Nos.

18-587, 18-588, 18-589

In the Supreme Court of the United States

__________________
DEPARTMENT OF HOMELAND SECURITY, et al., Petitioners,
v.
REGENTS OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, et al.,
Respondents.
__________________
DONALD J. TRUMP, PRESIDENT OF THE UNITED STATES, et
al., Petitioners,
v.
NATIONAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF
COLORED PEOPLE, et al., Respondents
__________________
KEVIN K. MCALEENAN, ACTING SECRETARY OF HOMELAND
SECURITY, et al., Petitioners,
v.
MARTIN JONATHAN BATALLA VIDAL, et al., Respondents.
__________________
On Writs of Certiorari to the United States Courts of
Appeals for the Ninth, District of Columbia, and
Second Circuits
__________________
BRIEF AMICUS CURIAE OF CITIZENS UNITED,
CITIZENS UNITED FOUNDATION, AND
THE PRESIDENTIAL COALITION, LLC
IN SUPPORT OF PETITIONERS
__________________
ROBERT J. OLSON*
JEREMIAH L. MORGAN
HERBERT W. TITUS
WILLIAM J. OLSON
WILLIAM J. OLSON, P.C.
370 Maple Ave. W., Ste. 4
Vienna, VA 22180
(703) 356-5070
[email protected]
*Counsel of Record
August 26, 2019 Attorneys for Amici Curiae
ii

TABLE OF CONTENTS
Page

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . iv

INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 1

STATEMENT . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 2

STATEMENT OF THE CASE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 7

ARGUMENT

I. DHS’ DECISION TO END DACA AND ENFORCE

IMMIGRATION LAW IS NOT JUDICIALLY
REVIEWABLE . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 9

A. Revising Reviewability Precedents:

From “No Opinion” to “May Be” to “Is” . . 10

B. The Decision to End DACA Is Not a

“Nonenforcement Decision” . . . . . . . . . . . 13

II. DHS’ DECISION TO END DACA WAS LAWFUL

UNDER SEC V. CHENERY . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 16

III. DACA HAS BEEN UNLAWFUL SINCE ITS

INCEPTION, BUT EVEN IF FOUND LAWFUL, WAS
LAWFULLY RESCINDED . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18
iii

A. The Ninth Circuit Clearly Erred by

Failing to Consider the Constitutionality
of DACA . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 18

B. DACA Is an Unconstitutional Exercise of

Legislative Power . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 20

C. DACA Violates Separation of Powers

Principles. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22

D. DACA Violates the Take Care Clause . . . 24

E. Even if DACA Was Lawful, It Can Be

Lawfully Rescinded . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26

CONCLUSION . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31
iv

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
Page
HOLY BIBLE
Exodus 18:16 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31

U.S. CONSTITUTION
Art. I, Sect. 1. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23, 26
Art. I, Sect. 7. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
Art. II, Sect. 1, Cl. 8 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24
Art. II, Sect. 3 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 24

STATUTES
5 U.S.C. § 701, et seq. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6, 16
Immigration and Nationality Act . . . . . . . . 6, passim

CASES
Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387
(2012) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4, 5, 21
City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290
(2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 12, 13
Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417 (1998) . . . . . . 25
Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958). . . . . . . . . . . . 27
Dept. of Transportation v. Ass’n. of American
R.R., 135 S. Ct. 1225 (2015). . . . . . . . . . . . 23, 26
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570
(2008) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 768 (1992) . . 9
Harper v. Va. Dep’t of Taxation, 509 U.S. 86
(1993) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821 (1985) . . 10, 11, 13
IRAP v. Trump, 857 F.3d 554 (4th Cir. 2017). . . . 10
Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137 (1803) . . . . . . 7, 28
v

Montana Air Chapter No. 29 v. Federal Labor

Relations Authority, 898 F.2d 753
(9th Cir. 1990) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11, 12
SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943) 16, 17, 18
Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp. 3d 591
(S.D. Tex. 2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134 (5th Cir.
2015) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 6
United States v. Texas, 136 S.Ct. 2271 (2016) . . . . 6
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343
U.S. 579 (1952). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 22

MISCELLANEOUS
50 Core American Documents (C. Burkett, ed.:
Ashbrook Press: 2016) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 29
B. Adams, “Late to the party: CNN and
MSNBC anchors discover there’s a crisis
at the border,” Washington Examiner
(June 26, 2019). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 4
W. Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws
of England (Univ. Chi. Facsimile ed.:
1765) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 27
G. Carey & J. McClellan, The Federalist
(Liberty Fund: 2001). . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14, 29
E. Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial
Supremacy, 58 WM. & MARY L. REV.
1459 (2017) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 28
Customs and Border Protection, Southwest
Border Migration FY 2019 . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 5
S.A. Camarota and K. Zeigler, “63% of
Non-Citizen Households Access Welfare
Programs,” Center for Immigration Studies
(Nov. 20, 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
vi

R. Delahunty & J. Yoo, “Dream On: The

Obama Administration’s Nonenforcement
of Immigration Laws, the DREAM Act,
and the Take Care Clause,” 91 TEX. L.
REV. 781 (2013) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 26
P. Kurland & R. Lerner, The Founders’
Constitution (Univ. of Chicago Press:
1987) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William
Charles Jarvis (Sept. 28, 1820) . . . . . . . . . 29, 30
K. Pavlich, “His Own Words: Obama Said He
Doesn't Have Authority For Executive
Amnesty 22 Times,” TownHall.com
(Nov. 19, 2014) . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 22
K.R. Thompson, “The Department of Homeland
Security’s Authority to Prioritize Removal of
Certain Aliens Unlawfully Present in the
United States and to Defer Removal of
Others,” U.S. Department of Justice, Office
of Legal Counsel (Nov. 19, 2014). . . . . . . . . . . 21
U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services,
Approximate Active DACA Recipients:
Country of Birth (July 31, 2018) . . . . . . . . . . . 21
INTEREST OF THE AMICI CURIAE1

Citizens United is a nonprofit social welfare

organization exempt from federal income tax under
Internal Revenue Code (“IRC”) section 501(c)(4).
Citizens United Foundation is a nonprofit educational
and legal organization exempt from federal income tax
under IRC section 501(c)(3). These organizations were
established, inter alia, for purposes related to
participation in the public policy process, including
conducting research, and informing and educating the
public on the proper construction of state and federal
constitutions, as well as statutes related to the rights
of citizens, and questions related to human and civil
rights secured by law.

The Presidential Coalition, LLC is an IRC section

527 political organization that was founded to educate
the American public on the value of having principled
conservative Republican leadership at all levels of
government, and to support the election of
conservative candidates to state and local government
and the appointment of conservatives to leadership
positions at the federal and state level in order to
advance conservative public policy initiatives.

These amici, along with several others, filed three

amicus briefs in two of these consolidated cases last
year:

1
It is hereby certified that counsel for the parties have consented
to the filing of this brief; that no counsel for a party authored this
brief in whole or in part; and that no person other than these
amici curiae, their members, or their counsel made a monetary
contribution to its preparation or submission.
2

• U.S. Department of Homeland Security v.

Regents of the University of California, Brief
Amicus Curiae of Citizens United, et al., U.S.
Supreme Court, on petition for certiorari
before judgment (Feb. 2, 2018);

• Vidal v. Nielsen, Brief Amicus Curiae of

Citizens United, et al., U.S. Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit (Mar. 14, 2018); and

• U.S. Department of Homeland Security v.

Regents of the University of California, Brief
Amicus Curiae of Citizens United, et al., U.S.
Supreme Court, on petition for certiorari (Dec.
6, 2018).

STATEMENT

The Brief for the Petitioners (“Pet. Br.”) addresses

the need for a rescission of the Deferred Action for
Childhood Arrivals (“DACA”) policy based on the
findings made by Secretary Nielsen in her statement
of July 22, 2018. Pet. Br. at 10, 40-41. These findings
supplemented the reasons given by Acting Secretary
Elaine C. Duke in her September 5, 2017
memorandum determining that DACA was unlawful
and would be wound down. In addition to agreeing
that DACA was contrary to law, Secretary Nielsen
asserted that “‘tens of thousands of minor aliens’ ...
have made the dangerous trek — with or without their
families — to and across our southern border without
legitimate claims to lawfully enter the country.” Id. at
40. Secretary Nielsen determined it necessary “that
DHS should send a strong message that children who
3

are sent or taken on this perilous and illegal journey

will not be accorded preferential treatment.” Id. at 41.

The lack of enforcement of our nation’s

immigration laws mandated by the courts below sends
exactly the wrong signal — that the United States
Government has lost the will to enforce its borders,
and that anyone who enters the country illegally
stands an excellent chance of being rewarded with
permanent status as a lawful resident, and likely
citizenship as well.

Multiple nationwide federal court injunctions that

have been in place for nearly two years send the
message that federal judges are in charge of our
borders — not Congress or the President of the United
States — and judges are welcoming of illegal
immigrants. Indeed, the Ninth Circuit did not try to
hide its policy preferences, praising DACA as a
response to “the cruelty and wastefulness of deporting
productive young people to countries with which they
have no ties.” Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S.
Dep’t of Homeland Security, 908 F.3d 476, 486 (9th
Cir. 2018) (“Regents”).2

In their briefs urging that the injunctions be

maintained, Respondents are unlikely to concede that

2
Pairing lax and deferred enforcement with the range of welfare-
type benefits, the lower court injunctions have exacerbated the
current crisis at the border. Almost two-thirds of illegal aliens
reportedly are receiving welfare benefits. See S.A. Camarota and
K. Zeigler, “63% of Non-Citizen Households Access Welfare
Programs,” Center for Immigration Studies (Nov. 20, 2018).
4

there is a crisis at the border as Secretary Nielsen

contended — although the mainstream media, which
has supported Respondents’ litigation throughout, has
changed its collective view on that point. On February
14, 2019, CNN Anchor Don Lemon opposed President
Trump’s attempt to declare a national emergency to
secure border funding:

Here is a really, really disgraceful thing. OK?

You listening? All of this, this whole mess, is
manufactured. It’s a manufactured crisis. A
noncrisis at the border that’s really not fooling
anybody. People go, ‘Oh, it’s a crisis, it’s a
crisis.’ They know it’s not a crisis. That’s all
for political expediency. [B. Adams, “Late to
the party: CNN and MSNBC anchors discover
there’s a crisis at the border,” Washington
Examiner (June 26, 2019).]

More recently, Lemon reversed ground, stating:

“For anybody who doesn’t think that

immigration is a crisis, a deadly serious crisis,
a humanitarian crisis....” [Id.]

CNN’s Chris Cuomo and MSNBC’s Brian Williams

showed the same pattern and have agreed there is a
crisis at the border. See id.

Some years ago, this Court recognized the scope of

the problems that border states face as a result of
illegal immigration. In Arizona v. United States, 567
U.S. 387 (2012), the Court noted that, in 2010, the
federal government “apprehended almost half a
5

million” unlawful aliens. Arizona at 397. The Court

added that “[s]tatistics alone do not capture the full
extent of Arizona’s concerns” about illegal
immigration, adding that the record in that case
demonstrates “an ‘epidemic of crime, safety risks,
serious property damage, and environmental problems’
associated with the influx of illegal migration across
private land near the Mexican border.” Id. at 398.
Since last addressed by this Court, conditions have
only worsened, and the nation’s border remains in
crisis. Each year, from FY 2014 through FY 2018,
Customs and Border Patrol has continued to
apprehend an average of over half a million
“inadmissibles.”

Broad deferred enforcement programs such as

DACA and Deferred Action for Parents of Americas
(“DAPA”) create an incentive for migrants to enter the
United States illegally, not waiting for proper
immigration processes. This year has seen an
explosion of illegal border crossings and
apprehensions, with over 144,000 apprehensions in
May 2019 alone.3 Through the first 10 months of FY
2019, there have been 862,785 apprehensions on the
Southwest border, but this number does not include
illegal crossings, making it impossible to know how
many total illegal immigrants are entering the United
States each month. The Constitution did not invest in
the federal judiciary the authority to protect the
nation’s borders, and it should not continue to impede

3
See Customs and Border Protection, Southwest Border
Migration FY 2019, https://www.cbp.gov/newsroom/
stats/sw-border-migration.
6

the President of the United States in his effort to do

just that.

It is in this context — the existence of a true crisis

at the border — a border that the President of the
United States has the duty to protect — that these
cases come to this Court.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

The original DACA policy, implemented by the

Obama Administration in 2012, was a decision not to
enforce existing law against a broad class of persons.
The later and lawfully indistinguishable DAPA policy,
which also expanded DACA, was determined to violate
the notice-and-comment provision of the
Administrative Procedure Act (“APA”) (5 U.S.C. § 701,
et seq.) by the U.S. District Court for the Southern
District of Texas. Texas v. United States, 86 F. Supp.
3d 591 (S.D. Tex. 2015). That decision was affirmed by
the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit. The
Fifth Circuit took the position that DAPA (and its
expansion of DACA) judgment likely violated both the
APA and the Immigration and Nationality Act. Texas
v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 136, 170-196 (5th Cir.
2015). Lastly, the judgment of the Fifth Circuit was
affirmed by this Court on an equally divided vote.
United States v. Texas, 136 S.Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016)
(per curiam).

Once the Trump Administration’s Department of

Homeland Security announced its decision to rescind
the DACA policy on September 5, 2017, it was
subjected to multiple challenges: (i) in the U.S.
7

District Court for the Northern District of California

(by the Regents of the University of California, et al.);
(ii) in the District of Columbia (by the National
Association for the Advancement of Colored People, et
al.); and (iii) in the Eastern District of New York (by
Batalla Vidal). These three cases led to the issuance
of three nationwide injunctions against DHS that
remain in effect to this day, nearly two years later.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT

The Trump Administration’s decision to end the

DACA non-enforcement policy — which has applied to
a broad class of persons illegally in the United States
— merely returns to the Department of Homeland
Security (“DHS”) the ability to begin to enforce
immigration law as it had been enforced prior to 2012.
The decision to end DACA and begin enforcement itself
did not constitute an adverse action against any
person illegally in the country, and therefore, no one
should have had standing even to challenge its
rescission.

The decision to end DACA was not a non-

enforcement decision and should not have been
evaluated as such. Rather, it was the opposite — a
decision to revoke a non-enforcement policy. That
decision to begin enforcement was unreviewable by the
judiciary because it could have been made by DHS for
any policy reason whatsoever. This Court’s decision in
SEC v. Chenery presents no bar to rescission of the
DACA non-enforcement decision. The decision to
enforce the law was not just presumptively
8

unreviewable by federal courts, it was also completely

unreviewable.

The courts below have made the legality and

constitutionality of DACA an issue in this case. The
justification for the injunctions against the rescission
of DACA was that it was predicated, in part, on an
opinion by the Attorney General and Secretary of DHS
that DACA was unlawful. Because the judges involved
disagreed, believing that DACA was lawful, the courts
felt empowered to enjoin DACA’s rescission on the
theory that the government had made a mistake of law
in viewing DACA to be unlawful, thereby rendering
the rescission illegitimate.

Actually, the courts had no basis to enjoin DHS,

irrespective of whether DACA was lawful or unlawful.
First, the judges were wrong in concluding that the
original DACA policy was lawful, and if the Court
agrees, the injunctions must be dissolved. However,
even if this Court were to believe that the original
DACA policy was lawful, the injunctions should still be
dissolved. This case does not present a situation
where there is a dispute of law between an agency and
the courts, and the court must have the final say.
There is no doctrine of judicial supremacy which
requires the Executive to consult with and then bow to
the opinion of the courts before determining and
carrying out its executive functions. Nor are the
Petitioners asking the courts to stand down from any
role in reviewing individual immigration decisions.
Rather, the courts have no role at this time in
mandating what the nation’s immigration policies will
be.
9

ARGUMENT

I. DHS’ DECISION TO END DACA AND

ENFORCE IMMIGRATION LAW IS NOT
JUDICIALLY REVIEWABLE.

Former Attorney General Sessions and the

Secretary of the Department of Homeland Security
determined that DACA should be phased out, inter
alia, because “the Department lacked statutory
authority to have created DACA in the first place,”
having been “‘an unconstitutional exercise of
authority’” with “the same legal and constitutional
defects that the courts recognized as to DAPA.”4
Regents at 491-92.5 The Ninth Circuit did not dispute
— and indeed no one appears to have disputed — that
the Trump Administration has the absolute discretion
to end the DACA program based on a change in policy.6
See Pet. Br. at 19-20; see also Regents at 510. And no
one in this case has alleged that the executive branch
has improperly enforced any immigration law that
Congress enacted. See Pet. Br. at 19. Indeed,

4
The legality of the DACA program is discussed in Section III,
infra.
5
The government argues that it also had provided additional
reasons for reversing the DACA program, and that those reasons
independently support its decision. Pet. Br. at 37.
6
Presumably, President Trump could simply declare “I have
chosen to end DACA because I believe it necessary to protect the
border,” and that would moot this case, as APA does not apply to
the President, absent express statement by Congress. See
Franklin v. Massachusetts, 505 U.S. 768, 801 (1992).
10

revocation of DACA only signals an intent to enforce

federal immigration law as it was enforced prior to
2012. The only sticking point for the courts has been
the reasons given for the decision to end DACA and to
begin to enforce immigration law. In other words,
DHS made a permissible decision for an
impermissible reason.7 Due to this perceived error in
reasoning (but not in judgment), the Ninth Circuit
panel below claimed that the decision to end DACA is
judicially reviewable.

A. Revising Reviewability Precedents:

From “No Opinion” to “May Be” to “Is.”

On its way to determining that the DHS decision

to revoke DACA was judicially reviewable, the panel
below first cited Heckler v. Chaney, 470 U.S. 821, 832
(1985), where this Court held that nonenforcement

7
This is not the first time that the lower courts have invalidated
this President’s policy agenda based on allegations of improper
reasons for otherwise legitimate decisions. See, e.g., IRAP v.
Trump, 857 F.3d 554, 572 (4th Cir. 2017) (claiming President
Trump’s order “drips with religious intolerance, animus, and
discrimination”). The lower courts have repeated these ad
hominem attacks ad nauseam, claiming that hidden, secret
motivations override the legality of otherwise perfectly acceptable
policy choices with which federal judges personally disagree. In
this case, the judges of the Ninth Circuit have made no secret of
how they wanted the case to turn out. Claiming that President
Obama’s policies “[r]ecogniz[ed] the cruelty and wastefulness of
deporting productive young people,” the allegedly neutral and
detached magistrates below decried the current administration’s
decision to end this so-called “‘commendable exercise’” and to
disappoint DACA recipients who were “trusting the government
to honor its promises.” Regents at 486-87.
11

decisions by the executive branch are presumed to be

nonreviewable by the judiciary. Regents at 495.
However, as the Ninth Circuit noted, this Court had
“express[ed] no opinion” as to whether an agency’s
nonenforcement decision is judicially reviewable if
based upon the belief that the agency lacked
jurisdiction to institute proceedings. Chaney at 833
n.4.8

Undeterred, the Ninth Circuit filled in the alleged

gap in Chaney with its own prior opinion in Montana
Air Chapter No. 29 v. Federal Labor Relations
Authority, 898 F.2d 753, 754 (9th Cir. 1990), finding
that “the Supreme Court had nevertheless ‘suggested
that’” such decisions “‘may be reviewable.’” Regents at
496. Thus, the Ninth Circuit understood Montana Air
as having established that the “presumption of
nonreviewability ‘may be overcome if the refusal is
based solely on the erroneous belief that the agency
lacks jurisdiction.’” Id. (emphasis added).

A page later, however, the Ninth Circuit took yet

another leap, converting Montana Air’s “may be
overcome” language into a hard-and-fast rule that “a
nonenforcement decision is reviewable ... if the
decision was based solely on the agency’s belief that it
lacked jurisdiction to act.” Regents at 497 (emphasis

8
This Court also discussed a situation where “the statute
conferring authority on the agency might indicate that such
decisions were not ‘committed to agency discretion’” (id.), but that
situation is not present here.
12

added).9 Of course, by the Ninth Circuit’s own

admission, this Court has never reached that
conclusion and neither had the Ninth Circuit — until
its decision in this case.

Then, as the icing on its cake, the Ninth Circuit

relied on City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290 (2013),
for the proposition that “there is no difference between
an agency that lacks jurisdiction to take a certain
action, and one that is barred by the substantive law
from doing the same....” Id. at 497. But the facts in
this case have nothing to do with the City of Arlington
distinction between an agency “exceeding the scope
of its authority ... and its exceeding authorized
application of authority that it unquestionably has,”10
or between agencies which “‘act improperly’” versus
ones that act “‘beyond their jurisdiction.’” Regents at
496 (emphasis added). Rather, in this case, DHS
clearly has not acted in excess of or beyond its
jurisdiction — but rather, it is the Ninth Circuit’s
opinion that, in implementing DACA, the agency has
acted well within any limit on its authority. Here, the
Ninth Circuit takes the position that DHS has far
more authority than the agency itself believes it has.
City of Arlington has no application here.

9
In Montana Air, the Ninth Circuit separately concluded that an
agency’s nonenforcement decision might be reviewable if based
“upon adoption of a general policy so extreme as to amount to an
abdication of the agency’s statutory responsibilities.” Id. at 754.
Unsurprisingly, the Ninth Circuit never mentioned this rule when
it opined that the original DACA program — adopting a general
policy not to enforce the law — was lawful.
10
City of Arlington at 299 (emphasis added).
13

B. The Decision to End DACA Is Not a

“Nonenforcement Decision.”

As discussed above, neither this Court’s decisions

nor the Ninth Circuit’s own precedents support its
conclusion that the decision to end DACA is judicially
reviewable. But there is an even more fundamental
weakness in the Ninth Circuit’s decision. The decision
to revoke DACA is not a “nonenforcement decision.”
Regents at 497. Rather, it is the opposite — an
enforcement decision — a “decision to rescind a
nonenforcement policy....” Pet. Br. at 21. Therefore,
this is not a case like Chaney where an agency decides
not to enforce because it does not have the jurisdiction
to bring enforcement proceedings. Rather, here an
agency is deciding to enforce the statute as it is
written, based on the court below’s theory that it does
not have the authority to abdicate its responsibility
to enforce the law.

This means that none of the factors weighing in

favor of judicial reviewability of nonenforcement
decisions is applicable here. See Pet. Br. at 31-32.
Certainly when, as here, an agency states its intent to
enforce the law, there is no “danger that [the] agenc[y]
may not carry out [its] delegated powers with
sufficient vigor....” Chaney at 834. Indeed, unlike
actual nonenforcement decisions, an enforcement
decision presents no conflict between the legislature
and the Executive. Rather, with the DHS decision to
revoke DACA and enforce immigration law, Congress
and the executive branch are once again in lockstep.
Congress has determined that certain persons are
unlawfully present in the United States, and the
14

Trump Administration has announced its intent to

enforce that law. It is only the lower federal courts —
part of the allegedly “weakest of the three departments
of power”11 — which have stood in the way, forcing
both other branches of government to bend to the
judiciary’s will through the liberal application of
nationwide injunctions.12

Both Respondents and the courts below try to give

the impression that the revocation of DACA will end
all exercises of prosecutorial discretion, and that all
DACA recipients immediately will be deported. On the
contrary, there is no indication that the executive
branch now will move generally to deport persons who
are part of the DACA program. With DACA repealed,
enforcement will simply revert to the way it was before
— with real prosecutorial discretion being applied
based on the facts and circumstances of actual
individual cases. True prosecutorial discretion will
replace the policy discretion, on a categorical basis,
engaged in by the prior administration.

11
A. Hamilton, Federalist No. 78, reprinted in G. Carey & J.
McClellan, The Federalist at 402 (Liberty Fund: 2001).
12
This Court has held that when the Executive and Congress act
arm-in-arm on a matter, the President’s authority is at its
maximum. Thus, a decision to enforce federal law, when
“executed by the President pursuant to an Act of Congress would
be supported by the strongest of presumptions and the widest
latitude of judicial interpretation, and the burden of persuasion
would rest heavily upon any who might attack it.” Youngstown
Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer, 343 U.S. 579, 637 (1952).
15

Respondents here are attempting to convince this

Court to do on a wholesale level what instead should
be done at the retail level. But as Petitioners note, “an
alien subjected to removal proceedings may challenge
the substantive validity of an adverse final order, but
he may not raise a procedural claim that the
government was arbitrary and capricious for
commencing enforcement.” Pet. Br. at 23.

In upholding the district court’s issuance of a

nationwide injunction, the Ninth Circuit has declared
that a duly enacted statute may not be enforced by the
Executive.13 In other words, the judiciary has created
a requirement that the federal government must
continue to permit our immigration laws to be broken
by hundreds of thousands of persons for a period now
going on two years — unless permitted to do otherwise
by the judicial branch. See Pet. Br. at 16. The
injunction below was not issued because the decision
to revoke DACA is unconstitutional, or because it
conflicts with a statute or an international agreement

13
The Ninth Circuit credits itself with “empowering the
Executive” in this case by informing DHS that it has greater
authority than it believes. Regents at 490. Of course, this is just
whitewash, as the Ninth Circuit’s opinion upheld the district
court’s injunction preventing the administration from
implementing its policy agenda and forcing the DACA program on
the American people for nearly an additional two years. Later,
the Ninth Circuit outrageously claims that its opinion in this case
“prevents [an] anti-democratic and untoward outcome,” allegedly
because an accurate description of the law permits voters to
properly allocate blame. Regents at 499. Of course, there is
nothing democratic about four unelected and unaccountable
judges below, all appointed by Democratic presidents, unilaterally
impeding the political agenda of an elected Republican president.
16

or treaty. Rather, it was issued solely because an

executive branch agency has taken the position that a
law Congress enacted should be enforced, and that the
prior administration’s political abdication of its
responsibility to enforce the law was wrong.

II. DHS’ DECISION TO END DACA WAS

LAWFUL UNDER SEC V. CHENERY.

Having determined that neither the APA nor the

Immigration and Nationality Act imposes any bar to
judicial review of the rescission of DACA, the Ninth
Circuit examined the merits of the decision to end
DACA, based on the “likelihood of success on the
merits” prong of the preliminary injunction standard.
Regents at 505, et seq.

The court below relied on this Court’s decision in

SEC v. Chenery Corp., 318 U.S. 80 (1943). There, the
Court determined that it could not uphold an “order”
by the Securities and Exchange Commission based on
the record before the Court. The Court likened review
of agency action to appellate review of lower court
decisions: if a lower court reaches the right result but
for the wrong reason, the appellate court nevertheless
can sustain the decision if there is an alternative
ground on which the lower court could have relied.
However, in cases where a required showing, or factual
or jury determination, was not made, the appellate
court must remand the case to make that
determination. Chenery at 88.

In rejecting the Commission’s order in Chenery,

the Court likened that case to the latter scenario — a
17

situation where “[t]he record is utterly barren of any

such showing,” and where “findings might have been
made and considerations disclosed which would justify
its order,” but were not. Id. at 93-94. Specifically, the
Court noted that the Commission had applied the
wrong standard to the case but that, since “the
Commission is not bound by settled judicial
precedents,” it was impossible for the Court to weigh
in on the issue, and thus remanded the case for further
findings. Id. at 89, 95.

This case involves precisely the opposite situation,

and implicates the first scenario from Chenery —
where a decision “must be affirmed if the result is
correct ‘although the lower court relied upon a wrong
ground or gave a wrong reason.’” Id. at 88. Here, the
decision to end DACA was said to have been made
because the program was believed to have been
unlawful and unconstitutional at its inception. And
even if the Ninth Circuit is correct that such a
justification was incorrect, the court admits that the
decision to end DACA may have been justified for any
number of other reasons, presumably including one as
simple as “because we can.” Unlike in Chenery, there
is no need to send the decision back to DHS for
additional fact finding or required showings, since the
agency was not required to find any facts or make any
showing before ending an entirely discretionary
program.

In Chenery, the Commission’s decision could have

been justified only by a determination that was not
made. Here, however, the decision to end DACA
presumably could have been justified by just about
18

any reason, allegedly except the one that was given.

Thus, like the other cases relied on by the panel below,
Chenery provides no support for the Ninth Circuit’s
decision, but actually demonstrates that the DHS
decision to end DACA should have been upheld.

III. DACA HAS BEEN UNLAWFUL SINCE ITS

INCEPTION, BUT EVEN IF FOUND
LAWFUL, WAS LAWFULLY RESCINDED.

A. The Ninth Circuit Clearly Erred by

Failing to Consider the Constitutionality
of DACA.

Although the questions presented to this Court do

not directly raise the legality or constitutionality of
DACA, that question is subsumed in the second
question presented — whether the Trump
Administration’s decision to wind down the Obama
Administration’s DACA policy is lawful. Indeed, these
amici argued at the petition stage that, in order to
evaluate properly the rescission of DACA, it would be
essential to evaluate the legality and constitutionality
of the original policy. See Brief Amicus Curiae of
Citizens United, et al. (Dec. 6, 2018) at 14.14

14
The government’s brief on the merits extensively addresses the
legality of the original DACA policy. See Pet. Br. at 43-52. So too
did the Ninth Circuit’s opinion below, as the legality of DACA was
necessary for the courts below to conclude as to the illegality of
the decision to end DACA. Regents at 506-510. See also Vidal v.
Nielsen, 279 F. Supp. 3d 401, 420-27 (E.D. NY 2018). Thus, the
lawfulness of the original DACA policy is before the Court, should
the Court first find the rescission of DACA to be judicially
reviewable. If this Court finds that DACA was unlawful to begin
19

Interestingly enough, the Ninth Circuit

acknowledged that the Attorney General’s (and DHS’s)
decision to end DACA was based in part on its
perceived unconstitutionality. Regents at 492, 506.
Yet, even though it purportedly rejected that
argument, the Ninth Circuit actually did not address
it. Rather, the court washed its hands of any
constitutional strictures on the theory that “no court
has ever held that DAPA is unconstitutional” and “the
government makes no attempt in this appeal to defend
the Attorney General’s assertion that the DACA
program is unconstitutional.” Id. at 506.

That is quite an interesting conclusion. Certainly,

it is axiomatic that, in a typical case, a criminal
defendant can waive many constitutional challenges.15
And an individual plaintiff certainly can waive
constitutional claims, such as in Section 1983
litigation. But this is anything but a typical case.
Here, with the Sessions16 and Duke memoranda, it was
the government arguing that its own ongoing action
is unconstitutional.

In the typical cases discussed above, a waiver of

constitutional claims or arguments means only that a
court must overlook past possible constitutional

with, then the nationwide injunctions against the Trump

Administration’s rescission of the program are even more clearly
unlawful.
15
See Criminal Resource Manual 626: Plea Agreements and
Sentencing Appeal Waivers — Discussion of the Law.
16
See Joint Appendix 877-878.
20

violations. Here, however, multiple federal courts,

including the Ninth Circuit, mandated future
government action, yet the Ninth Circuit expressly
refused to analyze whether that action is
constitutional or not. It was error for the court below
to fail to consider DACA’s constitutionality before
ordering that the program continue unabated.

In fact, once the district courts issued their

injunctions, DACA which originated as an executive
action, became DACA perpetuated by judicial action.
And it seems evident that courts have an obligation to
sua sponte consider the constitutionality of their own
orders. Indeed, had the Ninth Circuit examined the
issue, it would have found that the DACA policy
violated several constitutional provisions.

B. DACA Is an Unconstitutional Exercise of

Legislative Power.

The Immigration and Nationality Act did not

delegate to the Executive the power to invalidate
immigration laws, either permanently or temporarily.
Although the DACA policy advised beneficiaries that
their status (or lack thereof) could be revoked at any
time, DACA nevertheless granted a renewable two-
year deferred action status, and the benefits that go
with that status, to more than 700,000 aliens who are
present in the United States in defiance of the
immigration laws enacted by Congress.17 DACA thus
changed the nation’s immigration law in a

17
See U.S. Citizenship and Immigration Services, Approximate
Active DACA Recipients: Country of Birth (July 31, 2018).
21

fundamental way — a change that began in 2012 and

continues to this day.

Any notion that the Obama Administration

implemented DACA pursuant to congressional
authority is not plausible. President Obama
repeatedly failed to persuade Congress to enact the
Development, Relief, and Education for Alien Minors
Act (“DREAM”) Act, which would have gone a long way
towards eviscerating many of the nation’s immigration
laws. Thrice, Congress has made known its position
with respect to the provisions of DACA. First,
Congress explicitly legislated with regard to the
legality of aliens’ presence and the grounds for their
removal. See Arizona v. United States, 567 U.S. 387,
396-97 (2012). As the U.S. Department of Justice
Office of Legal Counsel’s own Memorandum (“OLC
Memo”) notes, “[i]n the INA, Congress established a
comprehensive scheme governing immigration and
naturalization.” Id. at 3.18 Second, Congress implicitly
rejected President Obama’s DACA scheme, in refusing
to take any steps toward enacting the DREAM Act and
thus ratifying the program. Third, the President has
only narrow, statutorily defined circumstances
whereby he may grant deferred-action status for
certain specified illegal aliens.

18
See K.R. Thompson, “The Department of Homeland Security’s
Authority to Prioritize Removal of Certain Aliens Unlawfully
Present in the United States and to Defer Removal of Others,”
U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Legal Counsel (Nov. 19,
2014).
22

Even the Ninth Circuit admits that “[u]nlike most

other forms of relief from deportation, deferred action
is not expressly grounded in statute.” Regents at 487.
In fact, President Obama publicly announced that he
did not believe he had the power to implement a
DACA-type policy.19 Nevertheless, he implemented
DACA anyway. President Obama’s assumption of a
broad general power (a power he acknowledged he did
not have) to waive the nation’s immigration laws for
large numbers of persons is simply incompatible with
the narrow and detailed statutory scheme. With
DACA, President Obama not only established new
national immigration policy outside of the legislative
process, but also he acted contrary to Congress’ clear
desires, where his power is clearly “at its lowest ebb”20
and, indeed, its exercise is unconstitutional.

C. DACA Violates Separation of Powers

Principles.

The Ninth Circuit, as well as the parties before it,

acknowledged that “DACA’s adoption was a general
statement of policy.” Regents at 513. But such a
policy is not the equivalent of legislation adopted
pursuant to the bicameral approval and presentment
process in Article I, Section 7 that govern the exercise
of legislative power. See Dept. of Transportation v.

19
K. Pavlich, “His Own Words: Obama Said He Doesn't Have
Authority For Executive Amnesty 22 Times,” TownHall.com (Nov.
19, 2014).
20
Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. at 637 (Jackson, J., concurring).
See discussion in Section II.B, infra.
23

Ass’n. of American R.R., 135 S. Ct. 1225, 1237 (2015)

(“DOT”) (Thomas, J., concurring).

Legislative power is vested by Article I, Section 1

of the Constitution in Congress alone, and Congress
“cannot delegate its ‘exclusively legislative’ authority
at all.” Id. The question, then, is whether DACA is an
exercise of legislative power to create immigration
policy or, as the Ninth Circuit alleges, stems from “the
Executive’s inherent authority to allocate resources
and prioritize cases.” Regents at 487.21

Although DACA is a rule governing the Secretary

and DHS agents in the administration and
enforcement of INA, it is also a rule governing private
conduct. First, DACA requires an alien to apply for
lawful presence status. Second, DACA requires the
alien to affirmatively demonstrate that he is entitled
to the deferred action status including, but not limited
to, “not fall[ing] within the Secretary’s enforcement
priorities.”22 And third, presumably if an applicant

21
The Ninth Circuit initially claims that DACA involves a system
whereby “each application is ... evaluated for approval by DHS
personnel on a case-by-case basis.” Regents at 490. Later,
however, the court lets the truth slip, acknowledging that this
alleged “case-by-case” review involves no “prosecutorial
discretion,” but rather that “DACA obviously allows (and indeed
requires) DHS officials to exercise discretion in making deferred
action decisions as to individual cases....” Id. at 507. In other
words, DACA allows/requires voluntary/mandatory “decisions” by
DHS rubber stampers. The Ninth Circuit’s statements are
doublespeak.
22
“Frequently Asked Questions: Rescission of Memorandum
Providing for Deferred Action for Parents of Americans and
24

fails to stay outside of those enforcement priorities, he

would be outside of the DACA qualifications, and
subject to priority removal. In sum, DACA established
a law — a generally applicable rule of private conduct
that applies generally to all aliens, but benefits only
certain of those aliens who “have no lawful
immigration status on th[e] date” of application. Id.
That action violated the separation of powers.

D. DACA Violates the Take Care Clause.

After a bill becomes law, other constitutional

provisions govern. The Take Care Clause of Article II,
Section 3 requires the President to “take Care that the
Laws be faithfully executed,” and the President’s Oath
of Office requires him to “preserve, protect and defend
the Constitution of the United States.” So long as a
law was duly enacted, and so long as it comports with
the Constitution, the President has a duty to
implement or enforce the law.23 The reason that all
persons illegally in the United States are not deported
immediately is regularly described as being due to
inadequate enforcement resources — not due to a
decision by the President that the law was unworthy
of being enforced. See Pet. Br. at 4.

Lawful Permanent Residents (“DAPA”),” Department of

Homeland Security (June 15, 2017).
23
On the other hand, if a law was not duly enacted, or if it is
“repugnant” to the Constitution, then the President could argue
that he is duty-bound by his oath not to implement and enforce
it. See Article II, Section 1, Clause 8. However, the Obama
Administration never made such claims about the INA.
25

This Court has noted that, “[a]lthough the

Constitution expressly authorizes the President to play
a role in the process of enacting statutes, it is silent on
the subject of unilateral Presidential action that either
repeals or amends parts of duly enacted statutes.”
Clinton v. New York, 524 U.S. 417, 439 (1998).
However, the Court did not view this silence as
authorizing executive action, but rather viewed it as
“equivalent to an express prohibition” on the post-
enactment executive meddling with enacted statutes.
Id. Whenever a President acts to “effect the repeal of
laws ... without observing the procedures set out in
Article I, § 7 ... he is rejecting the policy judgment
made by Congress and relying on his own policy
judgment.” Id. at 444-45.

Indeed, in the debates on the Constitution,

Hamilton and other advocates of a strong executive
proposed that “[t]he Executive ought to have an
absolute negative” over laws passed by Congress.
Records of the Federal Convention, June 4, 1787,
reprinted in P. Kurland & R. Lerner, The Founders’
Constitution (“Founders”) (Univ. of Chicago Press:
1987), vol. 2, p. 389. However, other delegates thought
that “[t]his was a mischievous sort of check,” that “[t]o
give such a prerogative would certainly be obnoxious
to the temper of this country,” and the proposal was
unanimously rejected by a vote of the state
delegations. Id. at 390. Since the framers specifically
rejected the idea that the President should have an
absolute veto, it certainly could not be argued that
they would have favored absolute executive power to
dispense with a law for policy reasons after it has been
enacted. This “threat of nonenforcement gives the
26

President improper leverage over Congress by

providing a second, postenactment veto.” R.
Delahunty & J. Yoo, “Dream On: The Obama
Administration’s Nonenforcement of Immigration
Laws, the DREAM Act, and the Take Care Clause,” 91
TEX. L. REV. 781, 795 (2013).

Because DACA is a “‘law’ in the Blackstonian

sense of [a] generally applicable rule[] of private
conduct” (see Dep’t of Transportation v. Ass’n of
American R.R., 135 S.Ct. 1225, 1245 (2015), it is
outside the authority of the DHS, because Article I,
Section 1 vests legislative power exclusively in
Congress. Id.

The [Constitution] itself and the writings

surrounding it reflect a conviction that the
power to make the law and the power to
enforce it must be kept separate, particularly
with respect to the regulation of private
conduct. [Id. at 1244.]

Thus, contrary to the lower courts’ conclusions that

DACA was a lawful exercise of authority under the
INA, for the reasons set forth above, and for the
reasons set forth by Petitioners, DACA was an
unlawful and unconstitutional action, and it was
appropriate for the Secretary to rescind it.

E. Even if DACA Was Lawful, It Can Be

Lawfully Rescinded.

Although these amici contend that DACA was

unlawful when implemented, the case does not turn on
27

that issue. If DACA was lawful when implemented, as

the courts below have contended, it nevertheless was
certainly possible for the Secretary of DHS and the
Attorney General to have a different view, and take
action based on that view, without first seeking
judicial approval. Indeed, judges have no
constitutional authority to decide constitutional issues
not properly before them. Any belief that no President
may have a view of the Constitution at odds with a
judge is an extreme and unsupportable view of judicial
supremacy.

Legal scholars may differ as to whether Congress

and the President have a role to play in interpreting
the law and the Constitution, or whether the Supreme
Court’s decisions become part of the supreme law of
the land. That is an extreme view — advanced only on
one known occasion by this Court in Cooper v. Aaron,
358 U.S. 1, 18 (1958), but at odds with a great deal of
history. Famously, William Blackstone wrote that a
judge’s “opinion” represents merely “evidence” of what
the law is. W. Blackstone, I Commentaries on the
Laws of England (Univ. Chi. Facsimile ed.: 1765) at ¶
71. In Marbury v. Madison, this Court likewise held
that it is the role of judges “to say what the law is.” 5
U.S. 137, 177 (1803). And just as “a legislative act
contrary to the constitution is not law,” (id.), a judicial
opinion that “is manifestly absurd or unjust” is not
simply “bad law” but rather “not law” at all.
Blackstone at ¶ 70; see also Harper v. Va. Dep’t of
Taxation, 509 U.S. 86, 107 (1993) (Scalia, J.,
concurring). It does not matter which branch of
government is responsible for the act, action, or
28

opinion — if it violates the law or the Constitution, all

are equally “not law.”

Indeed, although Marbury established judicial

review, it did not adopt judicial supremacy, “the idea
that the Supreme Court should be viewed as the
authoritative interpreter of the Constitution and that
we should deem its decisions as binding on the other
branches and levels of government....” E.
Chemerinsky, In Defense of Judicial Supremacy, 58
WM. & MARY L. REV. 1459 (2017). The natural
corollary to this view is that any opinion from any
judge in any court in the country issued on any topic
is the supreme law of the land, at least until overruled
by a higher court.

Although judicial supremacy is viewed by some as

“desirable because we want to have an authoritative
interpreter of the Constitution,”24 it has no basis in the
structure of the Constitution, which divides federal
power — including the power to opine on the law —
among the branches. Chemerinsky at 1459. And, as
amici argued in their brief at the petition stage,
officers of the executive and judicial branches are
“each independently bound by oath to support the
Constitution in the exercise of [their] respective

24
This school of thought would require that, if this Court in
District of Columbia v. Heller, 554 U.S. 570 (2008) had
determined that “the right of the people” only referred to a right
of the states to maintain the National Guard, overriding the
Second Amendment’s clear text, the Court’s edict must be followed
nationwide. History, however, teaches us that even this Court is
not infallible.
29

powers.” Brief Amicus Curiae of Citizens United, et al.

in Support of Petitioners (Dec. 6, 2018) at 8. These
oaths are to follow the Constitution and the law as the
oath taker understands it to be, not as the Ninth
Circuit would advise it should be. This understanding
stands in contrast to the Ninth Circuit’s view of “the
judiciary [being] the branch ultimately responsible for
interpreting the law....” Regents at 499.

President Andrew Jackson, in vetoing the national

bank bill enacted by Congress, wrote that “[t]he
Congress, the Executive, and the Court must each for
itself be guided by its own opinion of the
Constitution.... The opinion of the judges has no more
authority over Congress than the opinion of Congress
has over the judges, and on that point the President is
independent of both.” Veto Message of the Bill on the
Bank of the United States, reprinted in 50 Core
American Documents at 166-67 (C. Burkett, ed.:
Ashbrook Press: 2016). Likewise, in Federalist 49,
Madison wrote that “[t]he several departments being
perfectly co-ordinate by the terms of their common
commission, neither of them, it is evident, can pretend
to an exclusive or superior right of settling the
boundaries between their respective powers....”25
Finally, Thomas Jefferson wrote that “to consider the
judges as the ultimate arbiters of all constitutional
questions” is “a very dangerous doctrine indeed and
one which would place us under the despotism of an

25
J. Madison, Federalist No. 49, reprinted in The Federalist.
30

Oligarchy.”26 Petitioners agree, arguing that “as a

coordinate Branch, the Executive has an independent
duty to determine whether it lacks authority to act.”
Pet. Br. at 50.

Thankfully, this Court need not resolve any such

thorny and enduring constitutional disputes in this
case. This case does not involve a disagreement
between the branches as to what the law or
Constitution requires the President to do (or not to
do), but what the law permits him to do. As the
Ninth Circuit has admitted, this case is not a situation
where the agency has actually done anything unlawful
or unconstitutional. Rather, this case involves a
matter of executive discretion.

In forming the nation’s immigration policy, former

Attorney General Sessions and DHS officials have
relied upon their own opinions as to what the law and
Constitution requires of them. They may be right, or
they may be wrong, but it is not within the purview of
the courts to weigh in every time another branch of
government takes a position on a law or the
Constitution, and then acts on that position.

The Ninth Circuit disagreed, claiming that “[t]he

government may not simultaneously both assert that
its actions are legally compelled, based on its
interpretation of the law, and avoid review of that
assertion by the judicial branch....” Regents at 486.
But courts are not roving tribunals open to anyone

26
Letter from Thomas Jefferson to William Charles Jarvis (Sept.
28, 1820).
31

who might dispute the legality of government action or

inaction. See Exodus 18:16. As Petitioners note, “the
Executive is entitled to act on its view of the bounds of
its enforcement discretion even if the courts might
disagree.” Pet. Br. at 50-51.

Ironically, the Ninth Circuit does not accuse DHS

officials of taking too expansive a view of the scope of
executive authority, but rather too narrow a view. The
Ninth Circuit may disagree with the assessment that
DACA was wrongly implemented, but that does not
consequently give rise to a power to have its say on the
matter to set the record straight. In a case such as
this, it is perfectly acceptable for President Trump and
the Ninth Circuit to have different interpretations of
the law. And, unlike many other times in our history,
no constitutional crisis is created by DHS’s decision to
end DACA contrary to the wishes of the Ninth Circuit.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the decisions issued by

the U.S. Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit and the
U.S. District Court for the District of Columbia, and
the order issued by the U.S. District Court for the
Eastern District of New York granting an injunction,
should be reversed.
32

Respectfully submitted,

ROBERT J. OLSON*
JEREMIAH L. MORGAN
HERBERT W. TITUS
WILLIAM J. OLSON
WILLIAM J. OLSON, P.C.
370 Maple Ave. W., Ste. 4
Vienna, VA 22180
(703) 356-5070
[email protected]
Attorneys for Amici Curiae
August 26, 2019 *Counsel of Record