cmsbbcuig UPDATES IN CIVIL PROCEDURE

Justice Magdangal M. de Leon

ACTIONS IN GENERAL 
Basic rule in filing of action (Rule 2, Secs. 3-4)
1.  For one cause of action (one delict or wrong), file only ONE ACTION or suit.
Generally, NO SPLITTING A SINGLE CAUSE OF ACTION. Reasons: a. to avoid
multiplicity of suits; b. to minimize expenses, inconvenience and harassment.
2. Remedy against splitting a single cause of action (two complaints separately filed
for one action) - defendant may file:
a. motion to dismiss on the ground of
(1) litis pendentia, if first complaint is still pending (Rule 16, Sec. 1
[e])
(2) res judicata, if first complaint is terminated by final judgment
(Rule 16, Sec. 1 [f])
b. answer alleging either of above grounds as affirmative defense (Rule 16,
Sec. 6)
If defendant fails to raise ground on time, he is deemed to have WAIVED them.
Splitting must be questioned in the trial court; cannot be raised for the first time on
appeal.
The requisites of litis pendentia are the following: (a) identity of parties, or at least
such as representing the same interests in both actions; (b) identity of rights
asserted and relief prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts; and (c)
identity of the two cases such that judgment in one, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicata in the other. (  Romullo vs. Samahang
Magkakapitbahay ng Bayanihan Compound Homeowners Association,
Inc., G.R. No. 180687, October 6, 2010)
What are the requisites for joinder of causes of action? (Rule 2, Sec. 5)
1. Compliance with the rules on joinder of parties under Rule 3, Sec. 6.
2. A party cannot join in an ordinary action any of the special civil actions. –
Reason: special civil actions are governed by special rules.
3. Where the causes of action are between the SAME PARTIES but pertain to
DIFFERENT VENUES OR JURISDICTIONS, the joinder may be allowed in the
RTC, provided ONE OF THE CAUSES OF ACTION falls within
the jurisdiction of the RTC and the venue lies therein.
Exception:  Ejectment case may not be joined with an action within the
jurisdiction of the RTC as the same comes within the exclusive jurisdiction of
the MTC.
However, if a party invokes the jurisdiction of the court, he cannot thereafter
challenge the court’s jurisdiction in the same case. He is barred by estoppel
from doing so. (Hinog vs. Melicor, G.R. No.140954, April 12, 2005)
N.B. As to joinder in the MTC, it must have jurisdiction over ALL THE
CAUSES OF ACTION and must have common venue.
4. Where the claims in all the causes of action are principally for recovery of
money, jurisdiction is determined by the AGGREGATE OR TOTAL AMOUNT
claimed (totality rule).
N.B.  The totality rule applies only to the MTC – totality of claims cannot
exceed the jurisdictional amount of the MTC.
There is no totality rule for the RTC because its jurisdictional amount is without limit.
Exc. In tax cases where the limit is below P1 million. Amounts of P1 million or more
fall within the jurisdiction of the CTA.
Lack of legal capacity to sue – plaintiff’s general disability to sue, such as on
account of minority, insanity, incompetence, lack of juridical personality or any other
general disqualifications of a party.
Plaintiff’s lack of legal capacity to sue is a ground for motion to dismiss (Rule 16, Sec.
1[d]).
Ex. A foreign corporation doing business without a license lacks legal capacity to sue.
Lack of personality to sue– the fact that plaintiff is not the real party in interest.
Plaintiff’s lack of personality to sue is a ground for a motion to dismiss based on the
fact that the complaint, on its face, states no cause of action (Rule 16, Sec. 1
[g]) (Evangelista vs. Santiago, 457 SCRA 744 [2005])
A suit may only be instituted by the real party in interest. The original petition was
instituted by Win, which is a SEC-registered corporation. It filed a collection of sum of
money suit which involved a construction contract entered into by petitioner and
Multi-Rich, a sole proprietorship. The counsel of Win wanted to change the name of
the plaintiff in the suit to Multi-Rich. The change cannot be countenanced. The
plaintiff in the collection suit is a corporation. The name cannot be changed to that of
a sole proprietorship. Again, a sole proprietorship is not vested with juridical
personality to file or defend an action. (Excellent Quality Apparel, Inc. vs. Win
Multi Rich Builders, Inc.,    G.R. No. 175048, February 10, 2009)
In a case involving constitutional issues, “standing” or locus standi  means a
personal interest in the case such that the party has sustained or will sustained
DIRECT INJURY as a result of the government act that is being challenged.
To have legal standing, the petitioner must have DIRECT, PERSONAL and
SUBSTANTIAL INTEREST to protect. Here, petitioners, retired COA Chairmen and
Commissioners, have not shown any direct and personal interest in the COA
Organizational Restructuring Plan. There is no indication that they have sustained or
are in imminent danger of sustaining some direct injury as a result of its
implementation. Clearly, they have no legal standing to file the instant suit
(Domingo vs. Carague, 456 SCRA 450 [2005]).
Where the obligation of the parties is solidary, either of the parties is
indispensable, and the other is not even a necessary party because
complete relief is available from either. (Cerezo vs. Tuazon, G.R. No.
141538, March 23, 2004).
Procedure for dismissal if indispensable party is not impleaded
Anent the alleged non-joinder of indispensable parties, it is settled that the non-
joinder of indispensable parties is not a ground for the dismissal of an action. The
remedy is to implead the non-party claimed to be indispensable. Parties may be
added by order of the court on motion of the party or on its own initiative at any
stage of the action and/or such times as are just. It is only when the plaintiff refuses
to implead an indispensable party despite the order of the court, that the latter may
dismiss the complaint. In this case, no such order was issued by the trial
court. (Limos vs. Spouses Odones, G.R. No. 186979, August 11, 2010)
Whenever it appears to the court in the course of the proceeding that an
indispensable party has not been joined, it is the duty of the court to STOP THE
TRIAL and to ORDER THE INCLUSION of such party. The absence of an
indispensable party renders all subsequent actuations of the court NULL and VOID,
for want of authority to act, not only as to the absent parties, but even as to those
present (Uy vs. CA, 494 SCRA 535 [July 11, 2006]).
Intervention (Rule 19, Sec. 1)
Under this Rule, intervention shall be allowed when a person has (1) a legal interest
in the matter in litigation; (2) or in the success of any of the parties; (3) or an
interest against the parties; (4) or when he is so situated as to be adversely affected
by a distribution or disposition of property in the custody of the court or an officer
thereof.  (Alfelor vs. Halasan, G.R. No. 165987,  March 31, 2006).
Requirements:  [a] legal interest in the matter in litigation; and [b] consideration
must be given as to whether the adjudication of the original parties may be delayed
or prejudiced, or whether the intervenor's rights may be protected in a separate
proceeding or not.
Legal interest must be of such DIRECT and IMMEDIATE character that the intervenor
will either gain or lose by direct legal operation and effect of the judgment. Such
interest must be actual, direct and material, and not simply contingent and
expectant. (Perez vs. CA, G.R. No. 162580.  January 27, 2006)
What is the effect of non-substitution of a deceased party?
Non-compliance with the rule on substitution would render the proceedings and
judgment of the trial court infirm because the court acquires NO JURISDICTION over
the persons of the legal representatives or of the heirs on whom the trial and the
judgment would be binding.    
Thus, proper substitution of heirs must be effected for the trial court to acquire
jurisdiction over their persons and to obviate any future claim by any heir that he
was not apprised of the litigation against Bertuldo or that he did not authorize Atty.
Petalcorin to represent him.
No formal substitution of the parties was effected within thirty days from date of
death of Bertuldo, as required by Section 16, Rule 3 of the Rules of Court. Needless
to stress, the purpose behind the rule on substitution is the protection of the right of
every party to due process. It is to ensure that the deceased party would continue to
be properly represented in the suit through the duly appointed legal representative of
his estate. (Hinog vs. Melicor, 455 SCRA 460 [2005])
The Rules require the legal representatives of a dead litigant to be
substituted as parties to a litigation.  This requirement is necessitated by
due process.  Thus, when the rights of the legal representatives of a decedent are
actually recognized and protected, noncompliance or belated formal compliance with
the Rules cannot affect the validity of the promulgated decision.  After all, due
process had thereby been satisfied.
When a party to a pending action dies and the claim is not extinguished, the Rules of
Court require a substitution of the deceased.  The procedure is specifically governed
by Section 16 of Rule 3.  (Dela Cruz vs. Joaquin, G.R. No. 162788, July 28,
2005).
Failure of counsel to comply with his duty under Section 16 to inform the
court of the death of his client and no substitution of such party is effected,
will not invalidate the proceedings and the judgment thereon if the action
survives the death of such party.Moreover, the decision rendered shall bind his
successor-in-interest. The instant action for unlawful detainer, like any action for
recovery of real property, is a real action and as such survives the death of Faustino
Acosta. His heirs have taken his place and now represent his interests in the instant
petition. (Limbauan vs. Acosta, G.R. No. 148606, June 30, 2008)
SELECTION OF COURT
Subject matter jurisdiction is conferred by law. At the time petitioner filed his suit in
the trial court, statutory law vests on Regional Trial Courts exclusive original
jurisdiction over civil actions incapable of pecuniary estimation. An action for specific
performance, such as petitioner’s suit to enforce the Agreement on joint child
custody, belongs to this species of actions. (Herald Black Dacasin vs. Sharon Del
Mundo Dacasin,  G.R. No. 168785, February 5, 2010)
The arbitration clause is a commitment on the part of the parties to submit to
arbitration the disputes covered since that clause is binding, and they are expected
to abide by it in good faith. Clearly, the RTC should not have taken cognizance of the
collection suit. The presence of the arbitration clause vested jurisdiction on the CIAC
over all construction disputes between Petitioner and Multi-Rich. The RTC does not
have jurisdiction. (Excellent Quality Apparel, Inc. vs. Win Multi Rich Builders,
Inc., represented by its president, Wilson G. Chua,  G.R. No. 175048, February
10, 2009)
What is hierarchy of courts?
Pursuant to this doctrine, direct resort from the lower courts to the Supreme Court
will not be entertained unless the appropriate remedy cannot be obtained in the
lower tribunals.
Rationale:  (a) to prevent inordinate demands upon the SC’s time and attention
which are better devoted to those matters within its exclusive jurisdiction, and (b) to
prevent further overcrowding of the SC’s docket.
Thus, although the SC, CA and the RTC have CONCURRRENT jurisdiction to issue
writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction, such concurrence does not give the petitioner unrestricted freedom of
choice of court forum.
The SC will NOT ENTERTAIN DIRECT RESORT to it unless the redress desired cannot
be obtained in the appropriate courts, and EXCEPTIONAL AND COMPELLING
CIRCUMSTANCES, such as cases of national interest and of serious implications,
justify the extraordinary remedy  of writ of certiorari, calling for the exercise of its
primary jurisdiction. (Hinog vs.Melicor,  455 SCRA 460 [2005])
VENUE
The venue of the action for the nullification of the foreclosure sale is properly laid
with the Malolos RTC although two of the properties together with the Bulacan
properties are situated in Nueva Ecija.  The venue of real actions affecting properties
found in different provinces is determined by the SINGULARITY or PLURALITY of the
transactions involving said parcels of land. Where said parcels are the object of one
and the same transaction, the venue is in the court of any of the provinces wherein
a parcel of land is situated (United Overseas Bank Phils. (formerly Westmont
Bank) vs. Rosemoore Mining & Development Corp.,G.R. Nos. 159669 &
163521, March 12, 2007). 
Venue stipulations in a contract do not, as a rule, supersede the general
rule set forth in Rule 4 of the Revised Rules of Court in the absence of
qualifying or restrictive words. They should be considered merely as an
agreement or additional forum, not as limiting venue to the specified place.  (Pacific
Consutants  International Asia, Inc. vs.  Schonfeld,  G.R. No. 166920,
February 19, 2007)
ACTIONABLE DOCUMENT
Section 8, Rule 8 of the Rules of Court is not applicable when the adverse party does
not appear to be a party to the instrument. (Municipality of Tiwi vs.  Betito, G.R.
No. 171873, July 9, 2010)
Rule 8, Section 8 specifically applies to actions or defenses founded upon a
written instrument and provides the manner of denying it.  It is more
controlling than Rule 6, Section 10 which merely provides the effect of
failure to file a Reply.  Thus, where the defense in the Answer is based on an
actionable document, a Reply specifically denying it under oath must be made;
otherwise, the genuineness and due execution of the document will be deemed
admitted. (Casent  Realty Development Corp. vs. Philbanking Corporation, 
G.R. No. 150731,  September  14, 2007)
SUMMONS
Service of summons on resident defendant in an action in personam:
If he is temporarily out of the country, any of the following modes of service may be
resorted to: (1) substituted service set forth in Section 8 of Rule 14; (2) personal
service outside the country, with leave of court; (3) service by publication, also with
leave of court; or (4) any other manner the court may deem sufficient. (Belen vs. 
Chavez, G.R. No. 175334, March 26, 2008)
Section 16 of Rule 14 regarding service of summons on residents
temporarily out of the Philippines uses the words “may” and “also.” Thus,
extraterritorial service is not mandatory. Other methods of service of summons
allowed under the Rules may also be availed of by the serving officer on a defendant-
seaman. The normal method of service of summons on one temporarily absent is by
substituted service because personal service abroad and service by publication are
not ordinary means of summoning defendants. (Montefalcon vs. Vasquez,G.R.
No.165016, June 17, 2008)
Substituted service on resident defendant temporarily out of the country.
The Sheriff's Return stated that private respondent was out of the country; Thus, the
service of summons was made at her residence with her husband, Alfredo P. Agudo,
acknowledging receipt thereof. Alfredo was presumably of suitable age and
discretion, who was residing in that place and,therefore, was competent to receive
the summons on private respondent's behalf. The RTC had  indeed acquired
jurisdiction over the person of private respondent when the latter's counsel entered
his appearance on private respondent's behalf, without qualification and without
questioning the propriety of the service of summons, and even filed two Motions for
Extension of Time to File Answer. (Palma vs. Galvez , G.R. No. 165273, March 10,
2010)
Pursuant to Sec. 14, Rule 14, summons by publication applies inany action.
The rule does not distinquish whether the action is in personam, in rem or quasi in
rem. It authorizes summons by publication whatever the action may be as long as
the identity of the defendant is unknown or his whereabouts are unknown. (Santos
vs. PNOC Exploration Corporation, G.R. No. 170943, September 23, 2008)
For substituted service to be justified, the following circumstances must be
clearly established: (a) personal service of summons within a reasonable
time was impossible; (b) efforts were exerted to locate the party; and (c)
the summons was served upon a person of sufficient age and discretion
residing at the party’s residence or upon a competent person in charge of
the party’s office or place of business. Failure to do so would invalidate all
subsequent proceedings on jurisdictional grounds.
However, we frown upon an overly strict application of the Rules.   It is the spirit,
rather than the letter of the procedural rules, that governs.  In his Return, Sheriff
Potente declared that he was refused entry by the security guard in Alabang Hills
twice.  The latter informed him that petitioner prohibits him from allowing anybody
to proceed to her residence whenever she is out. It was impossible for the sheriff to
effect personal or substituted service of summons upon petitioner.  Considering her
strict instruction to the security guard, she must bear its consequences.  Thus,
summons has been properly served upon petitioner and it has acquired jurisdiction
over her. ( Robinson vs. Miralles,  G.R. No. 163584, December 12, 2006)
In case of substituted service, there should be a report indicating that the
person who received the summons in the defendant’s behalf was one with
whom the defendant had a relation of confidence ensuring that the latter
would actually receive the summons. Here, petitioner failed to show that the
security guard who received the summons in respondent’s behalf shared such
relation of confidence that respondent would surely receive the summons.  Hence,
we are unable to accept petitioner’s contention that service on the security guard
constituted substantial compliance with the requirements of substituted
service. (Orion Security Corporation vs. Kalfam Enterprises, Inc.,    G.R. No.
163287, April 27, 2007)
General rule: filing pleadings seeking affirmative relief constitutes
voluntary appearance and the consequent submission of one’s person to
the jurisdiction of the court.
Exceptions:Pleadings whose prayer is precisely for the avoidance of the jurisdiction,
which only leads to a special appearance. (1) in civil cases, motions to dismiss on
the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of defendant, whether or not other
grounds for dismissal  are included; (2) incriminal cases, motions to quash the
complaint on the ground of lack of jurisdiction over the person of the accused; and
(3) motions to quash a warrant of arrest. The first two are consequences of the fact 
that failure to file them would constitute a waiver of the defense  of lack of
jurisdiction over the person. The third is a consequence of the fact that it is the very
legality of the court process forcing the submission of the person of the accused that
is the very issue in a motion to quash a warrant of arrest. (Miranda vs.
Tuliao, G.R. No. 158763, March 31, 2006)
Defendant’s filing of a motion for resetting of the hearing effectively cured
the defect of the substituted service of summons. Although the substituted
service of summons on defendant is patently defective as the sheriff’s return does
not contain any statement with regard to the impossibility of personal service, said
defect was cured by his voluntary appearance.  After plaintiff moved for the
execution of the trial court’s decision, defendant filed a motion for a re-setting of the
court’s hearing thereon. An appearance in whatever form without expressly objecting
to the jurisdiction of the court over the person, is a submission to the jurisdiction of
the court over the person of the defendant or respondent. (Cezar vs. Ricafort-
Bautista, G.R. No. 136415,. October 31, 2006)
Under Section 15, Rule 14, there are only four instances wherein a
defendant who is a non-resident and is not found in the Philippines may be
served with summons by extraterritorial service : (1) when the action affects
the personal status of the plaintiff; (2) when the action relates to, or the subject of
which ia property, within the Philippines, in which the defendant claims a lien or an
interest, actual or contingent; (3) when the relief demanded in such action consists,
wholly or in part, in excluding the defendant from any interest in property located
within the Philippines; and (4) when the defendant non-resident’s property has been
attached within the Philippines.
In these instances, service of summons may be effected by (a) personal service out
of the country, with leave of court; (b) publication, also with leave of court; or (c)
any other manner the court may deem sufficient. Extraterritorial service of summons
applies only when the action is in remor quasi in rem and not when the action is in
personam. The case for collection of sum of money and damages filed by
the respondent against the petitioner being an action in personam, then
personal service of summons upon the petitioner within the Philippines is
essential for the RTC to validly acquire jurisdiction over the person of the
petitioner.  Having failed to do so, the RTC can never subject petitioner to its
jurisdiction. 
The mere allegation made by the respondent that the petitioner had shares of stock
within the Philippines was not enough to convert the action from one in personam to
one that was quasi in rem, for petitioner’s purported personal property was never
attached (Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte Ltd. vs. Dakila Trading
Corporation, G.R. No. 172242, August 14, 2007).
Non-forum shopping certification signed by counsel and not by the
principal party is a defective certification
This is because it is the principal party who has actual knowledge whether he has
initiated similar action/s in other courts, agencies or tribunals (Go vs. Rico, G.R. No.
140682, April 25, 2006)
Not fatal defect when only one petitioner signed the certification of non-
forum shopping
Such fact is not fatal to the petition because it satisifies the requirement that the
petition be signed by a principal party (Bases Conversion Development Authority vs.
Uy, G.R. No. 144062, November 2, 2006)
Effect of forum shopping
1. If the forum shopping is NOT considered WILFUL and DELIBERATE, the
subsequent cases shall be DISMISSED WITHOUT PREJUDICE on one of the
two grounds mentioned above
2. If the forum shopping is WILFUL and DELIBERATE, both (or all, if there
are more than two actions) shall be DISMISSED WITH PREJUDICE (Ao-As
vs. CA, 491 SCRA 353 [2006])
What are the requirements of forum shopping certificate for a corporation?
Only individuals vested with authority by a valid board resolution may sign the
certificate of non-forum shopping in behalf of a corporation. In addition, the Court
has required that proof of said authority must be attached. Failure to provide a
certificate of non-forum shopping is sufficient ground to dismiss the petition.
Likewise, the petition is subject to dismissal if a certification was submitted
unaccompanied by proof of the signatory's authority. (Philippine Airlines, Inc. vs.
Flight Attendants and Stewards Association of the Philippines (FASAP),
G.R. No. 143088.  January 24, 2006)
However, subsequent submission of Secretary’s Certificate is substantial compliance
with the requirement that a Board Resolution must authorize the officer executing
the non-forum certification on behalf of the corporation. (International
Construction Inc. vs. Feb Leasing and Financing Corp., G.R. No. 157195, April
22, 2005)
The lack of certification against forum shopping is generally not curable by the
submission thereof after the filing of the petition. Section 5 of Rule 45 provides that
the failure of the petitioner to submit the required documents that should accompany
the petition, including the certification against forum shopping, shall be sufficient
ground for the dismissal thereof. The same rule applies to certifications against
forum shopping signed by a person on behalf of a corporation which are
unaccompanied by proof that said signatory is authorized to file a petition on behalf
of the corporation. In certain exceptional circumstances, however, the Court has
allowed the belated filing of the certification. (Mediserv, inc. vs. Court of Appeals
(special former 13th division) and Landheights Development
Corporation, G.R. No. 161368, April 5, 2010)
Litis pendentia  is not present between a petition for writ of possession and
action for annulment of foreclosure. The issuance of the writ of possession being
a ministerial function, and summary in nature, it cannot be said to be a judgment on
the merits, but simply an incident in the transfer of title. Hence, a separate case for
annulment of mortgage and foreclosure sale cannot be barred by litis
pendentia or res judicata. Thus, insofar as Spec. Proc. No. 99-00988-D and Civil
Case No. 99-03169-D pending before different branches of RTC Dagupan City are
concerned, there is no litis pendentia. (Yu vs. PCIB, G.R. No. 147902.  March 17,
2006)
The pendency of a SEC case may be invoked as posing a prejudicial
question to an RTC civil case. Since the determination of the SEC as to which of
the two factions is the de jure board of NUI is crucial to the resolution of the case
before the RTC, we find that the trial court should suspend its proceedings until the
SEC comes out with its findings.(Abacan, Jr., et. al. vs. Northwestern
University, Inc.,  G.R. No. 140777, April 8, 2005)
What is judicial courtesy?
There are instances where even if there is no writ of preliminary injunction or
temporary restraining order issued by a higher court, it would be proper for a lower
court or court of origin to suspend its proceedings on the precept of judicial courtesy.
As the Supreme Court explained in Eternal Gardens Memorial Park v. Court of
Appeals, 164 SCRA 421, 427-428 (1988):
Due respect for the Supreme Courtand practical and ethical
considerations should have prompted the appellate court to wait for the final
determination of the petition before taking cognizance of the case and trying to
render moot exactly what was before this court x x x.  This Court explained,
however, that the rule on “judicial courtesy” applies where “there is a STRONG
PROBABILITY that the issues before the higher court would be rendered MOOT AND
MORIBUND as a result of the continuation of the proceedings in the lower court or
court of origin.” (Republic vs. Sandiganbayan, G.R. No. 166859, June 26, 2006)
Effect of amendment of Rule 65, Section 7 by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC,
December 12, 2007 on the principle of judicial courtesy . Judicial courtesy can
no longer be used as an excuse by courts or tribunals not to proceed with the
principal case.
Section 7.Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. -  The court in which the
petition is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it may also grant a
temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the preservation of
the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.  The petition shall not interrupt
the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or a writ of
preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from further
proceeding in the case.
The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten (10)
days from the filing of a petition for certiorari with a higher court or
tribunal, absent a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction,
or upon its expiration. Failure of the public respondent to proceed with the
principal case may be a ground for an administrative charge.
A compulsory counterclaim does not require a certificate of non-forum
shopping because a compulsory counterclaim is not an initiatory pleading.
The Rule distinctly provides that the required certification against forum shopping is
intended to cover an "initiatory pleading," meaning an "incipient application of a
party asserting a claim for relief." Respondent bank's Answer with Counterclaim is
not a responsive pleading, filed merely to counter petitioners' complaint that initiates
the civil action. In other words, the rule requiring such certification does not
contemplate a defendant's/ respondent's claim for relief that is derived only from, or
is necessarily connected with, the main action or complaint. In fact, upon failure by
the plaintiff to comply with such requirement, Section 5, quoted above, directs the
"dismissal of the case without prejudice," not the dismissal of respondent's
counterclaim. (Carpio vs. Rural Bank of Sto. Tomas (Batangas), Inc., G.R. No.
153171.  May 4, 2006)
What are the tests or criteria to determine compulsory or permissive
nature of specific counterclaims?
1.  Are the issues of fact and law raised by the claim and counterclaim
largely the same?
2. Would res judicata bar a subsequent suit on defendant’s claim absent the
compulsory counterclaim rule?
3. Will substantially the same evidence support or refute plaintiff’s claim as
well as defendant’s counterclaim?
4. Is there any logical relation between the claim and the counterclaim?
The evidence of the petitioner on its claim in its complaint, and that of the
respondents on their counterclaims are thus different. There is, likewise, no logical
relation between the claim of the petitioner and the counterclaim of the respondents.
Hence, the counterclaim of the respondents is an initiatory pleading, which requires
the respondents to append thereto a certificate of non-forum shopping. Their failure
to do so results to the dismissal of their counterclaim without prejudice. (Korea
Exchange Bank vs. Hon. Gonzales, et. al.,  G.R. Nos. 142286-87, April 15, 2005)
The elementary test for failure to state a cause of action is whether the
complaint alleges facts which if true would justify the relief demanded. 
The inquiry is into the sufficiency, not the veracity, of the material
allegations. If the allegations in the complaint furnish sufficient basis on which it
can be maintained, it should not be dismissed regardless of the defense that may be
presented by the defendant. (Heirs of Tomas Dolleton vs. Fil – Estate
Management, Inc.,    G.R. No. 170750, April 7, 2009)
When a motion to dismiss is premised on the ground that the complaint
fails to state a cause of action (Rule 16, Section 1 (g)), the ruling thereon
should be based only on the facts alleged in the complaint.  The court must
resolve the issue on the strength of such allegations, assuming them to be true.  The
test of sufficiency of a cause of action rests on whether, hypothetically admitting the
facts alleged in the complaint to be true, the court can render a valid judgment upon
the same, in accordance with the prayer in the complaint.  However, there is no
hypothetical admission of the veracity of the allegations if:
1.  the falsity of the allegations is subject to judicial notice;
2.  such allegations are legally impossible;
3.  the allegations refer to facts which are inadmissible in evidence;
4.  by the record or document in the pleading, the allegations
appear unfounded; or 
5.  there is evidence which has been presented to the court by
stipulation of the parties or in the course of the hearings related to
the case. (Heirs of Loreto Maramag vs.  Maramag, G.R. No. 181132,
2009 June 5, 2009)
A ground raised in a motion to dismiss may not be the subject of
preliminary hearing as special and affirmative defense in the answer,
except when there are several defendants but only one filed a motion to
dismiss.
Under Section 6, Rule 16 of the Rules of Court, the defendant may reiterate any of
the grounds for dismissal provided under Rule 16 of the Rules of Court as affirmative
defenses but a preliminary hearing may no longer be had thereon if a motion to
dismiss had already been filed. This section, however, does not recontemplate a
situation, such as the one obtaining in this case,  where there are several defendants
but only one filed a motion to dismiss. (Abrajano vs. Salas, Jr., G.R. No. 158895. 
February 16, 2006)
NOTICE OF DISMISSAL OF COMPLAINTunder Rule 17, Sec. 1
The trial court has no discretion or option to deny the motion, since dismissal by the
plaintiff under Section 1, Rule 17 is guaranteed as a matter of right to the plaintiffs. 
Even if the motion cites the most ridiculous of grounds for dismissal, the trial court
has no choice but to consider the complaint as dismissed, since the plaintiff may opt
for such dismissal as a matter of right, regardless of ground (O.B.
Jovenir Construction andDevelopment Corp. vs. Macamir Realty
and CA, G.R. No. 135803, March 28, 2006). 
MOTION TO DISMISS COMPLAINT DUE TO PLAINTIFF’S FAULTunder Rule
17, Sec. 3.
Sec. 3, Rule 17 enumerates the instances where the complaint may be dismissed
due to plaintiff’s fault:  (1) if he fails to appear on the date for the presentation of his
evidence in chief; (2) if he fails to prosecute his action for an unreasonable length of
time; or (3) if he fails to comply with the rules or any order of the court.  Once a
case is dismissed for failure to prosecute, this has the effect of an
adjudication on the merits and is understood to be with prejudice to the
filing of another action unless otherwise provided in the order of dismissal. 
In other words, unless there be a qualification in the order of dismissal that it is
without prejudice, the dismissal should be regarded as an adjudication on the merits
and is with prejudice. (Cruz vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 164797, February 13,
2006) 
In situations contemplated in Section 3, Rule 17, where a complaint is dismissed
for failure of the plaintiff to comply with a lawful order of the court, such
dismissal has the effect of an adjudication upon the merits.  A dismissal for failure to
prosecute has the effect of an adjudication on the merits, and operates as res
judicata, particularly when the court did not direct that the dismissal was without
prejudice.  (Court of Appeals vs. Alvarez, G.R. No. 142439, December 3, 2006)
Under Section 3, Rule 17 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the dismissal of the
complaint due to the fault of plaintiff does not necessarily carry with it the dismissal
of the counterclaim, compulsory or otherwise. In fact, the dismissal of the
complaint is without prejudice to the right of defendants to prosecute the
counterclaim. (Pinga vs. Santiago, G.R.No. 170354, June 30, 2006).
Pinga vs. Santiago which refers to instances covered by Section 3, Rule 17 on
dismissal of the complaint due to the fault of the plaintiff also applies where the
dismissal of the complaint was upon the instance of the petitioner who
correctly argued lack of jurisdiction over its person.
Petitioner’s counterclaim against respondent is for damages and attorney’s fees
arising from the unfounded suit.  While respondent’s complaint against petitioner is
already dismissed, petitioner may have very well already incurred damages and
litigation expenses such as attorney’s fees since it was forced to engage legal
representation in the Philippines to protect its rights and to assert lack of jurisdiction
of the courts over its person by virtue of the improper service of summons upon it. 
Hence, the cause of action of petitioner’s counterclaim is not eliminated by
the mere dismissal of respondent’s complaint. (Perkin Elmer Singapore Pte
Ltd. vs. Dakila Trading Corporation, G.R. No. 172242, August 14, 2007)
Remedy from order of dismissal for failure to prosecute – ordinary appeal.
An order of dismissal for failure to prosecute has the effect of an adjudication on the
merits. Petitioners’ counsel should have filed a notice of appeal with the appellate
court within the reglementary period.  Instead of filing a petition under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, the proper recourse was an ordinary appeal with the Court of Appeals
under Rule 41. (Ko vs. PNB, 479 SCRA 298, January 20, 2006)
Effect of declaration of default.
The mere fact that a defendant is declared in default does not automatically result in
the grant of the prayers of the plaintiff. To win, the latter must still present the same
quantum of evidence that would be required if the defendant were still present. A
party that defaults is not deprived of its rights, except the right to be heard and to
present evidence to the trial court. If the evidence presented does not support a
judgment for the plaintiff, the complaint should be dismissed, even if the defendant
may not have been heard or allowed to present any countervailing evidence
(Gajudo vs. Traders Royal Bank, G.R. No. 151098, March 21, 2006).
A defendant party declared in default retains the right to appeal from the judgment
by default on the ground that the plaintiff failed to prove the material allegations of
the complaint, or that the decision is contrary to law, even without need of the prior
filing of a motion to set aside the order of default (Martinez vs. Republic, G.R. No.
160895, October 30, 2006).
Procedure trial court must take when a defendant fails to file an answer.
Under Sec. 3 of Rule 9, the court "shall proceed to render judgment granting the
claimant such relief as his pleading may warrant," subject to the court’s discretion on
whether to require the presentation of evidence ex parte. The same provision also
sets down guidelines on the nature and extent of the relief that may be granted. In
particular, the court’s judgment "shall not exceed the amount or be different in kind
from that prayed for nor award unliquidated damages." (Gajudo vs. Traders
Royal Bank, supra)
DISCOVERY PROCEDURES
The importance of discovery procedures is well recognized by the Court. It approved
A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC on July 13, 2004 which provided for the guidelines to be
observed by trial court judges and clerks of court in the conduct of pre-trial and use
of deposition-discovery measures. Under A.M. No. 03-1-09-SC, trial courts are
directed to issue orders requiring parties to avail of interrogatories to parties under
Rule 25 and request for admission of adverse party under Rule 26 or at their
discretion make use of depositions under Rule 23 or other measures under Rule 27
and 28 within 5 days from the filing of the answer. The parties are likewise required
to submit, at least 3 days before the pre-trial, pre-trial briefs, containing among
others a manifestation of the parties of their having availed or their intention to avail
themselves of discovery procedures or referral to commissioners. (Hyatt Industrial
Manufacturing Corp. vs. LeyConstruction and Development Corp., G.R. No.
147143, March 10, 2006)
JUDGMENT ON THE PLEADINGS
Rule 34, Section 1 of the Rules of Court, provides that a judgment on the
pleadings is proper when an answer fails to tender an issue or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading. The essential
question is whether there are issues generated by the pleadings. A judgment on the
pleadings may be sought only by a claimant, who is the party seeking to recover
upon a claim, counterclaim or cross-claim; or to obtain a declaratory relief.
(Meneses vs. Secretary of Agrarian Reform, G.R. No. 156304, October 23,
2006)
Judgment on the pleadings is improper when the answer to the complaint tenders
several issues. A motion for judgment on the pleadings admits the truth of all the
material and relevant allegations of the opposing party and the judgment must rest
on those allegations taken together with such other allegations as are admitted in
the pleadings. It is proper when an answer fails to tender an issue, or otherwise
admits the material allegations of the adverse party's pleading. However, when it
appears that not all the material allegations of the complaint were admitted in the
answer for some of them were either denied or disputed, and the defendant has set
up certain special defenses which, if proven, would have the effect of nullifying
plaintiff's main cause of action, judgment on the pleadings cannot be
rendered. (Municipality of Tiwi  vs.  Betito, G.R. No. 171873, July 9, 2010)
SUMMARY JUDGMENT
For summary judgment to be proper, two (2) requisites must concur: (1) there must
be no genuine issue on any material fact, except for the amount of damages; and
(2) the moving party must be entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.
When, on their face, the pleadings tender a genuine issue, summary judgment is not
proper. An issue is genuine if it requires the PRESENTATION OF EVIDENCE as
distinguished from a sham, fictitious, contrived or false claim. The trial court’s
decision was merely denominated as summary judgment. But in essence, it is
actually equivalent to a judgment on the merits, making the rule on summary
judgment inapplicable in this case. (Ontimare vs. Elep, G.R. No. 159224, January
20, 2006).
When the facts as pleaded appear uncontested or undisputed, then there is no real
or genuine issue or question as to the facts, and summary judgment is called for.
The party who moves for summary judgment has the burden of demonstrating
clearly the absence of any genuine issue of fact, or that the issue posed in the
complaint is patently unsubstantial so as not to constitute a genuine issue for
trial. Trial courts have limited authority to render summary judgments and
may do so only when there is clearly no genuine issue as to any material
fact. When the facts as pleaded by the parties are disputed or contested,
proceedings for summary judgment cannot take the place of trial (Asian
Construction and Development Corp. vs. PCIB, G.R. No. 153827, April 25,
2006).
Under the Rules, summary judgment is appropriate when there are no genuine
issues of fact which call for the presentation of evidence in a full-blown trial. Even if
on their face the pleadings appear to raise issues, when the affidavits, depositions
and admissions show that such issues are not genuine, then summary judgment as
prescribed by the Rules must ensue as a matter of law. The determinative factor,
therefore, in a motion for summary judgment, is the presence or absence of a
genuine issue as to any material fact. (Philippine Bank Of Communications vs.
Spouses  Go  , G.R. No. 175514, February 14, 2011)
The trial court cannot motu proprio decide that summary judgment on an
action is in order.Under the applicable provisions of Rule 35, the defending party or
the claimant, as the case may be, must invoke the rule on summary judgment by
filing a motion. The adverse party must be notified of the motion for summary
judgment and furnished with supporting affidavits, depositions or admissions before
hearing is conducted. More importantly, a summary judgment is permitted only if
there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and a moving party is entitled to a
judgment as a matter of law. (Pineda vs. Guevara, G.R. No. 143188, February 14,
2007).
TRIAL
Lack of cause of action may be cured by evidence presented during the trial
and amendments to conform to the evidence.
Amendments of pleadings are allowed under Rule 10 of the 1997 Rules of Civil
Procedure in order that the actual merits of a case may be determined in the most
expeditious and inexpensive manner without regard to technicalities, and that all
other matters included in the case may be determined in a single proceeding,
thereby avoiding multiplicity of suits. Section 5 thereof applies to situations wherein
evidence not within the issues raised in the pleadings is presented by the parties
during the trial, and to conform to such evidence the pleadings are subsequently
amended on motion of a party. (Swagman Hotels & Travel, Inc. vs. CA,  G.R.
No. 161135, April 8, 2005).
DEMURRER TO EVIDENCE
Since respondent failed to deny the genuineness and due execution of the
Dacion and Confirmation Statement under oath, then these are deemed
admitted and must be considered by the court in resolving the demurrer to
evidence.  We held in Philippine American General Insurance Co., Inc. v. Sweet
Lines, Inc. that “[w]hen the due execution and genuineness of an instrument are
deemed admitted because of the adverse party’s failure to make a specific verified
denial thereof, the instrument need not be presented formally in evidence for it may
be considered an admitted fact.” (Casent  Realty Development Corp. vs.
Philbanking Corporation,  G.R. No. 150731,  September  14, 2007)
Upon the dismissal of the demurrer in the appellate court, the defendant
loses the right to present his evidenceand the appellate court shall then proceed
to render judgment on the merits on the basis of plaintiff’s evidence. The rule,
however, imposes the condition that if his demurrer is granted by the trial court, and
the order of dismissal is reversed on appeal, the movant loses his right to present
evidence in his behalf and he shall have been deemed to have elected to stand on
the insufficiency of plaintiff’s case and evidence. In such event, the appellate court
which reverses the order of dismissal shall proceed to render judgment on the merits
on the basis of plaintiff’s evidence (Republic vs. Tuvera, G.R. No. 148246,
February 16, 2007).
Distinction between motion to dismiss for failure to state a cause of action
and motion to dismiss based on lack of cause of action.
The first is raised in a motion to dismiss under Rule 16, Sec. 1 (g) before a
responsive pleading is filed and can be determined only from the allegations of the
pleading and not from evidentiary matters. The second is raised in a demurrer to
evidence under Rule 33 after the plaintiff has rested his case and can be resolved
only on the basis of the evidence he has presented in support of his claim (The
Manila Banking Corp. vs. University of Baguio, Inc., G.R. No. 159189,
February 21, 2007)
APPEAL AND REVIEW
The Supreme Court may review factual findings of the trial court and the
Court of Appeals
The petitioner admits that the issues on appeal are factual. Under Rule 45 of the
Rules of Court, only questions of law may be raised, for the simple reason that the
Court is not a trier of facts. The findings of the trial court as affirmed by the CA are
conclusive on this Court, absent proof of any of the recognized exceptional
circumstances such as: (1) the conclusion is grounded on speculations, surmises or
conjectures; (2) the inference is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) there
is grave abuse of discretion;
(4) the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) the findings of fact are
conflicting; (6) there is no citation of specific evidence on which the factual findings
are based; (7) the finding of absence of facts is contradicted by the presence of
evidence on record; (8) the findings of the CA are contrary to those of the trial court;
(9) the CA manifestly overlooked certain relevant and undisputed facts that, if
properly considered, would justify a different conclusion; (10) the findings of the CA
are beyond the issues of the case; and (11) the findings are contrary to the
admissions of both parties. (Asian Construction & Dev’t. Corp. vs.
Tulabut,  G.R. No. 161904, April 26, 2005)
The supervisory jurisdiction of a court over the issuance of a writ of
certiorari cannot be exercised for the purpose of reviewing the intrinsic
correctness of a judgment of the lower court – viz., on the basis either of the
law or the facts of the case, or of the wisdom or legal soundness of the
decision. Even if the findings of the court are incorrect, as long as it has
jurisdiction over the case, such correction is normally beyond the province
of certiorari. Where the error is not one of jurisdiction, but of an error of law or fact
– a mistake of judgment – appeal is the proper remedy.   Vios vs.  Pantangco,
Jr., G.R. No. 163103, February 6, 2009)
Regional trial courts have jurisdiction over complaints for recovery of ownership or
accion reivindicatoria.   Section 8, Rule 40 of the Rules on Civil Procedure
nonetheless allows the RTC to decide the case brought on appeal from the
MTC which, even without jurisdiction over the subject matter, may decide
the case on the merits.   In the instant case, the MTC of Mambajao should have
dismissed the complaint outright for lack of jurisdiction but since it decided the case
on its merits, the RTC rendered a decision based on the findings of the
MTC. (Provost vs. CA,  G.R. No. 160406,  June 26, 2006).
The RTC should have taken cognizance of the case. If the case is tried on the
merits by the Municipal Court without jurisdiction over the subject matter,
the RTC on appeal may no longer dismiss the case if it has original
jurisdiction thereof. Moreover, the RTC shall no longer try the case on the merits,
but shall decide the case on the basis of the evidence presented in the lower court,
without prejudice to the admission of the amended pleadings and additional evidence
in the interest of justice.(Encarnacion vs. Amigo,  G.R. No. 169793, September
15, 2006).
Inferior courts have jurisdiction to resolve questions of ownership
whenever it is necessary to decide the question of possession in an
ejectment case. 
The RTC erred when it agreed with the MTC’s decision to dismiss the case. At first
glance, it appears that based on the P13,300.00 assessed value of the subject
property as declared by respondents, the RTC would have no jurisdiction over the
case. But the above-quoted provision refers to theoriginal jurisdiction of the RTC.
Section 22 of BP 129 vests upon the RTC the exercise of appellate jurisdiction over
all cases decided by the Metropolitan Trial Courts, Municipal Trial Courts, and
Municipal Circuit Trial Courts in their respective territorial jurisdictions.  Clearly then,
the amount involved is immaterial for purposes of the RTC’s appellate jurisdiction. 
All cases decided by the MTC are generally appealable to the RTC irrespective of the
amount involved (Serrano vs. Gutierrez, G.R. No. 162366, November 10, 2006).
Appeal from RTC decision rendered in the exercise of its appellate
jurisdiction – petition for review under Rule 42.  
Since the unlawful detainer case was filed with the MTC and affirmed by the RTC,
petitioners should have filed a Petition for Review with the Court of Appeals under
Rule 42 and not a Notice of Appeal with the RTC.  However, we consider this to have
been remedied by the timely filing of the Motion for Reconsideration on the following
day.  Section 3, Rule 50 of the Rules of Court allows the withdrawal of appeal at any
time, as a matter of right, before the filing of the appellee’s brief.  Applying this rule
contextually, the filing of the Motion for Reconsideration may be deemed as an
effective withdrawal of the defective Notice of Appeal. (Ross Rica Sales Center,
Inc.  vs. Ong,  G.R. No. 132197, August 16, 2005)
No petition for relief in the Court of Appeals and Supreme Court
While Rule 38 uses the phrase “any court,” it refers only to Municipal/Metropolitan
and Regional Trial Courts. The procedure in the CA and the Supreme Court are
governed by separate provisions of the Rules of Court. There is no provision in the
Rules of Court making the petition for rellief applicable in the CA or this Court.
(Purcon vs. MRM Philippines, Inc., G.R. No. 182718, September 26, 2008)
ANNULMENT OF JUDGMENT
Section 1, Rule 47 of the 1987 Rules of Civil Procedure provides that the remedy of
annulment of judgments or final orders/resolutions of a Regional Trial Court in civil
actions can only be availed of where "the ordinary remedies of new trial, appeal,
petition for relief or other appropriate
remedies arenolongeravailablethroughnofaultofthepetitioner." A petition for
annulment of judgment under Rule 47 is a remedy granted only under exceptional
circumstances where a party, without fault on his part, has failed to avail of the
ordinary or other appropriate remedies provided by law. Such action is never
resorted to as a substitute for a party’s own neglect in not promptly availing of the
ordinary or other appropriate remedies. (Republic of the Philippines vs. Spouses
De Castro  , G.R. No. 189724, February 7, 2011)
Rule 47 applies only to annulment by the Court of Appeals of judgments or final
orders and resolutions in civil cases of Regional Trial Courts – it does not apply
to criminal actions (People vs. Bitanga, G.R. No. 159222, June 26 2007);  final
judgments or orders of quasi-judicial tribunals or administrative bodies such  as the
National Labor Relations Commission, the Ombudsman, the Civil Service
Commission, the Office of the President, and the PARAD (Fraginal vs. Paranal,
G.R. No. 150207, February 223, 2007).; or to nullification of decisions of the Court of
Appeals (Grande vs. University of the Philippines, G.R. No. 148456, September
15, 2006).
Although the RTC has the authority to annul final judgments, such authority pertains
only to final judgments rendered by inferior courts andquasi-judicial bodies
of equal ranking with such inferior courts. Given that DARAB decisions are
appealable to the CA, the inevitable conclusion is that the DARAB is a co-equal body
with the RTC and its decisions are beyond the RTC’s control (Springfield
Development Corp. vs. Presiding Judge of RTC of Misamis Oriental, Branch
40, G.R. No. 142628, February 6, 2007).
EXECUTION
Execution pending appeal applies to election cases.  Despite the silence of the
COMELEC Rules of Procedure as to the procedure of the issuance of a writ of
execution pending appeal, there is no reason to dispute the COMELEC’s authority to
do so, considering that the suppletory application of the Rules of Court is expressly
authorized by Section 1, Rule 41 of the COMELEC Rules of Procedure which provides
that absent any applicable provisions therein the pertinent provisions of the Rules of
Court shall be applicable by analogy or in a suppletory character and effect.
(Balajonda vs. COMELEC, G.R. No. 166032, February 28, 2005).
When title has been consolidated in name of mortgagee, writ of possession
is a matter of right.Once a mortgaged estate is extrajudicially sold, and is not
redeemed within the reglementary period, no separate and independent action is
necessary to obtain possession of the property.   The purchaser at the public auction
has only to file a petition for issuance of a writ of possession pursuant to Section 33
of Rule 39 of the Rules of Court. (DBP vs. Spouses Gatal, G.R. No. 138567, March
4, 2005).
Execution of money judgments under Rule 39, Sec. 9 – promissory note not
allowed.
The law mandates that in the execution of a money judgment, the judgment debtor
shall pay either in cash, certified bank check payable to the judgment obligee, or any
other form of payment acceptable to the latter.  Nowhere does the law mention
promissory notes as a form of payment. The only exception is when such form of
payment is acceptable to the judgment debtor. But it was obviously not acceptable
to complainant, otherwise she would not have filed this case against respondent
sheriff. In fact, she objected to it because the promissory notes of the defendants did
not satisfy the money judgment in her favor. (Dagooc vs. Erlina, A.M. No. P-04-
1857 (formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 02-1429-P), March 16, 2005)
Venue of action for revival of judgment
If the action for revival of judgment affects title to or possession of real property, or
interest therein, then it is a real action that must be filed with the court of the place
where the real property is located. (Infante vs. Aran Builders, Inc., G.R. No.
156596, August 24, 2007)
PROVISIONAL REMEDIES
Improper  issuance and service of writ of attachment
A distinction should be made between issuance and implementation of the writ of
attachment. This is necessary to determine when jurisdiction over the defendant
should be acquired to validly implement the writ.
The grant of the provisional remedy of attachment involves three stages:first, the
court issues the order granting the application; second, the writ of attachment issues
pursuant  to the order granting the writ; and third, the writ is implemented.  For
the initial two stages, it is not necessary that jurisdiction over the person of
the defendant be first obtained, but once the implementation of the writ
commences, the court must have acquired jurisdiction over the defendant  
(Mangila vs. Court of Appeals,  G.R. No. 125027,  August 12, 2002, 387 SCRA
162).
Preference of levy on attachment duly registered over a prior unregistered
sale
The settled rule is that levy on attachment, duly registered, takes preference over a
prior unregistered sale.  The preference created by the levy on attachment is not
diminished even by the subsequent registration of the prior sale.  This is so because
an attachment is a proceeding in rem.  It is against the particular property,
enforceable against the whole world. The attaching creditor acquires a specific
lien on the attached property which nothing can subsequently destroy
except the very dissolution of the attachment or levy itself.
The lien continues until the debt is paid, or sale is had under execution issued on the
judgment, or until the judgment is satisfied, or the attachment discharged or vacated
in some manner provided by law. Thus, in the registry, the attachment in favor of
respondents appeared in the nature of a real lien when petitioner had his purchase
recorded.  The effect of the notation of said lien was to subject and subordinate the
right of petitioner, as purchaser, to the lien (Valdevieso vs. Damalerio, G.R. No.
133303, February 17, 2005, 451 SCRA 664, 670).
Judge's authority to issue a writ of preliminary injunction only within
his/her territorial jurisdiction
As the presiding judge of RTC, Marawi City, he should have known that Makati City
was way beyond the boundaries of his territorial jurisdiction insofar as enforcing a
writ of preliminary injunction is concerned. Section 21 (1) of B.P. Blg. 129, as
amended, provides that the RTC shall exercise original jurisdiction in the issuance of
writs of certiorari, prohibition, mandamus, quo warranto, habeas corpus and
injunction which may be enforced in any part of their respective regions (Gomos vs.
Adiong,  A.M. No. RTJ-04-1863, October 22, 2004, 441 SCRA 162).
Original action for injunction outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals
What petitioner filed with the appellate court was an original action for preliminary
injunction which is a provisional and extraordinary remedy calculated to preserve or
maintain the status quo of things and is availed of to prevent actual or threatened
acts, until the merits of the case can be heard.  An original action for injunction is
outside the jurisdiction of the Court of Appeals, however. 
Under B.P. 129, the appellate court’s jurisdiction to grant a writ of
preliminary injunction is limited to actions or proceedings pending before it
(Section 2 of Rule 58) or in a petition for certiorari, prohibition or
mandamus (Section 7 of Rule 65). In the case at bar, petitioner’s complaint-in-
intervention in Civil Case No. 00-196 was pending before Branch 256 of the
Muntinlupa RTC, not with the appellate court.(Allgemeine-Bau-Chemie Phils., Inc.,
vs. Metropolitan Bank & Trust Co., Honorable N. C. Perello, G.R. No. 159296 ,
February 10, 2006).
Injunction to restrain extrajudicial foreclosure involving several parcels
located in different provinces
Separate injunction suits may be filed for breach of mortgage contract with
injunction to restrain extrajudicial foreclosure proceedings of mortgaged properties
located in different provinces without violating the rule against forum shopping since
injunction is enforceable only within the territorial limits of the trial court, thus the
mortgagor is left without remedy as to the properties located outside the jurisdiction
of the issuing court unless an application for injunction is made with another court
which has jurisdiction over the latter court (Benguet  Management Corporation vs.
Court ofAppeals, September 18, 2003, 411 SCRA 347).
CHANGE IN THE RULE
The last paragraph which was added to Section 5, Rule 58 states that a higher court
(RTC, Court of Appeals, Sandiganbayan, Court of Tax Appeals) which issues a writ of
preliminary injunction against a lower court, board, officer or quasi-judicial agency
must “decide the main case or petition within six (6) months from the issuance of
the writ.” (AM 07-7-12, effective December 27, 2007).
Purpose: in order not to unduly delay the main case lodged in the lower  court.
SPECIAL CIVIL ACTIONS
A petition for declaratory relief should be brought “in the appropriateregional trial
court.” The purpose of the petition is to ask the court to determine any question of
construction or validity arising from the sujbect matter thereof , and for the
declaration of rights and duties thereunder. Hence, the subject matter of such
petition raises issues which are not capable of pecuniary estimation and must be filed
in the RTC (Sec. 19 [1], BP 129; Sec. 1, Rule 63).    It would be error to file the
petition the petition with the Supreme Court which has no original jurisdiction to
entertain a petition for declaratory relief (Ortega vs. Quezon City
Government,  G.R. No. 161400, September 2, 2005).
However, where the action is for quieting of title which is a similar remedy under the
second paragraph of Sec. 1 of Rule 63, the jurisdiction will depend upon
the assessed value of the property.
Re-filing of petition for certiorari should be done within the 60-day
period.Where the dismissal by the Court of Appeals of the petition for certiorari in
CA-G.R. SP No. 69744 for non-submission of a non-forum shopping certification was
without prejudice and petitioner could have re-filed such petition, such re-filing
should still be done within the prescribed period under Section 4, Rule 65 of the 1997
Rules of Civil Procedure, or not later than sixty days from notice of the assailed Order
of the RTC.   (Estrera vs. CA, G.R. No. 154235-36, August 16, 2006)
CHANGES IN THE RULE
Period to file petition for certiorari now inextendible. Last paragraph of
Section 4, Rule 65: “No extension of time to file the petition shall be granted except
for compelling reasons and in no case exceeding fifteen (15) days” has
been DELETED by A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC, effective December 27, 2007.  Hence,
petitions for certiorari must be filed strictly within 60 days from notice of judgment or
from the order denying a motion for reconsideration.
If the Court intended to retain the authority of the proper courts to grant extensions
under Section 4 of Rule 65, the paragraph providing for such authority would have
been preserved. The removal of the said paragraph under the amendment by
A.M. No. 07-7-12-SC of Section 4, Rule 65 simply meant that there can no
longer be any extension of the 60-day period within which to file a petition
for certiorari. (Laguna Metts Corporation vs. Court of Appeals, G.R. No.
185220, July 27, 2009)
A. M. No. 07-7-12 has also amended the second paragraph of Sec. 4:                     
If the petition relates to an act or omission of a municipal trial court or of a
corporation, board, officer or person, it shall be filed withthe Regional Trial Court
exercising jurisdiction over the territorial area as defined by the Supreme Court.  It
may also be filed with the Court of Appeals whether or not the same is in aid of its
appellate jurisdiction, or with the Sandiganbayan if it is in aid of its appellate
jurisdiction.  If the petition involves an act or omission of a quasi-judicial agency,
unless otherwise provided by law or these rules, the petition shall be filed withand
be cognizable only by the Court of Appeals.
In election cases involving an act or omission of a municipal or regional
trial court, the petition shall be filed exclusively with the Commission on
Elections, in aid of its appellate jurisdiction
Following the hierarchy of courts, no certiorari against the RTC shall be filed with the
Supreme Court. This will help prevent the clogging of the Supreme Court’s dockets
as litigants will be discouraged from filing petitions directly with the Supreme Court.
Section 7.         Expediting proceedings; injunctive relief. -  The court in
which the petition is filed may issue orders expediting the proceedings, and it may
also grant a temporary restraining order or a writ of preliminary injunction for the
preservation of the rights of the parties pending such proceedings.  The petition shall
not interrupt the course of the principal case unless a temporary restraining order or
a writ of preliminary injunction has been issued against the public respondent from
further proceeding in the case.
The public respondent shall proceed with the principal case within ten (10)
days from the filing of a petition for certiorari with a higher court or
tribunal, absent a temporary restraining order or a preliminary injunction,
or upon its expiration. Failure of the public respondent to proceed with the
principal case may be a ground for an administrative charge
Unless there is a temporary restraining order or preliminary injunction issued by a
higher court, the main or principal case should proceed despite the filing of a petition
for certiorari questioning an act or omission of a court or tribunal
Judicial courtesy, therefore, can no longer be used as an excuse by courts or
tribunals not to proceed with the principal case.
Section 8.    Proceedings after comment is filed. -  After the commentor other
pleadings required by the court are filed, or the time for the filing thereof has
expired, the court may hear the case or require the parties to submit memoranda. 
If, after such hearing or filing of memoranda or the expiration of the period for
filing, the court finds that the allegations of the petition are true, it shall render
judgment for such relief to which the petitioner is entitled.
However, the court may dismiss the petition if it finds the same patently without
merit or prosecuted manifestly for delay, or if the questions raised therein are too
unsubstantial to require consideration. In such event, the court may award in
favor of the respondent treble costs solidarily against the petitioner and
counsel, in addition to subjecting counsel to administrative sanctions under
Rules 139 and 139-B of the Rules of Court.
The Court may impose motu proprio,  based on rep ipsa loquitur,other
disciplinary sanctions or measures on erring lawyers for patently dilatory
and unmeritorious petitions for certiorari.
Thewrit of prohibition does not lie against the exercise of a quasi-
legislative function. Since in issuing the questioned IRR of R.A. No. 9207, the
National Government Administration Committee was not exercising judicial, quasi-
judicial or ministerial function, which is the scope of a petition for prohibition under
Section 2, Rule 65 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, the instant prohibition should
be dismissed outright. Where the principal relief sought is to invalidate an IRR,
petitioners’ remedy is an ordinary action for its nullification, an action which properly
falls under the jurisdiction of the Regional Trial Court. (Holy Spirit Homeowners
Association vs. Defensor, G.R. No. 163980, August 3, 2006).
A writ of mandamus commanding the respondents to require PUVs to use CNG is
unavailing.  Mandamus is available only to compel the doing of an act
specifically enjoined by law as a duty. Here, there is no law that mandates the
respondents LTFRB and the DOTC to order owners of motor vehicles to use CNG.  At
most the LTFRB has been tasked by E.O. No. 290 in par. 4.5 (ii), Section 4 “to grant
preferential and exclusive Certificates of Public Convenience (CPC) or franchises to
operators of NGVs based on the results of the DOTC surveys”  (Henares, Jr. vs.
Land Transportation Franchising and Regulatory Board, G.R. No. 158290,
October 23, 2006).
Actions of quo warranto against persons who usurp an office in a corporation, which
were formerly cognizable by the Securities and Exchange Commission under PD
902-A, have been transferred to the courts of general jurisdiction.  But, this does not
change the fact that Rule 66 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure does not
apply to quo warranto cases against persons who usurp an office in a
private corporation(Calleja vs. Panday, G.R. No. 168696. February 28, 2006).
EXPROPRIATION
Rep. Act No. 8974 mandates immediate payment of the initial just
compensation prior to the issuance of the writ of possession in favor of the
government. RA 8974 requires that  the government make a direct payment to
the property owner before the writ may issue. Such payment is based on the zonal
valuation of the BIR in the case of land, the value of the improvements or structures
under the replacement cost method, or if no such valuation is available and in cases
of utmost urgency, the proffered value of the property to be seized. It is the plain
intent of RA 8974 to supersede the system of deposit under Rule 67 with the scheme
of “immediate payment” in cases involving national government infrastructure
projects (Republic vs. Gingoyon, G.R. No. 166249, December 19, 2005).
Section 9 of Rule 67 empowers the court to order payment to itself of the proceeds
of the expropriation whenever questions of ownership are yet to be settled. There is
no reason why this rule should not be applied even where the settlement of such
questions is to be made by another tribunal, i.e., the DARAB. (Philippine Veterans
Bank vs. Bases Conversion Development Authority,    G.R. No. 173085,
January 19, 2011)
FORECLOSURE OF MORTGAGE
Awrit of possession is “a writ of execution employed to enforce a
judgment to recover the possession of land. It commands the sheriff to enter
the land and give possession of it to the person entitled under the judgment.”
A writ of possession may be issued under the following instances: (1) in land
registration proceedings under Section 17 of Act 496; (2) in a judicial foreclosure,
provided the debtor is in possession of the mortgaged realty and no third person, not
a party  to the foreclosure suit, had intervened;  (3) in an extrajudicial foreclosure of
a real estate mortgage under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as amended by Act No.
4118; and (4) in execution sales (last paragraph of Section 33, Rule 39 of the Rules
of Court).
The present case falls under the third instance. Under Section 7 of Act No. 3135, as
amended by Act No. 4118, a writ of possession may be issued either (1) within the
one-year redemption period, upon the filing of a bond, or (2) after the lapse of the
redemption period, without need of a bond. (PNB vs. Sanao Marketing
Corporation, G.R. No. 153951, July 29, 2005
A writ of preliminary injunction is issued to prevent an extrajudicial foreclosure, only
upon a clear showing of a violation of the mortgagor’s unmistakable right.
Unsubstantiated allegations of denial of due process and prematurity of a loan are
not sufficient to defeat the mortgagee’s unmistakable right to an extrajudicial
foreclosure. (Selegna Management and Development Corporation vs. UCPB,
G.R. No. 165662, May 31, 2006)
An action to invalidate the mortgage or the foreclosure sale is not a valid
ground to oppose issuance of writ of possession .
As a rule, any question regarding the validity of the mortgage or its foreclosure
cannot be a legal ground for refusing the issuance of a writ of possession. Regardless
of whether or not there is a pending suit for annulment of the mortgage or the
foreclosure itself, the purchaser is entitled to a writ of possession, without prejudice
of course to the eventual outcome of said case. (Sps. Arquiza vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R. No. 160479, June 8, 2005)
FORCIBLE ENTRY AND UNLAWFUL DETAINER
In forcible entry or unlawful detainer cases, the only damage that can be recovered
is the fair rental value or the reasonable compensation for the use and
occupation of the leased property. The reason for this is that the only issue
raised in ejectment cases is that of rightful possession; hence, the damages which
could be recovered are those which the plaintiff could have sustained as a mere
possessor, or those caused by the loss of the use and occupation of the property,
and not the damages which he may have suffered but which have no direct relation
to his loss of material possession. (Teraña vs. Hon. De Sagun,  G.R. No. 152131,
April 29, 2009;Dumo vs. Espinas, G.R. No. 141962, January 25, 2006)
The judgment rendered in an action for unlawful detainer shall be conclusive with
respect to the possession only and shall in no wise bind the title or affect the
ownership of the land or building.  Such judgment would not bar an action between
the same parties respecting title to the land or building.  Section 18, Rule 70 of the
Rules of Court provides that when the defendant raises the defense of ownership in
his pleadings and the question of possession cannot be resolved without deciding the
issue of ownership, the issue of ownership shall be resolved only to determine the
issue of possession. (Roberts vs. Papio, G.R. No. 166714, February 9, 2007)
Accion publicianais one for the recovery of possession of the right to possess. It is
also referred to as an ejectment suit filed after the expiration of one year after the
occurrence of the cause of action or from the unlawful withholding of possession of
the realty. (Hilario, etc., et. al. vs. Salvador, et. al.,  G.R. No. 160384, April 29,
2005)
Does the RTC have jurisdiction over all cases of recovery of possession
regardless of the value of the property involved?
NO. The doctrine that all cases of recovery of possession or accion publiciana lies
with the regional trial courts regardless of the value of the property — no longer
holds true. As things now stand, a distinction must be made between those
properties the assessed value of which is below P20,000.00, if outside Metro Manila;
and P50,000.00, if within (Quinagoran vs. Court of Appeals,    G.R. No. 155179.
August 24, 2007)
Specifically, the regional trial court exercises exclusive original jurisdiction "in all civil
actions which involve  possession of real property." However, if the assessed
value of the real property involved does not exceed P50,000.00 in Metro
Manila, and P20,000.00 outside of Metro Manila, the municipal trial court
exercises jurisdiction over actions to recover possession of real
property (Atuel vs. Valdez, June 10, 2003, 403 SCRA 517, 528).
All cases involving title to or possession of real property with an assessed value of
less than P20,000.00 if outside Metro Manila, fall under the original jurisdiction of the
municipal trial court.  (Aliabo v. Carampatan, G.R. No. 128922, March 16, 2001,
354 SCRA 548, 552).
A complaint must allege the assessed value of the real property subject of
the complaint or the interest thereon to determine which court has
jurisdiction over the action.  This is because the nature of the action and which
court has original and exclusive jurisdiction over the same is determined by the
material allegations of the complaint, the type of relief prayed for by the plaintiff and
the law in effect when the action is filed, irrespective of whether the plaintiffs are
entitled to some or all of the claims asserted therein. (Laresma v. Abellana, G.R.
No. 140973, November 11, 2004, 442 SCRA 156; Hilario v. Salvador, G.R. No.
160384, April 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 815).
A complaint for reconveyance of a parcel of land which involves title to or
interest in real property should allege the assessed value of the land .  The
complaint specified only the market value or estimated value which is P15,000.00. 
In the absence of an assessed value, or in lieu thereof, the estimated value may be
alleged.
Sec. 22 of BP 129 as amended by R.A. No. 7691 (where the assessed value of the
real property does not exceed P20,000.00 or P50,000.00 in Metro Manila) grants the
MTC exclusive jurisdiction over subject case.The nature of an action is determined
not by what is stated in the caption of the complaint but its allegations and the reliefs
prayed for. Where the ultimate objective of the plaintiff is to obtain title to real
property, it should be filed in the proper court having jurisdiction over the assessed
value of the property subject thereof. (Barangay Piapi vs. Talip, 469 SCRA 409
[2005]).
The determining jurisdictional element for the accion reivindicatoria is, as
RA 7691 discloses, the assessed value of the property in question. For
properties in the provinces, the RTC has jurisdiction if the assessed value
exceeds P20,000, and the MTC, if the value is P20,000 or below . An
assessed value can have reference only to the tax rolls in the municipality where the
property is located, and is contained in the tax declaration. It is the amount in the
tax declaration that should be consulted and no other kind of value, and as
appearing in Exhibit B, this is P5,950. The case, therefore, falls within the exclusive
original jurisdiction of the Municipal Trial Court of Romblon which has jurisdiction
over the territory where the property is located, and not the court a quo.  . (Hilario
vs. Salvador,  G.R. No. 160384. April 29, 2005, 457 SCRA 815)
The actions envisaged in the aforequoted provisions (Secs. 19 and 33. BP
129, as amended by RA 7691) are accion publiciana and reivindicatoria. To
determine which court has jurisdiction over the action, the complaint must
allege the assessed value of the real property subject of the complaint or
the interest thereon.The complaint does not contain any allegation of the assessed
value of Lot 4-E covered by TCT No. 47171. There is, thus, no showing on the face of
the complaint that the RTC had exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the
respondent.
Moreover, as gleaned from the receipt of realty tax payments issued to the
respondent, the assessed value of the property in 1993 was P8,300.00.  Patently
then, the Municipal Trial Court of Aloguinsan, Cebu, and not the Regional
Trial Court of Toledo City, had exclusive jurisdiction over the action of the
respondent. Hence, all the proceedings in the RTC, including its decision,
are null and void  (Laresma vs.Abellana, G.R. No. 140973, November 11,
2004, 442 SCRA 156; Aliabo vs. Carampatan, G.R. No. 128922, March 16, 2001,
354 SCRA 548).;Ouano vs. PGTT Int'l. Investment Corporation, G.R. No.
134230, July 17, 2002, 384 SCRA 589) .
Accion publiciana is the plenary action to recover the right of possession which
should be brought in the proper regional trial court when dispossession has lasted
for more than one year (Canlas vs. Tubil,  G.R. No. 184285, September 25,
2009).
Mandatory allegations for the municipal trial court to acquire jurisdiction
over forcible  entry
First, the plaintiff must allege his prior physical possession of the property. Second,
he must also allege that he was deprived of his possession by force, intimidation,
threat, strategy or stealth. If the alleged dispossession did not occur by any of these
means, the proper recourse is to file not  an action for forcible entry but a plenary
action to recover possession with the Regional Trial Court (Benguet Corporation
vs. Cordillera Caraballo Mission, Inc., G.R. No.155343, September 2, 2005)..
What determines jurisdiction in unlawful detainer?
To vest the court jurisdiction to effect the ejectment of an occupant, it is necessary
that the complaint should embody such a statement of facts as brings the party
clearly within the class of cases for which the statutes provide a remedy, as these
proceedings are summary in nature. The complaint must show enough on its face
the court jurisdiction without resort to parol testimony.
The jurisdictional facts must appear on the face of the complaint. When the
complaint fails to aver facts constitutive of forcible entry or unlawful detainer, as
where it does not state how entry was effected or how and when dispossession
started, the remedy should either be an accion publiciana or an accion
reivindicatoria in the proper regional trial court.(Valdez, Jr. vs. Court of
Appeals, G.R No. 132424, May 4, 2006)
Possession by tolerance becomes unlawful from the time of demand  to
vacate.
Petitioner’s cause of action for unlawful detainer springs from     respondents’ failure
to vacate the questioned premises upon his demand sometime in 1996.  Within one
(1) year therefrom, or on November 6, 1996, petitioner filed the instant complaint.
Possession by tolerance is lawful, but such possession becomes unlawful when the
possessor by tolerance refuses to vacate upon demand made by the
owner. (Santos vs. Sps. Ayon,  G.R. No. 137013, May 6, 2005)
Where the period of the lease has expired and several demands were sent
to the lessee to vacate, when should the one year period to file unlawful
detainer be reckoned? From the date of the original demand or from the
date of the last demand?
From the date of the original demand if the subsequent demands are merely in the
nature of reminders or reiterations of the original demand.
Demand or notice to vacate is not a jurisdictional requirement when the action is
based on the expiration of the lease.. The law requires notice to be served only when
the action is due to the lessee’s failure to pay or the failure to comply with the
conditions of the lease. The one-year period is thus counted from the date of first
dispossession. The allegation that the lease was on a month-to-month basis is
tantamount to saying that the lease expired every month. Since the lease already
expired mid-year in 1995, as communicated in petitioners’ letter dated July 1, 1995,
it was at that time that respondent’s occupancy became unlawful. (Racaza vs.
Gozum, June 8, 2006, 490 SCRA 313)
As a general rule, an ejectment suit cannot be abated or suspended by the
mere filing before the regional trial court (RTC) of another action raising
ownership of the property as an issue . As an exception, however, unlawful
detainer actions may be suspended even on appeal, on considerations of equity,
such as when the demolition of petitioners' house would result from the enforcement
of the municipal circuit trial court (MCTC) judgment (Amagan vs. Marayag, G.R.
No. 138377, February 28, 2000).
Even if RTC judgments in unlawful detainer cases are immediately
executory, preliminary injunction may still be granted.  There need only be
clear showing that there exists a right to be protected and that the acts against
which the writ is to be directed violate said right. In this case, we note that the
petition for review filed with the Court of Appeals raises substantial issues meriting
serious consideration.  Chua’s putative right to continued possession of the premises
stands to be violated if the adverse judgment of the RTC were to be fully executed. 
Hence, the complete execution of the RTC judgment could be held in abeyance,
through a writ of preliminary injunction, until final resolution of the main controversy
(Benedicto vs. CA, G.R. No. 157604, October 19, 2005)
CONTEMPT
Respondent Judge’s blunder was compounded when she immediately cited
complainant in contempt of court and issued the bench warrant without requiring the
latter to explain the reason for his non-appearance and non-compliance with a
standing order. Under Rule 71 of the Rules of Court,complainant’s alleged
disobedience is an indirect contempt the punishment for which requires
that a respondent should be first asked to show cause why he should not
be punished for contempt.
Respondent also abused her contempt powers. If at all, complainant was guilty of
indirect contempt and not direct contempt.  For not affording complainant the
opportunity to explain why he should  not  be  cited  in  contempt,  she  blatantly
disregarded Rule 71 of the Rules of Court  (Tabujara vs. Judge Asdala, A.M. No.
RTJ-08-2126 [Formerly OCA I.P.I. No. 08-2896-RTJ], January 20, 2009 Jan 20, En
Banc)
Before one may be convicted of indirect contempt, there must be
compliance with the following requisites: (a) a charge in writing to be filed;
(b) an opportunity for respondent to comment thereon within such period
as may be fixed by the court; and (c) an opportunity to be heard by himself
or by counsel . (Tokio  Marine  Malayan Insurance Company Inc. vs. 
Valdez,  G.R. No. 150107, January 28, 2008).
Use of falsified and forged documents constitutes indirect  contempt not
direct contempt (Judge Dolores Espanol vs.  Atty. Benjamin Formoso, G.R. No.
150949, June 21, 2007).