FIRST DIVISION

[ G.R. No. 153206, October 23, 2006 ]

ONG ENG KIAM A.K.A. WILLIAM ONG, PETITIONER,

VS.

LUCITA G. ONG, RESPONDENT.

DECISION

AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ, J.:
1
Before this Court is a Petition for Review seeking the reversal of the Decision of the Court
of Appeals (CA) in CA G.R. CV No. 59400 which affirmed in toto the Decision of the Regional
Trial Court (RTC) Branch 41, Dagupan City granting the petition for legal separation filed by
herein respondent, as well as the Resolution 2 of the CA dated April 26, 2002 which denied
petitioner's motion for reconsideration.

Ong Eng Kiam, also known as William Ong (William) and Lucita G. Ong (Lucita) were married
on July 13, 1975 at the San Agustin Church in Manila. They have three children: Kingston,
3
Charleston, and Princeton who are now all of the age of majority.

On March 21, 1996, Lucita filed a Complaint for Legal Separation under Article 55 par. (1) of
4
the Family Code before the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Dagupan City, Branch 41
alleging that her life with William was marked by physical violence, threats, intimidation and
5
grossly abusive conduct.

Lucita claimed that: soon after three years of marriage, she and William quarreled almost
every day, with physical violence being inflicted upon her; William would shout invectives at
her like "putang ina mo", "gago", "tanga", and he would slap her, kick her, pull her hair, bang
her head against concrete wall and throw at her whatever he could reach with his hand; the
causes of these fights were petty things regarding their children or their business; William
would also scold and beat the children at different parts of their bodies using the buckle of his
belt; whenever she tried to stop William from hitting the children, he would turn his ire on her
and box her; on December 9, 1995, after she protested with William's decision to allow their
eldest son Kingston to go to Bacolod, William slapped her and said, "it is none of your
business"; on December 14, 1995, she asked William to bring Kingston back from Bacolod; a
violent quarrel ensued and William hit her on her head, left cheek, eye, stomach, and arms;
when William hit her on the stomach and she bent down because of the pain, he hit her on the
head then pointed a gun at her and asked her to leave the house; she then went to her sister's
house in Binondo where she was fetched by her other siblings and brought to their parents
house in Dagupan; the following day, she went to her parent's doctor, Dr. Vicente Elinzano for
6
treatment of her injuries.

William for his part denied that he ever inflicted physical harm on his wife, used insulting
language against her, or whipped the children with the buckle of his belt. While he admits that
he and Lucita quarreled on December 9, 1995, at their house in Jose Abad Santos Avenue,
Tondo, Manila, he claimed that he left the same, stayed in their Greenhills condominium and
only went back to their Tondo house to work in their office below. In the afternoon of December
14, 1995, their laundrywoman told him that Lucita left the house. 7

On January 5, 1998, the RTC rendered its Decision decreeing legal separation, thus:

WHEREFORE, premises considered, judgment is hereby rendered decreeing the legal

separation of plaintiff and defendant, with all the legal effects attendant thereto, particularly the
dissolution and liquidation of the conjugal partnership properties, for which purpose the parties
are hereby ordered to submit a complete inventory of said properties so that the Court can
make a just and proper division, such division to be embodied in a supplemental decision.
8
SO ORDERED.

The RTC found that:

It is indubitable that plaintiff (Lucita) and defendant (William) had their frequent quarrels and
misunderstanding which made both of their lives miserable and hellish. This is even admitted
by the defendant when he said that there was no day that he did not quarrel with his wife.
Defendant had regarded the plaintiff negligent in the performance of her wifely duties and had
blamed her for not reporting to him about the wrongdoings of their children. (citations omitted)

These quarrels were always punctuated by acts of physical violence, threats and intimidation
by the defendant against the plaintiff and on the children. In the process, insulting words and
language were heaped upon her. The plaintiff suffered and endured the mental and physical
anguish of these marital fights until December 14, 1995 when she had reached the limits of
her endurance. The more than twenty years of her marriage could not have been put to waste
by the plaintiff if the same had been lived in an atmosphere of love, harmony and peace.
Worst, their children are also suffering. As very well stated in plaintiff's memorandum, "it would
be unthinkable for her to throw away this twenty years of relationship, abandon the comforts of
her home and be separated from her children, whom she loves, if there exists no cause, which
9
is already beyond her endurance.

William appealed to the CA which affirmed in toto the RTC decision. In its Decision dated
October 8, 2001, the CA found that the testimonies for Lucita were straightforward and
credible and the ground for legal separation under Art. 55, par. 1 of the Family Code, i.e.,
physical violence and grossly abusive conduct directed against Lucita, were adequately

Page 2
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proven.

As the CA explained:

The straightforward and candid testimonies of the witnesses were uncontroverted and
credible. Dr. Elinzano's testimony was able to show that the [Lucita] suffered several injuries
inflicted by [William]. It is clear that on December 14, 1995, she sustained redness in her
cheek, black eye on her left eye, fist blow on the stomach, blood clot and a blackish
discoloration on both shoulders and a "bump" or "bukol" on her head. The presence of these
injuries was established by the testimonies of [Lucita] herself and her sister, Linda Lim. The
Memorandum/Medical Certificate also confirmed the evidence presented and does not deviate
from the doctor's main testimony --- that [Lucita] suffered physical violence on [sic] the hands
of her husband, caused by physical trauma, slapping of the cheek, boxing and fist blows. The
effect of the so-called alterations in the Memorandum/Medical Certificate questioned by
[William] does not depart from the main thrust of the testimony of the said doctor.

Also, the testimony of [Lucita] herself consistently and constantly established that [William]
inflicted repeated physical violence upon her during their marriage and that she had been
subjected to grossly abusive conduct when he constantly hurled invectives at her even in front
of their customers and employees, shouting words like, "gaga", "putang ina mo," tanga," and
"you don't know anything."

These were further corroborated by several incidents narrated by Linda Lim who lived in their
conjugal home from 1989 to 1991. She saw her sister after the December 14, 1995 incident
when she (Lucita) was fetched by the latter on the same date. She was a witness to the kind
of relationship her sister and [William] had during the three years she lived with them. She
observed that [William] has an "explosive temper, easily gets angry and becomes very
violent." She cited several instances which proved that William Ong indeed treated her wife
shabbily and despicably, in words and deeds.

xxx

That the physical violence and grossly abusive conduct were brought to bear upon [Lucita] by
[William] have been duly established by [Lucita] and her witnesses. These incidents were not
explained nor controverted by [William], except by making a general denial thereof.
Consequently, as between an affirmative assertion and a general denial, weight must be
accorded to the affirmative assertion.

The grossly abusive conduct is also apparent in the instances testified to by [Lucita] and her
sister. The injurious invectives hurled at [Lucita] and his treatment of her, in its entirety, in front
of their employees and friends, are enough to constitute grossly abusive conduct. The
aggregate behavior of [William] warrants legal separation under grossly abusive conduct. x x x
11

12
William filed a motion for reconsideration which was denied by the CA on April 26, 2002.

Page 3
Hence the present petition where William claims that:

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN DISREGARDING CLEAR

EVIDENCE THAT THE PETITION FOR LEGAL SEPARATION WAS INSTITUTED BY THE
PRIVATE RESPONDENT FOR THE SOLE PURPOSE OF REMOVING FROM PETITIONER
THE CONTROL AND OWNERSHIP OF THEIR CONJUGAL PROPERTIES AND TO
TRANSFER THE SAME TO PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S FAMILY.

II

THE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN ERROR OF LAW IN DISREGARDING CLEAR

EVIDENCE REPUDIATING PRIVATE RESPONDENT'S CLAIM OF REPEATED PHYSICAL
13
VIOLENCE AND GROSSLY ABUSIVE CONDUCT ON THE PART OF PETITIONER.

William argues that: the real motive of Lucita and her family in filing the case is to wrest control
and ownership of properties belonging to the conjugal partnership; these properties, which
include real properties in Hong Kong, Metro Manila, Baguio and Dagupan, were acquired
during the marriage through his (William's) sole efforts; the only parties who will benefit from a
decree of legal separation are Lucita's parents and siblings while such decree would condemn
him as a violent and cruel person, a wife-beater and child abuser, and will taint his reputation,
especially among the Filipino-Chinese community; substantial facts and circumstances have
been overlooked which warrant an exception to the general rule that factual findings of the trial
court will not be disturbed on appeal; the findings of the trial court that he committed acts of
repeated physical violence against Lucita and their children were not sufficiently established;
what took place were disagreements regarding the manner of raising and disciplining the
children particularly Charleston, Lucita's favorite son; marriage being a social contract cannot
be impaired by mere verbal disagreements and the complaining party must adduce clear and
convincing evidence to justify legal separation; the CA erred in relying on the testimonies of
Lucita and her witnesses, her sister Linda Lim, and their parent's doctor, Dr. Vicente
Elinzanzo, whose testimonies are tainted with relationship and fraud; in the 20 years of their
marriage, Lucita has not complained of any cruel behavior on the part of William in relation to
their marital and family life; William expressed his willingness to receive respondent
unconditionally however, it is Lucita who abandoned the conjugal dwelling on December 14,
1995 and instituted the complaint below in order to appropriate for herself and her relatives the
conjugal properties; the Constitution provides that marriage is an inviolable social institution
and shall be protected by the State, thus the rule is the preservation of the marital union and
not its infringement; only for grounds enumerated in Art. 55 of the Family Code, which grounds
should be clearly and convincingly proven, can the courts decree a legal separation among
the spouses. 14

Respondent Lucita in her Comment, meanwhile, asserts that: the issues raised in the present
petition are factual; the findings of both lower courts rest on strong and clear evidence borne

Page 4
by the records; this Court is not a trier of facts and factual findings of the RTC when confirmed
by the CA are final and conclusive and may not be reviewed on appeal; the contention of
William that Lucita filed the case for legal separation in order to remove from William the
control and ownership of their conjugal properties and to transfer the same to Lucita's family is
absurd; Lucita will not just throw her marriage of 20 years and forego the companionship of
William and her children just to serve the interest of her family; Lucita left the conjugal home
15
because of the repeated physical violence and grossly abusive conduct of petitioner.

Petitioner filed a Reply, reasserting his claims in his petition, 16 as well as a Memorandum
where he averred for the first time that since respondent is guilty of abandonment, the petition
for legal separation should be denied following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code. 17
Petitioner argues that since respondent herself has given ground for legal separation by
abandoning the family simply because of a quarrel and refusing to return thereto unless the
conjugal properties were placed in the administration of petitioner's in-laws, no decree of legal
separation should be issued in her favor. 18
19
Respondent likewise filed a Memorandum reiterating her earlier assertions.

We resolve to deny the petition.

It is settled that questions of fact cannot be the subject of a petition for review under Rule 45 of
the Rules of Court. The rule finds more stringent application where the CA upholds the
findings of fact of the trial court. In such instance, this Court is generally bound to adopt the
20
facts as determined by the lower courts.

The only instances when this Court reviews findings of fact are:

(1) when the findings are grounded entirely on speculation, surmises or conjectures; (2) when
the inference made is manifestly mistaken, absurd or impossible; (3) when there is grave
abuse of discretion; (4) when the judgment is based on a misapprehension of facts; (5) when
the findings of facts are conflicting; (6) when in making its findings the Court of Appeals went
beyond the issues of the case, or its findings are contrary to the admissions of both the
appellant and the appellee; (7) when the findings are contrary to that of the trial court; (8)
when the findings are conclusions without citation of specific evidence on which they are
based; (9) when the facts set forth in the petition as well as in the petitioner's main and reply
briefs are not disputed by the respondent; (10) when the findings of fact are premised on the
supposed absence of evidence and contradicted by the evidence on record; and (11) when the
Court of Appeals manifestly overlooked certain relevant facts not disputed by the parties,
21
which, if properly considered, would justify a different conclusion.

As petitioner failed to show that the instant case falls under any of the exceptional
circumstances, the general rule applies.

Indeed, this Court cannot review factual findings on appeal, especially when they are borne
22

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22
out by the records or are based on substantial evidence. In this case, the findings of the
RTC were affirmed by the CA and are adequately supported by the records.

As correctly observed by the trial court, William himself admitted that there was no day that he
did not quarrel with his wife, which made his life miserable, and he blames her for being
23
negligent of her wifely duties and for not reporting to him the wrongdoings of their children.

Lucita and her sister, Linda Lim, also gave numerous accounts of the instances when William
displayed violent temper against Lucita and their children; such as: when William threw a steel
24 25
chair at Lucita; threw chairs at their children; slapped Lucita and utter insulting words at
26 27
her; use the buckle of the belt in whipping the children; pinned Lucita against the wall
with his strong arms almost strangling her, and smashed the flower vase and brick rocks and
28
moldings leaving the bedroom in disarray; shouted at Lucita and threw a directory at her, in
front of Linda and the employees of their business, because he could not find a draft letter on
29
his table; got mad at Charleston for cooking steak with vetchin prompting William to smash
the plate with steak and hit Charleston, then slapped Lucita and shouted at her "putang ina
30
mo, gago, wala kang pakialam, tarantado" when she sided with Charleston; and the
December 9 and December 14, 1995 incidents which forced Lucita to leave the conjugal
31
dwelling.

Lucita also explained that the injuries she received on December 14, 1995, were not the first.
As she related before the trial court:

q.

You stated on cross examination that the injuries you sustained on December 14, 1995 were
the most serious?

a.

Unlike before I considered December 14, 1995 the very serious because before it is only on
the arm and black eye, but on this December 14, I suffered bruises in all parts of my body, sir.
32

To these, all William and his witnesses, could offer are denials and attempts to downplay the
33
said incidents.

As between the detailed accounts given for Lucita and the general denial for William, the Court
gives more weight to those of the former. The Court also gives a great amount of
consideration to the assessment of the trial court regarding the credibility of witnesses as trial
court judges enjoy the unique opportunity of observing the deportment of witnesses on the
stand, a vantage point denied appellate tribunals. 34 Indeed, it is settled that the assessment
of the trial court of the credibility of witnesses is entitled to great respect and weight having
35

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35
had the opportunity to observe the conduct and demeanor of the witnesses while testifying.
In this case, the RTC noted that:

[William]'s denial and that of his witnesses of the imputation of physical violence committed by
him could not be given much credence by the Court. Since the office secretary Ofelia Rosal
and the family laundrywoman Rosalino Morco are dependent upon defendant for their
livelihood, their testimonies may be tainted with bias and they could not be considered as
impartial and credible witnesses. So with Kingston Ong who lives with defendant and depends
36
upon him for support.

Parenthetically, William claims that that the witnesses of Lucita are not credible because of
their relationship with her. We do not agree. Relationship alone is not reason enough to
37
discredit and label a witness's testimony as biased and unworthy of credence and a
witness' relationship to one of the parties does not automatically affect the veracity of his or
38
her testimony. Considering the detailed and straightforward testimonies given by Linda Lim
and Dr. Vicente Elinzano, bolstered by the credence accorded them by the trial court, the
Court finds that their testimonies are not tainted with bias.

William also posits that the real motive of Lucita in filing the case for legal separation is in
order for her side of the family to gain control of the conjugal properties; that Lucita was willing
to destroy his reputation by filing the legal separation case just so her parents and her siblings
could control the properties he worked hard for. The Court finds such reasoning hard to
believe. What benefit would Lucita personally gain by pushing for her parents' and siblings'
financial interests at the expense of her marriage? What is more probable is that there truly
exists a ground for legal separation, a cause so strong, that Lucita had to seek redress from
the courts. As aptly stated by the RTC,

...it would be unthinkable for her to throw away this twenty years of relationship, abandon the
comforts of her home and be separated from her children whom she loves, if there exists no
cause, which is already beyond her endurance. 39

The claim of William that a decree of legal separation would taint his reputation and label him
as a wife-beater and child-abuser also does not elicit sympathy from this Court. If there would
be such a smear on his reputation then it would not be because of Lucita's decision to seek
relief from the courts, but because he gave Lucita reason to go to court in the first place.

Also without merit is the argument of William that since Lucita has abandoned the family, a
decree of legal separation should not be granted, following Art. 56, par. (4) of the Family Code
which provides that legal separation shall be denied when both parties have given ground for
legal separation. The abandonment referred to by the Family Code is abandonment without
justifiable cause for more than one year. 40 As it was established that Lucita left William due
to his abusive conduct, such does not constitute abandonment contemplated by the said
provision.

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As a final note, we reiterate that our Constitution is committed to the policy of strengthening

the family as a basic social institution. 41 The Constitution itself however does not establish
the parameters of state protection to marriage and the family, as it remains the province of the
legislature to define all legal aspects of marriage and prescribe the strategy and the modalities
to protect it and put into operation the constitutional provisions that protect the same. 42 With
the enactment of the Family Code, this has been accomplished as it defines marriage and the
family, spells out the corresponding legal effects, imposes the limitations that affect married
and family life, as well as prescribes the grounds for declaration of nullity and those for legal
separation. 43 As Lucita has adequately proven the presence of a ground for legal separation,
the Court has no reason but to affirm the findings of the RTC and the CA, and grant her the
relief she is entitled to under the law.

WHEREFORE, the petition is DENIED for lack of merit.

Costs against petitioner.

SO ORDERED.

Panganiban, C.J., (Chairperson), Ynares-Santiago, Callejo, Sr., and Chico-Nazario, JJ.,

concur.

1
Rollo, pp. 30-44; penned by Associate Justice Delilah Vidallon-Magtolis and concurred in
by Associate Justices Teodoro P. Regino and Josefina Guevara-Salonga.
2
Rollo, p. 46.
3
See records, p. 1.
4
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds:

(1) Repeated physical violence or grossly abusive conduct directed against the petitioner, a
common child, or a child of petitioner;

xxx
5
Records, p. 2.
6
Rollo, pp. 49-51 (RTC Decision).
7
Id. at 53 (RTC Decision).
8
Rollo, p. 56.
9
Id. at 55.

Page 8
10
Id. at 40-44.
11
Rollo, pp. 40-42.
12
Id. at 46.
13
Id. at 8-9.
14
Rollo, pp. 9-24.
15
Id. at 149-152.
16
Id. at 157-169.
17
Art. 56. The petition for legal separation shall be denied on any of the following grounds:

xxx

(4) Where both parties have given ground for legal separation;

xxx

Rollo, pp. 210-236.

18
Id. at 221.
19
Id. at 188-203.
20
Mangonon v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 125041, June 30, 2006.
21
Id.
22
Potenciano v. Reynoso, 449 Phil. 396, 405-406 (2003).
23
TSN, Ong Eng Kiam, September 25, 1997, pp. 29-32.
24
TSN, Lucita Ong, June 11, 1997, p. 14.
25
Id. at 20.
26
Id. at 21.
27
Id. at 23.
28
TSN, Linda Lim, June 25, 1997, p. 5.
29
Id. at 5-6.
30

Page 9
30
Id. at 7-8.

31
TSN, Lucita Ong, May 9, 1997, pp. 9-11, 16.
32
Id. at 21.
33
See TSN, Ong Eng Kiam, September 25, 1997, pp. 11, 53; TSN, Kingston Ong, September
24, 1997, pp. 16-18.
34
Roca v. Court of Appeals, 403 Phil. 326, 333 (2001).
35
Cirelos v. Hernandez, G.R. No. 146523, June 15, 2006; Antonio v. Reyes, G.R. No.
155800, March 10, 2006, 484 SCRA 353, 364.
36
Rollo, p. 56.
37
Roca v. Court of Appeals, supra note 34 at 334.
38
Philippine Airlines, Inc. v. Court of Appeals, G.R. No. 127473, December 8, 2003, 417
SCRA 196, 207.
39
Rollo, p. 55.
40
Art. 55. A petition for legal separation may be filed on any of the following grounds

...

(10) Abandonment of petitioner by respondent without justifiable cause for more than one
year.
41
Tuason v. Court of Appeals, 326 Phil. 169, 180 (1996).
42
Antonio v. Reyes, supra note 35 at 372.
43
Id. at 372.

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