Congressional Oversight Manual
Congressional Oversight Manual
Frederick M. Kaiser
Specialist in American National Government
Walter J. Oleszek
Senior Specialist in American National Government
Todd B. Tatelman
Legislative Attorney
January 6, 2011
Summary
The Congressional Research Service (CRS) developed the Congressional Oversight Manual over
30 years ago, following a three-day December 1978 Workshop on Congressional Oversight and
Investigations. The workshop was organized by a group of House and Senate committee aides
from both parties and CRS at the request of the bipartisan House leadership. The Manual was
produced by CRS with the assistance of a number of House committee staffers. In subsequent
years, CRS has sponsored and conducted various oversight seminars for House and Senate staff
and updated the Manual as circumstances warranted. The last revision occurred in 2007. Worth
noting is the bipartisan recommendation of the House members of the 1993 Joint Committee on
the Organization of Congress (Rept. No. 103-413, Vol. I):
[A]s a way to further enhance the oversight work of Congress, the Joint Committee would
encourage the Congressional Research Service to conduct on a regular basis, as it has done in
the past, oversight seminars for Members and congressional staff and to update on a regular
basis its Congressional Oversight Manual.
Over the years, CRS has assisted many Members, committees, party leaders, and staff aides in the
performance of the oversight function, that is, the review, monitoring, and supervision of the
implementation of public policy. Understandably, given the size, reach, cost, and continuing
growth of the modern executive establishment, Congress’s oversight role is even more
significant—and more demanding—than when Woodrow Wilson wrote in his classic
Congressional Government (1885): “Quite as important as lawmaking is vigilant oversight of
administration.” Today’s lawmakers and congressional aides, as well as commentators and
scholars, recognize that Congress’s work, ideally, should not end when it passes legislation.
Oversight is an integral way to make sure that the laws work and are being administered in an
effective, efficient, and economical manner. In light of this destination, oversight can be viewed
as one of Congress’s principal responsibilities as it grapples with the complexities of the 21st
century.
Contents
Purposes, Authority, and Participants...........................................................................................1
Purposes ...............................................................................................................................1
Ensure Executive Compliance with Legislative Intent .....................................................1
Improve the Efficiency, Effectiveness, and Economy of Governmental Operations ..........1
Evaluate Program Performance .......................................................................................2
Prevent Executive Encroachment on Legislative Prerogatives and Powers.......................2
Investigate Alleged Instances of Poor Administration, Arbitrary and Capricious
Behavior, Abuse, Waste, Dishonesty, and Fraud............................................................2
Assess Agency or Officials’ Ability to Manage and Carry out Program Objectives...........2
Review and Determine Federal Financial Priorities .........................................................2
Ensure That Executive Policies Reflect the Public Interest...............................................3
Protect Individual Rights and Liberties............................................................................3
Other Specific Purposes ..................................................................................................3
Authority to Conduct Oversight ............................................................................................4
United States Constitution...............................................................................................4
Principal Statutory Authority...........................................................................................5
Responsibilities in House and Senate Rules................................................................... 10
Congressional Participants in Oversight .............................................................................. 13
Members and Committees............................................................................................. 13
Staff of Member Offices and Committees...................................................................... 14
Congressional Support Agencies and Offices................................................................. 14
Oversight Coordination and Processes....................................................................................... 15
Oversight Coordination ....................................................................................................... 15
General Techniques of Ensuring Oversight Coordination Include .................................. 15
Specific Means of Ensuring Oversight Coordination Include ......................................... 16
Oversight Processes ............................................................................................................ 16
The Budget Process....................................................................................................... 16
The Authorization Process............................................................................................. 17
The Appropriations Process........................................................................................... 18
The Investigatory Process ............................................................................................. 19
The Confirmation Process ............................................................................................. 20
The Impeachment Process............................................................................................. 21
Investigative Oversight ............................................................................................................. 23
Constitutional Authority to Perform Oversight and Investigative Inquiries........................... 23
Authority of Congressional Committees .............................................................................. 24
Committee Jurisdiction ................................................................................................. 24
Legislative Purpose....................................................................................................... 25
Legal Tools Available for Oversight and Investigations........................................................ 27
Subpoena Power ........................................................................................................... 28
Deposition Authority..................................................................................................... 29
Hearings ....................................................................................................................... 30
Congressional Immunity ............................................................................................... 31
Enforcement of Congressional Authority............................................................................. 32
Contempt of Congress................................................................................................... 32
Perjury and False Statement Prosecutions...................................................................... 34
Limitations on Congressional Authority .............................................................................. 35
Tables
Table 1. Special Investigative Authorities of Selected Investigating Committees........................ 74
Appendixes
Appendix A. Illustrative Subpoena .......................................................................................... 135
Appendix B. Examples of White House Response to Congressional Requests ......................... 143
Appendix C. Selected Readings............................................................................................... 147
Appendix D. Other Resources ................................................................................................. 161
Contacts
Author Contact Information .................................................................................................... 162
Acknowledgments .................................................................................................................. 162
Despite its lengthy heritage, oversight was not given explicit recognition in public law until
enactment of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946. That act required House and Senate
standing committees to exercise “continuous watchfulness” over programs and agencies within
their jurisdiction.
Since the late 1960s, according to such scholars as political scientist Joel Aberbach, Congress has
shown increasing interest in oversight for several major reasons. These include the expansion in
number and complexity of federal programs and agencies; increase in expenditures and
personnel, including contract employees; the rise of the budget deficit; and the frequency of
divided government, with Congress and the White House controlled by different parties. Major
partisan disagreements over priorities and processes also heighten conflict between the legislature
and the executive.
Oversight occurs in virtually any congressional activity and through a wide variety of channels,
organizations, and structures. These range from formal committee hearings to informal Member
contacts with executive officials, from staff studies to support agency reviews, and from casework
conducted by Member offices to studies prepared by non-congressional entities, such as statutory
commissions and offices of inspector general.
Purposes
Congressional oversight of the Executive is designed to fulfill a number of purposes:
operations and service delivery. Such steps can improve the accountability of agency managers to
Congress and enhance program performance.
1. 1912 Anti-Gag Legislation and Whistleblower Protection Laws for Federal Employees.
a. The 1912 act countered executive orders, issued by Presidents Theodore Roosevelt and
William Howard Taft, which prohibited civil service employees from communicating
directly with Congress.
b. It also guaranteed that “the right of any persons employed in the civil service . . . to
petition Congress, or any Member thereof, or to furnish information to either House of
Congress, or to any committee or member thereof, shall not be denied or interfered
with.” 37 Stat. 555 (1912), codified at 5 U.S.C. § 7211 (2006).
e. Section 714 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, P.L. 111-117, 123 Stat. 3034
(2010), prohibits the payment of the salary of any officer or employee of the Federal
Government who prohibits or prevents or attempts or threatens to prohibit or prevent,
any other Federal officer or employee from having direct oral or written communication
or contact with any Member, committee or subcommittee. This prohibition applies
irrespective of whether such communication was initiated by such officer or employee
or in response to the request or inquiry of such Member, committee or subcommittee.
Further, any punishment or threat of punishment because of any contact or
communication by an officer or employee with a Member, committee, or subcommittee
is prohibited under the provisions of this act.
f. Section 716 of the Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2010, P.L. 111-117, 123 Stat. 3034
(2010), prohibits the expenditure of any appropriated funds for use in implementing or
enforcing agreement in Standard Forms 312 and 4414 of the Government or any other
non-disclosure policy form, or agreement if such policy, form, or agreement that does
not contain a provision that states that the restrictions are consistent with and do not
supercede, conflict with, or otherwise alter the employee obligation, rights and liabilities
created by E.O. 12958; 5 U.S.C. § 7211 (Lloyd-LaFollette Act); 10 U.S.C. § 1034
(Military Whistleblower Act); 5 U.S.C. § 2303 (b)(8) (Whistleblower Protection Act); 50
U.S.C. § 421 et seq. (Intelligence Identities Protection Act); and 18 U.S.C. §§ 641, 793,
794, 798, and 952 and 50 U.S.C. § (783)(b).
2. 1921 Budget and Accounting Act Establishing the General Accounting Office (GAO),
renamed the Government Accountability Office in 2004.
a. Insisted that GAO “shall be independent of the executive departments and under the
control and direction of the Comptroller General of the United States.” 42 Stat. 23
(1921) (emphasis added); and
b. Authorized for the first time in history, permanent professional and clerical staff for
committees. 60 Stat. 832 (1946) (emphasis added);
a. Required that House and Senate committees having jurisdiction over grants-in-aid
conduct studies of the programs under which grants-in-aid are made. 82 Stat. 1098
(1968); and
b. Provided that studies of these programs are to determine whether: (1) their purposes
have been met, (2) their objectives could be carried on without further assistance, (3)
they are adequate to meet needs, and (4) any changes in programs or procedures should
be made. 82 Stat. 1098 (1968).
a. Revised and rephrased in more explicit language the oversight function of House and
Senate standing committees: “. . . each standing committee shall review and study, on a
continuing basis, the application, administration, and execution of those laws or parts of
laws, the subject matter of which is within the jurisdiction of that committee.” 84 Stat.
1156 (1970) (emphasis added);
b. Required most House and Senate committees to issue biennial oversight reports. 84 Stat.
1156 (1970) (emphasis added);
c. Strengthened the program evaluation responsibilities and other authorities and duties of
the Government Accountability Office. 84 Stat. 1168-1171 (1970) (emphasis added);
e. Recommended that House and Senate committees ascertain whether programs within
their jurisdiction could be appropriated for annually. 84 Stat. 1174-1175 (1970)
(emphasis added);
f. Required most House and Senate committees to include in their committee reports on
legislation five-year cost estimates for carrying out the proposed program. 84 Stat. 1173-
1174 (1970) (emphasis added); and
g. Increased by two the number of permanent staff for each standing committee, including
provision for minority party hirings, and provided for hiring of consultants by standing
committees. 84 Stat. 1175-1179 (1970) (emphasis added).
a. Directed House and Senate committees to make a continuing review of the activities of
each advisory committee under its jurisdiction. 86 Stat. 771 (1972) (emphasis added);
and
b. The studies are to determine whether: (1) such committee should be abolished or merged
with any other advisory committee, (2) its responsibility should be revised, and (3) it
performs a necessary function not already being performed. 86 Stat. 771 (1972)
(advisory committee charters and reports can generally be obtained from the agency or
government organization being advised).
a. Expanded House and Senate committee authority for oversight. Permitted committees to
appraise and evaluate programs themselves “or by contract, or (to) require a
Government agency to do so and furnish a report thereon to the Congress.” 88 Stat. 325
(1974);
b. Directed the Comptroller General to “review and evaluate the results of Government
programs and activities,” on his own initiative, or at the request of either House or any
standing or joint committee and to assist committees in analyzing and assessing program
reviews or evaluation studies. (Emphasis added.) Authorized GAO to establish an Office
of Program Review and Evaluation to carry out these responsibilities. 88 Stat. 326
(1974) (emphasis added);
d. Required any House or Senate legislative committee report on a public bill or resolution
to include an analysis (prepared by the Congressional Budget Office) providing an
estimate and comparison of costs which would be incurred in carrying out the bill during
the next and following four fiscal years in which it would be effective. 88 Stat. 320
(1974) (emphasis added); and
e. Established House and Senate Budget Committees and the Congressional Budget Office.
The CBO director is authorized to “secure information, data, estimates, and statistics
directly from the various departments, agencies, and establishments” of the government.
88 Stat. 302 (1974) (emphasis added).
Separate from expanding its own authority and resources directly, Congress has
strengthened its oversight capabilities indirectly, by, for instance, establishing study
commissions to review and evaluate programs, policies, and operations of the government.
In addition, Congress has created various mechanisms, structures, and procedures within
the executive that improve the executive’s ability to monitor and control its own operations
and, at the same time, provide additional information and oversight-related analyses to
Congress. These statutory provisions include:
a. Establishing offices of inspector general in all cabinet departments, larger agencies and
numerous boards, commissions, and government corporations—Inspector General Act
of 1978, as amended, 5 U.S.C. Appendix 3;
b. Establishing chief financial officers in all cabinet departments and larger agencies—
Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, 107 Stat. 2838 (1990);
d. Improving the efficiency, effectiveness, and equity in the exchange of funds between the
federal government and state governments—Cash Management Improvement Act of
1990, 104 Stat. 1058 (1990);
i. Establishing uniform audit requirements for state and local governments and nonprofit
organizations receiving federal financial assistance—Single Audit Act of 1984, as
amended, 98 Stat. 2327 (1984) and 110 Stat. 679 (1996);
j. Creating a mechanism, the Congressional Review Act by which Congress can review and
disapprove virtually any federal rule or regulation—Small Business Regulatory
Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996, 110 Stat. 857-874 (1996), codified at 5 U.S.C. §§
801-808 (2006); and
k. Enacting other laws to assist the House and Senate in their reviews of various programs.
For example, the Economic Stabiization Act of 2008 (P.L. 110-343) permits the
Secretary of the Treasury to purchase and insure “troubled assets” to help promote the
strength of the economy and financial system. The act established two organizations to
provide broad oversight of the program—a Financial Stability Oversight Board and a
Congressional Oversight Panel. The act also placed audit responsibilites for the program
with two individuals—a new Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief
Program, and the Comptroller General of the United States, who heads the Government
Accountability Office (GAO).
b. The Committee on Oversight and Government Reform has additional oversight duties
to:
(1) review and study on a continuing basis, the operation of government activities at all
levels to determine their economy and efficiency (Rule X, clause 3);
(2) receive and examine reports of the Comptroller General and submit
recommendations thereon to the House (Rule X, clause 4);
(3) evaluate the effects of laws enacted to reorganize the legislative and executive
branches of the government (Rule X, clause 4);
(4) study intergovernmental relationships between the United States and states,
municipalities, and international organizations of which the United States is a
member (Rule X, clause 4); and
(5) report an oversight agenda, not later than March 31 of the first session of a
Congress, based upon oversight plans submitted by each standing committee and
after consultation with the Speaker of the House, the majority leader, and the
minority leader. The oversight agenda is to include the oversight plans of each
standing committee together with any recommendations that it or the House
leadership group may make to ensure the most effective coordination of such plans
(Rule X, clause 2).
c. House rules mandate or provide authority for other oversight efforts by standing
committees:
(1) Each standing committee (except Appropriations and Budget) shall review and study
on a continuing basis the application, administration, and execution of all laws
within its legislative jurisdiction (Rule X, clause 2).
(2) Committees have the authority to review the impact of tax policies on matters that
fall within their jurisdiction (Rule X, clause 2).
(3) Each committee (except Appropriations and Budget) has a responsibility for futures
research and forecasting (Rule X, clause 2).
(4) Specified committees have special oversight authority (i.e., the right to conduct
comprehensive reviews of specific subject areas that are within the legislative
jurisdiction of other committees). Special oversight is akin to the broad oversight
authority granted the Committee on Government Reform, by the 1946 Legislature
Reorganization Act, except that special oversight is generally limited to named
subjects (Rule X, clause 3).
(5) Each standing committee having more than 20 members shall establish an oversight
subcommittee, or require its subcommittees, if any, to conduct oversight in their
jurisdictional areas; a committee that establishes such a subcommittee may add it as
a sixth subcommittee, beyond the usual limit of five (Rule X, clauses 2 and 5).
(6) Committee reports on measures are to include oversight findings separately set out
and clearly identified (Rule XIII, clause 3).
(7) Costs of stenographic services and transcripts for oversight hearings are to be paid
“from the applicable accounts of the House” (Rule XI, clause 1).
(8) Each standing committee is to submit its oversight plans for the duration of a
Congress by February 15 of the first session to the Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform and the Committee on House Administration. Not later than
March 31, the Oversight and Oversight and Government Reform Committee must
report an oversight agenda (discussed above). In developing such plans, each
standing committee must, to the extent feasible (Rule X, clause 2):
(a) consult with other committees of the House that have jurisdiction over the same
or related laws, programs, or agencies within its jurisdiction, with the objective
of ensuring that such laws, programs, or agencies are reviewed in the same
Congress and that there is a maximum of coordination between such committees
in the conduct of such reviews; and such plans shall include an explanation of
what steps have been and will be taken to ensure such coordination and
cooperation;
(b) give priority consideration to including in its plans the review of those laws,
programs, or agencies operating under permanent budget authority or permanent
statutory authority; and
(c) have a view toward ensuring that all significant laws, programs, or agencies
within its jurisdiction are subject to review at least once every 10 years.
(9) Each committee must submit to the House, not later than January 2 of each odd-
numbered year, a report on the activities of that committee for the Congress (Rule
XI, clause 1):
(a) Such report must include separate sections summarizing the legislative and
oversight activities of that committee during that Congress.
(b) The oversight section of such report must include a summary of the oversight
plans submitted by the committee at the beginning of the Congress, a summary
of the actions taken and recommendations made with respect to each such plan,
(10) Soon after the 111th Congress convened, the House, on January 14, 2009, amended its
rules “to require each standing committee to hold at least three hearings per year on
waste, fraud, and abuse under each respective committee’s jurisdiction.” House
committees were obligated to hold a hearing if “an agency’s financial statements are
not in order” and if a program under a committee’s jurisdiction is “deemed by GAO
[Government Accountability Office] to be at high risk for waste, fraud, and abuse.”
d. The Speaker, with the approval of the House, is given additional authority to “appoint
special ad hoc oversight committees for the purpose or reviewing specific matters within
the jurisdiction of two or more standing committees.” (Rule X, clause 2) (emphasis
added).
2. Senate Rules
a. Each standing committee (except for Appropriations and Budget) must review and study
on a continuing basis, the application, administration, and execution of all laws within
its legislative jurisdiction (Rule XXVI, clause 8).
(2) a determination of the measure’s economic impact and effect on personal privacy;
and
d. The Committee on Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs has the following
additional oversight duties (Rule XXV, clause 1k):
(1) review and study on a continuing basis the operation of government activities at all
levels to determine their economy and efficiency;
(2) receive and examine reports of the Comptroller General and submit
recommendations thereon to the Senate;
(3) evaluate the effects of laws enacted to reorganize the legislative and executive
branches of the government; and
(4) study intergovernmental relationships between the United States and states,
municipalities, and international organizations of which the United States is a
member.
(5) On March 1, 1948 (during the 80th Congress), the Senate adopted S. Res. 189, which
established the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations of the then titled
Committee on Government Operations. The Subcommittee was an outgrowth of the
famous 1941 Truman Committee (after Senator Harry Truman) which investigated
fraud and mismanagement of the nation’s war program. The Truman Committee
ended in 1948, but the chairman of the Government Operations Committee made the
functions of the Truman panel one of his subcommittees: the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations. Since then this subcommittee has investigated
scores of issues, such as government waste, fraud, and inefficiency.
(b) Sometimes individual Members will conduct their own investigations or ad hoc
hearings, or direct their staffs to conduct oversight studies. Individual Members have
no authority to issue compulsory process or conduct official hearings. The Government
Accountability Office or some other legislative branch agency, a specially created task
force, or private research group might be requested to conduct an investigation of a
matter for a Senator or Representative.
2. Committees. The most common and effective method of conducting oversight is through
the committee structure. Throughout their histories, the House and Senate have used their
standing committees as well as select or special committees to investigate federal activities
and agencies along with other matters.
(a) The House Committee on Government Reform and the Senate Committee on Homeland
Security and Governmental Affairs, which have oversight jurisdiction over virtually the
entire federal government, have been vested with broad investigatory powers over
government-wide activities.
(b) The House and Senate Committees on Appropriations have similar responsibilities
when reviewing fiscal activities.
(d) Certain House and Senate committees have “special oversight” or “comprehensive
policy oversight” of designated subject areas as explained in the previous subsection.
(a) Casework can be an important vehicle for pursuing both the oversight and legislative
interests of the Member. The Senator or Representative and the staff may be attuned to
the relationship between casework and the oversight function. This is facilitated by a
regular exchange of ideas among the Member, legislative aides, and caseworkers on
problems brought to the office’s attention by constituents, and of possible legislative
initiatives to resolve those problems.
(c) Office procedures enable staff in some offices to identify cases that represent a situation
in which formal changes in agency procedure could be an appropriate remedy. Prompt
congressional inquiry and follow up enhance this type of oversight. Telephone inquiries
reinforced with written requests tend to ensure agency attention.
2. Committee Staff. As issues become more complex and Members’ staffs more overworked,
professional staffs of committees can provide the expert help required to conduct oversight
and investigations. Committee staff typically have the experience and expertise to conduct
effective oversight for the committees and subcommittees they serve. Committees may
also call upon legislative support agencies for assistance, hire consultants, or “borrow”
staff from federal departments.
Committee staff, in summary, occupy a central position in the conduct of oversight. The
informal contacts with executive officials at all levels constitute one of Congress’s most
effective devices for performing its “continuous watchfulness” function.
(c) Government Accountability Office (GAO), formerly the General Accounting Office.
Intercommittee cooperation on oversight can prove beneficial for a variety of reasons. It should,
for example, minimize unnecessary duplication and conflict and inhibit agencies from playing
one committee off against another. There are formal and informal ways to achieve oversight
coordination among committees.
Oversight Coordination
2. House rules require the findings and recommendations of the Committee on Government
Reform to be considered by the authorizing committees if presented to them in a timely
fashion. Such findings and recommendations are to be published in the authorizing
committees’ reports on legislation. House rules also require the oversight plans of
committees to include ways to maximize coordination between and among committees that
share jurisdiction over related laws, programs, or agencies.
2. Informal agreement among committees to oversee certain agencies and not others. For
example, the House and Senate Committees on Commerce agreed to hold oversight
hearings on certain regulatory agencies in alternate years.
3. Consultation between the authorizing and appropriating committees. The two Committees
on Commerce have worked closely and successfully with their corresponding
appropriations subcommittees to alert those panels to the authorizing committees’ intent
with respect to regulatory ratemaking by such agencies as the Federal Communications
Commission.
Oversight Processes
(4) ensure that revenue, spending, and debt legislation are consistent with the overall
budget policy.
2. The new budget process coexists with the established authorization and appropriation
procedures and significantly affects each.
a. On the authorization side, the Budget Act requires committees to submit their budgetary
“views and estimates” for matters under their jurisdiction to their Committee on the
Budget within six weeks after the President submits a budget.
b. On the appropriations side, new contract and borrowing authority must go through the
appropriations process. Subcommittees of the Appropriations Committees are assigned a
financial allocation that determines how much may be included in the measures they
report, although less than one-third of federal spending is subject to the annual
appropriations process. (The tax and appropriations panels of each house also submit
budgetary views and estimates to their respective Committee on the Budget.)
c. In deciding spending, revenue, credit, and debt issues, Congress is sensitive to trends in
the overall composition of the annual federal budget (expenditures for defense,
entitlements, interest on the debt, and domestic discretionary programs).
3. In short, the Budget Act has the potential of strengthening oversight by enabling Congress
better to relate program priorities to financial claims on the national budget. Each
committee, knowing that it will receive a fixed amount of the total to be included in a
budget resolution, has an incentive to scrutinize existing programs to make room for new
programs or expanded funding of ongoing projects or to assess whether programs have
outlived their usefulness.
2. The entire authorization process may involve a host of oversight tools—hearings, studies,
and reports—but the key to the process is the authorization statute.
a. An authorization statute creates and shapes government programs and agencies and it
contains the statement of legislative policy for the agency.
b. Authorization is the first lever in congressional exercise of the power of the purse; it
usually allows an agency to be funded, but it does not guarantee financing of agencies
and programs. Frequently, authorizations establish dollar ceilings on the amounts that
can be appropriated.
a. Through this process, Members are educated about the work of an agency and given an
opportunity to direct the agency’s effort in light of experience.
(1) In recent decades, there has been a mix of permanent and periodic (annual or multi-
year) authorizations, although reformers at time press for biennial budgeting (acting
on a two-year cycle for authorizations, appropriations, and budget resolutions).
(2) Periodic authorizations improve the likelihood that an agency will be scrutinized
systematically.
a. Knowledge by an agency that it must come to the legislative committee for renewed
authority increases the influence of the committee.
5. If agencies fail to comply with these informal directives, the authorization committees can
apply sanctions or move to convert the informal directive to a statutory command.
a. Its strategic position stems from the constitutional requirement that “no Money shall be
drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law.”
b. Congress’s power of the purse allows the House and Senate Committees on
Appropriations to play a prominent role in oversight.
a. The decisions of the committees are conditioned on their assessment of the agencies’
need for their budget request as indicated by past performance.
b. In practice, the entire record of an agency is fair game for the required assessment.
c. This comprehensive overview and the “carrot and stick” of the appropriations
recommendations make the committees significant focal points of congressional
oversight and is a key source of their power in Congress and in the federal government
generally.
a. Such legislation specifies the purpose for which funds may be used.
b. It defines the specified funding level for the agency as a whole as well as for programs
and divisions within the agency.
e. Appropriations measures and committee reports also stipulate how an agency’s budget
can be reprogrammed (shifting funds within an appropriations account; see box below).
The conference report for the Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental Appropriations for FY1999
provides guidelines for the reprogramming and transfer of funds for the Treasury and General Government
Appropriations Act, 1999. Each request from an agency to the review committee “shall include a declaration that, as
of the date of the request, none of the funds included in the request have been obligated, and none will be obligated,
until the Committees on Appropriations have approved the request.” H.Rept. 105-825, p. 1472 (1998).
a. Numerous Supreme Court decisions have upheld the legislative branch’s right of inquiry,
provided it stays within its legitimate legislative sphere.
b. The roots of Congress’s authority to conduct investigations extend back to the British
Parliament and colonial assemblies.
d. From time to time, legal questions have been raised about the investigative authority of
Congress. However, numerous Supreme Court decisions have upheld the legislative
branch’s right of inquiry, provided it serves a legitimate legislative interest.
a. individual Members;
b. they secure information that assists Congress in making informed policy judgments; and
c. they may aid in informing the public about the administration of laws.
1. The Constitution provides that the President “shall nominate, and by and with the Advice
and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls,
Judges of the supreme court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose
Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by
Law.” (Emphasis added.)
2. The confirmation hearing provides a forum for the discussion of the policies and programs
the nominee intends to pursue; this is a classic opportunity for senatorial oversight and
influence. The confirmation process as an oversight tool can be used to:
3. Once a nominee has been confirmed by the Senate, oversight includes following up to
ensure that the nominee fulfills any commitments made during confirmation hearings.
Subsequent hearings and committee investigations can explore whether such commitments
have been kept.
4. Recess Appointments. The Constitution provides that the President “shall have Power to fill
up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting
Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.” When Presidents relied
on this power to circumvent Senate confirmation, Congress responded with legislation that
prohibits, with certain exceptions, the payment of salaries to recess appointees. 54 Stat.
751 (1940); 5 U.S.C. § 5503 (2004). Also, in the annual Treasury, Transportation, Housing
and Urban Development Appropriations Act, Congress enacts an additional funding
restriction on recess appointees (see box).
No part of any appropriation for the current fiscal year contained in this or any other Act shall be paid to any person
for the filling of any position for which he or she has been nominated after the Senate has voted not to approve the
nomination of said person. 114 Stat. 2763A-157, sec. 609 (2000).
The Justice Department took the position that some executive officials were not restricted
by the Vacancies Act and could serve beyond the 120-day period. Under that interpretation,
the Administration selected Bill Lann Lee to head the Justice Department’s Civil Rights
Division, and argued that he could serve longer than had he been a recess appointee.
Congress responded by passing legislation in 1998 to make the Vacancies Act the exclusive
vehicle for temporarily filling vacant advice and consent positions. The new Vacancies Act,
included in the FY1999 Omnibus Consolidated and Emergency Supplemental
Appropriations Act (P.L. 105-277), rejects the Justice Department position and established
procedures for the appointment of executive officials who temporarily hold an office. With
various exceptions, the 120-day period has been replaced by a 210-day period.
a. a constitutionally mandated method for obtaining information that might otherwise not
be made available by the executive; and
a. The most significant procedural differences center on the roles played by each house of
Congress.
b. The House of Representatives has the sole power to impeach. A majority is required to
impeach.
c. If the House votes to impeach, the person is tried by the Senate, which has the sole
power to try an impeachment. A two-thirds majority is required to convict and remove
the individual. Should the Senate deem it appropriate in a given case, it may, by majority
vote, impose an additional judgment of disqualification from further federal offices of
honor, trust, or profit.
d. In Nixon v. United States, 506 U.S. 226 (1993), the Supreme Court held nonjusticiable a
constitutional challenge to the use by the Senate in an impeachment proceeding of a 12-
member committee appointed to take testimony and gather evidence. Such a committee
makes no recommendations as to the ultimate question before the Senate. Nor does the
committee rule on questions of relevancy, materiality, and competency. Rather, it reports
a certified copy of the transcript of the proceedings before the committee and any
evidence received by the committee to the full Senate for its consideration. The full
Senate may take further testimony or evidence, or it may hold the entire trial in open
Senate. In either event, the full Senate determines whether to convict on one or more of
the articles of impeachment involved and, upon conviction, decides the appropriate
judgment to be imposed.
3. The impeachment process is cumbersome and infrequently used. The House has voted to
impeach in 17 cases, 16 of which have reached the Senate, and 15 of which have gone to a
vote on one or more articles of impeachment. Seven cases, all pertaining to federal judges,
have resulted in conviction and removal; two of these also resulted in disqualification. The
most recent impeachment trial was that of President Clinton in 1998-99; the most recent
judicial impeachment trials were those of Judges Claiborne, Hastings, and Nixon in 1986,
1988 and 1989, respectively. A number of issues were addressed in the Clinton
impeachment trial and other past impeachment proceedings, although the answers to some
still remain somewhat ambiguous. For example:
a. An impeachment may be continued from one Congress to the next, although the
procedural steps vary depending upon the stage in the process.
b. The Constitution defines the grounds for impeachment as “Treason, Bribery, or other
high Crimes and Misdemeanors.” However, the meaning and scope of “high Crimes and
Misdemeanors” remains in dispute and depends on the interpretation of individual
legislators.
c. The Constitution provides for impeachment of the “President, Vice President, and all
civil Officers of the United States.” While the outer limits of the “civil Officers”
language are not altogether clear, past precedents suggest that it covers at least federal
judges and executive officers subject to the Appointments Clause.
d. Members of the House and Senate are not subject to impeachment because they are not
“civil officers.” William Blount, a U.S. Senator from Tennessee, was impeached by the
House in 1797, but the Senate chose to expel him instead of conducting an impeachment
trial.
Investigative Oversight
Congressional oversight and investigations, which are often adversarial and confrontational, can
serve to sustain and vindicate Congress’s role in the United States’ constitutional scheme of
separated powers. The rich history of congressional investigations, from the failed St. Clair
expedition in 1792 and including Teapot Dome, Watergate, Iran-Contra, and Whitewater, have
established, both legally and as a matter of practice, the nature and contours of congressional
prerogatives necessary to maintain the integrity of the legislative role.
This section provides an overview of some of the more common legal, procedural, and practical
issues that committees may face in the course of conducting oversight and/or congressional
investigations. This part begins with a general summary of Congress’s constitutional authority to
perform oversight and investigations. It then turns to a discussion of the legal tools commonly
used by congressional committees in conducting oversight and investigations, including the legal
basis for subpoenas, staff depositions, and committee hearings, as well as a discussion of the
various forms of “contempt of Congress,” the primary enforcement mechanism available. The
section will then discuss limitations on congressional authority, including constitutional
privileges, such as “executive privilege,” as well as other restrictions placed on Congress’s
authority to conduct oversight and investigations. Finally, the section will address a series of
frequently encountered legal issues, such as the applicability of the Privacy Act and the Freedom
of Information Act, access to grand jury materials and pending litigation files, as well as legal
issues raised by classified information and other information protection regimes.
1
See, e.g., Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 435 (1977); Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s
Fund, 421 U.S. 491 (1975); Barnblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178
(1957); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
appropriate under the Constitution.”2 Also, in Watkins v. United States, the Court emphasized that
the “power of the Congress to conduct investigations is inherent in the legislative process. That
power is broad. It encompasses inquiries concerning the administration of existing laws as well as
proposed or possibly needed statutes.”3 The Court further stressed that Congress’s power to
investigate is at its peak when focusing on alleged waste, fraud, abuse, or maladministration
within a government department. Specifically, the Court explained that the investigative power
“comprehends probes into departments of the federal government to expose corruption,
inefficiency, or waste.”4 The Court went on to note that the first Congresses held “inquiries
dealing with suspected corruption or mismanagement of government officials.”5 Given these
factors, the Court recognized “the power of the Congress to inquire into and publicize corruption,
maladministration, or inefficiencies in the agencies of Government.”6
Committee Jurisdiction
Establishing committee jurisdiction is the foundation for any attempt to obtain information and
documents from the Executive Branch. A claim of lawful jurisdiction, however, does not
automatically entitle the committee to access whatever documents and information it may seek.
Rather, an appropriate claim of jurisdiction authorizes the committee to inquire and request
information. The specifics of such access may still be subject to prudential, political, and
constitutionally-based privileges asserted by the targets of the inquiry.
As previously stated, a congressional committee is a creation of its parent house and, therefore,
has only the power to inquire into matters within the scope of the authority that has been
delegated to it by that body. 7 Thus, the enabling chamber rule or resolution that gives the
committee life is also the charter that defines the grant and limitations of the committee’s power.
In construing the scope of a committee’s authorizing charter, courts will look to the words of the
rule or resolution itself, and then, if necessary, to the usual sources of legislative history such as
floor debate, legislative reports, and prior committee practice and interpretation.
2
421 U.S. at 504, n. 15 (quoting Barenblatt, supra, 360 U.S. at 111).
3
354 U.S. at 187.
4
Id.
5
Id. at 182.
6
Id. at 200, n.33.
7
United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41, 42, 44 (1953); see also Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. at 198.
Rule X of the House Rules and Rule XXV of the Senate Rules deal respectively with the
organization of the standing committees and establish their jurisdiction. 8 Jurisdictional authority
for “special” investigations may be given to a standing committee, a joint committee of both
houses, or a special subcommittee of a standing committee, among other vehicles. Given the
specificity with which the House and Senate rules now confer jurisdiction on their standing
committees, as well as the care with which most authorizing resolutions for special and/or select
committees have been drafted in recent years, sufficient models exist to avoid a successful
judicial challenge by a witness that his noncompliance was justified by a committee’s
overstepping its delegated scope of authority.
Legislative Purpose
While the congressional power of inquiry is broad, it is not unlimited. The Supreme Court has
admonished that the power to investigate may be exercised only “in aid of the legislative
function”9 and cannot be used to expose for the sake of exposure alone. The Watkins Court
underlined these limitations stating that:
There is no general authority to expose the private affairs of individuals without justification
in terms of the functions of the Congress . . . nor is the Congress a law enforcement or trial
agency. These are functions of the executive and judicial departments of government. No
inquiry is an end in itself; it must be related to, and in furtherance of, a legitimate task of the
Congress.10
A committee’s inquiry must have a legislative purpose or be conducted pursuant to some other
constitutional power of the Congress, such as the authority of each House to discipline its own
Members, judge the returns of the their elections, and to conduct impeachment proceedings.11
Although the 1927 Supreme Court decision in Kilbourn v. Thompson12 held that the investigation
in that case was an improper probe into the private affairs of individuals, the courts today
generally will presume that there is a legislative purpose for an investigation, and the House or
Senate rule or resolution authorizing the investigation does not have to specifically state the
committee’s legislative purpose. 13 In In re Chapman,14 the Court upheld the validity of a
resolution authorizing an inquiry into charges of corruption against certain Senators despite the
fact that it was silent as to what might be done when the investigation was completed. The Court
stated:
8
See RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR THE 111TH CONGRESS, Rule X, available at,
http://www.rules.house.gov/ruleprec/111th.pdf (2009); see also S. Doc. 107-1, Senate Manual, Rule XXV, 107th Cong.
(2002).
9
Kilbourn v. Thompson, 103 U.S. 168, 204 (1880).
10
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. at 187.
11
See, e.g., McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927); see also In Re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661 (1897).
12
103 U.S. 168 (1881).
13
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927); see also Townsend v. United States, 95 F.2d 352 (D.C. Cir. 1938);
LEADING CASES ON CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATORY POWER, 7 (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter cited as Leading
Cases]. For a different assessment of recent case law concerning the requirement of a legislative purpose, See Allen B.
Moreland, Congressional Investigations and Private Persons, 40 SO. CAL. L. REV. 189, 232 (1967) [hereinafter
Moreland].
14
166 U.S. 661, 669 (1897).
The questions were undoubtedly pertinent to the subject matter of the inquiry. The
resolutions directed the committee to inquire “whether any Senator has been, or is,
speculating in what are known as sugar stocks during the consideration of the tariff bill now
before the Senate.” What the Senate might or might not do upon the facts when ascertained,
we cannot say nor are we called upon to inquire whether such ventures might be defensible,
as contended in argument, but it is plain that negative answers would have cleared that body
of what the Senate regarded as offensive imputations, while affirmative answers might have
led to further action on the part of the Senate within its constitutional powers.
Nor will it do to hold that the Senate had no jurisdiction to pursue the particular inquiry
because the preamble and resolutions did not specify that the proceedings were taken for the
purpose of censure or expulsion, if certain facts were disclosed by the investigation. The
matter was within the range of the constitutional powers of the Senate. The resolutions
adequately indicated that the transactions referred to were deemed by the Senate
reprehensible and deserving of condemnation and punishment. The right to expel extends to
all cases where the offense is such as in the judgment of the Senate is inconsistent with the
trust and duty of a member.
We cannot assume on this record that the action of the Senate was without a legitimate
object, and so encroach upon the province of that body. Indeed, we think it affirmatively
appears that the Senate was acting within its right, and it was certainly not necessary that the
resolutions should declare in advance what the Senate meditated doing when the
investigation was concluded.15
In McGrain v. Daugherty,16 the original resolution that authorized the Senate investigation into
the Teapot Dome Affair made no mention of a legislative purpose. A subsequent resolution for the
attachment of a contumacious witness declared that his testimony was sought for the purpose of
obtaining “information necessary as a basis for such legislative and other action as the Senate
may deem necessary and proper.” The Court found that the investigation was ordered for a
legitimate object. It wrote:
The only legitimate object the Senate could have in ordering the investigation was to aid it in
legislating, and we think the subject matter was such that the presumption should be
indulged that this was the real object. An express avowal of the object would have been
better; but in view of the particular subject-matter was not indispensable. ***
The second resolution–the one directing the witness be attached–declares that this testimony
is sought with the purpose of obtaining “information necessary as a basis for such legislative
and other action as the Senate may deem necessary and proper.” This avowal of
contemplated legislation is in accord with what we think is the right interpretation of the
earlier resolution directing the investigation. The suggested possibility of “other action” if
deemed “necessary or proper” is of course open to criticism in that there is no other action in
the matter which would be within the power of the Senate. But we do not assent to the view
that this indefinite and untenable suggestion invalidates the entire proceeding. The right view
in our opinion is that it takes nothing from the lawful object avowed in the same resolution
and is rightly inferable from the earlier one. It is not as if an inadmissible or unlawful object
were affirmatively and definitely avowed.17
15
In re Chapman, 166 U.S. at 699.
16
273 U.S. 135 (1927).
17
Id. at 179-180.
Moreover, when the purpose asserted is supported by reference to specific problems which in the
past have been, or in the future may be, the subject of appropriate legislation, it has been held that
a court cannot say that a committee of the Congress exceeds its power when it seeks information
in such areas.18 In the past, the types of legislative activity which have justified the exercise of the
power to investigate have included the primary functions of legislating and appropriating;19 the
function of deciding whether or not legislation is appropriate;20 oversight of the administration of
the laws by the executive branch;21 and the essential congressional function of informing itself in
matters of national concern. 22 In addition, Congress’s power to investigate such diverse matters as
foreign and domestic subversive activities, 23 labor union corruption,24 and organizations that
violate the civil rights of others25—have all been upheld by the Supreme Court.
Despite the Court’s broad interpretation of legislative purpose, Congress’s authority is not
unlimited. Courts have held that a committee lacks legislative purpose if it appears to be
conducting a legislative trial rather than an investigation to assist in performing its legislative
function.26 Furthermore, although “there is no congressional power to expose for the sake of
exposure,”27 “so long as Congress acts in pursuance of its constitutional power, the Judiciary
lacks authority to intervene on the basis of the motives which spurred the exercise of that
power.”28
18
Shelton v. United States, 404 F.2d 1292, 1297 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert denied, 393 U.S. 1024 (1969).
19
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959).
20
Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155, 161 (1955).
21
McGrain, 273 U.S. at 295.
22
United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 4, 43-45 (1953); see also Watkins, 354 U.S. at 200 n. 3.
23
See, e.g., Barrenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); McPhaul
v. United States, 364 U.S. 372 (1960).
24
Hutcheson v. United States, 369 U.S. 599 (1962).
25
Shelton v. United States, 404 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1024 (1969).
26
See United States v. Icardi, 140 F. Supp. 383 (D.D.C. 1956); United States v. Cross, 170 F. Supp. 303 (D.D.C. 1959).
27
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 (1957). However, Chief Justice Warren, writing for the majority, made it
clear that he was not referring to the “power of the Congress to inquire into and publicize corruption, mal-
administration or inefficiency in agencies of the Government.” Id.
28
Barenblatt, 360 U.S. at 132.
29
See, e.g., CONGRESS INVESTIGATES: A DOCUMENTARY HISTORY 1792-1974 (Arthur M. Schlesinger, Jr. & Roger Burns
eds. 1975).
grant witnesses limited immunity for the purpose of obtaining information and testimony that
may be protected by the Fifth Amendment’s right against self incrimination.
Subpoena Power
As a corollary to Congress’s accepted oversight and investigative authority, the Supreme Court
has determined that the “[i]ssuance of subpoenas...has long been held to be a legitimate use by
Congress of its power to investigate.”30 In particular, the Court has repeatedly cited the principle
that:
The power of inquiry, with the accompanying process to enforce it, has been deemed “an
essential and appropriate auxiliary to the legislative function.”32 A properly authorized subpoena
issued by a committee or subcommittee has the same force and effect as a subpoena issued by the
parent House itself. To validly issue a subpoena, individual committees or subcommittees must be
delegated this authority. Senate Rule XXVI(1) and House Rule XI(2)(m)(1) presently empower
all standing committees and subcommittees to require the attendance and testimony of witnesses
and the production of documents. Special or select committees must be specifically delegated that
authority by Senate or House resolution. The rules or practices of standing committees may
restrict the issuance of subpoenas only to full committees or, in certain instances, allow issuance
by a committee chairman alone, with or without the concurrence of the ranking minority
member.33
Congressional subpoenas are most frequently served by the U.S. Marshal’s office or by
committee staff, or less frequently by the Senate or House Sergeants-At-Arms. Service may be
effected anywhere in the United States. The subpoena power has been held to extend to aliens
physically present in the United States. As will be discussed below, however, securing compliance
of United States nationals and aliens living in foreign countries presents more complex
problems.34
A witness seeking to challenge the legal sufficiency of a subpoena has only limited remedies to
raise objections. The Supreme Court has ruled that courts may not enjoin the issuance of a
30
Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. at 504.
31
McGrain, 273 U.S. at 175; see also Buckley v. Valeo, 424 U.S. 1, 138 (1976), Eastland, 421 U.S. at 504-505.
32
McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. at 174-75.
33
See, e.g., House Committee on Government Reform, Rule 18(d); Senate Committee on Homeland Security and
Governmental Affairs, Rule 5(c).
34
See infra notes 160-181 and accompanying text.
congressional subpoena, holding that the Speech or Debate Clause of the Constitution35 provides
“an absolute bar to judicial interference” with such compulsory process.36 As a consequence, a
witness’s sole remedy generally is to refuse to comply, risk being cited for contempt, and then
raise the objections as a defense in a contempt prosecution.
Challenges to the legal sufficiency of subpoenas must overcome formidable judicial obstacles.
The standard to be applied in determining whether the congressional investigating power has
been properly asserted was articulated in Wilkinson v. United States:37 (1) the committee’s
investigation of the broad subject matter area must be authorized by Congress; (2) the
investigation must be pursuant to “a valid legislative purpose;” and (3) the specific inquiries must
be pertinent to the broad subject matter areas which have been authorized by the Congress. As to
the requirement of “valid legislative purpose,” the Supreme Court has made it clear that Congress
does not have to state explicitly what it intends to do as a result of an investigation.38
Deposition Authority
Committees often rely on informal staff interviews to gather information preparatory to
investigative hearings. However, in recent years, when specially authorized, congressional
committees have utilized staff-conducted depositions as a tool in exercising the investigatory
power. Staff depositions afford a number of significant advantages for committees engaged in
complex investigations. Staff depositions may assist committees in obtaining sworn testimony
quickly and confidentially without the necessity of Members devoting time to lengthy hearings
that may be unproductive because witnesses do not have the facts needed by the committee or
refuse to cooperate. Depositions are conducted in private and, thus, may be more conducive to
candid responses than would be the case at a public hearing. In addition, statements made by
witnesses that might defame or even tend to incriminate third parties can be verified before they
are repeated publically in an open hearing. Furthermore, depositions can prepare a committee for
the questioning of witnesses at a hearing or provide a screening process that can obviate the need
to call some witnesses. Finally, the deposition process also allows questioning of witnesses
outside of Washington, D.C., thereby avoiding the inconvenience of conducting field hearings
requiring the presence of Members.
Moreover, Congress has enhanced the efficacy of the staff deposition process by re-establishing
the applicability of 18 U.S.C. § 1001 to false statements made during congressional proceedings,
including the taking of depositions.39
Certain disadvantages may also inhere. Unrestrained staff may be tempted to engage in tangential
inquiries. Also, depositions present a “cold record” of a witness’s testimony and may not be as
useful for Members as in-person presentations.
35
U.S. CONST. Art. I, § 6, cl. 1.
36
Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 503-07 (1975).
37
365 U.S. 399, 408-09 (1961).
38
In re Chapman, 166 U.S. 661, 669 (1897).
39
False Statements Accountability Act of 1996, P.L. 104-292. Congress acted in response to the Supreme Court’s
decision in Hubbard v. United States, 514 U.S. 695 (1995), holding that 18 U.S.C. § 1001 applied only to false
statements made in executive branch department and agency proceedings.
At present, there are only a few standing committees that the House and Senate are expressly
authorized to conduct staff depositions. 40 On a number occasions such specific authority has been
granted pursuant to Senate and House resolutions.41 When granted, a committee will normally
adopt procedures for taking depositions, including provisions for notice (with or without a
subpoena), transcription of the deposition, the right to be accompanied by counsel, and the
manner in which objections to questions are to be resolved.
Hearings
House Rule XI(2) and Senate Rule XXVI(2) require that committees adopt written rules of
procedure and publish them in the Congressional Record. The failure to publish such rules has
resulted in the invalidation of a perjury prosecution. 42 Once properly promulgated, such rules are
judicially cognizable and must be strictly observed. The House and many individual Senate
committees require that all witnesses be given a copy of a committee’s rules.
Both the House and the Senate have adopted rules permitting a reduced quorum for taking
testimony and receiving evidence. House hearings may be conducted if at least two members are
present; most Senate committees permit hearings with only one member in attendance. Although
most committees have adopted the minimum quorum requirement, some have not, while others
require a higher quorum for sworn rather than unsworn testimony. For perjury purposes, the
quorum requirement must be met at the time the allegedly perjured testimony is given, not at the
beginning of the session. Reduced quorum requirement rules do not apply to authorizations for
the issuance of subpoenas. Senate rules require a one-third quorum of a committee or
subcommittee while the House requires a quorum of a majority of the members, unless a
committee delegates authority for issuance to its chairman.43
Senate and House rules limit the authority of their committees to meet in closed session. A House
rule provides that testimony “shall” be held in closed session if a majority of a committee or
subcommittee determines it “may tend to defame, degrade, or incriminate any person.” Such
testimony taken in closed session is normally releasable only by a majority vote of the committee.
Similarly, confidential material received in a closed session requires a majority vote for release.
In most oversight and investigative hearings the chair usually makes an opening statement. In the
case of an investigative hearing, it is an important means of defining the subject matter of the
hearing and thereby establishing the pertinence of questions asked the witnesses. Not all
committees swear in their witnesses; a few committees require that all witnesses be sworn. Most
committees leave the swearing of witnesses to the discretion of the chair. If a committee wishes
40
In the House, the only standing committee authorized to take depositions is the Committee on Oversight and
Government Reform. See RULES OF THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES FOR THE 111TH CONGRESS, Rule X(4)(c)(3)(A)
(2009), available at, http://www.rules.house.gov/ruleprec/111th.pdf. In the Senate, the Committees on Agriculture,
Nutrition, and Forestry, Ethics, Homeland Security and Governmental Affairs, Indian Affairs, and the Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations all have deposition authority. See S. Doc. 111-3, AUTHORITY AND RULES OF SENATE
COMMITTEES 2009-2010, 111th Cong. (2009).
41
See CRS Report 95-949, Staff Depositions in Congressional Investigations, by Jay R. Shampansky, at notes 16 and
18.
42
United States v. Reinecke, 524 F.2d 435 (D.C. Cir. 1975)(failure to publish committee rule setting one Senator as a
quorum for taking hearing testimony held a sufficient ground to reverse a perjury conviction).
43
Senate Rule XXVI(7)(a)(1); House Rule XI(2)(m)(3).
the potential sanction of perjury44 to apply, it should, in accordance with the statute, administer an
oath and swear its witnesses, though it should be noted that false statements not under oath are
also subject to criminal sanctions.45
A witness does not have the right to make a statement before being questioned, however, the
opportunity is usually accorded. Committee rules may prescribe the length of such statements and
also require written statements be submitted in advance of the hearing. Questioning of witnesses
may be structured so that members alternate for specified lengths of time. Questioning may also
be conducted by staff at the Committee’s discretion. Witnesses may be allowed to review a
transcript of their testimony and to make non-substantive corrections.
The right of a witness to be accompanied by counsel is recognized by House rule and the rules of
Senate committees. The House rule limits the role of counsel as solely “for the purpose of
advising them concerning their constitutional rights.” Some committees have adopted rules
specifically prohibiting counsel from “coaching” witnesses during their testimony. 46 A committee
has complete authority to control the conduct of counsel. Indeed, House Rule XI(2)(k)(4)
provides that “[t]he chairman may punish breaches of order and decorum, and of professional
ethics on the part of counsel, by censure or exclusion from the hearings; and the Committee may
cite the offender for contempt.” Some Senate committees have adopted similar rules.47 There is
no right of cross-examination of adverse witnesses during an investigative hearing. Witnesses are
entitled to a range of constitutional protections including, but not limited to the Fifth Amendment
right to avoid making self incriminating statements. These protections and privileges will be
discussed in more detail below. 48
Congressional Immunity
The Fifth Amendment to the Constitution provides in part that “no person ... shall be compelled in
any criminal case to be a witness against himself....” The privilege against self-incrimination is
available to a witness in a congressional investigation.49 When a witness before a committee
asserts this testimonial constitutional privilege, the committee may, upon a two-thirds vote of the
full committee, obtain a court order that compels and grants immunity against the use of
testimony and information derived from that testimony in a subsequent criminal prosecution. The
witness may still be prosecuted on the basis of other evidence. Grants of immunity have figured
prominently in a number of major congressional investigations, including Watergate (John Dean
and Jeb Magruder) and Iran-Contra (Oliver North and John Poindexter). The decision to grant
immunity involves a number of complex issues, but is ultimately a political decision that
Congress makes. As observed by Iran-Contra Independent Counsel Lawrence E. Walsh, “[t]he
legislative branch has the power to decide whether it is more important perhaps even to destroy a
prosecution than to hold back testimony they need. They make that decision. It is not a judicial
decision or a legal decision but a political decision of the highest importance.”50
44
18 U.S.C. § 1621 (2006).
45
18 U.S.C. § 1001 (2006).
46
See, e.g., Senate Permanent Committee on Investigations Rule 8.
47
See, e.g., Senate Aging Committee Rule V(8); Senate Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations Rule 7.
48
See infra notes 88-109 and accompanying text.
49
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955).
50
Lawrence E. Walsh, The Independent Counsel and the Separation of Powers, 25 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 9 (1988).
Appellate court decisions reversing the convictions of key Iran-Contra figures Lt. Colonel Oliver
North and Rear Admiral John Poindexter appear to have made the prosecutorial burden
substantially more difficult in high-profile cases. Despite extraordinary efforts by the independent
counsel and his staff to avoid being exposed to any of North’s or Poindexter’s immunized
testimony, and the submission of sealed packets of evidence to the district court to show that the
material was obtained independently of any immunized testimony to Congress, the appeals court
in both cases remanded the cases for a further determination whether the prosecution had directly
or indirectly used immunized testimony. Upon remand in both cases, the independent counsel
moved to dismiss the prosecutions upon his determination that he could not meet the strict
standards set by the appeals court in its decisions.52 It is unclear whether a consequence of the
ruling was to engender a reluctance on the part of committees to issue immunity grants. Since the
enactment of the 1970 statute, congressional committees have obtained more than 300 immunity
orders. Of these, almost half were obtained in connection with the 1978 investigation into the
assassinations of President John F. Kennedy and Martin Luther King, Jr.
Contempt of Congress
While the threat or actual issuance of a subpoena normally provides sufficient leverage to ensure
compliance, it is through the contempt power, or its threat, that Congress may act with ultimate
force in response to actions that obstruct the legislative process to punish the contemnor and/or to
remove the obstruction. The Supreme Court has recognized the contempt power as an inherent
attribute of Congress’s legislative authority, reasoning that if it did not possess this power, it
“would be exposed to every indignity and interruption that rudeness, caprice or even conspiracy
may mediate against it.”53
There are three different types of contempt proceedings. Both the House and Senate may cite a
witness for contempt under their inherent contempt power or under the criminal contempt
procedure established by statute.54 The Senate also has a third option, enforcement by means of a
statutory civil contempt procedure.55 In the House, civil contempt is also possible, but first the
51
See Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441, 460 (1972).
52
See United States v. North, 910 F. 2d 843 (D.C. Cir.), modified, 920 F. 2d 940 (D.C. Cir. 1990), cert denied, 500
U.S. 941 (1991); see also United States v. Poindexter, 951 F. 2d 369 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
53
Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821).
54
See 2 U.S.C. §§ 192, 194 (2006).
55
A more comprehensive treatment of the history and legal development of the congressional contempt power is
discussed in CRS Report RL34097, Congress’s Contempt Power: Law, History, Practice, and Procedure, by Todd B.
Tatelman.
full House of Representatives must authorize, via House Resolution (H. Res.), the Committee or
the Office of General Counsel to pursue a civil contempt action against a witness.
Inherent Contempt
Under the inherent contempt power, the individual is brought before the House or Senate by the
Sergeant-at-Arms, tried at the bar of the body, and can be imprisoned. The purpose of the
imprisonment or other sanction may be either punitive or coercive. Thus, the witness can be
imprisoned for a specified period of time as punishment, or for an indefinite period (but not, at
least in the case of the House, beyond the adjournment of a session of the Congress) until he
agrees to comply. The inherent contempt power has been recognized by the Supreme Court as
inextricably related to Congress’s constitutionally-based power to investigate.56 Between 1795
and 1934 the House and Senate utilized the inherent contempt power over 85 times, in most
instances to obtain (successfully) testimony and/or documents. The inherent contempt power has
not been exercised by either House in over 75 years. This appears to be because it has been
considered too cumbersome and time-consuming to hold contempt trials at the bar of the offended
chamber. Moreover, some have argued that the procedure is ineffective because punishment can
not extend beyond Congress’s adjournment date.
The criminal contempt procedure was rarely used until the twentieth century, but since 1935 it has
been essentially the exclusive vehicle for punishment of contemptuous conduct. Prior to
Watergate, no executive branch official had ever been the target of a criminal contempt
proceeding. Since 1975, however, 12 cabinet-level or senior executive officials have been cited
for contempt for failure to produce subpoenaed documents by either a subcommittee, a full
committee, or by a House. 57 In each instance there was substantial or full compliance with the
document demands before the initiation of criminal proceedings. However, following the vote of
contempt of EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch Burford, but before the contempt citation was
56
See Anderson v. Dunn, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 204 (1821); see also McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
57
The 12 officials are as follows: Secretary of State Henry Kissinger (1975); Secretary of Commerce Rogers C. B.
Morton (1975); Secretary of Health, Education, and Welfare Joseph A Califano, Jr. (1978); Secretary of Energy
Charles Duncan (1980); Secretary of Energy James B. Edwards (1981); Secretary of the Interior James Watt (1982);
EPA Administrator Anne Gorsuch Burford (1983); Attorney General William French Smith (1983); White House
Counsel John M. Quinn (1996); Attorney General Janet Reno (1998); White House Counsel Harriet Miers (2008); and
White House Chief of Staff Joshua Bolton (2008).
forwarded to the United States Attorney for grand jury action, the Department of Justice raised
the question whether Congress could compel the U.S. Attorney to submit the citation for grand
jury consideration. The documents in question were turned over to Congress before the issue was
litigated in court. The question of the duty of the U.S. Attorney under § 192 to enforce contempt
of Congress citations remains unresolved and has left some uncertainty as to the efficacy of the
use of criminal contempt proceedings against executive branch officials.
Civil Contempt
As an alternative to both the inherent contempt power of each house and criminal contempt, a
statutory civil contempt procedure is available in the Senate. Upon application of the Senate, the
federal district court issues an order to a person refusing, or threatening to refuse, to comply with
a Senate subpoena. If the individual still refuses to comply, he may be tried by the court in
summary proceedings for contempt of court, with sanctions imposed to coerce compliance. Civil
contempt can be more expeditious than a criminal proceeding, and it also provides an element of
flexibility, allowing the subpoenaed party to test legal defenses in court without necessarily
risking a criminal prosecution. Civil contempt is not authorized for use against executive branch
officials refusing to comply with a subpoena except in certain limited circumstances.58 Since
1979, the Senate has authorized the Office of Senate Legal Counsel to seek civil enforcement of a
document subpoena at least 6 times, the last in 1995. None have been against executive branch
officials.
In the House of Representatives, civil contempt proceedings are also possible, however, the
authority is not statutorily based. Rather, the full House must adopt a resolution finding the
person or persons in contempt and authorizing the Committee and/or the House General Counsel
to pursue a civil action in federal district court against the contemptuous witness. This action has
only been authorized one time, in 2008, against Harriet Miers and Joshua Bolton, both high
ranking officials in the administration of President George W. Bush.59
for perjury will lie for statements made only in the presence of committee staff unless the
committee has deposition authority and has taken formal action to allow it.
Unsworn Statements
Most statements made before Congress, at both the investigatory and hearing phases of oversight,
are unsworn. The practice of swearing in all witnesses at hearings is infrequent. Prosecutions may
be brought to punish congressional witnesses for giving willfully false testimony not under oath.
Under 18 U.S.C. § 1001, false statements by a person in “any investigation or review, conducted
pursuant to the authority of any committee, subcommittee, commission or office of the Congress,
consistent with applicable rules of the House and Senate” are punishable by a fine of up to
$250,000 or imprisonment for not more than five years, or both.63
Constitutional Limitations
The Supreme Court has observed that “Congress, in common with all branches of the
Government, must exercise its powers subject to the limitations placed by the Constitution on
governmental action, more particularly in the context of this case, the relevant limitations of the
Bill of Rights.”64 There are constitutional limits not only on Congress’s legislative powers, but
also on its oversight and investigative powers.
First Amendment
Although the First Amendment, by its terms, is expressly applicable only to legislation that
abridges freedom of speech, press, religion (establishment or free exercise), or assembly, the
Court has held that the amendment also restricts Congress in conducting oversight and/or
investigations.65 In the leading case involving the application of First Amendment rights in a
congressional investigation, Barenblatt v. United States,66 the Court held that “where First
Amendment rights are asserted to bar government interrogation resolution of the issue always
involves a balancing by the courts of the competing private and public interests at stake in the
particular circumstances shown.” Thus, unlike the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
incrimination, the First Amendment does not give a witness an absolute right to refuse to respond
to congressional demands for information. 67
The Court has held that in balancing the personal interest in privacy against the congressional
need for information, “the critical element is the existence of, and the weight to be ascribed to, the
63
18 U.S.C § 1001 (2006).
64
Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 112 (1959). Not all of the provisions of the Bill of Rights are applicable to
congressional hearings. For example, the sixth amendment right of a criminal defendant to cross-examine witnesses
and to call witnesses in his behalf has been held not applicable to a congressional hearing. United States v. Fort, 443
F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1971).
65
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 197 (1957).
66
360 U.S. 109, 126 (1959).
67
Id.
interest of the Congress in demanding disclosure from an unwilling witness.” 68 To protect the
rights of witnesses, in cases involving the First Amendment, the courts have emphasized the
requirements discussed above concerning authorization for the investigation, delegation of power
to investigate to the committee involved, and the existence of a legislative purpose. 69
While the Court has recognized the application of the First Amendment to congressional
investigations, and although the amendment has frequently been asserted by witnesses as grounds
for not complying with congressional demands for information, the Court has never relied on the
First Amendment as grounds for reversing a criminal contempt of Congress conviction.70
However, the Court has narrowly construed the scope of a committee’s authority so as to avoid
reaching a First Amendment issue.71 In addition, the Court has ruled in favor of a witness who
invoked his First Amendment rights in response to questioning by a state legislative committee.72
In a 1976 investigation of the unauthorized publication in the press of the report of the House
Select Committee on Intelligence, the Committee on Standards of Official Conduct subpoenaed
four news media representatives, including Daniel Schorr.73 The Standards of Official Conduct
Committee concluded that Mr. Schorr had obtained a copy of the Select Committee’s report and
had made it available for publication. Although the ethics committee found that “Mr. Schorr’s
role in publishing the report was a defiant act in disregard of the expressed will of the House of
Representatives to preclude publication of highly classified national security information,” it
68
Watkins, 354 U.S. at 198. A balancing test was also used in Branzburg v. Hayes, which involved the issue of the
claimed privilege of newsmen not to respond to demands of a grand jury for information. See 408 U.S. 665 (1972). In
its 5-4 decision, the Court concluded that the need of the grand jury for the information outweighed First Amendment
considerations, but there are indications in the opinion that “the infringement of protected First Amendment rights must
be no broader than necessary to achieve a permissible governmental purpose,” and that “a State’s interest must be
‘compelling’ or ‘paramount’ to justify even an indirect burden on First Amendment rights.” Id. at 699-700; see also
Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963) (applying the compelling interest test in a
legislative investigation).
69
See, e.g., Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109 (1959); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); United
States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953); see also 4 Deschler’s Precedents of the U.S. House of Representatives, ch. 15, §
10, n. 15 (1977).
70
Leading Cases, supra note 13, at 42; JAMES HAMILTON, THE POWER TO PROBE : A STUDY OF CONGRESSIONAL
INVESTIGATIONS, 234 (1977) [hereinafter Hamilton]. Although it was not in the criminal contempt context, one court of
appeals has upheld a witness’s First Amendment claim. In Stamler v. Willis, the Seventh Circuit Court of Appeals
ordered to trial a witness’s suit for declaratory relief against the House Un-American Activities Committee in which it
was alleged that the committee’s authorizing resolution had a “chilling effect” on plaintiff’s First Amendment rights.
See 415 F.2d 1365 (7th Cir. 1969), cert. denied, 399 U.S. 929 (1970). In other cases for declaratory and injunctive relief
brought against committees on First Amendment grounds, relief has been denied although the courts indicated that
relief could be granted if the circumstances were more compelling. See, e.g., Sanders v. McClellan, 463 F.2d 894 (D.C.
Cir. 1972); Davis v. Chord, 442 F. 2d 1207 (D.C. Cir. 1970); Ansara v. Eastland, 442 F.2d 751 (D.C. Cir. 1971).
However, in Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, the Supreme Court held that the Constitution’s Speech or
Debate Clause (Art. I, § 6, cl. 1) generally bars suits challenging the validity of congressional subpoenas on First
Amendment or other grounds. Thus, a witness generally cannot raise his constitutional defenses until a subsequent
criminal prosecution for contempt unless, in the case of a Senate committee, the statutory civil contempt procedure is
employed. 421 U.S. 491 (1975); see also United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F. Supp. 150 (D.D.C. 1983).
71
United States v. Rumely, 345 U.S. 41 (1953).
72
Gibson v. Florida Legislative Investigation Committee, 372 U.S. 539 (1963). In the majority opinion, Justice
Goldberg observed that “an essential prerequisite to the validity of an investigation which intrudes into the area of
constitutionally protected rights of speech, press, association and petition [is] that the State convincingly show a
substantial relation [or nexus] between the information sought and a subject of overriding and compelling state interest.
Id. a t 546.
73
H. Rept. 94-1754, 94th Cong., 6 (1976).
declined to cite him for contempt for his refusal to disclose his source. 74 The desire to avoid a
clash over First Amendment rights apparently was a major factor in the committee’s decision on
the contempt matter.75
In another First Amendment dispute, the Special Subcommittee on Investigations of the House
Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, in the course of its probe of allegations that
deceptive editing practices were employed in the production of the television news documentary
program The Selling of the Pentagon, subpoenaed Frank Stanton the president of CBS, directing
him to deliver to the subcommittee the “outtakes” relating to the program. 76 When, on First
Amendment grounds, Stanton declined to provide the subpoenaed materials, the subcommittee
unanimously voted a contempt citation, and the full committee by a vote of 25-13 recommended
to the House that Stanton be held in contempt.77 After extensive debate, the House failed to adopt
the committee report, voting instead to recommit the matter to the committee. 78 During the
debate, several Members expressed concern that approval of the contempt citation would have a
“chilling effect” on the press and would unconstitutionally involve the government in the
regulation of the press. 79
Fourth Amendment
Several opinions of the Supreme Court indicate that the Fourth Amendment’s prohibition against
unreasonable searches and seizures is applicable to congressional committees; however, there has
not been an opinion directly addressing the issue. 80 It appears that there must be a legitimate
legislative or oversight-related basis for the issuance of a congressional subpoena.81 The Fourth
Amendment protects a congressional witness against a subpoena which is unreasonably broad or
burdensome. 82 The Court has outlined the standard to be used in judging the reasonableness of a
congressional subpoena:
Petitioner contends that the subpoena was so broad as to constitute an unreasonable search
and seizure in violation of the Fourth Amendment .... ‘Adequacy or excess in the breath of
the subpoena are matters variable in relation to the nature, purposes, and scope of the
74
Id. at 42-43.
75
Id. at 47-48 (additional views of Representatives Spence, Teague, Hutchinson, and Flynt).
76
The outtakes were portions of the CBS film clips that were not actually broadcast. The subcommittee wanted to
compare the outtakes with the tape of the broadcast to determine if improper editing techniques had been used.
77
H. Rept. 92-349, 92d Cong. (1971). The legal argument of CBS was based in part on the claim that Congress could
not constitutionally legislate on the subject of editing techniques and, therefore, the subcommittee lacked a valid
legislative purpose for the investigation. Id. at 9.
78
See 117 CONG. REC. 23922-926, 24603-59, 24720-53 (1971).
79
Id. at 24731-732.
80
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 188 (1957); see also McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372 (1960).
81
A congressional subpoena may not be used in a mere “fishing expedition.” See Hearst v. Black, 87 F.2d 68, 71 (D .C.
Cir. 1936) (quoting, Federal Trade Commission v. American Tobacco Co., 264 U.S. 298, 306 (1924) (stating that “[i]t
is contrary to the first principles of justice to allow a search through all the records, relevant or irrelevant, in the hope
that something will turn up.”))); see also United States v. Groves, 188 F. Supp. 314 (W.D. Pa. 1937) (dicta); But see
Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 509 (1975), (recognizing that an investigation may lead
“up some ‘blind alleys’ and into nonproductive enterprises. To be a valid legislative inquiry there need be no
predictable end result.”).
82
McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372 (1960); see also Shelton v. United States, 404 F.2d 1292 (D.C. Cir. 1968),
cert. denied, 393 U.S. 1024 (1969).
inquiry’ .... The subcommittee’ s inquiry here was a relative1y broad one ... and the
permissible scope of materials that could reasonably be sought was necessarily equally
broad. It was not reasonable to suppose that the subcommittee knew precisely what books
and records were kept by the Civil Rights Congress, and therefore the subpoena could only ‘
specify ... with reasonable particularity, the subjects to which the documents ... relate .... ‘The
call of the subpoena for ‘all records, correspondence and memoranda’ of the Civil Rights
Congress relating to the specified subject describes them ‘with all of the particularity the
nature of the inquiry and the [subcommittee’s] situation would permit .... ‘The description
contained in the subpoena was sufficient to enable [petitioner] to know what particular
documents were required and to select them adequately. 83
If a witness has a legal objection to a subpoena duces tecum or is for some reason unable to
comply with a demand for documents, he must give the grounds for his noncompliance upon the
return of the subpoena. As the D.C. Circuit stated:
If [the witness] felt he could refuse compliance because he considered the subpoena so broad
as to constitute an unreasonable search and seizure within the prohibition of the fourth
amendment, then to avoid contempt for complete noncompliance he was under [an]
obligation to inform the subcommittee of his position. The subcommittee would then have
had the choice of adhering to the subpoena as formulated or of meeting the objection in light
of any pertinent representations made by [the witness].84
83
McPhaul, 364 U.S. at 832.
84
Shelton, 404 F.2d at 1299-1300; see also Leading Cases, supra note 13, at 49.
85
McPhaul, 364 U.S. at 382.
86
Nelson v. United States, 208 F.2d 505 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 827 (1953).
87
In United States v. McSurely, 473 F.2d 1178, 1194 (D.C. Cir. 1972), the court of appeals reversed contempt
convictions where the subcommittee subpoenas were based on information “derived by the subcommittee through a
previous unconstitutional search and seizure by [state] officials and the subcommittee’s own investigator.” The
decision of the court of appeals in the contempt case was rendered in December, 1972. In a civil case brought by the
criminal defendants, Alan and Margaret McSurely, against Senator McClellan and the subcommittee staff for alleged
violations of their constitutional rights by the transportation and use of the seized documents, the federal district court
in June, 1973, denied the motion of the defendants for summary judgment. While the appeal from the decision of the
district court in the civil case was pending before the court of appeals, the Supreme Court held, in Calandra v. United
States, 414 U.S. 338 (1974), that a grand jury is not precluded by the Fourth Amendment’s exclusionary rule from
questioning a witness on the basis of evidence that had been illegally seized. A divided court of appeals subsequently
held in McSurely v. McClellan, 521 F.2d 1024, 1047 (D.C. Cir. 1975), that under Calandra “a congressional committee
(continued...)
There is no required verbal formula for invoking the privilege, nor does there appear to be
necessary a warning by the committee. 96 A committee should recognize any reasonable
indication, such as “the fifth amendment,” that the witness is asserting his privilege.97 Where a
committee is uncertain whether the witness is in fact invoking the privilege against self-
incrimination or is claiming some other basis for declining to answer, the committee should direct
the witness to specify his privilege or objection.98
(...continued)
has the right in its investigatory capacity to use the product of a past unlawful search and seizure.”
The decision of the three-judge panel in the civil case was vacated and on rehearing by the full District of Columbia
Circuit, five judges were of the view that Calandra was applicable to the legislative sphere and another five judges
found it unnecessary to decide whether Calandra applies to committees but indicated that, even if it does not apply to
the legislative branch, the exclusionary rule may restrict a committee’s use of unlawfully seized documents if it does
not make mere “derivative use” of them but commits an independent fourth amendment violation in obtaining them.
McSurely v. McClellan, 553 F.2d 1277, 1293-94, 1317-25 (D.C. Cir. 1976) (en banc). The Supreme Court granted
certiorari in the case, 434 U.S. 888 (1977), but subsequently dismissed certiorari as improvidently granted, with no
explanation for this disposition of the case. See McAdams v. McSurely, 438 U.S. 189 (1978). Jury verdicts were
eventually returned against the Senate defendants, but were reversed in part on appeal. See 753 F.2d 88 (D.C. Cir.
1985), cert. denied, 54 U.S.L.W. 3372 (Dee. 3, 1985).
88
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178 (1957); Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955).
89
See McPhaul v. United States, 364 U.S. 372 (1960); see also McCormick, EVIDENCE § 120 (Cleary ed. 1984)
[hereinafter McCormick].
90
Hale v . Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
91
Bellis v. United States, 417 U.S. 85 (1974).
92
See United States v. White, 322 U.S. 694 (1944).
93
Bellis, 417 U.S. at 90; see also Rogers v. United States, 340 U.S. 367 (1951) (Communist Party).
94
Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391, 409 (1976); Andresen v. Maryland, 427 U.S. 463 (1976). The cases concerned
business records and there may be some protection available in the case of a subpoena for personal papers. See
McCormick, supra note 89 at §§ 126, 127.
95
United States v. Coe, 465 U.S. 605 (1984); Fisher v. United States, 425 U.S. 391 (1976); see also Curcio v. United
States, 354 U.S. 118 (1957); McCormick, supra note 89 at § 126.
96
Although there is no case law on point, it seems unlikely that Miranda warnings are required. That requirement flows
from judicial concern as to the validity of confessions evoked in an environment of a police station, isolated from
public scrutiny, with the possible threat of physical and prosecutorial jeopardy; an environment clearly distinguishable
from a congressional context. See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).
97
Quinn v. United States, 349 U.S. 155 (1955).
98
Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955); see also Leading Cases, supra note 297 at 63.
The committee can review the assertion of the privilege by a witness to determine its validity, but
the witness is not required to articulate the precise hazard that he fears. In regard to the assertion
of the privilege in judicial proceedings, the Supreme Court has advised:
To sustain the privilege, it need only be evident, from the implications of the question, in the
setting in which it is asked, that a responsive answer to the question or an explanation of why
it cannot be answered might be dangerous because injurious disclosure could result .... To
reject a claim, it should be ‘perfectly clear, from a careful consideration of all the
circumstances of the case, that the witness is mistaken, and that the answers cannot possibly
have a tendency’ to incriminate.99
The basis for asserting the privilege was elaborated upon in a lower court decision:
The privilege may only be asserted when there is reasonable apprehension on the part of the
witness that his answer would furnish some evidence upon which he could be convicted of a
criminal offense ... or which would reveal sources from which evidence could be obtained
that would lead to such conviction or to prosecution therefore ... .Once it has become
apparent that the answers to a question would expose a witness to the danger of conviction or
prosecution, wider latitude is permitted the witness in refusing to answer other questions.100
The privilege against self-incrimination may be waived by declining to assert it, specifically
disclaiming it, or testifying on the same matters as to which the privilege is later asserted.
However, because of the importance of the privilege, a court will not construe an ambiguous
statement of a witness before a committee as a waiver. 101
Where a witness asserts the privilege, the full House or the committee conducting the
investigation may seek a court order which (a) directs the witness to testify and (b) grants him
immunity against the use of his testimony, or other evidence derived from his testimony, in a
subsequent criminal prosecution. 102 As previously discussed, the immunity that is granted is “use”
immunity, not “transactional” immunity.103 Neither the immunized testimony that the witness
gives, nor evidence derived therefrom, may be used against him in a subsequent criminal
prosecution, except one for perjury or contempt relating to his testimony. However, he may be
convicted of the crime (the “transaction”) on the basis of other evidence. 104
99
Hoffman v. United States, 341 U.S. 479, 486-87 (1951).
100
United States v. Jaffee, 98 F. Supp. 191, 193-94 (D.D.C. 1951); see also Simpson v. United States, 241 F.2d 222 (9th
Cir. 1957) (privilege inapplicable to questions seeking basic identifying information, such as the witness’s name and
address).
101
Emspak v. United States, 349 U.S. 190 (1955); see also Johnson v. Zerbst, 304 U.S. 458, 464 (1938).
102
18 U.S.C. §§ 6002, 6005 (2000).
103
See supra, notes 49-52 and accompanying text.
104
The constitutionality of granting a witness only use immunity, rather than transactional immunity, was upheld in
Kastigar v. United States, 406 U.S. 441 (1972). In United States v. Romano, 583 F.2d 1 (1st Cir. 1978), the defendant
appealed from his conviction of several offenses on the ground, inter alia, that the prosecution’s evidence had been
derived, in part, from immunized testimony that he had given before a Senate subcommittee. Although the conviction
was affirmed, the case illustrates the difficulty that the prosecutor may have in establishing that its evidence was not
“tainted,” but rather was derived from independent sources, especially in a case where there was some cooperation in
the investigation between a committee and the Justice Department prior to the grant of immunity to testify before the
committee. See Kastigar, 406 U.S. at 461-621.
An application for a judicial immunity order must be approved by a majority of the House or
Senate or by a two-thirds vote of the full committee seeking the order.105 The Attorney General
must be notified at least ten days prior to the request for the order, and he can request a delay of
twenty days in issuing the order.106 Although the order to testify may be issued before the
witness’s appearance,107 it does not become legally effective until the witness has been asked the
question, invoked his privilege, and been presented with the court order.108 The role of the court
in issuing the order has been held to be ministerial and, thus, if the procedural requirements under
the immunity statute have been met, the court may not refuse to issue the order or impose
conditions on the grant of immunity.109
Attorney-Client Privilege
In practice, the exercise of committee discretion whether to accept a claim of attorney-client
privilege has turned on a “weighing [of] the legislative need for disclosure against any possible
resulting injury.”113 More particularly, the process by which committees resolve claims of
attorney-client privilege has traditionally been informed by weighing considerations of legislative
need, public policy, and the statutory duty of congressional committees to engage in continuous
105
18 U.S.C. § 6005(a) (2006).
106
However, the Justice Department may waive the notice requirement. Application of the Senate Permanent
Subcommittee on Investigations, 655 F.2d 1232, 1236 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 454 U.S. 1084 (1981).
107
Application of the Senate Permanentt Subcommittee on Investigations, 655 F.2d at 1257.
108
See In re McElreath, 248 F.2d 612 (D.C. Cir. 1957) (en banc).
109
Application of the U.S. Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities , 361 F. Supp. 1270 (D.D.C.
1973). In dicta, however, the court referred to the legislative history of the statutory procedure, which suggests that
although a court lacks power to review the advisability of granting immunity, a court may consider the jurisdiction of
Congress and the committee over the subject area and the relevance of the information that is sought to the committee’s
inquiry. See id. at 1278-79.
110
Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456, 467-68 (1961). As the court explained in that case, there is a separate
statutory requirement of pertinency.
111
Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 214-15 (1957).
112
Deutch v. United States, 367 U.S. 456, 467-68 (1961).
113
Hearings, “International Uranium Cartel,” Subcomm. on Oversight and Investigations, House Comm. on Interstate
and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., Vol. 1, 123 (1977).
oversight of the application, administration, and execution of laws that fall within their
jurisdiction,114 against any possible injury to the witness. In the particular circumstances of any
situation, a committee may consider and evaluate inter alia: the strength of a claimant’s assertion
in light of the pertinency of the documents or information sought to the subject of the
investigation; the practical unavailability of the documents or information from any other source;
the possible unavailability of the privilege to the claimant if it were to be raised in a judicial
forum; and the committee’s assessment of the cooperation of the witness in the matter. A valid
claim of attorney-client privilege, free of any taint of waiver, exception or other mitigating
circumstance, would merit substantial weight. Any serious doubt, however, as to the validity of
the asserted claim would diminish its compelling character. 115 Moreover, the conclusion that
recognition of non-constitutionally based privileges, such as attorney-client privilege, is a matter
of congressional discretion is consistent with both traditional British parliamentary and the
Congress’s historical practice.116
Although there is limited case law with respect to attorney-client privilege claims before
congressional committees,117 appellate court rulings on the privilege in cases involving other
investigative contexts (e.g., grand jury) have raised questions as to whether executive branch
officials may claim attorney-client, work product, or deliberative process privileges in the face of
investigative demands.118 These rulings may lead to additional arguments in support of the long-
standing congressional practice.
114
See 2 U.S.C. § 190d (2006).
115
See, e.g., Contempt of Congress Against Franklin L. Haney, H.Rept. 105-792, 105th Cong., 11-15 (1998);
Proceedings Against John M. Quinn, David Watkins, and Matthew Moore (Pursuant to Title 2, United States Code,
Sections 192 and 194), H.Rept. 104-598, 104th Cong., 40-54 (1996); Refusal of William H. Kennedy, III, To Produce
Notes Subpoenaed by the Special Committee to Investigate Whitewater Development Corporation and Related Matters,
S.Rept. 104-191, 104th Cong., 9-19 (1995); Proceedings Against Ralph Bernstein and Joseph Bernstein, H.Rept. 99-
462, 99th Cong., 13, 14 (1986); Hearings, International Uranium Control, before the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations, House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th Cong., 60, 123 (1977).
116
See, CRS Report 95-464, Investigative Oversight: An Introduction to the Law, Practice and Procedure of
Congressional Inquiry, pp. 43-55 (April 7, 1995); see also, Glenn A. Beard, Congress v. the Attorney-Client Privilege:
A “Full and Frank Discussion,” 35 Amer. CRIM. L. REV. 119 122-127 (1997) (“[C]ongressional witnesses are not
legally entitled to the protection of the attorney-client privilege, and investigating committees therefore have
discretionary authority to respect or overrule such claims as they see fit.”); Thomas Millett, The Applicability of
Evidentiary Privileges for Confidential Communications Before Congress, 21 JOHN MARSHALL L. REV. 309 (1988).
117
See In the Matter of Provident Life and Accident Co., E.D. Tenn., S.D., CIV-1-90-219, June 13, 1990 (noting that
the court’s earlier ruling on an attorney-client privilege claim was “not of constitutional dimensions, and is certainly not
binding on the Congress of the United States.”).
118
In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F. 3d 910 (8th Cir. 1997), cert. denied sub. nom., Office of the
President v. Office of the Independent Counsel, 521 U.S. 1105 (1997) (rejecting claims by the First Lady of attorney-
client and work-product privilege with respect notes taken by White House Counsel Office attorneys); In re Bruce R.
Lindsey (Grand Jury Testimony), 158 F. 3d 1263 (D.C. Cir. 1998), cert. denied, 525 U.S. 996 (1998) (holding that a
White House attorney may not invoke attorney-client privilege in response to grand jury subpoena seeking information
on possible commission of federal crimes); In re Sealed Case (Espy), 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997) (deciding that the
deliberative process privilege is a common law agency privilege which can be overcome by a showing of need by an
investigating body); In re: A Witness Before the Special Grand Jury, 288 F.3d 289 (7th Cir. 2002) (holding that the
attorney-client privilege is not applicable to communications between state government counsel and state office
holder); But see In re Grand Jury Investigation, 399 F.3d 527 (2d Cir. 2005) (upholding a claim of attorney-client
privilege with respect to communications between a former chief legal counsel to the governor of Connecticut who was
under grand jury investigation. It is worth noting that the Second Circuit recognized its apparent conflict with the afore-
cited cases, however, the ruling is arguably distinguishable on its facts. See Kerri R. Blumenauer, Privileged or Not?
How the Current Application of the Government Attorney-Client Privilege Leaves the Government Feeling
Unprivileged, 75 FORDHAM L. REV. 75 (2006)).
The legal basis for Congress’s practice in this area is based upon its inplicit constitutional
prerogative to investigate, which has been long recognized by the Supreme Court as extremely
broad and encompassing, and is at its peak when the subject is waste, fraud, abuse, or
maladministration within a government department.119 The attorney-client privilege is, on the
other hand, not a constitutionally based privilege; rather it is a judge-made exception to the
normal principle of full disclosure in the adversary process which is to be narrowly construed and
has been confined to the judicial forum.120
Subsequently, on February 16, 1999, the D.C. Bar’s Ethics Committee issued an opinion
vindicating the action taken by the firm. The Ethics Committee, interpreting D.C. Bar Rule of
Professional conduct 1.6(d)(2)(A), 126 held that an attorney faced with a congressional subpoena
that would reveal client confidences or secrets
119
McGrain v. Daugherty, 272 U.S. 135, 177 (1926); Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 187 (1957); Eastland v.
United States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 504 n.15 (1975).
120
Westinghouse Electric Corporation v. Republic of the Philippines, 951 F.2d 1414, 1423 (3d Cir. 1991).
121
The Supreme Court has recognized that “only infrequently have witnesses . . . [in congressional hearings] been
afforded the procedural rights normally associated with an adjudicative proceeding.” Hannah v. Larche, 363 U.S. 420,
425 (1960); see also United States v. Fort, 443 F. 2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1971) (rejecting
the contention that the constitutional right to cross-examine witnesses applied to a congressional investigation); In the
Matter of Provident Life and Accident Co., E.D. Tenn., S.D., CIV-1-90-219, June 13, 1990 (noting that the court’s
earlier ruling on an attorney-client privilege claim was “not of constitutional dimensions, and is certainly not binding
on the Congress of the United States.”).
122
Opinion No. 288, Compliance With Subpoena from Congressional Committee to Produce Lawyers’ Files
Containing Client Confidences or Secrets, Legal Ethics Committee, District of Columbia Bar, February 16, 1999. (D.C
Ethics Committee Opinion).
123
See H. Rep. No. 105-792, 105th Cong., 1-6, 7-8, 15-16 (1997).
124
See Meeting on Portal Investigation (Authorization of Subpoenas; Receipt of Subpoenaed Documents and
Consideration of Objections); and Contempt of Congress Proceedings Against Franklin L. Haney, H. Comm. On
Commerce, 105th Cong., 48-50 (1998).
125
Id. at 101-105.
126
Under Rule 1.6(d)(2)(A) a lawyer may reveal client confidences or secrets only when expressly permitted by the
D.C. Bar rules or when “required by law or court order.”
has a professional responsibility to seek to quash or limit the subpoena on all available,
legitimate grounds to protect confidential documents and client secrets. If, thereafter, the
Congressional subcommittee overrules these objections, orders production of the documents
and threatens to hold the lawyer in contempt absent compliance with the subpoena, then, in
the absence of a judicial order forbidding the production, the lawyer is permitted, but not
required, by the D.C. Rules of Professional Conduct to produce the subpoenaed documents.
A directive of a Congressional subcommittee accompanied by a threat of fines and
imprisonment pursuant to federal criminal law satisfies the standard of “required by law” as
that phrase is used in D.C. Rule of Professional conduct 1.6(d)(2)(A).
The D.C. Bar opinion urges attorneys to press every appropriate objection to the subpoena until
no further avenues of appeal are available, and even suggests that clients might be advised to
retain other counsel to institute a third-party action to enjoin compliance,127 but allows the
attorney to relent at the earliest point when he is put in legal jeopardy. The opinion represents the
first, and thus far the only, bar association in the nation to directly and definitively address the
merits of the issue.
In the end, it is the congressional committee alone that determines whether to accept a claim of
attorney-client privilege.
127
A direct suit to enjoin a committee from enforcing a subpoena has been foreclosed by the Supreme Court’s decision
in Eastland v. United States Servicemen’s Fund, 421 U.S. 491, 501 (1975), but that ruling does not appear to foreclose
an action against a “third party,” such as the client’s attorney, to test the validity of the subpoena or the power of a
committee to refuse to recognize the privilege. See, e.g., United States v. AT&T, 567 F. 2d 121 (D.C.Cir. 1977)
(entertaining an action by the Justice Department to enjoin AT&T from complying with a subpoena to provide
telephone records that might compromise national security matters).
128
See generally, 8 Wigmore, EVIDENCE § 2285 (McNaughton ed. 1961); see also FED. R. EVID. 501.
129
Compare Attorney-Client Privilege: Memoranda Opinions of the American Law Division, Library of Congress,
Comm. Print of the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations of the House Committee on Energy and Commerce,
98th Cong., 926 (1983) [hereinafter Attorney-Client Privilege Comm. Print], with Id. at 41, 44 et. seq; see also
generally, Moreland, supra note 13 at 265-67.
130
See e.g., In re Grand Jury Subpoena Duces Tecum, 112 F.3d 907, 924-25 (8th Cir. 1997); In re Grand Jury
Proceedings, 5 F.Supp.2d 21, 39 (D.D.C. 1998).
131
United States v. Fort, 443 F.2d 670 (D.C. Cir. 1970), cert. denied, 403 U.S. 932 (1971), (citing Hannah v. Larche,
363 U.S. 420 (1960)).
section 5 rulemaking powers,132 under which each House is the exclusive decision-maker
regarding the rules of its own proceedings. This rulemaking authority, as well as general
separation of powers considerations, suggest that Congress and its committees are not obliged to
abide by rules established by the courts to govern their own proceedings.133
Though congressional committees may not be legally obligated to recognize the privilege for
confidential communications, they may do so at their discretion. Historical precedent suggests
that committees often have recognized such privileges. 134 The decision as to whether or not to
allow such claims of privilege turns on a “weighing [of] the legislative need for disclosure against
any possible resulting injury.”135
132
U.S. CONST. Art. 1, § 5, cl. 2.
133
See generally, Telford Taylor, GRAND INQUEST : THE STORY OF CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS 227-28 (1974).
134
See Hamilton, supra note 70, at 244; see also S. Rept. No. 2, 84th Cong. (1955). Hamilton notes that John Dean, the
former counsel to the President, testified before the Senate Watergate Committee after Nixon had “waived any
attorney-client privilege he might have had because of their relationship.” Id.
135
Attorney-Client Privilege Comm. Print, supra note 129, at 27 (citing Hearings on an International Uranium Cartel
before the Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigations, House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce, 95th
Cong., 60, 123 (1977)).
136
See generally, CRS Report 95-464, Investigative Oversight: An Introduction to the Law, Practice and Procedure of
Congressional Inquiry, by Morton Rosenberg (available upon request).
137
See, e.g., In Re Sealed Case (Espy), 121 F. 3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
Indeed, most such disputes are settled short of litigation through negotiations between the
branches.138 The few situations that have reached a judicial forum, have found the federal courts
highly reluctant to rule on the merits. However, in United States v. Nixon, which involved a
judicial subpoena issued to the President at the request of the Watergate special prosecutor,139 the
Supreme Court found a constitutional basis for the doctrine of executive privilege in “the
supremacy of each branch within its own assigned area of constitutional duties” and in the
separation of powers. Although it considered presidential communications to be “presumptively
privileged,” the Court rejected the President’s contention that the privilege was absolute, thereby
precluding judicial review whenever it is asserted. The Court held that the judicial need for the
tapes outweighed the President’s “generalized interest in confidentiality.” The Court was careful
to limit the scope of its decision, noting that “we are not here concerned with the balance between
the President’s generalized interest in confidentiality . . . and congressional demands for
information.”140
Including Nixon, of the seven court decisions involving interbranch information access
disputes, 141 three have involved Congress and the Executive, but only one of these resulted in a
decision on the merits.142 One other case, involving legislation granting custody of President
Nixon’s presidential records to the Administrator of the General Services Administration, also
determined several pertinent executive privilege issues.143 Until the District of Columbia Circuit’s
1997 ruling in In re Sealed Case,144 and its 2004 ruling in Judicial Watch Inc. v. Department of
Justice,145 these judicial decisions had left important gaps in the law of presidential privilege
which increasingly became focal points, if not the source, of subsequent interbranch
confrontations. Among the more significant issues left open to debate included: whether the
President has to have actually seen or been familiar with the disputed matter; whether the
presidential privilege encompasses documents and information developed by, or in the possession
of, officers and employees in the departments and agencies of the Executive Branch; whether the
138
See, e.g., Neal Devins, Congressional-Executive Information Access Disputes: A Modest Proposal: Do Nothing, 48
ADMIN. L. REV., 109-137 (1996); Joel D. Bush, Congressional-Executive Access Disputes: Legal Standards and
Political Settlements, 9 J.L. & POL., 717 (1993); Stephen W. Stathis, Executive Cooperation: Presidential Recognition
of the Investigatory Authority of Congress and the Courts, 3 J.L. & POL., 183 (1986).
139
The subpoena was for certain tape recordings and documents relating to the President’s conversations with aides and
advisors. The materials were sought for use in a criminal trial.
140
418 U.S. 683, 712 n. 19 (1974). In Senate Select Committee on Presidential Campaign Activities v. Nixon, 498 F. 2d
725 (D.C. Cir. 1974), decided prior to U.S. v. Nixon, the appeals court denied the Watergate Committee’s access to five
presidential tapes because the committee had not met its burden of showing that “the subpoenaed evidence is
demonstrably critical to the responsible fulfillment of the Committee’s function.” The court noted that its denial was
based upon the initiation of impeachment proceedings by the House Judiciary Committee, the overlap of the
investigative objectives of both committees, and the fact that the impeachment committee already had the tapes in
question, concluding that “The Select Committee’s immediate oversight need for the subpoenaed tapes is, from a
congressional perspective, merely cumulative.” The unique and confining nature of the case’s factual and historical
context likely makes this an uncertain precedent for limiting a committee’s investigatory power in the face of a
presidential claim of privilege.
141
United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683 (1974); Nixon v. Sirica, 487 F.2d 700 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Senate Select
Committee v. Nixon, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974); United States v. AT&T, 551 F.2d 384 (D.C. Cir. 1976), appeal
after remand, 567 F.2d 121 (D.C. Cir. 1977); United States v. House of Representatives, 556 F.Supp. 150 (D.D.C.
1983); In re Sealed Case, 121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997); In re Grand Jury Proceedings, 5 F. Supp. 2d 21 (D.D.C.
1998).
142
Senate Select Committee, 498 F.2d 725 (D.C. Cir. 1974).
143
Nixon v. Administrator of General Services, 433 U.S. 425 (1977).
144
121 F.3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
145
365 F.3d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2004).
privilege encompasses all communications with respect to which the President may be interested
or is it confined to presidential decisionmaking and, if so, is it limited to any particular type of
presidential decisionmaking; and precisely what kind of demonstration of need must be shown to
justify release of materials that qualify for the privilege.
In In re Sealed Case (Espy), involving a grand jury subpoena for documents to the White House
Counsel’s Office during an independent counsel’s investigation of allegations of improprieties by
the Secretary of Agriculture, an appeals court held that the presidential communications privilege
extended to communications authored by or solicited and received by presidential advisers that
involved information regarding governmental operations that ultimately call for direct decision
making by the President, but he does not have to actually have seen the documents for which he
claims privilege. However, the court held that the privilege was held to be confined to White
House staff, and does not extend to staff in agencies. Moreover, the court concluded that the
privilege applied only to White House staff within “operational proximity” to direct presidential
decision making. According to the court, claims of executive privilege may be overcome by a
demonstration that each discrete group of subpoenaed materials likely contains important
evidence, and that the evidence was not available with due diligence elsewhere, a showing which
the court held the independent counsel had made. 146 In Espy, the appeals court held that the
independent counsel had met his burden and ordered the disclosure of the disputed documents.
The District of Columbia Circuit’s 2004 decision in Judicial Watch, Inc. v. Department of
Justice147 appears to lend substantial support to the above-expressed understanding of Espy. The
Judicial Watch dispute involved requests by Judicial Watch, Inc. for documents concerning
pardon applications and pardon grants reviewed by the Justice Department’s Office of the Pardon
Attorney and the Deputy Attorney General for consideration by President Clinton.148 Some 4,300
documents were withheld on the grounds that they were protected by the presidential
communications and deliberative process privileges. The district court held that because the
materials sought had been produced for the sole purpose of advising the President on a
“quintessential and non-delegable Presidential power” – the exercise of the President’s
constitutional pardon authority – the extension of the presidential communications privilege to
internal Justice Department documents which had not been “solicited and received” by the
President or the Office of the President was not warranted.149 The appeals court reversed,
concluding that “internal agency documents that are not solicited and received by the President or
his Office are instead protected against disclosure, if at all, by the deliberative process
privilege.”150
Guided by the analysis in Espy, the Judicial Watch majority emphasized that the “solicited and
received” limitation “is necessitated by the principles underlying the presidential communications
privilege, and a recognition of the dangers of expanding it too far.”151 Espy teaches, the court
146
121 F. 3d 729 (D.C. Cir. 1997).
147
365 F.3d 1108 (D.C. Cir. 2004). The panel split 2-1, with Judge Rogers writing for the majority and Judge Randolph
dissenting.
148
The President has delegated the formal process of review and recommendation of his pardon authority to the
Attorney General who in turn has delegated it to the Deputy Attorney General. The Deputy Attorney General oversees
the work of the Office of the Pardon Attorney.
149
365 F.3d at 1109-12.
150
Id. at 1112, 1114, 1123.
151
Id. at 1114.
explained, that the privilege may be invoked only when presidential advisers in close proximity to
the President who have significant responsibility for advising him on non-delegable matters
requiring direct presidential decisionmaking have solicited and received such documents or
communications or the President has received them himself. In rejecting the Government’s
argument that the privilege should be applicable to all departmental and agency communications
related to the Deputy Attorney General’s pardon recommendations for the President, the panel
majority held that:
such a bright-line rule is inconsistent with the nature and principles of the presidential
communications privilege, as well as the goal of serving the public interest. ...
Communications never received by the President or his Office are unlikely to “be revelatory
of his deliberations ... nor is there any reason to fear that the Deputy Attorney General’s
candor or the quality of the Deputy’s pardon recommendations would be sacrificed if the
presidential communications privilege did not apply to internal documents. ... Any pardon
documents, reports or recommendations that the Deputy Attorney General submits to the
Office of the President, and any direct communications the Deputy or the Pardon Attorney
may have with the White House Counsel or other immediate Presidential advisers will
remain protected. ... It is only those documents and recommendations of Department staff
that are not submitted by the Deputy Attorney General for the President and are not
otherwise received by the Office of the President, that do not fall under the presidential
communications privilege.152
Indeed, the Judicial Watch panel makes it clear that the Espy rationale would preclude cabinet
department heads from being treated as being part of the President’s immediate personal staff or
as some unit of the Office of the President:
The Judicial Watch majority took great pains to explain why Espy and the case before it differed
from the Nixon and post-Watergate cases. According to the court, “[u]ntil In re Sealed Case, the
privilege had been tied specifically to direct communications of the President with his immediate
White House advisors.”154 The Espy court, it explained, was for the first time confronted with the
question whether communications that the President’s closest advisors make in the course of
preparing advise for the President and which the President never saw should also be covered by
the presidential privilege. The Espy court’s answer was to “espouse[ ] a ‘limited extension’ of the
privilege’ ‘down the chain of command’ beyond the President to his immediate White House
advisors only,” recognizing “the need to ensure that the President would receive full and frank
advice with regard to his non-delegable appointment and removal powers, but was also wary of
undermining countervailing considerations such as openness in government.... Hence, the [Espy]
court determined that while ‘communications authored or solicited and received’ by immediate
White House advisors in the Office of the President could qualify under the privilege,
152
Id. at 1117.
153
Id. at 1121-22.
154
Id. at 1116.
communications of staff outside the White House in executive branch agencies that were not
solicited and received by such White House advisors could not.”155
The situation before the Judicial Watch court tested the Espy principles. While the presidential
decision involved—exercise of the President’s pardon power—was certainly a non-delegable,
core presidential function, the operating officials involved, the Deputy Attorney General and the
Pardon Attorney, were deemed to be too remote from the President and his senior White House
advisors to be protected. The court conceded that functionally those officials were performing a
task directly related to the pardon decision but concluded that an organizational test was more
appropriate for confining the potentially broad sweep that would result from a functional test;
under the latter test, there would be no limit to the coverage of the presidential communications
privilege. In such circumstances, the majority concluded, the lesser protections of the deliberative
process privilege would have to suffice. 156 The appeals court ordered the disclosure of 4,300
withheld documents.
Since the Kennedy Administration, executive policy directives establish that presidential
executive privilege may be asserted only by the President personally. The latest such directive,
issued by President Reagan in November 1982, and still in effect, requires that when agency
heads believe that a congressional information request raises substantial questions of executive
privilege they are to notify and consult with the attorney general and the counsel to the President.
If the matter is deemed to justify invocation of the privilege, it is reported to the President who
makes his decision.
However, a memorandum of September 28, 1994, from White House Counsel Lloyd Cutler to all
department and agency general counsels modified the Reagan policy by requiring agency heads
directly to notify the White House Counsel of any congressional request for “any document
created in the White House . . . or in a department or agency, that contains deliberations of, or
advice to or from, the White House” that may raise privilege issues. The White House counsel is
to seek an accommodation and, if that does not succeed, he is to consult the attorney general to
determine whether to recommend invocation of privilege to the President. The President then
determines whether to claim privilege, which is then communicated to the Congress by the White
House Counsel. Thus, it would appear that decision making with respect to claims of presidential
privilege is now fully centralized in the White House, but that the President must still personally
assert the claim. It does not appear that the Obama Administration has taken a public position on
the Reagan memorandum or the subsequent Cutler modification, but that could simply be because
President Obama has yet to make a claim of executive privilege.
The administration of President George W. Bush, through presidential signing statements157 and
opinions of the Department of Justice’s Office of Legal Counsel (OLC), articulated a legal view
of the breadth and reach of presidential constitutional prerogatives that, if applied to information
and documents often sought by congressional committees, would stymie such inquiries.158 In the
155
Id. at 1116-117.
156
Id. at 1118-24.
157
See CRS Report RL33667, Presidential Signing Statements: Constitutional and Institutional Implications, by T. J.
Halstead.
158
See Letter dated May 21, 2004 to Hon. Alex M. Azar, II, General Counsel, Department of Health and Human
Services from Jack L. Goldsmith III, Assistant Attorney General, Office of Legal Counsel, Department of Justice,
available at, http://www.usdoj.gov/olc/crsmemoresponsese.htm.
Bush Administration OLC’s view, under the precepts of executive privilege and the unitary
executive, Congress may not bypass the procedures the President establishes to authorize
disclosure to Congress of classified, privileged, or even non-privileged information by vesting
lower-level officers or employees with a right to disclose such information without presidential
authorization. Thus, OLC has declared that, “right of disclosure” statutes “unconstitutionally limit
the ability of the President and his appointees to supervise and control the work of subordinate
officers and employees of the Executive Branch.”159
The Bush Administration’s OLC assertions of these broad notions of presidential prerogatives
were unaccompanied by any authoritative judicial citations and, as indicated in the above
discussion, recent appellate court rulings cast considerable doubt on the broad claims of privilege
posited by OLC. Taken together, Espy and Judicial Watch arguably have effected important
qualifications and restraints on the nature, scope and reach of the presidential communications
privilege. As established by those cases, and until reviewed by the Supreme Court, to
appropriately invoke the privilege the following elements appear to be essential:
1. The protected communication must relate to a “quintessential and non-delegable
presidential power.” Espy and Judicial Watch involved the appointment and
removal and the pardon powers, respectively. Other core, direct presidential
decisionmaking powers include the Commander-in-Chief power, the sole
authority to receive ambassadors and other public ministers, the power to
negotiate treaties, and the power to grant pardons. It would arguably not include
decisionmaking with respect to laws that vest policymaking and implementation
authority in the heads of departments and agencies or which allow presidential
delegations of authority.
2. The communication must be authored or “solicited and received” by a close
White House advisor (or the President). The judicial test is that an advisor must
be in “operational proximity” with the President. This effectively means that the
scope of the presidential communications privilege extends only to the
boundaries of the White House and the Executive Office complex.
3. The presidential communications privilege remains a qualified privilege that may
be overcome by a showing of need and unavailability of the information
elsewhere by an appropriate investigating authority. The Espy court found an
adequate showing of need by the Independent Counsel; while in Judicial Watch,
the court found the privilege did not apply and the deliberative process privilege
was unavailing.
Other Limitations
159
Id. at 3.
160
See John C. Grabow, CONGRESSIONAL INVESTIGATIONS: LAW AND PRACTICE, § 3.2[b] (1988) (noting a 1985 attempt
by a Senate committee to serve a member of the Soviet Navy while on a Soviet freighter located temporarily in
American waters, and a 1986 attempt by various House committees to serve Ferdinand Marcos, the exiled former
(continued...)
provide a unique view both of the difficulties that may be encountered by committees in securing
judicial assistance abroad and the use of imaginative improvisation. 161 The House and Senate
Select Committees investigating the Iran-Contra matter were faced with formidable obstacles
from the outset, including, but not limited to: a relatively short deadline to complete their
investigation; a parallel Independent Counsel investigation competing for the same evidence;
witnesses and evidence in foreign countries with strict secrecy laws; and an Administration that
would not cooperate in facilitating any possible diplomatic accommodations.
One instance of an attempt to obtain information located overseas occurred with respect to
information contained in Swiss bank accounts. The Independent Counsel was qualified under §
1782 and under a Swiss Treaty to seek judicial assistance, and did. The letters rogatory and treaty
processes, however, were considered too time-consuming and, as it turned out, could not provide
the Independent Counsel all that he needed. 162 The Committees sought a sharing agreement with
the Independent Counsel, but he was reluctant to jeopardize his arrangement under the Treaty
with the Swiss government. With doubt whether they could use § 1782, the Committees
abandoned this route.
In 1987, the Committees issued an order requiring that former Major Richard V. Secord execute a
consent directive authorizing the release of his offshore bank records and accounts to the
Committee. 163 When Mr. Secord refused to sign the consent directive, the Committee sought to
obtain a court order directing him to comply. 164 While the Committee did not prevail in the
Secord litigation, the matter was not disposed of on jurisdictional grounds. Specifically, the
district court noted its jurisdiction pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1364, as Mr. Secord was a private
citizen. Moreover, there is no mention or indication of any challenge to the Committee’s ability to
seek such an order. Rather, the case was decided on Fifth Amendment grounds, with the court
holding that there was a testimonial aspect to requiring the signing of the consent directive. 165
Thus, the court concluded that the Committee’s order was a violation of Mr. Secord’s Fifth
Amendment right against self-incrimination.166 An appeal was taken by the Senate Committee,
but it was dismissed when the Committees obtained the documents they had sought another way.
It should be noted that the next year the Supreme Court upheld the tactic as valid because signing
documents releasing the information was found not to be testimonial in nature and, therefore, did
not violate the Fifth Amendment. 167
(...continued)
president of the Philippines.) However, the author does not provide any supporting authority documenting these
attempts or any explanation for why they were unsuccessful.
161
See generally, George W. Van Cleve & Charles Tiefer, Navigating the Shoals of “Use” Immunity and Secret
International Enterprises in Major Congressional Investigations: Lessons of the Iran-Contra Affair, 55 MO. L. REV. 43
(1990) [hereinafter Van Cleve & Tiefer].
162
Id. at 75-77.
163
Senate Select Committee on Secret Military Assistance to Iran and the Nicaraguan Opposition v. Secord, 664
F.Supp. 562, 563 (D.D.C. 1987).
164
Id.
165
Id. at 564-65.
166
Id. at 566. The ruling was not appealed because of the time strictures imposed on the House and Senate Select
Committee’s inquiry. It may be noted that in 1988 the Supreme Court adopted the Senate’s argument in a different
case, holding that such a directive is not testimonial in nature. See Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988).
167
Van Cleve & Tiefer, supra note 161 at 77-79; see also Doe v. United States, 487 U.S. 201 (1988).
As a last resort, the Committees decided that to obtain the critical financial records they had to
grant use immunity to a principal target of the investigation in return for the records. The witness
was hiding in Paris, however, and would not subject himself to U.S. jurisdiction. To establish its
own investigative legitimacy and to satisfy the witness as to the authoritativeness of the immunity
grant, the Committees cloaked its chief counsel with the maximum amount of congressional
authority by obtaining an order (a “commission”) from a district court, under Rule 28 of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, empowering him (the “commissioner”) to obtain evidence in
another country and to bring it back. This contrasts with a letter rogatory, which goes to a foreign
court, and with domestic deposition practice, which occurs on notice without going to or from
any court. Finally, the House Committee issued the chief counsel a commission, much like a
subpoena in format, to further document his official status. The witness turned over the financial
documents and aided in deciphering and understanding them. 168 The legal sufficiency of the tactic
was never tested in court; nevertheless, it proved effective.
Two vehicles exist by which U.S. courts request assistance from foreign countries in obtaining
evidence (including witness testimony) located outside the United States: mutual legal assistance
treaties and letters rogatory. Mutual legal assistance treaties provide for two countries’ mutual
assistance in criminal proceedings. Letters rogatory are formal requests made by a court in one
country to a competent body in another country to serve process or order testimony of a witness
or the production of evidence. 170 U.S. courts are statutorily authorized to issue such letters.171
However, letters rogatory are generally considered a measure of last resort and are generally used
only when no mutual legal assistance treaty exists.172
The existence of a mutual legal assistance treaty, however, does not guarantee that a
congressional subpoena will be enforced in a foreign jurisdiction. Rather, the specific wording of
the treaty will still need to be consulted before any determination can be made. For example, the
United States and the United Kingdom have a mutual legal assistance treaty, which provides for
various forms of assistance in criminal investigations and prosecutions, including serving
documents, transferring persons in custody for testimony, and, in some cases, compelling
testimony. 173 Invocation of the treaty would likely be the method by which a U.S. court would
168
Id. at 79-80.
169
See supra, notes 53-59 and accompanying text.
170
See 22 C.F.R. § 92.54 (2008).
171
28 U.S.C. §§ 1781, 1782 (2006).
172
See United States Department of State, Preparation of Letters Rogatory, available at, http://travel.state.gov/law/
info/judicial/judicial_683.html (“Letters rogatory may be used in countries where multi-lateral or bilateral treaties on
judicial assistance are not in force to effect service of process or to obtain evidence if permitted by the laws of the
foreign country”).
173
Treaty with the United Kingdom on Mutual Legal Assistance on Criminal Matters, U.S.-U.K., S. Treaty Doc. 104-2
(1995).
seek assistance from the United Kingdom in obtaining evidence. 174 Article 19 of the treaty defines
the “proceedings” to which the treaty applies. Specifically, it applies to any proceeding “related to
criminal matters,” including “any measure or step taken in connection with the investigation or
prosecution of criminal offenses.”175 In addition, it allows relevant officials, in their discretion, to
“treat as proceedings for the purpose of this treaty such hearings before or investigations by any
court, administrative agency or administrative tribunal with respect to the imposition of civil or
administrative sanctions.”176 Although this language might appear on its face to apply to civil or
criminal contempt proceedings, the relevant proceeding would likely be considered the
underlying congressional testimony, rather than the contempt proceeding with the court.177
Because it would not result in criminal or civil sanctions, British officials may view a
congressional committee hearing as not being a “proceeding” under the treaty.
If a letter rogatory were found to be an appropriate vehicle despite the U.S.-U.K. mutual legal
assistance treaty, it appears that the United Kingdom might nevertheless decline to enforce such a
letter sent to compel a witness to testify in a congressional investigation. Principles of
international comity – i.e., “friendly dealing between nations at peace”178 – undergird countries’
mutual compliance with letters rogatory. Although reciprocity is not coterminous with
international comity and the Supreme Court has held that judicial assistance by U.S. courts need
not depend on reciprocity,179 many countries use reciprocity as a guide to determine compliance
with letters rogatory. Thus, it is important to examine the extent of U.S. compliance with other
countries’ letters rogatory to determine the likely extent of reciprocal compliance abroad. The
applicable statute authorizes a U.S. district court to assist a foreign court if: (1) the person from
whom discovery is sought resides (or may be found) in the district of the court to which the
application is made; (2) the discovery is for use in a proceeding before a foreign tribunal; and (3)
the application is made directly by a foreign tribunal rather than by any other “interested
person.”180 For present purposes, the requirement that the evidence be for use in a “proceeding
before a foreign tribunal” is the only requirement that might present a hardship for a foreign
governmental body in an analogous situation. Domestic courts have generally interpreted the
word “tribunal” as including only entities with the capacity to make a binding adjudication.181
Following this interpretation, a foreign country following a reciprocal approach may elect to
174
However, the U.S.-U.K. mutual assistance treaty does not expressly prohibit assistance requested outside the scope
of the treaty. See Id. at Art. 17 (“Assistance and procedures set forth in this treaty shall not prevent either of the parties
from granting assistance to the other party through the provisions of other internal agreements to which it is a party or
through the provisions of its national laws).
175
Id. at Art. 19.
176
Id.
177
See, e.g., In re Letters of Request to Examine Witnesses from the Court of Queens Bench for Manitoba, 488 F.2d
511 (9th Cir. 1973) (denying assistance on ground that the entity issuing the subpoena was not a tribunal, despite the
fact that the request was sent by the Chief Justice of the Court of Queen’s Bench for Manitoba).
178
Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 162 (1895).
179
See Intel Corp. v. Advanced Micro Devices, Inc., 542 U.S. 241, 263 (“Section 1782 is a provision for assistance to
tribunals abroad. It does not direct United States courts to engage in comparative analysis to determine whether
analogous proceedings exist here. Comparisons of that order can be fraught with danger.”).
180
28 U.S.C. § 1782 (2006).
181
See, e.g., In re Letters Rogatory Issued By Director of Inspection of Government of India, 285 F.2d 1017 (2d Cir.
1967) (denying judicial assistance for an Indian tax collection entity because the tax assessment process did not result
in any adjudicative proceeding); In re Letters of Request to Examine Witnesses from the Court of Queens Bench for
Manitoba, Canada, 488 F.2d 511 (9th Cir. 1973) (holding that assistance to the Canadian Commission of Inquiry was
not contemplated by the statute because the body’s purpose is to conduct investigations unrelated to judicial or quasi-
judicial controversies).
decline assistance when requests originate from congressional committees, which are not
commonly considered “tribunals” as they lack the legal authority to render binding adjudications.
Although the Privacy Act places certain limitations on the disclosure of information by executive
departments, Congress has expressly reserved its constitutional right of access to information,185
specifying that the limitations on the executive do not apply to disclosure of records by the
executive “to either House of Congress, or, to the extent of matter within its jurisdiction, any
committee or subcommittee thereof, any joint committee of Congress or subcommittee of any
such joint committee ....”186 The exemption permitting disclosure to Congress applies, by its
terms, to a disclosure to the House or Senate, or to a committee or subcommittee which has
jurisdiction over the subject of the disclosure. The exemption does not, however, permit
disclosures to committees without jurisdiction, minority members of committees, or to individual
Members of Congress.
182
5 U.S.C. § 552a (2006).
183
Id. at § 552a(b).
184
Id. at § 552a(a)(4).
185
Id. at § 552a(a)(5).
186
See, e.g., Watkins v. United States, 354 U.S. 178, 200 n.33 (1957); McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927).
Furthermore, the original guidelines adopted by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB)187
state that the exemption for disclosure to Congress “does not authorize the disclosure of a record
to Members of Congress acting in their individual capacities without the consent of the
individual.”188 Similarly, some court rulings have found that the congressional exemption applies
“only to a House of Congress or a committee or subcommittee, not to individual congressmen.”189
One case construed the exemption somewhat more broadly and held that it applies to a disclosure
to an individual Member “in his official capacity as a member of ... [a] subcommittee, not as an
individual Member of Congress.”190 Another case, construing language in the Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) comparable to that in the congressional exemption under the Privacy Act,
declined to distinguish between disclosure to a congressional committee and a single Member
acting in an official capacity.191
FOIA applies to “agencies,”193 which are defined to include “any executive department, military
department, Government corporation, Government controlled corporation, or other establishment
in the executive branch of the Government (including the Executive Office of the President), or
any independent regulatory agency.”194 Congress is not included within the scope of that
definition, therefore, records of the House, Senate, congressional committees, and Members are
not subject to disclosure.195
187
5 U.S.C. § 552a(b)(9) (2006). The House report on the act explained that the congressional exemption “relates to
personal information needed by the Congress and its committees and subcommittees. Occasionally, it is necessary to
inquire into such subjects for legislative and investigative reasons.” See H. Rept. 93-1416, 93rd Cong., 13 (1974). The
legislative history of the act is sketched in Devine v. United States, 202 F.3d 547, 552 (2nd Cir. 2000).
188
OMB is required to prescribe guidelines and regulations for the use of agencies in implementing the act. See 5
U.S.C. § 552a(v) (2006).
189
Office of Management and Budget, Privacy Act Guidelines, 40 FED. REG. 28,949, 28,955 (1975).
190
Swenson v. United States Postal Service, 890 F.2d 1075, 1077 (9th Cir. 1989). Accord Williams v. Stovall, 1993 WL
431149 (D.C. Cir. Oct. 14, 1993) (per curiam)(stating that the “Privacy Act’s exception for information disclosed to
Congress or its committees does not expressly provide for disclosure to individual members of Congress”). Cf. Exxon
Corp. v. FTC, 589 F.2d 582, 592-94 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 943 (1979). On remand, the district court
in Swenson held that the defendant had violated the Privacy Act by disclosing private facts about plaintiff’s status as a
Postal Service employee to two Members of Congress who contacted the Service following allegations by the plaintiff
that the Service had undercounted certain routes. See 1994 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 16524 (E.D. Cal. Mar. 10, 1994).
191
Devine, 202 F.3d at 549, 551 (letter from agency Inspector General, concerning investigation, to chairman and
member of subcommittee with jurisdiction over subject of letter, was within scope of congressional exemption).
192
Exemptions cover material such as trade secrets obtained from an individual. Id. § 552(b)(4).
193
Id. § 552(a).
194
Id. § 552(f).
195
See, e.g., United We Stand Am. v. IRS, 359 F.3d 595, 597 (D.C. Cir. 2004) (stating that “The Freedom of
(continued...)
Contained within FOIA itself, is a carefully provided exemption that states that the statute “is not
authority to withhold information from Congress.”196 The D.C. Circuit, in Murphy v. Department
of the Army,197 explained that FOIA exemptions were no basis for withholding from Congress
because of:
the obvious purpose of the Congress to carve out for itself a special right of access to
privileged information not shared by others . . . . Congress, whether as a body, through
committees, or otherwise, must have the widest possible access to executive branch
information if it is to perform its manifold responsibilities effectively. If one consequence of
the facilitation of such access is that some information will be disclosed to congressional
authorities but not to private persons, that is but an incidental consequence of the need for
informed and effective lawmakers.198
Thus, when a congressional committee of jurisdiction is seeking information from an agency for
legislative or oversight purposes, it acts not pursuant to FOIA, but rather pursuant to Congress’s
constitutionally-based right of access to information from the executive branch. 199 Arguably this
places Congress in a much stronger position than the general public as the agency should not be
able to avail itself of the exceptions provided by the FOIA statute and should have no legal basis
to withhold the information from Congress.
(...continued)
Information Act does not cover congressional documents.”); Dow Jones & Co. v. DOJ, 917 F.2d 571, 574 (D.C. Cir.
1990) (holding that Congress is not an agency for any purpose under FOIA); Dunnington v. DOD, No. 06-0925, 2007
WL 60902, at *1 (D.D.C. Jan. 8, 2007) (ruling that U.S. Senate and House of Representatives are not agencies under
FOIA).
196
5 U.S. C. § 552(d) (2006).
197
613 F. 2d 1151 (D.C. Cir. 1979).
198
Murphy, 613 F.2d at 1155-56, 1158.
199
See, e.g., McGrain v. Daugherty, 273 U.S. 135 (1927). When a committee seeks information from the executive, it
may do so by means of an informal request from committee staff, a letter signed by the committee chair, or by exercise
of the subpoena authority, which is vested in standing committees by both bodies. House Rule XI, cl. 2(m); Senate
Rule XXVI.
200
H. Rept. 1497, 89th Cong., 11-12 (1966).
201
See Department of Justice, Office of Information and Privacy, Freedom of Information Act Guide, 41-42, (Spring
2010), available at, http://www.justice.gov/oip/foia_guide09/procedural-requirements.pdf (stating that “individual
Members of Congress possess the same rights of access as ‘any person’”).
202
521 U.S. 811 (1997).
203
See CRS Report R40873, Congressional Participation in Article III Courts: Jurisdiction and Standing to Sue, by
Todd B. Tatelman.
combination of the availably of the exceptions and the lack of judicial enforcement render FOIA
requests by Members a generally ineffective means of obtaining information from the executive
branch.
(1) to prevent the escape of those whose indictment may be contemplated; (2) to insure the
utmost freedom to the grand jury in its deliberations, and to prevent persons subject to
indictment or their friends from importuning the grand jurors; (3) to prevent subornation of
perjury or tampering with the witness who may testify before [the] grand jury and later
appear at the trial of those indicted by it; (4) to encourage free and untrammeled disclosures
by persons who have information with respect to the commission of crimes; (5) to protect
[the] innocent accused who is exonerated from disclosure of the fact that he has been under
investigation and from the expense of standing trial where there was no probability of
guilt.204
Although Rule 6(e) codifies the traditional policies underlying grand jury secrecy, it remains
subject to the exceptions that those policies recognize.205 The rule, however, was arguably not
intended to insulate from disclosure all information once it is presented to a grand jury.206 Rather,
according to the courts, the aim of the rule is to “prevent disclosure of the way in which
information was presented to the grand jury, the specific questions and inquiries of the grand jury,
the deliberations and vote of the grand jury, the targets upon which the grand jury’s suspicion
focuses, and specific details of what took place before the grand jury.”207
Court approved disclosures of grand jury material require “a strong showing of particularized
need.”208 Persons or entities seeking disclosure “must show that the material they seek is needed
to avoid a possible injustice in another judicial proceeding, that the need for disclosure is greater
than the need for continued secrecy, and that their request is structured to cover only material so
needed.”209 Since any examination begins with a preference for preservation of the grand jury’s
204
United States v. John Doe, Inc., 481 U.S. 102, 109 n.5 (1987) (quoting United States v. Rose, 215 F.2d 617, 628-29
(3d Cir. 1954) & United States v. Procter & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 681-82 n.6. (1958)); see also Douglas Oil Co.
v. Petrol Stops Northwest, 441 U.S. 211, 219 n.10 (1979).
205
See In re Report & Recommendation of Grand Jury, 370 F.Supp. 1219, 1229 (D.D.C.1974).
206
United States v. Saks & Co., 426 F.Supp. 812, 814 (S.D.N.Y.1976).
207
In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ven-Fuel, 441 F.Supp. 1299, 1302-03 (D. Fla. 1977) (citing United States v.
Interstate Dress Carriers, Inc., 280 F.2d 52, 54 (2d Cir. 1960); United States v. Saks & Co., 426 F.Supp. at 815; In re
Senate Banking Committee Hearings, 19 F.R.D. 410, 412-13 (N.D.Ill.1956)).
208
United States v. Sells Engineering, Inc., 463 U.S. 418, 443 (1983); see also Right of Party in Civil Action to Obtain
Disclosure, Under Rule 6(e)(3)(C)(i) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure, of Matters Occurring Before Grand
Jury, 71 ALR Fed 10.
209
Douglas Oil Co. v. Northwest Petrol Stops, 441 U.S. at 222; see also United States v. Moussaoui, 483 F.3d 220, 235
(4th Cir. 2007); McAninch v. Wintermute, 491 F.3d 759, 767 (8th Cir. 2007); United States v. Aisenberg, 358 F.3d 1327,
1348 (11th Cir. 2004); United States v. Campbell, 324 F.3d 497, 498-99 (7th Cir. 2003); In re Special Grand Jury 89-2,
143 F.3d 565, 569-70 (10th Cir. 1998); In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Ballas), 62 F.3d 1175, 1179 (9th Cir. 1995);
(continued...)
secrets, the particularized need requirement cannot be satisfied simply by demonstrating that the
information sought would be relevant or useful or that acquiring it from the grand jury rather than
from some other available source would be more convenient.210
In determining whether “the need for disclosure is greater than the need for continued secrecy,”211
the district court enjoys discretion to judge each case on its own facts,212 but some general trends
seem to have developed. The need to shield the grand jury’s activities from public display is less
compelling once it has completed its inquiries and been discharged, 213 especially if the resulting
criminal proceedings have also been concluded. 214 Of course, there must still be a
counterbalancing demonstration of need, 215 a requirement that becomes more difficult if the grand
jury witnesses whose testimony is to be disclosed still run the risk of retaliation. 216 According to
several courts of appeal:
Courts have consistently distinguished the requests for documents generated independent of
the grand jury investigation from the request for grand jury minutes or witness transcripts
reasoning that the degree of exposure of the grand jury process inherent in the revelation of
subpoenaed documents is lesser than the degree of disclosure attributable to publication of
witness transcripts.217
Moreover, the courts seem responsive to requests to disclose matters occurring before the grand
jury for the purpose of resolving some specific inconsistency in the testimony of a witness, or to
refresh a witness’s recollection during the course of a trial.218
(...continued)
United States v. Miramontex, 995 F.2d 56, 59 (5th Cir. 1993).
210
In re Grand Jury 95-1, 118 F.3d 1433, 1437 (10th Cir. 1997); see also In re Grand Jury Investigation (Missouri), 55
F.3d 350, 354-55 (8th Cir. 1995); Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698, 715 (2d Cir. 1987); Hernly v. United States, 832
F.2d 980, 883-85 (7th Cir. 1987); In re Grand Jury Proceedings GJ-76-4 & GJ-75-3, 800 F.2d 1293, 1302 (4th Cir.
1986).
211
Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 222; United States v. Nix, 21 F.3d 347, 351 (9th Cir. 1994).
212
United States v. Aisenberg, 358 F.3d 1327, 1349 (11th Cir. 2004); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings (Ballas),
62 F.3d 1175, 1180 (9th Cir. 1995).
213
United States v. Socony-Vacuum Oil Co., 310 U.S. 150, 234 (1940); see also In re Grand Jury Investigation
(Missouri), 55 F.3d 380, 354 (8th Cir. 1995); In re Grand Jury Proceeding Relative to Perl, 838 F.2d 304, 307 (8th Cir.
1988).
214
United States v. Blackwell, 954 F.Supp. 944, 966 (D.N.J. 1997); see also In re Grand Jury Proceedings GJ-76-4 &
GJ-75-3, 800 F.2d at 1301 (4th Cir. 1986); In re Shopping Cart Antitrust Litigation, 95 F.R.D. 309, 312-13 (S.D.N.Y.
1982).
215
United States v. Aisenberg, 358 F.3d 1327, 1348 (11th Cir. 2004); see also Hernly v. United States, 832 F.2d 980,
985 (7th Cir. 1987); In re Grand Jury Testimony, 832 F.2d 60, 64 (5th Cir. 1987).
216
Cullen v. Margiotta, 811 F.2d 698 (2d Cir. 1987); see also In re Grand Jury Investigation (Missouri), 55 F.3d 350,
355 (8th Cir. 1955).
217
In re Grand Jury Proceeding Relative to Perl, 838 F.2d 304, 306-307 (8th Cir. 1988); see also In re Grand Jury
Investigation (Missouri), 55 F.3d at 354 (8th Cir. 1995); In re Sealed Case, 801 F.2d 1379, 1381 (D.C.Cir. 1986); In re
Grand Jury Investigation, 630 F.2d 996, 1000 (3d Cir. 1980).
218
Douglas Oil, 441 U.S. at 222 n.12; see also United States v. Rockwell International Corp., 173 F.3d 757, 759 (10th
Cir. 1999); In re Grand Jury, 832 F.2d 60, 63 (5th Cir. 1987); Lucas v. Turner, 725 F.2d 1095, 1105 (7th Cir. 1984);
United States v. Fischbach and Moore, Inc., 776 F.2d 839, 845 (9th Cir. 1985). Under much the same logic, a court may
afford a grand jury witness access to his or her earlier testimony prior to a subsequent appearance, In re Grand Jury,
490 F.3d 978, 986-90 (D.C. Cir. 2007).
Turning to instances that have involved Congress or congressional committees, there are
numerous examples in which entities of the legislative branch have sought and received material
that was covered by Rule 6(e). For example, in 1952, the Senate Banking Committee requested to
review documents in the custody of the United States Attorney that had been shown to a federal
grand jury.219 The committee filed a motion asking that the United States Attorney be directed to
permit inspection and to supply copies of the documents. The United States objected on the
ground that the secrecy and confidentiality of the grand jury would be breached; however, the
court ordered the documents disclosed, concluding that “when the fact or document is sought for
itself, independently, rather than because it was stated before or displayed to the grand jury, there
is no bar of secrecy.”220
Similarly, in In re Grand Jury Investigation of Ven-Fuel et al.221 a federal district court held that a
subcommittee requesting documents presented to a grand jury was not prohibited by Rule 6(e).
The Ven-Fuel court, however, went further and discussed Congress’s general power of inquiry
with respect to Rule 6(e) information. The court held that when Congress is acting within the
“legitimate sphere of legislative activity” it is legally entitled to Rule 6(e) information. 222 The
court thus ordered that the Chair and Members of the Subcommittee “be permitted to examine all
of the documents, without segregation and identification of those upon which the criminal
indictment was based, in order to determine what specific documents they wish produced for their
use.”223
When information sought by a congressional committee seeks to reveal what actually occurred
before the grand jury, however, the courts have been much more reluctant to order its disclosure.
In In Re Grand Jury Impaneled October 2, 1978 (79-2),224 the District Court for the District of
Columbia held that a Subcommittee’s request for an inventory of all documents subpoenaed by a
grand jury falls within the scope of Rule 6(e) and, therefore, was not required to be disclosed.225
The court was particularly concerned that such a disclosure would “set a dangerous precedent by
revealing a great deal about the scope and focus of the grand jury’s investigation.”226
Although it appears that the decision to release grand jury information to congressional
committees is considered on a case-by-case basis, provided that the information sought from the
grand jury does not intrude impermissibly into the scope and focus of the grand jury’s
investigation, there is a strong set of precedents that would support its disclosure.227
219
In re Senate Banking Committee Hearings, 19 F.R.D. 410 (N.D. Ill. 1956).
220
Id. at 412.
221
441 F.Supp. 1299, 1302-03 (D. Fla. 1977).
222
Id. at 1307 (stating that “[t]here is no question that Chairman Moss and the Subcommittee have demonstrated their
constitutionally independent legal right to the documents that they seek for their legitimate legislative activity.”).
223
Id.
224
510 F.Supp. 112 (D.D.C. 1981).
225
Id. at 114.
226
Id. at 115 (citing S.E.C. v. Dresser Indus., 628 F.2d 1368, 1382 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 993 (1980);
United States v. Stanford, 589 F.2d 285, 291 n.6 (7th Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 440 U.S. 983 (1980); Davis v. Romney, 55
F.R.D. 337, 341-42 (E.D. Pa. 1972)).
227
See, e.g., In re Grand Jury Investigations of Uranium Industry, 1979 WL 1661 (D.D.C. 1979) (holding that a
subcommittee was entitled to disclosure of certain financial and other documents presented to the grand jury including
DOJ analyses, memoranda, and recommendations); In re Senate Banking Committee Hearings, 19 F.R.D. 410 (N.D. Ill.
1956).
General Jackson’s views were reiterated by Attorney General William French Smith in 1982 as
also applying to documents:
which are sensitive memoranda or notes by EPA attorneys and investigators reflecting
enforcement strategy, legal analyses, lists of potential witnesses, settlement considerations
and similar materials the disclosure of which might adversely affect a pending enforcement
action, overall enforcement policy, or the rights of individuals. I continue to believe, as have
my predecessors, that unrestricted dissemination of law enforcement files would prejudice
the cause of effective law enforcement and, because the reasons for the policy of
confidentiality are as sound and fundamental to the administration of justice today as they
were forty years ago, I see no reason to depart from the consistent position of previous
presidents and attorney generals. 230
Acceding to congressional investigation demands, the Attorney General asserted, would make
Congress “in a sense, a partner in the investigation” raising “ a substantial danger that
congressional pressures will influence the course of the investigation.” This policy is said to be
“premised in part on the fact that the Constitution vests in the President and his subordinates the
responsibility to ‘Take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed.’”231
Finally, in the 2001-2002 House Government Reform Committee investigation of the FBI misuse
of informants, the Department maintained its historic position of withholding internal deliberative
prosecutorial documents until just weeks before its eventual abandonment. In a February 1, 2002,
letter to Chairman Burton, the DOJ Assistant Attorney General for Legislative Affairs explained:
[the Department of Justice’s] particular concern in the current controversy pertains to the
narrow and especially sensitive categories of advice memoranda to the Attorney General and
the deliberative documents making recommendations regarding whether or not to bring
criminal charges against individuals. We believe that the public interest in avoiding the
polarization of the criminal justice process required greater protection of those documents
which, in turn, influences the accommodation process. This is not an “inflexible position,”
228
40 OP. ATTY. GEN. 45 (1941).
229
Id. at 46-47.
230
Letter to Hon. John D. Dingell Chairman, House Subcommittee on Oversight and Investigation, Committee on
Energy and Commerce, from Attorney General William French Smith, dated November 30, 1982, reprinted in H.Rept.
No. 97-968, 97th Cong., 37-38 (1983).
231
Id.
A review of the case law in this area suggests that the courts have recognized the potentially
prejudicial effect congressional hearings can have on pending cases.233 While not questioning the
prerogatives of Congress with respect to oversight and investigation, the cases pose a political
choice for the Congress. On one hand, congressionally generated publicity may result in harming
the prosecutorial effort of the Executive. Conversely, access to information under secure
conditions can fulfill the congressional power of investigation and at the same time need not be
inconsistent with the authority of the executive to pursue its case. Although powerful arguments
may be made on both sides, the decision to pursue a congressional investigation of pending civil
or criminal matters remains a choice that is solely within Congress’ discretion to make,
irrespective of the consequences. As the Iran-Contra Independent Counsel observed “[t]he
legislative branch has the power to decide whether it is more important perhaps to destroy a
prosecution than to hold back testimony they need. They make that decision. It is not a judicial
decision, or a legal decision, but a political decision of the highest importance.”234
Information is classified at one of three levels based on the amount of danger that its unauthorized
disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause to national security.238 Information is classified
as “Top Secret” if its unauthorized disclosure could reasonably be expected to cause
“exceptionally grave damage” to national security. The standard for “Secret” information is
“serious damage” to national security, while for “confidential” information the standard is
“damage” to national security. Significantly, for each level, the original classifying officer must
232
Hearings, “ Investigation Into Allegations of Justice Department Misconduct In New England-Volume I,” House
Comm. on Government Reform, 107th Cong. 520-556, 562-604 (May 3, December 13, 2001; February 6, 2002).
233
See CRS Report RL34197, Congressional Investigations of the Department of Justice, 1920-2007: History, Law,
and Practice, by Morton Rosenberg at 16-18 (available upon request).
234
Lawrence E. Walsh, The Independent Counsel and the Separation of Powers, 25 HOUS. L. REV. 1, 9 (1988).
235
Exec. Order No. 13526, 75 FED. REG. 707 (January 5, 2010).
236
Id. at § 1.3. The unauthorized disclosure of foreign government information is presumed to damage national
security. Id. at § 1.1(b).
237
Id. at § 1.4. The areas are as follows: military plans, weapons systems, or operations; foreign government
information; intelligence activities, intelligence sources/methods, cryptology; foreign relations or foreign activities of
the United States, including confidential sources; scientific, technological, or economic matters relating to national
security; federal programs for safeguarding nuclear materials or facilities; vulnerabilities or capabilities of national
security systems; or weapons of mass destruction. Id. In addition, when classified information which is incorporated,
paraphrased, restated, or generated in a new form, that new form must be classified at the same level as the original. Id.
at §§ 2.1 - 2.2.
238
Id. at § 1.2.
identify or describe the specific danger potentially presented by the information’s disclosure.239
The officer who originally classifies the information establishes a date for declassification based
upon the expected duration of the information’s sensitivity. If the office cannot set an earlier
declassification date, then the information must be marked for declassification in 10 years’ time
or 25 years, depending on the sensitivity of the information. 240 The deadline for declassification
can be extended if the threat to national security still exists.241
Access to classified information is generally limited to those who demonstrate their eligibility to
the relevant agency head, sign a nondisclosure agreement, and have a need to know the
information. 242 The need-to-know requirement can be waived, however, for former Presidents and
Vice Presidents, historical researchers, and former policy-making officials who were appointed by
the President or Vice President.243 The information being accessed may not be removed from the
controlling agency’s premises without permission. Each agency is required to establish systems
for controlling the distribution of classified information.244
The Executive Order does not contain any instructions regarding disclosures to Congress or its
committees of jurisdiction. Members of Congress and federal judges are considered to have the
need to know and access to any classified material, regardless of level of classification, based on
their election/appointment to constitutional office. Congressional aides, support staff, and other
legislative branch employees, however, do not automatically have such access and, therefore,
must go through the necessary security clearance process prior to being permitted to review such
information. The Executive Order’s silence with respect to disclosure to Congress, combined with
the absence of any other law restricting congressional access to classified material, leads to the
conclusion that mere classification cannot be used as a legal basis to withhold information from
Congress. That said, practical and political concerns with respect to controlled access, secure
storage, and public disclosure may provide persuasive rationales for withholding or limiting
congressional access. Committees and subcommittees have wide discretion to negotiate with the
Administration regarding these issues. For example, an investigating committee or subcommittee
may choose to agree to review documents at an Executive Branch secure facility, permit
redactions of certain information such as “sources and methods,” limit the ability of staff to
review certain material, and/or opt to hold non-public meetings, briefings, and hearings where
classified information will be discussed. None of these measures are legally required, but all are
within the investigating entity’s discretion and may assist in facilitating the disclosure of
materials sought during the investigation.
239
Id. Classifying authorities are specifically prohibited from classifying information for reasons other than protecting
national security, such as to conceal violations of law or avoid embarrassment. Id. at § 1.7(a).
240
Id. at § 1.5.
241
Id. at § 1.5(c).
242
Id. at § 4.1.
243
Id. at § 4.4.
244
Id. at § 4.2.
245
See, e.g., S. Rep. No.755, Books 1-3, 94th Cong. (1976); Intelligence Activities, S. Res. 21: Hearings Before the
Senate Select Comm. to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities, vols. 1-6, 94th Cong.
(continued...)
The investigation that gave rise to the judicial dispute involved allegations of improper domestic
intelligence gathering, foreign intelligence gathering, and the wiretapping of telephone
communications without a warrant. In June of 1976, subpoenas were issued to the American
Telephone and Telegraph Company (AT&T) by the Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations of the House Committee on Interstate and Foreign Commerce. The Subcommittee
was seeking copies of “all national security request letters sent to AT&T and its subsidiaries by
the [Federal Bureau of Investigation] FBI as well as records of such taps prior to the time when
the practice of sending such letters was initiated.”246 Before AT&T could comply with the request,
the DOJ and the Subcommittee’s Chairman, Representative John Moss, entered into negotiations
seeking to reach an alternate agreement which would prevent AT&T from having to turn over all
of its records. 247 When these negotiations broke down, the DOJ sought an injunction prohibiting
AT&T from complying with the Subcommittee’s subpoenas. According to the court, the DOJ
based its claim on the “the damage to the national interest from the centralization and possible
disclosure outside of Congress, of information identifying the targets of all foreign intelligence
surveillance since 1969.”248 The District Court for the District of Columbia applied a balancing
test between the competing Executive and Legislative Branch authorities with respect to the
issues presented. That court concluded that the alternative offered by the President met most of
the Subcommittee’s needs. The court, however, deferred to the “final determination” of the
President that execution of the subpoena “would involve unacceptable risks of disclosure of
extremely sensitive foreign intelligence and counterintelligence information and would be
detrimental to the national defense and foreign policy of the United States” and issued the
injunction.249
On appeal, the Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit (D.C. Circuit) first dismissed
several prudential concerns. Specifically, the court considered the doctrines of mootness, political
question, and standing, determining that none of them prevented the court from reaching the
merits of the injunction.250 Next, the court very carefully addressed the claims of absolute rights
asserted by both the Congress and the Executive Branch. Relying on both Eastland v. United
States Servicemen’s Fund,251 and United States v. Nixon,252 the court concluded that while
generally congressional subpoena power cannot be interfered with by the courts, the “Eastland
immunity is not absolute in the context of a conflicting constitutional interest asserted by a
coordinate branch of government.”253 Turning to the Executive Branch’s claims of absolute
control over national security information, the court noted that Supreme Court precedent does
“not establish judicial deference to executive determinations in the area of national security when
the result of that deference would be to impede Congress in exercising its legislative powers.”254
(...continued)
(1975); FBI Oversight: Hearings Before the Subcomm. on Civil and Constitutional Rights of the House Comm. of the
Judiciary, parts 1-3, 94th Cong. (1975-1976), parts 1-2, 95th Cong. (1978).
246
United States v. AT&T, 551 F.2d 384, 385 (D.C. Cir. 1976) [hereinafter AT&T I].
247
Id. at 386. The precise details of the delicate negotiations between the DOJ and the Subcommittee are explained by
the court, and, therefore, will not be recounted here. See id. at 386-88.
248
Id. at 388.
249
United States v. AT&T & Moss, 419 F.Supp. 454, 458-461 (D.D.C.1976).
250
See AT&T I, 551 F.3d at 390-91.
251
421 U.S. 491 (1975).
252
418 U.S. 683 (1974).
253
Id. at 392 (citing United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 706 (1974)).
254
Id. (citing United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936) & Chicago & Southern Air Lines v.
(continued...)
Given the sensitivity of the constitutional balancing that the court was faced with, combined with
the fact that the parties had nearly reached an out-of-court settlement, the court expressly declined
to rule on the merits of the injunction. Rather, it remanded the case to the district court to modify
the injunction to exclude information for which no claim of national security had been made. 255
Moreover, the court directed the parties to continue negotiations and report to the district court on
their progress.256
After continued negotiations, which focused primarily on access to un-redacted DOJ memoranda,
the parties reached an impasse and found themselves back before the D.C. Circuit.257 Again, the
court was faced with a dispute between two assertions of absolute constitutional authority. On one
hand, the Executive Branch asserted absolute discretion with respect to national security
materials. The court again rejected this claim stating that:
the executive would have it that the Constitution confers on the executive absolute discretion
in the area of national security. This does not stand up. While the Constitution assigns to the
President a number of powers relating to national security, including the function of
commander in chief and the power to make treaties and appoint Ambassadors, it confers
upon Congress other powers equally inseparable from the national security, such as the
powers to declare war, raise and support armed forces and, in the case of the Senate, consent
to treaties and the appointment of ambassadors.258
On the other hand, Congress, relying on the Speech or Debate Clause,259 asserted that judicial
interference with its investigations was constitutionally prohibited. The appeals court, adhering to
Supreme Court precedent, rejected this claim as well, holding that:
the [Speech or Debate] Clause does not and was not intended to immunize congressional
investigatory actions from judicial review. Congress’[s] investigatory power is not, itself,
absolute. And the fortuity that documents sought by a congressional subpoena are not in the
hands of a party claiming injury from the subpoena should not immunize that subpoena from
260
challenge by that party.
Like its previous decision, the court, rather than ruling on the merits of the constitutional conflict,
attempted to fashion a compromise resolution that would force the parties back to the negotiating
table, or at least allow the district court to play a role in mediating the dispute. It allowed the DOJ
to limit the sample size of the unedited memoranda and prohibited the committee staff from
removing its notes from the FBI’s possession. 261 In a situation where inaccuracy or deception was
(...continued)
Waterman Steamship Corp., 333 U.S. 103 (1948)).
255
Id. at 395 (stating that “[w]e direct the District Court to modify the injunction to exclude request letters pertaining to
taps classified by the FBI as domestic, since there was no contention by the Executive, nor finding by the District
Court, of undue risk to the national security from transmission of these letters to the Subcommittee.”).
256
Id.
257
See United States v. AT&T, 567 F.2d 121, 124-25 (D.C. Cir. 1977) (detailing the extensive negotiations between the
DOJ and the Subcommittee since the court last heard from the parties) [hereinafter AT&T II].
258
AT&T II, 567 F.2d at 128.
259
U.S. CONST. Art. 1, § 6, cl. 2.
260
AT&T II, 567 F.2d at 129 (citing Barenblatt v. United States, 360 U.S. 109, 111-12 (1959); Eastland, 421 U.S. at
513).
261
Id. at 131-32.
alleged by the Subcommittee, the materials were to be forwarded to the district court for in
camera review and any remedial action the court found necessary.262 In addition, while the
Attorney General was afforded the right to employ a substitution procedure for the most sensitive
documents, the substitutions would have to be approved by the district court based on a showing
of “the accuracy and fairness of the edited memorandum, and the extraordinary sensitivity of the
contents of the original memorandum to the national security.”263
In the end, the court in AT&T never ruled on the merits of the dispute and never resolved the
constitutional conflict between the branches. At most, AT&T stands for the proposition that
neither claims of executive control over national security documents, nor congressional assertions
of access are absolute. Instead, both claims are qualified and, therefore, subject to potential
judicial review, but only after every attempt to resolve the differences between the branches
themselves has been exhausted. In addition, AT&T provides support for the proposition that third-
party subpoenas—such as ones to telecommunications companies—can be challenged in federal
court and are not subject to the constitutional protection provided by the Speech or Debate
Clause.
“Sensitive but unclassified” material can take numerous forms, some categories are statutorily
authorized, while others are creations of the agency that authored or is holding the requested
information. Either way, the fact that information is “sensitive” does not provide a legal basis for
withholding it from duly authorized jurisdictional committees of the Congress. However, there
may be legitimate political and policy reasons that an agency’s classification of information as
“sensitive” be afforded due deference.
One example of a statutorily authorized SBU category is “sensitive security information” (SSI).
As ultimately codified by the Homeland Security Act of 2002, the Department of Homeland
Security (DHS), and specifically the Director of the Transportation Security Administration, has
the authority to:
262
Id.
263
Id. at 132.
264
See Homeland Security Act of 2002, P.L. 107-296, § 1601(b) 116 Stat. 2135, 2314 (2002) (codified as amended at
49 U.S.C. § 114(r)(1) (2006)) [hereinafter Homeland Security Act of 2002]; see also CRS Report RL33670, Protection
(continued...)
With respect to Congress, the SSI statute expressly states that the general authority provided to
DHS to withhold information from the public “does not authorize information to be withheld
from a committee of Congress authorized to have the information.”265 In addition, the SSI
regulations also appear to insulate congressional committees and their staffs from any sanctions
or penalty from the receipt and disclosure of SSI. Specifically, the SSI regulations contain a
provision defining those persons who are “covered persons” and, thus, subject to the regulations.
A close reading of the definition of “covered person” indicates that it does not include Members
of Congress, committees, or congressional staff.266 Moreover, the regulations specifically provide,
as directed by the underlying statute, that “[n]othing in this part precludes TSA or the Coast
Guard from disclosing SSI to a committee of Congress authorized to have the information or to
the Comptroller General, or to any authorized representative of the Comptroller General.”267
While SSI may be a statutorily authorized category of SBU information, many agencies have
developed their own internal information protection regimes that may be cited to prevent
information from being disclosed to Congress during legitimate oversight and investigations. One
example of such an agency created regime is “for official use only” (FOUO). According to a DHS
Management Directive, the FOUO classification268 distinguishes between documents marked
FOUO and other information that may be protected from public disclosure under different
designations. Specifically, the Directive defines FOUO as “not to be considered classified
information.”269 Additionally, the Directive states that information marked FOUO “is not
automatically exempt from disclosure under the provisions of the Freedom of Information
Act.”270 Moreover, the Directive makes clear that FOUO information is not intended to be
withheld from other governmental entities. According to the Directive, information marked
FOUO “may be shared with other agencies, federal, state, tribal, or local government and law
enforcement officials.”271 Such a definition appears to include Congress among the entities to
which the information can be disclosed and, therefore, congressional committees and
subcommittees of jurisdiction are included as well. Such inclusion is consistent with Congress’s
broad constitutionally-based authority to obtain information from executive agencies.
(...continued)
of Security-Related Information, by Gina Stevens and Todd B. Tatelman (providing a more complete discussion of the
background and history of the SSI statute).
265
Homeland Security Act of 2002, supra note 252 at § 1601(b)(2) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 114(r)(2) (2006)).
266
See 49 C.F.R. § 1520.7 (2010) (providing 13 specific categories of “covered persons”).
267
49 C.F.R. § 1520.15(c) (2010).
268
Department of Homeland Security, Management Directive System MD No. 11042.1, Safeguarding Sensitive but
Unclassified (For Official Use Only) Information (2005).
269
Id. at ¶ 4.
270
Id. at ¶ 6(a)(4).
271
Id. at ¶ 6(h)(6).
Taxation are permitted access to individual tax returns.272 Returns are to be submitted to the
requesting Committee in a manner that protects the privacy of the individual. In the event that
information identifying, either directly or indirectly, any tax filer is requested, it may only be
“when sitting in closed executive session unless such taxpayer otherwise consents in writing to
such disclosure.”273 Should any other committee of the House or Senate require such information,
the committee must first obtain a resolution of the House or Senate (in the case of other joint or
special committees a concurrent resolution) specifying the purpose for which the information is to
be furnished and that the requested information can not be reasonably obtained from any other
source.274 The information is to be provided only when the requesting committee is sitting in
closed executive session.275
Another commonly cited statutory restriction on its oversight prerogatives involves foreign
intelligence activities; specifically, the provisions of 50 U.S.C. §§ 413, 413a and 413b. Generally,
§ 413 governs congressional oversight of “intelligence activities”276 and requires that the
President “shall ensure that the congressional intelligence committees are kept fully and currently
informed of the intelligence activities of the United States, including any significant anticipated
intelligence activity as required by this subchapter.”277 Similarly, § 413a imposes a duty on the
Director of National Intelligence (DNI) to, “with due regard for the protection from unauthorized
disclosure of classified information relating to sensitive intelligence sources and methods or other
exceptionally sensitive matters,” keep the congressional intelligence committees “fully and
currently informed of all intelligence activities, other than a covert action (as defined in § 413b(e)
of this title), which are the responsibility of, are engaged in by, or are carried out for or on behalf
of, any department, agency, or entity of the United States Government....”278 Finally, § 413b deals
with the conduct of “covert actions” and, like its sister provisions requires the DNI to keep the
congressional intelligence committees “fully and currently informed of all covert actions which
are the responsibility of, are engaged in by, or are carried out for or on behalf of, any department,
agency, or entity of the United States Government ….”279
These self-imposed restrictions and limitations on congressional oversight powers raise the
question of whether statutes that generally prohibit public disclosure of documents and other
information are also restrictions on congressional access. The federal courts, when considering
272
26 U.S.C. § 6103(f)(1) (2006).
273
Id.
274
Id. at § 6103(f)(3).
275
Id.
276
While it appears that the term “intelligence activities” is defined by statute to include “covert actions” and “financial
intelligence activities,” the phrase “intelligence activities” is not further defined by law. See 50 U.S.C. § 413(f) (2006).
The phrase, however, is defined by Executive Order 12333 as “all activities that agencies within the Intelligence
Community are authorized to conduct pursuant to this Order.” Exec. Order 12333, § 3.4(e), 46 Fed. Reg. 59,941 (Dec.
4, 1981). Moreover, in report language accompanying the FY1991 Intelligence Authorization Act, the SSCI described
intelligence activities as consisting of “... the gathering of information ...,” while characterizing covert action as “.... an
instrument of foreign policy ... that goes beyond information gathering.” See Intelligence Authorization Act, Fiscal
Year 1991, P.L. 102-88, 105 Stat. 429 (1991); see also S.Rept. No. 102-85, 102nd Cong., 33-34 (1991). More detailed
definitions of intelligence activities and “intelligence-related activities” are contained in the Senate resolution and the
House Rule which established the SSCI and the House Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence (HPSCI),
respectively. See S. Res. 400, 94th Cong., § 14(a); see also House Rule X(11).
277
50 U.S.C. § 413(a)(1) (2006).
278
50 U.S.C. § 413a(a)(1) (2006).
279
50 U.S.C. § 413b((b)(1) (2006).
From time to time the President, the executive branch, and private parties have argued that certain
statutes of general applicability prevent the disclosure of confidential or sensitive information to
congressional committees. For example, a frequently cited statute to justify such non-disclosure is
the Trade Secrets Act, a criminal provision that generally prohibits the disclosure of trade secrets
and other confidential business information by a federal officer or employee “unless otherwise
authorized by law.”283 A review of the Trade Secrets Act’s legislative history, however, provides
no indication that it was ever intended to apply to Congress, its employees, or any legislative
branch agency or its employees.284 Moreover, as a matter of statutory construction it would
appear to be unusual for Congress to subject, sub silento, its staff to criminal sanctions for such
disclosures, especially given its well-established oversight and investigative prerogatives, and its
constitutional privilege with respect to Speech or Debate. 285 As such, there appears to be little
doubt that disclosure to Congress of confidential information covered by the Trade Secrets Act
would be deemed to be “authorized by law.” Similar arguments are likely to be advanced with
respect to statutes expressly prohibiting the disclosure of information to the public or limiting
disclosure to all but specific entities or government agencies, but are silent with respect to
disclosures to Congress. In these cases, the target of a congressional inquiry may attempt to use
the statute’s prohibition to avoid cooperation. Potential solutions are negotiations with the target,
accommodations in the form of accepted redactions or other means of providing the information,
or a so-called “friendly subpoena,” which may provide the targeted entity or individual with the
necessary legal cover to assist the committee with its inquiry. Each of these and many other
prospective solutions are at the discretion of the committee.
280
See, e.g., F.T.C. v. Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 626 F.2d 966, 970 (D.C. Cir. 1980); Exxon Corp. v. F.T.C.,
589 F.2d 582, 585-86 (D.C. Cir. 1978), cert. denied, 441 U.S. 943 (1979); Ashland Oil Co., Inc. v. F.T.C., 548 F.2d
977, 979 (D.C. Cir. 1976).
281
See Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp., 626 F.2d at 974; see also Exxon Corp. 589 F.2d at 589; Ashland Oil, 548
F.2d at 979; Moon v. CIA, 514 F.Supp. 836, 849-51 (S.D.N.Y. 1981).
282
See Doe v. McMillan, 412 U.S. 306 (1973); see also Owens-Corning Fiberglass Corp. 626 F.2d at 970.
283
18 U.S.C. § 1905 (2006).
284
See CNA Financial Corp. v. Donovan, 830 F.2d 1132, 1144-52 (D.C. Cir. 1987) (discussing in depth the legislative
history of the Trade Secrets Act).
285
U.S. CONST. Art. 1, § 6, cl. 1.
That court also suggested that the possibility that a “collegial remedy” for the minority exists
already, pointing to 5 U.S.C. § 2954, under which small groups of members of the House
Government Reform and Senate Governmental Affairs Committees can request information from
executive agencies without the need of formal committee action. 290 However, the precise scope
and efficacy of this provision is uncertain and a recent federal district court opinion cases doubt
on its enforceability by a court.
5 U.S.C. § 2954 is derived from § 2 of the Act of May 29, 1928,291 which originally referred not
to the current committees generally overseeing government agency operations but their
predecessors, the House and Senate Committees on Expenditures in the Executive Departments.
The principal purpose of the 1928 act, embodied in its first section, was to repeal legislation that
required the submission to the Congress of some 128 reports, many of which had become
286
House Rule XI 2(j)(1); see also House Banking Committee Rule IV(4).
287
Ashland Oil Co., Inc., v. FTC, 548 F. 2d 977, 979-80 (D.C. Cir. 1976), affirming 409 F. Supp. 297 (D.D. C. 1976);
see also Exxon v. Federal Trade Commission, 589 F. 2d 582, 592-93 (D.C. Cir. 1978)(acknowledging that the
“principle is important that disclosure of information can only be compelled by members . . .”); and In re Beef Industry
Antitrust Litigation, 589 F. 2d 786, 791 (5th Cir. 1979)(refusing to permit two Congressmen from intervening in private
litigation because they “failed to obtain a House Resolution or any similar authority before they sought to intervene.”)
288
860 F. Supp. 868 (D.D.C. 1994).
289
Id. at 874-76.
290
Id. at 876 note 7. 5 U.S.C. § 2954 provides: “An Executive agency, on request of the Committee on Government
[Reform] of the House of Representatives, or of any seven members thereof, or on request of the Committee on
Government Operations of the Senate, or any five members thereof, shall submit any information requested of it
relating to any matter within the jurisdiction of the committee.”
291
45 Stat. 996.
obsolete in part, and which, in any event, were deemed at the time to have no value, serve no
useful purpose, and were not printed by the House of Representatives.292
Section 2 of the 1928 Act contains the language that has been codified in 5 U.S.C. § 2954. The
legislative history, is somewhat mixed on the purpose of that language. The Senate report
indicated a limited purpose; namely, to make “it possible to require any report discontinued by the
language of this bill to be resubmitted to either House upon its necessity becoming evident to the
membership of either body.”293 The House report agreed on that point, but added the following:
“If any information is desired by any Member or Committee upon a particular subject that
information can be better secured by a request made by an individual Member or Committee, so
framed as to bring out the special information desired.”294
It is uncertain, then, how closely 5 U.S.C. § 2954 is tied to the 128 reports abolished by section 1
of the 1928 legislation. 295 Moreover, the provision lacks an explicit enforcement component.
Agency refusals to comply would not be subject to existing contempt processes, and the outcome
of a civil suit to compel production on the basis of the provision is problematic despite the Leach
court’s suggestion. Further, the provision applies only to the named committees; thus members of
all other committees would still face the Leach problem. Finally, even members of the named
committees are still likely to have to persuade a court that their claim is more than an intramural
dispute, that a court has jurisdiction to hear the suit, and that committee members have standing
to sue within the narrow parameters set by the Supreme Court in Raines v. Byrd.296
The first attempt to secure court enforcement of a document demand under § 2954 was brought in
2001 in a federal district court.297 That case involved a request of 16 minority party members of
the House Government Reform Committee for information from the Secretary of Commerce for
data concerning the 2000 census. The congressional plaintiffs sought declaratory and injunctive
relief, arguing that the plain language of § 2954 unambiguously directs agency compliance with
information requests and that while resort to the legislative history of the provision is not
necessary in such clear language situations, that history is supportive. In addition, the plaintiffs
argued that they were entitled to judicial relief because of the agency’s direct and particularized
rejection of an entitlement specifically granted to them by law. The government argued that
because the case had arisen out of a political dispute between Congress and the Executive
concerning access to information, the court should refrain from hearing the case in accordance
with the doctrine of equitable discretion. Alternatively, the government argued that § 2954 should
be construed, in light of its legislative history, and to avoid doubts about its constitutionally, as
preserving Congress’ access to the information formerly contained in the reports abolished by
section 1 of the 1928 Act, but not as guaranteeing an unqualified right of access to information
possessed by the executive branch. The district court rejected these arguments and ordered release
of the requested census data. The government thereafter moved for reconsideration, raising for the
292
H.R. 1757, 70th Cong., pp. 2-3 (1928). A study of the Bureau of Efficiency had recommended their elimination.
H.R. 1757, at p. 2; S.Rept. 1320, 70th Cong., p. 1 (1928).
293
S.Rept. 1320, supra, at 4.
294
H.R. 1757, supra, at 258; see also 69 CONG. REC. 9413-17, 10613-16 (1928) (House and Senate floor debates).
295
In codifying Title 5 in 1966, Congress made it clear that it was effecting no substantive changes in existing laws:
“The legislative purpose in enacting sections 1-6 of this act is to restate, without substantive change, the laws replaced
by those sections on the effective date of this Act.” P.L. 89-544, § 7(a).
296
521 U.S. 811 (1997).
297
Waxman, et al. v. Evans, Civ. Action No. 01-14530-LGB (AJWx) (C.D. Calif, May 21, 2001).
first time the questions whether plaintiffs, as individual legislators, lacked standing under the
Supreme Court’s ruling in Raines v. Byrd to sue for institutional injuries and whether the plaintiffs
had a right of action under § 2954, the Administrative Procedure Act, or the Mandamus statute to
bring suit against the Executive Branch for access to information. The court declined to consider
these arguments on the ground that the government could have presented them in support of its
original motion to dismiss but did not do so. 298
On appeal to the Ninth Circuit, the case was argued together with a separate Freedom of
Information Act (FOIA) suit for the same census data brought by two Washington State
legislators. After oral argument, the appeals court withdrew the submission of Waxman v. Evans,
deferring the case pending its decision in the FOIA suit. The appeals court ruled in favor of the
plaintiffs in the FOIA case on October 8, 2002,299 and on December 6, 2002, declared that the
action in Waxman was mooted by its FOIA decision and issued an order reversing and vacating
the district court’s decision, and remanding the case to the district court with instructions to
dismiss.300 On motion of the plaintiffs, the court of appeals modified this order on January 9,
2003, striking its reversal of the district court’s ruling, but leaving in effect its order to vacate and
dismiss.
A second attempt to secure judicial enforcement of a § 2954 document demand in the same
district court was rejected. In Waxman v. Thompson,301 19 Members of the House Government
Reform Committee brought suit to compel release by the Department of Health and Human
Services (HHS) of cost estimates prepared by its Office of Actuary during congressional
consideration of Medicare reform legislation in 2003. In addition to asserting a right of access
under § 2954, the congressional plaintiffs alleged a violation of 5 U.S.C. § 7211, which provides
that “[t]he right of employees . . . to furnish information to either House of Congress, or to a
committee or member thereof, may not be interfered with or denied.” The government opposed
the claims, raising the issues of standing under Raines v. Byrd, jurisdiction of the court to enforce
either statute, and the doctrine of equitable discretion.
On July 24, 2006, the district court, applying the guiding principles established by the Supreme
Court in the 1997 decision in Raines v. Byrd, 302 ruled that the congressional plaintiffs did not
have standing to sue. Raines involved a challenge to the constitutionality of the Line-Item Veto
Act of 1996 by six Members of Congress who had voted against it, alleging that it
unconstitutionally diminished the Member’s voting power by authorizing the President to
“cancel” certain spending and tax measures after he signed them into law, without complying
with the requirements of bicameral passage and presentment to the President. In Raines, the
Supreme Court held that the Member plaintiffs lacked standing because their complaint did not
establish that they had suffered an injury that was personal, particularized, and concrete. The
Court distinguished between a personal injury to a private right and an institutional or official
one, and was of the view that a congressional plaintiff may have standing in a suit against the
executive if it is alleged that the plaintiff has suffered either a personal injury (e.g., loss of
Member’s seat) on an institutional one that is not “abstract or widely dispersed,” but amounts to
Member vote nullification. The Court concluded that the plaintiffs in Raines had alleged an
298
Waxman v. Evans, Case No. CV 01-14530-LGB (AJW) at 3.
299
Carter v. U.S. Department of Commerce, 307 F. 3d 1084 (9th Cir. 2002).
300
Waxman v. Evans, No. 02-55825 (9th Cir. Dec. 6, 2002).
301
No. CV-04-3467 MMM (Manx) (C.D. Calif., May 17, 2004).
302
521 U.S. 811 (1997).
institutional injury that damaged all Members (a reduction of legislative and political power),
rather than a personal injury to a private right, which would be more particularized and
concrete. 303
Bound by the Supreme Court’s precedent, the district court concluded that when the Secretary
refused to produce the documents requested pursuant to § 2954, plaintiffs did not suffer a
personal injury as that term is defined by Raines. Rather, Congress, on whose behalf the plaintiffs
acted, suffered an institutional injury; namely, that its ability to assess the merits of the bill in
question was impeded or impaired. Such an injury is precisely of the type that, under Raines,
deprives individual legislators of standing to sue. Quoting Raines, the court noted that the
plaintiffs were “not ... singled out for specifically unfavorable treatment as opposed to other
Members of their respective bodies,” and cannot “claim that they have been deprived of
something to which they are reasonably entitled,” since the alleged injury “runs (in a sense) with
the Member’s seat, a seat which the Member holds (it might be quite arguably be said) as trustees
of his constituents, not as prerogatives of personal power.” A violation of § 2954, the court
concluded, therefore raises no personal or particularized injury to the plaintiffs, but at most a type
of institutional injury which necessarily damages all Members of Congress and both Houses of
Congress equally. The plaintiffs’ right to request and receive information from the executive
branch pursuant to § 2954 would cease once they were no longer in Congress or no longer a
member of the House Committee on Government Reform. The right that is asserted, the court
observed, runs with their congressional and committee seats, and is not personal to them. The
court also noted that no jurisdictional committee has specifically requested that the documents be
produced either by an official request or by a subpoena, nor does the legislative history of the
provision imply an intent to delegate authority to the requisite number of Members to seek to
enforce its provisions judicially.
The rules of the Senate provide substantially more effective means for individual minority-party
members to engage in “self-help” to support oversight objectives than afforded their House
counterparts. Senate rules emphasize the rights and prerogatives of individual Senators and,
therefore, minority groups of Senators.304 The most important of these rules are those that
effectively allow unlimited debate on a bill or amendment unless an extraordinary majority votes
to invoke cloture.305 Senators can use their right to filibuster, or simply the threat of filibuster, to
delay or prevent the Senate from engaging in legislative business. The Senate’s rules also are a
source of other minority rights that can directly or indirectly aid the minority in gaining
investigatory rights. For example, the right of extended debate applies in committee as well as on
the floor, with one crucial difference: the Senate’s cloture rule may not be invoked in committee.
Each Senate committee decides for itself how it will control debate, and therefore a filibuster
opportunity in a committee may be even greater than on the floor. Also, Senate Rule XXVI
prohibits the reporting of any measure or matter from a committee unless a majority of the
committee is present, another point of possible tactical leverage. Even beyond the potent power to
delay, Senators can promote their goals by taking advantage of other parliamentary rights and
opportunities that are provided by the Senate’s formal procedures and customary practices, such
as are afforded by the processes dealing with floor recognition, committee referrals, and the
amending process.
303
See CRS Report R40873, Congressional Participation in Article III Courts: Jurisdiction and Standing to Sue, by
Todd B. Tatelman.
304
See CRS Report RL30850, Minority Rights and Senate Procedures, by Judy Schneider.
305
Senate Rules XIX and XXII.
Specialized Investigations
Oversight at times occurs through specialized, temporary investigations of a specific event or
development. These are often dramatic, high profile endeavors, focusing on scandals, alleged
abuses of authority, suspected illegal conduct, or other unethical behavior. The stakes are high,
possibly even leading to the end of individual careers of high ranking executive officials. Indeed,
congressional investigations can induce resignations, firings, and impeachment proceedings and
question major policy actions of the executive, as with these notable occasions: the Senate
Watergate Committee investigation into the Nixon Administration in the early 1970s; the Church
and Pike select committees’ inquiries in the mid-1970s into intelligence agency abuses; the 1981
select committee inquiry into the ABSCAM scandal; the 1987 Iran-contra investigation during the
Reagan Administration; the multiple investigations of scandals and alleged misconduct during the
Clinton Administration; and the Hurricane Katrina probe in 2005 during the Bush Administration.
As a consequence, interest—in Congress, the executive, and the public—is frequently intense and
impassioned.
1. These investigative hearings may be televised in the contemporary era, and often result in
extensive news media coverage.
3. Specially created investigative committees usually have a short life span (e.g., six months,
one year, or at the longest until the end of a Congress, at which point the panel would have
to be reapproved if the inquiry were to continue).
4. The investigative panel often has to employ additional and special staff—including
investigators, attorneys, auditors, and researchers—because of the added work load and
need for specialized expertise in conducting such investigations and in the subject matter.
Such staff can be hired under contract from the private sector, transferred from existing
congressional offices or committees, transferred from the congressional support agencies,
or loaned by executive agencies, including the Federal Bureau of Investigation. The staff
would require appropriate security clearances if the inquiry looked into matters of national
security.
5. Such special panels have often been vested with investigative authorities not ordinarily
available to standing committees. Staff deposition authority is the most commonly given,
but given the particular circumstances, special panels have been vested with the authority
to obtain tax information, to seek international assistance in information gathering efforts
abroad, and to participate in judicial proceedings (see Table 1).
Authority to
International Tax
Deposition Participate In
Information Information
Authority Judicial
Gathering Authority Access Authority
Proceedings
2. Publish, as needed, a compilation of the all the basic statutes in force within the jurisdiction
of each subcommittee or for the committee itself if it has no subcommittees.
3. Request the assistance of the various legislative support agencies (the Congressional
Budget Office, the Congressional Research Service, or the Government Accountability
Office) in identifying the full range of federal programs and activities under a committee’s
jurisdiction.
2. Agency officials can be noticeably influenced by the knowledge and expectation that they
will be called before a congressional committee regularly to account for the activities of
their agencies.
b. serving as a forum for exchanging and communicating views on pertinent problems and
other relevant matters;
d. identifying program areas within each committee’s jurisdiction that may be vulnerable to
waste, fraud, abuse, or mismanagement; and
e. determining whether new laws are needed or whether changes in the administration of
existing laws will be sufficient to resolve problems.
4. The ability of committee members during oversight hearings to focus on meaningful issues
and to ask penetrating questions will be enhanced if staff have accumulated, organized, and
evaluated relevant data, information, and analyses about administrative performance.
a. Ideally, each standing committee should regularly monitor the application of laws and
implementation of programs within its jurisdiction. A prime objective of the “continuous
watchfulness” mandate (Section 136) of the Legislative Reorganization Act of 1946 is to
encourage committees to take an active and ongoing role in administrative review and
not wait for public revelations of agency and program inadequacies before conducting
oversight. As Section 136 states in part: “each standing committee of the Senate and
House of Representatives shall exercise continuous watchfulness of the execution by the
administrative agencies concerned of any laws, the subject matter of which is within the
jurisdiction of such committee.”
c. Information compiled in this fashion will be useful not only for regular oversight
hearings, but also for oversight hearings called unexpectedly with little opportunity to
conduct an extensive background study.
5. It is important that specific letters be directed by the committee to the agency witnesses so
that they will be on notice about what they will have to answer. In this way witnesses will
be responsive in providing worthwhile testimony at hearings; testify “to the point” and
avoid rambling and/or evasive statements; and restrict their use of this kind of answer to
questions: “I didn’t know you wanted that information. . . .”
Casework
An important check against bureaucratic indifference or inefficiency is “casework,” as noted in
Section I. Typically, Members of Congress hear from individual constituents and communities
about problems they are having with various federal agencies and departments. As a House
member once said:
Last year, one of my constituents, a 63-year old man who requires kidney dialysis,
discovered that he would no longer be receiving Medicare because the Social Security
Administration thought he was dead. Like many residents who have problems dealing
with the federal bureaucracy, this man contacted my district office and asked for help.
Without difficulty, he convinced my staff that he was indeed alive, and we in turn
convinced the Social Security Administration to resume sending him benefits.306
Casework is important not only in resolving problems that constituents are having with
bureaucrats but also in identifying limitations in the law. As a scholar of constituency service
explained: “Casework allows ad hoc correction of bureaucratic error, impropriety, and laxity, and
can lead a senator or representative to consider changes in laws because of particularly flagrant or
persistent problems that casework staff discovered.”307
Audits
1. Periodic auditing of executive departments is among the strongest techniques of legislative
oversight. Properly utilized, the audit enables Congress to hold executive officers to a strict
accounting for their use of public funds and the conduct of their administration.
a. whether claimed achievements are supported by adequate and reliable evidence and data
and are in compliance with legislatively established objectives; and
a. How successful is the program in accomplishing the intended results? Could program
objectives be achieved at less cost?
b. Has agency management clearly defined and promulgated the objectives and goals of
the program or activity?
306
Lee H. Hamilton, “Constituent Service and Representation,” The Public Manager, summer 1992, p. 12.
307
John R. Johannes, “Constituency Service,” in Donald Bacon, et. al., eds., The Encyclopedia of the United States
Congress (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1995), p. 544.
g. Were all studies, such as cost-benefit studies, appropriate for analyzing costs and
benefits of alternative approaches?
h. Is the program producing benefits or detriments that were not contemplated by Congress
when it authorized the program?
j. Does top management have the essential and reliable information necessary for
exercising supervision and control and for ascertaining directions or trends?
k. Does management have internal review or audit facilities adequate for monitoring
program operations, identifying program and management problems and weaknesses,
and insuring fiscal integrity?
4. In addition to GAO and other governmental audits, Congress may have access to the
internal audit reports of agency audit teams.
a. Internal audit reports are designed to meet the needs of executive officials.
2. Documents are on file for public inspection in the Office of the Federal Register the day
before they are published, unless the issuing agency requests earlier filing. The list of
documents on file for public inspection can be accessed via http://www.nara.gov/fedreg.
3. Regular scrutiny of the Federal Register by committees and staff may help them to identify
proposed rules and regulations in their subject areas that merit congressional review as to
need and likely effect.
a. Committee staffs, through field investigations or on-site visits for example, can help a
committee develop its own independent evaluation of the effectiveness of laws.
2. Support Agencies. The legislative support agencies, directly or indirectly, can assist
committees and Members in conducting investigations and reviewing agency performance.
(See “Section V” for a discussion of CRS, GAO, and CBO capabilities.)
3. Outside Contractors. The 1974 Budget Act, as amended, and the Legislative
Reorganization Act of 1970 authorize House and Senate committees to enlist the services
of individual consultants or organizations to assist them in their work.
b. Committees may also utilize, subject to appropriate approvals, federal and support
agency employees to aid them in their oversight activities.
c. Committees might also establish a voluntary advisory panel to assist them in their work.
2. Effective communication with the media is based on knowledge and understanding of each
of the media forms and the advantages and disadvantages of each.
Wire Services
(1) Timeliness, brevity, and accuracy are the main criteria for dealing with the wire service.
(2) Personal contact with wire service reporters gets the best results.
Daily Newspapers
(1) Obtain information on the operational procedures and deadlines of daily newspapers,
and how they are affected by time.
(2) Since regular news for Monday is usually low, it may be useful to issue statements and
releases for “Monday a.m.” use.
(3) Saturday usually has the lowest circulation and Sunday has the widest.
(4) Stories for weekend publication should be given to reporters during the middle of the
week or earlier.
Magazines
(1) Magazines and other periodicals are generally wider ranging and focus on why
something happens, not what happened.
(2) Weeklies do not ordinarily respond to Member press conferences and releases in the
same manner as the other media; personal meetings and telephone conversations are
usually more effective.
Trade Periodicals
Many of these topically oriented magazines and newsletters are produced by publishing firms
which utilize the services of the periodical press galleries in the Capitol.
Television
(1) House and Senate rules identify procedures for radio and television broadcasting of
committee hearings. (See House Rule XI and Senate Rule XXVI).
(2) News of a committee’s oversight activities may appear in diverse forms on television.
For example, it could appear on the networks as a brief report on the morning or
evening news, air on a cable news channel, or arise in the course of live House or
Senate floor debate telecast over C-SPAN (the Cable Satellite Public Affairs Network).
(a) Alert correspondents and Washington bureau chiefs of upcoming hearings several
days in advance via press releases; follow up with personal or telephone notification
of certain “must-contact” correspondents.
(b) Notify the Associated Press, Reuters, and other news services of a scheduled
hearing or meeting at least a day in advance. Allow enough lead time to permit
inclusion of the committee activity in the wire services’ calendar of daily events for
the next day.
(d) Alert interested correspondents or assignment editors when House or Senate floor
action is likely on a matter related to the committee’s oversight function.
(e) Provide or have available for the media background information on oversight issues
awaiting committee action or consideration by the House or Senate.
(f) Consider making committee members readily available for television cameras either
before or after any executive sessions (e.g., allowing television crews in briefly at
the start to take video footage of the committee, or arranging for a press conference
after the committee session).
(h) Keep the contact person of each of the network news interview programs (“Meet
the Press,” etc.) appraised of a committee’s oversight activities, and their relevance
to topical national issues. Suggest the appearance of committee members on
interview programs when a committee oversight issue becomes especially
newsworthy.
(i) Be alert to live television interview possibilities for committee members that can be
arranged on relatively short notice (e.g., newsmaker interviews on cable news
channels).
Radio
(1) Time is of the essence. Radio newsmen want congressional reaction immediately, not
hours later when the story breaks in the newspaper or on television.
(2) Members who are readily available for quick interviews are frequently broadcast within
minutes or the next morning coast-to-coast on hundreds of radio stations. In most cases
an interview will be aired repeatedly over a period of several hours.
(3) Congressional offices should contact radio reporters directly through the House and
Senate press galleries.
Press Conferences
(1) Time
(a) The periods between 10 a.m. and 2 p.m. are often preferable.
(b) Early morning press conferences usually have low attendance because reporters on
daily papers do not start work until mid-morning.
(c) Late afternoon press conferences are often unattended because reporters begin to
lose news time for that particular day.
(d) Check with the press galleries. They keep a running log of most scheduled news
events and can provide information on possible competition at any time on any day.
(2) Place
(a) Committee rooms are good, but they are frequently in use at the best time for a
conference.
(b) A Member’s office or the press galleries can be adequate, but keep in mind that the
reporters and cameramen need room to operate.
(c) It might be wise to go to the radio-TV galleries after the conference and do a repeat
to get electronic coverage.
(3) Notification
(b) Also notify the wire services and television networks directly at their downtown
offices.
(4) Form
(a) A press conference should be viewed as an open house with everybody invited and
everybody welcome.
(b) A brief opening statement should be read or summarized. After copies of it have
been distributed, the questioning should begin.
(c) The normal time for a routine press conference is about one-half hour.
News Releases
(1) A good news release answers in one page or less the questions where, when, who,
what, how, why, and, for some topics, how much (e.g., cost) or how many (e.g.,
beneficiaries).
(a) contain the name, telephone number, and e-mail of your press contact;
(e) avoid needless big words, long sentences, and long paragraphs; and
(f) make the point quickly, clearly, directly, and then end.
(2) The Internet can be employed in a variety of ways to mobilize public interest in
congressional oversight. For example, lawmakers can conduct on-line discussions with
interested citizens or committees can establish their own websites to solicit input from
individuals and organizations about executive branch departments and programs.
(3) There are various “bloggers” who now monitor federal spending. A USA Today
article—“‘Blogosphere’ Spurs Government Oversight,” September 12, 2006, p . 4A—
highlights this trend and underscores how more citizen participation in the public realm
can promote greater government accountability. With numerous government web sites
that enable attentive individuals to monitor the expenditure of federal funds, Congress
is now getting additional oversight assistance from the “public as watchdog.”
Overview
Contemporary statutory inspectors general (IGs), whose origins date to the mid-1970s, have been
granted substantial independence and powers to carry out their mandate to combat waste, fraud,
and abuse and to keep agency heads and Congress fully and currently informed about problems
and deficiencies within agencies. In order to carry these out, offices of inspector general (OIGs)
consolidate responsibility for and conduct audits and investigations within federal agencies.
Established by public law as permanent, nonpartisan, independent offices, they now exist in more
than 70 federal agencies, including all departments and larger agencies, along with numerous
boards and commissions and other entities.308
The overwhelming majority of IGs are governed by the Inspector General Act of 1978, as
amended (herein after referred to as the IG Act),309 which has been substantially modified twice
as well as subject to agency-specific OIG amendments. The Inspector General Act of 1978
provided the blueprint regarding IG appointments and removals, powers and authorities, and
responsibilities and duties, and created OIGs in 12 federal “establishments.”310 The Inspector
General Act Amendments of 1988 created a new set of IGs in “designated federal entities”
(DFEs), the usually smaller federal agencies, and added to the reporting obligations of all IGs and
agency heads, among other things. 311 And the Inspector General Reform Act of 2008 established a
new Council of the Inspectors General for Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE); amended reporting
obligations, salary and bonus provisions, and removal requirements; and added certain budget
protections for offices of inspector general.312
While the jurisdictions of most inspectors general are circumscribed, concentrated on the
programs and operations of the parent agency, 313 a few IGs have express authority over more than
one agency, organization, program, or activity. These cross-agency jurisdictions, moreover, differ
along three lines: across multiple agencies involved in a certain program or activity, over a
308
Three other inspector general posts (in the armed forces departments) are recognized in public law: Air Force (10
U.S.C. § 8020), Army (10 U.S.C. § 3020), and Navy (10 U.S.C. § 5020). However, these offices are not examined here,
because they have a significantly different heritage, set of authorities, operational structure and organization, and
degree of independence.
309
5 U.S.C. App. For background information and further citations, see CRS Report R40675, Statutory Offices of
Inspectors General (IGs): Methods of Appointment and Legislative Proposals, by Vanessa K. Burrows, and CRS
Report R40099, The Special Inspector General for the Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP), by Vanessa K.
Burrows; Phyllis K. Fong, Department of Agriculture Inspector General and Chair of the Council of the Inspectors
General on Integrity and Efficiency (CIGIE), “The IG Reform Act and the New IG Council: Dawn of a New Era,”
Journal of Public Inquiry, Fall-Winter 2008-2009, pp. 1-6; Paul Light, Monitoring Government: Inspectors General
and the Search for Accountability (Washington, Brookings Institution, 1992); Frederick M. Kaiser, “The Watchers’
Watchdog: The CIA Inspector General,” International Journal of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, Spring 1989,
vol. 3, pp. 55-75; and Project on Government Oversight (POGO), Inspectors General: Many Lack Essential Tools for
Independence (Washington, POGO, 2008). Additional sources include a number of reports and congressional testimony
from the U.S. Government Accountability Office, including: Federal Inspectors General: An Historical Perspective, T-
AIMD-98-146 (1998); Inspectors General: Enhancing Federal Accountability, GAO-04-117T (2003); Inspectors
General: Proposals to Strengthen Independence, GAO-07-1021T (2007); Inspectors General: Opportunities to
Enhance Independence and Accountability, GAO-07-1089T (2007); Highlights of the Comptroller General’s Panel on
Federal Oversight and the Inspectors General, GAO-06-931SP (2006); Designated Federal Entities: Survey of
Governance Practices and the Inspector General Role, GAO-09-270 (2009); and Inspectors General: Office
Consolidation and Related Issues, GAO-02-575 (2002), all available at http://www.gao.gov. Additional sources include
studies, reports, and strategic plans of individual IGs and CIGIE, available on the inspector general website at
http://www.ignet.gov.
310
P.L. 95-452. Two other IGs, which served as models, pre-dated this broad enactment: in 1976, in the Department of
Health, Education, and Welfare, now Health and Human Services (P.L. 94-505); and in 1977, in the then-new
Department of Energy (P.L. 95-91).
311
P.L. 100-504.
312
P.L. 110-409.
313
5 U.S.C. App. Secs. 2-4 and 8G(g)(1).
separate federal organization with related responsibilities, or over an independent bureau within
the parent agency. 314
Other pieces of legislation have established or amended offices in specified agencies or programs,
either directly under the IG Act or as separate units. The offices outside the IG Act are: housed in
five legislative branch agencies; attached to three temporary reconstruction and relief programs;
or situated in an office with jurisdiction over other agencies. Still other enactments have enhanced
IG independence or have added new responsibilities and powers on a selective basis.315
As a result, statutory IGs are not all created equal. And in certain cases, differences among them
are meaningful. Nonetheless, statutory IGs, for the most part, follow the standards, guidelines,
and directives in the IG Act.
Most of the IGs fall directly and explicitly under the IG Act. Ten, however, have been established
by and are governed by separate statutes. Seven of the ten are the Inspector General in the Central
Intelligence Agency (CIA), the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community within the
Office of the Director of National Intelligence (ODNI) with cross-agency jurisdiction, and the
314
The Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (IC), created by the Intelligence Authorization Act for Fiscal
Year 2010 (P.L. 111-259, § 405), has express cross-agency jurisdiction; this enactment, importantly, recognizes the
continued authority of the existing statutory inspectors general over IC components. (The same law (P.L. 111-259,§
431), incidentally, also created new inspector general posts in four Defense Department agencies, identified as
“designated federal entities” under the IG Act: i.e., the Defense Intelligence Agency, National Geospatial-Intelligence
Agency, National Reconnaissance Office, and National Security Agency.) A second type of IG with interagency
jurisdiction is the Inspector General of the Department of State and Broadcasting Board of Governors, recognizing the
Broadcasting Board as a separate organization outside the State Department (P.L. 105-277, Division G, Title XIII,
Chapter 3, § 1322(a)(3); 112 Stat. 2681-777 and 2681-778). Another IG reflects a variation on this theme; in this case,
the IG has explicit authority over an independent bureau within the IG’s designated federal entity. In 2010, the
Inspector General of the Board of Govenors for the Federal Reserve System was given jurisdiction over a new
organization—the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection which was established as an “independent bureau” in the
Federal Reserve System—by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203, §
1011). To reflect this expanded coverage, the IG was retitled the Inspector General of the Board of Governors of the
Federal Reserve System and the Bureau of Consumer Financial Protection (P.L. 111-203, § 1081(1)-(2)).
For a review of cross-agency jurisdictions for IGs and related matters, see GAO, Inspectors General: Office
Consolidation and Related Issues.
315
For instance, the inspectors general of federal banking agencies and of the Federal Reserve System had been given
review and reporting mandates in separate legislation (12 U.S.C. 1831o(k) and 12 U.S.C. 1790d(j), respectively), which
were modified in 2010 by the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (P.L. 111-203, Secs.
987(a) and 988(a)).
316
Some now-defunct statutory IGs have been abolished or transferred either when their “parent” agency met the same
fate or when superseded by another inspector general office. For example, the Office of Inspector General in the Office
of the Director of National Intelligence (DNI)—which operated under the full discretionary authority of the DNI (P.L.
108-458)—was supplanted by the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community (IC); the new IC IG post was
established by the Intelligence Authorization Act of 2010 (P.L. 111-259, § 405) with substantially broader authoritiy,
jurisdiction, and independence than the previous IG.
inspector general in each of five legislative branch agencies. Another three IGs are special
inspectors general for temporary programs, each of whom, interestingly, operates under a
different appointment process.
The statutory IGs can be grouped into five different categories, depending upon their location
(e.g., in either the executive branch or legislative branch), permanency of the entity or program
with which the IGs are affiliated, and methods of appointment and removal. The appointment can
be: by the President with the advice and consent of the Senate (PAS); by the President alone (in
only one case, i.e., the Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction); or by the
agency head, who might be an individual or a group composed of members of a governing board
or commission.
The two largest categories of statutory IGs, combining for more than 60 offices, operate under the
IG Act. The five types are the inspectors general in:
1. “federal establishments,” as identified in the IG Act, which include the 15
cabinet departments and larger federal agencies. Each IG is appointed by the
president by and with the advice and consent of the Senate and can be removed
by the president, but not by the agency head;317
2. “designated federal entities” (DFEs), as also identified in the IG Act, which
include the usually smaller boards, commissions, foundations, and government
enterprises. Each IG is appointed by and removable by the head of the agency;318
3. two other permanent executive agencies, each operating under its own
statutory authority. These are the Inspector General in the Central Intelligence
Agency (P.L. 101-193) and the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community
within the Office of the Director of National Intelligence, whose jurisdiction
extends across all IC elements or components (P.L. 111-259). Each IG is a PAS
appointee and removable by the president;
4. three temporary programs, each operating under its own authority and
reflecting different appointment powers. These are: the Special Inspector General
for Afghanistan Reconstruction (SIGAR), a direct presidential appointee, unique
among IGs (P.L. 110-181); the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction
(SIGIR), an appointee of the Secretary of Defense, after consultation with the
Secretary of State (P.L. 108-375); and the Special Inspector General for the
Troubled Asset Relief Program (SIGTARP), a PAS appointee (P.L. 110-343)319;
and
317
5 U.S.C. App., § 2. For a listing of IGs in establishments, see Fong, “The IG Reform Act;” and the IG directory on
inspector general website at http://www.ignet.gov. Two establishment-wide OIGs have other statutory OIGs within
each one’s department: in the Department of the Treasury, the Treasury Inspector General for Tax Administration,
which is also considered an establishment and whose IG is a PAS (5 U.S.C. App., § 8D(e)-(l)); and in the Department
of Defense, four DFEs, whose IGs are agency head appointees (P.L. 111-259, § 431, amending 5 U.S.C. App., Secs.
8G(a)(2) and 8H(a).
318
For a listing of IGs in DFEs, see the sources in the three previous footnotes.
319
The Troubled Asset Relief Program investment authority expired on Oct. 3, 2010. But the termination of that
authority did not affect the Treasury’s ability to administer existing troubled asset purchases and guarantees and its
ability to expend TARP funds for obligations entered into before the closing date. Consequently, SIGTARP’s oversight
mandate did not end then. Rather, the special inspector general is authorized to carry out the office’s duties until the
Government has sold or transferred all assets and terminated all insurance contracts acquired under TARP. See
SIGTARP, Quarterly Report to Congress, October 26, 2010, p. 19; and Burrows, SIGTARP.
5. five legislative branch agencies, each operating under its own statutory
authority. These are the Architect of the Capitol (P.L. 110-161); Government
Accountability Office (P.L. 110-323); Government Printing Office (P.L. 100-
504), the oldest of these; Library of Congress (P.L. 109-55); and U.S. Capitol
Police (P.L. 109-55), which has specialized responsibilities. Each IG is an agency
head appointee and removable by the head of the agency.
Purposes
Under Section 2 of the IG Act, the three principal purposes of inspectors general are:
Authorities
To carry out their purposes, IGs have been granted broad powers in a number of matters. They are
authorized to: conduct audits and investigations; access directly records and information related
to agency programs and operations; request assistance from other federal, state, and local
government agencies; subpoena information and documents; administer oaths when conducting
interviews; hold certain law enforcement powers; hire staff and manage their own resources;
receive and respond to complaints from agency employees, whose identity is to be protected; and
implement the cash incentive award program in their agency for employee disclosures of waste,
fraud, and abuse.322
320
P.L. 111-5.
321
P.L. 111-203, § 989E(a)-(b). This council is separate from CIGIE.
322
5 U.S.C. App. Secs. 6(a), 6(e), and 7; 5 U.S.C. § 4512.
Notwithstanding these powers, IGs are not authorized to take corrective action themselves.
Supplementing this, the Inspector General Act prohibits the transfer of “program operating
responsibilities” to an IG.323 The rationale for this proscription is that it would be difficult, if not
impossible, for IGs to audit or investigate programs and operations impartially and objectively if
they were directly involved in carrying them out.
One is to report suspected violations of federal criminal law directly and expeditiously to the
Attorney General.324
IGs are also required to report semiannually about their activities, findings, and recommendations
to the agency head, who must submit the IG report (unaltered but with his or her comments) to
Congress within 30 days.325 These semiannual reports, which contain a substantial amount of
required information and data, are to be made available to the public in another 60 days.326 IGs
are also to report “particularly serious or flagrant problems” immediately to the agency head, who
must submit the IG report (unaltered but with his or her comments) to Congress within seven
days.327
By means of the required reports and “otherwise,” IGs are to keep the agency head and Congress
“fully and currently informed.”328 Besides the prescribed reports, other means of communication
with Congress include: OIG officials testifying at hearings, meeting with Members and staff, and
responding to requests for information and reviews.
As a separate matter, the CIGIE is authorized (but not required) to “make such reports to
Congress as the Chairperson determines are necessary and appropriate.”329 By comparison to this
discretionary authority, the Chair is required to “prepare and transmit a report annually on behalf
of the Council to the President on the activities of the Council.”330
Each agency website, moreover, is to provide a direct link to the IG website, which, in turn, is to
make its reports on audits, investigations, and evaluations or inspections available to the public
(unless, of course, it is classified). 331
323
5 U.S.C. App. § 8G(b); § 9(a)(2).
324
5 U.S.C. App. § 4(d).
325
5 U.S.C. App. § 5(a), (b).
326
5 U.S.C. App. § 5(c).
327
5 U.S.C. App. § 5(d).
328
5 U.S.C. App. § 4(a)(5).
329
5 U.S.C. App. § 11(c)(1)(G).
330
5 U.S.C. App. § 11(b)(3)(viii).
331
5 U.S.C. App. § 8L.
Independence
IGs have broad powers and protections that support their independence, including hiring their
own staff and being given necessary facilities and services. Their independent status is reinforced
in other ways, for instance, by the authority to issue subpoenas for documents and through their
own law enforcement powers.332 The IG Act also ensures a degree of protection of IG budgets, by
providing for an appropriations line-item for IGs in the establishments, whose IGs are PAS
appointees, and by requiring that information about each IG budget request be made available in
the president’s annual budget submission to Congress (discussed further below). 333
Another protection of IG independence arises from the broad qualifications for IG appointments
and specialized ones on removals. Appointments are to be made without regard to political
affiliation and solely on the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability in certain relevant areas.334
At the other end of the IG continuum, the IG and Congress are to be notified 30-days in advance
of a prospective removal of an inspector general.335 (Both matters are discussed further below.)
There are also prohibitions on interference with their activities and operations and a proscription
on operating responsibilities (as noted above).336 Inspectors general, moreover, determine the
priorities and projects for their offices without outside direction, in most cases. However,
Congress has mandated, in legislation, that OIGs conduct certain reviews. Additionally, there are
a few instances when an agency head is authorized to prevent or halt an audit or investigation
(discussed further below). IGs, of course, may decide to conduct a review requested by the
agency head, president, legislators, employees, or anyone for that matter; but they are not
obligated to do so, unless it is called for in law.
Supervision
IGs serve under the “general supervision” of the agency head, reporting exclusively to the head or
to the officer next in rank if such authority is delegated.337 With but a few specified exceptions,
neither the agency head nor the officer next in line “shall prevent or prohibit the Inspector
General from initiating, carrying out, or completing any audit or investigation, or from issuing
any subpoena....”338
Under the IG Act, the heads of only six agencies—the Departments of Defense, Homeland
Security, Justice, and Treasury, plus the U.S. Postal Service and Federal Reserve Board—may
prevent or halt the IG from initiating, carrying out, or completing an audit or investigation, or
issuing a subpoena, and then only for certain reasons: to preserve national security interests or to
protect ongoing criminal investigations, among a few others.339 When exercising this power,
though, the IG Act generally provides for congressional notification of the exercise of such
332
5 U.S.C. App. Secs. 6(a)(4) and 6(e).
333
5 U.S.C. App. § 6(f); 31 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(25).
334
5 U.S.C. App. Secs. 3(a), 8G(c).
335
5 U.S.C. App. Secs. 3(b), 8G(e).
336
5 U.S.C. App. Secs. 3(a), 8G(b) and (d), 9(a)(2).
337
5 U.S.C. App. Secs. 3(a), 8G(d).
338
5 U.S.C. App. Secs. 3(a), 8G(d).
339
5 U.S.C. App. Secs. 8, 8D(a), 8E(a), 8G(f), 8G(g)(3), and 8I(a).
authority, either via the agency head or the inspector general, who must transmit an explanatory
statement for such action to specified congressional committees within 30 days.340 In addition to
the Secretary of Defense’s existing authority regarding the department IG, the Secretary, in
consultation with the Director of National Intelligence, may prohibit, for national security
reasons, certain intelligence community IGs from undertaking audits and investigations.341 The
four potentially-affected intelligence community elements—listed as designated federal entities
but housed in the Defense Department—are the Defense Intelligence Agency, the National
Geospatial-Intelligence Agency, the National Reconnaissance Office, and the National Security
Agency.
The CIA IG Act similarly allows the Director of the Central Intelligence Agency to prohibit the
inspector general from conducting investigations, audits, or inspections. But when exercising this
power, the head must then notify the House and Senate intelligence panels of his or her reasons
within seven days.342 A parallel provision applies to the Director of National Intelligence (DNI)
with respect to the Inspector General of the Intelligence Community. 343
The Inspector General Reform Act of 2008, moreover, addressed the reporting of the IG’s initial
budget estimate to the head of the establishment or DFE and subsequent developments.346 The
budget estimate includes the budget request, a request for funds for training, and amounts
necessary to support the newly created Council of the Inspectors General on Integrity and
Efficiency (CIGIE) (discussed further below). The establishment or DFE head must then include
this information, as well as comments of the IG with respect to the budget proposal, when
transmitting the request to the President. The President, in turn, must then include in his budget
submission to Congress: the IG’s budget estimate; the President’s requested amounts for the IG,
IG training, and support of the CIGIE; and comments of the affected IG, if he or she determines
that the President’s budget would “substantially inhibit” the IG from performing his or her duties.
340
See, e.g., 5 U.S.C. App. § 8(b)(3)-(4) (stating that the Secretary of Defense must “submit a statement concerning”
the exercise of such power to various congressional committees within 30 days and must also submit a “statement of
the reasons for the exercise of power” to the congressional committees within an additional 30 days after the
submission of the first statement); see also 5 U.S.C. App. § 8E(a)(2) (requiring the Attorney General to notify the IG in
writing of the exercise of such power and mandating that the IG transmit a copy of such notice to certain congressional
committees).
341
5 U.S.C. App. § 8G(d)(2).
342
P.L. 101-193
343
50 U.S.C. § 403-3h(f).
344
31 U.S.C. § 1105(a)(25).
345
50 U.S.C. § 403(q)(17)(f) and 50 U.S.C. §. 403-3H(m), respectively.
346
5 U.S.C. App. § 6(f)(1)-(3).
Similar provisions apply to the inspectors general for the CIA and of the Intelligence
Community.347
Under the Inspector General Act and other statutory establishments, IGs are to be selected
without regard to political affiliation and solely on the basis of integrity and demonstrated ability
in accounting, auditing, financial and management analysis, law, public administration, or
investigations.348 Along this line, CIGIE has set up a panel to submit recommendations of
individuals to the appropriate appointing authority for any appointment to an office of inspector
general, as directed in statute.349 The CIA IG and the Intelligence Community IG, who operate
under different statutes, are to be selected under these criteria as well as prior experience in the
field of foreign intelligence or national security and in compliance with the relevant security
standards.350
IGs, who are presidential appointees with the advice and consent of the Senate, can be removed
only by the president (or through the impeachment process in Congress). 351 When exercising this
authority, the president must communicate the reasons to Congress in writing 30 days prior to the
scheduled removal date.352 This advance notice allows the inspector general, Congress, or other
interested parties to examine and possibly object to the planned removal.
Some variations among IGs in designated federal entities and legislative branch agencies exist
over appointments, removals, and term limits. The DFE IGs are appointed by and can be removed
by the agency head, who must notify Congress in writing 30 days in advance when exercising the
removal power.353 Differences, however, arise over who might be considered to be the “head of
the agency” in a DFE. The agency head may be: an individual serving as the administrator or
director or as spelled out in law (e.g., the Archivist of the United States in the National Archives
and Records Administration), the chairperson of a board or commission, a full board or council as
specified in law (e.g., the National Council on the Arts in the National Endowment of the Arts), or
a certain super-majority of a governing board.354 In the United States Postal Service (USPS), for
instance, the governors appoint the inspector general, one of only two IGs with a set term (seven
years for the USPS IG) specified in law.355 Furthermore, the USPS IG is the only inspector
347
50 U.S.C.§ 403q(17)(f) and 50 U.S.C. § 403-3(n), respectively.
348
5 U.S.C. App. §§ 3(a) and 8G(c).
349
5 U.S.C. App. § 11(c)(1)(F). Also, see Fong, “The IG Reform Act,” p. 5.
350
50 U.S.C. §403(q)(b) and § 403-3H(c), respectively, for the CIA IG and the Intelligence Community IG.
351
5 U.S.C. App. § 3.
352
5 U.S.C. App. § 3(b) for PAS IGs under the IG Act; 50 U.S.C. §403(q)(b) for the IG in the CIA; and 50 U.S.C.
§403-3(H)(c)(4)) for the IG of the Intelligence Community.
353
5 U.S.C. App. § 8G(c) and (e).
354
5 U.S.C App. §§ 8G(a)(4), 8G(e), and 8G(h)(1).
355
5 U.S.C. App. §§ 8G(f)(1)-(2) and (4).
general with the qualification that he or she can be removed only “for cause” and then only by the
written concurrence of at least seven of the nine governors. In other cases, the Dodd-Frank Wall
Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act amended the IG Act of 1978 to require the written
concurrence of a two-thirds majority of board or commission members for removal of an IG in a
designated federal entity, where the board or commission is considered the DFE head. 356
The IG in the U.S. Capitol Police, who is appointed by and can be removed by the Capitol Police
Board, is the other inspector general with a legislated term limit; the inspector general is
appointed to a five-year term and can be reappointed twice.357 The Capitol Police IG may be
removed before the expiration of a five-year term but “only by the unanimous vote of all of the
voting members of the Capitol Police Board, and the Board shall communicate the reasons for
any such removal” to specified committees of Congress.358
Indirectly, the IG in the Peace Corps also faces an effective limited term (from five to eight-and-
a-half years), due to employment time limits for all Peace Corps personnel. 359
356
P.L. 111-103; 5 U.S.C. App. § 8G(e).
357
P.L. 109-55, § 1004(1)-(2). The IG’s appointment is to be made in consultation with the Inspectors General of the
Library of Congress, Government Printing Office, and Government Accountability Office.
358
P.L. 109-55, § 1004(3).
359
The statutory limit on Peace Corps employment ranges from five to eight-and-a-half years. It allows the Director to
grant a one-year extension to any employee plus a two-and-a-half year addition with the agency. This additional
amount would appear to be granted to an IG in the case that the IG’s extension would “promote the continuity of
functions in administering the Peace Corps.” 22 U.S.C. § 2506(a)(5) and (6).
360
5 U.S.C. App. § 11.
361
5 U.S.C. App. § 11(c)(E).
362
5 U.S.C. App. § 11(c)(3).
363
5 U.S.C. App. 11(c)(1)(F). The seven committees are Audit, Human Resources, Information Technology, Inspection
and Evaluation, Integrity, Investigations, and Legislation. See the IG website at http://www.ignet.gov; and Fong, “The
IG Reform Act,” p. 5.
CIGIE includes all statutory IGs along with other relevant officers, such as a representative of the
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) and the Special Counsel of the Office of Special
Counsel. 364 The council chairperson is an inspector general chosen from within its ranks, while
the executive chairperson is the OMB deputy director of management.365 CIGIE superseded two
other councils—the President’s Council on Integrity and Efficiency (PCIE) and the Executive
Council on Integrity and Efficiency (ECIE)—both created by executive orders, with the PCIE
beginning in the early 1980s.366
364
5 U.S.C. App., § 11(b)(1).
365
5 U.S.C. App., § 11(b)(2).
366
P.L. 110-409, § 7(c); see Exec. Order No. 12805, 57 Fed. Reg. 20627 (May 11,1992); Exec. Order No. 12993, 61
Fed. Reg. 13043 (Mar. 21, 1996).
367
P.L. 111-203, § 989E.
368
P.L. 111-259, § 405; 50 U.S.C. § 403-3h(h). The predecessor organization had operated under the same title. See
Offices of the Inspector General, Central Intelligence Agency and Department of Defense, Intelligence Community
Inspectors General Forum, Charter (modified March 15, 2004).
369
Office of Inspector General, Department of Defense, Defense Council on Integrity and Efficiency: Charter,
available at http://www.dodig.mil/dcie.html.
370
5 U.S.C. App. § 11(d)(1).
371
5 U.S.C. App. § 11(d)(2).
Reporting Requirements
Reporting requirements affect executive and administrative agencies and officers, including the
President; independent boards and commissions; and federally chartered corporations (as well as
the judiciary). These statutory provisions vary in terms of the specificity, detail, and type of
information that Congress demands. Reports may be required at periodic intervals, such as
semiannually or at the end of a fiscal year, or submitted only if and when a specific event,
activity, or set of conditions exists. The reports may also call upon an agency, commission, or
officer to
d. summarize an agency’s activities for the year or the prior six months.
Prior Consultation
In the past, explicit prior consultation provisions were rarely incorporated into law. However,
there appears to be an increase in statutory provisions as well as in committee reports that
accompany legislation specifying conditions for such discussion (see box).
A provision in the Conference Committee report on the 1978 Ethics in Government Act illustrates this development:
“The conferees expect the Attorney General to consult with the Judiciary Committees of both Houses of Congress
before substantially expanding the scope of authority or mandate of the Public Integrity Section of the Criminal
Division.”
1. The act created two new posts within OMB, along with a new position of chief financial
officer in 23 major federal agencies, including all Cabinet departments; a 24th agency has
since been added. Sixteen of these posts are filled by presidential appointees subject to
Senate confirmation; these are in the 14 Cabinet departments plus the Environmental
Protection Agency and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration. The remaining
eight CFO positions are in the Agency for International Development, Federal Emergency
Management Agency, General Services Administration, National Science Foundation,
Nuclear Regulatory Commission, Office of Personnel Management, Small Business
Administration, and the Social Security Administration.
2. The CFO act also provides for improvements in agency systems of accounting, financial
management, and internal controls to assure the issuance of reliable financial information
and to deter fraud, as well as waste and abuse of government resources.
3. The enactment, furthermore, calls for the production of complete, reliable, timely, and
consistent financial information for use by both the executive and the legislature in the
financing, management, and evaluation of federal programs.
1. Strategic Plans. The strategic plans specify five-year goals and objectives for agencies,
based on their basic missions and underlying statutory or other authority of the agency.
These plans, initially required in 1997, were to be developed in consultation with relevant
congressional offices and with information from “stakeholders” and then submitted to
Congress.
2. Annual Performance Plans and Goals. Based on these long-term plans, which may be
modified if conditions and agency responsibilities change, the agencies are directed to set
annual performance goals and to measure the results of their programs in achieving these
goals. The objective of GPRA is to focus on outcomes (i.e., the results and
accomplishments of a program, such as a decline in the use of illegal drugs for an anti-drug
abuse program) rather than outputs (i.e. other measures of agency activity and operations,
such as the number of anti-drug agents in the field). The annual plans, which are also
available to Congress, began with FY1999; the follow-up reports, which began in 2000,
are required six months after the end of the fiscal year.
Small Business Regulatory Enforcement Fairness Act of 1996 (110 Stat. 857-874)
Subtitle E of this act established, for the first time, a mechanism by which Congress can review
and disapprove virtually any federal rule or regulation. It requires that:
1. All agencies promulgating a covered rule must submit a report to each house of Congress
and the Comptroller General, containing specific information about the rule before it can
go into effect.
2. Rules designated by the Office of Management and Budget as “major” may normally not
go into effect until 60 days after submission, while non-major rules may become effective
“as otherwise allowed in law,” usually 30 days after publication in the Federal Register.
3. All covered rules are subject to fast-track disapproval by passage of a joint resolution,
even if they have already gone into effect, for a period of at least 60 days. Upon enactment
of such a joint resolution, no new rule that is “substantially the same” as the disapproved
rule may be issued until it is specifically authorized by a law enacted subsequent to the
disapproval of the original rule.
4. There can be no judicial review of actions taken (or not taken) by Congress, the
Comptroller General, or OMB; but the failure of an agency to submit a covered rule for
congressional review may be subject to sanction by a federal court.
1. Among other things, the current act and its 1980 predecessor more clearly defined the
oversight responsibilities of OMB’s Office of Information and Regulatory Affairs (OIRA);
it is authorized to develop and administer uniform information policies in order to ensure
the availability and accuracy of agency data collection.
2. Congressional oversight has been strengthened through its subsequent reauthorizations and
the requirement for Senate confirmation of OIRA’s administrator.
Federal Managers’ Financial Integrity Act (FMFIA) of 1982 (96 Stat. 814)
FMFIA is designed to improve the government’s ability to manage its programs by strengthening
internal management and financial controls, accounting systems, and financial reports.
1. The internal accounting systems are to be consistent with standards that the Comptroller
General prescribes, including a requirement that all assets be safeguarded against waste,
fraud, loss, unauthorized use, and misappropriation.
2. FMFIA also provides for ongoing evaluations of the internal control and accounting
systems that protect federal programs against waste, fraud, abuse, and mismanagement.
3. The enactment further mandates that the head of each agency report annually to the
President and Congress on the condition of these systems and on agency actions to correct
any material weakness which the reports identify.
4. FMFIA is also connected to the Chief Financial Officers Act of 1990, which calls upon the
director of OMB to submit a financial management status report to appropriate
congressional committees; part of this report is to be a summary of reports on internal
accounting and administrative control systems as required by FMFIA.
Resolutions of Inquiry
The House of Representatives can call upon the executive for factual information through
resolutions of inquiry.
2. Resolutions of inquiry are addressed to either the President or heads of departments and
agencies to supply specific factual information to the chamber. The resolutions usually
“request” the President or “direct” administrative heads to supply such information. In
calling upon the President for information, especially about foreign affairs, the qualifying
phrase—“if not incompatible with the public interest”—is often added.
3. Such resolutions are to ask for facts, documents, or specific information; these devices are
not to request an opinion or require an investigation (see box).
1. Limitations. Although House rules forbid in any general appropriations bill a provision
“changing existing law,” certain “limitations” may be admitted. “Just as the House under
its rules may decline to appropriate for a purpose authorized by law, so it may by limitation
prohibit the use of the money for part of the purpose while appropriating for the remainder
of it.” Constitution, Jefferson’s Manual, and Rules of the House of Representatives, H.
Doc. No. 110-162, 110th Cong., 2d Sess. § 1053 (2009). Limitations can be an effective
device in oversight by strengthening Congress’s ability to exercise control over federal
spending and to reduce unnecessary or undesired expenditures. Under House Rule XXI, no
provision changing existing law can be reported in any general appropriation bill “except
germane provisions that retrench expenditures by the reduction of amounts of money
covered by the bill” (the Holman rule). Rule XXI was amended in 1983 in an effort to
restrict the number of limitations on appropriations bills. The rule was changed again in
1995 by granting the majority leader a central role in determining consideration of
limitation amendments. The procedures for limitation in the House are set forth in the
Congressional Record for January 6, 1999, p. H29. A well-known limitation is the Hyde
amendment, which since the 1970s has restricted the use of Medicaid funds to fund
abortions for indigent women (see box).
“None of the funds appropriated under this Act shall be expended for any abortion ... [except] (1) if the pregnancy is
the result of an act of rape or incest; or (2) in the case where a woman suffers from a physical disorder, physical
injury, or physical illness, including a life-endangering physical condition caused by or arising from the pregnancy itself,
that would, as certified by a physician, place the woman in danger of death unless an abortion is performed.” Labor-
HHS Appropriations Act for fiscal 1998, 111 Stat. 1516, sec. 509 & 510 (1997).
2. Riders. Unlike limitations, legislative riders are extraneous to the subject matter of the bill
to which they are added. Riders appear in both authorization bills and appropriations bills.
In the latter, they may be subject to a point of order in the House on the ground that they
are attempts to place legislation in an appropriations bill. In the Senate, Rule XVI prohibits
on a point of order the addition to general appropriations bills of amendments that are
legislative or non-germane. Both chambers have procedures to waive these prohibitions
(see box on pg 103).
(a) No later than six months after the date of enactment of this Act, the Secretary of Homeland Security shall issue
interim final regulations establishing risk-based performance standards for security of chemical facilities and requiring
vulnerability assessments and the development and implementation of site security plans for chemical facilities:
Provided, That such regulations shall apply to chemical facilities that, in the discretion of the Secretary, present high
levels of security risk: Provided further, That such regulations shall permit each such facility, in developing and
implementing site security plans, to select layered security measures that, in combination, appropriately address the
vulnerability assessment and the risk-based performance standards for security for the facility: Provided further, That
the Secretary may not disapprove a site security plan submitted under this section based on the presence or absence
of a particular security measure, but the Secretary may disapprove a site security plan if the plan fails to satisfy the
risk-based performance standards established by this section: Provided further, That the Secretary may approve
alternative security programs established by private sector entities, Federal, State, or local authorities, or other
applicable laws if the Secretary determines that the requirements of such programs meet the requirements of this
section and the interim regulations: Provided further, That the Secretary shall review and approve each vulnerability
assessment and site security plan required under this section: Provided further, That the Secretary shall not apply
regulations issued pursuant to this section to facilities regulated pursuant to the Maritime Transportation Security Act
of 2002, P.L. 107-295, as amended; Public Water Systems, as defined by section 1401 of the Safe Drinking Water Act,
P.L. 93-523, as amended; Treatment Works as defined in section 212 of the Federal Water Pollution Control Act,
Public Law 92-500, as amended; any facility owned or operated by the Department of Defense or the Department of
Energy, or any facility subject to regulation by the Nuclear Regulatory Commission.
(b) Interim regulations issued under this section shall apply until the effective date of interim or final regulations
promulgated under other laws that establish requirements and standards referred to in subsection (a) and expressly
supersede this section: Provided, That the authority provided by this section shall terminate three years after the date
of enactment of this Act.
(c) Notwithstanding any other provision of law and subsection (b), information developed under this section, including
vulnerability assessments, site security plans, and other security related information, records, and documents shall be
given protections from public disclosure consistent with similar information developed by chemical facilities subject to
regulation under section 70103 of title 46, United States Code: Provided, That this subsection does not prohibit the
sharing of such information, as the Secretary deems appropriate, with State and local government officials possessing
the necessary security clearances, including law enforcement officials and first responders, for the purpose of carrying
out this section, provided that such information may not be disclosed pursuant to any State or local law: Provided
further, That in any proceeding to enforce this section, vulnerability assessments, site security plans, and other
information submitted to or obtained by the Secretary under this section, and related vulnerability or security
information, shall be treated as if the information were classified material.
(d) Any person who violates an order issued under this section shall be liable for a civil penalty under section
70119(a) of title 46, United States Code: Provided, That nothing in this section confers upon any
person except the Secretary a right of action against an owner or operator of a chemical facility to enforce any
provision of this section.
(e) The Secretary of Homeland Security shall audit and inspect chemical facilities for the purposes of determining
compliance with the regulations issued pursuant to this section.
(f) Nothing in this section shall be construed to supersede, amend, alter, or affect any Federal law that regulates the
manufacture, distribution in commerce, use, sale, other treatment, or disposal of chemical substances or mixtures.
(g) If the Secretary determines that a chemical facility is not in compliance with this section, the Secretary shall
provide the owner or operator with written notification (including a clear explanation of deficiencies in the
vulnerability assessment and site security plan) and opportunity for consultation, and issue an order to comply by
such date as the Secretary determines to be appropriate under the circumstances: Provided, That if the owner or
operator continues to be in noncompliance, the Secretary may issue an order for the facility to cease operation, until
the owner or operator complies with the order. Department of Homeland Security Appropriations Act, 2007, P.L.
109-295 § 550, 120 Stat. 1355 (2006).
they can be put into effect. This way of ensuring continuing oversight of policy areas follows two
paths: the legislative veto and advance notification.
Legislative Veto
Beginning in 1932, Congress delegated authority to the executive branch with the condition that
proposed executive actions would be first submitted to Congress and subjected to disapproval by
either house or disapproval by both houses acting through a concurrent resolution. Over the years,
other types of legislative veto were added, allowing Congress to control executive branch actions
without having to enact a law. In 1983, the Supreme Court ruled that the legislative veto was
unconstitutional on the ground that all exercises of legislative power that affect the rights, duties,
and relations of persons outside the legislative branch must satisfy the constitutional requirements
of bicameralism and presentment of a bill or resolution to the President for his signature or veto.
INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983). Despite this ruling, Congress has continued to enact
proscribed legislative vetoes and it has also relied on informal arrangements to provide
comparable controls.
For the appropriation account “Transportation Administrative Service Center,” no assessments may be levied against
any program, budget activity, subactivity or project funded by this statute “unless notice of such assessments and the
basis therefore are presented to the House and Senate Committees on Appropriations and are approved by such
Committees.” Department of Transportation and Related Agencies Appropriations Act 2001, 114 Stat. 1356A-2
(2000).
provide for a period of time during which action by the executive must be deferred, giving
Congress an opportunity to pass legislation prohibiting the pending action or using political
pressure to cause executive officials to retract or modify the proposed action. This type of “report
and wait” provision has been upheld by the Supreme Court. The Court noted: “The value of the
reservation of the power to examine proposed rules, laws and regulations before they become
effective is well understood by Congress. It is frequently, as here, employed to make sure that the
action under the delegation squares with the Congressional purpose.” Sibbach v. Wilson, 312 U.S.
1 (1941). An example appeared in the Comprehensive Anti-Apartheid Act of 1986, which was
directed toward South Africa’s political persecution of Nelson Mandela and other dissidents (see
box).
“The President may suspend or modify any of the measures required by this title or section 501(c) or section 504(b)
thirty days after he determines, and so reports to the Speaker of the House of Representatives and the chairman of
the Committee on Foreign Relations of the Senate, that the Government of South Africa has [taken certain actions]
unless the Congress enacts within such 30-day period, in accordance with section 602 of this Act, a joint resolution
disapproving the determination of the President under this subsection.” 100 Stat. 103, sec. 311 (1986).
Independent Counsel
The statutory provisions for the appointment of an independent counsel (formerly called “special
prosecutor”) were originally enacted as Title VI of the Ethics in Government Act of 1978, and
codified at 28 U.S.C. §§ 591-599. The independent counsel was reauthorized in 1983, 1987, and
1994. It expired on June 30, 1999. The mechanisms of the independent counsel law were
triggered by the receipt of information by the Attorney General that alleged a violation of any
federal criminal law (other than certain misdemeanors or “infractions”) by a person covered by
the act. Certain high-level federal officials, including the President, Vice President, and heads of
departments, were automatically covered by the law. In addition, the Attorney General had
discretion to seek an independent counsel for any person for whom there may exist a personal,
financial or political conflict of interest for Justice Department personnel to investigate; and the
Attorney General could seek an independent counsel for any Member of Congress when the
Attorney General deemed it to be in the “public interest.”
After conducting a limited review of the matter (a 30-day threshold review of the credibility and
specificity of the charges, and a subsequent 90-day preliminary investigation, with a possible 60-
day extension), the Attorney General, if he or she believed that “further investigation is
warranted”, would apply to a special “division of the court,” a federal three-judge panel appointed
by the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court, requesting that the division appoint an independent
counsel. The Attorney General of the United States was the only officer in the government
authorized to apply for the appointment of an independent counsel. The special division of the
court selected and appointed the independent counsel, and designated his or her prosecutorial
jurisdiction, based on the information provided the court by the Attorney General. The
independent counsel had the full range of investigatory and prosecutorial powers and functions of
the Attorney General or other Department of Justice employees.
There was no specific term of appointment for independent counsels. They could serve for as
long as it took to complete their duties concerning that specific matter within their defined and
limited jurisdiction. Once a matter was completed, the independent counsel filed a final report.
The special division of the court could also find that the independent counsel’s work was
completed and terminate the office. A periodic review of an independent counsel for such
determination was to be made by the special division of the court. An independent counsel, prior
to the completion of his or her duties, could be removed from office (other than by impeachment
and conviction) only by the Attorney General of the United States for good cause, physical or
mental disability, or other impairing condition, and such removal could be appealed to the court.
The procedures for appointing and removing the independent counsel were upheld by the
Supreme Court in Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654 (1988).
Investigation by the independent counsel could compete with parallel efforts by congressional
committees to examine the same issue. Congress could decide to accommodate the needs of the
independent counsel, such as delaying a legislative investigation until the independent counsel
completed certain phases of an inquiry (see box on previous page).
Although Congress could call on the Attorney General to apply for an independent counsel by a
written request from the House or Senate Judiciary Committee, or a majority of members of
either party of those committees, the Attorney General is not required to begin a preliminary
investigation or to apply for an independent counsel in response to such a request. However, in
such cases the Justice Department was required to provide certain information to the requesting
committee.
The independent counsel was directed by statutory language to submit to Congress an annual
report on the activities of such independent counsel, including the progress of investigations and
any prosecutions. Although it was recognized that certain information would have to be kept
confidential, the statute stated that “information adequate to justify the expenditures that the
office of the independent counsel has made” should be provided. 28 U.S.C. § 595(a)(2).
The independent counsel statute expired in 1992, partly because of criticism directed at Lawrence
Walsh’s investigation of Iran-Contra. The statute was reauthorized in 1994, but objections to the
investigations conducted by Kenneth Starr into Whitewater, Monica Lewinsky, and other matters,
put Congress under pressure to let the statute lapse on June 30, 1999.
Unless Congress in the future reauthorizes the independent counsel, the only available option for
an independent counsel is to have the Attorney General invoke existing authority to appoint a
special prosecutor to investigate a particular matter. For example, when the independent counsel
statute expired in 1992 and was not reauthorized until 1994, Attorney General Janet Reno
appointed Robert Fiske in 1993 to investigate the Clintons’ involvement in Whitewater and the
death of White House aide Vincent Foster. On July 9, 1999 Attorney General Reno promulgated
regulations concerning the appointment of outside, temporary counsels, to be called “Special
Counsels,” in certain circumstances to conduct investigations and possible prosecutions of certain
sensitive matters, or matters which may raise a conflict for the Justice Department (28 C.F.R. Part
600). Such special counsels will have substantially less independence than the statutory
independent General, including removal for “misconduct, dereliction of duty, incapacity, conflict
of interest, or for other good cause, including violation of Department policies.”
Organization
CRS is organized into five interdisciplinary research divisions: American Law; Domestic Social
Policy; Foreign Affairs, Defense and Trade; Government and Finance; and Resources, Science
and Industry. The Knowledge Services Group provides research support services to CRS analysts
and attorneys in providing authoritative and reliable information research and policy analysis to
the Congress.
Staff of CRS
CRS has about 700 employees on its permanent staff. The professional staff are diverse,
including, among others, attorneys, economists, engineers, social science analysts, information
scientists, librarians, defense and foreign affairs analysts, political scientists, public
administrators, and physical and biological scientists.
Legislative attorneys and paralegal staff respond to congressional needs for legal information and
analysis to support the legislative, oversight, and representational functions of Congress.
Information research
Information research specialists and resource specialists are available to provide information
research and reference assistance. The staff also provides copies of articles in newspapers,
journals, legal and legislative documents and offers assistance with a wide variety of electronic
files.
Briefings. CRS analysts and specialists are available to give one-on-one briefings to
Members and staff on public policy issues, the legislative process, congressional office
operations, committee matters, or a general orientation to CRS.
Federal Law Update. This series, offered twice yearly by the American Law Division,
focuses on developments on important issues of law directly related to the legislative business
of the Congress. The series can meet continuing legal education (CLE) requirements in some
states.
CRS Legislative Institutes. This three-part series provides training in the work of Congress
and the legislative process. Topics include the federal budget process, committee system and
procedures, floor procedures, amendments, and resolutions. In the Graduate Legislative
Institute, participants simulate congressional proceedings as “members of the CRS Congress”
and gain experience in procedures by moving bills through the legislative process.
District and Staff Institutes. These institutes provide orientation for staff of district offices
that include discussions of CRS services, the legislative and budget processes, casework,
Member allowances, ethics, and franking. The program is supported by the House and
Senate.
New Member Seminar. Every two years CRS offers new Members an orientation seminar
on public policy issues. These sessions are held in January at the beginning of each new
Congress.
For additional information about CRS seminars and events, call 7-7904.
CRS Products
Customized Memoranda
Confidential memoranda prepared for a specific office are a major form of CRS written
communication. These memoranda are solely for the use of the requesting office and are not
distributed further unless permission has been given by that office. Memoranda are often used by
CRS attorneys and analysts to respond to inquiries focused on legislative and policy matters of
individual Member interest.
CRS Reports
Reports for Congress on specific issues take many forms: policy analyses, statistical reviews,
economic studies, legal analyses, historical studies, and chronological reviews. Reports are
available on the CRS website at http://www.crs.gov. In addition, CRS prepares concise briefing
papers on issues before the Congress.
The La Follette Congressional Reading Room, the CRS Research Centers and the
Jefferson Congressional Reading Room
Staff in the congressional reading rooms and research centers provide telephone reference
assistance and in-person consultation on resources and research for congressional staff. A selected
research collection, newspapers and journals, and assistance with online searching is available.
The Jefferson Congressional Reading Room is a Members only facility staffed by CRS research
librarians providing in-person service.
Floor Agenda. The “Floor Agenda: CRS Products” page, a weekly compendium of CRS products
relevant to scheduled or expected floor action in the House and Senate, is available on the CRS
Website and through e-mail subscription to all Members, committees, subcommittees, and
congressional staff. All CRS products listed on the Floor Agenda are linked for electronic
delivery to subscriber desktops.
CRS Programs Listserv. Launched in fiscal 2001, this e-mail notification system provides
subscribers with descriptions of current CRS programs and links to online registration forms.
Current Legislative Issues. The Current Legislative Issues (CLI) system, accessible to the
Congress from the CRS Home Page, reflects policy areas identified by CRS research staff as
active and of current importance to the Congress. All products presented as CLIs are maintained
to address significant policy developments. On occasion the system is used to facilitate the
contribution of CRS expertise in situations requiring immediate attention of the Congress on an
unanticipated basis. CRS typically develops and maintains about 150 CLIs a year.
Divisions
Issue and legislative areas include education and training, health care and medicine, public health,
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occupational safety, unemployment and workers compensation, and issues related to the aging of
the U.S. population, to children, persons with disabilities, the poor, veterans, and minorities.
Offices
Interdisciplinary Teams
Limitations
The Legislative Reorganization Act of 1970 and specific provisions in various other Acts direct
and authorize CRS to provide a great range of products and services to the Congress. However,
pursuant to these statutory authorities and understandings reached over time in consultation with
the relevant oversight committees, the Service has developed the following policies limiting or
barring certain types of assistance. When it appears that a congressional request should be
declined on these policy grounds, that decision and notification to the requestor is to be made
only after consultation with the appropriate division chief or the Associate Director for Policy
Compliance.
a. CRS cannot prepare reports, seminars or undisclaimed products which are of a partisan
nature or advocate bills or policies. But CRS will respond to requests for “directed
writing”—statement drafts, casemaking or other disclaimed products clearly identified as
prepared at the direction of the client and not for attribution as CRS analysis or opinion. In
no case is excessive partisanship, incorrect factual data, moral denigration of opponents, or
personal research damaging to Members permissible.
c. Members of the CRS staff shall not appear as witnesses before committees of Congress in
their capacity as CRS employees or on matters relating to their official duties without the
express consent of the Director.
d. CRS does not draft bills (a function of the office of the legislative counsels), but will assist
with the preparation of legislative proposals.
e. CRS cannot meet deadlines or demands that could only be met by dropping or jeopardizing
the quality of responses to urgent legislative requests related to the public policy work of
the Congress, but the Service will respond to all requests as rapidly as is feasible under
prevailing workload conditions.
f. CRS cannot accept “rush” or priority deadlines on constituent inquiries but will respond as
expeditiously as is possible without compromising the quality of responses relating to
current legislative business.
h. CRS cannot give personal legal or medical advice, but will assist in the provision of
background information, the identification of relevant issues for further scrutiny, and
advice on sources of additional assistance.
i. CRS cannot undertake scholastic or personal research for office staff, but can, on a
nonpriority basis, help with bibliographic and reference services.
j. CRS assistance for former Members of Congress should be limited to use of the La Follette
Reading Room and reference centers, the hotline service, the provision of readily available
information and previously prepared CRS congressional distribution products. CRS cannot
undertake original research for former Members, but on a nonpriority basis responds to
requests for reference services and research guidance.
k. CRS is not authorized to provide congressional offices with clerical assistance (e.g.,
typing, duplication, maintenance of mailing lists, continuing clipping services, etc.).
l. CRS must not use its staff to index hearings or congressional documents other than those
prepared by the Service itself.
m. The Library of Congress is not authorized to subscribe to or lend on a regular basis current
issues of periodicals and newspapers for the purpose of furnishing them regularly to
individual congressional offices.
n. CRS must not use its staff to support executive or other commissions that are not funded
through the Legislative Branch Appropriations Act. In those instances where Members of
Congress are official members of a commission not served by CRS, the Service may
supply customary assistance to the Members, but queries should be placed through the
Members’ offices by their official staffs, and the replies should be sent to the Members’
offices, not to the office of the commission.
q. While CRS reference and research specialists serve all Members and committees of
Congress, the Director has the authority to assign staff to work temporarily for particular
committees on request. In current circumstances, however, no full time assignments may
be approved, and staff assigned to close support of a committee must be available to serve
other clients. When staff is adequate to permit the loan of subject specialists for short
periods, the Director may approve formal requests without reimbursement; staff loans for
periods of over 60 days must be reimbursed. No full-time assignment of staff is approved if
the assignment leaves the Service unable to adequately serve the Congress.
r. As a general rule, the services of CRS are provided exclusively to the Congress and, to the
extent provided by law, to other congressional support agencies. Because of the benefits
derived from the exchange of information with other governmental bodies (including
elected and appointed officials of foreign governments), the Service may also at the
discretion of the Director exchange courtesies and services of a limited nature with such
organizations, so long as such assistance benefits CRS services to Congress.
s. CRS does not provide its services to congressional member organizations and informal
caucuses not funded by legislative branch appropriations but will provide its normal
services to the offices of Members who belong to such entities and to formal congressional
party organizations. Current lists of organizations that may place requests directly are
available from the Inquiry Section.
t. CRS does not offer services to former Members of Congress, other than providing copies of
current CRS publications or limited brief reference assistance.
Contact Information
Fast Access to all CRS services
Phone 7-5700 (Press 1-5 to speak to an information specialist)
Website http://www.crs.gov
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TTY 7-7154
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e-mail lists select Services
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Dial by name 7-5700 (press 1-4 and spell last name then first name)
CRS Products
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Mailing Address
For questions, comments or problems about CRS services, please call 7-3915.
Under the Budget Act, the Joint Committee on Taxation is responsible for estimating the impact
on revenues when legislation involves income, estate, gift, excise, and payroll taxes, and CBO is
required to use those revenue estimates in its own analyses.
The Unfunded Mandates Reform Act of 1995 requires CBO to estimate the costs of federal
mandates in legislation that would affect state, local, and tribal governments or the private sector.
The act also authorizes CBO to prepare analyses and studies of the budgetary or financial impact
of proposed legislation that may significantly affect state and local governments or the private
sector, to the extent practicable, at the request of any committee.
Occasionally, other laws have directed CBO to analyze specific subjects. Such analyses have
included the treatment of administrative costs under credit reform accounting and the financial
risks posed by government-sponsored enterprises.
Cost Estimates
The Congressional Budget Office is responsible for providing federal budget and mandate cost
estimates for bills (other than appropriation bills) when they are reported by a full committee of
either House. Committee staff should notify CBO when bills are about to be ordered reported and
when cost estimates are needed.
CBO sometimes prepares cost estimates for proposals at other stages of the legislative process at
the request of a committee of jurisdiction, a budget committee, or the Congressional leadership.
For example, CBO may prepare cost estimates for alternative proposals to be considered by a
committee or subcommittee, including draft bills not yet introduced, or for amendments to be
considered during committee markups. In many cases, cost estimates provided at early stages in
the legislative process are informal, conveying preliminary budgetary effects. Similarly, CBO
may prepare cost estimates for floor amendments and for bills that pass one or both Houses.
For appropriation bills, CBO provides estimates of outlays that would result from budget
authority provided by such legislation. CBO also provides the budget and appropriations
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so that the Congress can know whether it is acting within the limits set by its annual budget
resolution.
When undertaking a cost estimate, CBO analysts contact the staff of the committee of jurisdiction
and, when applicable, the staffs of the Member sponsoring the proposal and the Member
requesting the estimate to gather background information and discuss the schedule for completing
the estimate. Budget and mandate cost estimates are based on the text of the proposed legislation.
CBO analysts consult with the staff of the committee of jurisdiction (for a reported bill) or the
sponsoring Member (for an introduced bill or amendment) when questions of interpretation arise,
but they draw their own conclusions on an impartial and objective basis.
CBO analysts contact the appropriate staff members if a forthcoming CBO estimate shows direct
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Analytic Studies
In addition to statutory reports, or studies done to support CBO’s statutory work, each year the
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Minority Member of the relevant committee or subcommittee; the Congressional leadership; or,
as time permits, individual Members.
When undertaking requested analyses of legislative proposals or issues, CBO staff members
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be done. CBO analysts draw their own conclusions on an impartial and objective basis, as they do
when preparing cost estimates. When appropriate and after consultation with the requester’s staff,
CBO staff inform committees that may have an interest in the work. As a final step in the process,
CBO informs the requester’s staff of the results of the analysis and releases the material.
CBO employs standard methods of economic analysis and closely follows professional
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All CBO estimates and analytic products are reviewed internally for technical competence,
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Although outside advisers provide considerable assistance, CBO is solely responsible for the
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The Director of the Congressional Budget Office transmits by letter all formal budget and
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budget committee or individual Member, CBO also sends a copy of its cost estimate
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for an introduced bill or amendment, CBO sends a copy of the estimate to the sponsor and the
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requester.
In contrast, CBO staff may provide informal cost estimates at various stages of the legislative
process as Members or committees evaluate proposals. Informal estimates are preliminary
because they do not undergo the same review procedures required for formal estimates.
Funding
The Legislative Branch Appropriations Act, 2010 (P.L. 111-68) provided the agency with $45.2
million in FY 2010 funding.
Workload
In fiscal year 2009, CBO issued 33 studies and reports, 9 briefs, 11 Monthly Budget Reviews, 38
letters, 8 presentations, and 5 background papers—along with 2 other publications and numerous
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calendar year 2009, CBO completed approximately 480 federal cost estimates as well as about
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Finally, CBO provides up-to-date data on its Web site, including current budget and economic
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Staffing
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The act specifies the activities of the office, two of which are of immediate interest to committee
oversight concerns: representing committees of the Senate in proceedings to aid them in
investigations, and advising committees and officers of the Senate.376
The Senate Legal Counsel may represent committees in proceedings to obtain evidence for
Senate investigations. Two specific proceedings are authorized.
The first proceeding is under the law providing committees the authority to grant witness
immunity (18 U.S.C. § 6005). It provides that a committee or subcommittee of either house of
Congress may request an immunity order from a U.S. district court when the request has been
approved by the affirmative vote of two-thirds of the members of the full committee. By the same
vote, a committee may direct the Senate Legal Counsel to represent it or any of its subcommittees
in an application for an immunity order. 377
The second proceeding involves authority under the Ethics in Government Act of 1978 which
permits the Senate Legal Counsel to represent a committee or subcommittee of the Senate in a
civil action to enforce a subpoena. Prior to the Ethics Act, subpoenas of the Senate could be
enforced only through the cumbersome method of a contempt proceeding before the bar of the
Senate or by a certification to the U.S. attorney and a prosecution for criminal contempt of
Congress under 2 U.S.C. §§ 192, 194. The Ethics Act authorizes the Senate to enforce its
372
A full description of the Office of Senate Legal Counsel and its work may be found in Floyd M. Riddick and Alan
S. Frumin, Riddick’s Senate Procedure, S.Doc. 28, 101st Cong., 2nd sess. 1236 (1992). See Charles Tiefer, The Senate
and House Counsel Offices: Dilemmas of Representing in Court the Institutional Congressional Client, Law and
Contemporary Problems, vol. 61: no. 2, spring 1998:48-63 (providing a more recent discussion of the history,
development and work of both the Senate and House counsels’ offices).
373
P.L. 95-520, secs. 701 et seq., 92 Stat. 1824, 1875 (1978), codified principally in 2 U.S.C. §§ 288, et seq.
374
S.Rept. 95-170, 95th Cong., 2nd sess. 84 (1978).
375
2 U.S.C. § 288(a) and (b), 288a.
376
In addition, the office is called upon to defend the Senate, its committees, officers and employees in civil litigation
relating to their official responsibilities or when they have been subpoenaed to testify or to produce Senate records; and
to appear for the Senate when it intervenes or appears as amicus curiae in a lawsuit to protect the powers or
responsibilities of Congress.
377
2 U.S.C. § 288b(d)(2), 288f.
subpoenas through a civil action in the U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia.378 The
House chose not to avail itself of this procedure and this enforcement method applies only to
Senate subpoenas. Senate subpoenas have been enforced in several civil actions. See, for
example, proceedings to hold in contempt a recalcitrant witness in the impeachment proceedings
against Judge Alcee L. Hastings379 and proceedings to enforce a subpoena duces tecum for the
production of diaries of Senator Bob Packwood. 380
The statute details the procedure for directing the Senate Legal Counsel to bring a civil action to
enforce a subpoena. In contrast to an application for an immunity order, which may be authorized
by a committee, only the full Senate by resolution may authorize an action to enforce a
subpoena.381 The Senate may not consider a resolution to direct the counsel to bring an action
unless the investigating committee reports the resolution by a majority vote. The statute specifies
the required contents of the committee report; among other matters, the committee must report on
the extent to which the subpoenaed party has complied with the subpoena, the objections or
privileges asserted by the witness, and the comparative effectiveness of a criminal and civil
proceeding.382 A significant limitation on the civil enforcement remedy is that it excludes from its
coverage actions against officers or employees of the federal government acting within their
official capacities, except where the refusal to comply is based on the assertion of a personal
privilege or objection and not on a governmental privilege or objection that has been authorized
by the executive branch. 383 Its reach is limited to natural persons and to entities acting or
purporting to act under the color of state law.384
(2) Advice to committees and officers of the Senate and other duties
The Ethics act details a number of advisory functions of the Office of Senate Legal Counsel.
Principal among these are the responsibility of advising Members, committees, and officers of the
Senate with respect to subpoenas or requests for the withdrawal of Senate documents, and the
responsibility of advising committees about their promulgation and implementation of rules and
procedures for congressional investigations. The office also provides advice about legal questions
that arise during the course of investigations.385
The act also provides that the counsel shall perform such other duties consistent with the
nonpartisan purposes and limitations of Title VII as the Senate may direct.386 Thus, in 1980, the
office was used in the investigation relating to President Carter’s brother, Billy, and his
connection to Libya. The office worked under the direction of the chairman and vice-chairman of
the subcommittee charged with the conduct of that investigation.387 Members of the office have
also undertaken special assignments such as the Senate’s investigation of “Abscam” and other
378
28 U.S.C. § 1365.
379
See S.Rept. 98, 101st Cong., 1st sess. (1989).
380
See, Senate Select Committee on Ethics v. Packwood, 845 F.Supp 17 (D.D.C. 1994), petition for stay pending
appeal denied, 510 U.S. 1319 (1994).
381
2 U.S.C. § 288d and 28 U.S.C. § 1365.
382
2 U.S.C. § 288 d(c).
383
See 28 U.S.C. § 1365 (a).
384
Id.
385
2 U.S.C. § 288g(a)(5) and (6).
386
2 U.S. 288g(c).
387
See S.Rept. 1015, 96th Cong., 2nd sess. (1980).
undercover activities,388 the impeachment proceedings of Judge Harry Claiborne, 389 Judge Walter
L. Nixon, Jr.,390 and Judge Alcee L. Hastings Jr., 391 and the confirmation hearings of Justice
Clarence E. Thomas. The office was called upon to assist in the Senate’s conduct of the
impeachment trial of President Clinton.
In addition, the counsel’s office provides information and advice to Members, officers, and
employees on a wide range of legal and administrative matters relating to Senate business. Unlike
the House practice, the Senate Legal Counsel plays no formal role in the review and issuance of
subpoenas. However, since it may become involved in civil enforcement proceedings, it has
welcomed the opportunity to review proposed subpoenas for form and substance prior to their
issuance by committees. The Office of Senate Legal Counsel can be reached at 224-4435.
The General Counsel, Deputy General Counsel, and other attorneys of the office are appointed by
the Speaker and serve at his pleasure. 393 The office “function[s] pursuant to the direction of the
Speaker, who shall consult with a Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group,” which consists of the
Speaker himself, the Majority Leader, Majority Whip, Minority Leader, and Minority Whip.394
The office has statutory authority to appear before state or federal courts in the course of
performing its functions. 2 U.S.C. § 130f. The office may appear as amicus curiae on behalf of
the Speaker and the Bipartisan Legal Advisory Group in litigation involving the institutional
interests of the House. 395 Where authorized by statute or resolution, the office may represent the
House itself in judicial proceedings.396 The office also represents House officers in litigation
affecting the institutional interests and prerogatives of the House.397 Finally, the office defends the
388
See S.Rept. 682, 97th Cong., 2nd sess. (1982).
389
See S.Rept. 812, 99th Cong., 2nd sess. (1986).
390
See S.Rept. 164, 101st Cong., 1st sess. (1989).
391
See S.Rept. 156, 101st Cong., 1st sess. (1989).
392
See H. Res. 5, § 11, 139 Cong. Rec. H5 (daily ed. Jan. 5, 1993).
393
House Rule II(8) of the Rules of the 108th Congress.
394
Id.
395
See. e.g., Elk Grove Unified School District v. Newdow, 124 S. Ct. 2301 (2004); Raines v. Byrd, 521 U.S. 811
(1997); Beverly Enterprises, Inc. v. Trump, 182 F.3d 183 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. McDade, 28 F.3d 283 (3d Cir.
1994); Cano v. Davis, No. 01-8477 (C.D. Cal. March 28, 2002) (unpublished order granting motions to quash
subpoenas to Members).
396
See. e.g., Department of Commerce v. U.S. House of Representatives, 525 U.S. 316 (1999) (litigation in which the
General Counsel was authorized by statute, P.L. 105-119, § 209(b) (1997), to represent the House in a challenge to the
legality of the Department of Commerce’s plan to use statistical sampling in the 2000 census).
397
See. e.g., Adams v. Clinton, 90 F. Supp. 2d 35, aff’d sub nom. Alexander v. Mineta, 531 U.S. 940, 941 (2000);
(continued...)
House, its committees, officers, and employees in civil litigation relating to their official
responsibilities, or when they have been subpoenaed to testify or to produce House records (see
House Rule VIII).
Unlike Senate committees, House committees may only issue subpoenas under the seal of the
Clerk of the House. In practice, committees often work closely with the Office of General
Counsel in drafting subpoenas and every subpoena issued by a committee is reviewed by the
office for substance and form. Committees frequently seek the advice and assistance of the Office
of General Counsel in dealing with various asserted constitutional, statutory, and common-law
privileges,398 in responding to executive agencies and officials that resist congressional
oversight,399 and in navigating the statutory process for obtaining a contempt citation with respect
to a recalcitrant witness.400
The Office of General Counsel represents the interests of House committees in judicial
proceedings in a variety of circumstances. The office represents committees in federal court on
applications for immunity orders pursuant to 18 U.S.C. § 6005; appears as amicus curiae in cases
affecting House committee investigations;401 defends against attempts to obtain direct or indirect
judicial interference with congressional subpoenas or other investigatory authority; 402 represents
committees seeking to prevent compelled disclosure of non-public information relating to their
investigatory or other legislative activities; 403 and appears in court on behalf of committees
seeking judicial assistance in obtaining access to documents or information such as documents
that are under seal or materials which may be protected by Rule 6(e) of the Federal Rules of
Criminal Procedure. 404
Like the Senate Legal Counsel’s office, the House General Counsel’s office also devotes a large
portion of its time to rendering informal advice to individual Members and committees. The
(...continued)
Schaffer v. Clinton, 240 F.3d 878 (10th Cir. 2001); Skaggs v. Carle, 110 F.3d 831 (D.C. Cir. 1997); Newdow v. Eagen,
No. 02-01704 (D.D.C. filed March 24, 2004).
398
See. e.g., H.Rept. 105-797, In the Matter of Representative Jay Kim, Committee on Standards of Official Conduct,
105th Cong., 2nd sess. 84-85 (Oct. 8, 1998).
399
See. e.g., Hearing, “The Attorney General’s Refusal to Provide Congressional Access to ‘Privileged’ Inslaw
Documents,” before the Subcommittee on Economic and Commercial Law, Committee on the Judiciary, 101st Cong.,
2nd sess. 77-104 (Dec. 5, 1990).
400
See. e.g., 132 Cong Rec. 3036-38 (1986) (floor consideration of contempt citation against two witnesses who
refused to testify concerning alleged assistance provided to former Philippines President Ferdinand E. Marcos and his
wife).
401
See. e.g., Dornan v. Sanchez, 978 F. Supp. 1315, 1317 n.1 (C.D. Cal. 1997).
402
See. e.g., Harris v. Board of Governors, 938 F.2d 720 (7th Cir. 1991); United States v. United States House of
Representatives, 556 F. Sup.. 150 (D.D.C. 1983).
403
See. e.g., Pentagen Technologies Int’l, Ltd. v. Committee on Appropriations of the United States House of
Representatives, 20 F. Supp. 2d 41 (D.D.C. 1998), aff’d 194 F.3d 174 (D.C. Cir. 1998); United States v. McDade, No.
96-1508 (3d Cir. July 12, 1996) (unpublished order quashing subpoena to the Committee on Standards of Official
Conduct); Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp. v. Williams, 62 F.3d 408 (D.C. Cir. 1995); United States v. Arthur
Andersen, LLP, No. 02-121 (S.D. Tex. filed May 15, 2002) (unpublished order quashing subpoena to the Committee on
Energy and Commerce).
404
See. e.g., In re Harrisburg Grand Jury, 638 F. Supp. 43 (M.D. Pa. 1986). Cf. United States v. Moussaoui, No. 01-
455-A, 2002 WL 1990900 (E.D. Va. Aug. 29, 2002) (order denying the “Expedited Motion of the United States for
Clarification Regarding the Applicability of the Protective Order for Unclassified But Sensitive Material and Local
Rule 57 to Information That May Be Made Public in Congressional Proceedings”).
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Analytical Perspectives, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2011 contains
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Historical Tables provides data on budget receipts, outlays, surpluses or deficits, Federal debt,
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The Appendix, Budget of the United States Government, Fiscal Year 2011 contains detailed
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budget totals.
Several other points about the President’s budget and executive agency budget products are worth
noting. First, the President’s budgetary communications to Congress continue after the
January/February submission and usually include a series of budget amendments and
supplementals, the Mid-Session Review, Statements of Administration Policy (SAPs) on
legislation, and even revised budgets on occasion. Second, most of these additional
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or the OMB homepage (in the case of SAPs). Third, the initial budget products often do not
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committees to begin developing legislation, and that further budgetary information is provided in
the “justification” materials (see below) and the later submission of legislative proposals. Finally,
the internal executive papers (such as agency budget submissions to OMB) often are not made
available to Congress.
b. Budget Committees. House and Senate Budget Committees, in preparing to report the annual
concurrent budget resolution, conduct hearings on overall federal budget policy. These hearings
and other fiscal analyses made by these panels address various aspects of federal programs and
funding levels which can be useful sources of information.
c. Other Committees. To assist the Budget Committees in developing the concurrent budget
resolution, other committees are required to prepare “views and estimates” of programs in their
jurisdiction. Committee views and estimates, usually packaged together and issued as a
committee print, also may be a useful source of detailed budget data.
d. Internal Agency Studies and Budget Reviews. These agency studies and reviews are often
conducted in support of budget formulation and can yield useful information about individual
programs. The budgeting documents, evaluations, and priority rankings of individual agency
programs can provide insights into executive branch views of the importance of individual
programs.
There are numerous think tanks, universities, or associations, for instance, that periodically
conduct studies of public policy issues and advise Members and others on how well federal
agencies and programs are working. Similarly, numerous interest groups are active in monitoring
areas such as civil rights, education, or health and they are not reluctant to point out alleged
bureaucratic failings to committees and Members. Some of these groups may also assist
committees and Members in bringing about improvements in agencies and programs. For
example, the Project on Government Oversight (POGO), an independent, nonprofit organization,
that is active in achieving a more effective, accountable, open, and ethical federal government.
The group’s web site is: http://www.pogo.org.
There are also scores of social, political, scientific, environmental, and humanitarian
nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) located around the world. Working with governments,
corporations, foundations, and other entities are such NGOs as Greeenpeace, Amnesty
International, the World Resources Institute, the Red Cross, and the Save the Children Fund.
Many NGOs might provide valuable assistance to congressional overseers because they “do legal,
scientific, technical, and policy analysis; provide services; shape, implement, monitor, and
enforce national and international commitments; and change institutions and norms.”405
405
Jim Bencivenga, “Critical Mass,” Christian Science Monitor, February 3, 2000, p. 15. Also see “NGOs,” The
Economist, January 29, 2000, pp. 25-27.
GENERAL INSTRUCTIONS
1. In complying with this Subpoena, you are required to produce all responsive documents that
are in your possession, custody, or control, whether held by you or your past or present agents,
employees, and representatives acting on your behalf. You are also required to produce
documents that you have a legal right to obtain, documents that you have a right to copy or
have access to, and documents that you have placed in the temporary possession, custody, or
control of any third party. No records, documents, data or information called for by this request
shall be destroyed, modified, removed or otherwise made inaccessible to the Committee.
2. In the event that any entity, organization or individual denoted in this subpoena has been, or is
also known by any other name than that herein denoted, the subpoena shall be read to also
include them under that alternative identification.
3. Each document produced shall be produced in a form that renders the document susceptible of
copying.
4. Documents produced in response to this subpoena shall be produced together with copies of
file labels, dividers or identifying markers with which they were associated when this subpoena
was served. Also identify to which paragraph from the subpoena that such documents are
responsive.
5. It shall not be a basis for refusal to produce documents that any other person or entity also
possesses non-identical or identical copies of the same document.
7. If the subpoena cannot be complied with in full, it shall be complied with to the extent
possible, which shall include an explanation of why full compliance is not possible.
8. In the event that a document is withheld on the basis of privilege, provide the following
information concerning any such document: (a) the privilege asserted; (b) the type of
document; (c) the general subject matter; (d) the date, author and addressee; and (e) the
relationship of the author and addressee to each other.
9. If any document responsive to this subpoena was, but no longer is, in your possession, custody,
or control, identify the document (stating its date, author, subject and recipients) and explain
the circumstances by which the document ceased to be in your possession, or control.
10. If a date set forth in this subpoena referring to a communication, meeting, or other event is
inaccurate, but the actual date is known to you or is otherwise apparent from the context of the
request, you should produce all documents which would be responsive as if the date were
correct.
11. Other than subpoena questions directed at the activities of specified entities or persons, to the
extent that information contained in documents sought by this subpoena may require
production of donor lists, or information otherwise enabling the re-creation of donor lists,
such identifying information may be redacted.
12. The time period covered by this subpoena is included in the attached Schedule A.
13. This request is continuing in nature. Any record, document, compilation of data or
information, not produced because it has not been located or discovered by the return date,
shall be produced immediately upon location or discovery subsequent thereto.
14. All documents shall be Bates stamped sequentially and produced sequentially.
15. Two sets of documents shall be delivered, one set for the Majority Staff and one set for the
Minority Staff. When documents are produced to the Subcommittee, production sets shall be
delivered to the Majority Staff in Room B346 Rayburn House Office Building and the
Minority Staff in Room 2101 Rayburn House Office Building.
GENERAL DEFINITIONS
1. The term “document” means any written, recorded, or graphic matter of any nature whatsoever,
regardless of how recorded, and whether original or copy, including, but not limited to, the
3. The terms “and” and “or” shall be construed broadly and either conjunctively or disjunctively
to bring within the scope of this subpoena any information which might otherwise be construed
to be outside its scope. The singular includes plural number, and vice versa. The masculine
includes the feminine and neuter genders.
4. The term “White House” refers to the Executive Office of the President and all of its units
including, without limitation, the Office of Administration, the White House Office, the Office
of the Vice President, the Office of Science and Technology Policy, the Office of Management
and Budget, the United States Trade Representative, the Office of Public Liaison, the Office of
Correspondence, the Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for Policy and Political Affairs, the
Office of the Deputy Chief of Staff for White House Operations, the Domestic Policy Council,
the Office of Federal Procurement Policy, the Office of Intergovernmental Affairs, the Office
of Legislative Affairs, Media Affairs, the National Economic Council, the Office of Policy
Development, the Office of Political Affairs, the Office of Presidential Personnel, the Office of
the Press Secretary, the Office of Scheduling and Advance, the Council of Economic Advisors,
the Council on Environmental Quality, the Executive Residence, the President’s Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board, the National Security Council, the Office of National Drug
Control, and the Office of Policy Development.
Custodian of Documents
International Brotherhood of Teamsters
25 Louisiana Avenue, N.W.
Washington, D.C. 20001
SCHEDULE A
1. All organizational charts and personnel rosters for the International Brotherhood of Teamsters
(“Teamsters” or “IBT”), including the DRIVE PAC, in effect during calendar years 1991
through 1997.
2. All IBT operating, finance, and administrative manuals in effect during calendar years 1991
through 1997, including, but not limited to those that set forth (1) operating policies, practices,
and procedures; (2) internal financial practices and reporting requirements; and (3)
authorization, approval, and review responsibilities.
3. All annual audit reports of the IBT for the years 1991 through 1996 performed by the auditing
firm of Grant Thornton.
4. All IBT annual reports to its membership and the public for years 1991 through 1997, including
copies of IBT annual audited financial statements certified to by independent public
accountants.
5. All books and records showing receipts and expenditures, assets and liabilities, profits and
losses, and all other records used for recording the financial affairs of the IBT including,
journals (or other books of original entry) and ledgers including cash receipts journals, cash
disbursements journals, revenue journals, general journals, subledgers, and workpapers
reflecting accounting entries.
6. All Federal Income Tax returns filed by the IBT for years 1991 through 1997.
7. All minutes of the General Board, Executive Board, Executive Council, and all Standing
Committees, including any internal ethics committees formed to investigate misconduct and
corruption, and all handouts and reports prepared and produced at each Committee meeting.
8. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about, any contribution,
donation, expenditure, outlay, in-kind assistance, transfer, loan, or grant (from DRIVE, DRIVE
E&L fund, or IBT general treasury) to any of the following entities/organizations:
a. Citizen Action
c. Project Vote
f. AFL-CIO
g. AFSCME
1. Clinton-Gore ‘96
m. SEIU
9. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about any of the following
individuals/entities:
d. Martin Davis
e. Michael Ansara
f. Jere Nash
g. Share Group
h. November Group
i. Terrence McAuliffe
j. Charles Blitz
k. New Party
m. Delancy Printing
n. Axis Enterprises
o. Barbara Arnold
p. Peter McGourty
q. Charles McDonald
r. Theodore Kheel
10. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information on about, communications
between the Teamsters and the White House regarding any of the following issues:
12. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about, communications
between the Teamsters and the Democratic National Committee, DSCC, or DCCC.
13. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about, communications
between the Teamsters and the Clinton-Gore ‘96 Campaign Committee.
14. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about, policies and
procedures in effect during 1996 regarding the approval of expenditures from the IBT general
treasury, DRIVE E&L fund, and DRIVE PAC.
15. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about the retention by the
IBT of the law firm Covington & Burling and/or Charles Ruff.
16. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about work for the IBT
performed by the firm Palladino & Sutherland and/or Jack Palladino.
17. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about work for the IBT
performed by Ace Investigations and/or Guerrieri, Edmund, and James.
18. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about IBT involvement in
the 1995-1996 Oregon Senate race (Ron Wyden vs. Gordon Smith).
19. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about, Ron Carey’s
campaign for reelection as general president of the Teamsters.
20. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about organization, planning,
and operation of the 1996 IBT Convention.
21. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about the following:
a. Trish Hoppey
b. John Latz
22. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about the Household Finance
Corporation.
23. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about, any “affinity credit
card” program or other credit card program sponsored by or participated in by the IBT.
24. A list of all bank accounts held by the International Brotherhood of Teamsters including the
name of the bank, account number, and bank address.
25. All documents referring or relating to, or containing information about, payments made by the
IBT to any official or employee of the Independent Review Board.
26. Unless otherwise indicated, the time period covered by this subpoena is between January
1991 and December 1997.
November 4, 1982
The policy of this administration is to comply with Congressional Requests for information
to the fullest extent consistent with the constitutional and statutory obligations of the
Executive Branch. While this Administration, like its predecessors, has an obligation to
protect the confidentiality of some communications, executive privilege will be asserted only
in the most compelling circumstances, and only after careful review demonstrates that
assertion of the privilege is necessary. Historically, good faith negotiations between
Congress and the executive branch has minimized the need for invoking executive privilege,
and this tradition of accommodation should continue as the primary means of resolving
conflicts between the Branches. To ensure that every reasonable accommodation is made to
the needs of Congress, executive privilege shall not be invoked without specific Presidential
authorization.
The Supreme Court has held that the Executive Branch may occasionally find it necessary
and proper to preserve the confidentiality of national security secrets, deliberative
communications that form a part of the decision-making process, or other information
important to the discharge of the Executive Branch’s constitutional responsibilities.
Legitimate and appropriate claims of privilege should not thoughtlessly be waived.
However, to ensure that this Administration acts responsibly and consistently in the exercise
of its duties, with due regard for the responsibilities and prerogatives of Congress, the
following procedures shall be followed whenever Congressional requests for information
raise concerns regarding the confidentiality of the information sought:
1. Congressional requests for information shall be complied with as promptly and as fully as
possible, unless it is determined that compliance raises a substantial question of executive
privilege. A “substantial question of executive privilege” exists if disclosure of the
information requested might significantly impair the national security (including the
conduct of foreign relations), the deliberative processes of the Executive Branch or other
aspects of the performance of the Executive Branch’s constitutional duties.
in part or from information received from another department or agency, the latter entity
shall also be consulted as to whether disclosure of the information raises a substantial
question of executive privilege.
3. Every effort shall be made to comply with the Congressional request in a manner
consistent with the legitimate needs of the Executive Branch. The Department Head, the
Attorney “General and the Counsel to the President may, in the exercise of their
discretion in the circumstances, determine that executive privilege shall not be invoked
and release the requested information.
4. If the Department Head, the Attorney General or the Counsel to the President believes,
after consultation, that the circumstances justify invocation of executive privilege, the
issue shall be presented to the President by the Counsel to the President, who will
advise the Department Head and the Attorney General of the President’s decision.
5. Pending a final Presidential decision on the matter, the Department Head shall request
the Congressional body to hod its request for the information in abeyance. The
Department Head shall expressly indicate that the purpose of this request is to protect
the privilege pending a Presidential decision, claim of privilege.
6. If the President decides to invoke executive privilege, the Department Head shall advise
the requesting Congressional body that the claim of executive privilege is being made
with the specific approval of the President.
Any questions concerning these procedures or related matters should be addressed to the
Attorney General, through the Assistant Attorney General for the Office of Legal Counsel,
and to the Counsel to the President.
Ronald Reagan
The policy of this Administration is to comply with congressional requests for information
to the fullest extent consistent with the constitutional and statutory obligations of the
Executive Branch. While this Administration, like its predecessors, has an obligation to
protect the confidentiality of core communications, executive privilege will be asserted only
after careful review demonstrates that assertion of the privilege is necessary to protect
Executive Branch prerogatives.
The doctrine of executive privilege protects the confidentiality of deliberations within the
White House, including its policy councils, as well as communications between the White
House and executive departments and agencies. Executive privilege applies to written and
oral communications between and among the White House, its policy councils and
Executive Branch agencies, as well as to documents that describe or prepares for such
communications (e.g. “talking points”). This has been the view expressed by all recent
White House Counsels. In circumstances involving communications relating to
investigations of personal wrongdoing by government officials, it is our practice not to
assert executive privilege, either, in judicial proceedings or in congressional investigations
and hearings. Executive privilege must always be weighed against other competing
governmental interests, including the judicial need to obtain relevant evidence, especially in
criminal proceedings, and the congressional need to make factual findings for legislative
and oversight purposes.
In the last resort, this balancing is usually conducted by the courts. However, when
executive privilege is asserted against a congressional request for documents, the courts
usually decline to intervene until after the other two branches have exhausted the possibility
of working out a satisfactory accommodation. It is our policy to work out such an
accommodation whenever we can, without unduly interfering with the President’s need to
conduct frank exchange of views with his principal advisors.
Historically, good faith negotiations between Congress and the Executive Branch have
minimized the need for invoking executive privilege.
First, any document created in the White House, including a White House policy
council, or in a department or agency, that contains the deliberations of, or advice to or
from, the White House, should be presumptively treated as protected by executive
privilege. This is so regardless of the document’s location at the time of the request or
whether it originated in the White House or in a department or agency.
Second, a department or agency receiving a request for any such document should
promptly notify the White House Counsel’s Office, and direct any inquiries regarding
such a document to the White House Counsel’s Office.
Third, the White House Counsel’s Office, working together with the department or
agency (and, where appropriate, the Department of Justice), will discuss the request
with appropriate congressional representatives to determine whether a mutually
satisfactory recommendation is available.
Counsel to the President will consult with the Department of Justice and other affected
agencies to determine whether to recommend that the President invoke the privilege.
We believe this policy will facilitate the resolution of issues relating to disclosures to
Congress and maximize the opportunity for reaching mutually satisfactory accommodations
with Congress. We will of course try to cooperate with reasonable congressional requests for
information in ways that preserve the President’s ability to exchange frank advice with his
immediate staff and the heads of the executive departments and agencies.
Congressional Oversight: Methods and Techniques. Committee Print, Prepared for the
Subcommittee on Oversight Procedures of the Senate Committee on Government Operations
by the Congressional Research Service and the General Accounting Office, 94th Congress, 2nd
session. Washington: GPO, 1976.
Fisher, Louis. Constitutional Conflicts between Congress and the President. Lawrence, Kansas:
University Press of Kansas, 2007, 5th Revised Edition. KF4565.F57 1997
Foreman, Christopher H. Signals from the Hill: Congressional Oversight and the Challenge of
Social Regulation. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1988. JK585.F68
Hamilton, James. The Power to Probe: A Study of Congressional Investigations. New York:
Vintage Books, 1976.
History of the United States House of Representatives, 1789-1994. H.Doc. 103-324, 103rd
Congress, 2nd session. Washington: GPO, 1994. Chapter XI, “Oversight,” pp. 233-266.
——. Congressional Oversight of the Presidency. Annals, vol. 499, September 1988, pp. 75-89.
CRS Report RL32113, Congressional Intervention in the Administrative Process: Legal and
Ethical Considerations, by Jack Maskell, September 25, 2003.
Mayhew, David R. Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946-
1990. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991. JK2261.M36
National Academy of Public Administration. Panel on Congress and the Executive. Beyond
Distrust: Building Bridges Between Congress and the Executive. Washington: NAPA, 1992.
Oleszek, Walter J. Congressional Procedures and the Policy Process, 6th ed. Washington:
Congressional Quarterly Press, 2004. Chapter 10, Legislative Oversight. KF4937.O44
——. CRS Report RL32617, A Perspective on Congress’s Oversight Function, September 30,
2004.
Ornstein, Norman F. and Thomas E. Mann. When Congress Checks Out. Foreign Affairs, vol. 85,
2006, pp. 67-80.
Rosenberg, Morton. Congress’s Prerogative Over Agencies and Agency Decisionmakers: The
Rise and Demise of the Reagan Administration’s Theory of the Unitary Executive. George
Washington Law Review, vol. 57, January 1989, pp. 627-703.
Schlesinger, Arthur M. and Roger Bruns, eds. Congress Investigates: A Documented History,
1792-1974 (5 vols.) New York: Chelsea House Publishers, 1975.
JK1123.A2S34
Study on Federal Regulation: Congressional Oversight of Regulatory Agencies. Senate Doc. 95-
26, 95th Congress, 1st session. Washington: GPO, 1977.
U.S. General Accounting Office. Investigators’ Guide to Sources of Information. GAO Report
OSI-97-2. Washington: GAO, 1997.
West, William F. Controlling the Bureaucracy: Institutional Constraints in Theory and Practice.
Armonk, New York and London, England: M.E. Sharpe: 1995.
JK421.W44
Fisher, Louis. Presidential Spending Power. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1975.
345 p. HJ257.2.F57
CRS Report 98-720, Manual on the Federal Budget Process, by Robert Keith and Allen Schick,
August 25, 1998.
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(SIGTARP), by Vanessa K. Burrows.
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Journal of Public Inquiry, Fall-Winter 1999.
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General in Federal Agencies. Public Administration Review, vol. 58, March/April, 1998.
_____. The Inspector General Act of 1978: A 10-Year Review. H. Rept. 100-1027, 100th Cong.,
2nd sess. Washington: GPO, 1988.
_____. The Inspector General Act: 20 Years Later. Hearings, 105th Congress, 2nd session.
Washington: GPO, 1998.
——. Highlights of the Comptroller General’s Panel on Federal Oversight and the Inspectors
General. GAO Report GAO-06-931SP. Washington: GAO, 2006.
_____. Inspectors General: Office Consolidation and Related Issues. GAO Report GAO-02-575.
Washington: GAO, 2002.
CRS Report RL30795, General Management Laws: A Compendium, by Clinton T. Brass et al..
CRS Report RL32339, Federal Regulations: Efforts to Estimate Total Costs and Benefits of
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——. “Foreign Policy by Reporting Requirement.” The Washington Quarterly, vol. 11, Winter
1988.
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Abdo Baaklini, ed., Comparative Legislative Reforms and Innovations. New York: SUNY
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14, 108th Congress, 1st session. Washington: GPO, 2003.
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Better & Costs Less: Streamlining Management Control. Washington: Office of the Vice
President, 1993 (Reduce the Burden of Congressionally Mandated Reports, pp. 33-36).
Resolutions of Inquiry
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Johannes, John R. To Serve the People: Congress and Constituency Service. Lincoln, University
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1989. 210 p. JK1447.C66
Hess, Stephen. Live From Capitol Hill. Washington: The Brookings Institution, 1991. 178 p.
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Mann, Thomas and Norman Ornstein, eds. Congress, the Press, and the Public. Washington: The
American Enterprise Institute and The Brookings Institution, 1994. 212 p. JK1140.C62
Ritchie, Donald A. Press Gallery: Congress and the Washington Correspondents. Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1991. PN4899.W3R58
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Fisher, Louis. Constitutional Conflicts between Congress and the President. Lawrence, Kansas:
University Press of Kansas, 1997, 4th revised ed. pp. 160-195. KF4565.F57
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Vintage Books, 1976. KF4942.H34
Mayhew, David R. Divided We Govern: Party Control, Lawmaking, and Investigations, 1946-
1990. New Haven: Yale University Press, 1991.
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Schlesinger, Arthur M. Jr. and Roger Bruns. Congress Investigates: A Documented History. New
York: Chelsea House, 1975 (5 vols.).
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Taylor, Telford. The Grand Inquest: The Story of Congressional Investigations New York: Simon
and Schuster, 1955. KF4942.T38
Banks, William C. and Peter Raven-Hansen. National Security Law and the Power of the Purse.
New York, Oxford University Press, 1994. 260 p.
KF4651.B36
Devins, Neal. “Regulation of Government Agencies Through Limitation Riders,” Duke Law
Journal, v. 1987: 456.
Fisher, Louis. “The Authorization-Appropriation Process in Congress: Formal Rules and Informal
Practices,” Catholic University Law Review, v. 29, 1979:5.
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785.
Craig, Barbara Hinson. Chadha: The Story of an Epic Constitutional Struggle. New York: Oxford
University Press, 1988. KF228.C43C73
Fisher, Louis. “The Legislative Veto: Invalidated, It Survives,” Law & Contemporary Problems,
v. 56, 1993: 273.
Gibson, Martha Liebler. Weapons of Influence: the Legislative Veto, American Foreign Policy,
and the Irony of Reform. Boulder, Colo., Westview Press, 1992. 188p. JX1706.G53
Korn, Jessica. The Power of Separation: American Constitutionalism and the Myth of the
Legislative Veto. Princeton, N.J.: Princeton University Press, 1996. 178p.
JK305.K67
Independent Counsel
Eastland, Terry. Ethics, Politics and the Independent Counsel. Washington, National Legal Center
for the Public Interest, 1989. 180 p. KF4568.E17 1989
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University Press of Kansas, 2000. 325 p. KF4568.H37
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Researcher, v. 7, no. 7, February 21, 1997: 145-167.
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Separation of Powers. Wake Forest law review, v. 23, 1988: 635.
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1990: 1-80.
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Review, v. 25, 1988: 1.
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1983. 319p.
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Chatham House Publishers, Inc., 1994. 390p. JK585.W48
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Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1993. 450p. JK1118.H55
U.S. Congress. Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress. Support Agencies. Hearing
before the Joint Committee on the Organization of Congress. 103rd Congress, 1st session, June
10, 1993, Washington: GPO, 1993. 1577p. KF25.O7
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698.
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v. 50, April 8, 1991: 124-130.
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319-326.
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Congress,” Government Information Quarterly, v. 2, January 1985: 5-11.
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by Frederick M. Kaiser, updated regularly.
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of Intelligence and Counterintelligence, v. 15, 2002: 330-389.
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of the U.S. General Accounting Office. Report Prepared by the National Academy of Public
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p.
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48-63.
The Constitutional Context of Oversight. Michael Stern, senior counsel with the House
General Counsel’s Office, and Michael Davidson, former Senate Legal Counsel, discuss the
constitutional context of oversight. In addition, the two attorneys address a variety of oversight
topics, including congressional investigations. Taped as part of a 1999 series of CRS programs
examining various aspects of congressional oversight.
The “Rules & Tools” of Oversight. This program focuses on the formal institutional rules that
committees must follow to insure the legitimacy and fairness of oversight proceedings. The
nature of the formidable powers of inquiry available to congressional committees and the
practicalities of their effective utilization are also explored. Taped as part of a 1999 series of CRS
programs examining various aspects of congressional oversight.
Sources of Oversight Assistance. This session focuses on where congressional committees can
obtain assistance in conducting oversight. Especially relevant are inspectors general, chief
financial officers, and Congress’s own support agencies, the Congressional Budget Office,
Congressional Research Service, and Government Accountability Office. Taped as part of a 1999
series of CRS programs examining various aspect of congressional oversight.
Fiscal Oversight: “Follow the Money.” This seminar examines congressional oversight of fiscal
and budgetary activities, focusing on the role of the House and Senate Appropriations
Committees in the annual budget cycle and key support activities of the Congressional Budget
Office to Congress on budgetary matters generally. Taped as part of a 1999 series of CRS
programs examining various aspects of congressional oversight.
Outside Actors in the Oversight Process. This program addresses how non-congressional
individuals can assist in the investigative process and in monitoring executive branch
performance. The panel includes a journalist, members of public and private interest groups, and
a former counsel with the House Commerce Committee, Subcommittee on Oversight and
Investigations. Taped as part of a 1999 series of CRS programs examining various aspects of
congressional oversight.
Preparing for an Oversight Investigation. This program probes the “ins and outs” of how to
prepare for Congressional Investigations from the perspective of both the investigator and those
being investigated Taped as part of a 1999 series of CRS programs examining various aspects of
congressional oversight.
Congress, the President, the Courts, and the Separation of Powers. Product No.: MM70097.
VHS copies of CRS video programs are available on loan to congressional offices. The
soundtracks of many television programs are also available on audio cassettes. For the schedule
of CRS Programs on Channel 6 of the House and Channel 5 of the Senate, call 7-7009. For
further information about any of these programs, please call 7-7547.
Acknowledgments
To revise a document of this size and scope requires the contributions of many people. The three CRS
specialists, listed on the title page, were responsible for organizing and writing this version of the Manual.
In addition, other CRS personnel assisted in the preparation and publication of this report, along with staff
of the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) and the Government Accountability Office (GAO).