5.115, nn. 833–834, above;
Vol. VII, Annex 176, DCL-022, para. 10 (“I called the University on six or seven occasions
to request these transcripts. The University administration either said to me: ‘we will see’ or
they transferred me to another department . . . However, none of these departments answered
the phone.”); Vol. VII, Annex 163, DCL-001, para. 15; Vol. VII, Annex 172, DCL-013,
para. 20; Vol. VII, Annex 174, DCL-020, para. 12; Vol. VIII, Annex 200, DCL-070, para.
18 (needed to collect transcript in person); Vol. XI, Annex 263, DCL-180, para. 13.
852
See, e.g., Vol. VII, Annex 176, DCL-022, para. 12; Vol. VIII, Annex 200, DCL-070, para.
20; Vol. X, Annex 239, DCL-144, para. 32.
853
See, e.g., Vol. VIII, Annex 196, DCL-056, para. 11 (“[the transcripts] that I received were
only copies and not official documents; they were not stampled by the Emirati and Qatari
authorities.”); Vol. VII, Annex 183, DCL-031, para. 12; Vol. IX, Annex 213, DCL-089,
paras. 11–14.
854
Vol. VII Annex 180, DCL-028, para. 29; Vol. XII, Annex 263, DCL-180, paras. 18–20.

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grades will be accepted. As a result, students’ career plans have changed, their
graduation has been delayed and the cost and time required to complete their
studies has increased 855.

5.121 Finally, some Qatari students have not been able to continue their
education due to the lack of comparable alternatives outside of the UAE. For
instance, some Qatari students who studied in more flexible programs in the UAE
prior to 5 June, have been generally unable to find a comparable alternative 856.
Prior to the Travel Ban, students had traveled to the UAE for these types of
programs because they did not exist in Qatar 857. These students therefore had to

855
See e.g., Vol. VII, Annex 172, DCL-013, para. 39 (“My studies, career and life plans have
been delayed by two years. I will now graduate at the age of [redacted]. This has affected me
very deeply on a psychological level because in Qatar, it is not considered normal to start
working at this age. I moreover cannot get married before I start working. I feel really guilty
that my father still has to pay for my living expenses.”); see also Vol. VII, Annex 168, DCL-
009, para. 18; Vol. VII, Annex 173, DCL-018, para. 11; Vol. VII, Annex 174, DCL-020,
para. 18; Vol. VII, Annex 175, DCL-021, paras. 18–19, 22; Vol. VII, Annex 176, DCL-022,
para. 13; Vol. VII, Annex 183, DCL-031, para. 13; Vol. VIII, Annex 187, DCL-038,
para. 20; Vol. VIII, Annex 188, DCL-040, para. 19; Vol. VIII, Annex 190, DCL-043, para.
31; Vol. VIII, Annex 196, DCL-056, para. 32; Vol. VIII, Annex 200, DCL-070, para. 20;
Vol. IX, Annex 208, DCL-082, para. 23; Vol. X, Annex 233, DCL-132, para.10; Vol. X,
Annex 239, DCL-144, para. 31; Vol. XI, Annex 259, DCL-175, paras. 17–18; Vol. VIII,
Annex 268, DCL-185, para. 10.
856
See, e.g., Vol. VIII, Annex 196, DCL-056, para. 33 (“Studying in [redacted] is not easy for
me. I have to leave my family, my wife, and my children for long periods of time when I go
there. . . . It would have been much more convenient to continue studying in the UAE.”); see
also Vol. VII, Annex 174, DCL-020, para. 5; Vol. VII, Annex 183, DCL-031, paras. 14, 21;
Vol. VIII, Annex 202, DCL-073, para. 28; Vol. IX, Annex 221, DCL-102, para. 12; Vol.
XII, Annex 263, DCL-180, para. 21.
857
See, e.g., Vol. VII, Annex 177, DCL-024, para. 27; Vol. VII, Annex 183, DCL-031, para. 6;
Vol. VIII, Annex 198, DCL-066, para. 7; Vol. IX, Annex 221, DCL-102, para. 6; Vol. XI,
Annex 249, DCL-164, para. 6; Vol. XI, Annex 251, DCL-166, para. 8; Vol. XI, Annex 256,
DCL-172, para. 15.

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stop their studies or take a leave of absence from work to complete them
elsewhere 858.

5.122 The Travel Bans have not only negatively impacted Qatari students’
education and work prospects in the myriad ways set out above, but also their
mental health and well-being. As one Qatari student put it, “I feel emotionally
drained and fragile. No student expects to have their graduation snatched away
from them in the final stages of their education, especially given the personal and
professional sacrifices I had made to study in the UAE.” 859

5.123 While the UAE claimed at the provisional measures hearing that hundreds
of Qataris are presently enrolled in educational institutions in the UAE, the
evidence adduced in support is nothing more than a list of dates and ports of entry.
No effort has been made to demonstrate that the entries listed correlate to students
or even Qataris, let alone to Qatari students who remain enrolled at UAE

858
See, e.g., Vol. VIII, Annex 196, DCL-056, para. 33 (“I also have to take annual leave to
study now, as my work will not allow me to take unpaid leave.”); Vol. IX, Annex 221, DCL-
102, paras. 10, 12 (“Because I would not be able to travel to the UAE, I had no hope that I
could complete my degree there); see also Vol. VII, Annex 183, DCL-031, para 21; Vol. XI,
Annex 251, DCL-166, para. 22; Vol. X, Annex 261, DCL-178, para. 11.
859
Vol. VIII, Annex 190, DCL-043, para. 38; see also Vol. VIII, Annex 188, DCL-040, para.
20 (“I simply cannot express the devastation I feel.”); Vol. VIII, Annex 201, DCL-072,
paras. 21, 25 (“This was a very dark period—and the beginning of an extended
depression. . . . I lost weight. I did not want to eat. I did not want to see my family. I just
stayed alone in my room. I had no energy and was not in the mood for anyone or anything.”);
Vol. VII, Annex 163, DCL-001, para. 20; Vol. VII, Annex 167, DCL-006, para. 21;
Vol. VII, Annex 175, DCL-021, para. 17; Vol. VII, Annex 177, DCL-024, para.30; Vol. VII
Annex 180, DCL-028, para. 30; Vol. VIII, Annex 200, DCL-070, para. 25; Vol. IX, Annex
208, DCL-082, para. 26; Vol. IX, Annex 209, DCL-083, para. 28; Vol. IX, Annex 213,
DCL-089, para. 16; Vol. IX, Annex 214, DCL-091, para.13; Vol. IX, Annex 222, DCL-105,
para. 20; Vol. X, Annex 238, DCL-143, para. 14; Vol. X, Annex 239, DCL-144, para. 33;
Vol. X, Annex 240, DCL-145, para. 23; Vol. XI, Annex 249, DCL-164, para. 18; Vol. XI,
Annex 259, DCL-175, para. 19; Vol. XII, Annex 263, DCL-180, paras. 22–23.

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institutions. 860 Further, the fact that a student remains enrolled at a university does
not mean that the student has in fact been able to continue and complete their
studies.

5.124 The only piece of evidence presented by the UAE that contained any
specific details relating to education is an email dated 8 March 2018 from the
UAE Office of the Undersecretary for Higher Education, which just concedes that
a “number of students from the State of Qatar dropped out university studies [sic]
for non-academic reason [sic].”861 The UAE has provided no credible evidence to
suggest that the effects of the violation has been mitigated, much less remedied.

3. Interference with the Right to Property

5.125 The UAE has impermissibly interfered with the right to property, a right
that is explicitly referenced in Article 5(d)(v) of the CERD, and further protected
in, inter alia, the UDHR, the Arab Charter on Human Rights, and the United
Nations General Assembly’s Declaration on the Human Rights of Individuals

860
See CR 2018/13, p. 13, para. 14 (Alnowais); CR 2018/15, p. 34, paras. 25–26 (Buderi); UAE
PM Exhibit 12 (25 June 2018), Immigration – Student Entry Records, pp. 3–17.
861
UAE PM, Exhibit 8 (25 June 2018), Education – Undersecretary of Academic Affairs Email
(dated 8 March 2018), p. 5. The UAE claimed that this email instructed higher education
institutions to inform Qatari students that “studies are available to all students who meet the
required conditions.” However, according to one Qatari student, “On [redacted] 2018, I
received an email from [redacted] to my personal email account, asking me to confirm that I
wished to resume my studies at [redacted]. [Exhibit A] By that time, I had already been
taking classes at the [redacted] for several months and had missed nearly two full semesters
of classes at [redacted]. I found the email very confusing, because I still was not allowed to
travel to the UAE—as the [redacted] administration knew—and the email did not actually say
I could return if I wished to do so. I therefore replied to the email by explaining that I could
not enter the UAE to resume classes, and in any case I had already transferred to another
university.” Vol. XI, Annex 249, DCL-164, para. 14.

307
Who Are Not Nationals of the Country in Which They Live 862. Article 5(d)(v)
prohibits discriminatory interference with the right to own property, and any
privileges that flow from that ownership right 863.

5.126 It is not uncommon for Qataris to invest in property in the UAE. In 2016
alone, Qataris bought approximately US$500 million worth of property in
Dubai 864. As a result of the Absolute and Modified Travel Bans, however, Qataris
are unable to freely exercise rights associated with ownership. Notably, to this day
the ownership of property has never been an explicit carve-out to the successive
iterations of the Absolute Travel Ban.

5.127 As of June 2018, the NHRC had received 458 individual claims related to
property865, while the CCC has documented a total of 786 claims related to
interference with property rights 866. The UAE’s own evidence shows a steep drop

862
See UDHR, Art. 17 (“(1) Everyone has the right to own property alone as well as in
association with others. (2) No one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property.”); Arab
Charter on Human Rights, Art. 31 (“Everyone has a guaranteed right to own private property,
and shall not under any circumstances be arbitrarily or unlawfully divested of all or any part
of his property.”); United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Fortieth
Session, 116th Plenary Meeting, document A/RES/40/144, Art. 5(2)(d) (“[Aliens shall enjoy]
. . . [t]he right to own property alone as well as in association with others, subject to domestic
law.”).
863
See Vol. III, Annex 92, CERD, Art. 5(d)(v).
864
See “The boycott of Qatar is hurting its enforcers”, The Economist (19 October 2017),
[Link]
will-not-trade-doha-iranians-will-boycott.
865
Vol. V, Annex 140, National Human Rights Committee, Fifth General Report, Continuation
of human rights violations: A year of the blockade imposed on Qatar (June 2018), p. 24.
866
Vol. XII, Annex 272, Affidavit, State of Qatar Compensation Claims Committee, Exhibit B
(Portion of CCC Claims Database related to the UAE). The vast majority of these claims
(83%) were submitted by Qataris who were prevented from accessing real property—
apartments, houses, and land—in the UAE. Ibid.

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in the number of property purchases by Qataris in the UAE, from 220 in 2017 to
just 23 in 2018 867.

5.128 As a result of the Travel Ban, Qataris have lost physical access to their
properties in the UAE. One Qatari who owns land in the UAE reports that he
cannot access his property and is therefore left to wonder “whether I still own my
land . . . Someone else could have taken it, and I would not know about it.” 868 A
property developer told another Qatari owner the only way to exit the purchase
agreement for a property he could not access was to find a buyer for the property
and “then come to the UAE to transfer the agreement . . . into the buyer’s name. I
told the representative that I wasn’t allowed to come to the UAE because I am
Qatari, but he did not seem to care. He told me that it was the only choice I had if
I wanted to get out of the purchase agreement.” 869 Other Qataris lost control over

867
UAE PM Exhibit 3 (25 June 2018), Report of Abu Dhabi police on Hotline, Real Estate,
Funds, Licenses and Immigration, p. 14. The 2017 number may well be misleading, since it
does not indicate how many of those transactions took place before 5 June 2017 versus after.
868
Vol. VIII, Annex 193, DCL-048, para. 26;see, e.g.,Vol. IX, Annex 216, DCL-093, paras. 19,
25 (“However, we cannot check [the property’s] status with our own eyes, as we can no
longer travel to the UAE. There is no one in the UAE who could help me and check the status
of the construction for me . . . We do not know if or when we will be able to access it
again.”); Vol. VII, Annex 169, DCL-010, para. 21; Vol. VIII, Annex 191, DCL-046, paras.
8–10, 23, 26; Vol. VIII, Annex 194, DCL-051, para. 13; Vol. VIII, Annex 195, DCL-053,
para. 13; Vol. VIII, Annex 196, DCL-056, para. 25; Vol. VIII, Annex 199, DCL-068, paras.
8, 16; Vol. IX, Annex 211, DCL-086, paras. 13, 16; Vol. IX, Annex 215, DCL-092, para.
16; Vol. IX, Annex 217, DCL-096, para. 23; Vol. IX, Annex 218, DCL-097, para. 25; Vol.
X, Annex 237, DCL-140, paras. 17; Vol. XI, Annex 250, DCL-165, paras. 9–10; Vol. XI,
Annex 252, DCL-167, para. 17; Vol. XI, Annex 258, DCL-174, para. 16; Vol. XI, Annex
260, DCL-177, para. 12; Vol. XI, Annex 269, DCL-187, para. 14; Vol. X, Annex 229, DCL-
123, para. 10; Vol. X, Annex 230, DCL-124, paras. 19–22.
869
Vol. VIII, Annex 182, DCL-030, para. 9; see e.g., Vol. VII, Annex 170, DCL-011, para. 26;
Vol. X, Annex 242, DCL-147, para. 12; Vol. XI, Annex 258, DCL-174, para. 10.

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their businesses and had to either close or sell them, including because they could
not travel to the UAE to renew the Emirati commercial license 870.

5.129 Qataris also have reported being unable to sell or transfer their UAE
properties as they cannot travel there to manage the sales and property managers
will not communicate with them. There is also evidence of the UAE authorities
freezing real estate sales and property registrations by Qataris—a further State act
of racial discrimination which is significantly impairing Qataris’ property
rights 871. For example, a Qatari who owned property in the UAE contacted his
agent in July 2017 to find out how to sell his property. The agent reported that the
Land Department had communicated verbally that Qataris cannot sell properties in
the UAE 872.

5.130 Because they cannot travel to the UAE, some Qataris have tried to grant a
Power of Attorney (“PoA”) in order to manage their property from abroad via a
third party. A valid PoA must be signed and notarized by a Notary Public. If
executed outside of the UAE, it must be notarized and authenticated by the UAE
Embassy (or equivalent) in the country in which it is signed. As the UAE
Embassy in Qatar is closed, a Qatari wishing to execute a PoA must travel to a

870
See, e.g., Vol. IX, Annex 204, DCL-076, para. 32 (“I lost everything: my home, my
businesses, all of my savings, and my friendships. . . . My family and I have had to start over
empty-handed.”); Vol. IX, Annex 224, DCL-108, para. 12. (“It was devastating to lose
control over a business that I had built by myself, from scratch, and had turned into a
successful shop over the course of a decade.”); Vol. IX, Annex 217, DCL-096, paras. 14–22;
Vol. IX, Annex 219, DCL-098, para.15; Vol. IX, Annex 220, DCL-100, paras. 22–32; Vol.
X, Annex 238, DCL-143, para. 19; Vol. XI, Annex 247, DCL-161, para. 19.
871
See Vol. XI, Annex 248, DCL-162, para 13; Vol. XII, Annex 265, DCL-182, paras. 9, 11
(“They refused to register the sale agreement just because I am Qatari.”) Vol. IX, Annex 218,
DCL-097, para. 21; Vol. XII, Annex 267, DCL-184, para. 14.
872
Vol. VII, Annex 169, DCL-010, para. 16.

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third country such as Kuwait or Oman. During the provisional measures hearing,
the UAE attempted to demonstrate that UAE embassies and consulates in third
countries continue to be available as normal to Qataris to authenticate documents,
such as PoAs 873. As an initial matter, the alleged availability of PoAs does not and
cannot remedy the impairment of Qataris’ property rights as a result of the
Absolute and Modified Travel Bans. At most, the hypothetical availability of
PoAs could mitigate harm caused by the UAE’s unlawful expulsion and Travel
Bans.

5.131 But in practice, PoAs have proven ineffective. First, the process for
Qataris to obtain PoAs is arbitrary. Some of the attempts by Qataris to obtain
PoAs have been rebuffed by UAE embassy officials, who have rejected requests
because the applicant was Qatari 874. Second, the small number of Qataris who
have actually received valid PoAs have often been unable to use them including
because, as set out in further detail below, Emiratis and non-Emiratis alike are
afraid to act pursuant to a Qatari PoA as a result of the Anti-Qatari Incitement
Campaign 875.

5.132 The few documents adduced by the UAE to support its claim are hardly
convincing—two relate to documents submitted not by Qataris but by an Emirati
couple and a Qatari-Emirati couple, and the majority of them were executed by
corporations, not individual Qataris 876. In fact, one of the examples cited by the

873
CR 2018/13, p. 14, para. 17 (Alnowais).
874
See para. 4.65, above.
875
See para. 4.65, above.
876
See UAE PM Exhibit 5 (25 June 2018), Business – UAE Embassy – Authentication Records.

311
UAE as a “successful” receipt of a PoA by a Qatari corporation was one obtained
by Muntajat, a state-owned subsidiary of Qatar Petroleum 877. But what the UAE
omitted were the details. Muntajat explained that, prior to 5 June, the relatively
straightforward process for obtaining a PoA took “one day (or two, at most, if
there was some delay).” 878 However, its attempt to obtain a POA since 5 June
2017, “took some six weeks, three lawyers’ offices, and visits to two embassies
and four ministries in three countries”, at an exorbitant cost of approximately
US$11,000 879. Further:

“The only reason that Muntajat was able to manage

this complicated process is that it had preexisting
relationships with lawyers in the various legal fields
and the existing transnational relationships among
the law firms, as well as the Company’s
considerable resources that enabled it to complete
the process at embassies and notary offices in three
countries.” 880

5.133 Individuals who do not have access to the same extensive financial and
expert resources thus face insurmountable obstacles to obtaining a valid PoA881.
As a result, the system of PoAs argued by the UAE simply has not, and cannot,

877
See UAE PM Exhibit 6 (25 June 2018), Power of Attorney.
878
Vol. XI, Annex 245, DCL-152, para. 19.
879
Vol. XI, Annex 245, DCL-152, paras. 21, 26 (emphasis added).
880
Vol. XI, Annex 245, DCL-152, para. 22.
881
For example, a Qatari who has been unable to access and manage his properties in the UAE
since 5 June 2017 can no longer rent those which were not already under local management.
Vol. IX, Annex 211, DCL-086, paras. 14–15 (“Regarding the [redacted] which are currently
under estate agent management . . . we have been unable to obtain powers of attorney for
individuals in the UAE to manage this process in our absence, as there is no Emirati embassy
in Qatar.”).

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even begin to mitigate the harm caused by the UAE’s impermissible interference
with the right of Qataris to their property in the UAE 882.

4. Interference with the Right to Work

5.134 The UAE has impermissibly interfered with the right to work and free
choice of employment as stated in Article 5(e)(i), Article 23(1) of the UDHR and
Article 34 of the Arab Charter on Human Rights 883, which require that the UAE
refrain from discriminatory interference with, at a very minimum, access to the
labor market 884.

5.135 As a result of the UAE’s Absolute and Modified Travel Ban, Qataris were
deprived of their work on a discriminatory basis because Qataris working in the

882
Further, while the UAE introduced evidence at the provisional measures phase purporting to
demonstrate that commercial licenses continue to be issued and renewed for Qataris in the
UAE, the data, again, only covers the period between 5 June 2017 to 18 June 2018. See UAE
PM, Exhibit 3 (25 June 2018), Report of Abu Dhabi police on Hotline, Real Estate, Funds,
Licenses and I mmigration, p. 16. Further, regardless of whether a license is issued or
renewed, Qatari managers cannot effectively manage their businesses if they cannot travel to
the UAE, an impossibility that is compounded by the difficulties they face in executing a
valid PoA.
883
See Vol. III, Annex 92, CERD, Art. 5(e)(i); UDHR, Art. 23(1) (“Everyone has the right to
work, to free choice of employment, to just and favourable working conditions of work and
to protection against unemployment.”); Arab Charter on Human Rights, Art. 34 (“1. The right
to work is a natural right of every citizen. The State shall endeavor to provide, to the extent
possible, a job for the largest number of those willing to work, while ensuring production, the
freedom to choose one's work and equality of opportunity without discrimination of any kind
on grounds of race, colour, sex, religion, language, political opinion, membership in a union,
national origin, social origin, disability or any other situation” . . . 5. “Each State party shall
ensure to workers who migrate to its territory the requisite protection in accordance with the
laws in force.”); see also International Convenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights,
Art. 6(1) (“The States Parties to the present Covenant recognize the right to work, which
includes the right of everyone to the opportunity to gain his living by work which he freely
chooses or accepts, and will take appropriate steps to safeguard this right.”).
884
See ibid.

313
UAE had their employment summarily ended when they were forced to leave the
country 885. Notably, employment in the UAE has never been an explicit carve-out
to the successive iterations of the Absolute Travel Ban.

5.136 Ten of the verified complaints submitted to the CCC relate to interference
with the right to work 886. For example, a Qatari woman who had been working in
the UAE for many years fled the UAE on 5 June 2017 in response to the
Expulsion Order. Her Emirati employer’s human resources director now refuses to
communicate with her and she has not been able to find a new position in
Qatar 887.

5. Interference with Right to Equal Treatment Before Tribunals

5.137 As noted above, the UAE’s Article 2(1), 5(a) and 6 obligations require that
the UAE provide equal access to justice without interference on racially
885
See, e.g., Vol. VIII, Annex 191, DCL-046, para. 25 (“On June 5, 2017, without any notice or
time to prepare, I was forced to leave my job[.] . . . I have worked hard for 20 years, and
instead of being promoted and continuing to climb the career ladder as a Manager, I found
myself in between jobs for approximately a year, forced to eventually take up a lower
position. I have worked so hard, and now I cannot help but feel like my career is ruined.”);
see also Vol. VII, Annex 179, DCL-027, para. 19.
886
Vol. XII, Annex 263, Affidavit, State of Qatar Compensation Claims Committee, Exhibit B
(Portion of CCC Claims Database related to the UAE). All ten of these claimants were in the
UAE when the Expulsion Order was announced, and fled the UAE on or after 5 June 2017.
As a result of the UAE’s Discriminatory Measures, five of these claimants lost the job or
position they held on 5 June 2017.
887
See Vol. VII, Annex 178, DCL-025, para. 23 (“As a woman who worked very hard to reach
a senior position as [redacted], it is absolutely devastating to be unemployed and without any
social status.”); see also Vol. V, Annex 135, National Human Rights Committee, 100 Days
Under the Blockade: NHRC Third report on human rights violations caused by the blockade
imposed on the state of Qatar (30 August 2017), p. 7 (“[M]any citizens who are employed at
public, private, or government sectors and used to move freely between the four countries are
now jobless with no source of income and with no compensations from the three states that
initiated the blockade”).

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discriminatory grounds, ensuring the enjoyment of fundamental procedural
rights 888.

5.138 The multiple links between Qataris and the UAE prior to the 5 June, based
upon the freedoms established under the GCC framework, mean that Qataris have
rights subject to UAE law and the jurisdiction of Emirati courts. For Qataris that
have been expelled and/or subject to the Travel Bans, they have been denied
access to justice and procedural rights on discriminatory grounds.

5.139 In June 2018, the NHRC documented the inability of Qataris to “resort to
the courts” and to “exercise the right to litigation and [the] right to defense,”
including through the “[n]on-implementation of court orders issued in favor of
Qataris” 889. Twenty-six of the verified complaints submitted to the CCC relate to
denial of access to justice in the UAE 890. As explained by the OHCHR, “legal
cooperation has been suspended, including power of attorney.” 891

888
See para. 5.10, above; see also Vol. VI, Annex 150, P. Thornberry, The International
Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (Oxford University
Press, 2016), p. 427 (the overarching “justice infrastructure requirements of Articles 2 and
5—notably 5(a)—are complemented by the specific requirements of Article 6” to make
tribunals an effective means of relief from racial discrimination); Arab Charter on Human
Rights, Art. 12 (“All persons are equal before the courts and tribunals. The States parties
shall guarantee the independence of the judiciary and protect magistrates against any
interference, pressure or threats. They shall also guarantee every person subject to their
jurisdiction the right to seek a legal remedy before courts of all levels.”), 13(1) (“Everyone
has the right to a fair trial that affords adequate guarantees before a competent, independent
and impartial court that has been constituted by law . . .”).
889
Vol. V, Annex 140, National Human Rights Committee, Fifth General Report, Continuation
of human rights violations: A year of the blockade imposed on Qatar (June 2018), p. 53.
890
Vol. XII, Annex 272, Affidavit, State of Qatar Compensation Claims Committee, Exhibit B
(Portion of CCC Claims Database related to the UAE). The majority of these claimants
submitted claims related to ongoing cases before UAE courts, which they have been unable
to meaningfully participate in since 5 June 2017. Some claimants also reported that they were
315
5.140 As a result of the Travel Bans, Qataris cannot physically access UAE
courts and institutions, meet with an Emirati attorney in the UAE or appear before
the court as a party or witness 892. Once again, pursuing legal actions before local
courts and tribunals is not an explicit carve-out to the Absolute Travel Ban, nor is
defending such actions 893. In addition, Emirati courts are reported to have adopted
a discriminatory attitude to cases brought by Qataris, with one declarant reporting:
“I have heard from my lawyer’s office [in the UAE] that Emirati authorities have
indefinitely delayed proceedings involving Qataris” 894. Further, as explained
above, the UAE has compounded this violation with the difficulties that it has
imposed on Qataris’ ability to execute valid PoAs, 895 and engaging Emirati agents,
including local counsel, has proved extremely difficult for Qataris, as Emiratis are
afraid of punishment under the law if they assist Qataris 896.

unable to validate or use Powers of Attorney for use in the UAE. Others reported that they
faced difficulties finding legal representation or communicating with lawyers in the UAE.
891
Vol. III, Annex 98, OHCHR Technical Mission to the State of Qatar, Report On the impact
of the Gulf Crisis on hum an rights (December 2017), available at [Link]
content/uploads/2018/01/[Link], para. 40.
892
See paras. 4.79–4.81, above.
893
Likewise, the Travel Bans prevent Qataris from seeking redress against violations of their
rights, but also render them unable to defend themselves if claims are brought against them in
the UAE. See e.g., Vol. VIII, Annex 193, DCL-048, paras. 19, 25 (“[A]fter obtaining a court
order in my favor, I am still unable to enforce it or collect the sums under it.”); Vol. IX,
Annex 203, DCL-074, para. 17; Vol. XI, Annex 262, DCL-179, paras. 14-17.
894
Vol. X, Annex 230, DCL-124, para. 18.
895
See paras. 5.131–5.133, above.
896
See para. 4.62, above.

316
5.141 In short, just like the UAE’s collective expulsion of Qataris, neither the
Absolute nor Modified Travel Bans can be justified as legitimate or proportional.
The UAE has compromised Qataris’ fundamental human rights and freedoms,
including the rights to due process, to family life, to education and access to
justice, because they are a member of a group defined by their national origin. The
UAE’s arbitrary conduct has been compounded by its failure to afford a protective
legal framework or access to an effective remedy as required by Article 6. As
such, the UAE has violated a multiple Article 5 obligations, as well as Articles
2(1) and 6 of the CERD.

Section III. The UAE’s Interference with Qataris’ Right to Freedom of

Opinion and Expression Violates Articles 2(1), 5(d)(viii) and 6 of the CERD

5.142 The UAE also has silenced media emanating from Qatar through its Qatari
Media Block, thereby nullifying and impairing the rights of Qataris to freedom of
opinion and expression on racially discriminatory grounds, directly contrary to its
obligations to respect and protect these rights under Articles 2(1), 5(d)(viii) and 6
of the CERD 897.

5.143 As discussed above, even before announcing the Discriminatory Measures,

the UAE had moved to block the transmission of Al Jazeera and other Qatari
content in the UAE and then demanded that Qatar dismantle Al Jazeera as a

897
See Vol. III, Annex 92, CERD, Arts. 2(1), 5(d)(viii), 6; see also UDHR, Art. 19 (“Everyone
has the right to freedom of opinion and expression; this right includes freedom to hold
opinions without interference and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through
any media and regardless of frontiers.”); Arab Charter on Human Rights, Art. 32(1) (“The
present Charter guarantees the right to information and to freedom of opinion and expression,
as well as the right to seek, receive and impart information and ideas through any medium,
regardless of geographical boundaries.”).

317
condition of repealing its Discriminatory Measures 898. Silencing the region’s
premier independent news channel stands in stark contrast to the directive that
“[e]veryone has the right to hold opinions and to seek, receive and impart
information and ideas of all kinds through any media and regardless of
frontiers” 899.

5.144 Evidence obtained from Al Jazeera shows that attempts to block the
transmission of Al Jazeera’s content began as early as 23 May 2017, the day that
the QNA was hacked. While Al Jazeera’s satellite signal was protected from
interference, its website and the broadcast of its television content were no longer
available in the UAE as of 23 and 24 May 2017 respectively:

“the number of site visits from the UAE [to Al

Jazeera’s satellite distribution website] dropped
from 972 visitors in May 2017 to 52 in June 2017.
This represents a drop of 95%, which persisted
through the following months and strongly indicates
that access to Al Jazeera’ satellite distribution
website was being blocked for internet users located
in the UAE.” 900

898
See paras. 2.43, 2.64, above.
899
Vol. IV, Annex 113, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 35: Combating racist
hate speech, document CERD/C/GC/35 (26 September 2013), para. 26.
900
Vol. XII, Annex 264, DCL-181 Witness Declaration, Al Jazeera Media Network
Representative, para. 7.

318
5.145 On 18 September, the number of views on Al Jazeera’s social media and
mobile network platforms in the UAE “plummeted from 350,000/day to zero . . .
Access to these apps is still blocked in the UAE.” 901

5.146 Steps were also taken to silence Qatar’s beIN Sports, the region’s
preeminent network of sports channels. Following the 5 June Directive, the
Emirati government ordered hotel property managers to “terminate the broadcast
and display of bein [sic] sports channels in the hotel facilities until further
notice” 902, although certain content later became available from 26 July 2017903.
The sale of beIN Sports receivers and cards was also prohibited 904.

5.147 The UAE also directed internet providers in the UAE to block access to
the websites of Qatari service providers from the territory of the UAE. In addition
to Al Jazeera, Qatari newspapers such as the Peninsula were blocked 905.

901
Vol. XII, Annex 264, DCL-181 Witness Declaration, Al Jazeera Media Network
Representative, para. 11.
902
Vol. II, Annex 17, Sharjah Commerce and Tourism Development Authority, Ban of bein
[sic] Sports Channels Display (15 June 2017).
903
See Vol. II, Annex 22, Abu Dhabi Tourism and Culture Authority, Circular No. (33) 2017
(26 July 2017).
904
See Vol. II, Annex 16, “UAE bans selling and subscription of beIN Sports receivers and
cards”, UAE News Agency WAM (14 June 2017), [Link]
p. 1; Vol. II, Annex 28, Letter from United Arab Emirates National Media Council to United
Arab Emirates Ministry of Economics, beIN Sports Receivers and Cards (6 June 2018) (with
certified translation).
905
See “Websites of Al Jazeera, Qatari newspapers blocked in Saudi Arabia and UAE”, Al
Arabiya (24 May 2017), [Link]
[Link]; Vol. V, Annex 125,
Committee to Protect Journalists, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain block Qatari news websites
(25 May 2017), [Link]
319
5.148 Into this informational vacuum, the UAE has injected and tolerated anti-
Qatari rhetoric and sentiments 906. In this environment, Qataris have withdrawn
from public life in the UAE as Qataris. The UAE has engendered such fear that
Qataris can no longer freely express their views, opinions and even identity as
Qataris while in the UAE, for example. Qataris have stopped wearing Qatari
dress, speaking with a Qatari accent, or playing Qatari songs 907, Qatari license
plates have been removed, and cars with such license plates vandalized 908.

5.149 As emphasized by the CERD Committee, the rights to freedom of opinion

and expression are “indispensable for the articulation of human rights” and all
“States parties should adopt policies empowering all groups within the purview of
the Convention to exercise” them 909.

5.150 Notably, the CERD protects both the rights of individuals and
“institutions”, which should be read broadly to include corporations such as Qatari
media outlets. Article 2(1)(a) explicitly provides that “[e]ach State Party
undertakes to engage in no act or practice of racial discrimination against persons,
groups of persons or institutions”. The ordinary meaning of “institutions” includes

[Link], pp. 1–3; “The Peninsula Qatar website blocked in UAE”, The Peninsula (10
June 2017), [Link]
blocked-in-UAE.
906
See paras. 2.45–2.61, above.
907
See, e.g., para. 2.25, nn. 64, 65, above; para. 3.95, n. 318, above; Vol. VII, Annex 180, DCL-
028 , para 20.
908
See, e.g., para. 2.25, n. 66, above; Vol. IX, Annex 220, DCL-100, paras. 33–34.
909
Vol. IV, Annex 113, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 35: Combatting
Racist Hate Speech, document CERD/C/GC/35 (2013), para. 29.

320
corporations 910, and the object and purpose of the CERD—to guarantee protection
against racial discrimination—supports their inclusion as rights-holders under the
Convention. Indeed, the travaux préparatoires clarify that the reference to
“institutions” was included in Article 2(1)(a) to address concerns that the
Convention’s jurisdiction ratione personae was “too restricted” precisely because
“article 2 protected only individuals and did not offer any safeguards against
discriminations to groups or institutions”. 911

910
See Merriam-Webster Dictionary, Definition of “Institution”, [Link]
[Link]/dictionary/institution (“[A]n established organization or corporation (such as a
bank or university) especially of a public character”.).
911
Vol. III, Annex 70, United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly, Eighteenth
Session, Third Committee, document A/C.3/SR.1214, paras. 3–4. Corporations are
recognized as rights-holders under other human rights conventions. The ECHR explicitly
grants rights to legal persons in Art. 1 Protocol 1 (“Every natural or legal person is entitled to
the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions . . .”) and the ECtHR has also recognized that,
inter alia, the following rights granted to “persons” include legal persons: “freedom of
expression, right to privacy, right to a fair trial”. The standing of legal persons to bring claims
in protection of rights has also been recognized under the ACHPR (see African Commission
on Human and Peoples’ Rights, Interights v. Mauritania, Communication No. 242/2001, 56
(4 June 2004)), and under the ACHR (see Vol. IV, Annex 123, IACtHR, Entitlement of
Legal entities to hold rights under the Inter-American Human Rights System (Interpretation
and scope of Article 1(2), in relation to Articles 1(1), 8, 11(2), 13, 16, 21, 24, 25, 29, 30, 44,
46 and 62(3) of the American Convention on Human Rights, as well as of Article 8(1)(A) and
(B) of the Protocol of San Salvador), Advisory Opinion OC-22/16 (26 February 2016)
(“IACtHR Advisory Opinion”), paras. 105, 107, 111, 115–117, 120; Inter-American
Commission on Human Rights, Granier et al. (Radio Caracas Television) vs. Venezuela,
Judgment, (ser. C) No. 293 (22 June 2015) (restrictions on freedom of expression affecting
media outlets may affect the rights of individuals who engage in communication through that
entity.). The terms of the ACHR grants rights strictly to “ser humanos” (“human beings”).
However, the IACtHR has expressly distinguished the terms of the ACHR and its practice in
this respect from that of certain other human rights bodies, particularly the ECtHR and the
CERD Committee, which recognize legal persons as having rights. The CERD Committee
has “established that legal persons can denounce violations affecting their rights, provided
they have suffered harm and can be considered victims in the case”. See IACtHR Advisory
Opinion, in which the IACtHR notes that, at paras. 60, 62 (emphasis added).

321
5.151 In sum, by adopting the Qatari Media Block, the State has not only failed
to prevent discriminatory interference with the right to freedom of opinion and
expression, it has been the primary agent of that interference. This is a clear
violation of Article 5. The singling out of Qataris and Qatari media based solely
on their Qatari national origin and subjecting them to “restrictions” which nullify
or impair their right to freedom of opinion and expression represents a violation of
Article 2(1). Further, as set out above, by failing to provide a remedy to the
Qataris whose rights were impacted by the Qatari Media Block, the UAE has
violated Article 6 of the CERD.

Section IV. The UAE’s Propagation and Incitement of Discriminatory Anti-

Qatari Propaganda and Ideas Violate Articles 2, 4, 6 and 7 of the CERD

5.152 The Expulsion Order and the Absolute Travel Ban were not the only
measures that the UAE took that nullified and impaired the rights of Qataris. They
were accompanied by the UAE’s wide-ranging Anti-Qatari Incitement Campaign.

5.153 The UAE’s Anti-Incitement Campaign constitutes a fundamental violation

of the CERD in two broad respects. First, the UAE itself has propagated Anti-
Qatari ideas and incited racial discrimination. The Anti-Sympathy Law and the
Block on Qatari media contributed to and facilitated the reach of this Campaign –
which has fostered prejudice and fear in a manner deeply detrimental to the
perception of Qatari identity (Section A). Second, the UAE has also tolerated
(indeed, encouraged) the dissemination of such Anti-Qatari ideas by private
individuals (Section B). Both categories of State action and inaction violate
Articles 2, 4, 6 and 7 of the CERD.

322
A. THE UAE IS VIOLATING THE CERD THROUGH ITS ANTI-QATARI INCITEMENT
CAMPAIGN

5.154 The core of the CERD’s protections against racially discriminatory

theories and ideas can be found in Article 4:

“States Parties condemn all propaganda and all

organizations which are based on ideas or theories
of superiority of one race or group of persons of one
colour or ethnic origin, or which attempt to justify
or promote racial hatred and discrimination in any
form, and undertake to adopt immediate and
positive measures designed to eradicate all
incitement to, or acts of, such discrimination and, to
this end, with due regard to the principles embodied
in the Universal Declaration of Human Rights and
the rights expressly set forth in article 5 of this
Convention, inter alia:

(a) Shall declare an offence punishable by law all

dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or
hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well
as all acts of violence or incitement to such acts
against any race or group of persons of another
colour or ethnic origin, and also the provision of any
assistance to racist activities, including the financing
thereof;

(b) Shall declare illegal and prohibit organizations,

and also organized and all other propaganda
activities, which promote and incite racial
discrimination, and shall recognize participation in
such organizations or activities as an offence
punishable by law;

(c) Shall not permit public authorities or public

institutions, national or local, to promote or incite
racial discrimination.”

323
5.155 Article 4 plays a crucial role in achieving the objectives of the CERD. As
the CERD Committee explained in General Recommendation 35: “[w]hen the
[Convention] was being adopted, article 4 was regarded as central to the struggle
against racial discrimination …. [T]he implementation of article 4 is now of
increased importance.” 912 The reason is straightforward: “dissemination of ideas
based on racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial discrimination, as well as
all acts of violence or incitement to such acts against any race or group of persons
of another colour or ethnic origin” are anathema to the objectives of the CERD 913.

5.156 Other provisions of the CERD are likewise engaged by the propagation
and tolerance of racially discriminatory ideas: in particular, the positive
obligations set out in Article 7 are mandatory and require “immediate and
effective measures” that aim to combat prejudice, recognizing the importance of
States parties educating and informing their populations so as to promote
friendship and tolerance 914. These obligations have been described by the CERD
Committee as “an indispensable complement to other approaches to combatting

912
Vol. IV, Annex 106, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 15 on article 4 of the
Convention, contained in document A/48/18 (1993), para. 1.
913
Vol. III, Annex 92, CERD, Art. 4(a). See UN General Assembly, International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights, 16 December 1966, 999 UNTS 171, Art. 20 (providing that “any
advocacy of national, racial, or religious hatred that constitutes incitement to discrimination,
hostility or violence shall be prohibited by law”). Though the CERD does not itself define
“propaganda”, international law generally defines propaganda as statements or materials
designed to influence their audience, whether organized or unorganized. See E. De
Brabandere, “Propaganda” in Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law (Oxford
Public International Law, 2012) (“Propaganda can be described as a method of
communication, by State organs or individuals, aimed at influencing and manipulating the
behaviour of people in a certain predefined way. The element of influence and manipulation
is at the centre of the concept, and distinguishes it from mere factual information.”).
914
Vol. III, Annex 92, CERD, Art. 7.

324
racial discrimination.” 915 They reinforce the obligations set out in Article 4 by
seeking to create an atmosphere in which racially discriminatory ideas and
propaganda cannot thrive. A State party that is systematically avoiding its Article
4 obligations is thus by definition undermining its Article 7 obligations, and the
effectiveness of the measures that might fall within its scope.

5.157 Each of States parties’ panoply of obligations under Article 2(1)—

including the undertakings not to engage in acts of racial discrimination, not to
sponsor or support racial discrimination by others, and to prohibit and bring to an
end all racial discrimination—is likewise engaged by the promotion and tolerance
of racially discriminatory ideas. Article 6 reinforces this framework by requiring
effective protection and remedies against all “dissemination of ideas based on
racial superiority . . .”.

5.158 The CERD Committee has made clear that each of these provisions works
in conjunction not only to prohibit States parties from themselves propagating
racially discriminatory ideas, but also by mandating them to adopt effective
measures to prohibit the promotion and incitement of racial discrimination:

“[I]t does not suffice, for the purposes of article 4 of

the Convention, merely to declare acts of racial
discrimination punishable on paper. Rather, criminal
laws and other legal provisions prohibiting racial
discrimination must also be effectively implemented
by the competent national tribunals and other State
institutions. This obligation is implicit in article 4 of
the Convention, under which States parties

915
See e.g., Vol. IV, Annex 113, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 35 on
Combating racist hate speech, document CERD/C/GC/35 (2013), para. 6; Gelle v. Denmark,
Communication No. 34/2004, Opinion, document CERD/C/68/D/34/2004 (2006), para. 7.4.

325
undertake to adopt immediate and positive measures
to eradicate all incitement to, or act of, racial
discrimination. It is also reflected in other
provisions of the Convention, such as article 2,
paragraph 1(d), which requires States to prohibit and
bring to an end, by all appropriate means, racial
discrimination, and article 6, which guarantees to
everyone effective protection and remedies against
any acts of racial discrimination.” 916

5.159 States parties’ obligations in this regard extend to non-citizens 917. Indeed,
States parties must “address xenophobic attitudes and behavior towards non-
citizens”, and the CERD therefore mandates “resolute action to counter any
tendency to target, stigmatize, stereotype or profile, on the basis of . . . national or
ethnic origin, members of ‘non-citizen’ population groups.” 918

916
Jama v. Denmark, Communication No. 41/2008, Opinion, document CERD/C/75/D/41/2008
(2009), para. 7.3; see also Gelle v. Denmark, Communication No. 34/2004, Opinion,
document CERD/C/68/D/34/2004 (2006), paras. 7.2–7.3; N. Lerner, The UN Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination (BRILL, 2014), p. 42.
917
See e.g., Vol. IV, Annex 113, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 35 on
Combating racist hate speech, document CERD/C/GC/35 (2013), para. 6. While there is no
explicit reference to “national origin” in the chapeau of Article 4, the CERD Committee also
has made clear that (i) racially discriminatory propaganda targeting a group of individuals on
the basis of national origin falls within the scope of Article 4. Gelle v. Denmark,
Communication No. 34/2004, Opinion, document CERD/C/68/D/34/2004 (2006); see also
Vol. VI, Annex 150, P. Thornberry, The International Convention on the Elimination of all
Forms of Racial Discrimination: A Commentary (Oxford University Press, 2016), p. 282
(while the “travaux are not illuminating in this respect”, Article 4 “should not be read to
suggest that particular categories remain bereft of protection from hate speech”).
918
Vol. IV, Annex 109, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 30 on discrimination
against non-citizens, document CERD/C/64/Misc.11/rev.3 (2004), paras. 11–12; see also
Vol. IV, Annex 113, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 35 on Combating
racist hate speech, document CERD/C/GC/35 (2013), para. 10 (“The Committee recalls the
mandatory nature of article 4 . . . .”).

326
5.160 Accordingly, singling out a group of non-citizens on the basis of their
national origin and subjecting them to a State-sponsored campaign of racially
discriminatory incitement and ideas engages a State Party’s obligations under (i)
Article 4, in particular its obligation under Article 4(c) “not [to] permit public
authorities or public institutions, national or local, to promote or incite racial
discrimination”; (ii) Article 7, as such a campaign is the antithesis of “promoting
understanding, tolerance and friendship among nations and racial or ethnical
groups”; (iii) under Article 2(1)(a), as such a campaign is an “act or practice” of
racial discrimination prohibited by Article 2(1)(a) as it has the “purpose or effect
of nullifying or impairing the recognition, enjoyment or exercise” of their human
rights and fundamental freedoms; and (iv) Article 6, where the State Party fails to
provide an effective remedy for its own and its officials’ unlawful dissemination
of racially-discriminatory ideas. The reach of the CERD is broad in this regard;
General Recommendation 35 specifies that “[p]ublic authorities at all
administrative levels” are bound by Article 4 919. Equally, the acts of State officials
are undoubtedly captured by these prohibitions as they are attributable to the State
pursuant to Article 4 of the ILC Draft Articles on the Responsibility of States for
Internationally Wrongful Acts 920.

919
The CERD Committee has made clear “that the provisions of article 4 are of a mandatory
character” and that “[p]ublic authorities at all administrative levels” are bound by those
provisions. See Vol. IV, Annex 106, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 15 on
article 4 of the Convention, contained in document A/48/18 (1993), paras. 2, 7.
920
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Yearbook of the
International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II (Part Two) (“ILC Articles”), Art. 4 (“[t]he
conduct of any State organ shall be considered an act of that State under international law,
whether the organ exercises legislative, executive, judicial or any other functions, whatever
position it holds in the organization of the State, and whatever its character as an organ of the
central Government or of a territorial unit of the State”, where an organ includes “…any
person or entity which has that status in accordance with the internal law of the State.”). The
commentaries to Article 4 quote the Moses case: “An officer or person in authority represents
327
5.161 Indeed, the power of public officials to disseminate and promote racial
discrimination is “of particular concern” to the CERD Committee 921, especially
“reported instances of hate speech directed against national and ethnic minorities .
. . attributed to high-ranking government officials and public figures [and]
reported to have a significant detrimental effect on the population.” 922 The CERD
Committee has also emphasized the “important role” played by high-level public
officials in achieving the mandate of Article 7 —to promote a culture of tolerance

pro tanto his government, which in an international sense is the aggregate of all officers and
men in authority”, and then states “[t]here have been many statements of principle since
then”. [para. 4] As long as an official is exercising his authority, it does not matter what
position that person holds within the government [commentaries to Article 4, para. 7]. Per
Article 7, the actions of its officials still constitute acts of the UAE even if they exceed
authority or contravene instructions.
921
Vol. IV, Annex 113, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 35 on Combating
racist hate speech, document CERD/C/GC/35 (2013), para. 22. The Committee noted in
particular “the role of politicians and other public opinion-formers in contributing to the
creation of a negative climate towards groups protected by the Convention and has
encouraged such persons and bodies to adopt positive approaches directed to the promotion
of intercultural understanding and harmony.” Ibid. para. 15.
922
CERD Committee, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, Turkmenistan, document CERD/C/TKM/CO/5 (27 March 2007), para. 11;
see also CERD Committee, Concluding observations on the combined twentieth to twenty-
second periodic reports of Bulgaria, document CERD/C/BGR/CO/20-22 (2017), paras. 11–
12 (“In particular, the Committee is concerned that racist discourse and appeals are evident
during election campaigns and that political parties and candidates frequently use slurs
against minority groups and individuals.”); CERD Committee, Concluding observations on
the twenty-third and t wenty-fourth periodic reports of the Russian Federation, document
CERD/C/RUS/CO/23-24 (20 September 2017), paras. 15–16 (expressing concern that
“[r]acist hate speech is still used by officials and politicians,” and recommending, inter alia,
that Russia “[i]ntensify its efforts to raise the awareness of the public, civil servants and law
enforcement officials ... in order to combat stereotypes, prejudices and discrimination”);
CERD Committee, Concluding observations of the Committee on the Elimination of Racial
Discrimination, Pakistan, document CERD/C/PAK/CO/21-23 (3 October 2016), paras. 15–
16 (noting a “rise in racist hate speech . . . including by public officials and political parties”
and recommending, inter alia, “enhanced human rights education and awareness-raising
campaigns,” as well as the condemnation of racist hate speech by public officials).

328
and respect—by formally rejected and condemning racially hateful ideas. 923
Public figures hold an elevated position in the public discourse, and their
affiliation with the State bestows upon them a cover of legitimacy—to say nothing
of their power to transform racially discriminatory ideas into action.

5.162 As such, the Committee has recommended that States parties “[d]raw the
attention of politicians and members of political parties to the particular duties and
responsibilities incumbent upon them pursuant to Article 4 of the Convention with
regard to their speeches, articles or other forms of expression in the media.” 924 For
example, in the face of apparent racist public discourse, including by political
candidates and parties in Bulgaria, the Committee recommended that States not
only amend their legislation “to include a definition of hate speech that is in line
with article 4”, but also “[e]stablish protocols to prevent and condemn hate speech
by public officials and politicians” and “[r]aise public awareness on respect for
diversity and the elimination of racial discrimination.” 925

5.163 Likewise, in its recent Concluding Observations adopted with respect to

the United Kingdom, the Committee expressed concerns about “divisive, anti-
immigrant and xenophobic rhetoric” and observed that politicians and prominent
political figures “not only failed to condemn such rhetoric, but also created and

923
Vol. IV, Annex 113, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 35 on Combating
racist hate speech, document CERD/C/GC/35 (2013), para. 37.
924
See Kamal Quereshi v. Denmark, Communication No. 27/2002, Opinion, document
CERD/C/63/D/27/2002 (2003), para. 9; P.S.N. v. Denmark, Communication No. 36/2006,
Opinion, document CERD/C/71/D/36/2006 (2007), para. 6.5; A.W.R.A.P. v. Denmark,
Communication No. 37/2006, Opinion, document CERD/C/71/D/37/2006 (2007), para. 6.5.
925
CERD Committee, Concluding Observations on the combined twentieth to twenty-second
periodic reports of Bulgaria, document CERD/C/BGR/CO/20-22 (31 May 2017), paras. 11–
12.

329
entrenched prejudices, thereby emboldening individuals to carry out acts of
intimidation and hate.” 926 The Committee recommended that the United Kingdom
“ensure that public officials not only refrain from such speech but also formally
reject hate speech and condemn the hateful ideas expressed, so as to promote a
culture of tolerance and respect.” 927

5.164 Here, the UAE and its officials, far from “condemning” racial
discrimination, have instead exercised their public power in violation of Articles
2(1), 4, 6 and 7 of the CERD in three ways: first, the UAE itself has spread and
encouraged racially discriminatory propaganda against Qataris; second, the UAE
has sought to silence any dissent—indeed, anyone seeking to “show compassion”
to Qatar or Qataris; and third, the UAE has failed to take any action whatsoever to
provide effective redress for those affected by the Campaign and to punish the
officials responsible for the spread of racially-discriminatory ideas.

5.165 First, the UAE and its officials have actively pursued the spread of racially
discriminatory ideas debasing and stigmatizing Qatar and Qataris. The UAE has
orchestrated the Anti-Qatari Incitement Campaign: a campaign that it has
propagated, encouraged and condoned, through lobbyists, State-sponsored speech

926
CERD Committee, Concluding Oobservations on the combined twenty-first to twenty-third
periodic reports of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, document
CERD/C/GBR/CO/21-23 (3 October 2016).
927
CERD Committee, Concluding observations on the combined twenty-first to twenty-third
periodic reports of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, document
CERD/C/GBR/CO/21-23 (3 October 2016), paras. 15–16; see also Vol. IV, Annex 113,
CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 35 on Combating racist hate speech,
document CERD/C/GC/35 (2013), para. 37 (“Formal rejection of hate speech by high-level
public officials and condemnation of the hateful ideas expressed play an important role in
promoting a culture of tolerance and respect.”).

330
and planting of false news 928. For example, the UAE’s National Media Council
paid a British communications company USD 333,000 to launch a public relations
campaign against Qatar on social media 929.

5.166 The UAE’s preference for Twitter and other social media outlets for
broadcasting discriminatory rhetoric is particularly problematic as it is a platform
known to reach a wide audience and on which messages are, by design, easy to
disseminate further 930. In fact, the CERD Committee has stressed the power of
media outlets, including social media outlets, such as Twitter, as a conduit of the
immediate mass dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred,
incitement, and threats, as well as a channel to promote tolerance and provide
information to the public to combat prejudice. On this basis, the Committee has
advised that States should therefore be particularly concerned by the use of the
media, including social media and the internet, as a platform to disseminate
racially discriminatory ideas 931.

928
See para. 2.36, above.
929
See Vol. VI, Annex 158, United States Department of Justice, FARA Registration Unit, SCL
Social Limited Registration Statement Pursuant to the Foreign Agents Registration Act (6
October 2017), [Link]
930
Joyce Hakmeh, Cybercrime Legislation in the GCC Countries: Fit for Purpose?, Chatham
House Research Paper (July 2018), Table 1. The choice of social media by the UAE and its
State officials to spread its message was deliberate. The GCC has among the highest “internet
and mobile penetration rates” in the world: in the UAE, 91.2% of the population uses the
Internet, and 94% of the population has a social media account. This “remarkable online
presence, standing in contrast to a traditionally limited public sphere for interaction”, has
served many purposes, including as a vehicle for leaders “to engage with their millions of
followers.” Ibid., pp. 5–6.
931
Vol. IV, Annex 113, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 35 on Combatting
racist hate speech, document CERD/C/GC/35 (2013), paras. 15, 39.

331
5.167 Further, as detailed above 932, high-profile representatives of the State have
engaged openly 933, or behind thinly veiled disguise 934, in anti-Qatar and anti-
Qatari rhetoric designed to incite racial hatred and even violence 935. Indeed, the
UAE’s own public officials are among the best-known propagators of anti-Qatar
and anti-Qatari sentiment in a context where identity of State and population are
intertwined 936. The acts and statements of these officials are attributable to the
UAE and thus engage its responsibility under Article 2(1) and Article 4 of the
CERD, and derail the effectiveness of measures to encourage tolerance, as
required by Article 7.

5.168 The UAE’s actions are a far cry from the Committee’s recommendation to
“ensure that public officials not only refrain from such speech but also formally
reject hate speech and condemn the hateful ideas expressed, so as to promote a
culture of tolerance and respect.” 937 The actions of the UAE’s public officials
designed to promote anti-Qatari incitement have been taken with the full
knowledge and approval of the highest levels of the UAE Government. As such,

932
See para. 2.36, above.
933
See paras. 2.54-2.55, above.
934
See para. 2.53, above.
935
See para. 2.56-2.61, above.
936
See para. 2.54-2.55, above.
937
See CERD Committee, Concluding observations on the combined twenty-first to twenty-third
periodic reports of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, document
CERD/C/GBR/CO/21–23 (2016), para. 16(d); see also Vol. IV, Annex 113, CERD
Committee, General Recommendation No. 35 on Combating racist hate speech, document
CERD/C/GC/35 (2013), para. 37 (“Formal rejection of hate speech by high-level public
officials and condemnation of the hateful ideas expressed play an important role in promoting
a culture of tolerance and respect.”).

332
the nature of the UAE’s conduct is far more egregious than conduct the CERD
Committee has found to violate the CERD. In particular, in TBB-Turkish Union v.
Germany, the CERD Committee found violations of Articles 2(1)(d), 4, and 6 of
the CERD on the basis of Germany’s failure to effectively investigate statements
of a German public official classifying Turkish immigrants as “bad” immigrants,
thus “[adding] to public vilification and debasement of Turks and Muslims in
general.” 938

5.169 Further, the Anti-Qatari Incitement Campaign sits alongside the UAE’s
Expulsion Order. By collectively expelling Qataris from the UAE on the grounds
of alleged “precautionary security reasons”, 939 the Emirati government singled
out the Qatari people as a group that should be both feared and despised, without
any legitimate or objective basis whatsoever. In so doing, the UAE has, to borrow
the words of the UN Human Rights Council, “exaggerated economic and national
security concerns that are not grounded in objective reality in order to justify
racist and xenophobic practices in the context of citizenship, nationality and
immigration laws and policies.” 940

938
TBB-Turkish Union in Berlin/Brandenburg v. Germany, Communication No. 48/2010,
Opinion, document CERD/C/82/D/ 48/2010 (2013), paras. 12.4, 12.9.
939
Vol. II, Annex 1, UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UAE supports statements of Kingdom of
Bahrain and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia on Qatar (5 June 2017) (emphasis added).
940
United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly Human Rights Council, Thirty-
Eighth Session, document A/HRC/38/52, para. 65. According to the UNHCR, “racist and
xenophobic ideologies rooted in ethno-nationalism regularly combine with national security
fears and economic anxieties to violate the human rights of non-citizens . . . on the basis of
race, ethnicity, national origin and religion.” Ibid. para. 63. For this reason, “States must
refrain from pretextual use of exaggerated economic and national security concerns that are
not grounded in objective reality in order to justify racist and xenophobic practices in the
context of citizenship, nationality and immigration laws and policies.” Ibid. para. 65.

333
5.170 Second, the UAE has supplemented its vilification of Qataris by stifling
any voices that it deems show “sympathy” to Qatar and Qataris and any public
discourse that might temper the Campaign. The UAE’s Anti-Sympathy law, which
prohibited the expression of “sympathy, bias, or affection for that state [of Qatar],
or objecting to the position of the State of the United Arab Emirates and the strict
and firm measures that it has taken against the Qatari government”, has reinforced
its Campaign 941. While the Attorney General may have referred to Qatar and “the
Qatari government”, these are clearly understood as a reference to Qatar qua State
and Qatar qua Qataris, including by Emiratis and Qataris alike 942. The Anti-
Sympathy Law is no idle threat; as discussed above, it has been actively enforced
against Emiratis, Qataris and other nationals 943.

5.171 As noted above, the UAE also closed down Qatari media channels in favor
of its own media outlets and those of its allies. The effect of this shutdown, again,
has been to silence sources of independent information that might have mitigated
the racially discriminatory messages disseminated through the Anti-Qatari
Incitement Campaign 944. It is an explicit example of the dangers of departing from
the CERD Committee’s warning that media pluralism “facilitates the emergence
of speech capable of countering racist hate speech”. 945

941
Vol. II, Annex 46, “Attorney General Warns against Sympathy for Qatar or Objecting to the
State’s Positions”, Al-Bayan Online (7 June 2017), [Link]
uae/news-and-reports/2017-06-07-1.2969979 (certified translation).
942
See para. 2.39, above.
943
See para. 2.40-2.41, above.
944
See para. 2.42, above.
945
Vol. IV, Annex 113, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 35 on Combating
racist hate speech, document CERD/C/GC/35 (2013), para. 41.

334
5.172 Third and f inally, the UAE’s failure to take any action whatsoever to
provide effective redress for those affected by the Campaign and to punish the
officials responsible for the spread of racially-discriminatory ideas represents a
further violation of Article 6.

5.173 In short, the UAE has deliberately pursued the “public vilification and
debasement” of specific protected groups, in this case, Qataris 946. It had also
stymied the possibility of any dissent to its Anti-Qatari Incitement Campaign. It
has violated its obligations under Articles 2(1), 4, 7, and 6 as a result.

B. THE UAE IS VIOLATING THE CERD BY FAILING TO TAKE EFFECTIVE MEASURES

TO ERADICATE INCITEMENT TO RACIAL DISCRIMINATION

5.174 As noted above, Articles 2(1), 4, and 7 also set out a series of non-
exhaustive “positive measures” that States must adopt “to eradicate all incitement
to, or acts of … discrimination” by private institutions and individuals. Of
particular relevance, Article 4(a) requires States Parties to “declare an offence
punishable by law all dissemination of ideas based on racial superiority or hatred,
incitement to racial discrimination, as well as all acts of violence or incitement to
such acts,” while Article 2(1) also requires, inter alia, the adoption of
“legislation” prohibiting and bringing to an end “racial discrimination by any
persons, group and organization” and an undertaking that States Parties “not …
sponsor, defend or support racial discrimination.” Article 7 demonstrates the
scope of the UAE’s positive obligations in this regard, requiring it not just to

946
TBB-Turkish Union in Berlin/Brandenburg v. Germany, Communication No. 48/2010,
Opinion, document CERD/C/82/D/48/2010 (2013), paras. 12.4, 12.9; ibid., para. 12.8
(concluding that statements published by a German official characterizing Turkish
immigrants as a problematic group “amounted to dissemination of ideas based upon racial
superiority or hatred and contained elements of incitement to racial discrimination”).

335
criminalize discrimination but also to adopt immediate and effective measures to
“combat[] prejudices” and “promot[e] understanding, tolerance and friendship.
Article 6, when read with Articles 2(1) and (4) demands that such legislation is
not only adopted, 947 but also effectively implemented. 948

5.175 The CERD Committee has emphasized in particular States parties’

obligations regarding the regulation of media outlets 949, which it views as
“hav[ing] an essential role in promoting responsibility in the dissemination of
ideas and opinions”. 950 It has thus encouraged States to “put[] in place legislation
for the media in line with international standards” and encourage the media to
adopt codes of conduct that incorporate the principles of the Convention”. 951 The
Committee has also recommended that States “take effective measures to combat

947
See Vol. IV, Annex 110, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 31 on the
prevention of racial discrimination in the administration and functioning of the criminal
justice system, Sixty-fifth session (2005), para. 4(a) (“States parties should…criminalize all
acts of racism as provided by [Article 4], in particular the dissemination of ideas based on
racial superiority or hatred, incitement to racial hatred, violence or incitement to racial
violence, but also racist propaganda activities and participation in racist organizations”).
948
Gelle v. Denmark, Communication No. 34/2004, Opinion, document CERD/C/68/D/34/2004
(2006), para. 17 (“The Committee reiterates that it is not enough to declare the forms of
conduct in Article 4 as offences; the provisions of the Article must also be effectively
implemented. Effective implementation is characteristically achieved through investigations
of offences set out in the Convention, and, where appropriate, prosecution of offenders.”).
949
See also CERD Committee, Concluding observations on the twentieth to twenty-second
periodic reports of Greece, document CERD/C/GRC/CO/20-22 (3 October 2016), para. 17(c)
(expressing concern at xenophobic speech in local media and recommending that Greece
“[e]nsure that the media does not stigmatize, stereotype or negatively target non-citizens and
ethnic minorities” by inter alia imposing “appropriate sanctions.”) (emphasis added).
950
Vol. IV, Annex 113, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 35 on Combating
racist hate speech, document CERD/C/GC/35 (2013), para. 39.
951
Vol. IV, Annex 113, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 35 on Combating
racist hate speech, document CERD/C/GC/35 (2013), para. 39.

336
racist media coverage…and ensure that such cases are thoroughly investigated,
and where appropriate, that sanctions are imposed.” 952 For example, in response to
concerns regarding the dissemination of racial prejudice and stereotypes by the
media in Russia, the Committee recommended that Russia “[e]nsure that media
regulatory bodies investigate and repress manifestations of racism, xenophobia
and intolerance, adequately discipline and punish perpetrators…” 953. It has also
set out key factors that States parties should consider in determining the scope of
the criminal offence that they must adopt to combat racially discriminatory
propaganda and ideas, which are particularly relevant to media outlets, such as the
nature of the audience, the potential for repetition and the frequency of the
dissemination 954.

5.176 Yet, far from effectively criminalizing anti-Qatari discrimination and

ensuring media outlets within its jurisdiction promote the principles of the CERD,
the UAE has promoted and encouraged the natural consequence of its own
actions: the spread of anti-Qatari sentiment by private Emirati institutions—
including the Emirati media—and individuals.

952
CERD Committee, Concluding observations on the combined twenty-first to twenty-third
periodic reports of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, document
CERD/C/GBR/CO/21-23 (3 October 2016), paras. 15–16.
953
CERD Committee, Concluding observations on the twenty-third and twenty-fourth periodic
reports of the Russian Federation, document CERD/C/RUS/CO/23-24 (20 September 2017),
paras. 15–16; see also CERD Committee, Concluding observations on the combined
twentieth to twenty-second periodic reports of Bulgaria, document CERD/C/BGR/CO/20-22
(31 May 2017), paras. 11–12.
954
Vol. IV, Annex 113, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 35 on Combating
racist hate speech, document CERD/C/GC/35 (2013), para. 15.

337
5.177 As noted above, the OHCHR has identified a “widespread defamation and
hatred campaign against Qatar”, with hundreds of anti-Qatar press articles and
caricatures published in the Emirati media since June 2017. For example, on 20
June 2017, the Emirati newspaper Al-Ittihad published an article targeting a Qatari
institution as “the terrorist arm of Qatar in the sports world!” It alleged that Aspire
Academy—an independent, government-funded agency in Qatar that provides
sports training and education—is a cover for “secret activity” and “activities that
are in violation of international law.” 955 The article further claims that “[t]he
answer is clear to all but the people of Qatar[.]” 956 Al-Ittihad again targeted a
Qatari institution as promoting terrorist activity in October 2018, when it
published a caricature of a man with “Qatari Regime” written on his clothing,
holding a rifle in the shape of the Al-Jazeera logo, and carrying a terrorist on his
back 957:

955
Vol. II, Annex 48, “Qatar Commits Suicide: Aspire…Qatar’s ‘terrorist’ in the ‘sports
world’!”, Al–Ittihad (20 June 2017).
956
Vol. II, Annex 48, “Qatar Commits Suicide: Aspire…Qatar’s ‘terrorist’ in the ‘sports
world’!”, Al–Ittihad (20 June 2017).
957
Vol. VI, Annex 161, Compendium of Social Media Posts, Index No. 45.

338
5.178 This message is a common one among Emirati news outlets. Sky News
Arabia, an [Emirati channel], has posted videos alleging that Qatar supports
terrorists; some of Sky News’ anti-Qatari videos have also been widely shared
online by Emiratis. One such video, for example, was shared on Twitter with the
caption “#suspicious deals…financing terrorists, kidnapping and taking hostages
as well as secret deals exposing the role of Qatar…#Sky documentaries”. 958 In
fact, hundreds of private individuals have taken to social media to express anti-
Qatari sentiment, examples of which have been compiled into a compendium 959.
One such social media user writes:

“The Qatari is like a pig or a swine (wild boar). The

pig is distinguished from other animals by the fact
that it is a cuckold and lacks virility... The Qatari

958
Vol. VI, Annex 161, Compendium of Social Media Posts, Index No. 46.
959
See generally Vol. VI, Annex 161, Compendium of Social Media Posts. The Compendium
includes samples of social media posts from UAE officials, media, and private individuals
containing incendiary speech against Qataris and Qatar.

339
does not have any manhood or masculinity… There
are not enough men in Qatar, so its government
imports men for them from Turkey and Iran to
protect their wives and families.” 960

5.179 Such propaganda constitutes “other-directed speech which rejects the core
human rights principles of human dignity and equality and seeks to degrade the
standing of individuals and groups in the estimation of society”, which the CERD
Committee notes is abhorred by the international community961.

5.180 And yet, the UAE has thus failed to live up to its obligation to “take all
appropriate measures” to “bring to an end” racially discriminatory propaganda
against Qataris. Instead of dedicating the “widest possible range of resources” to
eradicate racially discriminatory propaganda, the UAE has dedicated none. For
example, the UAE has taken no steps to censure or curb the prolific spread of anti-
Qatari sentiments including through the use of its anti-discrimination laws. Nor
has the UAE “[e]nsure[d] that media regulatory bodies investigate and repress
manifestations of racism, xenophobia and intolerance, adequately discipline and
punish perpetrators…” 962. There is no evidence of legislative amendments or
public awareness and education campaigns. Instead, it has taken the opposite
course. While the UAE has claimed that discrimination is punishable under its

960
Vol. VI, Annex 161, Compendium of Social Media Posts, Index No. 80.
961
Vol. IV, Annex 113, CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 35 on Combating
racist hate speech, document CERD/C/GC/35 (2013), para. 10.
962
CERD Committee, Concluding observations on the twenty-third and twenty-fourth periodic
reports of the Russian Federation, document CERD/C/RUS/CO/23-24 (2017), para. 16; see
also CERD Committee, Concluding observations on the combined twentieth to twenty-second
periodic reports of Bulgaria, document CERD/C/BGR/CO/20-22 (2017), paras. 11–12.

340
anti-discrimination and hatred law 963, it is instead punishing those who speak out
against discrimination 964.

5.181 The obligations set out in Articles 4 and 7, read together with Articles 2(1)
and 6, are central to achieving the overarching objectives of the CERD – to fight
against and eliminate racial discrimination. The UAE, however, has chosen not to
comply with these obligations and has actively fostered a climate of hostility. The
UAE has propagated, encouraged and tolerated the spread of racially
discriminatory propaganda and ideas – using the very platforms that the CERD
Committee has warned to be of greatest reach and influence in the spread of racial
prejudice. It has not sanctioned its own public officials, known as some of the
most prolific propagators of racially discriminatory ideas against Qatar and
Qataris, nor has it taken any measures to stem the use of media platforms to
spread a message of difference and rejection. This is the opposite course from that
previewed by Article 7, that States parties actively using platforms such as these
to encourage tolerance and combat prejudice.

5.182 The UAE’s actions demonstrate the destructive effects of propagating and
tolerating racially discriminatory ideas and prejudice on the enjoyment of
fundamental rights and freedoms. Indeed, the Anti-Qatari Incitement Campaign,
and in particular the Anti-Sympathy Law, has had a devastating impact on the
ability of Qataris to fully realize and enjoy their rights and freedoms, including in

963
See CR 2018/13, p. 65, para. 32 (Shaw).
964
See, e.g., para. 2.40, above.

341
relation to their family relationships 965, their education rights 966, their property
rights, including investments and businesses, and right to work 967, and their access
to Emirati tribunals to defend their rights 968—compounding the impact of the
Expulsion Order and Travel Ban.

965
See, e.g., para. Error! Reference source not found. [Link]! Bladwijzer niet gedefinieerd.,
Vol. VIII, Annex 195, DCL-053, para. 11; Vol. IX, Annex 218, DCL-097, para.17;Vol.
VIII, Annex 189, DCL-041, paras. 18-20 (“My husband is very worried about doing or
saying anything that could be interpreted as sympathizing with Qatar . . . Our conversations
are not as meaningful as they once were.”); ; Vol. VII, Annex 181, DCL-029, para. 12; Vol.
VIII, Annex 185, DCL-036, para. 33; Vol. VIII, Annex 186, DCL-037, paras. 13, 25; Vol.
IX, Annex 207, DCL-080, para. 28; Vol. IX, Annex 209, DCL-083, para. 29; Vol. X, Annex
237, DCL-140, para. 11.
966
See, e.g., Vol. VIII, Annex 188, DCL-040, para. 17 (“I asked an Emirati friend of mine to
visit the University staff on my behalf. He is in [redacted] the UAE. My friend was turned
away, and was told by the University staff that he could be in breach of the anti-sympathy
law if he continued to assist me. He called me from a number that I did not recognize to tell
me what had happened and, apologetically, that he would not be able to assist any further
because he was afraid of violating the law”).
967
See, e.g., Vol. VIII, Annex 194, DCL-051, para 13; Vol. IX, Annex 212, DCL-088, para. 10;
Vol. IX, Annex 217, DCL-096, para. 18; Vol. IX, Annex 220, DCL-100, para. 22 (“We
knew that there was reluctance to do business with Qataris, and so I tried to minimize my
association with the company. A couple of clients also stopped doing business with us and
told us this was because I am Qatari.”).
968
See Vol. III, Annex 95, OHCHR Report, para. 40 (“Furthermore, lawyers in these countries
are unlikely to defend Qataris as this would likely be interpreted as an expression of
sympathy towards Qatar.”). The Discriminatory Measures therefore not only prevent Qataris
from seeking redress against violations of their rights, but also render them unable to defend
themselves if claims are brought against them in the UAE. See, e.g., para. 4.62; see also Vol.
VI, Annex 153, Nashwa Fakry, “Testimonies of Citizens and Residents Affected by the
Blockade”, Al Sharq (29 June 2018). A Qatari who tried to find legal representation against
his business partners in the UAE reported to Qatari newspaper Al Sharq: “He said that he had
contacted many lawyers in the UAE. When he told them that he is a Qatari national, they
refused to act on his behalf. He called other lawyers but they all had the same response,
‘Qatari? I'm sorry, I can't help.’ He continued: ‘There was a contact person between us and
the UAE. Suddenly he stopped communicating with us. We learned that the authorities there
had summoned him and prevented him from contacting me or anyone else in Qatar’” Ibid.
(emphasis added).

342
CHAPTER VI
THE UAE’S ONGOING VIOLATION OF
THE PROVISIONAL MEASURES ORDER

6.1 The Court’s Order of 23 July 2018 indicated the following provisional
measures to prevent irreparable harm to the rights in dispute 969:

(1) The UAE must ensure that:

(i) Families that include a Qatari, separated

by the measures adopted by the United Arab
Emirates on 5 June 2017, are reunited;

(ii) Qatari students affected by the measures

adopted by the United Arab Emirates on 5 June
2017 are given the opportunity to complete their
education in the United Arab Emirates or to obtain
their educational records if they wish to continue
their studies elsewhere; and

(iii) Qataris affected by the measures

adopted by the United Arab Emirates on 5 June
2017 are allowed access to tribunals and other
judicial organs of the United Arab Emirates.

(2) Both Parties shall refrain from any action

which might aggravate or extend the dispute before
the Court or make it more difficult to resolve.

6.2 The UAE has failed to comply with these measures, each of which
constitutes an autonomous legal obligation separate and apart from the UAE’s

969
Application of the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Order of 23 July 2018, para. 79.

343
obligations under the CERD. 970 Instead, the UAE persistently has denied the
existence of its violations, relying upon a patently ineffective “hotline”
mechanism as its means of “compliance”, while continuing to promote
discriminatory sentiment against Qatar and Qataris through its Anti-Qatari
Incitement Campaign.

Section I. The Order’s Binding and Autonomous Legal Character

6.3 The Order created new autonomous legal obligations that are of a binding
character, 971 handed down to preserve the rights in dispute pending a decision on
the merits, and thus to uphold the exercise of the Court’s judicial function in this
case. These obligations, which came into effect on 23 July 2018, were
immediately binding on the UAE, and any failure to respect the Order after that
date gives rise to an obligation to cease the breach and make reparation 972.

970
See Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case Concerning
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2009, para. 51 (finding a breach of a provisional measures order under the Court’s
ancillary jurisdiction, despite not finding jurisdiction to adjudicate the request for
reconsideration).
971
In the Order itself, the Court reaffirmed that its“orders on provisional measures under Article
41 [of the Statute] have binding effect” (LaGrand (Germany v. United States of America),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, p. 506, para. 109) and thus create international legal
obligations for any party to whom the provisional measures are addressed.” Application of
the International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination
(Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Order of 23 July 2018, para. 77; see also Alleged Violations
of the 1955 Treaty of Amity, Economic Relations, and Consular Rights (Islamic Republic of
Iran v. United States of America), Order of 3 October 2018, para. 100 (reaffirming that
provisional measures orders create binding international legal obligations).
972
Certain Activities Carried Out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v. Nicaragua),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, para. 126 (“what may have ceased is the breach, not the
responsibility arising from the breach.”).

344
6.4 The Order is designed to prevent irreparable harm to the rights in
dispute 973. In this case, the rights in dispute are fundamental human rights, the
violation of which risks long-lasting and irreparable harm, and thus the obligations
are of the most pressing and immediate nature. The Order recognizes the “human
realities” of the situation before it 974: that the lives of many individuals are daily
impacted by the actions of the UAE.

6.5 The Court has jurisdiction to adjudicate compliance with the obligations
contained in provisional measures orders, separate from its competence to
adjudicate Qatar’s other claims under the CERD. This power is implicit in the
Court’s incidental jurisdiction to indicate provisional measures under Article 41 of
the Statute. 975 It underpins the effectiveness of that authority and thus the integrity
of the judicial functions that provisional measures seek to protect.

973
See Application of the International Convention on t he Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Order of 23 July 2018, para. 71 (concluding
that there was an imminent risk of irreparable prejudice to Qatar’s rights under CERD).
974
See Application of the International Convention on t he Elimination of All Forms of Racial
Discrimination (Qatar v. United Arab Emirates), Separate Opinion of J. Cançado Trindade,
para. 70. (explaining that “[h]uman beings in vulnerability are the ultimate beneficiaries” of
provisional measures orders). R. Higgins, “Interim Measures for the Protection of Human
Rights,” (1997) 36 Columbia Journal of Transnational Law 91, p. 108 (noting that the
evolving jurisprudence on provisional measures shows a “growing tendency to recognize the
human realities behind disputes of states”).
975
See Request for Interpretation of the Judgment of 31 March 2004 in the Case concerning
Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J.
Reports 2009, para. 51 (“There is no reason for the Court to seek any further basis of
jurisdiction than Article 60 of the Statute to deal with this alleged breach of its Order
indicating provisional measures issued in the same proceedings. The Court’s competence
under Article 60 necessarily entails its incidental jurisdiction to make findings about alleged
breaches of the Order indicating provisional measures. That is still so even when the Court
decides, upon examination of the Request for interpretation, as it has done in the present case,
not to exercise its jurisdiction to proceed under Article 60”). While the Court’s reasoning is
applied to its powers under Article 60 of the Statute, the same rationale can be extrapolated to
345
Section II. The UAE’s Intransigent and Inadequate Response to the Order

6.6 The provisional measures ordered by the Court are protective in scope and
exacting and specific in their requirements. By their very nature and purpose, they
impose obligations of result, not just conduct. This is reflected in the language
chosen by the Court: that the UAE “must ensure…”. “[E]nsure” means that the
UAE must “make certain” that all “families that include a Qatari”, “Qatari
students affected by the measures” and “Qataris affected by the measures”, are
afforded the rights and opportunities set out in the Order 976. The Order thus
requires proactive steps to bring about a specific end.

6.7 In relation to “families that include a Qatari”, the envisaged end is

reunification. Reunite means to “cause to come together again after a period of
separation or disunity” 977. The measure requires that the UAE restore the status-
quo for families that existed before it implemented the Discriminatory Measures,
i.e., to allow families to “come together” in the way that they choose. “Unity”
does not mean temporary, infrequent visits, subject to an arbitrary approval
mechanism. 978 Nor is it compatible with the Anti-Sympathy Law, the restrictions
on freedom of expression and identity, and the Anti-Qatari Incitement Campaign

the exercise of its powers under Article 41, where the original basis of claim is a treaty,
should the Court find no jurisdiction to adjudicate those treaty claims.
976
Oxford Dictionary, Definition of “Ensure”, [Link]
/ensure (“"[m)ake certain that [something] will occur or be the case”); Cambridge
Dictionary, Definition of “Ensure”, [Link]
/ensure (“to make something certain to happen”); “Ensure”, Merriam-Webster Dictionary,
[Link] (“to make sure, certain, or safe).
977
Oxford Dictionary, Definition of “Reunite”, [Link]
/reunite.
978
See para. 5.79, above.

346
which act to instill fear in Qataris of travelling to the UAE, and in Emirati family
members of communicating with their Qatari relatives, or restricting what they
can and cannot talk about. 979

6.8 The UAE must also ensure that Qatari students are given the opportunity
to complete their education or obtain their educational records, whether they
studied at a public or private institution. At the provisional measures hearing, the
UAE implicitly acknowledged its violations of the right to education, noting that
educational institutions contacted students in March 2018 to tell them that they are
“welcome” to return 980. The experience of declarants, as detailed above, shows
that any such contact has been isolated 981.

6.9 In any case, this is not enough, as the Court recognized by issuing the
Order. The opportunity to continue studies must be genuine. Telling students they
are “welcome” in the prevailing atmosphere in the UAE is futile. In March 2018,
there was no possibility for students to gain permission to enter the UAE – the
arbitrary opportunity that did exist was only for family members with first degree
relatives in the UAE 982. Further, when students are too scared to travel to the
UAE, are harassed on the basis of their national origin, and are subjected to

979
See paras. 2.39, above.
980
CR 2018/13, p. 13, para. 14 (Alnowais) (“Earlier this year, my Government asked all post-
secondary institutions in the UAE to contact Qatari students who discontinued their studies to
ensure they understood that they were welcome to return.”)
981
See para. 5.116-5.122, above.
982
See para. 4.52, above.

347
propaganda against their people or country of origin, any such opportunity is
illusory 983.

6.10 Likewise, ensuring that Qataris affected by the measures are afforded
access to courts and tribunals requires that Qataris have effective access to a
mechanism to vindicate their rights. The obligation is not concerned simply with
theory, but also with ensuring that in practice, Qataris are empowered to bring a
legal claim in the UAE. This is far from the reality Qataris face when they have
tried to access judicial mechanisms in the UAE, including with respect to the
arbitrary and ineffective processes for Qataris to obtain PoAs and the fear that
Emiratis have of assisting or being associated in any way with Qataris 984. Nor has
the UAE taken steps to address concerns about the independence of the judiciary
or the violation of due process rights, especially in cases that relate to ‘security’
concerns 985.

6.11 The UAE has not only failed to comply with the Order, but has clearly
indicated a deliberate and concerted decision not to comply. The day after the
Order, the UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs issued a statement proclaiming that
the Court had refused to grant the provisional measures sought by Qatar and only
“indicated certain measures with which the UAE is already in compliance” 986. The

983
See para. 5.124–5.125, above.
984
See paras. 5.132, above.
985
See para. 4.54, above.
986
Vol. II, Annex 30, UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Court of Justice refuses
to grant provisional measures sought by Qatar (24 July 2018), [Link]
MediaCenter/News/Pages/24-07-2018-International-Court-of-Justice-refuses-to-grant-
[Link].

348
UAE reaffirmed this position in its 12 September 2018 letter to the Court, arguing
that the Order merely “reflects long-standing UAE policy and practice” 987. The
UAE further flatly rejected Qatar’s offer to work collaboratively to monitor the
implementation of the Order and made clear it did not see the need to take
additional remedial steps 988.

6.12 The UAE’s argument that it has always been in compliance with the Order
is belied by the fact that the Court will only indicate provisional measures when it
is satisfied that the current state of affairs presents an imminent risk of irreparable
harm to the rights in dispute. The raison d’être of the Order is therefore to
preserve rights that were at risk of not being adequately protected before 23 July
2018, by definition, requiring a change in policy and/or practice. Maintaining the
pre-Order position is thus not only an unacceptable approach, it is definitive
evidence of breach 989.

6.13 The UAE has been true to its statements. Since 23 July 2018, the UAE has
not made any effective changes to its policies and practices. The day after the
Order, the UAE made clear that it would not modify or add to its ineffective

987
Vol. II, Annex 31, Letter from the Agent of the United Arab Emirates to the Registrar of the
International Court of Justice (12 September 2018).
988
Vol. II, Annex 31, Letter from the Agent of the United Arab Emirates to the Registrar of the
International Court of Justice (12 September 2018).
989
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua (Nicaragua v. United States of
America), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1986, para. 289 (“When the Court finds that the
situation requires that measures of this kind [provisional measures] should be taken, it is
incumbent on each party to take the Court's indications seriously into account, and not to
direct its conduct solely by reference to what it believes is its rights.”).

349
hotline mechanism, alleging that “Qatari visitors may enter the UAE with prior
entry permission through the telephone hotline announced on June 11, 2017” 990.

6.14 In its 12 September 2018 letter, the UAE vaguely alludes to “significant
steps” it has taken to ensure that the rights of ordinary Qatari citizens are
protected, but only specifically refers to the singular step of applying for travel
authorization through the hotline 991. The UAE’s “hotline” was ineffective in July
2018, and it remains ineffective now. 992

6.15 Finally, the UAE’s refusal to make any changes has been most prominent
in respect of the Discriminatory Measures themselves, including the proliferation
of racially discriminatory propaganda. The Anti-Qatari Incitement Campaign
continues unabated. UAE officials have continued to make public statements that
foster a climate of hostility and discrimination, perpetuating the UAE’s violations
993
of the CERD and exhibiting a conscious choice to ignore the Order. In so
doing, the UAE’s refusal to comply with the Order and its decision to continue its
discriminatory practices in violation of the CERD have also aggravated the
dispute.

990
Vol. II, Annex 30, UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International Court of Justice refuses
to grant provisional measures sought by Qatar (24 July 2018), [Link]
MediaCenter/News/Pages/24-07-2018-International-Court-of-Justice-refuses-to-grant-
[Link].
991
Vol. II, Annex 31, Letter from the Agent of the United Arab Emirates to the Registrar of the
International Court of Justice (12 September 2018).
992
See para. 4.49, above.
993
See para. 2.59, above.

350
6.16 The evidence demonstrates that the UAE has violated the Order: there has
been no meaningful shift in policy or practice and the UAE’s discriminatory
practices continue as before.

6.17 The obligations contained in the Order are binding upon the UAE, and
thus non-compliance is an internationally wrongful act. The UAE’s conscious and
public decision not to change the acts that gave rise to the Order in the first place
continue to perpetuate prejudice and to inflict irreparable harm on Qataris
envisaged by the existence of the Order itself—irreparable, severe and
widespread. 994 The damage caused is both material and non-material in nature and
the UAE is obligated to make reparation for this harm 995.

994
CR 2018/14, p. 33, para. 9 (Goldsmith) (“Where the existence and raison d’être of rights
stem from the equality and dignity of human beings, the harm that results from their violation
is apparent. Deprivation of family life, education, medical care, property, work on a
discriminatory basis all strike at the very heart of equality and dignity…irreparable harm is
the natural consequence of violation of such rights.”).
995
See para. 7.3, below.

351
352
CHAPTER VII
REMEDIES

7.1 As Qatar has demonstrated in the preceding sections of this Memorial, the
UAE has committed multiple violations of the CERD, each of which undermines
a foundational norm of the international legal order: the prohibition of racial
discrimination. Worse, it has done so with the aim of punishing the Qatari people
for purposes of executing on its attempted political and economic coercion of the
Qatari Government.

7.2 Qatar sets out below an overview of the relief it seeks from the Court
(Section I), and an elaboration of the relief it seeks in respect of each of the
UAE’s violations (Section II).

Section I. The Applicable Principles

7.3 It is an uncontested principle of the law of State responsibility that

commission of an internationally wrongful act or omission entails international
responsibility. Upon a finding and declaration of breach by the Court, Qatar will
be entitled to specific remedies as a consequence of the UAE’s violations of the
CERD, including the obligations of the UAE to (i) cease its ongoing wrongful
acts; (ii) make reparation for the injury resulting from its wrongful acts; and
(iii) provide assurances and guarantees of non-repetition 996. Qatar will address
each in turn.

996
See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with
commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II (Part Two),
Commentary to Arts. 30–31, pp. 88–94 (citing, inter alia, LaGrand (Germany v. United
States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, para. 125; Factory at Chorzów, Merits,
353
7.4 First, the obligation of cessation stands separate and apart from the
obligation to make reparation. Cessation plays an essential role in protecting not
only the interests of the injured State, but also those of all States parties to the
CERD, as well as the international community as a whole:

“The function of cessation is to put an end to a

violation of international law and to safeguard the
continuing validity and effectiveness of the
underlying primary rule. The responsible State’s
obligation of cessation thus protects both the
interests of the injured State or States and the
interests of the international community as a whole
in the preservation of, and reliance on, the rule of
law.” 997

7.5 Cessation is the “first requirement” 998 for the UAE to meet in rectifying
those of its breaches of the CERD that are still ongoing 999. That requirement
applies to both acts and omissions 1000.

Judgment No. 8, 1927, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 9, p. 47; Corfu Channel, Assessment of Amount
of Compensation, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1949, p. 250).
997
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with
commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II (Part Two),
Commentary to Art. 30, p. 89.
998
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Yearbook of the
International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II (Part Two), Commentary to Art. 30, p. 89.
999
See Jurisdictional Immunities of the State (Germany v. Italy: Greece intervening), Judgment,
I.C.J. Reports 2012, p. 153, para. 137 (“According to general international law on the
responsibility of States for internationally wrongful acts, as expressed in this respect by
Article 30 (a) of the International Law Commission’s Articles on the subject, the State
responsible for an internationally wrongful act is under an obligation to cease that act, if it is
continuing”); Legal Consequences of the Construction of a Wall in the Occupied Palestinian
Territory, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2004, para. 150 (“The Court observes that Israel
also has an obligation to put an end to the violation of its international obligations flowing
from the construction of the wall in the Occupied Palestinian Territory. The obligation of a
354
7.6 Second, the Court has reaffirmed the obligation to make reparation for
wrongful acts on numerous occasions, reiterating the elementary principle of
international law set out by the PCIJ in Factory at Chorzów:

“any breach of an engagement involves an

obligation to make reparation. . . reparation is the
indispensable complement of a failure to apply a
convention, and there is no necessity for this to be
stated in the convention itself [...] The essential
principle contained in the actual notion of an illegal
act—a principle which seems to be established by
international practice and in particular by the
decisions of arbitral tribunals—is that reparation
must, as far as possible, wipe out all the
consequences of the illegal act and reestablish the
situation which would, in all probability, have
existed if that act had not been committed.” 1001

7.7 The obligation to make full reparation for the damage caused by an
internationally wrongful act has been codified in Article 31 of the ILC’s Draft
Articles on the Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts (“ILC
Articles”) and repeatedly recognized by the Court as applicable customary

State responsible for an internationally wrongful act to put an end to that act is well
established in general international law, and the Court has on a number of occasions
confirmed the existence of that obligation”).
1000
See Case concerning the difference between New Zealand and France concerning the
interpretation or application of two agreements, concluded on 9 J uly 1986 between the two
States and which related to the problems arising from the Rainbow Warrior Affair, Decision,
30 April 1990, RIAA, Vol. XX, p. 270, para. 113 (cessation may consist of abstaining from
certain actions or positive conduct).
1001
Factory at Chorzów, Merits, Judgment No. 13 of 13 September 1928, P.C.I.J., Series A, No.
17, pp. 29, 47 (emphasis added); see also Avena and Other Mexican Nationals (Mexico v.
United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2004, para. 119; Ahmadou Sadio Diallo
(Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2010, para. 161.

355
international law 1002. Article 31 emphasizes that the obligation to make full
reparation extends to both material and moral damage 1003.

7.8 The ILC Articles establish three forms of reparation: restitution,

compensation and satisfaction 1004.

7.9 Damage should be made good by restitution, unless impossible or unduly

burdensome, in which case compensation is to be awarded in respect of
financially assessable damage 1005. As the PCIJ said in Factory at Chorzów, a
claim for compensation is “the most usual form of reparation”, and “[t]he remedy
should be commensurate with the loss, so that the injured party may be made
whole” 1006.

1002
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Yearbook of the
International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II (Part Two), Commentary to Art. 31(1), pp. 91–
94; see also Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the
Congo), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010, para. 161; Avena and Other Mexican
Nationals (Mexico v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2004, para. 119;
Gabčíkovo-Nagymaros Project (Hungary/Slovakia), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 1997, para 150.
1003
See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Yearbook of
the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II (Part Two), Commentary to Art. 31(2).
1004
See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with
commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II (Part Two),
Commentary to Art. 34, pp. 95–96.
1005
See Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with
commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001, Vol. II, (Part Two),
Commentary to Art. 35, pp. 96–98; Pulp Mills on the River Uruguay (Argentina v. Uruguay),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010, para. 273.
1006
Factory at Chorzów, Merits, Judgment No.13 of 13 September 1928, P.C.I.J., Series A,
No. 17, pp. 27–28 (“[i]t is a principle of international law that the reparation of a wrong may
consist in an indemnity corresponding to the damage which the nationals of the injured State
have suffered as a result of the act which is contrary to international law. This is even the
most usual form of reparation; it is the form selected by Germany in this case and the
356
7.10 The requirement that damage be “financially assessable” to be amenable to
compensation does not disqualify non-pecuniary (or moral) damage from its
scope 1007. In the words of the Umpire in Lusitania, cited by the ILC:

“It is difficult to lay down any rule for measuring

injury to the feelings, or humiliation or shame, or
mental suffering, and yet it frequently happens that
such injuries are very real and c all for
compensation as actual damages as much as
physical pain and suffering and many other
elements which, though difficult to measure by
pecuniary standards, are, nevertheless, universally
considered in awarding compensatory damages.” 1008

7.11 The Court has adopted the same approach. In the Diallo case, the Court
held that “[n]on-material injury to a person which is cognizable under
international law may take various forms,” and it gave as examples the forms of
damage set out in Lusitania, as well as endorsing the observation of the IACtHR
in Gutiérrez‑Soler v. Colombia that “[n]on pecuniary damage may include
distress, suffering, tampering with the victim’s core values, and changes of a non-
pecuniary nature in the person’s everyday life” 1009.

admissibility of it has not been disputed”); Opinion in the Lusitania Cases, Decision,
1 November 1923, RIAA, Vol. VII, p. 39 (“The remedy should be commensurate with the
loss, so that the injured party may be made whole”).
1007
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with
commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001 Vol. II (Part Two),
Commentary to Art. 36(2), p. 99.
1008
Opinion in the Lusitania Cases, 1 November 1923, RIAA, Vol. VII, p. 40 (emphasis in
original).
1009
Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v. Democratic Republic of the Congo),
Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2012, para. 18 (citing IACtHR, Gutiérrez‑Soler v. Colombia,
357
7.12 Satisfaction is envisaged as a residual form of reparation, available in
respect of “non-financially assessable damage” where restitution and
compensation cannot meet the requirement that reparation “wipe[s] all out the
consequences of the illegal act and reestablish[es] the situation which would, in all
probability, have existed if that act had not been committed” 1010. Two forms of
satisfaction are relevant here: (i) declarations of wrongfulness and (ii) an
apology1011. While a form of satisfaction, declarations of wrongfulness are also
the natural result of the exercise of the Court's judicial function and the precursor
to determining the consequences that flow from a breach of an international
obligation:

“Any court or tribunal which has jurisdiction over a

dispute has the authority to determine the lawfulness
of the conduct in question and to make a declaration
of its findings, as a necessary part of the process of
determining the case. Such a declaration may be a

Judgment (12 September 2005), para. 82). In Diallo, the award of compensation was
predominantly for the moral damage suffered. In its merits judgment in the case, the Court
also held: “[i]n the light of the circumstances of the case, in particular the fundamental
character of the human rights obligations breached and Guinea’s claim for reparation in the
form of compensation, the Court is of the opinion that, in addition to a judicial finding of the
violations, reparation due to Guinea for the injury suffered by Mr. Diallo must take the form
of compensation”. Case concerning Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea v.
Democratic Republic of the Congo), Merits, Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2010, para. 161.
1010
Factory at Chorzów, Merits, Judgment No. 13, 1928, P.C.I.J., Series A, No. 17, p. 47; Draft
Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with commentaries,
Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001 Vol. II (Part Two), Commentary to
Art. 37, pp. 105–107.
1011
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with
commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001 Vol. II (Part Two),
Commentary to Art. 37, p. 106.

358
preliminary to a decision on any form of reparation
. . .” 1012.

7.13 The ILC commentaries to Article 37 of the ILC Articles note that
“[r]equests for, or offers of, an apology are a quite frequent feature of diplomatic
practice and the tender of a timely apology, where the circumstances justify it, can
do much to resolve a dispute” 1013. Apologies have, for example, been offered by
the responsible State in cases before the Court in which prisoners on death row
were not afforded consular notification. 1014 Human rights courts and other bodies
also regularly award apologies as a form of satisfaction for human rights
violations 1015.

1012
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with
commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001 Vol. II (Part Two),
Commentary to Art. 37, pp. 105–107.
1013
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with
commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001 Vol. II (Part Two),
Commentary to Art. 37, p. 107. For example, an apology was required when the US Coast
Guard sank a ship and offered when obligations of consular notification were violated. See
S.S. “I’m Alone” (Canada v. United States), Award, 5 January 1935, RIAA, Vol. III, p. 1618;
LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2001, paras.
123, 125; Case concerning the Vienna Convention on C onsular Relations (Paraguay v.
United States of America), Provisional Measures Order, I.C.J. Reports 1998, Declaration of
President Schwebel, p. 15, Declaration of Judge Oda, p. 17.
1014
See, e.g., LaGrand Case (Germany v. United States of America), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports
2001, paras. 123, 125; Case concerning the Vienna Convention on Consular Relations
(Paraguay v. United States of America), Provisional Measures Order, I.C.J. Reports 1998,
Declaration of President Schwebel, p. 15, Declaration of Judge Oda, p. 17.
1015
See, e.g., IACtHR, Case of the Miguel Castro-Castro Prison v. Peru, Judgment (25
November 2006), para. 445; IACtHR, Case of Girls Yean and Bosico v. Dominican Republic,
Judgment (8 September 2005), para. 235; ACHPR, Institute for Human Rights and
Development in Africa and Others v. Democratic Republic of Congo (18 June 2016),
Communication 393/10, para. 154. The utility of apologies are also recognized in the general
guidance of certain of these tribunals. See ACHPR, General Comment on A rticle 5 of the
African Charter on Human and Peoples’ Rights, (23 February – 4 March 2017) Twenty-First
Extra-Ordinary Session, para. 44 (“Satisfaction includes . . . public apologies, including
359
7.14 Notably, a party’s choice as to the appropriate form will be given some
weight 1016. The ILC Articles also make clear that “full” reparation may require an
award that encompasses a combination of forms of reparation 1017. Here, Qatar
seeks restitution, compensation and satisfaction in order to meet the standard of
full “reparation” for the injuries resulting from the various wrongful acts for
which the UAE bears responsibility.

7.15 Finally, like cessation, assurances and guarantees of non-repetition are

forward-looking, designed to ensure the “continuation . . . of the legal relationship
affected by the breach” 1018. They play a preventative role. The suitability of
assurances and guarantees of non-repetition depends upon the nature of both the
obligation and the breach in question 1019.

acknowledgement of the facts and acceptance of responsibility”); United Nations, Resolution

adopted by the General Assembly on 16 December 2005: Basic Principles and Guidelines on
the Right to a R emedy and Reparation for Victims of Gross Violations of International
Human Rights Law and Se rious Violations of International Humanitarian Law, document
A/RES/60/147, Art. 22(e) (listing “[p]ublic apology, including acknowledgement of the facts
and acceptance of responsibility” as a form of satisfaction).
1016
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with
commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001 Vol. II (Part Two), Art.
43(2).
1017
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with
commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001 Vol. II (Part Two),
Commentary to Art. 34, pp. 95–96.
1018
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with
commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001 Vol. II (Part Two),
Commentary to Art. 30, p. 90.
1019
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with
commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001 Vol. II (Part Two),
Commentary to Art. 30, pp. 88–91.

360
Section II. The Relief Sought

7.16 As set out above, the UAE has committed four independent violations of
the CERD: (i) the Expulsion Order and accompanying Absolute Travel Ban,
which violate Articles 2(1), 5(a) and 6 of the CERD; (ii) the past imposition of the
Absolute Travel Ban and ongoing maintenance of the Modified Travel Ban, which
violated and continues to violate, respectively, Articles 2(1), 5(a), 5(d)(iv),
5(d)(v), 5(e)(i), 5(e)(v) and 6 of the CERD; (iii) the Block on Qatari Media, which
violates Articles 2(1), 5 and 6; and (iv) the Anti-Qatari Incitement Campaign,
which violates Articles 2(1), 4, 6 and 7 of the CERD. In addition, the UAE has
violated and remains in violation of the Court’s Provisional Measures Order.

7.17 First, as set out above in Chapter V, Section I, through the June 2017
Expulsion Order and Absolute Travel Ban 1020, the UAE expelled Qataris on a
collective basis, without any consideration of their personal circumstances, in
violation of Articles 2(1), 5(a) and 6 of the CERD. Qatar requests:

• Full reparation in the form of restoration of the status quo ant e to

reverse the collective and discriminatory exclusion of Qataris who
were living in the UAE on 5 June 2017 on the basis of their national
origin, including but not limited to:

(i) restitution in the form of lifting, by means of the UAE’s

own choosing, of any current bar on re-entry through the
Modified Travel Ban, as it applies to Qataris resident in the
UAE prior to 5 June 2017 and collectively expelled; and

(ii) compensation to remedy the material losses and moral

damage that Qatar and Qataris have suffered as a result of the
1020
As discussed above in Chapter II, the Expulsion Order expelled Qataris in the UAE on 5 June
2017 and the imposition of the Absolute Travel Ban prevented Qataris living in the UAE but
who happened to be outside the UAE on 5 June 2017 from returning home.

361
Expulsion Order and Absolute Travel Ban, together with
interest on a pre- and post-judgment basis 1021, as restitution
cannot fully address the UAE’s past interference with the
fundamental due process and other rights of Qataris by way of
the collective expulsion. Qatar requests that compensation be
quantified at a later date. In line with the Court’s recent
practice, 1022 Qatar asks that the parties be given a fixed period
of time of 12 months from the date of the Court’s judgment on
the merits to negotiate the quantum of compensation due, and,
should they fail to reach agreement, that the question be
referred back to the Court.

• A declaration that the Expulsion Order and Absolute Travel Ban

violated Articles 2(1), 5(a) and 6.

• Assurances and guarantees of non-repetition.

7.18 Second, as set out above in Chapter V, Section II, the UAE has violated
Articles 2(1), 5(a), 5(d)(iv), 5(d)(v), 5(e)(i), 5(e)(v) and 6 of the CERD through
the Absolute Travel Ban and continues to violate those provisions through the
ongoing maintenance of the Modified Travel Ban (in all of its iterations) 1023. By
these actions, the UAE impaired individual Qataris’ rights to family, education,
property, work and equal access to Emirati courts and tribunals. Qatar thereby
requests:

1021
Draft Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, with
commentaries, Yearbook of the International Law Commission, 2001 Vol. II (Part Two),
pp. 107–109; see also Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa
Rica v. Nicaragua), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2018, pp. 40–41, paras. 150–155 (awarding
both pre-judgment and post-judgment interest); Ahmadou Sadio Diallo (Republic of Guinea
v. Democratic Republic of the Congo), Compensation, Judgment,, I.C.J. Reports 2012 (I), p.
343, para. 56 (“[T]he award of post-judgment interest is consistent with the practice of other
international courts and tribunals . . .”).
1022
See, e.g., Certain Activities Carried out by Nicaragua in the Border Area (Costa Rica v.
Nicaragua), Judgment, I.C.J. Reports 2015, p. 741, para. 229(5)(b) (requiring the parties to
seek a settlement on the matter of compensation within 12 months of the judgment).
1023
See Chapter V, above.

362
• Cessation of the ongoing discriminatory treatment of Qataris with
respect to entry into and residence in the UAE.

• Full reparation in the form of restoration of the status quo ant e by

any means necessary to reverse the collective and discriminatory
exclusion of Qataris on the basis of their national origin, including
but not limited to:

(i) restitution in the form of lifting, by means of the UAE’s

own choosing, the Modified Travel Ban as it applies to Qataris
collectively based on their national origin, and to the extent that
the UAE seeks to impose new conditions on re-entry by
Qataris, an order that the UAE ensure that it does so only after
guarantee of a good faith assessment of each individual’s
circumstances and in light of the impact on fundamental rights
and due process rights; and

(ii) compensation to remedy the material losses and moral

damage that Qatar and Qataris have suffered as a result of the
Absolute and Modified Travel bans, together with interest on a
pre- and post-judgment basis, as restitution cannot fully address
the UAE’s past interference with Qataris’ rights to family,
education, property, work, and equal access to Emirati courts
and tribunals. Qatar requests that compensation be quantified at
a later date in accord with the Court’s practice set forth above.

• A declaration that the ongoing maintenance of the Modified Travel

Ban violates Articles 2(1), 5(a), 5(d)(iv), 5(d)(v), 5(e)(i), 5(e)(v) and
6 of the CERD.

• Assurances and guarantees of non-repetition.

7.19 Third, as set out above in Chapter V, Section IV, the Block on Qatari
Media violates Articles 2(1), 5(d)(viii) and 6 of the CERD. Qatar requests:

• Cessation of the Block on Qatari Media, by any means necessary.

• A declaration that the Block on Qatari Media violates Articles 2(1),

5(d)(viii) and 6 of the CERD.

363
• Assurances and guarantees of non-repetition.

7.20 Fourth, as set out above in Chapter V, Section III, the UAE continues to
conduct the Anti-Qatari Incitement Campaign through which it has propagated,
encouraged, and failed to suppress anti-Qatari propaganda, theories, and ideas in
violation of Articles 2(1), 4, 6 and 7. Qatar requests:

• Cessation of the Anti-Qatari Incitement Campaign by any means

necessary, including but not limited to (i) ensuring that UAE public
authorities, institutions and officials immediately cease the
dissemination of anti-Qatari propaganda, theories, and ideas including
indirectly through the engagement of public relations professionals
and lobbyists; and (ii) ceasing discriminatory application of the
Cybercrime Law to criminalize the expression of “sympathy” for
Qatar.

• Compensation to remedy the moral damage that individual Qataris

are shown to have suffered as a result of the Anti-Qatari Incitement
Campaign, together with interest on a pre- and post-judgment basis,
as restitution does not appear possible with respect to this violation of
the CERD. Qatar requests that compensation be quantified at a later
date in accord with the Court’s practice set forth above.

• A declaration that the Anti-Qatari Incitement Campaign violates

Articles 2(1), 4, 6 and 7 of the CERD.

• Assurances and guarantees of non-repetition.

7.21 Fifth, as set out above in Chapter VI, the UAE has violated the Court’s
Provisional Measures Order by failing to ensure that (i) families that include a
Qatari separated as a result of the Discriminatory Measures are reunited, (ii)
Qatari students are given the opportunity to complete their education in the UAE
or to obtain their educational records, and (iii) Qataris are allowed access to
tribunals and other judicial organs of the UAE. Qatar requests:

364
• A declaration that the UAE has violated the Provisional Measures
Order.

7.22 Finally, Qatar requests an apology for the UAE’s violations of Articles
2(1), 4, 5, 6 and 7 of the CERD. In making this request, Qatar draws the Court’s
attention to the UAE’s intentional and discriminatory infliction of fear,
humiliation, and material hardship on individual human beings in an attempt to
pressure a neighboring State to submit to its demands. The UAE has acted in
deliberate disregard of both the letter and the spirit of the fundamental values
contained in a universal human rights convention.

365
366
SUBMISSIONS

On the basis of the facts and legal arguments presented in this Memorial,
Qatar, in its own right and as parens patriae of its citizens, respectfully requests
the Court:

1. To adjudge and declare that the UAE, by the acts and omissions of its
organs, agents, persons, and entities exercising governmental authority,
and through other agents acting on its instructions or under its direction
and control, is responsible for violations of the CERD, namely Articles
2(1), 4, 5, 6 and 7, including by:

a. expelling, on a collective basis, all Qataris from the UAE;

b. applying the Absolute Ban and Modified Travel Ban in violation of

fundamental rights that must be guaranteed equally to all under the
CERD, regardless of national origin, including the rights to family,
freedom of opinion and expression, education and training,
property, work, and equal treatment before tribunals;

c. engaging in, sponsoring, supporting, and otherwise encouraging

racial discrimination, including racially discriminatory incitement
against Qataris, most importantly by criminalizing “sympathy” with
Qatar and orchestrating, funding, and actively promoting a
campaign of hatred against Qatar and Qataris, and thereby failing
to nullify laws and regulations that have the effect of creating or
perpetuating racial discrimination, to take “all appropriate”
measures to combat the spread of prejudice and negative
stereotypes, and to promote tolerance, understanding and
friendship; and

d. failing to provide access to effective protection and remedies to

Qataris to seek redress against acts of racial discrimination under
the CERD through UAE tribunals or institutions, including the
right to seek reparation;

2. To adjudge and declare that the UAE has violated the Court’s Order on
Provisional Measures of 23 July 2018;
367
3. And further to adjudge and declare that the UAE is obligated to cease
its ongoing violations, make full reparation for all material and moral
damage caused by its internationally wrongful acts and omissions
under the CERD, and offer assurances and guarantees of non-
repetition.

4. Accordingly, the Court is respectfully requested to order that the UAE:

a. immediately cease its ongoing internationally wrongful acts and

omissions in contravention of Articles 2(1), 4, 5, 6, and 7 of the
Convention as requested in Chapter VII;

b. provide full reparation for the harm caused by its actions, including
(i) restitution by lifting the ongoing Modified Travel Ban as it
applies to Qataris collectively based on their national origin; (ii)
financial compensation for the material and moral damage suffered
by Qatar and Qataris, in an amount to be quantified in a separate
phase of these proceedings; and (iii) satisfaction in the forms of a
declaration of wrongfulness and an apology to Qatar and the Qatari
people, as requested in Chapter VII; and

c. provide Qatar with assurances and guarantees of non-repetition in

written form as requested in Chapter VII.

368
Qatar reserves the right to supplement or amend these submissions in light
of further pleadings and as necessary.

Respectfully submitted,

____________________________

Dr. Mohammed Abdulaziz Al-Khulaifi

AGENT OF THE STATE OF QATAR
25 APRIL 2019

369
370
CERTIFICATION

I certify that all Annexes are true copies of the documents referred to and that the
translations provided are accurate.

____________________________

Dr. Mohammed Abdulaziz Al-Khulaifi

AGENT OF THE STATE OF QATAR
25 APRIL 2019

371
372
LIST OF ANNEXES

VOLUME II

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS AND

STATEMENTS

Annex 1 United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs, UAE supports

statements of Kingdom of Bahrain and Kingdom of Saudi Arabia
on Qatar (5 June 2017)

Annex 2 United Arab Emirates Ministry of Interior, General Directorate of

Residency & Foreigners Affairs - Dubai, Ban on Travelers from
and to Qatar (5 June 2017) (with certified translation)

Annex 3 United Arab Emirates General Civil Aviation Authority,

NOTAM LYA7213 (5 June 2017)

Annex 4 Chief Harbour Master, Abu Dhabi Ports, Restriction to vessels and
cargo coming from / going to Qatari ports (5 June 2017)

Annex 5 Harbour Master, Port of Fujairah, Entry Restrictions to Vessels

Flying Qatar Flag, Vessels Destined to or Arrival from Qatar
Ports
(5 June 2017)

Annex 6 General Manager Ras Al Khaimah Ports, Saqr Port Authority,

Restrictions for vessels flying Qatari flag and vessels loading for
Qatar (6 June 2017)

Annex 7 Director - Operations, Government of Sharjah Department of

Seaports & Customs, Restrictions to all Qatar Vessels and Cargoes
(6 June 2017)

373
Annex 8 Harbour Master, RAK Ports, Notice to Mariners No. 10 (7 June
2017)

Annex 9 Abu Dhabi Petroleum Ports Authority, Enforcement of Blockade

with Qatar (undated)

Annex 10 Twitter Post, Regarding the Sympathy Law, @MOJ_UAE

(6 June 2017) (with certified translation)

Annex 11 United Arab Emirates Federal Transport Authority, Circular

No. 2/2/1023: Implementation Process of the decision related to
Qatar sanctions (11 June 2017)

Annex 12 DP World Circular: Entry Restrictions to All Qatar Vessels and

Cargoes - FTA (11 June 2017)

Annex 13 United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs, President issues

directives to address humanitarian cases of Emirati-Qatari joint
families (11 June 2017), available at
[Link]
[Link]#[Link]

Annex 14 Chief Harbour Master, Abu Dhabi Ports, Implementation Process

of the Decision related to Qatar Sanctions (12 June 2017)

Annex 15 Harbour Master, Port of Fujairah, Notice to Mariners No. 225:

Implementation Process of the Decision Related to Qatar Sanctions
(12 June 2017)

Annex 16 “UAE bans selling and subscription of beIN Sports receivers and
cards”, Emirates News Agency WAM (14 June 2017), available at
[Link]

Annex 17 Sharjah Commerce and Tourism Development Authority, Ban of

bein [sic] Sports Channels Display (15 June 2017)

374
Annex 18 “Here is the Full List of Demands Requested from Qatar”,
CNN Arabic (24 June 2017), available at [Link]
middle-east/2017/06/24/cnn-obtains-full-list-qatar-demands

Annex 19 “Arab countries ‘six principles for Qatar’ a measure to restart the
negotiation process”, The National (19 July 2017), available at
[Link]
for-qatar-a-measure-to-restart-the-negotiation-process-1.610314

Annex 20 Abu Dhabi Department of Economic Development, Circular

prohibiting the broadcasting / playing of a number of satellite
channels (6 July 2017) (with certified translation)

Annex 21 Dubai Maritime City Authority, Circular MO/MSE/CO11/2017:

Restriction to vessels and cargo coming from/going to Qatari ports
(6 July 2017)

Annex 22 Abu Dhabi Tourism and Culture Authority, Circular No. (33) 2017
(26 July 2017)

Annex 23 Reply of the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to the
United Nations Office in Geneva to the Joint Communication from
Special Procedures Mandate Holders of the Human Rights Council,
HRC/NONE/2017/112 (12 September 2017)

Annex 24 United Nations General Assembly, General Debate of the 72nd

Session: Address by HH Sheikh Abdullah bin Zayed Al Nahyan,
Minister for Foreign Affairs of the United Arab Emirates
(22 September 2017), available at [Link]
/72/united-arab-emirates

Annex 25 “Joint Statement issued by four boycotting States denouncing

report of UNHCHR’s technical mission on its visit to Qatar”, Saudi
Press Agency (30 January 2018), available at [Link]
.sa/[Link]?lang=en&newsid=1715223

375
Annex 26 “Arab Quartet responds to Qatar’s remarks at the UN Human
Rights Council”, Al Arabiya English (28 February 2018), available
at [Link]
Quartet-responds-to-Qatar-s-remarks-at-the-UN-Human-Rights-
[Link]

Annex 27 Letter from the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to
the United Nations in Geneva to the United Nations High
Commissioner for Human Rights (16 May 2018)

Annex 28 Letter from United Arab Emirates National Media Council to

United Arab Emirates Ministry of Economics, beIN Sports
Receivers and Cards (6 June 2018) (with certified translation)

Annex 29 United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs, An Official

Statement by The UAE Ministry of Foreign Affairs and
International Cooperation (5 July 2018), available at
[Link]
[Link]#[Link]

Annex 30 United Arab Emirates Ministry of Foreign Affairs, International

Court of Justice refuses to grant provisional measures sought by
Qatar (24 July 2018), available at [Link]
MediaCenter/News/Pages/24-07-2018-International-Court-of-
Justice-refuses-to-grant-provisional-measures-sought-by-
[Link]

Annex 31 Letter from the Agent of the United Arab Emirates to the Registrar
of the International Court of Justice (12 September 2018)

Annex 32 Chief Harbour Master, Abu Dhabi Ports, CHM Direction No.
02/2019: Update on Implementation Process of the Decision
related to Qatar Sanctions (12 February 2019)

376
Annex 33 “Federal Land & Maritime Transport Authority: No change in
boycott measures against Qatar at UAE sea ports”, Emirates News
Agency (21 February 2019), available at [Link]
1395302741506

Annex 34 United Arab Emirates Government Portal, Do you need an entry

permit or visa to visit the UAE?, [Link]
information-and-services/visa-and-emirates-id/do-you-need-an-
entry-permit-or-a-visa-to-enter-the-uae (accessed 11 April 2019)

Annex 35 Dubai Government Portal, Education, [Link]

/Topics/[Link]?ID=3&category=Home (accessed
30 March 2019)

Annex 36 United Arab Emirates Federal Authority for Identity & Citizenship,
Browse Smart Service, [Link]
/web/client/guest/[Link]#/dashboard (accessed 30 March 2019)

UNITED ARAB EMIRATES LEGISLATION

Annex 37 United Arab Emirates Federal Law No. (17) of 1972 on Citizenship
and Passports (18 November 1972)

Annex 38 United Arab Emirates Federal Decree-Law No. (5) of 2012 on

Combating Cybercrimes (13 August 2012)

377
UNITED ARAB EMIRATES LOCAL NEWS MEDIA

Annex 39 Video, Sky NEWS Arabia (23 May 2017) and Video, “Watch the
Emir of Qatar’s Speech on Official Television”, Sky NEWS Arabia
(24 May 2017) available at [Link]
/middle-east/951413-%D8%B4%D8%A7%D9%87%D8%AF-
%D9%83%D9%84%D9%85%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%94%D9%
85%D9%8A%D8%B1-%D9%82%D8%B7%D8%B1-%D8%A7%
D9%84%D8%AA%D9%84%D9%81%D8%B2%D9%8A%D9%8
8%D9%86-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%B1%D8%B3%D9%85%D9
%8A (with certified translation)

Annex 40 Ahmad Ashour, “Analysts: Qatar Drives a Wedge in the Gulf and
Arab Ranks”, Emirates Today (25 May 2017), available at
[Link]
1.998540 (with certified translation)

Annex 41 “Tamim Isolates Qatar by Turning Against Enduring Gulf and

Arab Principles”, Al-Khaleej (25 May 2017), available at
[Link]
34b355b1e616 (with certified translation)

Annex 42 “‘A deluge of rage’ strikes the emirate of treason and criminality”,
Al-Youm7 (25 May 2017), available at [Link]
story/2017/5/25/%D8%B7%D9%88%D9%81%D8%A7%D9%86-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%BA%D8%B6%D8%A8-%D9%8A%D8
%B6%D8%B1%D8%A8-%D8%A5%D9%85%D8%A7%D8%B1
%D8%A9-%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%8A%D8%A7%D9
%86%D8%A9-%D9%88%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%A5%D8%AC
%D8%B1%D8%A7%D9%85-%D8%B5%D8%AD%D8%A7%D9
%81%D8%A9-8%A7%D9%84%D8%AE%D9%84%D9%8A%D8
%AC-%D8%AA%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%85-%D8%AE%D8%A
7%D9%86/3252812 (with certified translation)

378
Annex 43 Video, “UAE cuts diplomatic ties with Qatar – Special Coverage”,
Abu Dhabi TV (5 June 2017), available at [Link]
com/watch?v=1sGbP0DITIU (with certified translation)

Annex 44 Video, “UAE News – The official statement of the UAE boycott of
the State of Qatar”, Akhbar El Emarat (5 June 2017), available at
[Link] (with certified
translation)

Annex 45 Twitter Post, regarding the 5 June 2017 Measures, @wamnews

(5 June 2017 at 5:57 a.m.) (with certified translation)

Annex 46 “Attorney General Warns against Sympathy for Qatar or Objecting

to the State’s Positions”, Al-Bayan Online (7 June 2017), available
at [Link]
06-07-1.2969979 (with certified translation)

Annex 47 Twitter Post, Statement from the Attorney General regarding

objection to state positions, @UAE_Barq (7 June 2017) (with
certified translation)

Annex 48 “Qatar Commits Suicide: Aspire…Qatar’s ‘terrorist’ in the ‘sports

world’!”, Al–Ittihad (20 June 2017) (with certified translation)

Annex 49 Instagram Post, “Ban on travel to Qatar”, @3meed_news (5 June

2017 at 7:47 a.m.) (with certified translation)

STATE OF QATAR GOVERNMENT DOCUMENTS AND

STATEMENTS

Annex 50 Letter from Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, Minister of

Foreign Affairs of State of Qatar, to Abdul Latif Bin Rashid Al-
Ziyani, Secretary-General of GCC (19 February 2017)
(with certified translation)

379
Annex 51 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, An Official Source at the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs: the Perpetrators of the Electronic
Piracy against Qatar News Agency website will be prosecuted (24
May 2017), available at [Link]
details/2017/05/24/an-official-source-at-the-ministry-of-foreign-
affairs-the-perpetrators-of-the-electronic-piracy-against-qatar-
news-agency-website-will-be-prosecuted

Annex 52 Twitter Posts, Regarding the 5 June 2017 Measures,

@qatarembassyUAE (5 June 2017) (with certified translation)

Annex 53 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister: Qatar

‘Willing to Talk’ to Resolve Diplomatic Crisis (6 June 2017)
available at [Link]
2017/06/06/foreign-minister-qatar-’willing-to-talk’-to-resolve-
diplomatic-crisis

Annex 54 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister: Qatar

Committed to Approach of Dialogue in Resolving Differences with
Neighboring Countries (10 June 2017) available at [Link]
[Link]/en/all-mofa-news/details/2017/06/10/foreign-minister-
qatar-committed-to-approach-of-dialogue-in-resolving-differences-
with

Annex 55 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister: Qatar

Focuses on Solving Humanitarian Problems of Illegal Siege (12
June 2017), available at [Link]
news/details/2017/06/12/foreign-minister-qatar-focuses-on-
solving-humanitarian-problems-of-illegal-siege

Annex 56 Letter from Amiri Diwan to HE Sheikh Abdullah bin Nasser bin
Khalifa Al–Thani establishing the CCC (14 June 2017)
(with certified translation)

380
Annex 57 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Qatari, German Foreign
Ministers: Dialogue Only Option to Resolve Crisis (4 July 2017),
available at [Link]
2017/07/04/qatari-german-foreign-ministers-dialogue-only-option-
to-resolve-crises

Annex 58 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Qatar Committed to Dialogue to

Solve GCC Crisis - Ambassador to Austria (25 July 2017),
available at [Link]
/2017/07/26/qatar-committed-to-dialogue-to-solve-gcc-crisis---
ambassador-to-austria

Annex 59 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister: No Response

from Siege Countries to US Proposals on Crisis (27 July 2017),
available at [Link]
2017/07/27/foreign-minister-no-response-from-siege-countries-to-
us-proposals-on-the-crisis

Annex 60 Letter from Mohammed bin Abdulrahman Al Thani, Minister of

Foreign Affairs of State of Qatar, to Abdul Latif Bin Rashid Al-
Ziyani, Secretary-General of GCC (7 August 2017) (with certified
translation)

Annex 61 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister Reiterates:

Qatar Welcomes Any Effort Supports Kuwait Mediation to Resolve
Gulf Crisis (30 August 2017), available at [Link]
qa/en/all-mofa-news/details/2017/08/30/foreign-minister-reiterates-
qatar-welcomes-any-effort-supports-kuwaiti-mediation-to-resolve-
gulf-crisis

381
Annex 62 Permanent Mission of the State of Qatar to the United Nations
Office in Geneva – Switzerland, HE the Foreign Minister delivers
a statement before the 36th Session of the Human Rights Council
(11 September 2017), available at [Link]
news/detail/2017/09/17/he-the-foreign-minister-delivers-a-
statement-in-front-of-the-36th-session-of-the-human-rights-council

Annex 63 United Nations General Assembly, General Debate at the 72nd

Session: Address by HH Sheikh Tamim Bin Hamad Al Thani, Amir
of the State of Qatar (19 September 2017), available at
[Link] (with certified translation)

Annex 64 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister: ‘Qatar Will

Address the Media Campaign Targeting It’ (25 May 2017),
available at [Link]
/05/25/foreign-minister-%27qatar-will-address-the-media-
campaign-targeting-it%27

Annex 65 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Minister: Qatar Sees

Any GCC Meeting Golden Opportunity for Civilized Dialogue
(22 October 2017), available at [Link]
mofa-news/details/2017/10/22/foreign-minister-qatar-sees-any-gcc-
meeting-golden-opportunity-for-civilized-dialogue

Annex 66 Qatar Ministry of Foreign Affairs, The Foreign Minister Stresses

Qatar’s Commitment to Resolving GCC Crisis (18 November
2017), available at [Link]
news/details/2017/11/18/the-foreign-minister-stresses-qatar’s-
commitment-to-resolving-gcc-crisis

382
Annex 67 Permanent Mission of the State of Qatar to the United Nations
Office in Geneva – Switzerland, Statement of HE Deputy Prime
Minister of Foreig[n] Affairs t[o] the 37th Human Rights Council
(25 February 2018), available at [Link]
/detail/2018/02/28/statement-of-he-deputy-prime-minister-of-
foreigh-affairs-ta-the-37th-human-rights-council

Annex 68 Request for Negotiation from the Permanent Delegation of the

State of Qatar to the United Nations in Geneva to the Emirati
Minister of State for Foreign Affairs (25 April 2018) (with certified
translation)

STATE OF QATAR LEGISLATION

Annex 69 Qatar Law No. 38 of 2005 on the acquisition of Qatari nationality

38/2005 (30 October 2005), available at [Link]
/[Link]?id=2591&language=en

VOLUME III

UNITED NATIONS DOCUMENTS

Annex 70 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly,

Eighteenth Session, Third Committee, document A/C.3/SR.1214
(27 September 1963)

Annex 71 United Nations, Official Records of the Economic and Social

Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,
Sixteenth Session, document E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.321 (17 January
1964)

383
Annex 72 United Nations, Official Records of the Economic and Social
Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Report
of the Sixteenth Session of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to the Commission on
Human Rights, document E/CN.4/Sub.2/L.345/Add.4 (30 January
1964)

Annex 73 United Nations, Official Records of the Economic and Social

Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,
Sixteenth Session, document E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.408 (5 February
1964)

Annex 74 United Nations, Official Records of the Economic and Social

Council, Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities, Sixteenth Session, document
E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.411 (5 February 1964)

Annex 75 United Nations, Official Records of the Economic and Social

Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities, Report
of the Sixteenth Session of the Sub-Commission on Prevention of
Discrimination and Protection of Minorities to the Commission on
Human Rights, document E/CN.4/873, E/CN.4/Sub.2/241 (11
February 1964)

Annex 76 United Nations, Official Records of the Economic and Social

Council, Commission on Human Rights, Twentieth Session,
document E/CN.4/L.679 (17 February 1964)

Annex 77 United Nations, Official Records of the Economic and Social

Council, Commission on Human Rights, Report on the Twentieth
Session, document E/3873, E/CN.4/874 (1964)

384
Annex 78 United Nations, Official Records of the Economic and Social
Council, Commission on Human Rights, Twentieth Session,
document E/CN.4/SR.809 (14 May 1964)

Annex 79 United Nations, Official Records of the Economic and Social

Council, Commission on Human Rights, Sub-Commission on
Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,
Sixteenth Session, document E/CN.4/Sub.2/SR.427 (12 February
1964)

Annex 80 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly,

Twentieth Session, Third Committee, document A/C.3/SR.1299
(11 October 1965)

Annex 81 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly,

Twentieth Session, Third Committee, document A/C.3/SR.1304
(14 October 1965)

Annex 82 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly,

Twentieth Session, Third Committee, document A/C.3/L.1237
(15 October 1965)

Annex 83 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly,

Twentieth Session, Third Committee, document A/C.3/SR.1307
(18 October 1965)

Annex 84 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly,

Twentieth Session, Third Committee, document A/C.3/SR.1313
(21 October 1965)

Annex 85 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly,

Twentieth Session, Third Committee, document A/C.3/L.1272
(1 November 1965)

385
Annex 86 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly,
Twentieth Session, Third Committee, document A/C.3/SR.1344
(16 November 1965)

Annex 87 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly,

Twentieth Session, Third Committee, document A/C.3/SR.1345
(17 November 1965)

Annex 88 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly,

Twentieth Session, Third Committee, document A/C.3/L.1291
(18 November 1965)

Annex 89 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly,

Twentieth Session, Third Committee, document A/C.3/L.1313
(30 November 1965)

Annex 90 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly,

Twentieth Session, Third Committee, document A/C.3/SR.1367
(7 December 1965)

Annex 91 United Nations, Official Records of the General Assembly,

Twentieth Session, Draft International Convention on the
Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, Report of the
Third Committee, document A/6181 (18 December 1965)

Annex 92 International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial

Discrimination, 660 U.N.T.S. 195 (21 December 1965)
(entered into force 4 January 1969) (authentic English text)

Annex 93 Human Rights Committee, CCPR General Comment No. 15:

The Position of Aliens Under the Covenant (11 April 1986)

Annex 94 Twitter Post, regarding Discrimination on Nationality,

@UNHumanRights (30 January 2017 at 3:47 a.m.)

386
Annex 95 OHCHR, Demand for Qatar to close Al-Jazeera “a major blow to
media pluralism”- United Nations expert (28 June 2017),
available at [Link]
[Link]?NewsID=21808&LangID=E

Annex 96 OHCHR, Qatar diplomatic crisis: Comment by UN High

Commissioner for Human Rights Zeid Ra’ad Al Hussein on impact
on human rights (14 June 2017), available at [Link]
org/EN/NewsEvents/Pages/[Link]?NewsID=21739&L
angID=E

Annex 97 Joint Communication from Special Procedures Mandate Holders of

the Human Rights Council to the United Arab Emirates, document
UA ARE 5/2017 (18 August 2017)

Annex 98 OHCHR Technical Mission to the State of Qatar, Report On the

impact of the Gulf Crisis on human rights (December 2017),
available at [Link]
[Link]

Annex 99 Letter from the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights to the Permanent Mission of the United Arab Emirates to
the United Nations (29 June 2018)

Annex 100 Letter from the United Nations High Commissioner for Human
Rights to the Minister of Foreign Affairs and International
Cooperation of the United Arab Emirates (7 August 2018)

Annex 101 OHCHR, Press briefing note on United Arab Emirates (4 January
2019)

387
VOLUME IV

CERD COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS AND PROCEEDINGS

Annex 102 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 1 concerning

States parties’ obligations, contained in document A/87/18 (1972)

Annex 103 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 7 relating to the

implementation of article 4, contained in document A/40/18 (1985)

Annex 104 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 11 on non-

citizens, contained in document A/48/18 (1993)

Annex 105 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 14 on article 1,

paragraph 1, of the Convention, contained in document A/48/18
(1993)

Annex 106 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 15 on article 4

of the Convention, Forty-second session (1993)

Annex 107 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 13 on the

training of law enforcement officials in the protection of human
rights, Forty-second session (1993)

Annex 108 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 20 on article 5

of the Convention, contained in document A/51/18 (1996)

Annex 109 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 30 on

discrimination against non-citizens, Sixty-fifth session (2005)

Annex 110 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 31 on the

prevention of racial discrimination in the administration and
functioning of the criminal justice system, Sixty-fifth session
(2005)

388
Annex 111 CERD Committee, Reports Submitted by States Parties in
Accordance with Article 9 of the Convention: United Arab
Emirates, document CERD/C/ARE/12-17 (27 March 2009)

Annex 112 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 32: The meaning
and scope of special measures in the International Convention on
the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination, document
CERD/C/GC/32 (24 September 2009)

Annex 113 CERD Committee, General Recommendation No. 35: Combating

racist hate speech, document CERD/C/GC/35 (26 September
2013)

Annex 114 CERD Committee, Concluding observations on the combined

eighteenth to twenty-first periodic reports of the United Arab
Emirates, document CERD/C/ARE/CO/18-21 (13 September
2017)

Annex 115 State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates, ICERD-ISC-2018/2,

Response of the United Arab Emirates (7 August 2018)

Annex 116 Letter from the Permanent Mission of the State of Qatar to the
United Nations Office and other international organizations in
Geneva to the Secretariat of the United Nations (Office of the High
Commissioner for Human Rights) referring the matter at issue in
ICERD-ISC-2018/2 again to the CERD Committee (29 October
2018)

Annex 117 State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates, ICERD-ISC-2018/2,

Response of the United Arab Emirates (7 November 2018)

Annex 118 State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates, ICERD-ISC-2018/2,

Supplemental Response of the United Arab Emirates
(29 November 2018)

389
Annex 119 Note Verbale of the Secretariat of the United Nations (Office of the
High Commissioner for Human Rights) to the Permanent Mission
of the State of Qatar to the United Nations Office at Geneva
regarding interstate communication ICERD-ISC-2018/2 (14
December 2018), available at [Link]
HRBodies/CERD/NV_QatarUAE_14Dec2018%20_003.pdf

Annex 120 State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates, ICERD-ISC-2018/2,

Supplemental Response of the UAE on Issues of Jurisdiction and
Admissibility (14 January 2019)

Annex 121 State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates, ICERD-ISC-2018/2,

Response of the State of Qatar (14 February 2019)

Annex 122 State of Qatar v. United Arab Emirates, ICERD-ISC-2018/2,

Comments on Qatar’s Response on Issues of Jurisdiction and
Admissibility (19 March 2019)

INTERNATIONAL ORGANIZATION DOCUMENTS

Annex 123 IACtHR, Entitlement of legal entities to hold rights under the
Inter-American Human Rights System (Interpretation and scope of
Article 1(2), in relation to Articles 1(1), 8, 11(2), 13, 16, 21, 24, 25,
29, 30, 44, 46 and 62(3) of the American Convention on Human
Rights, as well as of Article 8(1)(A) and (B) of the Protocol of San
Salvador), Advisory Opinion OC-22/16 (26 February 2016)

390
VOLUME V

NON-GOVERNMENTAL ORGANIZATION REPORTS AND

STATEMENTS

Annex 124 International Federation for Human Rights, United Arab Emirates:
Criminalising Dissent UAE 94 Trial Deeply Flawed, Judicial
Observation Report (August 2013), available at
[Link]

Annex 125 Committee to Project Journalists, Saudi Arabia, UAE, Bahrain

block Qatari news websites (25 May 2017), available at
[Link]
[Link]

Annex 126 Reporters Without Borders, Al Jazeera - collateral victim of

diplomatic offensive against Qatar (7 June 2017), available at
[Link]
offensive-against-qatar

Annex 127 Committee to Protect Journalists, UAE threatens 15 years in prison

for expressions of ‘sympathy’ with Qatar (7 June 2017), available
at [Link]
[Link]

Annex 128 National Human Rights Committee, First Report Regarding the
Human Rights Violations as a Result of the Blockade on the State
of Qatar (13 June 2017), avaialble at [Link]
content/uploads/2017/06/First-Report-of-the-Qatar-National-
[Link]

391
Annex 129 Amnesty International, Gulf / Qatar dispute: Human dignity
trampled and families facing uncertainty as sinister deadline
passes (19 June 2017), available at [Link]
latest/news/2017/06/gulf-qatar-dispute-human-dignity-trampled-
and-families-facing-uncertainty-as-sinister-deadline-passes/

Annex 130 Human Rights Watch, Submission for the Universal Periodic
Review of the United Arab Emirates (29 June 2017), available at
[Link]
periodic-review-united-arab-emirates

Annex 131 Article 19, Qatar: Demands to close Al Jazeera endanger press
freedom and access to information (30 June 2017), available at
[Link]
jazeera-endanger-press-freedom-and-access-to-information/

Annex 132 National Human Rights Committee, Second Report Regarding the
Human Rights Violations as a Result of the Blockade on the State
of Qatar (1 July 2017), available at [Link]
content/uploads/2017/07/NHRC-Second-Report-Regarding-the-
Human-Rights-Violations-as-a-Result-of-the-Blockade-on-the-
[Link]

Annex 133 Twitter Post, regarding the Arrest of Ghanem Mattar,

@AmnestyAR (10 July 2017 at 2:14am) (with certified translation)

Annex 134 Human Rights Watch, Qatar: Isolation Causing Rights Abuses
(12 July 2017), available at [Link]
/qatar-isolation-causing-rights-abuses

Annex 135 National Human Rights Committee, 100 Days Under the Blockade:
NHRC Third report on human rights violations caused by the
blockade imposed on the state of Qatar (30 August 2017)

392
Annex 136 National Human Rights Committee, 6 Months of Violations, What
Happens Now? The Fourth General Report on the Violations of
Human Rights Arising from the Blockade on the State of Qatar
(5 December 2017) (with certified translation)

Annex 137 Human Rights Watch, World Report 2018 Country Summary:
United Arab Emirates (January 2018), available at
[Link]
arab-emirates

Annex 138 Human Rights Watch, UAE Award-Winning Activist Jailed for 10
Years (1 June 2018), available at [Link]
06/01/uae-award-winning-activist-jailed-10-years

Annex 139 Human Rights Watch, UAE Continues to Flout International Law
(29 June 2018), available at [Link]
06/29/uae-continues-flout-international-law

Annex 140 National Human Rights Committee, Fifth General Report,

Continuation of human rights violations: A year of the blockade
imposed on Qatar (June 2018)

Annex 141 Reporters Without Borders, Unacceptable Call for Al Jazeera’s

Closure in Gulf Crisis (28 June 2017), available at [Link]
en/news/unacceptable-call-al-jazeeras-closure-gulf-crisis

Annex 142 Amnesty International, Report 2017/18: The State of the World’s
Human Rights (2018), available at [Link]
download/Documents/[Link]

Annex 143 Asian Football Confederation (AFC), AFC DEC issues

USD$150,000 fine on UAE FA (11 March 2019), available at
[Link]
on-uae-fa

393
BOOKS, ARTICLES, AND NEWS ARTICLES

Annex 144 M. Banton, International Action Against Racial Discrimination

(Oxford University Press, 1996)

Annex 145 A. A. Cançado Trindade, The Application of the Rule of Exhaustion

of Local Remedies in International Law (Cambridge University
Press, 1983)

Annex 146 B. Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International

Courts and Tribunals (Cambridge University Press, 2006)

Annex 147 J. Crawford, Brownlie’s Principles of Public International Law

(8th ed., Oxford University Press, 2012)

Annex 148 N. Lerner, The UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of

Racial Discrimination (BRILL, 2014)

VOLUME VI

BOOKS, ARTICLES, AND NEWS ARTICLES

Annex 149 Y. Shany, The Competing Jurisdictions of International Courts and

Tribunals (Oxford University Press, 2003)

Annex 150 P. Thornberry, The International Convention on the Elimination of

all Forms of Racial Discrimination: A Commentary (Oxford
University Press, 2016)

Annex 151 D. Weissbrodt, The Human Rights of Non-Citizens (Oxford

University Press, 2008)

394
Annex 152 Aziz El Yaakoubi, “Emir of Qatar calls for negotiations to ease
Gulf boycott”, The Independent (22 July 2017), available at
[Link]
tamim-bin-hamad-al-thani-saudi-arabia-egypt-united-arab-
[Link]

Annex 153 Nashwa Fakry, “Testimonies of Citizens and Residents Affected by

the Blockade”, Al Sharq (29 June 2018), available at
[Link]
D8%A7 %D8%AF%D8%A7%D8%AA-%D9%85%D9%88%D8
%A7%D8 %B7%D9%86%D9%8A%D9%86-%D9%88%D9%85
%D9%82 %D9%8A%D9%85%D9%8A%D9%86-%D8%AA%D8
%B6%D8%B1%D8%B1%D9%88%D8%A7-%D9%85%D9%86-
%D8%A7%D9%84%D8%AD%D8%B5%D8%A7%D8%B1 (with
certified translation)

OTHER DOCUMENTS

Annex 154 Xinhua Online Dictionary, Definitions of “原”, “属”, and “国”,
available at [Link] (with certified translation)

Annex 155 Ozhegov Dictionary, Definitions of “Национальный” and

“Нация”, available at [Link] Ushakov’s
Dictionary, Definition of “Происхождение”, available at
[Link] (with certified translation)

Annex 156 Real Academia Española, Diccionario de la lengua española,

Definitions of “Nacion”, “Nacional”, and “Origen”, available at
[Link] (with certified translation)

Annex 157 Emirates Airline, Help Centre: Travel updates, available at

[Link]
/#4258319

395
Annex 158 United States Department of Justice, FARA Registration Unit,
Exhibit A to SCL Social Limited Registration Statement Pursuant
to the Foreign Agents Registration Act (6 October 2017), available
at [Link]

Annex 159 Government Communications Office for State of Qatar v. John

Does 1-10 (Supreme Court of the State of New York, County of
Kings): Documents obtained in U.S. proceedings

Annex 160 Video, posted on Snapchat by Ghanem Abdullah Mattar (undated)

(with certified translation)

Annex 161 Compendium of Social Media Posts (with certified translation)

Annex 162 Expert Report of Dr. J.E. Peterson, dated 9 April 2019

VOLUME VII

DECLARATIONS

Annex 163 DCL-001 Witness Declaration No. 001, dated 13 March 2019, and
Exhibit A

Annex 164 DCL-002 Witness Declaration No. 002, dated 3 April 2019, and
Exhibits A–F

Annex 165 DCL-004 Witness Declaration No. 004, dated 4 February 2019,
and Exhibits A–J

Annex 166 DCL-005 Witness Declaration No. 005, dated 24 March 2019, and
Exhibits A–B

Annex 167 DCL-006 Witness Declaration No. 006, dated 21 March 2019, and
Exhibits A–F
396
Annex 168 DCL-009 Witness Declaration No. 009, dated 4 April 2019, and
Exhibit A

Annex 169 DCL-010 Witness Declaration No. 010, dated 25 March 2019, and
Exhibits A–C

Annex 170 DCL-011 Witness Declaration No. 011, dated 31 March 2019, and
Exhibits A-D

Annex 171 DCL-012 Witness Declaration No. 012, dated 28 March 2019, and
Exhibit A

Annex 172 DCL-013 Witness Declaration No. 013, dated 28 February 2019,
and Exhibits A–C

Annex 173 DCL-018 Witness Declaration No. 018, dated 27 March 2019, and
Exhibits A-B

Annex 174 DCL-020 Witness Declaration No. 020, dated 17 April 2019, and
Exhibit A

Annex 175 DCL-021 Witness Declaration No. 021, dated 4 April 2019, and
Exhibits A–B

Annex 176 DCL-022 Witness Declaration No. 022, dated 15 March 2019

Annex 177 DCL-024 Witness Declaration No. 024, dated 20 March 2019, and
Exhibits A–F

Annex 178 DCL-025 Witness Declaration No. 025, dated 2 April 2019, and
Exhibit A

Annex 179 DCL-027 Witness Declaration No. 027, dated 17 March 2019, and
Exhibits A–B

397
Annex 180 DCL-028 Witness Declaration No. 028, dated 14 March 2019, and
Exhibits A–B

Annex 181 DCL-029 Witness Declaration No. 029, dated 19 March 2019, and
Exhibits A–D

Annex 182 DCL-030 Witness Declaration No. 030, dated 30 January 2019,
and Exhibits A–H

Annex 183 DCL-031 Witness Declaration No. 031, dated 1 April 2019, and
Exhibits A–C

Annex 184 DCL-033 Witness Declaration No. 033, dated 18 March 2019, and
Exhibit A

VOLUME VIII

DECLARATIONS

Annex 185 DCL-036 Witness Declaration No. 036, dated 2 April 2019, and
Exhibits A–G

Annex 186 DCL-037 Witness Declaration No. 037, dated 6 March 2019, and
Exhibits A–B

Annex 187 DCL-038 Witness Declaration No. 038, dated 21 March 2019, and
Exhibits A–C

Annex 188 DCL-040 Witness Declaration No. 040, dated 18 March 2019, and
Exhibits A–B

Annex 189 DCL-041 Witness Declaration No. 041, dated 24 March 2019, and
Exhibits A–B

398
Annex 190 DCL-043 Witness Declaration No. 043, dated 19 March 2019, and
Exhibits A–I

Annex 191 DCL-046 Witness Declaration No. 046, dated 19 March 2019, and
Exhibits A–B

Annex 192 DCL-047 Witness Declaration No. 047, dated 8 April 2019, and
Exhibits A–B

Annex 193 DCL-048 Witness Declaration No. 048, dated 31 January 2019,
and Exhibits A–R

Annex 194 DCL-051 Witness Declaration No. 051, dated 27 March 2019, and
Exhibits A-C

Annex 195 DCL-053 Witness Declaration No. 053, dated 21 March 2019, and
Exhibits A–C

Annex 196 DCL-056 Witness Declaration No. 056, dated 18 March 2019, and
Exhibits A–E

Annex 197 DCL-058 Witness Declaration No. 058, dated 4 April 2019, and
Exhibits A–D

Annex 198 DCL-066 Witness Declaration No. 066, dated 17 March 2019, and
Exhibit A

Annex 199 DCL-068 Witness Declaration No. 068, dated 27 March 2019, and
Exhibits A–E

Annex 200 DCL-070 Witness Declaration No. 070, dated 19 March 2019, and
Exhibits A–F

Annex 201 DCL-072 Witness Declaration No. 072, dated 4 April 2019, and
Exhibits A-C

399
Annex 202 DCL-073 Witness Declaration No. 073, dated 6 February 2019,
and Exhibits A–M

VOLUME IX

DECLARATIONS

Annex 203 DCL-074 Witness Declaration No. 074, dated 4 April 2019, and
Exhibits A–B

Annex 204 DCL-076 Witness Declaration No. 076, dated 27 March 2018, and
Exhibits A–D

Annex 205 DCL-078 Witness Declaration No. 078, dated 10 April 2019, and
Exhibit A

Annex 206 DCL-079 Witness Declaration No. 079, dated 30 January 2019,
and Exhibits A–E

Annex 207 DCL-080 Witness Declaration No. 080, dated 17 March 2019, and
Exhibits A–D

Annex 208 DCL-082 Witness Declaration No. 082, dated 13 March 2019, and
Exhibits A-B

Annex 209 DCL-083 Witness Declaration No. 083, dated 4 April 2019, and
Exhibits A-D

Annex 210 DCL-084 Witness Declaration No. 084, dated 20 March 2019, and
Exhibits A–C

Annex 211 DCL-086 Witness Declaration No. 086, dated 21 March 2019, and
Exhibits A–B

400
Annex 212 DCL-088 Witness Declaration No. 088, dated 3 April 2019, and
Exhibits A-B

Annex 213 DCL-089 Witness Declaration No. 089, dated 13 March 2019, and
Exhibits A-B

Annex 214 DCL-091 Witness Declaration No. 091, dated 7 April 2019

Annex 215 DCL-092 Witness Declaration No. 092, dated 27 March 2019, and
Exhibits A–B

Annex 216 DCL-093 Witness Declaration No. 093, dated 29 January 2019,
and Exhibits A–I

Annex 217 DCL-096 Witness Declaration No. 096, dated 27 March 2019, and
Exhibits A–C

Annex 218 DCL-097 Witness Declaration No. 097, dated 31 March 2019, and
Exhibits A-D

Annex 219 DCL-098 Witness Declaration No. 098, dated 27 March 2019, and
Exhibits A–B

Annex 220 DCL-100 Witness Declaration No. 100, dated 14 March 2019, and
Exhibits A–K

Annex 221 DCL-102 Witness Declaration No. 102, dated 26 March 2019, and
Exhibit A

Annex 222 DCL-105 Witness Declaration No. 105, dated 21 March 2019, and
Exhibits A–B

Annex 223 DCL-107 Witness Declaration No. 107, dated 2 April 2019, and
Exhibits A-B

401
Annex 224 DCL-108 Witness Declaration No. 108, dated 7 February 2019,
and Exhibits A–F

VOLUME X

DECLARATIONS

Annex 225 DCL-109 Witness Declaration No. 109, dated 21 March 2019, and
Exhibit A

Annex 226 DCL-112 Witness Declaration No. 112, dated 20 March 2019, and
Exhibits A–E

Annex 227 DCL-113 Witness Declaration No. 113, dated 11 February 2019,
and Exhibits A–C

Annex 228 DCL-121 Witness Declaration No. 121, dated 26 March 2019, and
Exhibits A–B

Annex 229 DCL-123 Witness Declaration No. 123, dated 3 April 2019 and
Exhibits A-E

Annex 230 DCL-124 Witness Declaration No. 124, dated 25 March 2019, and
Exhibits A–C

Annex 231 DCL-125 Witness Declaration No. 125, dated 6 February 2019,
and Exhibits A-C

Annex 232 DCL-130 Witness Declaration No. 130, dated 1 April 2019, and
Exhibit A

Annex 233 DCL-132 Witness Declaration No. 132, dated 17 April 2019,and
Exhibits A–B

402
Annex 234 DCL-135 Witness Declaration No. 135, dated 31 January 2019,
and Exhibits A–F

Annex 235 DCL-136 Witness Declaration No. 136, dated 7 February 2019,
and Exhibit A

Annex 236 DCL-139 Witness Declaration No. 139, dated 21 March 2019, and
Exhibits A–C

Annex 237 DCL-140 Witness Declaration No. 140, dated 2 April 2019, and
Exhibit A

Annex 238 DCL-143 Witness Declaration No. 143, dated 3 April 2019

Annex 239 DCL-144 Witness Declaration No. 144, dated 6 March 2019, and
Exhibits A–D

Annex 240 DCL-145 Witness Declaration No. 145, dated 20 March 2019, and
Exhibit A

Annex 241 DCL-146 Witness Declaration No. 146, dated 31 January 2019,
and Exhibits A–E

Annex 242 DCL-147 Witness Declaration No. 147, dated 3 February 2019,
and Exhibits A–H

Annex 243 DCL-148 Witness Declaration No. 148, dated 25 March 2019, and
Exhibits A-D

403
VOLUME XI

DECLARATIONS

Annex 244 DCL-151 Witness Declaration, Qatar Airways Representative,

dated 13 April 2019, and Annex A and Exhibits 1-5

Annex 245 DCL-152 Witness Declaration No. 152, dated 10 February 2019,
and Exhibits A–C

Annex 246 DCL-153 Witness Declaration No. 153, dated 4 April 2019, and
Exhibits A-E

Annex 247 DCL-161 Witness Declaration No. 161, dated 31 March 2019 and
Exhibits A-C

Annex 248 DCL-162 Witness Declaration No. 162, dated 20 March 2019, and
Exhibits A–B

Annex 249 DCL-164 Witness Declaration No. 164, dated 21 March 2019, and
Exhibits A–B

Annex 250 DCL-165 Witness Declaration No. 165, dated 12 March 2019, and
Exhibits A–C

Annex 251 DCL-166 Witness Declaration No. 166, dated 27 March 2019, and
Exhibits A-H

Annex 252 DCL-167 Witness Declaration No. 167, dated 11 March 2019, and
Exhibit A

Annex 253 DCL-168 Witness Declaration No. 168, dated 20 March 2019

Annex 254 DCL-170 Witness Declaration No. 170, dated 3 April 2019, and
Exhibits A-B

404
Annex 255 DCL-171 Witness Declaration No. 171, dated 25 March 2019, and
Exhibits A–C

Annex 256 DCL-172 Witness Declaration No. 172, dated 27 March 2019, and
Exhibits A–C

Annex 257 DCL-173 Witness Declaration No. 173, dated 3 April 2019, and
Exhibits A-B

Annex 258 DCL-174 Witness Declaration No. 174, dated 3 April 2019, and
Exhibits A-B

Annex 259 DCL-175 Witness Declaration No. 175, dated 4 April 2019, and
Exhibits A-B

Annex 260 DCL-177 Witness Declaration No. 177, dated 2 April 2019, and
Exhibits A-B

Annex 261 DCL-178 Witness Declaration No. 178, dated 8 April 2019, and
Exhibits A-B

Annex 262 DCL-179 Witness Declaration No. 179, dated 4 April 2019, and
Exhibits A-B

VOLUME XII

DECLARATIONS

Annex 263 DCL-180 Witness Declaration No. 180, dated 28 March 2019, and
Exhibit A

Annex 264 DCL-181 Witness Declaration, Al Jazeera Media Network

Representative, dated 3 April 2019, and Exhibits A-E

405
Annex 265 DCL-182 Witness Declaration No. 182, dated 4 April 2019

Annex 266 DCL-183 Witness Declaration No. 183, dated 3 April 2019, and
Exhibits A-B

Annex 267 DCL-184 Witness Declaration No. 184, dated 4 April 2019, and
Exhibits A-D

Annex 268 DCL-185 Witness Declaration No. 185, dated 3 April 2019, and
Exhibits A-B

Annex 269 DCL-187 Witness Declaration No. 187, dated 3 April 2019, and
Exhibits A-B

Annex 270 DCL-188 Witness Declaration No. 188, dated 4 April 2019, and
Exhibits A-B

Annex 271 DCL-189 Witness Declaration No. 189, dated 4 April 2019, and
Exhibit A

PRIMARY SOURCE STATISTICS

Annex 272 Affidavit, State of Qatar Compensation Claims Committee,

dated 16 April 2019, and Exhibits A-B

Annex 273 Affidavit, State of Qatar Planning and Statistics Authority,

dated 18 April 2019, and Exhibit A

Annex 274 Affidavit, State of Qatar Ministry of Education and Higher

Education, dated 14 April 2019, and Annex A

Annex 275 Affidavit, Qatar Central Bank, dated 14 April 2019, and Annex A

Annex 276 Affidavit, Airport Passports Department, State of Qatar Ministry of

Interior, dated 16 April 2019, and Annex A

406
Annex 277 Affidavit of Youssef Abdullah Al-Kebesi, Chief of Operations,
Ooredoo Qatar, dated 8 April 2019, and Annex A

Annex 278 Affidavit of Hamad bin Abdullah Al Thani, Chief Executive

Officer, Vodafone Qatar Co, dated 17 April 2019, and Annex A

407