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Thomas Flanagan

Dr. Amato

PHIL1301

10 December 2014

Nietzsche v. Brassier

Every philosopher’s metaphysical or ontological descriptions of reality shape what sort of

philosophical deductions he or she can make. Plato’s defense of a transcendental Truth guided

him to prescribe individuals reason as a means to arrive at Justice, while Emerson’s multifaceted

Truth led him to argue that subjects should develop self-reliant spirits. Friedrich Nietzsche and

Ray Brassier, like other philosophers, develop unique descriptions of the world. However, the

case of comparing Nietzsche and Brassier is an odd one because their ontological descriptions

vary in a radical way yet their conclusions remain quite similar. While Nietzsche dismisses

images as illusory and posits that there is no thing in of itself, Brassier, part of the newly

developing school of speculative realism, staunchly advocates that there is indeed a mind

independent reality. Both philosophers arrive the conclusion that the world is entangled in

nihilism but for different reasons. Nietzsche’s chaotic, indecipherable world renders

interpretation of meaning impossible whereas Brassier’s very much accessible world shows that

even when if one has full access to the thing in of itself he or she can find no purpose. Despite

some stark differences, a further investigation of the two philosophers using Birth of a Tragedy

and Nihil Unbound as principle texts reveals that Brassier’s speculative realism does not go as

far as to unground Nietzsche’s arguments but rather can be used to develop meaningful caveats

and footnotes that refine Nietzsche’s nihilism in a way that is more accurate and precise.

Nietzsche’s first book, The Birth of a Tragedy presents ideas that are representative of
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Nietzsche’s whole anthology and philosophy and is a good place to start for analyzing Nietzsche

understanding of the world. In Birth of a Tragedy, Nietzsche begins immediately by introducing

the duality between the Apollonian and the Dionysian, which represent in their most basic forms,

civility and chaos, respectively. He indicates that these two modes of existence which have been

incorporated into cultures throughout history determine the success or downfall of civilizations.

Nietzsche is sure to note, however, that “it was in dreams that the magnificent forms of the gods

first appeared before the souls of men” in order to warn that this dichotomy is only true so far as

poets imagined Apollo and Dionysus to posses their ascribed characteristics (Birth 1). No matter

how aware individuals are that they are seeing only images they manage to still allow “shapes to

speak to [them]” such that “appearance still shimmers through” (Birth 1). Only pages into his

first book, Nietzsche already has described a theme ubiquitous in all his works, that images are

deceitful and lead individuals towards believing in false truths that eventually turn society

against itself when those truths no longer hold as granted; this is later described as

“ressentiment”. In context of Birth of a Tragedy, Nietzsche deploys his critique of images on the

“Apollonian illusion” which Nietzsche describes as the civilizational security that gives

individuals the feeling that their choices are insulated from active decision-making and roles in

society, as if they were in a “plastic world” (Birth 21). Thus, Nietzsche exposes that the images

found in the every day Apollonian or civilized world are only constructs behind which, lies

nothing. Beyond this curtain of meaning there is only the fate of death and suffering much like

the “fearful fate of the wise Oedipus” that brought about his demise, leaving only images as a

means for humans to be “equipped for suffering” from the nihilism of the world (Birth 3). What

is important in these deductions is that Nietzsche’s nihilism is derived from the observation that

no meaning can be found within the world because the world is only constructed of images
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which possess no inherent value. For Nietzsche, truth is ultimately tied to meaning, and the

inability for one to arrive at any ultimate conclusion about any instance of reality leaves

philosophers in a state of flux where nothing is ascertainable.

Brassier’s descriptions of reality vary wildly from Nietzsche. It is important to note

before proceeding, however, that “descriptions of reality” could be better stated as “descriptions

of how individuals can come to know and interpret reality.” Both Nietzsche and Brassier are

concerned with what individuals must do in the world they find themselves in and how the

limitations of knowing that reality control what sort of affirmative actions, if any, they can take.

Although Brassier may not directly affiliate with it, his name is usually associated with a newly

growing movement known as speculative realism. Speculative realism’s primary goal, in the

words of Brassier, is to “uphold the autonomy of a space-time that is independent of the

correlation of thinking and being” (Nihil 149). This affirmation does away with the Kantian

notion of “a finitude” which functions to actively deny of a world free from human

representation (Nihil 127). Brassier reaches this realism by borrowing somewhat from Francois

Laruelle whose “non-philosophy” provides powerful insight to imagine non-human points of

observation that function as “autonomous theoretical practice” (Nihil 120). This theoretical

observational point is termed “radical immanence,” which can be thought of as reality exactly

how it is. Like how a microscope or telescope enhances human observational power to allow

humans to perceive things one step closer to the way they really are, this point of nonbeing is

capable of fully experiencing the immanence of reality surrounding it. For Laruelle, every

instance is a “philosophical decision” during which the immanence of the world binds with the

transcendence of thought to create a unity that is represented in the human mind (Nihil 122).

Thereby, Brassier argues that the limitations of human grasps at reality are not embedded in
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reality itself but in the process of binding reality to human representation during the

philosophical decision. The result is an affirmation that while there may be limitations to how

humans represent reality, that reality is not affected by those human representations.

The foremost difference between speculative realism and Nietzsche’s world of deceitful

images is that the former is ontological whereas the latter is metaphysical. There is a lack of

precision from Nietzsche exactly because his philosophy precludes it. Rather than try to describe

the world and what it entails, Nietzsche argues that one cannot even get that far and instead can

only know that there is uncertainty, randomness, and suffering in life. On the other hand,

speculative realism argues that reality allows itself to be better known through closer

interrogations (Brassier even flirts with affirming science) that allows for very precise ontologies

that can overthrow the need for metaphysics entirely. If one accepts these premises what value

can there still be garnered from Nietzsche? If there is in fact truth in the world, how can

Nietzsche’s nihilism still stand?

There are several ways in which speculative realism can be used to caveat Nietzsche’s

ideas in a way that still thoroughly preserves them. First, the acknowledgment of a mind

independent reality does not preclude images such as the Apollonian illusion from maintaining

their harmful effects on civilizations. Even Brassier notes that just because there is a reality free

from thought that does not mean that representations of that reality are not deleterious. The

“speculative” part of speculative realism indicates that we are always at least one step away from

knowing reality even if it does exist in some pure form. Thus, Nietzsche’s arguments are can be

lowered in degree of severity, particularly in areas of hard sciences, but they still easily hold

strong in areas such as social sciences and prescriptive philosophy which try to interpret human

nature in ways that are always abstract at best. In this respect, contemporary readers of Nietzsche
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can note that practically there is only an obfuscation of reality in areas that are particularly

difficult to capture in models or theories, whereas some ideas may be very close to reality with

only a marginal degree of incorrectness.

The next possibility depends on discarding how Nietzsche describes the nihilistic world

while retaining his solution to it. Part of the problem with Nietzsche’s thought is that he assumes

that truth is always tied to meaning. In an interview with the quarterly magazine Kronos,

Brassier notably indicates that “[he] is a nihilist because [he] still believes in truth.” Part of his

speculative thought is that there are aspects of the reality that one can come to know and call as

true given enough interrogation and thought. Unlike Nietzsche, however, he arrives at his

nihilism by showing that a closer look descriptive truth reveals that there is no inherent meaning

tied to the way things are; this is nearly opposite the route Nietzsche’s nihilism takes. For him,

one is unable to arrive at meaning because he or she discovers that there is no truth. This is the

the greatest point of clash between Nietzsche and Brassier, however, sacrificing Nietzsche’s

metaphysics still allows one to ponder if his way of dealing with nihilism has any residual value.

Brassier argues for a complete repudiation of values and meaning in order to attune individuals

with what he calls the “intelligibility of extinction” which allows one to have greater

understanding of knowledge outside of the subject once one realizes that human life will go on

after the extinguishment of the Sun (Nihil 238). Unlike Nietzsche’s solution which involves

escaping the Apollonian illusion and taking up a participative and creative role in life in order to

have small instances of pleasure and meaning within a lifetime, Brassier discards the possibility

of overcoming nihilism in even this trivial way. In this way, Brassier can be considered a

hardcore nihilist who believes nihilism is impossible to overcome whereas Nietzsche can be read

as an existentialist who posits nihilism as an incredibly difficult obstacle that he has burdened
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upon himself to overcome. However, if one accepts Brassier’s speculative realistic description of

the world while retaining Nietzsche’s participative solution then perhaps some meaningful value

can still develop in individuals who embrace the niceties of life. Although, Brassier would argue

that this would be an illusory meaning, it could still be a life affirming process that is not tied up

with ressentiment associated with other false images that Nietzsche quick to dismiss. Thus,

Nietzsche philosophy’s in light of speculative realism is no longer about what is correctly

valuable but rather what is most efficacious and does not trigger values to turn in on themselves

as do many other attempts at meaning fail. It does not matter whether Nietzsche’s solution is

“true” but rather what matters is if it is efficient and gives humans a meaningful existence that

will not collapse because the subtleties of participating in life are the least constructed and least

concerned with upholding images of false righteousness.

Works Cited
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Brassier, Ray. Nihil Unbound: Enlightenment and Extinction. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2007.

Print.

Brassier, Ray, and Marcin Rychter. "Ray Brassier Interviewed by Marcin Rychter - I Am a Nihilist

Because I Still Believe in Truth." KRONOS Metafizyka. N.p., n.d. Web. 30 Nov. 2014.

Nietzsche, Friedrich Wilhelm. The Birth of Tragedy. Oxford: Oxford UP, 2000. Print. (numbers in

parentheses are sections, not pages)