Lakas NG Manggagawang Makabayan vs. Marcelo Enterprises

01/02/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 118

422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan vs. Marcelo
Enterprises
*
No. L-38258. November 19, 1982.

LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWANG MAKABAYAN

(LAKAS), petitioner, vs. MARCELO ENTERPRISES and
MARCELO TIRE & RUBBER CORP., MARCELO
RUBBER AND LATEX PRODUCTS, MARCELO STEEL
CORPORATION, MARCELO CHEMICAL & PIGMENT
CORP., POLARIS MARKETING CORPORATION and
THE COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS,
respondents.
*
No. L-38260. November 19, 1982.
MARCELO TIRE & RUBBER CORPORATION,

MARCELO RUBBER & LATEX PRODUCTS, INC.,
MARCELO STEEL CORPORATION, POLARIS
MARKETING CORPORATION, MARCELO CHEMICAL
AND PIGMENT CORP., MARCELO ENTERPRISES,
under which name or style they are also known,
petitioners, vs. LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWANG
MAKABAYAN (LAKAS) AND THE HONORABLE
COURT OF INDUSTRIAL RELATIONS, respondents.
Labor Law; There is no evidence that the management of

Marcelo group of companies was guilty of ULP in asking the
returning strikers to fill up forms on when they are available for
work.—Hence, anent the second issue of whether or not the com-
________________
* SECOND DIVISION.
423
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VOL. 118, NOVEMBER 19, 1982 423
Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan vs. Marcelo Enterprises
plaint for unfair labor practice can be sustained, this Court rules
in favor of the respondent Marcelo Companies and consequently,
the appealed Decision is reversed. This reversal is inevitable after
this Court has pored through the voluminuous records of the case
as well as after applying the established jurisprudence and the
law on the matters raised.We are not unmindful of the plight of
the employees in this case but We consider it oppressive to grant
their petition in G.R.No.L-38258, for not only is there no evidence
which shows that the respondent Marcelo Companies were
seeking for an opportunity to discharge these employees for union
activities, or to discriminate against them because of such
activities, but there is affirmative evidence to establish the
contrary conclusion.
Same; Management’s suggestion that union file necessary

complaint in court in view of fact that there are several unions
claiming to represent employees does not constitute failure or
refusal to bargain in good faith to said union’s demands.—
Contrary to the pretensions of complainant LAKAS, the
respondent Marcelo Companies did not ignore the demand for
collective bargaining contained in its letter of June 20, 1967.
Neither did the companies refuse to bargain at all. What it did
was to apprise LAKAS of the existing conflicting demands for
recognition as the bargaining representative in the appropriate
units involved, and suggested the settlement of the issue by
means of the filing of a petition for certification election before the
Court of Industrial Relations. This was not only the legally
approved procedure but was dictated by the fact that there was
indeed a legitimate representation issue. PSSLU, with whom the
existing CB As were entered into, was demanding of respondent
companies to collectively bargain with it; so was Paulino Lazaro of
MUEWA, J.C. Espinas & Associates for MACATIFU and the
MFWU, and the complainant LAKAS for MULU which we
understand is the aggrupation of MACATIFU, MFWU and
UNWU. On top of all of these, Jose Roque of UNWU
disauthorized the PSSLU from representing his union; and
similarly, Augusto Carreon of MACATIFU itself informed
management as late as July 11, 1967 or after the demand of
LAKAS that no group representing his Union “is not authorized
and should not be entertained.”
Same; Where there exists a legitimate issue as to which of

several unions is the legitimate representative of employees, it is
ULP for one of the unions to stage a strike and demand that
employer sit down with it for collective bargaining.—The clear

facts of the case as hereinbefore restated indisputably show that a
legitimate
424
representation issue confronted the respondent Marcelo

Companies. In the face of these facts and in conformity with the
existing jurisprudence, We hold that there existed no duty to
bargain collectively with the complainant LAKAS on the part of
said companies. And proceeding from this basis, it follows that all
acts instigated by complainant LAKAS such as the filing of the
Notice of Strike on June 13, 1967 (although later withdrawn) and
the two strikes of September 4, 1967 and November 7, 1967 were
calculated, designed and intended to compel the respondent
Marcelo Companies to recognize or bargain with it
notwithstanding that it was an uncertified union, or in the case of
respondent Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation, to bargain with
it despite the fact that the MUEWA of Paulino Lazaro was
already certified as the sole bargaining agent in said respondent
company. These concerted activities executed and carried into
effect at the instigation and motivation of LAKAS are all illegal
and violative of the employer’s basic right to bargain collectively
only with the representative supported by the majority of its
employees in each of the bargaining units. This Court is not
unaware of the present predicament of the employees involved
but much as We sympathize with those who have been misled and
so lost then-jobs through hasty, ill-advised and precipitate moves,
We rule that the facts neither substantiate nor support the
finding that the respondent Marcelo Companies are guilty of
unfair labor practice.
Same; Employer not guilty of bad faith where it not with

union’s officers and offered suggestions on how to resolve their dif-
ferences.—It is also evident from the records that the charge of
bargaining in bad faith imputed to the respondent companies, is
hardly credible. In fact, such charge is valid as only against the
complainant LAKAS. The parties had a total of five (5)
conferences for purposes of collective bargaining. It is worth
considering that the first strike of September 4, 1967 was staged
less than a week after the fourth CBA conference and without any
benefit of any previous strike notice. In this connection, it must be
stated that the notice of strike filed on June 13, 1967 could not
have been the strike notice for the first strike because it was
already withdrawn on July 14, 1967. Thus, from these stated facts
can be seen that the first strike was held while the parties were in
the process of negotiating. Nor can it be sustained that the
respondent Marcelo Companies bargained in bad faith since there
were proposals offered by them, but the complainant LAKAS
stood pat on its position that all of their economic demands should
be met and that all of these demands should be granted in all of
the respondent Marcelo Companies. The companies’ refusal to ac-
425
VOL. 118, NOVEMBER 19, 1982 425
cede to the demands of LAKAS appears to be justified since there

is no showing that these companies were in the same state of
financial and economic affairs. There is reason to believe that the
first strike was staged only for the purpose of compelling the
respondent Marcelo Companies to accede to the inflexible
demands of the complainant LAKAS. The records further
establish that after the resumption of normal operations following
the first strike and the consequent Return-to-work Agreement,
the striking unions led by complainant LAKAS and the
management of the respondent Marcelo Companies resumed their
bargaining negotiations. And that on October 13, 1967,
complainant LAKAS sent the final drafts of the collective
bargaining proposals for MFWU and UNWU. The second strike of
November 7, 1967 was then staged immediately after which
strike, as before, was again lacking of a strike notice. All of these
facts show that it was complainant LAKAS, and not the
respondent Marcelo Companies, which refused to negotiate in the
pending collective bargaining process. All that the facts show is
that the bargaining position of complainant LAKAS was inflexible
and that it was in tine with this uncompromising attitude that
the strikes were declared, significantly after notice that
management did not or could not meet all of their 17-points
demand.
Same; Employer may be justified in requiring a reasonable

scheduling of working hours of returning striking employees and
inquiring into their time availabilities.—But We are more
impressed and are persuaded to accept as true the contention of
the respondent Marcelo Companies that the aforestated
requirement was only for purposes of proper scheduling of the
start of work for each returning strikers. It must be noted that as
a consequence of the two strikes which were both attended by

widespread acts of violence and vandalism, the businesses of the
respondent companies were completely paralyzed. It would hardly
be justiciable to demand of the respondent companies to readmit
all the returning workers in one big force or as each demanded
readmission. There were machines that were not in operating
condition because of long disuse during the strikes. Some of the
machines needed more than one worker to operate them so that in
the absence of the needed team of workers, the start of work by
one without his teammates would necessarily be useless, and the
company would be paying for his time spent doing no work.
Finally, We take judicial cognizance of the fact that companies
whose businesses were completely paralyzed by major strikes
cannot resume operations at once and in the same state or force
as before the strikes.
426
Same; Same.—But what strikes Us most in lending credence

to respondents’ allegation that Exhibit “49” was not meant to
screen the strikers, is the fact that all of the returning strikers
who filled up the form were scheduled for work and consequently
started with their jobs.It is only those strikers who refused or
failed to fill-up the required form, like the herein complaining
employees, who were not scheduled for work and consequently
have not been re-employed by the respondent Marcelo Companies.
Even if there was a sincere belief on their part that the
requirement of Exhibit “49” was a ruse at “screening” them, this
fear would have been dispelled upon notice of the fact that each
and all of their co-strikers who filled up the required form were in
fact scheduled for work and started to work. The stoppage of their
work was not, therefore, the direct consequence of the respondent
companies’ complained act. Hence, their economic loss should not
be shifted to the employer.
Same; Right to engage in concerted activities is not an

absolute one.—It was never the state policy nor Our judicial
pronouncement that the employees’ rights to self-organization
and to engage in concerted activities for mutual aid and
protection, are absolute or be upheld under all circumstances.
Same; Action; A labor union cannot bring an action on behalf

of employees who are members of another union even if said
employees signed the complaint.—Firstly, LAKAS cannot bring

any action for and in behalf of the employees who were members
of MUEWA because, as intimated earlier in this Decision, the said
local union was never an affiliate of LAKAS. What appears clearly
from the records is that it was Augusto Carreon and his followers
who joined LAKAS, but then Augusto Carreon was not the
recognized president of MUEWA and neither he nor his followers
can claim any legitimate representation of MUEWA. Apparently,
it is this split faction of MUEWA, headed by Augusto Carreon,
who is being sought to be represented by LAKAS. However, it
cannot do so because the members constituting this split faction of
MUEWA were still members of MUEWA which was on its own
right a duly registered labor union. Hence, any suit to be brought
for and in behalf of them can be made only by MUEWA, and not
LAKAS. It appearing then that Augusto Carreon and his cohorts
did not disaffiliate from MUEWA nor signed any individual
affiliation with LAKAS, LAKAS bears no legal interest in
representing MUEWA or any of its members.
427
VOL. 118, NOVEMBER 10, 198 427
Same; Same.—Nor will the lower court’s opinion be availing

with respect to the complaining employees belonging to UNWU
and MFWU. Although it is true, as alleged by LAKAS, that when
it filed the charge on December 26, 1967, the officers of the
movant unions were not yet then the officers thereof,
nevertheless, the moment MFWU and UNWU separated from and
disaffiliated with LAKAS to again exercise its rights as
independent local unions, registered before as such, they are no
longer affiliates of LAKAS, as what transpired here. Naturally,
there would no longer be any reason or occasion for LAKAS to
continue representing them. Notable is the fact that the members
purportedly represented by LAKAS constitute the mere minority
of the movant unions, as may be inferred from the allegations of
the movant unions as well as the counter-allegations of LAKAS
filed below. As such, they cannot prevail or dictate upon the will
of the greater majority of the unions to which they still belong, it
appearing that they never disaffiliated from their unions; or
stated in another way, they are bound by the action of the greater
majority.
Same; Same; Where a union brought suit in behalf of

employees it was not authorized to represent, the proper remedy is
to drop the union as party to the action and place the names of the
employees instead.—This is not to say that the complaining
employees were without any venue for redress. Under the
aforestated considerations, the respondent court should have
directed the amendment of the complaint by dropping LAKAS as
the complainant and allowing the suit to be further prosecuted in
the individual names of those who had grievances. A class suit
under Rule 3, Section 12 of the Rules of Court is authorized and
should suffice for the purpose.
Same; Same; Appeals; Supreme Court may cure defect of

inclusion/non-inclusion of proper parties even on appeal—In
fairness to the complaining employees, however, We treated their
Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision subject of appeal as
curing the defect of the complaint as the said motion expressly
manifested their collective desire to pursue the complaint for and
in their own behalves and disauthorizing LAKAS’ counsel from
further representing them. And We have also treated their
petition before Us in the same manner, disregarding the fact that
LAKAS remained the petitioning party, as it appears from the
verification that the petition in L-38258 was for and in behalf of
the complaining employees. The merits of their petition, however,
fall short of substantiating the charge of unfair labor practice
against the respondent Marcelo Companies. On the other hand,
the appeal of the Marcelo Companies in L-38260 must be upheld
and sustained.
428

Enterprises
SEPARATE APPEALS by certiorari from the decision of

the Court of Industrial Relations.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
GUERRERO, J.:
Separate appeals by certiorari from the Decision of the

Court of Industrial Relations (Manila) dated July 20, 1973,
as well as the Resolution of the court en banc dated
January 24, 1974 denying the reconsideration thereof
rendered in ULP Case No. 4951 entitled, “Lakas ng
Manggagawang Makabayan, Petitioner, versus
Marcelo Enterprises and Marcelo Tire and Rubber
Corporation, Marcelo Rubber and Latex Products,
Marcelo Steel Corporation, Polaris Marketing

Corporation, and Marcelo Chemical and Pigment
Corporation, Respondents.”
The antecedent facts as found by the respondent Court
of Industrial Relations embodied in the appealed Decision
are correct, supported as they are by the evidence on
record. Nevertheless, We find it necessary to make a re-
statement of the facts that are integrated and inter-related,
drawn from the voluminuous records of these cases which
are herein jointly decided, since it would only be from a
statement of all the relevant facts of the cases made in all
fullness, collectively and comprehensively, can the intricate
issues posed in these appeals be completely and judiciously
resolved.
It appears that prior to May 23, 1967, the date which
may be stated as the start of the labor dispute between
Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan (hereinafter
referred to as complainant LAKAS) and the management
of the Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation, Marcelo
Rubber and Latex Products, Inc., Polaris Marketing
Corporation, Marcelo Chemical and Pigment Corporation,
and the Marcelo Steel Corporation (Nail Plan)
(hereinafter referred to as respondent Marcelo
Companies) the Marcelo Companies had existing
collective bargaining agreements (CBAs) with the local
unions then existing within the appropriate bargaining
units, viz: (1) the respondent Marcelo Tire and Rubber
Corporation, with the Marcelo Camelback Tire and Foam
Union (MACATIFU); (2) the
429
VOL. 118, NOVEMBER 19. 1982 429

Enterprises
respondent Marcelo Rubber and Latex Products, Inc., with

the Marcelo Free Workers Union (MFWU); and (3) the
respondent Marcelo Steel Corporation with the United
Nail Workers Union (UNWU). These existing CBAs were
entered into by and between the parties while the
aforestated local unions were then affiliated with a
national federation, the Philippine Social Security Labor
Union (PSSLU).
It is well to note from the records that when the
aforestated CBAs of the said local unions were nearing
their respective expiration dates (March 15, 1967) for
MACATIFU and UNWU, and June 5, 1967 for MFWU), the
general situation within the ranks of labor was far from

united. The MACATIFU in respondent Marcelo Tire and
Rubber Corporation, then headed by Augusto Carreon, did
not enjoy the undivided support of all the workers of the
respondent corporation, as there existed a rival union, the
Marcelo United Employees and Workers Association
(MUEWA) whose president was then Paulino Lazaro. As
events would later develop, the members of the
MACATIFU of Augusto Carreon joined the MUEWA of
Paulino Lazaro, after the latter filed a petition for direct
certification which was granted by the industrial court’s
Order of July 5, 1967 recognizing and certifying MUEWA
as the sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all
the regular workers of the respondent corporation. The
union rivalry between MACATIFU and MUEWA did not,
however, end with the Order of July 5, 1967, but more than
ever developed into a more pressing problem of union
leadership because Augusto Carreon also claimed to be the
president of the MUEWA by virtue of the affiliation of his
MACATIFU members with MUEWA. The records also
reveal that even the ranks of MFWU in respondent
Marcelo Rubber and Latex Products, Inc. was divided
between those supporting Ceferino Ramos and Cornelio
Dizon who both claimed the presidency in said union. Only
the UNWU in respondent Marcelo Steel Corporation was
then enjoying relative peace as Jose Roque was solely
recognized as the union’s president. The events that
followed are hereinafter stated in chronological order for a
clearer understanding of the present situation.
On March 14, 1967, the management of respondent
Marcelo
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Steel Corporation received a letter requesting the

negotiation of a new CBA together with a draft thereof,
from the PSSLU president, Antonio Diaz, for and in behalf
of UNWU whose CBA was to expire the following day.
Similar letters and proposals were, likewise, sent to the
management of respondent Marcelo Tire and Rubber
Corporation for and in behalf of MACATIFU, and to
respondent Marcelo Rubber and Latex Products for and in
behalf of MFWU, whose respective CBAs were both to
expire on June 5, 1967.
However, on that very same day of March 14, 1967, the

management of respondent Marcelo Tire and Rubber
Corporation received a letter from the UNWU president,
Jose Roque, disauthorizing the PSSLU from representing
his union.
Then, on April 14, 1967, Paulino Lazaro of MUEWA
requested negotiation of a new CBA with respondent
Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation, submitting
therewith his union’s own proposals.
Again, on May 3, 1967, the management of respondents
Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation and Marcelo
Rubber and Latex Products, Inc., received another letter
requesting negotiation of new CBAs also for and in behalf
of the MACATIFU and the MFWU from J.C. Espinas &
Associates.
Finally, on May 23, 1967, the management of all the
respondent Marcelo Companies received a letter from
Prudencio Jalandoni, the alleged president of the
complainant LAKAS. In this letter of May 23, 1967, the
complainant LAKAS informed management of the
affiliation of the Marcelo United Labor Union (MULU)
with it. Included therein was a 17-points demand for
purposes of the requested collective bargaining with
management.
Confronted with a problem of whom to recognize as the
bargaining representative of all its workers, the
management of all the respondent Marcelo Companies
understandably dealt with the problem in this wise, viz: (1)
it asked proof of authority to represent the MFWU and the
MACATIFU from J.C. Espinas & Associates; and (2) in a
letter dated May 25, 1967, it apprised PSSLU, Paulino
Lazaro of MUEWA and complainant LAKAS of the fact of
the existing conflicting demands
431
VOL. 118, NOVEMBER 19, 1982 431

Enterprises
for recognition as the bargaining representative in the

appropriate units involved, consequently suggesting to all
to settle the question by filing a petition for certification
election before the Court of Industrial Relations, with an
assurance that the management will abide by whatever
orders the industrial court may issue thereon.
PSSLU demurred to management’s stand and informed
them of its intention to file an unfair labor practice case
because of management’s refusal to bargain with it,

pointedly stating that it was with the PSSLU that the
existing CBAs were entered into. Again, as events later
developed, on or about the middle of August 1981, PSSLU
filed a Notice of Strike which became the subject of
conciliation with the respondent companies. In the case of
MUEWA, Paulino Lazaro threatened that his union will
declare a strike against respondent Marcelo Tire and
Rubber Corporation. On the other hand, complainant
LAKAS for MULU filed on June 13, 1967 before the
Bureau of Labor Relations a Notice of Strike against all the
respondent Marcelo Companies, alleging as reasons
therefor harassment of union officers and members due to
union affiliation and refusal to bargain. This aforestated
Notice of Strike was, however, withdrawn on July 14, 1967.
In the meantime, as stated earlier in this Decision, the
MUEWA filed a petition for direct certification before the
industrial court. There being no other union or interested
person appearing before the court except the MUEWA, and
finding that MUEWA represented more than the majority
of the workers in respondent Marcelo Tire and Rubber
Corporation, the court granted the petition and by Order of
July 5, 1967, certified MUEWA of Paulino Lazaro as the
sole and exclusive bargaining representative of all the
regular workers in said respondent.
On July 11, 1967, Augusto Carreon of MACATIFU wrote
the management of respondent Marcelo Tire and Rubber
Corporation expressly stating that no one was yet
authorized to submit proposals for and in behalf of the
union for the renewal of its CBA, adding that “(a)ny group
representing our Union is not authorized and should not be
entertained.”
432

Enterprises
On July 14, 1967, as earlier stated, the Notice of Strike

filed by complainant LAKAS was withdrawn pursuant to a
Memorandum Agreement signed on the same day by
management and LAKAS.
Thereafter, or on July 20, 1967, letters of proposal for
collective bargaining were sent by Prudencio Jalandoni of
LAKAS to all the respondent Marcelo companies. In
answer thereto, management wrote two (2) letters, both
dated July 24, 1967, addressed to Jalandoni, expressing
their conformity to sit down in conference on the points to

be negotiated as soon as LAKAS can present evidence of
authority to represent the employees of respondent
corporations in said conference. The records disclose that it
was in the atmosphere of constant reservation on the part
of management as to the question of representation
recognition that complainant LAKAS and management sat
down for CBA negotiations.
The first conference was held on August 14, 1967,
followed by one on August 16, 1967 whereby management,
in formal reply to union’s economic demands, stated its
willingness to give pay adjustments and suggested renewal
of other provisions of the old CBAs. A third conference was
set although no one from LAKAS or the local unions
appeared. On August 29, 1967, the fourth conference was
held where, from a letter dated August 30, 1967 from Jose
Delfin of Management to Jose B. Roque of UNWU, can be
inferred that in the conference of August 29, 1967, the
management with respect to respondent Marcelo Steel
Corporation, agreed to give pay adjustments from P0.15 to
P0.25 to meritorious cases only, and to increase its
contribution to the retirement fund from 1-112%to 3%
provided the employees’ contribution will be increased from
1% to 2%. Management likewise suggested the renewal of
the other provisions of the existing CBA. Management’s
offers were not accepted by complainant LAKAS who
insisted on the grant of all its economic demands and in all
of the Marcelo Companies.
As it would later appear during the trial of the ULP case
below, and as found as a fact by the respondent court, only
the economic proposals of complainant LAKAS were the
matters taken up in all these CBA conferences.
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VOL. 118, NOVEMBER 19, 1982 433

Enterprises
Less than a week after the fourth CBA conference, or on

September 4, 1967, the complainant LAKAS declared a
strike against all the respondent Marcelo Companies. Acts
of violence and vandalism attended the picketing. Ingress
and egress at the respondents’ premises were successfully
blocked. One worker, Plaridel Tiangco, was manhandled by
the strikers and was hospitalized. Windows of the
Chemical Plant were badly damaged. As a consequence, ten
(10) strikers were later charged before the Municipal Court
of Malabon, Rizal, four of whom were convicted while the

others were at large.
On September 13, 1967, the respondent Marcelo
Companies obtained a writ of preliminary injunction from
the Court of First Instance of Rizal enjoining the strikers
from preventing the ingress and egress at the respondents’
premises. The following day, a “Return to Work
Agreement” (Exhibit “A”) was executed by and among the
management, represented by Jose P. Marcelo and Jose A.
Delfin, and the local unions, together with complainant
LAKAS, represented by Prudencio Jalandoni for LAKAS,
Jose B. Roque for UNWU, Cornelio Dizon for MFWU and
Augusto Carreon for MUEWA, the representations of the
latter two, however, being expressly subjected by
management to non-recognition. Aside from providing for
the immediate lifting of the picket lines, the agreement,
more pertinently provides, to wit,
“4. The management agrees to accept all employees who struck

without discrimination or harassment consistent with an orderly
operation of its various plants, provided it is understood that
management has not waived and shall continue to exercise freely
its rights and prerogatives to punish, discipline and dismiss its
employees in accordance with law and existing rules and
regulations that cases filed in court will be allowed to take their
normal course.”
By virtue of this agreement, the respondent Marcelo

Companies resumed operations and the strikers went back
to work. As found by the respondent court, all strikers were
admitted back to work, except four (4) namely, Wilfredo
Jarquio, Leonardo Sakdalan, Jesus Lim and Arlington
Glodeviza, who chose not to report for work because of the
criminal charges filed against them before the municipal
court of Malabon
434

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and because of the administrative investigation conducted

by management in connection with the acts of violence and
vandalism committed during the September 4 strike.
Together with Jesus Lim, three other strikers who reported
for work and were admitted, namely, Jose Roque, Alfredo
Cabel and Ramon Bataycan, were convicted in said

criminal case.
After the resumption of normal business, the
management of the respondent Marcelo Companies, the
complainant LAKAS together with the local unions
resumed their bargaining negotiations subject to the
conditions earlier mentioned. On October 4, 1967, the
parties met and discussed the bargaining unit to be covered
by the CBA in case one is entered into, union shop
arrangement, check-off, waiver of the employer of the
notice requirement in case of employees’ separation,
separation pay in cash equivalent to 12-days pay for every
year of service, retirement plan, and one or two years
duration of the CBA. It was also agreed in that meeting not
to negotiate with respect to respondent Marcelo Tire and
Rubber Corpora-don inasmuch as a CBA had already been
entered into by management with the MUEWA of Paulino
Lazaro, the recently certified union in said respondent.
Finally, on October 13, 1967, the negotiations reached
its final stage when the management of respondents
Marcelo Rubber and Latex Products, Inc. and Marcelo
Steel Corporation gave the complainant LAKAS a copy of
management’s drafts of the collective bargaining proposals
for MFWU and UNWU, respectively.
Unexpectedly and without filing a notice of strike,
complainant LAKAS declared another strike against the
respondent Marcelo Companies on November 7, 1967,
resulting in the complete paralyzation of the business of
said respondents. Because of this second strike, conciliation
conferences were again set by the Conciliation Service
Division of the Department of Labor on November 8,
November 23, and December 4, 1967. On the last
aforementioned date, however, neither complainant
LAKAS nor the local unions appeared.
Instead, on December 13, 1967, Prudencio Jalandoni of
complainant LAKAS, in behalf of the striking unions,
coursed a letter (Exhibit “B”) to Jose P. Marcelo of
management advis-
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VOL. 118, NOVEMBER 19, 1982 435

Enterprises
ing that, “on Monday, December 18, 1967, at 7:00 o’clock in

the morning, all your striking workers and employees will
return to work under the same terms and conditions of
employrnent before the strike.” The letter was attested to

by Cornelio Dizon for MFWU, Jose Roque for UNWU and
Augusto Carreon for MUEWA. On December 15, 1967, the
Bureau of Labor Relations was informed by the
complainant LAKAS who requested for the Bureau’s
representative to witness the return of the strikers to their
jobs.
The records reveal that in the meantime, prior to
December 13, 1967, some of the strikers started going back
to work and were admitted; and that as early as December
4, 1967, the management started posting notices at the
gates of the respective premises of the respondents for
strikers to return back to work. Similar notices were also
posted on December 18 and December 27, 1967
Upon their return, the reporting strikers were requested
to fill up a certain form (Exhibit “49”) wherein they were to
indicate the date of their availability for work in order that
they may be scheduled. According to the respondent
Marcelo Companies, this requirement was asked of the
strikers for legitimate business reasons within
management prerogative. Several of the strikers filled up
the required form and were accordingly scheduled for work.
The remaining others, led and supported by complainant
LAKAS, refused and insisted that they be all admitted
back to work without complying with the aforestated
requirement, alleging that the same constituted a
“screening” of the striking workers. As matters stood,
Management refused to forego the requirement; on the
other hand, the remaining strikers demanded to be
readmitted without filing up the form for scheduling.
These then constitute the factual background when the
complainant LAKAS, represented by its counsel, Atty.
Benjamin C. Pineda, on December 26, 1967, filed before the
respondent court a charge for unfair labor practice against
the respondent. Marcelo Companies, alleging non-
readmission of the striking members of the three (3)
affiliated local unions despite the unconditional offer to
return to work after the strike of November 7, 1967. Based
on the allegations of the foregoing
436

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charge and after a preliminary investigation conducted by

the acting Prosecutor of said respondent court, the acting
Chief Prosecutor, Atty. Antonio Tria Tirona, filed on

February 12, 1968 the instant complaint under authority of
Section 5(b) of Republic Act 875, otherwise known as the
Industrial Peace Act.
The Complaint below alleges, among others, to wit:
“1. That complainant is a legitimate labor organization, with its

affiliates, namely: Marcelo Free Workers Union, United Nail
Workers Union, and Marcelo United Employees Unions, whose
members listed in Annexes “A”, “B”, and “C” of this complaint are
considered employees of respondent within the meaning of the
Act;
“2. x x x
xxx
xxx
“3. That individual complainants listed in Annexes “ A ”, “B “,
and “C” of this complaint are members of the Marcelo United
Employees and Workers Association, Marcelo Free Workers
Union, and United Nail Workers Union, respectively; that the
members of the Marcelo United Employees and Workers Union
are workers of respondent Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation;
that the members of the Marcelo Free Workers Union compose
the workers of the Marcelo Rubber and Latex Products, Polaris
Marketing Corporation, and the members of the United Nail
Workers Union compose the workers of the Marcelo Steel
Corporation (Nail Plant);
“4. That each of the aforesaid local unions, before their
affiliation with the complainant union LAKAS, had a collective
bargaining agreement with respondents; that after the expiration
of the collective bargaining agreement above-mentioned and after
the abovementioned local unions affiliated with the complainant
LAKAS, the said federation sent to respondents’ president, Jose
P. Marcelo, on May 23, 1967, a letter, requesting for a
negotiation for collective bargaining, together with union
proposals thereof, but respondents refused;
“5. That after respondents knew of the affiliation of the
aforementioned local unions with the LAKAS, the said
respondents, thru their officers and agents began harassing the
union members, discriminated against them by transferring some
of its officers and members from one section to another in such a
way that their work was reduced to manual labor, and by
suspending them without
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justifiable cause, in spite of long years of service with said

respondents;
“6. That as a result of the abovementioned unfair labor practice
of respondents, and after complainant sent communication
thereto, protesting against the acts of the above-mentioned,
complainant decided to stage a strike on September 4, 1967, after
filing a notice of strike with the Department of Labor;
“7. That on September 14, 1967, however, Jose P. Marcelo,
and Jose A. Delfin, president and vice-president of the
respondents, respectively, on one hand and the presidents of the
three local unions above-mentioned and the national president of
complainant union on the other, entered into a Return-to-Work
Agreement, providing among others, as follows:
‘4. The management agrees to accept all employees who struck without
discrimination or harassment consistent with an orderly operation of its
various plants provided it is understood that management has not
waived and shall continue to exercise freely its rights and prerogatives to
punish, discipline and dismiss its employees in accordance with law and
existing rules and regulations and that cases filed in Court will be
allowed to take their normal course.’
“8. That, contrary to the above Return-to-Work agreement, and

in violation thereof, respondents refused to admit the members of
the three striking local unions; that in admitting union members
back to work, they were screened in spite of their long
employment with respondent, but respondents gave preference to
the casual employees;
“9. That, because of the refusal of the respondents to accept
some union members, in violation of the above-mentioned Return-
to-Work agreement and refusal of respondents to bargain in good
faith with complainant, the latter, together with the members of
the three local unions above-mentioned, again staged a strike on
November 7, 1967;
“10. That on December 13, 1967, complainant sent a letter to
respondents that the members of the striking unions
abovementioned offered to return to work on December 18, 1967
without any condition, but respondents likewise refused, and still
continue to refuse to reinstate them up to the present;
“11. That hereto attached are the list of names of the members
of the three local unions above-mentioned who were not admitted
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back to work by respondents, marked as Annexes “A”, “B”, and

“G” and made as an integral part of this complaint;
“12. That the union members listed in Annexes “A”, “B”, and
“C” hereof were not able to secure substantial employment in
spite of diligent efforts exerted by them;
“13. That the above unfair labor practice acts of respondents
are in violation of Section 4, subsections 1, 4 and 6 in relation to
Sections 13, 14 and 15 of Republic Act No. 875.”
The complaint prayed “that after due hearing, judgment be

rendered, declaring respondents guilty of unfair labor
practice, and
“(a) Ordering respondents to cease and desist from

further committing the acts complained of;
“(b) Ordering respondents to comply with the Return-to-
work agreement dated September 14, 1967, and to
admit back to work the workers listed in annexes
“A”, “B” and “C” hereof, with back wages, without,
loss of seniority rights and privileges thereof;
“(c) Ordering respondents to bargain in good faith with
complainant union; and
“(d) Granting complainant and its complaining
members thereof such other affirmative reliefs and
remedies equitable and proper, in order to
effectuate the policies of the Industrial Peace Act.”
On March 16, 1968, after an Urgent Motion for Extension

of Time to File Answer, the respondents filed their Answer
denying the material allegations of the Complaint and
alleging as affirmative defenses,
“I. That the Collective Bargaining Agreement between

respondent Marcelo Steel Corporation and the
United Nail Workers Union expired on March 15,
1967; The Collective Bargaining Agreement
between the United Rubber Workers Union (which
eventually became the Marcelo Free Workers
Union) and the respondent Marcelo Rubber and
Latex Products, Inc., expired on June 5, 1967; the
Collective Bargaining Agreement between Marcelo
Camelback Tire and Foam Union and the Marcelo
Tire and Rubber Corporation expired on June 5,
1967;
“II. That on May 23, 1967, one Mr. Prudencio Jalandoni
of complainant addressed a communication to Mr.
Jose P. Marcelo of
439
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respondents informing him of the alleged affiliation

of the Marcelo United Labor Union with
complainant and submitting a set of collective
bargaining proposal to which counsel for
respondents replied suggesting that a petition for
certification election be filed with the Court of
Industrial Relations in view of the several demands
for representation recognition;
“III. That the transfers of workers from one job to
another were made in accordance with needs of the
service. Respondents afforded union officers and
members affected by the transfers the privilege to
watch out for vacancies and select positions they
prefer to be in. No suspensions without justifiable
cause were made as alleged in the Complaint;
“IV. That between May 23, 1967, the date of their first
demand for negotiations, and September 4, 1967,
the start of the first strike, proposals and counter-
proposals were had. Respondents are not aware of
whether or not a notice of strike was filed with the
Court of Industrial Relations;
“V. That Mr. Jose P. Marcelo is the President of
Marcelo Rubber and Latex Products, Inc.,
Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation, and
Marcelo Steel Corporation, while Mr. Jose A.
Delfin is the acting Personnel Manager of
respondent Marcelo Rubber and Latex Products,
Inc., Marcelo Tire and Rubber Corporation,
Marcelo Steel Corporation and Marcelo Chemical
and Pigment Corporation;
“VI That respondents did not refuse to admit members
of the striking union. Only four (4) workers who
had criminal cases filed against them voluntarily
failed to report to the Personnel Department for
administrative investigation;
“VII. That after September 14, 1967, all workers of the
different respondent corporations returned to work
except the four mentioned in the preceding
paragraph hereof who have pending criminal cases;
between September 14, 1967, and November 7,
1967 another strike was declared without

justifiable cause;
“VIII. That on November 28, 1967, respondent obtained
an injunction from the Court of First Instance of
Rizal, Caloocan City Branch, against the illegal
picketing of the local unions; in the first week of
December, 1967, the striking workers began
returning to work; on December 13, 1967, a letter
was received from complainant advising
respondents that its striking workers were calling
off, lifting the picket line and returning to work,
that from the first week of December, 1967,
respondents invited the striking workers desiring to
return to work to fill out an information sheet
stating therein their readiness to work and the
exact dates they were available so that pro-
440

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per scheduling could be done; a number of workers

showed no interest in reporting to work;
management posted in the Checkpoint, Bulletin
Boards, and the gates notices calling all workers to
return to work but a number of workers obviously
were not interested in returning anymore;
“IX. That respondents posted several times lists of
names of workers who had not returned to work
with the invitation to return to work, but they did
not return to work;
“X. That a number of workers in the list Annexes “A”,
“B” and “C” have resigned after they found more
profitable employment elsewhere;
“XI. That the local unions referred to in the Complaint if
they ever had affiliated with complainant union
had subsequently disaffiliated therefrom;
“XII. That the strikes called and declared by the striking
unions were illegal;
“XIII. That the local unions were bargaining in bad faith
with respondents,”
and praying for the dismissal of the Complaint as well as

for the declaration of illegality of the two (2) strikes called
by the striking unions.

Thereafter, the trial commenced. Then on October 24,
1968, a development occurred which gave a peculiar aspect
to the case at bar. A Manifestation and Motion signed by
the respective officers and members of the MUEWA,
headed by Paulino Lazaro, was filed by the said union,
alleging, to wit,
“1. That the above-entitled case purportedly shows

that the Marcelo United Employees and Workers
Association is one of the Complainants being
represented by the Petitioner Lakas ng
Manggagawang Makabayan (LMM);
“2. That it likewise appears in the above-entitled case
that the services of the herein Petitioner was
sought by a certain Augusto Carreon together with
his cohorts who are not members of the Marcelo
United Employees and Workers Association much
less connected with the Marcelo Tire and Rubber
Corporation wherein the Marcelo United
Employees and Workers Association has an existing
Collective Bargaining Agreement;
“3. That to set the records of this Honorable Court
straight, the undersigned officers and members of
the Marcelo United
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Employees and Workers Association respectfully manifest

that the aforesaid organization has no complaint
whatsoever against any of the Marcelo Enterprises;
“4. x x x
“5. x x x, the Complaint filed by the Petitioner in the
aboveentitled case in behalf of the Marcelo United
Employees and Workers Association is without authority
from the latter and therefore the officers and/or
representatives of the petitioning labor organization
should be cited for Contempt of Court;
“6. x x x, the Complaint filed by the Petitioner in the
aboveentitled case in behalf of the Marcelo United and
Employees and Workers Association should be considered
as withdrawn;
xxx
xxx
x x x.”
This was followed by another Manifestation and Motion

filed on November 6, 1968 and signed by the officers and
members of the UNWU, headed by its President, Juan
Balgos, alleging, to wit,
“1. That the above-entitled case purportedly shows

that the United Nail Workers Union is being
represented by the Petitioner Lakas ng
Manggagawang Makabayan for the alleged
reason that the former is one of the affiliates of the
latter;
“2. That on January 15, 1968, all the Officers and
members of the United Nail Workers Union
disaffiliated from the herein Petitioning labor
organization for the reason that Petitioning labor
organization could not serve the best interest of the
Officers and members of the United Nail Workers
Union and as such is a stumbling block to a
harmonious labor-management relations within all
the Marcelo enterprises; x x x
“3. That the filing of the above-entitled case by the
herein Petitioning labor organization was made
over and above the objections of the officers and
members of the United Nail Workers Union;
“4. That in view of all the foregoing, the Officers and
members of the United Nail Workers Union do
hereby disauthorize the Petitioner of the above-
entitled case (Re: Lakas ng Manggagawang
Makabayan) from further representing the United
Nail Workers Union in the above-entitled case;
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“5. That in view further of the fact that the filing of the
aboveentitled case was made over and above the objections
of the Officers and members of the United Nail Workers
Union, the latter therefore manifest their intention to
cease and desist as they hereby ceased and desisted from
further prosecuting the above-entitled case in the interest
of a harmonius labor-management relation within the

Marcelo Enterprises;
xxx
xxx
x x x.”
Likewise, a Manifestation and Motion signed by the

Officers and members of the MFWU, headed by its
president, Benjamin Manaol, dated October 28, 1968 and
filed November 6, 1968, stated the same allegations as the
Manifestation and Motion filed by the UNWU quoted
above, except that the disaffiliation of the MFWU from
LAKAS was made effective January 25, 1968. The
Resolutions of Disaffiliation of both MFWU and UNWU
were attached to these Manifestations.
On November 19, 1968, complainant LAKAS filed an
Opposition to these Manifestations and Motions, materially
alleging that, to wit:
“1. That complainants respectfully stated that when

Charge No. 2265 was filed on December 26, 1967 in
this case, giving rise to the instant complaint, the
alleged officers of the union-movants were not yet
officers on the filing of said Charge No. 2265, x x x
“2. That the alleged officers and members who signed
the three (3) Manifestations and Motions are the
very employees who were accepted back to work by
the respondents during the strike by the
complainants on September 4, 1967 and November
7, 1967; and the said alleged officers and members
who signed the said manifestations and motions are
still working up to the present in the
establishments of the respondents.
“3. That precisely because of the acceptance back to
work of these alleged officers and members of the
union-movants, and the refusal of respondents to
accept back to work all the individual complainants
in this case mentioned in Annexes “A”, “B” and “C”
of the instant complaint, inspite of the offer to
return to work by the complainants herein made to
the respondents without any conditions at the time
of the strike, as per complainants’ letter of
December 13,
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1967 (Exh. “B”. for the complainants), which fact precisely

gave rise to the filing of this case.
xxx
xxx
x x x.”
On January 31, 1969, after the submission of their

respective Memoranda on the motions asking for the
dismissal and withdrawal of the complaint, the Court of
Industrial Relations issued an Order deferring the
resolution of the Motions until after the trial on the merits.
To this Order, two separate Motions for Reconsideration
were filed by the respondent companies and the movant-
unions, which motions were, however, denied by the court
en banc by its Resolution dated March 5, 1969.
After the trial onthe merits of the case, and after
submission by the parties of their respective memoranda,
the respondent court rendered on July 20, 1973 the
Decision subject of these petitions. On the motions for
dismissal or withdrawal of the complaint as prayed for by
MUEWA, UNWU and MFWU, the respondent court denied
the same on the ground that the instant case was filed by
the Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan for and in
behalf of the individual employees concerned and not for
the movants who were not authorized by said individual
complainants to ask for the dismissal. On the merits of the
case, while the Decision contained opinions to the effect
that the respondent Marcelo Companies were not remiss
in their obligation to bargain, and that the September 4,
1967 strike as well as the November 7, 1967 strike, were
economic strikes, and were, therefore, illegal because of
lack of the required notices of strike before the strikes were
declared in both instances, the Decision, nevertheless, on
the opinion that the “procedure of scheduling adopted by
the respondents was in effect a screening of those who were
to be readmitted,” declared respondent Marcelo
Companies guilty of unfair labor practice in discriminating
against the employees named in Annexes “A”, “B”, and “C”
by refusing to admit them back to work while other strikers
were admitted back to work after the strike of November 7,
1967. The dispositive portion of the appealed Decision
states, to wit,
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“WHEREFORE, in view of all the foregoing, respondents should

be, as they are hereby, declared guilty of unfair labor practice only
for the discrimination on terms or conditions of employment as
hereinbefore discussed in connection with the return of the
strikers-complainants back to work after the second strike, and,
therefore, ordered to pay the individual complainants appearing
in Annexes “A”, “B” and “C” of the Complaint, except Arlington
Glodeviza, Jesus Lim, Wilfredo Jarquio, Leonardo Sakdalan, Jose
Roque, Alfredo Cabel, and those still working, were dismissed for
cause, whose contracts expired or who had resigned as above
indicated, their back wages from December 18, 1967but only up to
June 29, 1970 when this case was submitted for decision, without
reinstatement, minus their earnings elsewhere for the same period.
“As to those who died without having been reemployed, the
back wages shall be from December 18, 1967 up to the date of
then-demise, as indicated in the body of this Decision, but not
beyond June 20, 1970, likewise less their earnings elsewhere.
“The Chief Auditing Examiner of this Court, or his duly
authorized representative, is hereby directed to proceed to the
premises of respondent companies to examine their books,
payrolls, vouchers and other pertinent papers or documents as
may be necessary to compute the back wages due the individual
complainant in line with this Decision, and to submit his Report
thereon not later than twenty (20) days after completion of such
examination for further disposition of the Court.
SO ORDERED.”
On August 9, 1973, counsel for respondent Marcelo

Companies filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the above
Decision assigning as errors, to wit,
“I. The trial court erred in not finding that

complainant Lakas ng Manggagawang
Makabayan (Lakas) has no authority to file
and/or to prosecute the Complaint against
respondents in representation of the local unions
and/or individual complainants and/or members of
local unions in their individual capacities and in not
dismissing the complaint on that ground upon
motions of the local unions concerned and/or their
members.
II. The trial court erred in finding that respondent
discriminated against individual complainants who
were not readmitted to work after the November 7,
1967 strike while others were able to return to their

former employment and in holding that the
445
VOL. 118, NOVEMBER 19, 1982 445

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procedure adopted by respondents was in effect a

screening of those who were readmitted and in
finding respondents guilty of unfair labor practice
by reason thereof.”
On August 14, 1973, the individual complainants who had

earlier disauthorized the counsel of record, Atty. Benjamin
Pineda, from further representing them and from amicably
settling their claims, on their own behalf filed their
arguments in support of their Motion for Reconsideration,
through a newly retained counsel, Atty. Pablo B. Castillon.
Assigned as errors are, to wit,
“I. The findings of the trial court excluding some of the

employees from the aforementioned Decision as
well as from the benefits resulting therefrom is not
in accordance with law and the facts.
“II. The findings of the trial court declaring the strikes
of September 4 and November 7, 1967 as illegal for
being an economic strike is not in accordance with
law and the facts adduced in this case.
“III. The Honorable trial court in ordering the reduction
of the back wages, without reinstatement, appears
to have departed from the substantial evidence rule
and established jurisprudence.”
By Resolution of January 24, 1974, the Court en banc

denied the two (2) Motions for Reconsideration filed by both
the respondent Marcelo Companies and the individual
complainants. On February 19, 1974 and on February 20,
1974, both parties filed their respective Notices of Appeals.
Hence, these petitions.
In L-38258, the petition filed by complainant Lakas ng
Manggagawang Makabayan (LAKAS), the following
were assigned as reversible errors, to wit,
I. The respondent court erred in finding the strikes of

September 4 and November 7, 1967 to be economic
strikes and declaring the said strikes illegal for

non-compliance with the procedural requirement of
Section 14(d) of Republic Act 875, although its
illegality was condoned or waived because of the
Return-to-Work agreement on the first strike, and
the discriminatory rehiring of the striking
employees after the second strike.
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II. The respondent court erred in denying

reinstatement to the striking complainants in Case
No. 4951-ULP, and limiting the computation of
their backwages from December 18, 1967 to June
29, 1970 only, despite its findings of unfair labor
practice against private respondents herein as a
consequence of the discriminatory rehiring of the
striking employees after the November 7, 1967
strike.
III. The respondent court erred in excluding the other
individual complainants, except those who are still
working, those who resigned on or before December
18, 1967, and those whose employment contract
expired, and denying to these individual
complainants the benefits resulting therefrom.
On the other hand, in L-38260 which is the petition filed by

respondents Marcelo Enterprises, Marcelo Tire and
Rubber Corporation, Marcelo Rubber & Latex Products,
Marcelo Steel Corporation, Marcelo Chemical & Pigment
Corporation, and Polaris Marketing Corporation, the
following is the alleged assignment of errors, to wit,
I. Respondent court erred in not finding that

respondent Lakas ng Manggagawang
Makabayan (LAKAS) had no authority to file
and/or to prosecute the complaint against the
petitioners herein in representation of the local
unions and/or individual complainants and/or
members of local unions in their individual
capacities and in not dismissing the complaint in
Case No. 4951-ULP of respondent court on that
ground upon motions of the local unions concerned

and/or their officers and members.
II. Respondent court erred in finding that petitioners
herein discriminated against individual
complainants in Case No. 4951-ULP of respondent
court who were not readmitted to work after the
November 7, 1967 strike, while others were able to
return to their former employment and in holding
that the procedure adopted by petitioners herein
was in effect a screening of those who were
readmitted and in finding petitioners herein guilty
of unfair labor practice by reasons thereof.
III. Respondent court erred in rendering judgment
ordering petitioners herein to pay individual
complainants in Case No. 4951ULP of respondent
court backwages from December 18, 1967, to June
29, 1970, minus their earnings elsewhere, except
those who have resigned, those who have been
dismissed for cause, those whose contracts have
expired and those who are already working.
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IV. Respondent court erred in holding that petitioners

herein have waived their right to declare the strikes
of September 4, 1967 and November 7, 1967, illegal.
From the aforecited assignments of errors respectively

made in both petitions “before Us, We find that there are
only two basic issues posed for Our resolution, viz: (1)
whether or not the complaint filed by LAKAS against the
Marcelo Companies can be sustained, in view of the
alleged fact that its authority to file and prosecute the
same has been squarely raised in issue at the first instance
before the respondent court; and (2) whether or not the
Marcelo Companies are guilty of unfair labor practice, for
which they should be made liable for backwages and be
obliged to reinstate the employees appearing in Annexes
“A”, “B”, and “C” of the complaint, taking into consideration
the prayer of LAKAS anent the correct payment of said
backwages and the non-exclusion of some employees from
the benefits arising from the appealed Decision.
The first issue poses a procedural question which We

shall dwell on after a resolution of the second issue, this
latter issue being of greater significance to the correct
determination of the rights of all parties concerned as it
treats of the merits of the present petitions.
Hence, anent the second issue of whether or not the
complaint for unfair labor practice can be sustained, this
Court rules in favor of the respondent Marcelo Companies
and consequently, the appealed Decision is reversed. This
reversal is inevitable after this Court has pored through
the voluminuous records of the case as well as after
applying the established jurisprudence and the law on the
matters raised. We are not unmindful of the plight of the
employees in this case but We consider it oppressive to
grant their petition in G.R. No. L-38258 for not only is
there no evidence which shows that the respondent
Marcelo Companies were seeking for an opportunity to
discharge these employees for union activities, or to
discriminate against them because of such activities, but
there is affirmative evidence to establish the contrary
conclusion.
448

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The present controversy is a three-sided conflict, although

focus has been greatly placed upon an alleged labor dispute
between complainant LAKAS and the respondent Marcelo
Companies. It would bear emphasizing, however, that what
had been patently disregarded by the respondent industrial
court and the parties alike, is the fact that LAKAS had
never been the bargaining representative of any and all of
the local unions then existing in the respondent Marcelo
Companies.
Contrary to the pretensions of complainant LAKAS, the
respondent Marcelo Companies did not ignore the demand
for collective bargaining contained in its letter of June 20,
1967. Neither did the companies refuse to bargain at all.
What it did was to apprise LAKAS of the existing
conflicting demands for recognition as the bargaining
representative in the appropriate units involved, and
suggested the settlement of the issue by means of the filing
of a petition for certification election before the Court of
Industrial Relations. This was not only the legally
approved procedure but was dictated by the fact that there
was indeed a legitimate representation issue. PSSLU, with

whom the existing CBAs As were entered into, was
demanding of respondent companies to collectively bargain
with it; so was Paulino Lazaro of MUEWA, J.C. Espinas &
Associates for MACATIFU and the MFWU, and the
complainant LAKAS for MULU which we understand is
the aggrupation of MACATIFU, MFWU and UNWU. On
top of all of these, Jose Roque of UNWU disauthorized the
PSSLU from representing his union; and similarly,
Augusto Carreon of MACATIFU itself informed
management as late as July 11, 1967 or after the demand
of LAKAS that no group representing his Union “is not
authorized and should not be entertained.”
Indeed, what We said in Philippine Association of Free
Labor Unions (PAFLU) vs. The Bureau of Labor Relations,
69 SCRA 132, applies as well to this case.
“x x x, in a situation like this where the issue of legitimate

representation in dispute is viewed for not only by one legitimate
labor organization but two or more, there is every equitable
ground warranting the holding of a certification election. In this
way, the issue as to who is really the true bargaining
representative of all the
449
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employees may be firmly settled by the simple expedient of an

election.”
The above-cited case gives the reason for the need of

determining once and for all the true choice of membership
as to who should be their bargaining representative, which
is that, “(E)xperience teaches us, one of the root causes of
labor or industrial disputes is the problem arising from a
questionable bargaining representative entering into CBA
concerning terms and conditions of employment.”
Respecting the issue of representation and the right of
the employer to demand reasonable proof of majority
representation on the part of the supposed or putative
bargaining agent, the commentaries in Rothenberg on
Labor Relations, pp. 429-431, are forceful and persuasive,
thus:
“It is essential to the right of a putative bargaining agent to

represent the employees that it be the delegate of a majority of
the employees and, conversely, an employer is under duty to

bargain collectively only when the bargaining agent is
representative of the majority of the employees. A natural
consequence of these principles is that the employer has the right
to demand of the asserted bargaining agent proof of its
representation of its employees. Having the right to
demonstration of this fact, it is not an ‘unfair labor practice’ for an
employer to refuse to negotiate until the asserted bargaining
agent has presented reasonable proof of majority representation.
It is necessary however, that such demand be made in good faith
and not merely as a pretext or device for delay or evasion. The
employer’s right is however to reasonable proof . x x x
“x x x Although an employer has the undoubted right to
bargain with a bargaining agent whose authority has been
established, without the requirement that the bargaining agent
be officially certified by the National Labor Relations Board as
such, if the informally presented evidence leaves a real doubt as
to the issue, the employer has a right to demand a certification
and to refuse to negotiate until such official certification is
presented.”
The clear facts of the case as hereinbefore restated

indusputably show that a legitimate representation issue
confronted the respondent Marcelo Companies. In the face
of these facts and in conformity with the existing
jurisprudence,
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We hold that there existed no duty to bargain collectively

with the complainant LAKAS on the part of said
companies. And proceeding from this basis, it follows that
all acts instigated by complainant LAKAS such as the
filing of the Notice of Strike on June 13, 1967 (although
later withdrawn) and the two strikes of September 4, 1967
and November 7, 1967 were calculated, designed and
intended to compel the respondent Marcelo Companies to
recognize or bargain with it notwithstanding that it was an
uncertified union, or in the case of respondent Marcelo
Tire and Rubber Corporation, to bargain with it despite the
fact that the MUEWA of Paulino Lazaro was already
certified as the sole bargaining agent in said respondent
company. These concerted activities executed and carried
into effect at the instigation and motivation of LAKAS are
all illegal and violative of the employer’s basic right to

bargain collectively only with the representative supported
by the majority of its employees in each of the bargaining
units. This Court is not unaware of the present
predicament of the employees involved but much as We
sympathize with those who have been misled and so lost
their jobs through hasty, illadvised and precipitate moves,
We rule that the facts neither substantiate nor support the
finding that the respondent Marcelo Companies are guilty
of unfair labor practice.
There are also other facts which this Court cannot
ignore. The complaint of LAKAS charge that after their
first strike of September 4, 1967, management and the
striking employees entered into a Return-to-Work
Agreement but that it was violated by the respondent
companies who “refused to admit the members of the three
striking local unions x x x and gave preference to the
casual employees.” (No. 8, Complaint). It is also alleged
that the strike of November 7, 1967 was staged “because of
the refusal of the respondents to accept some union
members x x x and refusal of respondents to bargain in
good faith with complainant” (No. 9, Complaint). We find
however, that in making these charges, complainant
LAKAS lacked candor, truth and fidelity towards the
courts.
It is a fact found by the respondent court, and as
revealed by the records of the case, that the respondent
Marcelo Companies did not violate the terms of the
Return-to-Work Agree-
451
VOL. 118, NOVEMBER 19, 1982 451

Enterprises
ment negotiated after the first strike. All of the strikers

were admitted back to work except four (4) who opted not
to report for work because of the administrative
investigation conducted in connection with the acts of
violence perpetrated during the said strike.
It is also evident from the records that the charge of
bargaining in bad faith imputed to the respondent
companies, is hardly credible. In fact, such charge is valid
as only against the complainant LAKAS. The parties had a
total of five (5) conferences for purposes of collective
bargaining. It is worth considering that the first strike of
September 4, 1967 was staged less than a week after the
fourth CBA conference and without any benefit of any

previous strike notice. In this connection, it must be stated
that the notice of strike filed on June 13, 1967 could not
have been the strike notice for the first strike because it
was already withdrawn on July 14, 1967. Thus, from these
stated facts can be seen that the first strike was held while
the parties were in the process of negotiating. Nor can it be
sustained that the respondent Marcelo Companies
bargained in bad faith since there were proposals offered
by them, but the complainant LAKAS stood pat on its
position that all of their economic demands should be met
and that all of these demands should be granted in all of
the respondent Marcelo Companies. The companies’
refusal to accede to the demands of LAKAS appears to be
justified since there is no showing that these companies
were in the same state of financial and economic affairs.
There is reason to believe that the first strike was staged
only for the purpose of compelling the respondent Marcelo
Companies to accede to the inflexible demands of the
complainant LAKAS. The records further establish that
after the resumption of normal operations following the
first strike and the consequent Return-to-work Agreement,
the striking unions led by complainant LAKAS and the
management of the respondent Marcelo Companies
resumed their bargaining negotiations. And that on
October 13, 1967, complainant LAKAS sent the final drafts
of the collective bargaining proposals for MFWU and
UNWU. The second strike of November 7, 1967 was then
staged immediately after which strike, as before, was again
lacking of a srike notice. All of these facts show that it was
complainant
452

Enterprises
LAKAS, and not the respondent Marcelo Companies,

which refused to negotiate in the pending collective
bargaining process. All that the facts show is that the
bargaining position of complainant LAKAS was inflexible
and that it was in line with this uncompromising attitude
that the strikes were declared, significantly after notice
that management did not or could not meet all of their 17-
points demand.
Respondent court, upholding the contention of petitioner
LAKAS that after the second strike, the respondent
Marcelo Companies, despite the strikers’ unconditional

offer to return to work, refused to readmit them without
“screening” which LAKAS insists to be “discriminatory
hiring of the striking employees,” declared that although
the two strikes were illegal, being economic strikes held in
violation of the strike notice requirement, nevertheless
held the Marcelo Companies guilty of unfair labor practice
in discriminating against the complaining employees by
refusing to readmit them while other strikers were
admitted back to work. We do not agree.
It is the settled jurisprudence that it is an unfair labor
practice for an employer not to reinstate, or refuse re-
employment to, members of union who abandon their 1
strike and make unconditional offer to return to work. As
indeed Exhibit “B” presents an unconditional offer of the
striking employees to return to work under the same terms
and conditions of employment before the strike, the
question then confronting Us is whether or not on the part
of the respondent companies, there was refusal to reinstate
or re-employ the strikers.
We find as a fact that the respondent Marcelo
Companies did not refuse to reinstate or re-employ the
strikers, as a consequence of which We overrule the finding
of unfair labor practice against said companies based on
the erroneous conclusion of the respondent court. It is clear
from the records that even before the unconditional offer to
return to work contained in Exhibit “B” was made, the
repondent Marcelo Companies had already posted notices
for the strikers to return back to work.
________________
1 People’s Bank & Trust Company Employees Union, et al. vs. CIR, et
al., 69 SCRA 10; Cromwell Commercial Employees and Laborers Union
(PTUC) vs. CIR, et al., 12 SCRA 124.
453
VOL. 118, NOVEMBER 19, 1982 453

Enterprises
It is true that upon their return, the strikers were required

to fill up a form (Exhibit “49”) wherein they were to
indicate the date of their availability for work. But We are
more impressed and are persuaded to accept as true the
contention of the respondent Marcelo Companies that the
aforestated requirement was only for purposes of proper
scheduling of the start of work for each returning striker. It

must be noted that as a consequence of the two strikes
which were both attended by widespread acts of violence
and vandalism, the businesses of the respondent companies
were completely paralyzed. It would hardly be justiciable to
demand of the respondent companies to readmit all the
returning workers in one big force or as each demanded
readmission. There were machines that were not in
operating condition because of long disuse during the
strikes. Some of the machines needed more than one
worker to operate them so that in the absence of the needed
team of workers, the start of work by one without his
teammates would necessarily be useless, and the company
would be paying for his time spent doing no work. Finally,
We take judicial cognizance of the fact that companies
whose businesses were completely paralyzed by major
strikes cannot resume operations at once and in the same
state or force as before the strikes.
But what strikes Us most in lending credence to
respondents’ allegation that Exhibit “49” was not meant to
screen the strikers, is the fact that all of the returning
strikers who filled up the form were scheduled for work and
consequently started with their jobs. It is only those
strikers who refused or failed to fill-up the required form,
like the herein complaining employees, who were not
scheduled for work and consequently have not been re-
employed by the respondent Marcelo Companies. Even if
there was a sincere belief on their part that the
requirement of Exhibit “49” was a ruse at “screening” them,
this fear would have been dispelled upon notice of the fact
that each and all of their co-strikers who filled up the
required form were in fact scheduled for work and started
to work. The stoppage of their work was not, therefore, the
direct consequence of the respondent companies’
complained act. Hence, their economic loss should not be
shifted to
454

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the employer.
It was never the state policy nor Our judicial
pronouncement that the employees’ right to self-
organization and to engage in concerted activities for
mutual aid and protection, are absolute or be upheld tinder
all circumstances. Thus,

3
in the case of Royal Interocean
Lines, et al. vs. CIR, We cited these authorities giving
adequate panoply to the rights of employer, to wit;
“The protection of workers’ right to self-organization in no way

interfere with employer’s freedom to enforce such rules and orders
as are necessary to proper conduct of his businesses, so long as
employer’s supervision is not for the purpose of intimidating or
coercing his employees with respect to their self-organization and
representation. (National Relations Board vs. Hudson Motor Car
Co., CC. A., 1942, 123 F 2d. 528).”
“It is the function of the court to see that the rights of
selforganization and collective bargaining guaranteed by the Act
are amply secured to the employee, but in its effort to prevent the
prescribed unfair labor practice, the court must he mindful of the
welfare of the honest employer (Martel Mills Corp. vs. M.L.R.L.,
CC. A., 1940, 11471 F 2d. 264).”
In Pagkakaisang Itinataguyod ng mga Manggagawa sa

Ang Tibay (PIMA), Eliseo Samson, et al. vs. Ang Tibay,
Inc., et al.,L-22273, May 16, 1967, 20 SCRA 45, We held
that the exaction, by the employer, from the strikers
returning to work, of a promise not to destroy company
property and not to commit acts of reprisal against union
members who did not participate in the strike, cannot be
considered an unfair labor practice because it was not
intended to discourage union membership. It was an act of
a self-preservation designed to insure peace and order in
the employer’s premises. It was also held therein that what
the Industrial Peace Act regards as an unfair labor practice
is the discrimination committed by the employer in regard
to tenure of employment for the purpose of encouraging or
discouraging union membership.
________________
2 See Dinglasan vs. National Labor Union, L-14183, November 28,

1959.
3 109 Phil. 900 (1960).
455
VOL. 118, NOVEMBER 19, 1982 455

Enterprises
In the light of the above ruling and taking the facts and
circumstances of the case before Us in relation to the
requirement by the respondent companies in the filling up

of Exhibit “49”, We hold and rule that the requirement was
an act of selfpreservation, designed to effect cost-savings as
well as to insure peace and order within their premises.
Accordingly, the petition in G. R. No. L-38258 should be
dismissed, it having failed to prove, substantiate and
justify the unfair labor practice charges against the
respondent Marcelo Companies.
Now to the procedural question posed in the first issue
brought about by the respondent court’s denial of the
motions to withdraw the complaint respectively filed by
MUEWA, UNWU and MFWU. In their petition (G.R. L-
38260) the respondent Marcelo Companies maintain that
the respondent court erred in not dismissing the complaint
even as it knew fully well that the very authority of
LAKAS to represent the labor unions who had precisely
disaffiliated from the LAKAS, was open to serious question
and was being ventilated before it. On the other hand, the
respondent court rationalized the denial of the aforestated
motions to withdraw by holding that the complaint was
filed by LAKAS on behalf of the individual employees
whose names were attached to the complaint and hence,
that the local unions who were not so authorized by these
individual employees, cannot withdraw the said complaint.
The lower court’s opinion is erroneous.
Firstly, LAKAS cannot bring any action for and in
behalf of the employees who were members of MUEWA
because, as intimated earlier in this Decision, the said local
union was never an affiliate of LAKAS. What appears
clearly from the records is that it was Augusto Carreon and
his followers who joined LAKAS, but then Augusto
Carreon was not the recognized president of MUEWA and
neither he nor his followers can claim any legitimate
representation of MUEWA. Apparently, it is this split
faction of MUEWA, headed by Augusto Carreon, who is
being sought to be represented by LAKAS. However, it
cannot do so because the members constituting this split
faction of MUEWA were still members of MUEWA which
was on its own right a duly registered labor union. Hence,
any suit to be brought for and in behalf of them can be
456

Enterprises
made only by MUEWA, and not LAKAS. It appearing then

that Augusto Carreon and his cohorts did not disaffiliate
from MUEWA nor signed any individual affiliation with
LAKAS, LAKAS bears no legal interest in representing
MUEWA or any of its members.
Nor will the lower court’s opinion be availing with
respect to the complaining employees belonging to UNWU
and MFWU. Although it is true, as alleged by LAKAS, that
when it filed the charge on December 26, 1967, the officers
of the movant unions were not yet then the officers thereof,
nevertheless, the moment MFWU and UNWU separated
from and disaffiliated with LAKAS to again exercise its
rights as independent local unions, registered before as
such, they are no longer affiliates of LAKAS, as what
transpired here. Naturally, there would no longer be any
reason or occasion for LAKAS to continue representing
them. Notable is the fact that the members purportedly
represented by LAKAS constitute the mere minority of the
movant unions, as may be inferred from the allegations of
the movant unions as well as the counter-allegations of
LAKAS filed below. As such, they cannot prevail or dictate
upon the will of the greater majority of the unions to which
they still belong, it appearing that they never disaffiliated
from their unions; or stated in another
4
way, they are bound
by the action of the greater majority. 5
In NARIC Workers’ Union vs. CIR, We ruled that, “(a)
labor union would go beyond the limits of its legitimate
purposes if it is given the unrestrained liberty to prosecute
any case even for employees who are not members of any
union at all. A suit brought by another in representation of
a real party in interest is defective.” Under the
uncontroverted facts obtaining herein, the aforestated
ruling is applicable, the only difference being that, here, a
labor federation seeks to represent members of a registered
local union never affiliated with it and members of
registered local unions which, in the course of the
proceedings before the industrial court, disaffiliated from
it.
________________
4 National Labor Union vs. Ang Bisig ng P.M.C., L-12575, May 13,
1959.
5 3 SCRA 804.
457
VOL. 118, NOVEMBER 19, 1982 457

Enterprises
This is not to say that the complaining employees were

without any venue for redress. Under the aforestated
considerations, the respondent court should have directed
the amendment of the complaint by dropping LAKAS as
the complainant and allowing the suit to be further
prosecuted in the individual names of those who had
grievances. A class suit under Rule 3, Section 12 of the
Rules of Court is authorized and should suffice for the
purpose.
In fairness to the complaining employees, however, We
treated their Motion for Reconsideration of the Decision
subject of appeal as curing the defect of the complaint as
the said motion expressly manifested their collective desire
to pursue the complaint for and in their own behalves and
disauthorizing LAKAS’ counsel from further representing
them. And We have also treated their petition before Us in
the same manner, disregarding the fact that LAKAS
remained the petitioning party, as it appears from the
verification that the petition in L38258 was for and in
behalf of the complaining employees. The merits of their
petition, however, fall short of substantiating the charge of
unfair labor practice against the respondent Marcelo
Companies. On the other hand, the appeal of the Marcelo
Companies in L-38260 must be upheld and sustained.
WHEREFORE, upon the foregoing considerations, the
petition in L-38258 is dismissed and the petition in L-
38260 is granted. The decision of the Court of Industrial
Relations is hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE and a
new judgment is rendered holding that the respondent
Marcelo Companies are not guilty of unfair labor practice.
No costs.
SO ORDERED.
Makasiar (Chairman), Concepcion, Jr., Abad

Santos, De Castro and Escolin,JJ., concur.
Aquino, J.,in the result.
Petition in L-38258 dismissed and petition in L-38260

granted.
458

People vs. Cardenas
Notes.—By failure to report for work with petitioner

when she had an opportunity to do so and leaving instead
for abroad with intent to work there, private respondent
must be deemed to have effectively waived reinstatement.
(East Asiatic Co., Ltd vs. Court of Industrial Relations,40
SCRA 521.)
If the employer’s improper conduct was an initial cause
of the strike, all the strikers are entitled to reinstatement
and the dismissal of replacement employees whenever
necessary. (Insular Life Ass. Co., Ltd. Employees
Association-NATU vs. Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd., 37
SCRA 244.)
——o0o——
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01/02/2020 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED VOLUME 118

422 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

LAKAS NG MANGGAGAWANG MAKABAYAN

MARCELO TIRE & RUBBER CORPORATION,

Labor Law; There is no evidence that the management of

VOL. 118, NOVEMBER 19, 1982 423

Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan vs. Marcelo Enterprises

Same; Management’s suggestion that union file necessary

Same; Where there exists a legitimate issue as to which of

employer sit down with it for collective bargaining.—The clear

424 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan vs. Marcelo Enterprises

representation issue confronted the respondent Marcelo

Same; Employer not guilty of bad faith where it not with

VOL. 118, NOVEMBER 19, 1982 425

Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan vs. Marcelo Enterprises

cede to the demands of LAKAS appears to be justified since there

Same; Employer may be justified in requiring a reasonable

a consequence of the two strikes which were both attended by

426 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan vs. Marcelo Enterprises

Same; Same.—But what strikes Us most in lending credence

Same; Right to engage in concerted activities is not an

Same; Action; A labor union cannot bring an action on behalf

employees signed the complaint.—Firstly, LAKAS cannot bring

VOL. 118, NOVEMBER 10, 198 427

Lakas ng Manggagawang Makabayan vs. Marcelo Enterprises

Same; Same.—Nor will the lower court’s opinion be availing

Same; Same; Where a union brought suit in behalf of

Same; Same; Appeals; Supreme Court may cure defect of

428 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

SEPARATE APPEALS by certiorari from the decision of

The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.

Separate appeals by certiorari from the Decision of the

Marcelo Steel Corporation, Polaris Marketing

VOL. 118, NOVEMBER 19. 1982 429

respondent Marcelo Rubber and Latex Products, Inc., with

general situation within the ranks of labor was far from

430 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

Steel Corporation received a letter requesting the

However, on that very same day of March 14, 1967, the

VOL. 118, NOVEMBER 19, 1982 431

for recognition as the bargaining representative in the

because of management’s refusal to bargain with it,

432 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

On July 14, 1967, as earlier stated, the Notice of Strike

their conformity to sit down in conference on the points to

VOL. 118, NOVEMBER 19, 1982 433

Less than a week after the fourth CBA conference, or on

of Malabon, Rizal, four of whom were convicted while the

“4. The management agrees to accept all employees who struck

By virtue of this agreement, the respondent Marcelo

434 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED

and because of the administrative investigation conducted

Cabel and Ramon Bataycan, were convicted in said

VOL. 118, NOVEMBER 19, 1982 435

ing that, “on Monday, December 18, 1967, at 7:00 o’clock in

employrnent before the strike.” The letter was attested to

436 SUPREME COURT REPORTS ANNOTATED