People vs.

Villagracia
G.R. No. 94471
March 1, 1993

Accused-appellants seek the reversal of the April 17, 1990 decision of the Honorable Enrico A. Lanzanas,
Presiding Judge of Branch 63 of the Regional Trial Court, Fourth Judicial Region, stationed at Calauag,
Quezon, sentencing each of them to reclusion perpetua with the accessory penalties provided for by law for
committing robbery with frustrated homicide and ". . . to jointly and severally reimburse the offended party in
the amount of P10,195.00 for the stolen properties, the sum of P8,000.00 as and for medical expenses of Alejo
Flavier plus the costs of the suit.

Facts:

On the evening of September 30, 1987, Norberto Villagracia, along with five other individuals had committed
an armed robbery at the dwelling of the spouses Alejo and Lourdes Flavier at Barangay Tan-ag, Lopez,
Quezon. Posing as members of the New People’s Army (NPA) who are in need of food, they abused the
compassion of the homeowners. The band was able to obtain Php 2,500.00 in cash, with the addition of
valuable items. The band also obtained Php 10,195.00 worth of grocery items like cans of assorted sardines,
cigarettes, and other merchandise from the store of the victims. To add insult to injury, one of the robbers had
stabbed the patriarch of the household, which produced a mortal wound that could have been the cause of his
untimely demise if not for the medical intervention that was administered by an experienced doctor.

In the case at bar, accused-appellants are assailing the credibility of the witnesses, stating that their confession
to the crime was tainted with dishonesty, as they were subjected to duress at the time of their interrogation.

Issue:

Whether or not the contention of accused-appellants against the credibility of the witnesses is meritorious?

Ruling:

No. A study of the record reveals that the State was able to overcome the constitutional presumption of
innocence by the required proof beyond reasonable doubt. The factum probandum was established by the three
eyewitnesses who positively pointed to accused-appellants as the perpetrators of the crime.

Since the testimony of the three prosecution witnesses is supported by affirmative evidence, accused-
appellants' exculpation premised on denial and alibi must inevitably crumble.

Moreover, the version of the three prosecution eyewitnesses on the attempt on the life of Alejo was reinforced
by the findings and testimony of Dr. Teodoro Serrano, the attending physician, who confirmed that the stab
wounds could have produced death.

Furthermore, there are no significant inconsistencies in Alejo's testimony. When he said he knew the armed
men by their faces, he was referring to the armed men who entered his house and not to those who stayed
outside as lookout, apart from the fact that the alleged infirmities are too petty as to impair his credibility.

Finally, it is legally inconsequential for accused-appellants to capitalize on the so-called inadmissible character
of their forced confessions since, apart from this unfounded assumption, the open court declarations of the
witnesses for the prosecution are sufficient to warrant accused-appellants' perdition. And verily, the trial court
did not consider the confessions in adjudging accused-appellants criminally culpable.

Decision:

WHEREFORE, the appeal is DISMISSED for lack of merit and the decision of the court a quo is affirmed in
toto.
PEOPLE vs. MORIAL
G.R. No. 129295
August 15, 2001

Facts:

On January 6, 1996, Paula and Albert Bandidas were killed and robbed inside their home at
Barangay Cagnituan, Maasin, Southern Leyte. A witness by the name of Gabriel Guilao
positively identified Edwin and Leonardo Morial, along with Nonelito Abinon as the ones who
are responsible for the crime. They were asked various questions by the policemen and were
invited to the police station for further investigation. They were handled by SPO4 Andres
Fernandez, and were subjected to interrogations the following day. That investigation conducted
by SPO4 Fernandez resulted into the admission by Leandro that he was one of those who
participated in the robbery with homicide. With the latter’s consent, his statements were reduced
into writing. SPO4 Fernandez then advised him of his right to remain silent and to have
a counsel, whatever will be his answer will be used as evidence in court. SPO4 Fernandez
volunteered to obtain a lawyer for the suspect, to which Leandro consented. Atty. Aguilar was
contacted by the former and he first met the latter at January 9, 1996 at about 8:00 in the
morning. After Leandro agreed to answer voluntarily knowing that the same can be used against
him as evidence in court, the investigation was conducted by SPO4 Fernandez with the presence
of the counsel. After “all the material points” were asked, Atty. Aguilar asked the investigator if
he can leave due to very important engagement. The latter agreed to the lawyer’s request. But
before leaving, Atty. Aguilar asked Leonardo if he was willing to answer questions in his
absence, the latter agreed. During and despite Atty. Aguilar’s absence, SPO4 Fernandez
continued with the investigation and propounded several more questions to Leonardo, which the
latter answered.

Issue:

Whether or not Leonardo Morial’s right to counsel was waived during the investigation.

Ruling:

Leonardo was effectively deprived of his right to counsel during the custodial investigation;
therefore his quasi-judicial confession is inadmissible in evidence against him and his other co-
accused. The Court stressed out that an accused under custodial interrogation must continuously
have a counsel assisting him from the very start thereof. SPO4 Fernandez cannot justify that
Atty. Aguilar only left after Leonardo had admitted that he and his companions committed the
crime. Neither can Atty. Aguilar rationalize that he only left after Leonardo had admitted the
“material points”, referring to the participation of the three accused to the crime. Both
are invalid since Section 2 of R.A. No. 7438 requires that “any person arrested, detained or under
custodial investigation shall at all times be assisted by counsel.” Furthermore, the last paragraph
of Section 3 states that “in the absence of any lawyer, no custodial investigation shall be
conducted.”

Even granted that Leonardo consented Atty. Aguilar’s departure during the investigation and
to answer questions during the lawyer’s absence, such consent was an invalid waiver of his right
to counsel and his right to remain silent. Under Section 12, Article III of the Constitution, these
rights cannot be waived unless the same is made in writing and in the presence of the counsel. In
the case at bar, no such written and counseled waiver of these rights was presented as evidence.
David vs. Court of Appeals
G.R. Nos. 111168-69
June 17, 1998

This is a petition for review on certiorari of the decision of the Court of Appeals. Petitioner
Joaquin E. David was charged, in two separate informations, with homicide and frustrated
homicide for fatal shooting of Noel Nora and the serious wounding of the latter's brother,
Narciso Nora, Jr., on March 28, 1981, in Malabon, Metro Manila.

Facts:

On the night of March 28, 1981, petitioner Joaquin David had a verbal altercation with the
brothers Noel and Narciso Nora, along with other individuals which resulted into a fight. David
claimed to have been stabbed by one of the assailants, and could have sustained mortal wounds if
he was not able to dodge the deadly blows of his attackers. After managing to break loose from
their grips, David hurriedly went inside their house to get his father’s government-issued pistol.
He went back outside to get even with the Nora brothers. Upon seeing them outside his house,
petitioner fired successive shots towards Noel and company, which caused his untimely demise.
Narciso was hit in the ankle while Arturo Nora was nearly hit in the groin. After the shooting
incident, David went inside the house and immediately gave the pistol to his mother.

In the case at bar, petitioner claimed self-defense. He also argued that the Court of Appeals erred
in its decision, in which it declares his action not as an act of self-defense, but as retaliation to
the Nora brothers, for the fact that unlawful aggression had already ceased at the time. The claim
of self-defense was denied by the court. However, the court pointed out one circumstance not
raised by the defense but evident from the record of this case—minority. At the hearing on
November 11, 1987, petitioner’s mother stated that he was 16 or 17 years old when the shooting
incident happened.

Issue:

Whether or not the mitigating circumstance of minority is applicable in the case at bar.

Ruling:

Yes, herein petitioner is entitled to a privileged mitigating circumstance of minority.

The court said, “It is clear that on March 28, 1981, when the crime was committed, he (the
petitioner) was only 17 years old.”

According to the court, if the accused alleges minority and the prosecution do not disprove his
claim by contrary evidence, such allegation can be accepted as a fact. And that any doubt in
respect of the accused is resolved in his favor.
Pomoy vs. People

G.R. No. 150647

Before us is a Petition for Review1 under Rule 45 of the Rules of Court, seeking to set aside the
February 28, 2001 Decision2 and the October 30, 2001 Resolution3 of the Court of Appeals (CA)
in CA–GR CR No. 18759. The CA affirmed, with modifications, the March 8, 1995
judgment4 of the Regional Trial Court (RTC)5 of Iloilo City (Branch 25) in Criminal Case No.
36921, finding Roweno Pomoy guilty of the crime of homicide.

Facts:

On the morning of January 4, 1990, some policemen arrived at the Concepcion College in
Concepcion, Iloilo to arrest Mr. Tomas Balboa, a teacher of the said college, for his alleged
involvement in a robbery which took place in the municipality in December 1989. He was taken
to the headquarters of the now-defunct 321st Philippine Constabulary Company at Camp
Jalandoni, Sara, Iloilo, for further interrogation. At 2pm that day, petitioner Sgt. Roweno Pomoy
had accompanied Balboa to the interrogation room. He had with him a 45. Caliber pistol, tucked
in a holster which was hanging by the side of his belt. After a few minutes, two consecutive
gunshots were heard from inside the room in which the two were situated. It appears that they
had a struggle for the possession of the sidearm. Inside the room, Balboa was seen lying in a pool
of his own blood. He died as a result of the shots to two separate vital parts of his body.

Petitioner claimed self-defense. He argued that it was an accident. However, the Court of
Appeals ruled against petitioner, stating that the shooting was done by petitioner with intent to
kill Balboa. It stated that the location of the wounds found on the body of the deceased did not
support the assertion of petitioner that there had been a grappling fir the gun. Thus, there is no
unlawful aggression on the part of the deceased to justify self-defense.

Issue:

Whether or not the shooting of Tomas Balboa was the result of accident in the fulfillment of
petitioner’s duty.

Ruling:

Yes. It was in the lawful performance of his duty as a law enforcer that petitioner tried to defend
his possession of the weapon when the victim suddenly tried to remove it from his holster. Said
weapon could have been used by the deceased to kill, main or intimidate someone, including that
of the petitioner.

Decision:

Petition is GRANTED and the assailed decision is REVERSED. Petitioner is ACQUITTED.

By petition for review on certiorari, Virgilio Talampas y Matic (Talampas) seeks the review of
the affirmance of his conviction for homicide (for the killing of the late Ernesto Matic y
Masinloc) by the Court of Appeals (CA) through its decision promulgated on August 16, 2007.

Facts:

On the evening of July 5, 1995, witness Jose Sevillo saw the accused who is riding a bicycle in
front of his house in Malabanan, Binan, Laguna. The brothers Ernesto and Eduardo Matic were
outside the witness’ house, repairing his tricycle when suddenly, accused Talampas drew out his
revolver and started firing towards Eduardo. After being hit, Eduardo hid behind Ernesto, who
was hit in the back of his head, which caused his instantaneous death. Thereafter, the appellant
ran away, while Jose and his neighbors brought the victim to the hospital, but to no avail.

On his part, Talampas interposed self-defense and accident. He asserted that Eduardo is his main
target, and not the deceased. He argued that during that time, Eduardo was with Ernesto. The
former had hit him with a monkey wrench; that while they hap grappled, he noticed that Eduardo
had with him a revolver, and that Talampas had struggled to take possession of the firearm which
accidentally fired in the process, hitting Ernesto’s head and Eduardo thigh as a result.

On June 22, 2004, the RTC, giving credence to the testimony of eyewitness Jose Sevilla, found
Talampas guilty beyond reasonable doubt of homicide.

Issue:
Whether or not the lower courts both erred in rejecting his claim of self-defense and accident?

Ruling:

No. In the nature of self-defense, the protagonists should be the accused and the victim. The
established circumstances indicated that such did not happen here, for it was Talampas who had
initiated the attack only against Eduardo; and that Ernesto had not been at any time a target of
Talampas’ attack, he having only happened to be present at the scene of the attack. In reality,
neither Eduardo nor Ernesto had committed any unlawful aggression against Talampas. Thus,
Talampas was not repelling any unlawful aggression from the victim (Ernesto), thereby
rendering his plea of self-defense unwarranted.

Secondly, Talampas could not relieve himself of criminal liability by invoking accident as a
defense. Article 12(4) of the Revised Penal Code,10 the legal provision pertinent to accident,
contemplates a situation where a person is in fact in the act of doing something legal, exercising
due care, diligence and prudence, but in the process produces harm or injury to someone or to
something not in the least in the mind of the actor – an accidental result flowing out of a legal
act.

And, thirdly, the fact that the target of Talampas’ assault was Eduardo, not Ernesto, did not
excuse his hitting and killing of Ernesto. The fatal hitting of Ernesto was the natural and direct
consequence of Talampas’ felonious deadly assault against Eduardo. Talampas’ poor aim
amounted to aberratio ictus, or mistake in the blow, a circumstance that neither exempted him
from criminal responsibility nor mitigated his criminal liability.

Decision:

WHEREFORE, the Court AFFIRMS the decision promulgated on August 16, 2007 finding
VIRGILIO TALAMPAS y MATIC guilty beyond reasonable doubt of the crime of homicide,
and IMPOSES the indeterminate sentence of 10 years of prision mayor, as minimum, to 14
years, eight months, and one day of reclusion temporal, as maximum.