PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs.

RUBEN BURGOS y TITO,

defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-68955 | 1986-09-04

FACTS:
 By virtue of an intelligent information obtained by the Constabulary and INP units,
stationed at Digos, Davao del Sur, on May 12, 1982, one Cesar Masamlok personally and
voluntarily surrendered to the authorities at about 9:00 o'clock A.M. at Digos, Davao del
Sur Constabulary Headquarters, stating that he was forcibly recruited by accused Ruben
Burgos as member of the NPA, threatening him with the use of firearm against his life, if
he refused. Along with his recruitment, accused was asked to contribute one (1) chopa of
rice and one peso (P1.00) per month, as his contribution to the NPA.
 Immediately, upon receipt of said information, a joint team of PC-INP units, composed of
fifteen (15) members, headed by Captain Melchesideck Bargio, (PC), on the following
day, May 13, 1982, was dispatched at Tiguman; Davao del Sur, to arrest accused Ruben
Burgos. Through the help of Pedro Burgos, brother of accused, the team was able to
locate accused, who was plowing his field.
 Right in the house of accused, the latter was called by the team and Pat. Bioco asked
accused about his firearm, as reported by Cesar Masamlok. At first accused denied
possession of said firearm but later, upon question profounded by Sgt. Alejandro
Buncalan with the wife of the accused, the latter pointed to a place below their house
where a gun was buried in the ground. Pat. Bioco then verified the place pointed by
accused's wife and dug the grounds, after which he recovered the firearm, Caliber .38
revolver. After the recovery of the firearm, accused likewise pointed to the team,
subversive documents which he allegedly kept in a stock pile of cogon, at a distance of
three (3) meters apart from his house.
 A charge for Illegal Possession of Firearms in Furtherance of Subversion was filed in the
RTC Davao Del Sur.
 RTC – guilty; even if there was no warrant for the arrest of Burgos, the fact that "the
authorities received an urgent report of accused's involvement in subversive activities
from a reliable source (report of Cesar Masamlok) the circumstances of his arrest, even
without judicial warrant, is lawfully within the ambit of Section 6-A of Rule 113 of the
Rules of Court and applicable jurisprudence on the matter.

ISSUE: Was the arrest of Ruben Burgos lawful?

HELD: NO.
 The records of the case disclose that when the police authorities went to the house of
Ruben Burgos for the purpose of arresting him upon information given by Cesar
Masamlok that the accused allegedly recruited him to join the New People's Army
(NPA), they did not have any warrant of arrest or search warrant with them.
 Under Section 6(a) of Rule 113, the officer arresting a person who has just committed, is
committing, or is about to commit an offense must have personal knowledge of that fact.
The offense must also be committed in his presence or within his view. There is no such
personal knowledge in this case. Whatever knowledge was possessed by the arresting
officers, it came in its entirety from the information furnished by Cesar Masamlok. The
location of the firearm was given by the appellant's wife.
 The right of a person to be secure against any unreasonable seizure of his body and any
deprivation of his liberty is a most basic and fundamental one. The statute or rule which
allows exceptions to the requirement of warrants of arrest is strictly construed. Any
exception must clearly fall within the situations when securing a warrant would be absurd
or is manifestly unnecessary as provided by the Rule. We cannot liberally construe the
rule on arrests without warrant or extend its application beyond the cases specifically
provided by law. To do so would infringe upon personal liberty and set back a basic right
so often violated and so deserving of full protection.
 In arrests without a warrant under Section 6(b), however, it is not enough that there is
reasonable ground to believe that the person to be arrested has committed a crime. A
crime must in fact or actually have been committed first. That a crime has actually been
committed is an essential precondition. It is not enough to suspect that a crime may have
been committed. The fact of the commission of the offense must be undisputed. The test
of reasonable ground applies only to the identity of the perpetrator.
 In this case, the accused was arrested on the sole basis of Masamlok's verbal report.
Masamlok led the authorities to suspect that the accused had committed a crime. They
were still fishing for evidence of a crime not yet ascertained. The subsequent recovery of
the subject firearm on the basis of information from the lips of a frightened wife cannot
make the arrest lawful. If an arrest without warrant is unlawful at the moment it is made,
generally nothing that happened or is discovered afterwards can make it lawful. The fruit
of a poisoned tree is necessarily also tainted.
 We find no compelling reason for the haste with which the arresting officers sought to
arrest the accused. We fail to see why they failed to first go through the process of
obtaining a warrant of arrest, if indeed they had reasonable ground to believe that the
accused had truly committed a crime. There is no showing that there was a real
apprehension that the accused was on the verge of flight or escape. Likewise, there is no
showing that the whereabouts of the accused were unknown.
 The basis for the action taken by the arresting officer was the verbal report made by
Masamlok who was not required to subscribe his allegations under oath. There was no
compulsion for him to state truthfully his charges under pain of criminal prosecution.
Consequently, the need to go through the process of securing a search warrant and a
warrant of arrest becomes even more clear. The arrest of the accused while he was
plowing his field is illegal. The arrest being unlawful, the search and seizure which
transpired afterwards could not likewise be deemed legal as being mere incidents to a
valid arrest.
 The fact that the accused failed to object to the entry into his house does not amount to a
permission to make a search therein.
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES, plaintiff-appellee, vs. IDEL AMINNUDIN y AHNI,
defendant-appellant.
G.R. No. L-74869 | 1988-07-06

FACTS:
 Idel Aminnudin was arrested on June 25, 1984, shortly after disembarking from the M/V
Wilcon 9 at about 8:30 in the evening, in Iloilo City. The PC officers who were in fact
waiting for him simply accosted him, inspected his bag and finding what looked liked
marijuana leaves took him to their headquarters for investigation. The two bundles of
suspect articles were confiscated from him and later taken to the NBI laboratory for
examination. When they were verified as marijuana leaves, an information for violation
of the Dangerous Drugs Act was filed against him.
 According to the prosecution, the PC officers had earlier received a tip from one of their
informers that the accused-appellant was on board a vessel bound for Iloilo City and was
carrying marijuana. 7 He was identified by name. 8 Acting on this tip, they waited for
him in the evening of June 25, 1984, and approached him as he descended from the
gangplank after the informer had pointed to him. 9 They detained him and inspected the
bag he was carrying. It was found to contain three kilos of what were later analyzed as
marijuana leaves by an NBI forensic examiner, 10 who testified that she conducted
microscopic, chemical and chromatographic tests on them. On the basis of this finding,
the corresponding charge was then filed against Aminnudin. 
 RTC – guilty. Hence, this petition.
 Aminnudin disclaimed the marijuana, averring that all he had in his bag was his clothing
consisting of a jacket, two shirts and two pairs of pants. 11 He alleged that he was
arbitrarily arrested and immediately handcuffed. His bag was confiscated without a
search warrant.

ISSUE: Is the arrest valid?

HELD: NO.
 It is not disputed, and in fact it is admitted by the PC officers who testified for the
prosecution, that they had no warrant when they arrested Aminnudin and seized the bag
he was carrying. Their only justification was the tip they had earlier received from a
reliable and regular informer who reported to them that Aminnudin was arriving in Iloilo
by boat with marijuana.
 In the case at bar, there was no warrant of arrest or search warrant issued by a judge after
personal determination by him of the existence of probable cause. Contrary to the
averments of the government, the accused-appellant was not caught in flagrante nor was a
crime about to be committed or had just been committed to justify the warrantless arrest
allowed under Rule 113 of the Rules of Court. Even expediency could not be invoked to
dispense with the obtention of the warrant as in the case of Roldan v. Arca, 24 for
example. Here it was held that vessels and aircraft are subject to warrantless searches and
seizures for violation of the customs law because these vehicles may be quickly moved
out of the locality or jurisdiction before the warrant can be secured. 
 The present case presented no such urgency. From the conflicting declarations of the PC
witnesses, it is clear that they had at least two days within which they could have
obtained a warrant to arrest and search Aminnudin who was coming Iloilo on the M/V
Wilcon 9. His name was known. The vehicle was identified. The date of its arrival was
certain. And from the information they had received, they could have persuaded a judge
that there was probable cause, indeed, to justify the issuance of a warrant. Yet they did
nothing. No effort was made to comply with the law. The Bill of Rights was ignored
altogether because the PC lieutenant who was the head of the arresting team, had
determined on his own authority that "search warrant was not necessary." 
 In the case at bar, the accused-appellant was not, at the moment of his arrest, committing
a crime nor was it shown that he was about to do so or that he had just done so. What he
was doing was descending the gangplank of the M/V Wilcon 9 and there was no outward
indication that called for his arrest. To all appearances, he was like any of the other
passengers innocently disembarking from the vessel. It was only when the informer
pointed to him as the carrier of the marijuana that the suddenly became suspect and so
subject to apprehension. It was the furtive finger that triggered his arrest. The
identification by the informer was the probable cause as determined by the officers (and
not a judge) that authorized them to pounce upon Aminnudin and immediately arrest
him. 
 Without the evidence of the marijuana allegedly seized from Aminnudin, the case of the
prosecution must fall. That evidence cannot be admitted, and should never have been
considered by the trial court for the simple fact is that the marijuana was seized illegally.
It is the fruit of the poisonous tree, to use Justice Holmes' felicitous phrase. The search
was not an incident of a lawful arrest because there was no warrant of arrest and the
warrantless arrest did not come under the exceptions allowed by the Rules of Court.
Hence, the warrantless search was also illegal and the evidence obtained thereby was
inadmissible. 
 ACQUITTED.
Antiquera vs. People (2013)
G.R. No. 180661 | 2013-12-11

FACTS:
 On January 13, 2004 the second Assistant City Prosecutor of Pasay City charged the
accused George Codes Antiquera* and Corazon Olivenza Cruz with illegal ·possession of
paraphernalia for dangerous drugs 1 before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Pasay
City.
 The prosecution evidence shows that at around 4:45 a.m. of February 11, 2004, PO1
Gregorio Recio, PO1 Laurence Cabutihan, P/Insp. Eric Ibon, PO1 Rodelio Rania, and
two civilian operatives on board a patrol car and a tricycle were conducting a police
visibility patrol on David Street, Pasay City, when they saw two unidentified men rush
out of house number 107-C and immediately boarded a jeep.
 Suspecting that a crime had been committed, the police officers approached the house
from where the men came and peeked through the partially opened door. PO1 Recio and
PO1 Cabutihan saw accused Antiquera holding an improvised tooter and a pink lighter.
Beside him was his live-in partner, Cruz, who was holding an aluminum foil and
an improvised burner. They sat facing each other at the living room. This prompted the
police officers to enter the house, introduce themselves, and arrest Antiquera and Cruz.
 While inspecting the immediate surroundings, PO1 Cabutihan saw a wooden jewelry box
atop a table. It contained an improvised burner, wok, scissors, 10 small transparent plastic
sachets with traces of white crystalline substance, improvised scoop, and seven unused
strips of aluminum foil. The police officers confiscated all these and brought Antiquera
and Cruz to the Drug Enforcement Unit of the Philippine National Police in Pasay City
for further investigation and testing. A forensic chemical officer examined the
confiscated drug paraphernalia and found them positive for traces of
methamphetamine hydrochloride or “shabu.”
 Accused Antiquera gave a different story. He said that on the date and time in question,
he and Cruz were asleep in their house when he was roused by knocking on the door.
When he went to open it, three armed police officers forced themselves into the house.
One of them shoved him and said, “D’yan ka lang, pusher ka.” He was handcuffed and
someone instructed two of the officers to go to his room. The police later brought accused
Antiquera and Cruz to the police station and there informed them of the charges against
them. They were shown a box that the police said had been recovered from his house.
 A charge for illegal possession of drug paraphernalia was filed before the RTC.
 RTC - found accused Antiquera and Cruz guilty of the crime charged; the police caught
accused Antiquera and Cruz in the act of using shabu and having drug paraphernalia in
their possession
 CA – affirmed RTC in toto. MR denied. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: W/N the warrantless arrest is valid.

HELD: NO.
 Section 5(a), Rule 113 of the Rules of Criminal Procedure provides that a "peace officer
or a private person may, without a warrant, arrest a person when, in his presence, the
person to be arrested has committed, is actually committing, or is attempting to commit
an offense." This is an arrest in flagrante delicto. The overt act constituting the crime is
done in the presence or within the view of the arresting officer.
 The circumstances in this case do not make out a case of arrest made in flagrante delicto.
 The police officers claim that they were alerted when they saw two unidentified men
suddenly rush out of 107 David Street, Pasay City. Since they suspected that a crime had
been committed, the natural thing for them to do was to give chase to the jeep that the
two fleeing men boarded, given that the officers were in a patrol car and a tricycle.
Running after the fleeing suspects was the more urgent task but the officers instead gave
priority to the house even when they heard no cry for help from it.
 Admittedly, the police officers did not notice anything amiss going on in the house from
the street where they stood. Indeed, even as they peeked through its partially opened
door, they saw no activity that warranted their entering it.
 Q – But before you saw them, you just had to push the door wide open to
peep through its opening because you did not know what was happening
inside?
A – Yes, Your Honor.
 Clearly, no crime was plainly exposed to the view of the arresting officers that authorized
the arrest of accused Antiquera without warrant. Considering that his arrest was illegal,
the search and seizure that resulted from it was likewise illegal. Consequently, the
various drug paraphernalia that the police officers allegedly found in the house and seized
are inadmissible, having proceeded from an invalid search and seizure.
 The failure of the accused to object to the irregularity of his arrest by itself is not enough
to sustain his conviction. A waiver of an illegal warrantless arrest does not carry with it a
waiver of the inadmissibility of evidence seized during the illegal warrantless arrest.
SENATOR LEILA M. DE LIMA, Petitioner, vs.
HON. JUANITA GUERRERO et. al, in her capacity as Presiding Judge, Regional Trial
Court of Muntinlupa City, Respondents.
G.R. No. 229781 | 2017-10-10

FACTS:
 The Senate and the House of Representatives conducted several inquiries on the
proliferation of dangerous drugs syndicated at the New Bilibid Prison (NBP), inviting
inmates who executed affidavits in support of their testimonies. These legislative
inquiries led to the filing of several complaints with the DOJ, against petitioner Sen. Leila
De Lima.
 The DOJ Panel proceeded with the conduct of the preliminary investigation 16 and, in its
Joint Resolution dated February 14, 2017, 17 recommended the filing
of Informations against petitioner De Lima. Accordingly, on February 17, 2017,
three Informations  were filed against petitioner De Lima and several co-accused before
the RTC of Muntinlupa City. She was charged for violation of Section 5 in relation to
Section (jj), Section 26(b), and Section 28 of Republic Act No. (RA) 9165 for illegal drug
trading; De Lima and Ragos, with the use of their power, position, and authority,
demand, solicit and extort money from the high profile inmates in the New Bilibid Prison
to support the senatorial bid of De Lima in the May 2016 election; by reason of which,
the inmates, not being lawfully authorized by law and through the use of mobile phones
and other electronic devices, did then and there willfully and unlawfully trade and
traffic dangerous drugs, and thereafter give and deliver to De Lima, through Ragos and
Dayan, the proceeds of illegal drug trading amounting to Five Million (P5,000,000.00)
Pesos on 24 November 2012, Five Million (P5,000,000.00) Pesos on 15 December 2012,
and One Hundred Thousand (P100,000.00) Pesos weekly "tara" each from the high
profile inmates in the New Bilibid Prison.
 RTC – found probable cause and issued the assailed warrant of arrest against the
petitioner. Hence, this present petition.
 Petitioner maintains that respondent judge failed to personally determine the probable
cause for the issuance of the warrant of arrest since, as stated in the assailed Order,
respondent judge based her findings on the evidence presented during the preliminary
investigation and not on the report and supporting documents submitted by the
prosecutor.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent gravely abused her discretion in finding probable cause to
issue the Warrant of Arrest against petitioner.

HELD: NO.
 In the present case, the respondent judge had no positive duty to first resolve the Motion
to Quash before issuing a warrant of arrest. There is no rule of procedure, statute, or
jurisprudence to support the petitioner's claim. Rather, Sec.5(a), Rule 112 of the Rules of
Court117 required the respondent judge to evaluate the prosecutor's resolution and its
supporting evidence within a limited period of only ten (10) days.
 SEC. 5.  When warrant of arrest may issue. - (a) By the Regional Trial Court.
- Within ten (10) days from the filing of the complaint or information, the
judge shall personally evaluate the resolution of the prosecutor and its
supporting evidence. He may immediately dismiss the case if the evidence on
record clearly fails to establish probable cause. If he finds probable cause, he shall
issue a warrant of arrest, or a commitment order when the complaint or
information was filed pursuant to Section 6 of this Rule. In case of doubt on the
existence of probable cause, the judge may order the prosecutor to present
additional evidence within five (5) days from notice and the issue must be
resolved by the court within thirty (30) days from the filing of the complaint or
information.
 It is not far-fetched to conclude, therefore, that had the respondent judge waited longer
and first attended to the petitioner's Motion to Quash, she would have exposed herself to
a possible administrative liability for failure to observe Sec. 5(a), Rule 112 of the Rules
of Court. Her exercise of discretion was sound and in conformity with the provisions of
the Rules of Court considering that a Motion to Quash may be filed and, thus resolved by
a trial court judge, at any time before the accused petitioner enters her plea. 118 What is
more, it is in accord with this Court's ruling in Marcos v. Cabrera-Faller119 that "[a]s the
presiding judge, it was her task, upon the filing of the Information, to first and foremost
determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused."
 Personal determination of the existence of probable cause by the judge is required before
a warrant of arrest may issue. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and
personal responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself the existence of probable
cause. In satisfying himself of the existence of probable cause for the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his
witnesses. Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall: (1)
personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents submitted by
the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis thereof,
issue a warrant of arrest; or (2) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable
cause, he may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of
supporting affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to
the existence of probable cause.
 As the prosecutor's report/resolution precisely finds support from the evidence
presented during the preliminary investigation, this Court cannot consider the
respondent judge to have evaded her duty or refused to perform her
obligation to satisfy herself that substantial basis exists for the petitioner's
arrest. It may perhaps even be stated that respondent judge performed her duty in a
manner that far exceeds what is required of her by the rules when she reviewed all the
evidence, not just the supporting documents.
 [T]he judge cannot rely solely on the report of the prosecutor in finding
probable cause to justify the issuance of a warrant of arrest . Obviously and
understandably, the contents of the prosecutor's report will support his own conclusion
that there is reason to charge the accused for an offense and hold him for trial.
However, the judge must decide independently. Hence, he must have supporting
evidence, other than the prosecutor's bare report, upon which to legally sustain his
own findings on the existence (or non-existence) of probable cause to issue an arrest
order. This responsibility of determining personally and independently the existence or
nonexistence of probable cause is lodged in him by no less than the most basic law of the
land. Parenthetically, the prosecutor could ease the burden of the judge and speed up the
litigation process by forwarding to the latter not only the information and his bare
resolution finding probable cause, but also so much of the records and the evidence on
hand as to enable His Honor to make his personal and separate judicial finding on
whether to issue a warrant of arrest.
 Notably, for purposes of determining the propriety of the issuance of a
warrant of arrest, the judge is tasked to merely determine the probability, not
the certainty, of the guilt of the accused.  129 She is given wide latitude of
discretion in the determination of probable cause for the issuance of warrants
of arrest. 130 A finding of probable cause to order the accused's arrest does not require an
inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to procure a conviction. 131 It is enough
that it is believed that the act or omission complained of constitutes the offense charged.
TERESITA TANGHAL OKABE, Petitioner, versus HON. PEDRO DE LEON
GUTIERREZ, in his capacity as Presiding Judge of RTC, Pasay City, Branch 119;
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINES; and CECILIA MARUYAMA, Respondents.
G.R. No. 150185 | 2004-05-27

FACTS:
 Cecilia Maruyama executed a fifteen-page affidavit-complaint[2] and filed the same with
the Office of the City Prosecutor of Pasay City, on December 29, 1999, charging Lorna
Tanghal and petitioner Teresita Tanghal Okabe, a.k.a. Shiela Okabe, with estafa. In her
affidavit, Maruyama alleged, inter alia, that on December 11, 1998, she entrusted
Y11,410,000 with the peso equivalent of P3,993,500 to the petitioner, who was engaged
in the business of "door-to-door delivery" from Japan to the Philippines. It was alleged
that the petitioner failed to deliver the money as agreed upon, and, at first, denied
receiving the said amount but later returned only US$1,000 through Lorna Tanghal.
 After the requisite preliminary investigation, 2nd Assistant City Prosecutor Joselito J.
Vibandor came out with a resolution dated March 30, 2000, finding probable cause for
estafa against the petitioner. On May 15, 2000, an Information against the petitioner was
filed in the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City. The case was raffled to Branch 119 of the
court presided by Judge Pedro de Leon Gutierrez.
 The trial court issued a warrant for the arrest of the petitioner with a recommended bond
of P40,000.  The petitioner posted a personal bail bond in the said amount. In several
occasions, the accused was alleged to have left the country without the permission from
the trial court. The private prosecutor filed an urgent ex parte motion for the issuance of
the hold departure order.
 RTC judge - granted the motion of the private prosecutor for the issuance of a hold
departure order. The petitioner then filed with the Court of Appeals a petition for
certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court with a plea for a writ of preliminary
injunction.
 CA - the petitioner's motion for reconsideration of the trial court's decision was denied
and her petition for the nullification of the August 25, 2000 Order of the respondent judge
was dismissed; based on the respondent judge's personal examination of respondent
Maruyama's affidavit-complaint, the resolution of the investigating prosecutor and the
Information approved by the city prosecutor, a finding of probable cause was in order.
Hence, this petition.
 The petitioner asserts that the respondent judge could not have determined the existence
of probable cause for her arrest solely on the resolution of the investigating prosecutor
and the undated affidavit-complaint of respondent Maruyama. She posits that the
respondent judge should have ordered the investigating prosecutor to submit the
affidavits of the witnesses of respondent Maruyama and the latter's documentary
evidence, as well as the counter-affidavit of the petitioner and the transcripts of the
stenographic notes, if any, taken during the preliminary investigation. The petitioner adds
that the respondent judge should have personally reviewed the said documents before
determining the presence or absence of probable cause.
 The Office of the Solicitor General, on the other hand, asserts that the respondent judge
did not commit any grave abuse of discretion when he found probable cause against the
petitioner for estafa, and thereafter issued a warrant for her arrest. It argues that the
respondent judge personally determined the existence of probable cause independently of
the certification of the investigating prosecutor, and only after examining the
Information, the resolution of the investigating prosecutor, as well as the affidavit-
complaint of the private complainant. It asserts that such documents are sufficient on
which to anchor a finding of probable cause.

ISSUE: Whether or not the respondent judge committed a grave abuse of his discretion
amounting to excess or lack of jurisdiction in issuing his August 25, 2000 Order

HELD: YES.
 In this case, the investigating prosecutor submitted to the respondent judge only his
resolution after his preliminary investigation of the case and the affidavit-
complaint of the private complainant, and failed to include the affidavits of
the witnesses of the private complainant, and the latter's reply affidavit, the
counter-affidavit of the petitioner, as well as the evidence adduced by the
private complainant as required by case law, and now by Section 8(a), Rule
112 of the Revised Rules on Criminal Procedure. The aforecited affidavits, more
specifically the fax message of Lorna Tanghal and the document signed by her
covering the amount of US$1,000, are of vital importance, as they would enable
the respondent judge to properly determine the existence or non-existence of probable
cause.
 We agree with the petitioner that before the RTC judge issues a warrant of arrest under
Section 6, Rule 112 of the Rules of Court[42] in relation to Section 2, Article III of the
1987 Constitution, the judge must make a personal determination of the
existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused .
The duty to make such determination is personal and exclusive to the issuing judge. He
cannot abdicate his duty and rely on the certification of the investigating prosecutor that
he had conducted a preliminary investigation in accordance with law and the Rules of
Court, as amended, and found probable cause for the filing of the Information.
 If the investigating prosecutor finds probable cause for the filing of the Information
against the respondent, he executes a certification at the bottom of the Information that
from the evidence presented, there is a reasonable ground to believe that the offense
charged has been committed and that the accused is probably guilty thereof. Such
certification of the investigating prosecutor is, by itself, ineffective. It is not
binding on the trial court. Nor may the RTC rely on the said certification as basis for a
finding of the existence of probable cause for the arrest of the accused.
 In contrast, the task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with the court is
first and foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the
arrest of the accused. Probable cause is meant such set of facts and circumstances which
would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to believe that the offense charged in
the Information or any offense included therein has been committed by the person sought
to be arrested.[45] In determining probable cause, the average man weighs facts and
circumstances without resorting to the calibrations of the rules of evidence of which he
has no technical knowledge. He relies on common sense.[46] A finding of probable cause
needs only to rest on evidence showing that more likely than not a crime has been
committed and that it was committed by the accused. Probable cause demands more than
bare suspicion, it requires less than evidence which would justify conviction.
 In determining the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of the
accused, the RTC judge may rely on the findings and conclusions in the
resolution of the investigating prosecutor finding probable cause for the
filing of the Information. After all, as the Court held in Webb v. De Leon,[49] the
judge just personally reviews the initial determination of the investigating prosecutor
finding a probable cause to see if it is supported by substantial evidence.[50] However,
in determining the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest
of the accused, the judge should not rely solely on the said report .[51] The
judge should consider not only the report of the investigating prosecutor but also the
affidavit/affidavits and the documentary evidence of the parties, the counter-affidavit of
the accused and his witnesses, as well as the transcript of stenographic notes taken during
the preliminary investigation, if any, submitted to the court by the investigating
prosecutor upon the filing of the Information.
 It is not required that the complete or entire records of the case during the preliminary
investigation be submitted to and examined by the judge. We do not intend to unduly
burden trial courts by obliging them to examine the complete records of every case all the
time simply for the purpose of ordering the arrest of an accused. What is required, rather,
is that the judge must have sufficient supporting documents (such as the complaint,
affidavits, counter-affidavits, sworn statements of witnesses or transcripts of stenographic
notes, if any) upon which to make his independent judgment or, at the very least, upon
which to verify the findings of the prosecutor as to the existence of probable cause. The
point is: he cannot rely solely and entirely on the prosecutor's recommendation, as
Respondent Court did in this case. Although the prosecutor enjoys the legal presumption
of regularity in the performance of his official duties and functions, which in turn gives
his report the presumption of accuracy, the Constitution, we repeat, commands the judge
to personally determine probable cause in the issuance of warrants of arrest. This Court
has consistently held that a judge fails in his bounden duty if he relies merely on the
certification or the report of the investigating officer.
 The assailed Orders dated August 25 and 28, 2000 and the Warrant of Arrest issued by
the respondent judge in Criminal Case No. 00-0749 are SET ASIDE. The records are
REMANDED to the Regional Trial Court of Pasay City, Branch 119. The respondent
judge is hereby DIRECTED to determine the existence or non-existence of probable
cause for the arrest of the petitioner based on the complete records.
LIZA L. MAZA et. al PETITIONERS, VS. HON. EVELYN A. TURLA, IN HER
CAPACITY AS PRESIDING JUDGE OF REGIONAL TRIAL COURT OF PALAYAN
CITY, RESPONDENTS.
G.R. No. 187094 | 2017-02-15

FACTS:
 Petitioners Liza L. Maza, Saturnino C. Ocampo, Teodoro A. Casiño, and Rafael V.
Mariano (petitioners) are former members of the House of Representatives.
 In three letters[6] all dated December 14, 2006, Police Senior Inspector Arnold M. Palomo
(Inspector Palomo), Deputy Provincial Chief of the Nueva Ecija Criminal Investigation
and Detection Team, referred to the Provincial Prosecutor of Cabanatuan City, Nueva
Ecija, three (3) cases of murder against petitioners and 15 other persons. Inspector
Palomo named 19 individuals, including Petitioners, who were allegedly responsible for
the death of Carlito Bayudang, Jimmy Peralta, and Danilo Felipe.
 The panel of prosecutors issued on April 11, 2008 a Joint Resolution, [24] reviewed and
approved by Officer-in-charge Provincial Prosecutor Floro F. Florendo (Prosecutor
Florendo). The panel found probable cause for murder in the killing of Carlito Bayudang
and Jimmy Peralta, and for kidnapping with murder in the killing of Danilo Felipe,
against the nineteen 19 suspects. Two (2) Informations[26] for murder were filed before
the Regional Trial Court of Palayan City, Branch 40 in Nueva Ecija, (Palayan cases) and
an Information[27] for kidnapping with murder was filed in Guimba, Nueva Ecija (Guimba
case).
 On April 21, 2008, petitioners also filed a Motion for Judicial Determination of Probable
Cause with Prayer to Dismiss the Case Outright [31] on the Palayan cases. They requested
the court to move forward with the presented evidence and decide if there were probable
cause and, consequently, dismiss the case outright if there were none.
 Judge Turla held that "the proper procedure in the conduct of the preliminary
investigation was not followed in [the Palayan] cases and remanded the case to the
prosecutors. Hence, this petition.
 Petitioners claim that Judge Turla's order of remanding the case back to the prosecutors
had no basis in law, jurisprudence, or the rules. Since she had already evaluated the
evidence submitted by the prosecutors along with the Informations, she should have
determined the existence of probable cause for the issuance of arrest warrants or the
dismissal of the Palayan cases. If she finds the evidence inadequate, she may order the
prosecutors to present additional evidence.
 On the allegation that Judge Turla reneged on her constitutional duty to determine
robable cause, respondents counter that she did not abandon her mandate. [60] Her act of
remanding the cases to the public prosecutors "is a confirmation of her observance of the
well-settled principle that such determination of probable cause is an exclusive executive
function of the prosecutorial arm of our government.

ISSUE: Whether respondent Judge Turla gravely abused her discretion when she remanded the
Palayan cases to the Provincial Prosecutor for the conduct of preliminary investigation

HELD: YES, the remand is improper.

 The determination of probable cause for filing an information in court and that for
issuance of an arrest warrant are different. Once the information is filed in court, the trial
court acquires jurisdiction and "any disposition of the case as to its dismissal or the
conviction or acquittal of the accused rests in the sound discretion of the Court.
 Thus, when Judge Turla held that the prosecutors' conduct of preliminary investigation
was "incomplete"[79] and that their determination of probable cause "has not measured up
to [the] standard,"[80] she encroached upon the exclusive function of the prosecutors.
Instead of determining probable cause, she ruled on the propriety of the preliminary
investigation.
 Regardless of Judge Turla's assessment on the conduct of the preliminary investigation, it
was incumbent upon her to determine the existence of probable cause against the accused
after a personal evaluation of the prosecutors' report and the supporting documents. She
could even disregard the report if she found it unsatisfactory, and/or require the
prosecutors to submit additional evidence. There was no option for her to remand the
case back to the panel of prosecutors for another preliminary investigation. In doing so,
she acted without any legal basis.
 [T]he task of the presiding judge when the Information is filed with the court is first and
foremost to determine the existence or non-existence of probable cause for the arrest of
the accused. What the Constitution underscores is the exclusive and personal
responsibility of the issuing judge to satisfy himself of the existence of probable cause.
But the judge is not required to personally examine the complainant and his witnesses.
Following established doctrine and procedure, he shall (1) personally evaluate the report
and the supporting documents submitted by the prosecutor regarding the existence of
probable cause, and on the basis thereof, he may already make a personal determination
of the existence of probable cause; and (2) if he is not satisfied that probable cause exists,
he may disregard the prosecutor's report and require the submission of supporting
affidavits of witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion as to the existence of
probable cause.
Allado vs. Diokno (1994)
G.R. No. 113630 | 1994-05-05

FACTS:
 Petitioners Diosdado Jose Allado and Roberto L. Mendoza, alumni of the UP College of
Law, are partners of the Law Firm of Salonga, Hernandez and Allado. In the practice of
their profession, and on the basis of an alleged extrajudicial confession of a security
guard, they have been accused of the heinous crime of kidnapping with murder by the
Presidential Anti-Crime Commission (PACC) and ordered arrested without bail by
respondent RTC Judge Diokno.
 Security Guard Escolastico Umbal, a dischargee of the Philippine Constabulary, executed
an extrajudicial sworn statement implicating petitioners as the brains behind the
kidnapping and slaying of Eugen Alexander Van Twest, a German national. Umbal
claimed that he and his companions were met by petitioners at Silahis Hotel and in
exchange for P2.5M the former undertook to apprehend Van Twest who allegedly had an
international warrant of arrest against him.
 Thus, on 16 June 1992, Umbal and companions abducted Van Twest. They blocked his
blue Nissan Pathfinder, forced him into the car, and brought him to a "safe house". After
four (4) days, the abductors returned to the "safe house" together with petitioners. SPO2
Bato faked the interrogation of Van Twest, pretending it was official, and then made him
sign certain documents (authorizing transfer of several properties and withdrawal of P5M
in bank deposit). The following day, Gamatero shot Van Twest in the chest with a baby
armalite, after which Antonio stabbed him repeatedly, cut off his private part, and later
burned his cadaver into fine ashes using gasoline and rubber tires.
 A day after Umbal executed his extrajudicial confession, the operatives of the PACC,
armed with a search warrant, separately raided the two (2) dwellings of Santiago (one of
the abductors). The raiders recovered a blue Nissan Pathfinder and assorted firearms and
ammunition and placed Santiago and his trusted aide, Efren Madolid, under arrest. Also
arrested later that day were Antonino and Bato who where found to have in their
possession several firearms and ammunition and Van Twest's Cartier sunglasses.
 Sr. Supt. Panfilo Lacson, Chief of PACC Task Force Habagat, referred the case to the
Department of Justice (DOJ) for the institution of criminal proceedings. A subpoena was
issued to petitioners informing them that a complaint was filed against them and directing
them to appear before the DOJ. A panel of prosecutors was formed to conduct the
preliminary investigation. The panel issued a resolution finding a prima facie case against
the petitioners. An information for kidnapping with murder was filed in the RTC Makati
presided by respondent Judge Diokno.
 Petitioners filed an appeal with the Secretary of Justice seeking review of the resolution
on the panel of prosecutors. They moved to defer the proceedings before the trial court
pending resolution of the appeal before the Secretary of Justice. However, Judge Diokno
issued the assailed warrant of arrest against petitioners. Hence, this petition.
 Petitioners contend that Judge Diokno acted with grave abuse of discretion and in excess
of jurisdiction in "whimsically holding that there is probable cause against petitioners
without determining the admissibility of the evidence against petitioners and without
even stating the basis of his findings," and in "relying on the Resolution of the Panel and
their certification that probable cause exists when the certification is flawed."
ISSUE: W/N there is probable cause which led to the issuance of the alleged warrant of arrest.

HELD: NONE.
 The Presidential Anti-Crime Commission relies heavily on the sworn statement of
Security Guard Umbal who supposedly confessed his participation in the alleged
kidnapping and murder of Van Twest. For one, there is serious doubt on Van Twest's
reported death since the corpus delicti has not been established, nor have his remains
been recovered. Umbal claims that Van Twest was completely burned into ashes with the
use of gasoline and rubber tires from around ten o'clock in the evening to six o'clock the
next [Link] is highly improbable, if not ridiculous. A human body cannot be
pulverized into ashes by simply burning it with the use of gasoline and rubber tires in an
open field. Even crematoria use entirely closed incinerators where the corpse is subjected
to intense heat. Thereafter, the remains undergo a process where the bones are completely
ground to dust.
 In the case of Van Twest, there is not even any insinuation that earnest efforts were
exerted to recover traces of his remains from the scene of the alleged cremation. In fact,
after Van Twest's reported abduction on 16 June 1992, his counsel continued to represent
him before judicial and quasi-judicial proceedings. Under the circumstances, we cannot
discount petitioners' theory that the supposed death of Van Twest who is reportedly an
international fugitive from justice is a likely story to stop the international manhunt for
his arrest. In U.S. v. Samarin, this Court ruled that when the supposed victim is wholly
unknown, his body not found, and there is but one witness who testifies to the killing, the
corpus delicti is not sufficiently proved.
 The credibility of Umbal is badly battered. Certainly, his bare allegations are insufficient
to justify sending two lawyers to jail, or anybody for that matter. More importantly, the
PACC operatives who applied for a warrant to search the dwellings of Santiago never
implicated petitioners. In fact they claimed that according to Umbal, it was Santiago, and
not petitioners, who masterminded the whole affair. While there may be bits of evidence
against petitioners' co-accused, i.e., referring to those seized from the dwellings of
Santiago, these do not in the least prove petitioners' complicity in the crime charged.
Based on the evidence thus far submitted there is nothing indeed, much less is there
probable cause, to incriminate petitioners.
 Probable cause for an arrest or for the issuance of a warrant of arrest has been defined as
such facts and circumstances which would lead a reasonably discreet and prudent man to
believe that an offense has been committed by the person sought to be arrested. And as a
protection against false prosecution and arrest, it is the knowledge of facts, actual or
apparent, strong enough to justify a reasonable man in the belief that he has lawful
grounds for arresting the accused.
 Probable cause is a reasonable ground of presumption that a matter is, or may be, well
founded, such a state of facts in the mind of the prosecutor as would lead a person of
ordinary caution and prudence to believe, or entertain an honest or strong suspicion, that
a thing is so. The term does not mean "actual and positive cause" nor does it import
absolute certainty. It is merely based on opinion and reasonable belief. Thus, a finding of
probable cause does not require an inquiry into whether there is sufficient evidence to
procure a conviction. It is enough that it is believed that the act or omission complained
of constitutes the offense charged. Precisely, there is a trial for the reception of evidence
of the prosecution in support of the charge.
 Judge Diokno committed grave abuse of discretion in issuing the warrant for the arrest of
petitioners it appearing that he did not personally examine the evidence nor did he call for
the complainant and his witnesses in the face of their incredible accounts. Instead,
he merely relied on the certification of the prosecutors that probable cause existed. For,
otherwise, he would have found out that the evidence thus far presented was utterly
insufficient to warrant the arrest of petitioners.
 The judge (a) shall personally evaluate the report and the supporting documents
submitted by the fiscal regarding the existence of probable cause and, on the basis
thereof, issue a warrant of arrest; or, (b) if on the basis thereof he finds no probable cause,
may disregard the fiscal's report and require the submission of supporting affidavits of
witnesses to aid him in arriving at a conclusion on the existence of probable cause.
 The preliminary inquiry made by a prosecutor does not bind the judge. It merely assists
him in making the determination of probable cause. The judge does not have to follow
what the prosecutor presents to him. By itself, the prosecutor's certification of probable
cause is ineffectual. It is the report, the affidavits, the transcript of stenographic notes (if
any), and all other supporting documents behind the prosecutor's certification which are
material in assisting the judge in his determination of probable cause.
 Judges and prosecutors alike should distinguish the preliminary inquiry which determines
probable cause for the issuance of a warrant of arrest from the preliminary investigation
proper which ascertains whether the offender should be held for trial or released. Even if
the two inquiries be conducted in the course of one and the same proceeding, there should
be no confusion about their objectives. The determination of probable cause for the
warrant is made by the judge. The preliminary investigation proper ---- whether or not
there is reasonable ground to believe that the accused is guilty of the offense charged and
therefore, whether or not he should be subjected to the expense, rigors and
embarrassment of trial ---- is a function of the prosecutor.
 Clearly, probable cause may not be established simply by showing that a trial judge
subjectively believes that he has good grounds for his action. Good faith is not enough. If
subjective good faith alone were the test, the constitutional protection would be
demeaned and the people would be "secure in their persons, houses, papers and effects"
only in the fallible discretion of the judge. On the contrary, the probable cause test is an
objective one, for in order that there be probable cause the facts and circumstances must
be such as would warrant a belief by a reasonably discreet and prudent man that the
accused is guilty of the crime which has just been committed. This, as we said, is the
standard. Hence, if upon the filing of the information in court the trial judge, after
reviewing the information and the documents attached thereto, finds that no probable
cause exists must either call for the complainant and the witnesses themselves or simply
dismiss the case. There is no reason to hold the accused for trial and further expose him
to an open and public accusation of the crime when no probable cause exists.
 The right of the State to prosecute is not a carte blanche for government agents to defy
and disregard the rights of its citizens under the Constitution. Confinement, regardless of
duration, is too high a price to pay for reckless and impulsive prosecution. Hence, even if
we apply in this case the "multifactor balancing test" which requires the officer to weigh
the manner and intensity of the interference on the right of the people, the gravity of the
crime committed and the circumstances attending the incident, still we cannot see
probable cause to order the detention of petitioners.