The Harnack/Barth Correspondence: A Paraphrase with Comments

George Hunsinger

The Thomist: A Speculative Quarterly Review, Volume 50, Number 4, October

1986, pp. 599-622 (Article)

Published by The Catholic University of America Press

DOI: https://doi.org/10.1353/tho.1986.0005

For additional information about this article

https://muse.jhu.edu/article/638112/summary

[ Access provided at 24 May 2020 14:45 GMT from Cornerstone University ]

THE HARNACK/BARTH CORRESPONDENCE:
A PARAPHRASE WITH COMMENTS

I N 19~8 ADOLF VON HARNACK published an open

letter to the despisers of scientific theology-by which he
meant the emerging new group of " dialectical theolo-
gians "-and this letter was to initiate the climactic phase of
his history with Karl Barth. That history had begun years
earlier in the winter semester of 1906-07, when the young Karl
Barth had moved as a student to Berlin. To his surprise Barth
soon came to think more highly of Harnack than of any other
professor. Attaching himself to the great theologian as a pupil,
he became the youngest regular member of Hamack's seminar
in church history, in which he worked with great diligence.
Harnack regarded Barth as a promising student.1
The second phase of their history was one of which Harnack
knew nothing, but which for Barth was that now famous mo-
ment of theological disillusionment shortly after the outbreak
of the First World War. Finding the names of his most re-
vered teachers attached to a manifesto acclaiming Germany's
war policy of aggression, Barth was so shaken that he felt a
need to break decisively with their liberal theological presup-
positions. Prominent among the signatories was none other
than Adolf von Harnack, whom Barth always mentioned ex-
plicitly, among others, when recalling the impact of the mani-
festo upon him. 2
l Eberhard Busch, Karl Barth ( Phila.: Fortress Press, 1976), pp. 38-39.
2 In a recent article Wilfred Harle has attempted to cast doubt on the sig-
nificance of the 1914 manifesto for Barth's break with liberalism. Harle
documents that there was not one such manifesto but two and that they did
not appear in .August, as Barth years later would recall, but in October.
These facts by themselves would be of marginal interest. Harle goes on to
argue that no evidence can be found in contemporary documents that the
capitulation of Barth's teachers in general and the manifesto in particular

599
600 GEORGE HUNSINGER

The third phase of their relationship, a kind of prelude to

the 1923 correspondence, occurred when both men spoke at a
student conference in 1920. Barth lectured on " Biblical Ques-
tions, Insights and Vistas." 3 He declared God to be " wholly
other," dismissed historical method as a means to theological
knowledge, and denounced all organic connections between
human culture and divine revelation as contrary to the cross
of Christ. The effect of Barth's lecture on Harnack was, ac-
cording to Harnack's biographer, staggering. "There was not
one sentence, not one thought, with which he could agree."
Harnack could acknowledge Barth's deep seriousness, but
Barth's theology "made him shudder." 4 Horrified that the

played as significant a role for Barth as Barth later attributed to them. Al-
though this question deserves further investigation, a document not available
to Harle has since been cited by Busch (Karl Barth, p. 81 n. 104) which is
contemporary and which pertains to the fundamental point of the impact on
Barth of the capitulation of Barth's teachers. Harle goes on to make two
further points which in my opinion make his argument dubious. First, al-
though he correctly observes that Barth's break with liberalism "·as starting
to become visible prior to 1914, he not only mistakenly assumes that these
prior developments must rule out a decisive shock of recognition in 1914, but
he also mistakenly reads Barth's assimilation of religious-socialist motifs as
evidence of Barth's break with liberalism. Theologically, however, the assimi-
lation of these motifs was more nearly a supplement to than a break with
Barth's early liberalism. The second dubious move occurs when Harle engages
in psychological speculations pertaining to Barth's relationship to his father.
Even if such speculations were not dubious, they would not necessarily rule
out the shock of recognition in 1914 nor would they explain the theological
motives for Barth's break with liberalism. See ·wilfred Hiirle, "Der Aufruf
der 93 Intellektuellen und Karl Earths Bruch mit der liberalen Theologie,"
Zeitschrift fii,r Theologie und Kirche 72 ( 1975), pp. 206-224. For a summary
of Barth's early break with liberalism, see my essay "Toward a Radical
Barth," in Karl Barth and Radical Politics, ed. by George Hunsinger ( Phila.:
Westminster Press, 1976), pp. 192-211.
BThe lecture may be found in Karl Barth, 'l'he Word of God a,nd the W01·d
of Man (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1957), pp. 51-96.
4.Agnes von Zahn-Harnack, Adolf von Harnack (Berlin: Hans Bott Verlag,
1936, 1951), p. 532. I am borrowing the translation made of this passage by G.
Wayne Glick, The Reality of Christianity: A S tiidy of Adolf von II arnack as
Historian and Theologian (N.Y.: Harper & Row, 1967), p. 223. For a study of
the Harnack/Barth correspondence which pays special attention to its pre-
lude in 1920, see Peter Henke, "Erwiihlung und Entwicklung, Zur Ausein-
HARNACK/BARTH; A PARAPHRASE WITH COMMENTS 601
new theology continued to gain ground, Harnack at last threw
down the gauntlet in 1923.
The debate, which took place in the pages of Die Christliche
Welt, occurred in several exchanges. Harnack opened with
"fifteen questions," and Barth countered with "fifteen an-
swers." Harnack returned with an "open letter" addressed
directly to Barth, and Barth retorted with a very long "an-
swer." Finally, Harnack drafted a "postscript," which drew
the debate to a close. 5 Although personal relations between
the two men remained cordial, the theological rift between
them was too fundamental to be overcome. 6
The Harnack/Barth correspondence continues to be of in-
terest, not only because it was a historic encounter between
the leading liberal and the leading dialectical theologian of the
day, but also because of the light it casts on Barth's theology
in particular. The questions posed by Harnack have recurred
again and again in the reception and assessment of Barth's
theology. The answers proposed by Barth, though not final in
terms of his development, nonetheless indicated the basic in-
tentions which would undergird his massive life-long theologi-
cal project. The correspondence thus affords an excellent op-
portunity not only to observe Barth's theology in process of
definition, but also to understand it in relation to the past from
which it broke so dramatically. At the same time the cor-
respondence serves as a concise and accessible introduction to
continuing themes in Barth's work.
andersetzung zwischen Adolf von Harnack und Karl Barth," Neue Zeit-
schrift fiir Systematische Theologie und Religionsphilosophie 18 ( 1976), pp.
194-208.
5 An English translation may be found in The Beginnings of Dialectic
Theology, ed. by James M. Robinson (Richmond, Va.: John Knox Press,
HlGS), pp. Hi5-187. Complete reference to the German original may be found
in H. Martin Rumscheiclt, Revelation and 'l'heology: An Analysis of the
Barth-Harnack Corrnspondence of 1923 (Cambridge: Cambridge University
Press, 1972), p. 201 n. 2. The German text may be found most conveniently
in Karl Barth, Theologische Ji'ragen und Antworten Zurich: Evangelisher
Ver lag zollikon, l!J57), pp. 7 -31.
6 See Busch, J(arl Rarth, p. 147; Agnes von Zahn-Harnack, Adolf van Har-

nack, p. 534.
602 GEORGE HUNSINGER

The exercise which follows is intended to be entirely modest.

The correspondence as a whole will simply be phaphrased ac-
cording to Harnack's original format of fifteen topics. Har-
nack's questions will be reversed into assertions in order to
bring out the constructive standpoint lurking behind his
critique. Barth's answers will be summarized on the basis of
the entire correspondence. Having set forth the course of de-
bate on its own terms, I will conclude with some critical ob-
servations. 7

1. On revelation and reason, especially as they relate to

scripture.
Harnack. The Bible's religious content is not unequivocal but
quite diverse. If we are to determine it for faith, worship and
life, we need a better basis than merely subjective and indi-
vidual experience. We need to draw upon historical knowl-
edge and critical reflection. How is theology to deal with the
diversity of biblical content, if not rationally, by means of
historical analysis? Historical knowledge and critical reflec-
tion are indispensable if we are to avoid naive biblicism.
Barth. God's revelation is unitary, not incoherent. The con-
tent of this revelation is autonomous, suprarational and self-
communicating. Knowledge cannot be "historical," proper-
ly speaking, if it fails to recognize precisely this living
and transcendent quality of God's revelation. No knowl-
edge which denies or reinterprets this quality can properly be
called " historical." The concept of history is, in effect, to be
critically subordinated to the concepts of theology. This un-
derstanding of God's revelation-as unitary; as autonomous,
suprarational and self-communicating; as living and trans-
cendent-is grounded in the relationship of God to humanity
as disclosed by God's revelation ("the essence of the subject

7 A detailed analysis of the correspondence may be found in Rumscheidt,

Revelation and Theology ( n.5). See also Glick, The Reality of Ohristianity
( n.4) , pp. 222-228.
HARNACK/BARTH: A PARAPHRASE WITH COMMENTS 603
matter ") . God's revelation, in other words, is all these things
by definition-and by event. " Critical reflection " would
recognize this event as such and respect it-at least within
the context of theology and faith. Theology depends on the
remembrance that the object of its reflection-God-had pre-
viously been for it the living and sovereign subject. God must
become this subject for theology again and again. The event
of God's self-disclosure as indissolubly subject has nothing at
all to do with an anthropocentric and subjectivist concept of
religious experience. Theological method is "scientific "-i.e.,
appropriate to and governed by its subject matter-to the ex-
tent that it recognizes its object as indissolubly subject. In
short, revelation transcends, delimits and relativizes reason,
including critical historical reason. Is the method to deter-
mine the subject matter (Harnack) , or is the subject matter
to determine the method (Barth) ?

~. On the conditions for the possibility of understanding the

content of scripture.
Harnack. Historical knowledge and critical reflection need to
be used if we are to understand the Bible's diverse content,
which is not self-evident and clear in itself. The Bible's con-
tent is not so inconceivable and indescribable-so unhistori-
cal-that we must wait upon inner illumination in order to
grasp it. Inner openness or empathy may be necessary, but
that is no substitute for historical knowledge and critical re-
flection. In short, biblical content is not self-evident, but
neither is it inconceivable. It is accessible to critical historical
analysis. An unhistorical transcendentalism goes hand in hand
with arbitrary subjectivism.
Barth. The Bible can be understood in the proper (theologi-
cal) sense of the term only by the power of the Spirit-who is
the same as its content. The content of the Bible, in other
words, is the person of the living God. This content is ac-
knowledged, and in that sense " understood," only by faith.
This content (the living God), its mode of impartation (the
604 GEORGE HUNSINGER

power of the Spirit), and its mode of apprehension (faith) are

all sui generis. They are all, by definition, in a class by them-
selves. They are not, in other words, merely particular in-
stances of something more general, nor are they generally (ra-
tionally) accessible. They are equidistant from both religious
experience and historical reason, and have no essential con-
nection to either, although a contingent connection to either
or both may arise. But revelation and faith stand on their
own. They do not need either religious experience or critical
historical reason to be what they are. They are what they are
without them. God's revelation is imparted to us by God, by
the power of the Spirit; and it is received by the miracle and
mystery of faith (not by this or that mental faculty) . Those
who on critical historical grounds develop an a priori rejection
of miracle and mystery, of revelation and faith, of that which
passes all understanding, cut themselves off to that extent
from the gospel.

3. On faith, religious experience and preaching, especially

whether faith is subject to phenomenological description and
preaching to rational control.
Harnack. Awakening to faith cannot be had without religious
experience, for the two are not different but identical. Faith,
being essentially experiential, is subject to phenomenological
description. If the two were different, faith would be indis-
tinguishable from uncontrollable fanaticism. Faith can be so
distinguished, however, because it can only come about through
the preaching of the gospel, and because such preaching is not
possible without historical knowledge and critical reflection.
Preaching disciplined by historical reason is therefore neces-
sary for awakening a responsible faith. Faith divorced from
historically disciplined experience would be irrational and there-
fore arbitrary.
Barth. Faith and religious experience are two entirely different
things, as different as the earth (the phenomenal) is from
heaven (the transcendental, the eschatological, the real). As a
HARNACK/BARTH: A PARAPHRASE WITH COMMENTS 605
matter of fact, however, faith cannot always be phenomenologi-
cally distinguished from " uncontrollable fanaticism " or for
that matter from" religious experience." No human experience
as such is identical with the awakening to faith, but religious
experience can serve as a symptom or sign of the presence of
faith. At best religious experience has the status of a witness
to faith. But experiences, whatever they might be, are not to
be confused with or mistaken for faith. The preaching of the
gospel, which properly awakens faith as the response, depends
not on historical research or critical reflection, but on the word
of Christ. In other words, the condition for the possibility of
effective preaching is not human reason but divine revelation.
Divine revelation is the object and content of both theology
and preaching. Each in its own way is concerned with taking
up and passing on God's revelation (the word of Christ). To
that extent theology and preaching have the same task. There
is no reason why they cannot be assisted in this task in an oc-
casional and auxillary way by " historical knowledge " and
" critical reflection."

4. On how one's view of faith pertains to one's view of being

in the world.
Harnack. Religious experience is not in a class by itself. It is
not contrary to or disparate from all other experience. If it
were, the logical result would be either a radical flight from the
world or else a lapse into sophistry. The sophistry would arise
because even a decision to flee the world would require an act
of volition and would still therefore be something worldly.
Religious experience qua experience is something worldly, just
like all other experience. So far from being exceptional, reli-
gious experience is an instance of the general class called his-
torical experience. An ahistorical (religious) experience would
in practice necessitate a flight from the world, which is not only
impossible but self-contradictory.
Barth. Faith involves not a flight from the world, but a more
or less radical protest against this world. Faith protests against
606 GEORGE HUNSINGER

the world we see on the basis of the world's coming transfor-

mation, which we do not see, but for which we hope by the
promises of God. The fundamental distance of faith from this
world is grounded not only in eschatological hope, but also in
creation faith-in our acknowledgement of God as Creator.
Either way, the cross of Christ signifies the absolute contrast
between God and world. It stands as a negative parable for
the original and final unity (not identity) between Creator
and creation. Not even our (merely human) protest against
the world can justify us in God's sight. Only God's protest-
the cross of Christ-can do that. All this has nothing to do
with sophistry. But sophistry has everything to do with using
a trite concept of creation to bypass the cross-trite, because
it so readily glosses over everything against which faith must
currently protest for the sake of the cross and in the name of
hope.

5. On whether the relation between God and the world is

essentially mysterious.
Harnack. God and the world do not stand in absolute con-
trast. Neither do our life in God and our life in the world. If
they really were absolute contrasts, we could make no sense of
the heart of the gospel. For at its heart the gospel closely con-
nects and even equates love for God with neighbor-love. A
logically necessary presupposition for this equation is a high
regard for morality in general. The relation between God and
the world (as between life in God and worldly life) is there-
fore morally and rationally intelligible. An absolute contrast
between God and the world would be mysterious, unintelligible
and contrary to the heart of the gospel.
Barth. The heart of the gospel shows us precisely how strange
and incomprehensible is the relation between God and the
world. It shows us that they are indeed absolute contrasts.
One must not confuse, as happens with Harnack, the heart of
the gospel with the moral law. Yet even the law, in its own
way, bears witness to the absolute contrast between our life
HARNACK/BARTH: A PARAPHRASE WITH COMMENTS 607
in God and our life in the world. The law (including " high
regard for morality ") enjoins us to love our neighbor. But if
we do not do this and indeed cannot do this-as is of course
actually the case-then what does that say about the state of
our love for God? Our life in the world is the very life in which
we love neither God nor neighbor. This point, as disclosed by
the law, is the first sign of absolute contrast. The second is
like unto it-namely, the miraculous event by which the eternal
God intervenes on our behalf in order to overcome the absolute
contrast established by our lovelessness and sin. This matter,
too, is strange and incomprehensible. Indeed, a greater mys-
tery than our failure to return God's love in creating us is the
persistence of God's love in the face of our refusal. Therefore,
not only does our lovelessness stand in absolute contrast to
God's original love (contrast one), but even more does God's
persisting love stand in contrast to our hopeless refusal (con-
trast two) . These strange and utter contrasts, especially the
miracle of God's persisting love, can be known only by God's
revelation, not by mere human reason, regardless of how criti-
cal and historical it may be. The God who overcomes our
radical lovelessness is the God who reveals these contrasts to
us. But this divine overcoming of our sin is not only some-
thing strange and mysterious. It is also dreadful. The God
who overcomes is not to be trifled with. For we are not made
alive unless we are first slain.

6. On the condition for the possibility of leading people to God.

Harnack. Leading people to God is not different from leading
them to what is good. This equation also indicates that we
are not faced with absolute contrasts, neither between God
and the world nor between life in God and worldly life. No
genuine spiritual development can occur without historical
knowledge and a high regard for morality. Critical reason is
therefore the condition for the possibility of leading people to
God, for it is critical reason by which we know of history and
morality. What we know in general by reason-here the
608 GEORGE HUNSINGER

essence of the good-provides the necessary precondition for

what we receive in particular by faith.
Barth. The condition for the possibility of leading people to
God is not reason but revelation. Leading people to God is
not something we do, but something God does. It is not a mat-
ter of what we think we know about history and morality in
relation to God, but of God's history and God's "morality"
in relation to us. "No one can come to me unless the Father
who sent me draws him, and I will raise him up at the last day"
(Jn. 6: 44). Note the themes in this passage: divine sover-
eignty, christocentrism, eschatology, coming to God as resur-
rection from the dead. These themes do not confirm and build
upon but negate and reconstitute what we know in general by
reason. '

7. On the relation between religion and culture.

Harnack. Between religion and culture there is an intimate
connection. Culture-its development, its knowledge, its mor-
ality-reveres God. This reverence for God is necessary if we
are to protect our culture from atheism. More especially, reli-
gion is necessary for a culture's health, vitality and soundness.
The relation between religion and culture is one of mutual im-
manence. Culture is the bearer of religion; religion is the critic
of culture.
Barth. Religion and culture are indeed intimately connected.
Religion serves an important cultural function-sanctifying
war, mystifying oppression, and euphemizing every collective
form of crime. Culture reveres God precisely to the extent that
God is useful for such purposes. Is there not therefore some-
thing rather suspect about implicitly contrasting the "higher
values " or " religious experiences " of our culture to those of
" primitive " peoples who have not yet attained to our level?
The preaching of the gospel (see # 3 above) has nothing to do
with the sacralizing of culture but rather with its desacraliza-
tion. Whether cultural invocations of God, derived as they are
HARNACK/BARTH: A PARAPHRASE Wl'rH COMMENTS 00!)

from polytheism, serve to protect us from atheism or actually

to implant it among us remains an open question. ·vvhen cul-
ture is the bearer of religion, religion is domesticated by cul-
ture. Religion as borne by culture will never be a serious critic,
or at least not sufficiently serious, when seriousness is measured
by the gospel.

8. On whether religion is continuous with culture, and faith

with reason.
Harnack. High cultural achievements, such as Goethe's pan-
theism or Kant's concept of God, do not stand in simple con-
trast to true statements about God. If they did, we could not
logically distinguish between the value of these statements
and barbarism. True theological statements are akin to those
of sophisticated cultural refinement, but incongruous with
those of barbarism. Faith's knowledge of God completes and
purifies the knowledge of God derived from reason (e.g., ro-
mantic pantheism, moral theism) . To place faith and reason
in stark contrast would make it impossible to distinguish the
significance of the barbaric from that of the refined, for both
would be equally distant from faith.
Barth. True theological statements have nothing to do with
high cultural achievements. Faith does not complete and
purify knowledge of God derived from reason. All human
statements about God stand under the crisis of God's judg-
ment. No way exists from humanity to God, whether that
humanity be barbaric or as cultured as Goethe and Kant. The
gospel is discontinuous with humanly or independently derived
statements about God. Divine revelation and human culture
are separated by a great divide. True theological statements
are based on revelation not on reason. They are received and
acknowledged only by faith. No way exists from us to God,
but a way does exist-the way of God's revelation-from God
to us.
610 GEORGE HUNSINGER

9. On the standpoint from which these relations are perceived:

critical history vs. divine revelation.
Harnack. From the standpoint of critical history, a general
rule may be inferred about all physical and intellectual devel-
opment: contrasts are at the same time steps, and steps are
contrasts. Secular conceptions of God (e.g., Goethe and Kant)
stand in such a relation to true (that is, Christian) concep-
tions. The relationship is relative-not qualitative but merely
quantitative. It is a matter of degree not of kind. Historical
knowledge and critical reflection make this insight possible.
Barth. From a standpoint based on divine revelation, the dif-
ference between faith and reason, or between God's truth and
our truth, is exactly the reverse of what Harnack says. It is not
a matter of degree, but a matter of kind. Revelation is a trans-
cendent reality such that God's truth always stands in con-
tradiction to our truth. We cannot build from strictly human
statements about God, among which there are certainly dif-
ferences of degree, to the content of the gospel. We can only
move from the content of the gospel to an assessment of human
statements about God. The condition for the possibility of
uttering true statements about God is not to be found in them-
selves. When true theological statements are uttered, it is al-
ways a matter of grace. It always depends on God's free de-
cision from moment to moment, and hence it is always an
event. Over this event we have no disposal. The Spirit blows
where it will. Our part in it begins and ends in humility, long-
ing and prayer. By our own efforts, by quantitative stages, we
cannot pass from the old world to the new. Only by God's
action, whereby we are slain and born anew, do we make the
truly qualitative transition.

10. On the relation between experience and eschatology.

Harnack. The highest and final knowledge of God is the in-
sight that " God is love." The sphere of God is one of love, joy
and peace. Transitional moments of terror are not unknown
HARNACK/BARTH: A PARAPHRASE WITH COMMENTS 611
to Christian experience. But one ought not to remain sus-
pended in them throughout the course of this life. These mo-
ments are not independent of God's love, and in view of God's
love they ought not to be prolonged. The transition is to be
completed by entering here and now into the love, joy and
peace God has prepared for us. The terror of crisis and judg-
ment is momentary and transitional, not a prolonged and re-
peated Christian experience. God is primarily a God of love,
not a God of wrath. Christian experience is primarily of love,
joy and peace, not of crisis and dread. The law's terrifying
accusations are but the portal through which we pass on the
way to receiving the gospel's consolation.
Barth. The insight that " God is love " only goes to reveal
that between God and us there yawns an infinite qualitative
difference. As our highest and final knowledge of God, the in-
sight is really eschatological. It represents the promised fu-
ture. It points not primarily to our present experience but to
that which is yet to come. It points to the future of God's love
as something already disclosed to us but not yet possessed. For
now we live between already and not yet, memory and hope-
we live between the times. Until the promised future arrives
we will always be in transition. Until then our existence will
always be paradoxical. Our belief, for example, will always
also be disbelief. We do not believe in the conditions of present
reality, not even in our present experience of faith. Faith is
faith precisely when it points away from itself toward its ob-
ject-toward the God who is love, and therefore toward the
promised future. Faith lives by the promises of God, and we
are saved in no other way than by hope.

11. On experience, reason and revelation.

Harnack. According to the biblical injunction, we are to think
on those things which are true, honorable, just, gracious, ex-
cellent and worthy of praise. To meditate on these things is
liberating. Our experience of God can thus not be divorced
from our experience of all that is good, beautiful and true.
612 GEORGE HUNSINGER

How are we to devote ourselves to uniting these things with

our experience of God if not by historical knowledge and criti-
cal reflection? How do we know of the good, the beautiful and
the true if not through critical historical reason? We need this
reason in order to have these things upon which to meditate
and thus to nurture our experience of God. Once again it
would seem that reason is indispensable to faith and to foster-
ing Christian maturity.
Barth. We are not to move from experience and reason to
revelation, but from revelation to experience and reason. The
former is untroubled and organic; the latter is laden with
dialectic and crisis. This crisis is itself the condition for the
possibility of the biblical injunction to think on those things
which are true, honorable, just, and so on. Revelation is the
crisis of all that we call good, beautiful and true. It is the nega-
tion out of which they are to be reconstituted on a higher, criti-
cal plane. What their final reconstitution is to be is beyond our
capacity to say. What we can say is that all our experiences
and judgments of the good, the beautiful and the true are con-
tinually to be assessed in light of their crisis. In other words,
such experiences and judgments themselves cannot be nor-
mative; but when critically tested in light of revelation, they
can at best have the provisional status of parables and there-
fore witnesses. Their relation to the content of revelation will
never be more than likeness in the midst of great unlikeness.
It will be a relation of limited correlation, never a relation of
organic synthesis.

rn. On sin in relation to the form and content of preaching.

Harnack. Sin may be defined as a lack of respect and love.
Our lack of respect and love can be brought to an end only
through the preaching of God's holy majesty and love. In this
preaching there is no place for mixing in every sort of paradox
and arbitrary expression. The integrity of preaching-the very
means by which our sin is to be overcome-is threatened sev-
erely by the use of paradox and arbitrariness. The content of
HARNACK/BARTH: A PARAPHRASE WITH COMMENTS 613
preaching is neither irrational nor antirational. Paradox and
arbitrariness therefore have no place in it. Preaching otherwise
will be ineffective, and we will be left alone in our sin.
Barth. Sin is rather more serious than mere lack of respect
and love. It is enmity with God and estrangement from God.
It is our being lost in an alienated and superficial likeness to
God. It is a condition which can only end in our annihilation.
Given the radical negativity in which we exist, the affirma-
tions of preaching cannot be made without taking unexpected
turns and without resorting to paradoxical modes of expres-
sion. To suppose otherwise is to be a spectator rather than
a participant. A simpler solution would be wonderful, but in
this life is not to be our lot. If anything is to be learned from
historical knowledge, it would be that none of the great theo-
logians of the church-not at any rate Paul or Luther-were
able to offer a simpler solution to the problem. Can we say
that their preaching was "ineffective"?

13. On the danger of irrationalism in theology.

Harnack. The raw material of religious life-everything sub-
conscious, everything nonrational, fascinating, numinous, etc.
-remains less than human so long as it is not disciplined by
reason, so long as it is not rationally apprehended, understood
and purified. Only in that way is it protected in its own proper
character. Therefore, we ought not to wish to belittle or even
reject reason, for reason is a humanizing force in our existence.
If the rash work of destroying reason is brought to comple-
tion, we can only expect the worst. For reason, again, is a bul-
wark against dehumanization. On the smouldering ruins of
this onslaught against reason, a Gnostic occultism is already
arising. In short, reason humanizes everything religious, and
to attack reason is to move toward the occult.
Barth. Which theology is it that stands in danger of irration-
alism and of succumbing to dark psychic impulses-the one
that merely brings reason to the crisis of its limit, or the one
614 GEORGE HUNSINGER

that divinizes "feeling"? Which theology is it that thinks

critical reason can finally be circumvented by the discovery
of a source of religious knowledge within the depths of human
self-consciousness? And if we are to worry about occultism,
which theology is it that may lose its most gifted adherents to
anthroposophy at any moment?

14. On the condition for the possibility of knowing Jesus

Christ.
Harnack. The person of Jesus Christ stands at the center of
the gospel. Our basis for attaining reliable and common knowl-
edge of this person is critical historical investigation. Without
this basis of knowledge we are in danger of exchanging the real
Christ for an imaginary one. The real Christ can be retrieved
only by historical criticism, and therefore only scientific the-
ology deals with the real Christ.
Barth. The real Jesus Christ can he known only by faith, not
by critical historical reason. Critical reason by itself leads only
to skepticism. Historical skepticism merely confirms the ·bibli-
cal teaching that we no longer know Christ according to the
flesh. Since we need to become aware of this again and again,
the more radical and terrifying the criticism, the better for
revelation as the real and exclusive basis of our knowledge of
Jesus Christ. Revelation is self-authenticating and occurs
without external support. Historical criticism, by inspiring
fear and trembling, reaches its categorical limit. Precisely this
is its service to theology.

15. On scientific method in theology.

Harnack. We are frail creatures subject to sloth, myopia and
numerous other ills. Isn't this all the more reason to maintain
an intimate connection between theology and science (histori-
cal criticism)? Without a firm connection to historical science
we would have no theology at all. Without the discipline of
scientific method, theology would have no power to convince
HARNACK/BARTH: A PARAPHRASE WITH COMMENTS 615
and would be of no value for us today. Theology divorced from
scientific method threatens to dissolve into illusion. It will lose
its ability to be convincing in the modern world.
Barth. Theology is scientific and objective not when it im-
poses a method on its subject matter, but when it allows its
subject matter to determine its method. For what does it mean
to be scientific if not to be relevant to the subject matter?
Only when theological method reflects the fact that its subject
matter is the living God, is it " scientific " in any meaningful
sense of the term. In view of this subject matter, the appro-
priate method is for theology to become a witness to the Word
of God-to God's revelation of judgment and love. Theology
as witness lets its norms be determined by its object and not
by methods derived from elsewhere. Our theological work will
find its value and its power to convince-even in the modern
world-not by relying on alien methods but by being faithful
ology deals with the real Christ.

* * * * * *
Although a full analysis of the Harnack/Barth correspond-
ence would be beyond the scope of this essay, the foregoing
paraphrase allows its main themes to come into focus. Har-
nack's criticism may be summarized as contending that Barth
was subjectivist in method, obscure in conceptuality, and sec-
tarian in ethical implication. By contrast Barth's counter-
charge seems to have been that Harnack was scientistic in
method, reductionist in conceptuality, and acculturationist in
ethical implication. I will briefly explore these distinctions.
Harnack believed Barth to be subjectivist in method. Again
and again in describing Barth's theological procedure, Harnack
argued that Barth leaves everything to " subjective experi-
ence," that he verges on " uncontrollable fanaticism," that his
arbitrariness gives carte blanche to " every conceivable fan-
tasy." 8 All of these dire consequences followed, as far as Har-

s See Beginnmgs (n. 5), pp. 165, 166, 174.

GEORGE HUNSINGER

nack could see, from Barth's refusal to grant historical-critical

method a normative status and indispensable role in Christian
theological reflection. Historical-critical method was for Har-
nack the touchstone of scientific objectivity.
Barth, in turn, believed Harnack's method to be scientistic.
" Scientism" occurs by conflating scientific method as a fruit-
ful way of thinking with an ideology which presumes this
method to have established the conditions for the possibility
of all that is meaningful or real. It is a worldview which takes
the procedures and structures of science to be monolithic so
that they become canonical for all inquiry and knowledge. 9
Support for Barth's critique emerged when Harnack insisted
science presented " the only possible way of mastering an ob-
ject through knowledge," that the task of theology was "the
same as the tasks of science in general," that " each age pos-
sesses only one science," and that " as there is only one scien-
tific method, so there is only one scientific task." 10 By con-
trast, Barth proposed that scientific method was not monolithic
but discrete from case to case, more nearly regional than
global, never more than a heuristic device to be determined by
the peculiarities of its object of investigation (its "subject
matter"). Why should it be so surprising, he wondered, if the
mysterious subject matter of theology turned out to require a
procedure materially (though not formally) different from
those of other disciplines-even a procedure which by com-
parison seemed logically odd? Conformance to the revelation of
the living God was for Barth the touchstone of objectivity.
Since this revelation was not " historical " in any ordinary
sense of the term, it could not be apprehended by historical-
critical method as Harnack conceived it, even though historical

o I lrnve followed the definition of "scientism" provided by Alasdair Mac-

Intyre, " Philosophy, the 'Other' Disciplines and Their Histories: A Re-
joinder to Richard }forty," Soundings 65 ( l 982), p. 144. See also the ex-
ceptionally lucid discussion by Thomas F. Tracy, "Enacting History: Ogden
and Kaufman on God's Mighty Acts,'' The Journal of Religion 64 ( 1984), pp.
29.:rn.
10 Begiunings, pp. 171, 174, 186.
HARNACK/BARTH; A PARAPHRASE vVl'l'H COMMENTS 617
criticism had a subordinate and propaedeutic role to play in
carrying out the theological task.
That Barth was right about the scientism of Harnack's
method there can be, it seems to me, no doubt. Not only did
Harnack openly assume scientific method to be monolithic,
but as G. Wayne Glick has shown conclusively, Harnack also
unconsciously incorporated into his understanding of " sci-
ence" a great many " axiological principles" or value judg-
ments beyond the scope of scientific method itself. 11 But was
Harnack right about Barth? Was he right that "revelation
is not a scientific concept"? 12 Was he right that Barth's con-
cept of revelation in itself merely opens the door to every kind
of arbitrariness and subjectivism? From Harnack to Pannen-
berg such charges about Barth's theology have repeatedly been
made. Although the issue remains unsettled and cannot be de-
cided here, recent work by Honald F. Thiemann has shown
that at least some versions of the charge must be dismissed. 13
It is ironic that Harnack should accuse Barth of "subject-
ivism," for subjectivism was of course one of Barth's deepest
worries about the liberal theological tradition as represented by
Harnack. It is worth noting that Barth had not ans>vered Har-
nack here to his own satisfaction. At the time of their corres-
pondence Barth based his claim to theological objectivity on
an appeal to divine revelation as attested in scripture and on a
dialectical method designed to break free of liberalism's own
special brand of " subjectivism." Dialectic was the instrument
of Barth's assault against the fundamental premise of liber-
alism-namely, its insistence on finding the possibility for talk-
ing about God strictly in the subjective conditions of religious
experience (regardless of how disciplined by " science ") or in

11 See Glick, 'l'he Reality of Christianity, pp. 7, 80, 89-93, 101-104, 225-
227, 332-334, 337-338, 340, 345-349.
12 Beginnings, p. 186.

1:1 See Ronald F. Thiemann, Re1;clation and 'I'heology: 'l'hc Gospel as Nrir-
rrited Prornfae ( N utre Dame, Incl.: l1ni 1·ersity of Notre !lame P1·ess, ms;; l.
See also idem, "Hevclation and Imaginative Construction,'' 'l'he ,J ournu.l of
Religion ul ( 1981), pp. 242-203.
618 GEORGE HUNSINGER

some related anthropological phenomenon. Not until his

breakthrough in studying Anselm, however, would Barth feel
that he had adequately come to display the objectivist logic
alien to liberalism but internal to the Christian faith. 14
Harnack's perception of Barth's method as subjectivist was
compounded by his perception of Barth's dialectic. For al-
though Barth intended his dialectic to work in favor of ob-
jectivism, the dialectical conceptuality struck Harnack as
totally obscure.15 Harnack's difficulty is not surprising, for an
implicit contradiction seemed to exist between Barth's concept
of " crisis " and his concept of " parable." " Crisis " designated
the absolute contrast between God and the world. It meant
divine judgment against sinful humanity, against every identi-
fication of the human with the divine. It meant flat contradic-
tion between God's truth and every human attempt at truth,
high or low, cultured or uncultured. 16 "Parable," on the other
hand, stood for relative correspondence. It meant likeness in
the midst of great unlikeness between our words and God's
Word, our deeds and God's deed, our protests and God's pro-
test.11 Clearly, the concepts of absolute contrast and of rela-
tive likeness cannot be logically reconciled. How can there be
a " parable " in the midst of such a " crisis," or if there can
be, how can the "crisis" be so severe?
No wonder, to Barth's express dismay, Harnack focused ex-
clusively on the rhetoric of absolute contrast (which stung
him most deeply) and ignored the rhetoric of relative likeness.
Barth seemed to be tearing apart every unity Harnack held
dear and to offer nothing but chaos to replace it. Barth for
his part did not deny the inconceivability of " parable " in the
midst of " crisis." Instead, he argued for inconceivability

14 See Karl Barth, Anselm: Fides Quaerens Intellectum (London: SCM

Press, 1960) . "Among all my books I regard this as the one written with
the greatest satisfaction." (Barth, How I Changed My Mind [Richmond, Va.:
John Knox Press, 1966], p. 43.)
15 Beginnings, pp. 165-166, 171-173.
16 Beginnings, pp. 168, 169, 180, 184.
11 See especially Beginnings, p. 183.
HARNACK/BARTH: A PARAPHRASE WITH COMMENTS 619
mediated by "miracle." Once "crisis " had destroyed all possi-
bility of human conditions for speaking of God, divine
" miracle " dialectically called forth " parables " and " wit-
nesses" without in any way slackening the "crisis." The con-
dition for the possibility of such likenesses was humanly in-
comprehensible and lay solely in the hands of God.18
A further reason for Hamack's professed puzzlement may be
found in Barth's failure adequately to distinguish at this time
between the normative and the valid. Harnack understandaibly
perceived Barth to be saying that any theological statement
was completely invalid which claimed a basis other than God's
revelation as attested by scripture. Barth's position was more
complicated, though it has commonly been interpreted that
way. Interpreted in light of his later development,10 however,
what Barth wanted to say was something like this: All theo-
logical statements derived and grounded independently of
God's revelation must be subjected to a process of Aufhebung.
In and of themselves such statements can never be normative,
and therefore theology can never build upon them or enter into
synthesis with them, not even critically. At the level of norms
and criteria we meet with an absolute contrast.
However, whatever particles of truth we might find in such
statements-and we should e:x:pect to find some to a greater or
lesser degree-will always be embedded in a larger abstraction
(because independent of revelation) , and the abstraction as a
whole will falsify these particles of truth insofar as they par-
ticipate in it. The particles of truth can be seen for what they
are only from the standpoint of revelation, and they can be
liberated only by a process which subjects the abstraction to
18 Beginnings, pp. 180, 183, 184.
10 See especially the discussion of " secular parables " in Karl Barth,
Ohurch Dogmatics, Vol. IV, Part 3, First Half (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark,
1961), pp. 87-135. See also Barth's procedure in dealing with Christian and
non-Christian anthropologies he considers inadequate in Church Dogmatics,
Vol. III, Part 2 (Edinburgh: T. & T. Clark, 1960). Barth characteristically
subjects these anthropologies, which he regards as " abstractions," to a kind
of Aufhebung.
620 GEORGE HUNSINGER

a kind of death and resurrection, or complete cancellation and

then reconstitution on a higher or different plane. At the level
of truth, therefore, we meet with both absolute contrast and
the possibility of relative likeness. The dialectic of A ufhebung
allowed Barth to say a complete No or a partial Yes (or both),
depending on the needs of the situation. 20 In short, theological
statements independent of revelation can never be normative
and never be valid in themselves. But they can contain par-
ticles of truth which, once liberated, can function as likenesses
(but no more) to the truth of God's revelation. The rudiments
of this dialectical conceptuality were all present in Barth's cor-
respondence with Harnack, but not with sufficient clarity for
Harnack to make them out.
Barth for his part was convinced that the scientism of Har-
nack's method resulted inevitably in a reductionist conceptual-
ity. You rob faith and revelation of content, he wrote to Har-
nack quite pointedly. 21 Harnack's "simple gospel" was all
that was left over once " scientific method " had purged the-
ology of its theme. The reconciliation between the gospel and
science was purchased at the expense of the gospel. The simple
gospel was a domesticated gospel, causing no offense because
it could no longer speak of cross, resurrection, faith and so
on as anything other than the realizations of human possibili-
ties.22 The scientific method had in effect reduced the gospel to
a faith without God.
The reductionism enforced by Harnack's method has become
a standard item of critique, articulated against Harnack by
critics as diverse as Alfred Loisy, H. Richard Niebuhr and
James Orr. 23 Such reductionism seems to be endemic to liberal
theology as a whole, and, if Alasdair Macintyre is correct, it
has had exactly the opposite effect from what Harnack ex-

20 Cf. Edgar Thaidigsmann, "Aufhebung, Eine theologische Kategorie

des friihe Barth," Evangelische Theologie 43 ( 1983), pp. 328-349.
21 Beginnings, p. 183.
22 Beginnin!Js, p. 179; cf. pp. 177, 183, 185.
23 Sec the summary in Glick, The Reality of Christianity, pp. 280-290.
HARNACK/BARTH: A PARAPHRASE WITH COMMENTS G21

pected and hoped. "The abandonment of theistic content in

favor of secular intelligibility," comments Macintyre, " leads
away from even the remnants of theistic practice." 24
At the time of their correspondence Harnack was 71 years
old and Barth was 36. The old liberal thought Barth was in
danger of "sectarianism;" the young radical thought Harnack
had capitulated to " acculturation." 25 The old liberal com-
pared Barth to Herostrates, destroyer of the temple by fire, for
the pyrotechnics of Barth's dialectic threatened to topple the
twin pillars of " science " and " religion " by which the old
liberal's great cultural synthesis was upheld and in which his
highest aspirations were enshrined. 26 The young radical was
convinced that Harnack's failure to appreciate the desacral-
izing significance of the cross was as the root of his readiness to
become a " war theologian " who had made a " religious ex-
perience" out of experiences during the war. 27 The old liberal
represented H. Richard Niebuhr's " Christ of culture" with all
its strengths of relevance and sophistication and its weaknesses
of capitulation and confusion. The young radical represented
not Niebuhr's sectarian " Christ against culture," but his
"Christ transforming culture "-although he knew as did

24 Alasdair :Macintyre, "The Fate of Theism," in The Religious Signifi-

cance of Atheism (New York: Columbia University Press, 1969), p. 29.
25 Harnack's worry about "sectarianism" is implicit throughout the cor-

respondence, for example, in his remarks about flight from the world. For
an explicit use of the term outside the correspondence, see Glick, The Reality
of Christianity, p. 225. Barth's corresponding worry appears in nos. 4 and
7 of his "Fifteen Answers." See Beginnings, pp. 165, 168.
26 The reference to Herostrates is suppressed in our English translation

(Beginning8, 166). See Rumscheidt, Revelation and Theology, p. 31.

21 Beginnings, p. 168. That more was at stake when Harnack signed the
two 1914 manifestos mentioned by Harle than the mere "Dummheit" to
which Harle would like to reduce it (see n. 2 above) may be gauged from
Agnes von Zahn-Harnack's defense of her father, fraught as it was with
ominous implications for Germany's future. The dialectical theologians, she
writes, had a viewpoint from which the war "had shown only its terrible-
ness, its sinfulness, its destructive rage, lrnt nothing of the exaltation which
thrills a people ready to give its life as a sacrifice for its brothers" (Adolf
van Harnack, p. 530.
622 GEORGE HUNSINGER

Niebuhr that the latter cannot really be had without an in-

corporation of the former. 28 Unlike both Harnack and Nie-
buhr, however, the young radical regarded the direct locus of
cultural transformation to be not primarily the society at large,
but rather a particular community called the church.29
In conclusion it seems fair to suggest that Harnack was in-
capable of recognizing Barth's theological proposals as legiti-
mate, ultimately because what Barth was proposing vis-a-vis
Harnack was a revolutionary theological paradigm. As in the
case of the paradigm shifts described by Thomas S. Kuhn, 30
Barth's arose as an attempt to explain certain anomalies and to
avoid them. The anomalies were basically two: theologians
who defended a war of aggression; a theological method which
eviscerated the content of the gospel. The radical explanation
was that both depended at bottom on making anthropological
phenomena the condition for the possibility of talking about
God. The revolutionary solution was a new paradigm with
content inspired by the Reformation, thought-form inspired
by Hegel,31 and counter-cultural ethic inspired by religious
socialism. 32 These would eventually be supplemented by a pro-
cedure and logic inspired by Anselm. Together they were to
provide a safeguard against liberal capitulations to scientism,
reductionism and acculturation.
GEORGE HUNSINGER
Bangor Theological Seminary,
Bangor, Maine

2s H. Richard Niebuhr, Christ and Culture (New York: Harper & Row,
1951).
29 See, for example, Karl Barth, "Church and Culture," in Theology and
Church (London: SCM Press, 1962), pp. 334-354.
30 See Thomas S. Kuhn, The Structure of Scientific Revolutions, 2nd ed.
(Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1970).
a1 See Michael Welker, "Barth und Hegel," Evangelische Theologie 43
(1983)' pp. 307-328.
32 For Barth's relationship to "religious socialism," see Friedrich-Wilhelm

Marquardt, Theologie und Sozialismus: Das Beispiel Karl Earths (Munich,

Chr. Kaiser, 1972), pp. 70-83, 114-126, 200-207. See also Karl Barth and
Radical Politics (n. 2), pp. 209-211; Busch, Karl Barth (n. 1), pp. 68-124.