Marxist feminism

Marxist feminism is a sub-type of feminist theory which focuses on the dismantling of

capitalism as a way to liberate women. Marxist feminism states that private property, which
gives rise to economic inequality, dependence, political confusion, and ultimately unhealthy
social relations between men and women, is the root of women's oppression in the current social
context.

Marxist feminism's foundation is laid by Engels in his analysis of gender oppression in The
Origins of the Family, Private Property and the State. He outlines that a woman's subordination
is not a result of her biologic disposition but of social relations. The institution of family as it
exists is a complex system in which men command women's services.

According to Marxist theory, the individual is heavily influenced by the structure of society,
which in all modern societies means a class structure; that is, people's opportunities, wants, and
interests are seen to be shaped by the mode of production that characterizes the society they
inhabit. Marxist feminists see contemporary gender inequality as determined ultimately by the
capitalist mode of production. Gender oppression is class oppression and the relationship
between man and woman in society is similar to the relations between proletariat and bourgeoise.
Women's subordination is seen as a form of class oppression, which is maintained (like racism)
because it serves the interests of capital and the ruling class. Marxist feminists have extended
traditional Marxist analysis by looking at domestic labour as well as wage work.

Radical Women, a major Marxist-feminist organization, bases its theory on Marx' and Engels'
analysis that the enslavement of women was the first building block of an economic system
based on private property. They contend that elimination of the capitalist profit-driven economy
will remove the motivation for sexism, racism, homophobia, and other forms of oppression.[1]

In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, both Clara Zetkin and Eleanor Marx were
against the demonization of men and supported a proletarian revolution that would overcome as
many male–female inequalities as possible.[2] As their movement already had the most radical
demands in women's equality, most Marxist leaders, including Clara Zetkin[3][4] and Alexandra
Kollontai,[5][6] counterposed Marxism against feminism, rather than trying to combine them.

[edit] Critiques of Marxist feminism

Gayle Rubin, who has written on a certain range of subjects including sadomasochism,
prostitution, pornography, and lesbian literature as well as anthropological studies and histories
of sexual subcultures, first rose to prominence through her 1975 essay "The Traffic in Women:
Notes on the 'Political Economy' of Sex", in which she coins the phrase "sex/gender system" and
criticizes Marxism for what she claims is its incomplete analysis of sexism under capitalism,
without dismissing or dismantling Marxist fundamentals in the process.

Radical feminism, which emerged in the 1970s, also took issue with Marxist feminism. Radical
feminist theorists stated that modern society and its constructs (law, religion, politics, art, etc.)
are the product of males and therefore have a patriarchal character. According to those who
subscribe to this view, the best solution for women's oppression would be to treat patriarchy not
as a subset of capitalism but as a problem in its own right (see identity politics). Thus,
eliminating women's oppression means eliminating male domination in all its forms.

Orthodox Marxists point out that most Marxist forerunners claimed by feminists or "marxist
feminists" including Clara Zetkin[7][8] and Alexandra Kollontai[9][10] were against feminism. They
agreed with the main Marxist movement that feminism was a bourgeois ideology counterposed
to Marxism and against the working class. Instead of feminism, the Marxists supported the more
radical political program of liberating women through socialist revolution, with a special
emphasis on work among women and in materially changing their conditions after the
revolution. Orthodox Marxists view the later attempt to combine Marxism and feminism as a
liberal creation of academics and reformist leftists who want to make alliances with bourgeois
feminists.

For what reason, then, should the woman worker seek a union with the bourgeois feminists?
Who, in actual fact, would stand to gain in the event of such an alliance? Certainly not the
woman worker. -Alexandra Kollontai, 1909 [9]

[edit] See also

 Radical Women
 The Origin of the Family, Private Property, and the State
 Gender roles in Eastern Europe after Communism

[edit] References
1. ^ The Radical Women Manifesto: Socialist Feminist Theory, Program and
Organizational Structure[1], Red Letter Press, 2001, ISBN 0-932323-11-1, pages 2 -26.
2. ^ Stokes, John (2000). Eleanor Marx (1855–1898): Life, Work, Contacts. Aldershot:
Ashgate. ISBN 978-0-7546-0113-5.
3. ^ Zetkin, Clara, On a Bourgeois Feminist Petition (1895).
4. ^ Zetkin, Clara, Lenin On the Women's Question.
5. ^ Kollontai, Alexandra, The Social Basis of the Woman Question (1909).
6. ^ Kollontai, Alexandra, Women Workers Struggle For Their Rights (1919).
7. ^ Zetkin, Clara On a Bourgeois Feminist Petition 1895
8. ^ Zetkin, Clara Lenin on the Women’s Question
9. ^ a b Kollontai, Alexandra The Social Basis of the Woman Question 1909
10. ^ Kollontai, Alexandra Women Workers Struggle For Their Rights 1919

Gender Inequality & Theories Of Patriarchy

Assess the claim that gender inequalities in the domestic and occupational divisions of labour are best
understood with reference to the concept of patriarchy. You should illustrate your answer with
reference to a range of feminist perspectives.

Introduction
Western female thought through the centuries has identified the relationship between patriarchy and
gender as crucial to the women¡¦s subordinate position. For two hundred years, patriarchy precluded
women from having a legal or political identity and the legislation and attitudes supporting this provided
the model for slavery. In the late 19th and early 20th centuries suffrage campaigners succeeded in
securing some legal and political rights for women in the UK. By the middle of the 20th century, the
emphasis had shifted from suffrage to social and economic equality in the public and private sphere and
the women¡¦s movement that sprung up during the 1960s began to argue that women were oppressed
by patriarchal structures.

Equal

status for women of all races, classes, sexualities and abilities - in the 21st century these feminist
claims for equality are generally accepted as reasonable principles in western society; yet the
contradiction between this principle of equality and the demonstrable inequalities between the
sexes that still exist exposes the continuing dominance of male privilege and values throughout
society (patriarchy). This essay seeks to move beyond the irrepressible evidence for gender
inequality and the division of labour. Rather, it poses the question of gender inequality as it
manifests itself as an effect of patriarchy drawing from a theoretical body of work which has
been developed so recently that it would have been impossible to write this essay thirty years
ago.

Feminist Theory and Patriarchy

Although ¡§¡K patriarchy is arguably the oldest example of a forced or exploitative division of
social activities¡¨ and clearly existed before it was ever examined by sociologists, the features...

Gender Inequality
Rebecca Brooker
Soc 201 Online

Gender Inequality

This paper is an analysis of contemporary issues associated with gender and power in the workplace;
which will specifically include a discussion of gender relations, stereotyping, women's identity, the
structuring of formal and informal power, sources of inequality, and sexual harassment.
          The concept of gender in relation to the division of labor in the workplace, and in relation to issues
of power and control is an unfortunate, groundless stereotype.   Suzanne Tallichet notes that the
gendered division of workplace labor is rooted in flawed ideology of innate sex differences in traits and
abilities, and operates through various control mechanisms. (Tallichet 1995: 698)   These control
mechanisms are primarily exercised by men over women and serve to exaggerate differences between
the sexes, especially surrounding women's presumed incapability for doing male identified work.
        Tallichet notes

Is this Essay helpful? Join OPPapers to read more and access more than 325,000 just like it!

get better grades

that most forms of workplace control take the form of harassment, sexual bribery, gender based jokes
and comments, and profanity which passively but concisely makes gender differences an aspect of work
relations. (Tallichet 1995: 698-699)   Jan Grant and Paige Porter (1994: 150) add the ideology of ‘the
gendered logic of accumulation" to the discussion of gender in the workplace, which notes that men in
Western societies have traditionally acquired and maintained the bulk of wealth in society.
        These traditional roles and consequently women's identities have been formed and maintained by
the workplace, therefore understanding any gender differences in labor requires an examination in this
light. Grant and Porter remind the researcher that the concepts of male and female are not independent
relationships of the workplace, but have been strongly influenced and determined by the relationships
of male and female in society at large.
        Unfortunately the gendered division of labor has...

MARXISM AND CLASS, GENDER AND RACE:

RETHINKING THE TRILOGY

Published (2001) in RACE, GENDER & CLASS, Vol. 8, No. 2, pp. 23-33,
special issue on Marxism and Race, Gender & Class. It is posted here
with permission of Jean Belkhir, Editor

Introduction

A taken for granted feature of most social science publications today,

especially those about inequality, is the ritual critique of Marx and
Marxism in the process of introducing theoretical alternatives
intended to remedy its alleged "failures." This practice became
popular in early feminist literature: Marx and Marxists were criticized
for not developing an in-depth analysis of the oppression of women,
their "economism," "class reductionism," and "sex blind" categories of
analysis. Soon after it became common place to assert that Marxism
was also at fault for neglecting race, demography, ethnicity, the
environment and practically everything that mattered to the "new
social movements" in the West. As the movements died, scholarship
informed by those political concerns flourished; the energy that might
have been spent in the public arena found expression in academic
programs (e.g., women's studies, racial/ethnic studies) and efforts to
increase "diversity" in the curriculum and the population of
educational institutions.

Publication of the journal Race, Sex & Class (changed afterwards to

Race, Gender & Class), in 1993, signaled the convergence of those
political and intellectual interests into a new social science
perspective that soon acquired enormous visibility, as demonstrated
by the proliferation of journal articles and books with race, gender and
class in their titles. This perspective, put forth primarily but not
exclusively by social scientists of color, emerged as a reaction to
feminist theories which neglected racial/ethnic and class differences
among women, theories of racial/ethnic inequality which neglected
sexism among men of color and, predictably, as a corrective to
Marxism's alleged shortcomings. For example, Jean Belkhir, editor and
founder of Race, Sex & Class, prefaces an article on this topic as
follows: "The "Failure" Of Marxism To Develop Adequate Tools and A
Comprehensive Theory of Ethnicity, Gender and Class Issues is
Undisputable" (Belkhir, 1994: 79). The list of putative "failures" could
be as long as we wanted it to be but what would that prove, beyond
the fact that Marx's and Engels' political and theoretical priorities
differed from those of contemporary social scientists? Less biased,
albeit debatable, is the conclusion that Marxism, although offering
"crucial and unparalleled insights" into the operation of capitalism,
"needs to develop the analytical tools to investigate the study of
racism, sexism and classism" (Belkhir, 1994: 79). To refer to class as
"classism" is, from the standpoint of Marxist theory, "a deeply
misleading formulation" (Eagleton, 1996: 57; see also Kandal, 1995:
143) because class is not simply another ideology legitimating
oppression; it denotes exploitative relations between people mediated
by their relations to the means of production. Nevertheless, it is the
case that neither Marx nor Engels devoted the intensity of effort to the
investigation of gender and race (and other issues) that would have
satisfied today's critics. It is (and any literature review would support
this point) far easier to emphasize their "sins" of omission and -- in
light of current political sensibilities -- commission, than it is to use
their theoretical and methodological contributions to theorize and
investigate those aspects of capitalist social formations that today
concern us. Notable exceptions are Berberoglu (1994), who has
examined the underlying class forces leading to gender and racial
divisions in the U.S. working class, linking gender and racial
oppression to capital accumulation, and Kandal (1995), who has
forcefully argued for the need to avoid the racialization and
feminization of social conflicts while minimizing or overlooking the
significance of class.

In this essay, I intend to argue that Marxism does contain the

analytical tools necessary to theorize and deepen our understanding of
class, gender and race. I intend critically to examine, from the
standpoint of Marxist theory, the arguments for race, gender and class
studies offered by some of their main proponents, assessing their
strengths and limitations and demonstrating, in the process, that
Marxism is theoretically and politically necessary if the study of class,
gender and race is to achieve more than the endless documentation of
variations in their relative salience and combined effects in very
specific contexts and experiences.

Race, Gender & Class as a Social Science Perspective

Long before the popularization of the Race, Gender & Class (RGC)
perspective, I suspect that most Marxist sociologists teaching social
stratification were already adept practitioners. For many years, for
example, the Section on Marxist sociology of the American
Sociological Association included in its annual program a session on
Class, Gender and Race. I certainly called my students' attention, in
twenty nine years of teaching social stratification and other subjects
in which inequality matters, to the fact that everybody's lives are
affected by class, gender and race/ethnic structures (in addition to age
and other sources of inequality). We are, in Marx's terms, "an
ensemble of social relations" (Marx, 1994: 100, emphasis added), and
we live our lives at the core of the intersection of a number of unequal
social relations based on hierarchically interrelated structures which,
together, define the historical specificity of the capitalist modes of
production and reproduction and underlay their observable
manifestations. I also routinely called students' attention to the
problems inherent in the widespread practice of assuming the
existence of common interests, ideologies, politics, and experiences
based on gender, race and ethnicity because class location, and socio-
economic status differences within classes, divide those population
aggregates into classes and strata with contradictory and conflicting
interests. In turn, aggregates sharing the same class location, or
similar socio-economic characteristics within a class, are themselves
divided by gender, race and ethnicity so that it is problematic to
assume that they might spontaneously coalesce into class or status
self-conscious, organized groups. This is why, in the late sixties and
early 1970s, I was critical of feminist theories which ignored class,
racial and ethnic divisions among women and men, and theories of
patriarchy that ignored how most men under capitalism are relatively
powerless (Gimenez, 1975). Later on, I published a critical assessment
of the "feminization of poverty" thesis because it was not sensitive to
the effects of class, socio-economic status, racial and ethnic divisions
among men and women; it neglected the connections between the
poverty of women and the poverty of men and overlooked the
significance of this thesis as a powerful indicator of the immiseration
of the lower strata within the U.S. working class (Gimenez, 1990).

I am aware, however, that most sociologists do not take Marxism

seriously and that theorists of gender and racial oppression have been,
on the whole, hostile to Marxism's alleged reductionisms. More
importantly, this is a country where class is not part of the common
sense understanding of the world and remains conspicuously absent
from the vocabulary of politicians and most mass media pundits. This
is why, despite the U.S. history of labor struggles, today people are
more likely to understand their social and economic grievances in
gender, racial and ethnic terms, rather than in class terms, despite the
fact that class is an ineradicable dimension of everybody's lives. I am
not arguing that racial and gender based grievances are less important
nor that they are a form of "false consciousness;" in the present
historical conjuncture in the U.S. it has become increasingly difficult,
exceptions notwithstanding, to articulate class grievances separately
from gender and racial/ethnic grievances. The ideological and political
struggles against "class reductionism" have succeeded too well, as
Kandal (1995) pointed out, resulting in what amounts to gender and
race/ethnic reductionisms. This situation does not indicate the demise
of class as a fundamental determinant of peoples' lives, but that the
relationship between structural changes, class formations and
political consciousness is more complex than what simplistic versions
of Marxism would suggest. It is an important principle of historical
materialism that it is necessary to differentiate between material or
objective processes of economic change and the ideological (e.g.,
legal, political, philosophical, etc.) ways in which people become
conscious of these processes of transformations and conflicts and
fight them out (Marx, [1859] 1970: 21). This is why I welcomed the
emergence of the RGC perspective because, I thought, it would
contribute to raise awareness about the reality and the importance of
class and the extent to which neither racial nor gender oppression can
be understood in isolation from the realities of class exploitation. My
expectations, however, were misplaced: the location of class in the
RGC trilogy, at the end, replicates its relative significance within this
approach; class is "the weak link in the chain" (Kandal, 1995: 143). But
altering the place of class in the trilogy would not matter, for the RGC
perspective erases the qualitative differences between class and
other sources of inequality and oppression, an erasure grounded in its
essentially atheoretical nature.

What is RGC's object of study? Essentially, it is the "intersections of

race, gender and class" (Collins, 1997: 74). Authors vary in the
metaphors they use to describe the nature of these intersections: e.g.,
triple oppression, interplay, interrelation, cumulative effects,
interconnections (Belkhir, 1994); interactive, triadic relation,
overlapping, interactive systems (Belkhir, 1993: 4); multiple jeopardy,
meaning "not only several, simultaneous oppressions but also the
multiplicative relations among them" (King, cited in Barnett et al,
1999: 14, emphasis in the text); multiplicative, simultaneous, inter-
connected systems of a whole (Barnett et al, 1999: 15). Collins,
however, appears to disagree with mathematical interpretations of
these relationships, for she states that they (meaning race, gender and
class) cannot be "added together to produce one so-called grand
oppression" (Collins, cited in Barnett, 1999:15); it follows they cannot
be multiplied either. Collins views are the most helpful for identifying
the main elements of this approach:

1. Race, gender and class are "distinctive yet interlocking structures of

oppression" (Collins, 1993: 26)
2. "The notion of interlocking refers to the macro level connections
linking systems of oppression such as race, class and gender" (Collins,
1997: 74).
3. "The notion of intersectionality describes microlevel processes -
namely, how each individual and group occupies a social position
within interlocking structures of oppression described by the metaphor
of intersectionality" (Collins, 1997: 74).
4. "Everyone has a race/gender/class specific identity" (Collins, 1993:
28).
5. Every individual is, simultaneously, "being oppressed and oppressor"
(Collins, 1993: 28).
6. Oppressions should not be ranked nor should we struggle about
which oppression is more fundamental: to theorize these connections it
is necessary "to support a working hypothesis of equivalency between
oppressions" (Collins, 1997:74).
7. These perspective requires that we ask new questions such as, for
example, "How are relationships of domination and subordination
structured and maintained in the American political economy? How do
race, class and gender function as parallel and interlocking systems
that shape this basic relationship of domination and subordination?"
(Collins, 1993: 29).

As Collins acknowledges (and this is something evident in the

preceding sample of metaphors attempting to deal with this issue)
"the area of race, class and gender studies struggles with the complex
question of how to think about intersections of systems of oppression"
(Collins, 1997: 73). One solution, based on the assumption that gender,
race and class are simultaneously experienced, is to consider them as
"situated accomplishments;" they are not only individual attributes but
"something which is accomplished in interaction with others" who, in
turn, render these accomplishments accountable within institutional
settings (West and Fenstermaker, 1997: 64). From this
ethnomethodological stance, people simultaneously "do" difference
(i.e., gender, race and class) in the process of interacting with others
and, through their "doings," contribute to the reproduction of those
structures. As Collins rightly points out, this postmodern, social
constructionist analysis that reduces oppressive structures to
"difference," leaves out "the power relations and material inequalities
that constitute oppression" (Collins, 1997: 75). The
ethnomethodological solution is unsatisfactory for other reasons as
well, which follow form its basic RGC assumptions; i.e., that everyone
has a race, gender, class identity, and that the effects of all social
interactions are simultaneously "gendered," "raced," and "classed."
(West and Fenstermaker, 1997: 60).

To postulate an isomorphic relation between structural location --

whether location is conceptualized singly or intersectionally makes no
difference -- and identity or identities entails a structural determinism
similar to that imputed to "orthodox Marxism." While it is true, as it
could not be otherwise, that all members of a given society are
simultaneously located in a number of structures which, together,
shape their experiences and opportunity structures, structural location
does not necessarily entail awareness of being thus located or the
automatic development of identities corresponding to those locations.
It cannot be assumed, then, that everyone has a race/gender/class
identity, as Collins argues, though it is true that everyone, by
definition, is located at the intersection of class, gender, and
racial/ethnic structures. That most individuals in this country are more
likely to adopt and self-consciously display gender and racial/ethnic
rather than class identities is not an automatic reflection of their
structural locations but the combined effect of many factors such as,
for example, the heritage of slavery, the presence of colonized
minorities, the composition of past and current immigration flows,
McCarthysm, the balance of power between classes and
characteristics of the class struggle and, last but not least, the effects
of the 1960s social movements and dominant ideologies defining the
limits of political discourse. RGC thinking conflates objective location
in the intersection of structures of inequality and oppression with
identities; i.e., individuals' subjective understanding of who they really
are, and this conflation opens the way to the ethnomethodological
solution to "intersectionality," which assumes that everyone deploys
those identities in the course of social interaction, so that all social
exchanges are "raced," "gendered," and "classed" (and the list could
go on; "aged "ethnicized," "nationalitized," etc.).

As most institutional settings are characterized by hierarchical

structures which distribute people in locations associated with
different statuses, power, privilege, etc, it is likely that, whatever
individuals' conception of who they really are might be, their behavior
is routinely interpreted in different terms by their peers and by those
who are located high in the hierarchical structure, in positions that
give them the power to make decisions affecting other people's lives.
Identities are a contested terrain, both a product of individuals'
spontaneous, common sense self-understanding and political choices
that help them make sense of their existence, and a product of
labeling from above (e.g., by employers and by the state) or by their
peers; i.e., the effects of acts of power. It is important, therefore, to
differentiate between "legitimating identities," which are the product
of dominant institutions and groups, and "resistance identities," which
emerge from the grassroots (Castells, 1997). How "intersectionality" is
experienced, then, is itself a thoroughly political process that raises
questions about the possibility that what once were "resistance
identities," when linked to social movements, might in time become
"legitimating identities," when harnessed by the state to narrow legal
and political boundaries that rule out other forms of political self-
understanding.

How are we to understand, at the macro level of analysis, the

racialization, genderization and the placement of people in given class
and or socio-economic status locations? Are these and other
structures of inequality reproduced simply by "doing difference"? While
empirical research on these matters is important to document the
persistence and pervasiveness of gender, class, and race prejudice
and stereotypes that permeate ordinary, day to day interactions, it
demonstrates at the same time the limited, descriptive, non-
explanatory nature of "intersectionality." In the context of Marxist
theory, the argument that people are "an ensemble of social relations,"
meaning everyone is located at the intersection of numerous social
structures, counteracts one-sided, abstract, ahistorical notions of
human nature. As an RGC insight, it is also useful to critique dominant
stereotypes which associate poverty, race, and ethnicity with women
and with "minority" (i.e., "non-white") status, as if "whites," besides
having "culture" (ethnicity being the culture of the relatively
powerless) were mostly rich and male. But this insight, captured in the
metaphor of "intersectionality" and having as a referent the multiple
locations of individuals in the structures that make up the social
formation as a whole, allows us only a) to map the distribution of the
population in these manifold locations where most individuals occupy
"contradictory" locations; i.e., locations where dominant and
subordinate relations intersect (Wright, 1978); and b) to investigate
empirically the extent to which locations and identities coincide or
not, and the patterns of recognition and mis-recognition that ensue. A
graphic depiction of several of these intersections, placing individuals
and couples in the intersection of wealth ownership, income levels,
occupations, gender, race, ethnicity, age and employment status is the
well known "American Profile Poster" accompanying Rose's periodic
description of U.S. social stratification (Rose, 1992). A description,
however, no matter how thorough, has meaning only within a specific
theoretical context. Intersectionality in itself, as an account of the
multiplicity of locations effecting individuals experiences, or as a
study of the patterned variations in the identities individuals claim for
themselves regardless of those locations, cannot explain either the
sources of inequalities or their reproduction over time;
intersectionality must be placed in the "institutional bases of power
shaping race, class and gender" (Collins, 1997: 74). What are these
institutional bases of power? How do we identify them? How do we
link intersectionality to its macro level conditions of possibility, those
"interlocking" structures of oppression? It is here that the RGC
perspective runs into a theoretical dead end which the abundance of
metaphors (e.g., interlocking, intersecting, etc.) can neither hide nor
overcome. Collins postulates the existence of a "basic relationship of
domination and subordination" within the American political economy
which is "shaped" by the "race, class and gender interlocking system"
(Collins, 1993: 29). RGC studies, as Andersen and Collins point out,
require the "analysis and criticism of existing systems of power and
privilege" (Andersen and Collins, 1995: xiii). While they postulate the
existence of a more fundamental or "basic" structure of unequal power
relations and privilege which underlies race, gender and class, no
macro level theoretical perspective is offered to identify this basic,
fundamental structures. It is at this point that the formal nature of the
RGC perspective becomes clear: race, gender and class have become,
for all practical purposes, taken for granted categories of analysis
whose meaning apparently remains invariant in all theoretical
frameworks and contexts. There are many competing theories of race,
gender, class, American society, political economy, power, etc. but no
specific theory is invoked to define how the terms race, gender and
class are used, or to identify how they are related to the rest of the
social system. To some extent, race, gender and class and their
intersections and interlockings have become a mantra to be invoked in
any and all theoretical contexts, for a tacit agreement about their
ubiquitousness and meaning seems to have developed among RGC
studies advocates, so that all that remains to be dome is empirically to
document their intersections everywhere, for everything that happens
is, by definition, raced, classed, and gendered. This pragmatic
acceptance of race, gender and class, as givens, results in the
downplaying of theory, and the resort to experience as the source of
knowledge. The emphasis on experience in the construction of
knowledge is intended as a corrective to theories that, presumably,
reflect only the experience of the powerful. RGC seems to offer a
subjectivist understanding of theory as simply a reflection of the
experience and consciousness of the individual theorist, rather than as
a body of propositions which is collectively and systematically
produced under historically specific conditions of possibility which
grant them historical validity for as long as those conditions prevail.
Instead, knowledge and theory are pragmatically conceived as the
products or reflection of experience and, as such, unavoidably partial,
so that greater accuracy and relative completeness can be
approximated only through gathering the experiential accounts of all
groups. Such is the importance given to the role of experience in the
production of knowledge that in the eight page introduction to the first
section of an RGC anthology, the word experience is repeated thirty
six times (Andersen and Collins, 1995: 1-9).
I agree with the importance of learning from the experience of all
groups, especially those who have been silenced by oppression and
exclusion and by the effects of ideologies that mystify their actual
conditions of existence. To learn how people describe their
understanding of their lives is very illuminating, for "ideas are the
conscious expression -- real or illusory -- of (our) actual relations and
activities" (Marx, 1994: 111), because "social existence determines
consciousness" (Marx, 1994: 211). Given that our existence is shaped
by the capitalist mode of production, experience, to be fully
understood in its broader social and political implications, has to be
situated in the context of the capitalist forces and relations that
produce it. Experience in itself, however, is suspect because,
dialectically, it is a unity of opposites; it is, at the same time, unique,
personal, insightful and revealing and, at the same time, thoroughly
social, partial, mystifying, itself the product of historical forces about
which individuals may know little or nothing about (for a critical
assessment of experience as a source of knowledge see Sherry
Gorelick, "Contradictions of feminist methodology," in Chow,
Wilkinson, and Baca Zinn, 1996; applicable to the role of experience in
contemporary RGC and feminist research is Jacoby's critique of the
1960s politics of subjectivity: Jacoby, 1973: 37- 49). Given the
emancipatory goals of the RGC perspective, it is through the analytical
tools of Marxist theory that it can move forward, beyond the impasse
revealed by the constant reiteration of variations on the "interlocking"
metaphor. This would require, however, a) a rethinking and
modification of the postulated relationships between race, class and
gender, and b) a reconsideration of the notion that, because everyone
is located at the intersection of these structures, all social relations
and interactions are "raced," "classed," and "gendered."

In the RGC perspective, race, gender and class are presented as

equivalent systems of oppression with extremely negative
consequences for the oppressed. It is also asserted that the
theorization of the connections between these systems require "a
working hypothesis of equivalency" (Collins, 1997:74). Whether or not
it is possible to view class as just another system of oppression
depends on the theoretical framework within class is defined. If
defined within the traditional sociology of stratification perspective, in
terms of a gradation perspective, class refers simply to strata or
population aggregates ranked on the basis of standard SES indicators
(income, occupation, and education) (for an excellent discussion of the
difference between gradational and relational concepts of class, see
Ossowski, 1963). Class in this non-relational, descriptive sense has no
claims to being more fundamental than gender or racial oppression; it
simply refers to the set of individual attributes that place individuals
within an aggregate or strata arbitrarily defined by the researcher (i.e.,
depending on their data and research purposes, anywhere from three
or four to twelve "classes" can be identified).

From the standpoint of Marxist theory, however, class is qualitatively

different from gender and race and cannot be considered just another
system of oppression. As Eagleton points out, whereas racism and
sexism are unremittingly bad, class is not entirely a "bad thing" even
though socialists would like to abolish it. The bourgeoisie in its
revolutionary stage was instrumental in ushering a new era in
historical development, one which liberated the average person from
the oppressions of feudalism and put forth the ideals of liberty,
equality and fraternity. Today, however, it has an unquestionably
negative role to play as it expands and deepens the rule of capital over
the entire globe. The working class, on the other hand, is pivotally
located to wage the final struggle against capital and, consequently, it
is "an excellent thing" (Eagleton, 1996: 57). While racism and sexism
have no redeeming feature, class relations are, dialectically, a unity of
opposites; both a site of exploitation and, objectively, a site where the
potential agents of social change are forged. To argue that the
working class is the fundamental agent of change does not entail the
notion that it is the only agent of change. The working class is of
course composed of women and men who belong to different races,
ethnicities, national origins, cultures, and so forth, so that gender and
racial/ethnic struggles have the potential of fueling class struggles
because, given the patterns of wealth ownership and income
distribution in this and all capitalist countries, those who raise the
banners of gender and racial struggles are overwhelmingly
propertyless workers, technically members of the working class,
people who need to work for economic survival whether it is for a
wage or a salary, for whom racism, sexism and class exploitation
matter. But this vision of a mobilized working class where gender and
racial struggles are not subsumed but are nevertheless related
requires a class conscious effort to link RGC studies to the Marxist
analysis of historical change. In so far as the "class" in RGC remains a
neutral concept, open to any and all theoretical meanings, just one
oppression among others, intersectionality will not realize its
revolutionary potential.

Nevertheless, I want to argue against the notion that class should be

considered equivalent to gender and race. I find the grounds for my
argument not only on the crucial role class struggles play in processes
of epochal change but also in the very assumptions of RGC studies and
the ethnomethodological insights put forth by West and Fenstermaker
(1994). The assumption of the simultaneity of experience (i.e., all
interactions are raced, classed, gendered) together with the ambiguity
inherent in the interactions themselves, so that while one person
might think he or she is "doing gender," another might interpret those
"doings" in terms of "doing class," highlight the basic issue that
Collins accurately identifies when she argues that ethnomethodology
ignores power relations. Power relations underlie all processes of
social interaction and this is why social facts are constraining upon
people. But the pervasiveness of power ought not to obfuscate the fact
that some power relations are more important and consequential than
others. For example, the power that physical attractiveness might
confer a woman in her interactions with her less attractive female
supervisor or employer does not match the economic power of the
latter over the former. In my view, the flattening or erasure of the
qualitative difference between class, race and gender in the RGC
perspective is the foundation for the recognition that it is important to
deal with "basic relations of domination and subordination" which now
appear disembodied, outside class relations. In the effort to reject
"class reductionism," by postulating the equivalence between class
and other forms of oppression, the RGC perspective both negates the
fundamental importance of class but it is forced to acknowledge its
importance by postulating some other "basic" structures of
domination. Class relations -- whether we are referring to the relations
between capitalist and wage workers, or to the relations between
workers (salaried and waged) and their managers and supervisors,
those who are placed in "contradictory class locations," (Wright, 1978)
-- are of paramount importance, for most people's economic survival is
determined by them. Those in dominant class positions do exert power
over their employees and subordinates and a crucial way in which that
power is used is through their choosing the identity they impute their
workers. Whatever identity workers might claim or "do," employers
can, in turn, disregard their claims and "read" their "doings" differently
as "raced" or "gendered" or both, rather than as "classed," thus
downplaying their class location and the class nature of their
grievances. To argue, then, that class is fundamental is not to
"reduce" gender or racial oppression to class, but to acknowledge that
the underlying basic and "nameless" power at the root of what
happens in social interactions grounded in "intersectionality" is class
power.

Conclusion

As long as the RGC perspective reduces class to just another form of

oppression, and remains theoretically eclectic, so that
intersectionality and interlockings are, in a way, "up for grabs,"
meaning open to any and all theoretical interpretations, the nature of
those metaphors of division and connection will remain ambiguous and
open to conflicting and even contradictory interpretations. Marxism is
not the only macro level theory that the RGC perspective could link to
in order to explore the "basic structures of domination" but it is, I
would argue, the most suitable for RGC's emancipatory political
objectives.

References

Andersen, Margaret L. and Patricia Hill Collins. 1995. Race, Class, and
Gender. An anthology. Second edition. Belmont, CA: Wadsworth
Publishing Company.

Barnett, Bernice McNair, Rose Brewer and M. Bahati Kuumba,

1999. "New Directions in Race, Gender & Class Studies: African
American Experiences." Race, Gender & Class, 6, 2, 7-28.
Belkhir, Jean. 1994. "The 'Failure' and Revival of Marxism on
Race, Gender & Class Issues." Race, Sex & Class. 2 1, 79-107.

--------. 1993. "Editor's Introduction: Integrating Race, Sex & Class

in Our disciplines." Race, Sex & Class. 1 1, 3-11.

Berberoglu, Berch. 1994. "Class, Race & Gender: The Triangle of

Oppression." Race, Sex & Class, 2, 1, 69-77.

Gorelick, Sherry. 1996. "Contradictions of feminist methodology,"

in Esther Ngan-Ling Chow, D. Wilkinson and M. Baca Zinn, eds.,
Race, Class & Gender. Common bonds, Different Voices.
Thousand Oaks/London/Dehli: Sage Publications.

Collins, Patricia Hill. 1993. "Toward a New Vision: Race, Class

and Gender as Categories of Analysis and Connection." Race,
Sex & Class, 1, 1, 25-45.

_______, 1997. "On West and Fenstermaker's 'Doing Difference,'" in

Mary Roth Walsh, ed., Women, Men and Gender. Ongoing
Debates. New Haven & London: Yale University Press, 73-75.

Eagleton, Terry. 1996. The Illusions of Postmodernism. London:

Blackwell.

Gimenez, Martha E. 1975. "Marxism and Feminism." Frontiers: A

Journal of Women Studies, 1, 1, 61-80.

_______, 1990. "The Feminization of Poverty: Myth of Reality?"

Social Justice, 17, 3, 43-69.

Kandal, Terry. 1995. "Gender, Race & Ethnicity: Let's not Forget
Class." Race, Gender & Class. 2, 2, 139-162.

Jacobi, Russell. 1973. "The Politics of Subjectivity." New Left

Review, 79, 37-49.

Marx, Karl. 1994."Theses on Feuerbach." in L. Simon, ed., Karl

Marx. Selected Writings. New York: Hackett.
_____[1859] 1970. A Contribution to the Critique of Political
Economy. New York: International Publishers.

------. 1994. "The German Ideology." in Simon, op. cit.

Ossowski, Stanislaw. 1963. Class Structure in the Social

Consciousness. New York: The Free Press of Glencoe.

Rose, Stephen J. 1992. Social Stratification in the United States:

The American Profile Poster Revised and Expanded. New York:
New Press.

West, Candace and Sarah Fenstermaker. 1997. "Doing

Difference," in Mary Roth Walsh, ed., op. cit., 58-72.

Wright, Erik. O. 1978. Class, Crisis and the State. London: Verso.