Islamıc University of Europe

JOURNAL OF ISLAMIC RESEARCH

İslam Araştırmaları
‫البحوث االسالمية‬
Vol 3 No 2 December 2010
JOURNAL OF ISLAMIC RESEARCH

Ghazali‟s Account
Of Signification
Ass. Hadi Ensar Ceylan
Ankara University, Faculty of Divinity
[email protected]

I. INTRODUCTION
Signification is a crucial subject in Islamic thought particularly in logic and
methodology. Signification is primarily a subject of logic in all its details. In
methodology, the subject is considered in terms of the signification of utter-
ance to meaning in acknowledged sources for obtaining judgment. In logic
and methodology, the subject of signification is certainly treated in different
ways. However, this does not prevent signification from having common
foundations in both sciences. Therefore, it is possible to compare the
sciences of logic and methodology with respect to signification. This possi-
bility implies a vast area. The present study will only attempt to compare
“the ways in which meaning is signified by utterances” in logic and metho-
dology based on Ghazali‟s (d.505/1111) ideas. Our choice of Ghazali could
concisely be expressed in a few points. First, Ghazali occupies a prominent
place in methodology. His prominence stems from the fact that his work al-
Mustasfâ was a turning point in the systematization of methodology. Al-
though we can talk about an established framework for the books on metho-
dology compiled before Ghazali in general, the framework was not so much
organized in itself.1 This was also a source of complaint for Ghazali, who
1
This lack of organization is observed about which subject should be dealt with where and
how. It was a result of different ideas about the subject matter of methodology and can be
regarded as normal in a sense because such periods are inevitable for all sciences in their
process of formation and systematization. For a more detailed examination, see Cessâs
(ö.370/980), al-Fusûl; Bâkıllânî (ö.403/1012), al-Takrîb ve‟l-Irshâd; Debûsî (ö.430/1039),
Takvîmu‟l-Edille; Abu‟l-Huseyn al-Basrî (ö.436/1044), al-Mu‟temed; Ibn Hazm
(ö.456/1063), al-Ihkâm; Imâmu‟l-Harameyn al-Cuveynî (ö.473/1080), al-Burhân; Abu‟l-
Velîd al-Bâcî (ö.474/1081), Ihkâmu‟l-Fusûl; Abû Ishâk al-Shîrâzî (ö.476/1083), Sharhu‟l-
Luma‟.

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expressed his criticisms on the point in his introduction of al-Mustasfâ.2

Ghazali argues that before him, there was a convention in methodology lite-
rature of dragging out matters of Islamic theology (kalam) by Islamic theo-
logians and matters of jurisprudence (fiqh) by jurisprudents. This fact pre-
vented methodology from attaining an organized structure in itself.
Criticizing his predecessors, Ghazali presents a highly systematized frame-
work in al-Mustasfâ when compared to the books written before him. The
book consists of an introduction and four chapters. The introduction entirely
deals with issues in logic. Since he considered methodology as a theoretical
science, Ghazali gave an outline for logic in his introduction to the book on
methodology on account to the fact that logic should be regarded as a foun-
dation for every theoretical science.
The four chapters following the introduction deal with the subjects of me-
thodology. Ghazali divides the subject matter of methodology into four. The
first part concerns sharia provisions. The second part examines the sources
of sharia provisions, while the third part deals with the methods to obtain
sharia provisions from sources. The fourth and last part is about the qualities
of a person to obtain sharia provisions. Ghazali uses an analogy to explain
this system. If we take methodology as the process of obtaining any product,
then the product itself is (semere) sharia provision and the product‟s source
is (müsmir) sharia source.3 The product is obtained from the source (is-
tismâr) through ways of signification. Finally, the person to obtain the prod-
uct is (müstesmir) a jurisprudent.
This framework drawn by Ghazali fully encompasses the subjects of metho-
dology. Before him, no such consistent system had been established and this
framework has exerted great influence after Ghazali.
Another reason for preferring to study Ghazali in our work is his perspective
on logic. Drawing upon the idea that “what one knows without the know-
ledge of logic is unreliable”4, Ghazali carried logic to a central point in Is-
lamic sciences. By central, I mean logic is considered as the basis (of
sciences). Ghazali has been much influential in this sense thereafter.5

2
Abu Hamed Muhammad b. Muhammad al-Ghazali (d.505/1111), al-Mustasfâ min Ilmi‟l-
Usûl, Dâru‟l-Erkam, Beirut (p.d), I/24,27.
3
For Ghazali, these sources of the Sharia include the Quran, Sunnah and ijmâ (consensus).
For him, qiyâs (analogy) is not a source but a way to deduce provisions from the source,
and thus, is a subject under matters on signification. So Ghazali‟s approach to qiyâs is high-
ly important.
4
Ghazali, al-Mustasfâ, I/29.
5
A literature review on certain texts would be sufficient to see to what extent the science of
logic developed after Ghazali. See Esîruddîn al-Ebherî (d.663/1265), Îsâgocî; Necmeddîn
al-Kazvînî (d.675/1276), al-Risâletu‟s-Shamsiyye; Sirâcuddîn al-Urmevî (d.682/1283),
Metâliu‟l-Envâr. On the other hand, that logic gained prominence with and through Ghazali

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al-Mustasfâ is the last book on methodology written by Ghazali. He had

written another one, al-Manhûl, when he was young; however, it is relatively
weaker than al-Mustasfâ in terms of being systematic.6 Another distinguish-
ing aspect of al-Mustasfâ from other works on methodology is that it sum-
marizes the science of logic in its introduction. Such approach of Ghazali
allows comparisons between logic and methodology on a single source.7 For
all these reasons, we made Ghazali and al-Mustasfâ the basis of our study.
The paper first deals with the ways in which meaning is signified by utter-
ances in the science of logic and proceeds through a discussion in terms of
methodology and their comparison in the conclusion section.

II. THE WAYS IN WHICH MEANING IS SIGNIFIED BY UT-

TERANCE IN LOGIC
Ghazali is the first author to include an introduction about the science of
logic in a book on methodology. In this sense, he is a notable scholar for
consideration in comparisons between logic and methodology in any terms.
Ghazali‟s introduction to al-Mustasfâ could be taken as an abridged version
of what he discusses at length in his books on logic called Mi‟yâr al-Ilm and
Mihakk al-Nazar. He himself pointed to this fact by stating that he limited
himself to providing only what could be useful in general.8 Yet, in a different
vein, Ghazali included in his introduction remarks about why logic is impor-
tant for methodology. It shall be helpful for our study to consider the re-
marks in question.
Ghazali uses the notion of temhîd in his introduction to al-Mustasfâ.9 Ac-
cordingly, this introduction on logic is regarded as a prelude to methodology.
Nevertheless, Ghazali puts forward that logic is not simply a prelude pecu-
liar to methodology. That is to say, Ghazali categorizes the science of me-
thodology under rational sciences in his classification of sciences in his
book. For him, logic is an introduction to every science falling under this
category, for logic deals with the principles of reasoning. In this sense, Gha-

is a sufficient response to the claims that thought died with Ghazali. The proponents of such
claim lack insight into the position of logic among Islamic sciences.
6
In the introduction to al-Mustasfâ, Ghazali tells about another book on methodology he
compiled (I/15). We learn from here that this work called Tehzîbu‟l-Usûl is more compre-
hensive than al-Mustasfâ. Unfortunately, the work is not available among the manuscripts
in our libraries.
7
Most prominent sources of methodology compiled after Ghazali treated the subjects of logic
in their introductions. See Fahreddîn al-Râzî (d.606/1210), al-Mahsûl; Seyfuddîn al-Âmidî
(d.631/1234), al-Ihkâm; Ibn al-Hâcib (d.646/1248), Muhtasar; Ibnu‟s-Sâ‟âtî (d.694/1294),
Bedîu‟n-Nizâm; Molla Fenârî (d.834/1430), Fusûlu‟l-Bedâyi.
8
Ghazali, al-Mustasfâ, I/28.
9
Ghazali, ibid, I/16.

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zali considers a person without any knowledge of logic as follows: “A per-

son lacks insight into this science can never be trusted in his scholarly activi-
ties.”10 This remark by Ghazali reveals that methodology and logic bear a
common ground in not only the context of signification, but beyond that, and
this close relationship requires giving priority to logic. Following these ela-
borations, we can now examine how signification was treated in the intro-
duction to al-Mustasfâ.
The introduction to al-Mustasfâ is divided into two, i.e. definition and com-
parison. Such division points out to the traditional distinction tasavvurât
and tasdîkât in classical logic.11 Signification is discussed in the second part
about analogy. Ghazali divided his chapter on analogy into three, which are
prefixes, main subjects and suffixes. Signification is explained under prefix-
es, since analogy cannot be made without knowledge of the signification of
meaning by utterance and the ways to such signification. This could be in-
terpreted as follows: Analogy consists of certain judgments, and judgment
consists of single words one including predicate and the other one about
which predication is made (that is subject). Since words are utterances, how
meaning is signified by words is important to understand them. Thus, signi-
fication is an introduction to analogy.
Ghazali did not define the concept of signification in his introduction. He
treated the subject directly through his classification of the ways of significa-
tion. The author might have thought that the concept of signification is so
self-evident that it did not need to be defined.12 Thus, the lack of this defini-
tion in the book may not be taken as a deficiency.
There are three ways by which meaning is signified by utterance in the
science of logic: Whole meaning signified by the utterance (mutabakat), a
part of meaning signified by the utterance (tazammun) and a case in which
the utterance signifies a meaning which is not included under but required by
its own meaning (iltizam).13 In his introduction, Ghazali presented the same
division, providing examples for each.14 For instance, the word “house” sig-

10
Ghazali, ibid, I/29.
11
Tasavvur (envision) refers to the occurrence of a thing‟s image in mind. Tasdîk (confirma-
tion) is attributing something to another in terms of affirmation and negation. Classical logic
consists of two parts, one involving matters about tasavvur and the other examining matters
about tasdîk.
12
Signification is usually defined as follows: “Signification refers to a case in which know-
ledge of one thing requires knowing another thing.” See Seyyid Sharîf al-Curcânî
(ö.816/1413), al-Ta‟rîfât, Dâru‟n-Nefâis, Beirut 2003, s.172.
13
For detailed information, see Kutbuddin al-Râzî (ö.766/1365), Tahrîru‟l-Kavâidi‟l-
Mantıkıyye, Intişârât-ı Bîdâr, Kum 1424, s.82-89.
14
Ghazali, al-Mustasfâ, I/77.

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nifies the entirety of its assigned (vaz‘15) meaning through mutabakat. In

such signification, there is a complete overlapping between the meaning
signified by the utterance and the meaning assigned for the utterance. When
the word “house” is used to signify roof, the utterance signifies the meaning
“roof” by tazammun. Because roof is a part of the meaning assigned for the
word “house”. Thus, “house” signifies a meaning as its part, not to a mean-
ing beyond itself. Signification by iltizam could be exemplified by wall sig-
nified by the word “roof”. Wall is not a meaning included under the assigned
meaning for the word “roof”. Yet, we necessarily think of the meaning wall
when we think of the meaning of “roof”, since no roof can exist without
walls. So there exists a relationship of necessity (luzûm) between the mean-
ings of roof and wall. Hence, a case in which a word signifies a meaning that
is necessary although it is out of its own meaning is called signification by
iltizam.
Classification of the ways by which meaning is signified by utterance could
be summarized as follows: an utterance either signifies a meaning it contains
or signifies a meaning that it does not contain but it necessitates. The latter is
called signification by iltizam. In the former, the utterance signifies either
the entirety or a part of a meaning it contains. The second is signification by
tazammun and the first is signification by mutabakat.
After classifying the ways of signification, Ghazali makes the following
interpretation about signification by iltizam: “Avoid using utterances that
signify by iltizam for reasoning! Instead, content yourself with utterances
that signify by mutabakat and tazammun, for there is no limit to significa-
tion by iltizam. For instance, roof signifies wall; wall signifies the founda-
tion; and foundation signifies the earth by iltizam and this cannot be li-
mited.”16 The concept of “reasoning” is prominent in this interpretation by
Ghazali. What Ghazali sought to clean off signification by iltizam is the
field in which exact knowledge is sought. Since there is no limit to significa-
tion by iltizâm, then one cannot possibly attain exact knowledge using it.
Thus, signification by iltizâm can only take one to conjectural (zannî)
knowledge. Exact (kat’î) knowledge can only be attained either through
signification by mutabakat or tazammun.
Ghazali treats analogy (qiyas) from this perspective when discussing the
ways through which meaning is signified by utterance in methodology. We
will discuss this later. However, assuming the existence of such relationship

15
Lexical meaning of “vaz‘” is “to put, place”. As a term, it refers to placing an utterance in a
way to correspond to a meaning. For instance, the word “human” has placed to correspond
to the meaning “a thinking living being”. For detailed information, see: Isâmuddîn Ibrâhîm
b. Muhammed al-Isferâyînî (ö.951/1544), Sharhu‟r-Risâleti‟l-Vad‟iyye, (m.y.), Istanbul
1280, p. 6.
16
Ghazali, al-Mustasfâ, I/77.

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in logic it might be useful to examine „analogy‟ in the introduction to al-

Mustasfâ.
In the introduction, analogy is discussed under “main subjects”. Ghazali
defines analogy as follows: “generation of an outcome from two premises
brought together under certain conditions”.17 In this discussion, analogy is
divided into three in terms of the content of premises. If premises denote
exact knowledge, they are termed as burhân; if they become so well-known
to be used as arguments against an opponent in debate, then they are cedelî;
and if they do not refer to any exact knowledge, one can talk about fıkhî
analogy. This division by Ghazali demonstrates that analogy in logic and
analogy in jurisprudence are distinguished from each other not in form, but
in content. The difference in content was explained in terms of their denota-
tion of exact knowledge. Since logical analogy and analogy in jurisprudence
are different in their content, there should be congruence between them in
terms of form. And this points out to the fact that the matter of signification
as explained by Ghazali for jurisprudential analogy should correspond to
something in logical analogy. Nevertheless, Ghazali did not include logical
analogy into the ways by which meaning is signified by utterance, nor he did
not separately discuss signification with respect to burhân. Still, at some
point, Ghazali treated the concepts of burhân and signification together. At
this point, Ghazali puts forward the following remark after arguing that the
outcome necessarily comes to mind after the premises are confirmed by rea-
son: “The signification aspect taking place in this form is summarized by the
fact that a judgment that is valid for an attribute is also valid for that which is
designated by that attribute.”18 An example could be useful for a better un-
derstanding of this remark.
One example for analogy given in the part on burhân is as follows: “All
things consist of parts. All that consists of parts came into being afterwards.
Then all things came into being afterwards.”19 Ghazali‟s remark included the
concepts of “attribute”, “designated thing” and “judgment”. If we take this
example, attribute refers to the notion of “consisting of parts” which both
premises contain. The valid judgment for attribute is coming into being af-
terwards. In addition, the designated thing is the concept of a thing. Conse-
quently, as Ghazali points out, the judgment (coming into being afterwards)
is valid for attribute (consisting of parts) as well as for the designated thing
(object). That is how signification in analogy occurs. There is important
question to be addressed here: So which category should signification in
analogy be placed under the classification which is put forward for the ways
through which meaning is signified by utterance? As we shall see further, in

17
Ghazali, ibid., I/93.
18
Ghazali, al-Mustasfâ, I/96.
19
Ghazali, ibid., I/93.

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his answer to this question with respect to the science of methodology, Gha-
zali describes signification in analogy as signification through reason. As we
said earlier, Ghazali also argues that logical analogy and jurisprudential
analogy are parallel in their forms. Then, signification through reason should
also apply to logical analogy. Yet, as we said before, Ghazali divides in three
the ways through which meaning is signified by utterance in logic: mutaba-
kat, tazammun and iltizam. There is no such thing as “signification through
reason” among them. So we ask a second question: what place does signifi-
cation through reason occupy among these three categories? That question is
of great importance for our point. Though we find a clear answer to this
question in Ghazali, one of the leading followers of Ghazali, Fahreddîn al-
Râzî (d.606/1209), clearly stated that signification by tazammun and ilti-
zam are signification through reason.20 Yet, another argument is also possi-
ble. The relationship between attribute and designated thing cannot be de-
scribed either as a mutabakat or tazammun relationship. Because the
meaning of attribute is neither the whole nor part of the meaning of the des-
ignated thing; yet, there exists a relationship of necessity between them. The
designated thing requires that the meaning contained in the attribute also
apply to itself. Then, it seems to be the most probable choice to consider the
relationship between the designated things and attributes as signification by
iltizam. Therefore, although we admit that our result is open to debate, the
signification in analogy is arguably signification by iltizam.
On the other, what places our result under serious doubt is Ghazali‟s recom-
mendation not to use signification by iltizam for reasoning. Since Ghazali
made logical analogy an indispensable part of reasoning, it is improbable
that for him, analogy can overlap with signification by iltizam, which, as he
argues, should be kept away from reasoning. Instead, analogy can be said to
be signification by tazammun as there also exists a relationship of necessity
in signification by tazammun. While in signification by iltizam, the word as
a signifier necessitates a meaning other than its own, there is a need for a
meaning contained under the word‟s own meaning in signification by ta-
zammun. Therefore, the relationship of necessity is common in both types
of signification. One involves an external necessity, while the other involves
an internal one.21 Thus, the relationship between analogy and signification
by tazammun is a subject that requires a separate discussion.
In his introduction to al-Mustasfâ, Ghazali expressed the above comments
about signification of meaning by utterance. To sum up, utterance signifies
meaning in three ways: mutabakat, tazammun and iltizam. And there is
also signification in the form of analogy, which we have concluded to refer

20
Fahreddîn al-Râzî, al-Mahsûl, Muessesetu‟r-Risâle, Beirut 1997, I/219.
21
Muhammed b. Velî al-Izmîrî (ö.1165/1751), Hâshiyetu Mir‟âti‟l-Usûl, al-Hâc Muharrem
Efendi Matbaası, Istanbul 1302, II/83.

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to signification by tazammun or iltizâm although Ghazali did not provide

any clear explanations. Now we can move on to the second part of the article
dealing with the ways in which meaning is signified by utterances in terms
of methodology.

III. THE WAYS IN WHICH MEANING IS SIGNIFIED IN ME-

THODOLOGY
In his introduction, Ghazali first points out to the ways meaning is signified
by utterances in terms of methodology. He uses various concepts for making
different classifications using different utterances. His first classification
divides the ways of signification into four, for each of which he uses the
following concepts respectively: signification by the form of utterance, sig-
nification by the concept of utterance, signification by the context of utter-
ance, and signification by the rational part of utterance, which refers to anal-
ogy.22 At another place, he makes a classification of three and uses the fol-
lowing concepts: signification of what is uttered, signification of the con-
cept, and signification of what is reasoned.23 Apart from these, he also ap-
plied a classification of four at two other points: signification of what is ut-
tered, signification of the concept, signification of necessity, and significa-
tion of what is reasoned.24 Though there are certain changes in utterances
used, their meanings are close. Yet, as a significant difference, one classifi-
cation divides the ways of signification into three and another divides them
into four. We could conclude that the main one is the classification of four
since it is used more commonly. Nevertheless, Ghazali used the classifica-
tion of three in the part where he treated the subject. We have already men-
tioned that Ghazali divided his book into four chapters. The ways in which
meaning is signified by utterance are discussed in chapter three, which is
further divided into three. The first part is about signification of what is ut-
tered. The second part concerns signification of concept. Signification of
necessity, which he mentioned as a separate part in the introduction, was
discussed under the title of signification of concept. Thus, the four ways of
signification were reduced to three in their treatment. The third and last part
discusses signification of what is reasoned. Ghazali devoted this whole chap-
ter to analogy. And this shows that Ghazali refers to analogy by “significa-
tion of what is reasoned”. Following these remarks on different classifica-
tions in various parts of the book, we can now discuss the subject in detail.
Remembering Ghazali‟s analogy of harvest, the method used to produce
crops refers to the ways in which meaning is signified by utterance. Without

22
Ghazali, al-Mustasfâ, I/18.
23
Ghazali, ibid, I/20.
24
Ghazali, ibid, I/22, 25.

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any knowledge about the ways in which meaning is signified by utterance,

one cannot possibly deduce provisions from the sources on Sharia. Ghazali
describes the chapter on the ways in which meaning is signified by utterance
as the pillar of methodology.25 Such treatment is because this chapter is the
main subject of pursuit for methodology scholars. To explain this, Ghazali
points out to the fact that a jurisprudent is not an authority on provisions and
sharia sources. Thus, what he can simply do in chapters about provisions and
sharia sources is to accept them as they are. In these areas, there is no place
for his jurisprudence. The number of provisions and sharia sources is certain.
A jurisprudent does not have a say in this field. On the other hand, in matters
concerning the ways of signification, one totally relies on jurisprudents‟
interpretations and jurisprudence. Therefore, the pillar of methodology con-
cerns the ways in which meaning is signified by utterance.
As we said earlier, Ghazali divides the ways in which meaning is signified
by utterance into three.26 Ghazali divides signification into four parts in
chapter one. The first part treats implicit (mucmel) and explicit (mubeyyen)
utterances, the second part is about utterances that are open to interpretation
(zâhir) and interpreted (müevvel), the third part concerns orders and prohi-
bitions, and the fourth and last part is about public (âmm) and private (hâss)
utterances. Ghazali also wrote an introduction for this chapter, in which he
discusses the following: the origin of languages, the relationship between
language and reasoning, customary names, useful utterance, ways to under-
stand what is meant, metaphor and reality.
Ghazali did not further explain what he meant by signification of what is
uttered. He directly started his discussion based on his classification. Yet, it
is not hard to conclude that he meant by signification of what is uttered the
meaning assigned for utterance. Accordingly, if the meaning signified by
utterance is a meaning contained by the meaning of utterance itself and is
directly understood from the utterance, here the utterance signifies its mean-
ing in its own form.27
Signification of implicit and explicit utterances, utterances that are open to
interpretation and interpreted, and other kinds of utterances falls under the
category of the signification of what is uttered; because signification of such
utterances occurs according to the characteristics of utterances. In relation to
our subject, we do not need to and will not go into detail for these kinds of
utterances.
The second part concerns the signification of concept. Ghazali treated the
subject under five titles: (1) signification of necessity, (2) signification of the

25
Ghazali, al-Mustasfâ, I/657.
26
Ghazali, ibid, I/658.
27
Ghazali, ibid., I/658.

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sign, (3) understanding the reason for the existence of a provision from the
attribute mentioned along with the provision, (4) signification by utterance
of cases that are subject to one about which a provision was made and (5)
signification by utterance of cases that are against the one about which a
provision was made. As said earlier, Ghazali discussed in this part the signi-
fication of necessity and signification of the sign together. Now let us move
onto these discussions.
In the signification of necessity, an utterance signifies a meaning it necessar-
ily requires, not its literal meaning. Signification of necessity can only take
place in three ways.
1. Such signification is necessary to exist so that one can judge that the ut-
terer speaks the truth. For example, for the hadith “Mistakes and forgetful-
ness has been lifted from my ummah” to be true, the word “mistakes” should
mean the sentence for mistakes. Because we know that, the ummah is not
immune to mistakes and forgetfulness. Then, for this utterance to be true, the
word “mistakes” should necessarily signify the sentence for mistakes. After
all, this utterance signifies its own meaning by necessity.28
2. Legal validity of an utterance depends on the presence of such significa-
tion. As an example, let us take the utterance “free your slave in my name”
told by someone to another. For this utterance to be legally valid, the slave
must have bought before by the demander. Thus, this utterance signifies that
the slave had been bought before he was freed, which is a necessary signifi-
cation.29
3. The ability to envision an utterance depends on the rational existence of
such signification. Surat an-Nisâ verse 23 says, “Forbidden to you are your
mothers”. What is forbidden in this verse is to marry one‟s mother. There-
fore, the word “mother” in the verse signifies marrying mothers.30
To sum up the signification of necessity, there is neither a direct nor an indi-
rect relation between utterance and the meaning signified by the utterance.
However, for the utterance to be meaningful, one needs a link between the
utterance and the meaning it signifies. In this regard, signification of necessi-
ty is distinguished from both the signification of what is uttered and signifi-
cation of the sign. For as we have already seen, the signification of what is
uttered concerns the meaning directly understood from the utterance. In sig-
nification of the sign, on the other hand, there is a reference to the indirectly,
though not directly, understood meaning from the utterance. However, there

28
Ghazali, al-Mustasfâ, II/217.
29
Ghazali, ibid., II/218.
30
Ghazali, ibid., II/219.

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is no direct link between the utterance and the signified meaning here, and
what requires us to establish this link is simply a necessity.
Secondly, in this chapter, Ghazali discusses the signification of the sign,
which is defined as follows: “It is signification of meaning understood from
the sign of the utterance, not the utterance itself. What we mean by this is
that the meaning that is not the aim of the utterance is understood from the
utterance.”31 Ghazali makes an analogy to a case in which things other than
those understood simply from a speaker‟s utterance are understood from his
behavior and attitude. Similarly, other meanings that are not understood
from the utterance itself are sometimes attached to an utterance.
Surat al-Baqarah verse 187 says that prohibitions of fasting are removed
until daylight. Thus, one is free to eat, drink and have sexual intercourse
from fast break until sunrise. Although this is the meaning understood from
the utterance of the verse, it is also understood from the sign of the verse that
starting the day without ghusl will not damage fasting. If intercourse is al-
lowed until daylight, then there is a possibility that one can start the day
without ghusl. So signification of this provision by the verse is the significa-
tion of by an utterance a meaning that is not directly understood from the
utterance itself, but from its sign.
Thirdly, Ghazali provides an example for understanding the reason for the
existence of a provision from the attribute mentioned along with the provi-
sion.32 From Surat al-Mâide verse 38, which orders to cut off the hands of
the man who steals and the woman who steals, one can also understand that
stealing is a reason for this provision. Yet, this secondary meaning is not
clearly expressed in the verse. The verse does not contain an explicit state-
ment that “the reason for this provision is stealing” The reason for the provi-
sion is understood from the sign of the verse.
The difference between this kind of signification and the signification of the
sign mentioned in the second part does not seem to be a big one. In the last
analysis, the meaning signified by the utterance in both is a meaning that not
uttered. Still, one can make such distinction between the two. The meaning
understood in the signification of the sign is not used as an element in analo-
gy, while the meaning concluded from this signification is used as an ele-
ment of analogy. Yet, this difference stems from the state of what is signi-
fied. It is still possible to argue that there is not a great difference between
the two in terms of being ways of signification.
The fourth type of signification concerns cases in which utterance is subject
to one about which a provision was made. An example of such signification

31
Ghazali, al-Mustasfâ, II/220.
32
Ghazali, ibid, II/222.

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is Surat al-Isra verse 23. Here there is a prohibition of saying disrespectful

words to parents, which means not to persecute parents in any way. From
this relation with meaning, we conclude from the verse that it is also forbid-
den to, say, beat one‟s parents because beating is a much more severe pu-
nishment for parents than simply saying disrespectful words. If the latter is
prohibited, then the former is also prohibited.33 Some call this “signification
of a higher level by a lower level due to its relation with cause”. Ghazali
thinks it is possible, but does not deem it acceptable since for him, a lower
level does not always signify a higher level if one does not know the purpose
of an utterance. For instance, if one swears that “I will not spend one‟s prop-
erty” but burns them, one cannot say he acted against his words; because his
oath only concerned spending that person‟s property. So in this type of signi-
fication, one needs to maintain the relation between the utterance and the
meaning as its cause and to realize signification on this basis.
Immediate There is a very close relationship between cases in which utter-
ance is subject to one about which a provision was made and signification of
the sign. Both signify a meaning that is not directly understood from the
utterance itself. Yet, one can think of a difference between the two: in the
first type of signification, the meaning stems from its relation to the cause of
that utterance, while signification of the sign lacks this quality.
The fifth and last part is about signification by utterance of cases that are
against the one about which a provision was made. Ghazali explained the
essence of this method as follows: “does association of a provision with
something‟s attribute signify that the provision does not apply to another
thing against it with respect to this attribute?” It will be clearer if we answer
this question using an example. Surat al-Maida verse 95 prohibits killing a
game during pilgrimage. For whoever kills intentionally, the compensation
will be offering the like of what he killed. A careful look will reveal that the
verse‟s provision was made conditional to “doing intentionally”. One can
ask if only this particular verse signifies that the same compensation is not
required for games killed unintentionally and by mistake.
Signification by utterance of cases that are against the one about which a
provision was made has been one of the most debated matters in methodolo-
gy books. Ghazali treated the subject in detail by going into all evidence put
forward by those who consider this type of signification as legitimate and
illegitimate. Ghazali‟s own position is that the mentioned attribute does not
signify a case that is not mentioned.34 In this context, Ghazali acted against
Imam Shafi‟i (d.204/820) and Imam Malik (d.179/795). We leave discussing
this subject to another study since it is beyond the scope of the present study.

33
Ghazali, al-Mustasfâ, II/222.
34
Ghazali, al-Mustasfâ, II/224.

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We have mentioned five types of signification in the part about signification

of concept: signification of necessity, signification of the sign, signification
of the reason for the provision, signification of cases that are subject to one
about which a provision was made and signification of cases that are against
the one about which a provision was made. Ghazali deemed all of these five
methods as legitimate, except for signification of cases that are against the
one about which a provision was made. We can classify those deemed as
legitimate by Ghazali as follows: in signification of concept, utterance signi-
fies or does not signify a meaning through necessity. The first is signification
of necessity. The second either involves or does not involve signification of
meaning through its relation to the meaning as the reason of the utterance.
The first refers to signification of cases that are subject to one about which a
provision was made. In the second one, the meaning signified by the utter-
ance is either a meaning used in analogy or it is not. The first is signification
of the reason for the provision, while the second is signification of the sign.
In this classification, one can see that each has certain differences; yet, par-
ticularly treating signification of reason and signification of the sign sepa-
rately was not a result of the characteristics of the ways of signification.
Such distinction was made by considering what is signified, as we already
said. Thereby, this classification can be reorganized in a better way.
Thus, we have examined the first part of the chapter on signification of
meaning by utterance. We have already said that Ghazali mentioned analogy
in the third part of this chapter. Now let us see how Ghazali treated analogy.
Ghazali discussed analogy through two introductions and four sections. One
introduction defines analogy and the other discusses the jurisprudential me-
thods for „illa (cause)35. Jurisprudential methods for „illa are three: Identify-
ing the existence of „illa in an element of analogy (tahkîku’l-menât), identi-
fying what can be properly be „illa from among the characteristics of the
element of analogy (tenkîhu’l-menât), identifying the „illa in matters for
whose „illa is not explicit (tahrîcu’l-menât). The sections about analogy
discusses the following: Proof for the existence of analogy, ways to identify
„illa, resemblance between the source of analogy and two different targets
(kıyâs-ı şebeh), elements of analogy. Of interest for us is the first introduc-
tion defining analogy. Drawing upon the author‟s remarks on analogy, we
will attempt to reveal the connection between analogy and signification. For
in relation to our subject, we are interested in the fact that analogy is re-
garded as a way of signification.
Analogy (qiyas) is defined in al-Mustasfâ as in the following: “Analogy
refers to attributing one known thing to another known thing for inference

35
„İlla is the common characteristic of two things compared. It is also raison d‟être of analo-
gy.

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through a positive or negative case that brings the two together.”36 The see-
mingly complex definition could be explained as follows. As suggested by
Ghazali, an analogy should contain four elements, which are target, source,
„illa and inference. The definition is more comprehensible if we try to identi-
fy these elements of analogy in the definition. The two known things in the
definition are the source and target. Thus, the source is attributed to the tar-
get in a certain case. What brings these two elements together is „illa. After
these two elements are brought together by „illa, the source is attributed to
the target with respect to the presence or absence of an inference. Inference
is the point at which attribution is realized.
Let us make the definition clear using an example provided by Ghazali for
jurisprudential qiyâs (analogy). Ghazali‟s example is as follows: “Date wine
is intoxicant. All intoxicants are haram. Then date wine is haram.” This
form of qiyâs contains three elements of qiyâs: The source, „illa and infe-
rence. The validity of this qiyâs requires an external evidence, which is a
proof that presents us the target and its inference. Without such external
evidence, one cannot possibly attain the complete form of qiyâs. Using the
example, date wine is the source, “being intoxicant” is the „illa and “being
haram” is the inference. Here, the external evidence is the verse forbidding
grape wine as haram. We first have to know the external evidence to per-
form qiyâs. Then we find the „illa for this provision. The Prophet (pbuh) said
in a hadith “All intoxicants are haram”, which shows us that the „illa is be-
ing intoxicant. Then we have all the elements, and what is left is to identify
the form of qiyâs. From the intoxicant quality of date wine, we can infer the
fact that it is also haram since being intoxicant is a reason for being haram.
Consequently, following the example, we attribute the source (date wine) to
the target (grape wine) based on an inference (being haram) through an „illa
(being intoxicant).
Unfortunately, Ghazali failed to reveal clearly that why he considered analo-
gy as a way of signification. Yet, it seems possible to arrive at an explana-
tion from what he said. As could be understood from Ghazali‟s definition of
an example about jurisprudential qiyâs, the reason for his considering qiyâs
as a way of signification is that jurisprudential qiyâs also takes place in a
form similar to logical analogy. Now, we cannot argue that logical analogy
and jurisprudential qiyâs are totally identical, for as Ghazali suggests, in
order to form a jurisprudential qiyâs, one needs an external evidence con-
taining a target and its inference.37 However, logical analogy lacks this as-
pect. Despite this minor difference, the two types of analogy overlap in
terms of inference since them both have a form. Inference upon the form is
entirely rational. Accordingly, an individual with knowledge on the form of
36
Ghazali, al-Mustasfâ, II/278.
37
Ghazali, al-Mustasfâ, I/93.

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qiyâs will be able to arrive at the conclusion from the premises through ra-
tional signification, whatever the content of the qiyâs. That is why Ghazali
regarded qiyâs as the signification of what is reasoned.
Ghazali also said the following to explain jurisprudential qiyâs: “Jurispru-
dential qiyâs relating one thing to another on the basis of identicalness.”38
The two things meant by this are the source and the target. The point of iden-
ticalness at which the former is related to the latter is inference. The raison
d‟être for the inference is the „illa, which is common in both. Therefore, the
source and the target entirely overlap with regard to „illa and inference, and
it is this overlapping that is called qiyâs. This idea is confirmed by the posi-
tion Ghazali mentioned in the introduction to his book. When evaluation
jurisprudential qiyâs in his introduction to logic, he said the following about
the essence of qiyâs: “to combine the particular with the general.”39 Here, the
particular concerns the source and the target, which are particular as they are
for certain situations. The general is „illa. Since these two particulars are
combined under a general „illa, an inference which is valid for one is also
valid for the other. Thus, qiyâs takes place between the two.

IV. CONCLUSION and INTERPRETATION

For Ghazali, the least common denominator for the sciences of logic and
methodology are that they are both theoretical sciences. In this sense, both
sciences have common matters, one of which is signification. Both logic and
methodology involve discussions about signification of meaning by utter-
ances and the ways of such signification. At the beginning of the study, we
started from the assumption that the perspectives of logic and methodology
could coincide with regard to this subject. At the point of conclusion, we see
that such overlapping is realized in general terms.
There are three ways of signification of meaning by utterance in the science
of logic: mutabakat, tazammun and iltizam. The first two originate from
the utterance itself. Signification by iltizam, on the other hand, refers to
signification of a meaning to which the utterance is attached in terms of con-
cept, not a meaning that is originally contained by the utterance. Thus, these
three forms of signification are reduced to two in another sense: Significa-
tion of a meaning in the utterance itself, and signification of a meaning out-
side the utterance.
Excluding signification in analogy, there are two types of signification in the
science of methodology: signification of the utterance, signification of the
concept. As we said earlier, signification of the concept is further divided

38
Ghazali, ibid, II/279.
39
Ghazali, ibid., I/94.

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into four legitimate parts, which are signification of necessity, signification

of the sign, signification of „illa and signification of cases that are subject to
the one about which a provision was made. Consequently, signification in
methodology is also divided into two main sections, which are signification
of a meaning in the utterance itself, and signification of a meaning outside
the utterance.
Signification of what is uttered in methodology corresponds to signification
by mutabakat and tazammun in logic. With regard to the signification of
what is not uttered, signification of concept in methodology corresponds to
signification by iltizam in logic.
The subject of analogy is treated separately in two sciences. However, in
methodology, Ghazali describes analogy as the signification of what is rea-
soned. Even though it is not clearly stated that analogy in logic is an inde-
pendent way of signification, as we have said, Ghazali accepts the presence
of a kind of signification in analogy, which is a rational signification. For
when we think of analogy in both sciences in form, we see that there is a
rational inference. If we abstract the form of analogy from its content, what
remains is simply an inference required by reason. This rational inference is
as follows: “All a‟s are b‟s. All b‟s are c‟s. Then all a‟s are c‟s.” No matter
what symbols are written in the inference, the conclusion will necessarily be
the same, for it is what reason dictates. At this point, the difference between
the overlapping logical and jurisprudential analogy takes place in the process
of obtaining the form. While form is entirely depending on exact knowledge
in logic, this is not the case for form in fiqh. As we stated earlier, Ghazali
summarized that as follows: If the premises of an analogy express exact
knowledge, the analogy is a logical one; while it is called a jurisprudential
analogy if its premises do not express exact knowledge. As a result, analogy
is regarded as a rational signification in both sciences.
We believe that our conclusions need further investigation in the literature
on methodology, which Ghazali was influenced and was influenced by. The
present study is preliminary in comparing logic and methodology with re-
gard to the ways of signification. Thus, further studies on the period before
and after Ghazali will either confirm the results of this study or allow us to
obtain different results.

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