This is crazy!

Respondent DISCOVERED that she was MARRIED to a certain Korean National, while she was
preparing her documents/papers for her forthcoming marriage with her fianc. See Digest below!
JURISPRUDENCE UPDATE: (J. PERALTA DOCTRINE)
REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES vs. MERLINDA L. OLAYBAR, G.R. No. 189538, February 10, 2014.
PERALTA, J p:
FACTS:
Respondent requested from the National Statistics Office (NSO) a Certificate of No Marriage (CENOMAR) as one of
the requirements for her marriage with her boyfriend of five years. Upon receipt thereof, she discovered that she was
already married to a certain Ye Son Sune, a Korean National, on June 24, 2002, at the Office of the Municipal Trial
Court in Cities (MTCC), Palace of Justice. She denied having contracted said marriage and claimed that she did not
know the alleged husband; she did not appear before the solemnizing officer; and, that the signature appearing in the
marriage certificate is not hers. She filed a Petition under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court for Cancellation of Entries in
the Marriage Contract, especially the entries in the wife portion thereof. Respondent impleaded the Local Civil
Registrar
of
Cebu
City,
as
well
as
her
alleged
husband,
as
parties
to
the
case.
During trial, respondent testified on her behalf and explained that she could not have appeared before Judge
Mamerto Califlores, the supposed solemnizing officer, at the time the marriage was allegedly celebrated, because she
was then in Makati working as a medical distributor in Hansao Pharma. She completely denied having known the
supposed husband, but she revealed that she recognized the named witnesses to the marriage as she had met them
while she was working as a receptionist in Tadels Pension House. She believed that her name was used by a certain
Johnny Singh, who owned a travel agency, whom she gave her personal circumstances in order for her to obtain a
passport. Respondent also presented as witness a certain Eufrocina Natinga, an employee of MTCC, Branch 1, who
confirmed that the marriage of Ye Son Sune was indeed celebrated in their office, but claimed that the alleged wife
who appeared was definitely not respondent. Lastly, a document examiner testified that the signature appearing in the
marriage contract was forged.
On May 5, 2009, the RTC rendered the assailed Decision in favor of respondent and directed the Local Civil Registrar
of Cebu City to cancel all the entries in the WIFE portion of the alleged marriage contract of the petitioner and
respondent Ye Son Sune. Finding that the signature appearing in the subject marriage contract was not that of
respondent, the court found basis in granting the latter's prayer to straighten her record and rectify the terrible
mistake.
ISSUES:
1.
Did
the
RTC
correctly
apply
Rule
108
of
the
Rules
of
Court?
2. is the cancellation of all entries in the wife portion of the alleged marriage contract in effect a declaration that the
marriage is void ab initio?
RULING:
1. YES. Since the promulgation of Republic v. Valencia in 1986, the Court has repeatedly ruled that "even substantial
errors in a civil registry may be corrected through a petition filed under Rule 108, with the true facts established and
the parties aggrieved by the error availing themselves of the appropriate adversarial proceeding."

Rule 108 of the Rules of Court sets forth the rules on cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. It
provides the procedure for cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry. The proceedings may either be
summary or adversary. If the correction is clerical, then the procedure to be adopted is summary. If the rectification
affects the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party, it is deemed substantial, and the procedure to be adopted
is adversary.
An appropriate adversary suit or proceeding is one where the trial court has conducted proceedings where all relevant
facts have been fully and properly developed, where opposing counsel have been given opportunity to demolish the
opposite party's case, and where the evidence has been thoroughly weighed and considered.
It is true that in special proceedings, formal pleadings and a hearing may be dispensed with, and the remedy [is]
granted upon mere application or motion. However, a special proceeding is not always summary. The procedure laid
down in Rule 108 is not a summary proceeding per se. It requires publication of the petition; it mandates the inclusion
as parties of all persons who may claim interest which would be affected by the cancellation or correction; it also
requires the civil registrar and any person in interest to file their opposition, if any; and it states that although the court
may make orders expediting the proceedings, it is after hearing that the court shall either dismiss the petition or issue
an order granting the same. Thus, as long as the procedural requirements in Rule 108 are followed, it is the
appropriate adversary proceeding to effect substantial corrections and changes in entries of the civil register.
In this case, the entries made in the wife portion of the certificate of marriage are admittedly the personal
circumstances of respondent. The latter, however, claims that her signature was forged and she was not the one who
contracted marriage with the purported husband. In other words, she claims that no such marriage was entered into
or if there was, she was not the one who entered into such contract. It must be recalled that when respondent tried to
obtain a CENOMAR from the NSO, it appeared that she was married to a certain Ye Son Sune. She then sought the
cancellation of entries in the wife portion of the marriage certificate. HTCSDE
In filing the petition for correction of entry under Rule 108, respondent made the Local Civil Registrar of Cebu City, as
well as her alleged husband Ye Son Sune, as parties-respondents. It is likewise undisputed that the procedural
requirements set forth in Rule 108 were complied with. The Office of the Solicitor General was likewise notified of the
petition which in turn authorized the Office of the City Prosecutor to participate in the proceedings. More importantly,
trial was conducted where respondent herself, the stenographer of the court where the alleged marriage was
conducted, as well as a document examiner, testified. Several documents were also considered as evidence. With the
testimonies and other evidence presented, the trial court found that the signature appearing in the subject marriage
certificate was different from respondent's signature appearing in some of her government issued identification cards.
The court thus made a categorical conclusion that respondent's signature in the marriage certificate was not hers
and, therefore, was forged. Clearly, it was established that, as she claimed in her petition, no such marriage was
celebrated.
2. NO. The SC maintained that Rule 108 cannot be availed of to determine the validity of marriage, the SC ruled that
it cannot nullify the proceedings before the trial court where all the parties had been given the opportunity to contest
the allegations of respondent; the procedures were followed, and all the evidence of the parties had already been
admitted and examined. Respondent indeed sought, not the nullification of marriage as there was no marriage to
speak of, but the correction of the record of such marriage to reflect the truth as set forth by the evidence. Otherwise
stated, in allowing the correction of the subject certificate of marriage by cancelling the wife portion thereof, the trial
court did not, in any way, declare the marriage void as there was no marriage to speak of.
In Minoru Fujiki v. Maria Paz Galela Marinay, Shinichi Maekara, Local Civil Registrar of Quezon City, and the
Administrator and Civil Registrar General of the National Statistics Office, the SC ruled that a "petition for correction or
cancellation of an entry in the civil registry cannot substitute for an action to invalidate a marriage. A direct action is

necessary to prevent circumvention of the substantive and procedural safeguards of marriage under the Family Code,
A.M. No. 02-11-10-SC and other related laws. Among these safeguards are the requirement of proving the limited
grounds for the dissolution of marriage, support pendente lite of the spouses and children, the liquidation, partition
and distribution of the properties of the spouses and the investigation of the public prosecutor to determine collusion.
A direct action for declaration of nullity or annulment of marriage is also necessary to prevent circumvention of the
jurisdiction of the Family Courts under the Family Courts Act of 1997 (Republic Act No. 8369), as a petition for
cancellation or correction of entries in the civil registry may be filed in the Regional Trial Court where the
corresponding civil registry is located. In other words, a Filipino citizen cannot dissolve his marriage by the mere
expedient of changing his entry of marriage in the civil registry."
In this case, however, the SC found that aside from the certificate of marriage, no such evidence was presented to
show the existence of marriage. Rather, respondent showed by overwhelming evidence that no marriage was entered
into and that she was not even aware of such existence. The testimonial and documentary evidence clearly
established that the only "evidence" of marriage which is the marriage certificate was a forgery.

Rule 103 v. 108 CASE

Republic of the Philippines

Supreme Court
Manila
THIRD DIVISION
REPUBLIC
PHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,

OF

THE

G.R. No. 189476

Present:

- versus JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON

COSETENG-MAGPAYO
(A.K.A. JULIAN EDWARD
EMERSON
MARQUEZ-LIM
COSETENG),
Respondent.

CARPIO MORALES, J., Chairperson,

BRION,
BERSAMIN, and
VILLARAMA, JR., and
SERENO, JJ.
Promulgated:
February 2, 2011

x--------------------------------------------------x

DECISION

CARPIO MORALES, J.:

Born in Makati on September 9, 1972, Julian Edward Emerson Coseteng

Magpayo (respondent) is the son of Fulvio M. Magpayo Jr. and Anna Dominique
Marquez-Lim Coseteng who, as respondents certificate of live birth [1] shows,
contracted marriage on March 26, 1972.
Claiming, however, that his parents were never legally married, respondent
filed on July 22, 2008 at the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Quezon City a Petition
to change his name to Julian Edward Emerson Marquez Lim Coseteng. The
petition, docketed as SPP No. Q-0863058, was entitled IN RE PETITION
FOR CHANGE OF NAME OF JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG
MAGPAYO TO JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG.
In support of his petition, respondent submitted a certification from the
National Statistics Office stating that his mother Anna Dominique does not appear
in [its] National Indices of Marriage. [2] Respondent also submitted his academic
records from elementary up to college[3] showing that he carried the surname
Coseteng, and the birth certificate of his child where Coseteng appears as his
surname.[4] In the 1998, 2001 and 2004 Elections, respondent ran and was elected
as Councilor of Quezon Citys 3rdDistrict using the name JULIAN M.L.
COSETENG.[5]
On order of Branch 77 of the Quezon City RTC,[6] respondent amended his
petition by alleging therein compliance with the 3-year residency requirement
under Section 2, Rule 103 of the Rules of Court.[7]
The notice setting the petition for hearing on November 20, 2008 was
published in the newspaper Broadside in its issues of October 31-November 6,
2008, November 7-13, 2008, and November 14-20, 2008.[8] And a copy of the
notice was furnished the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG).
No opposition to the petition having been filed, an order of general default
was entered by the trial court which then allowed respondent to present
evidence ex parte.[9]

By Decision of January 8, 2009,[10] the trial court granted respondents

petition and directed the Civil Registrar of MakatiCity to:

1. Delete the entry March 26, 1972 in Item 24 for DATE

AND PLACE OF MARRIAGE OF PARTIES [in herein
respondents Certificate of live Birth];
2. Correct the entry MAGPAYO in the space for the Last
Name of the [respondent] to COSETENG;
3. Delete the entry COSETENG in the space for Middle
Name of the [respondent]; and
4. Delete the entry Fulvio Miranda Magpayo, Jr. in the
space for FATHER of the [respondent] (emphasis and underscoring
supplied; capitalization in the original)

The Republic of the Philippines (Republic) filed a motion for

reconsideration but it was denied by the trial court by Order of July 2, 2009,
[11]
hence, it, thru the OSG, lodged the present petition for review to the Court on
pure question of law.
The Republic assails the decision in this wise:
I.

. . . THE PETITION FOR CHANGE OF NAMEINVOLVES

THE CHANGE OF [RESPONDENTS] CIVIL STATUS FROM
LEGITIMATE TO ILLEGITIMATE AND, THEREFORE,
SHOULD
BE
MADE
THROUGH
APPROPRIATE
ADVERSARIAL PROCEEDINGS

II.

THE
TRIAL
COURT EXCEEDED
ITS
JURISDICTION WHEN IT DIRECTED THE DELETION OF
THE NAME OF RESPONDENTS FATHER FROM HIS BIRTH
CERTIFICATE.[12] (emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The Republic contends that the deletion of the entry on the date and place of
marriage of respondents parents from his birth certificate has the effect of changing

his civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, hence, any change in civil status of a
person must be effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding.[13]
The Republic adds that by ordering the deletion of respondents parents date
of marriage and the name of respondents fatherfrom the entries in respondents
birth certificate,[14] the trial court exceeded its jurisdiction, such order not being in
accord with respondents prayer reading:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, it is most respectfully
prayed that the Honorable Court issue an order allowing the change of
name of petitioner from JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON COSETENG
MAGPAYO to JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON MARQUEZ-LIM
COSETENG, and that the Honorable Court order the Local Civil
Registrar and all other relevant government agencies to reflect the said
change of name in their records.
Petitioner prays for other reliefs deemed proper under the
premises.[15] (underscoring supplied)

Respondent counters that the proceeding before the trial court was adversarial in
nature. He cites the serving of copies of the petition and its annexes upon the Civil
Registrar of Makati, the Civil Registrar General, and the OSG; the posting of
copies of the notice of hearing in at least four public places at least ten days before
the hearing; the delegation to the OSG by the City Prosecutor of Quezon City to
appear on behalf of the Republic; the publication of the notice of hearing in a
newspaper of general circulation for three consecutive weeks; and the fact that no
oppositors appeared on the scheduled hearing.[16]
The petition is impressed with merit.
A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103 (CHANGE OF
NAME) using valid and meritorious grounds including(a) when the name is
ridiculous, dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or pronounce; (b) when the
change results as a legal consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the change
will avoid confusion; (d) when one has continuously used and been known since
childhood by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien parentage; (e) a sincere
desire to adopt a Filipino name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good faith

and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when the surname causes embarrassment
and there is no showing that the desired change of name was for a fraudulent
purpose or that the change of name would prejudice public interest. [17] Respondents
reason for changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or analogous to,
recognized grounds, however.
The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of
the Philippines.[18] In Alfon, the Court allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella Alfon,
to use the name that she had been known since childhood in order to avoid
confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. She merely sought to use
the surname of her mother which she had been using since childhood.Ruling in her
favor, the Court held that she was lawfully entitled to use her mothers surname,
adding that the avoidance of confusion was justification enough to allow her to do
so. In the present case, however, respondent denies his legitimacy.
The change being sought in respondents petition goes so far as to affect
his legal status in relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy to that
of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant respondents supplication.
Labayo-Rowe v. Republic[19] categorically holds that changes which
may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate. . . are substantial and
controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate adversary
proceedings . . .
Since respondents desired change affects his civil status from legitimate to
illegitimate, Rule 108 applies. It reads:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition.Any person interested in any
act, event, order or decree concerning the civil status of persons which
has been recorded in the civil register, may file a verified petition for
the cancellation or correction of any entry relating thereto,with the
[RTC] of the province where the corresponding civil registry is
located.
xxxx

SEC. 3. Parties.When cancellation or correction of an entry in the

civil register is sought, the civil registrar and all persons who have or
claim any interest which would be affected thereby shall be made
parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the petition,
the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the hearing of the
same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
named in the petition. The court shall also cause the order to be
published once a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper of
general circulation in the province. (emphasis, italics and underscoring
supplied)

Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns ones civil
status should be filed in the civil registry in which the entry is sought to be
cancelled or corrected that of Makati in the present case, and all persons who have
or claim any interest which would be affected thereby should be made parties to
the proceeding.
As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not
in Makati where his birth certificate was registered but inQuezon City. And as the
above-mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent before the RTC shows,
neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were made parties
thereto.

Respondent nevertheless cites Republic v. Capote[20] in support of his claim

that his change of name was effected through an appropriate adversary proceeding.
Republic v. Belmonte,[21] illuminates, however:
The procedure recited in Rule 103 regarding change of name and
in Rule 108 concerning the cancellation or correction of entries in the
civil registry are separate and distinct. They may not be substituted one
for the other for the sole purpose of expediency. To hold otherwise
would render nugatory the provisions of the Rules of Court allowing the

change of ones name or the correction of entries in the civil registry only
upon meritorious grounds. . . . (emphasis, capitalization and
underscoring supplied)

Even assuming arguendo that respondent had simultaneously availed of

these
two
statutory
remedies,
respondent
cannot
be
said
to
have sufficiently complied with Rule 108. For, as reflected above, aside
from improper venue, he failed to implead the civil registrar of Makati and all
affected parties as respondents in the case.
Republic v. Labrador[22] mandates that a petition for a substantial correction
or change of entries in the civil registry should have as respondents the civil
registrar, as well as all other persons who have or claim to have any interest that
would be affected thereby. It cannot be gainsaid that change of status of a child in
relation to his parents is a substantial correction or change of entry in the civil
registry.
Labayo-Rowe[23] highlights the necessity of impleading indispensable parties
in a petition which involves substantial and controversial alterations. In that case,
the therein petitioner Emperatriz Labayo-Rowe (Emperatriz) filed a petition for the
correction of entries in the birth certificates of her children, Vicente Miclat, Jr. and
Victoria Miclat, in the Civil Registry of San Fernando, Pampanga. Emperatriz
alleged that her name appearing in the birth certificates is Beatriz, which is her
nickname, but her full name is Emperatriz; and her civil status appearing in the
birth certificate of her daughter Victoria as married on 1953 Bulan are erroneous
because she was not married to Vicente Miclat who was the one who furnished the
data in said birth certificate.
The trial court found merit in Emperatrizs petition and accordingly directed
the local civil registrar to change her name appearing in her childrens birth
certificates from Beatriz to Emperatriz; and to correct her civil status in Victorias
birth certificate from married to single and the date and place of marriage to no
marriage.

On petition before this Court after the Court of Appeals found that the order
of the trial court involved a question of law, the Court nullified the trial courts
order directing the change of Emperatriz civil status and the filiation of her child
Victoria in light of the following observations:
x x x x Aside from the Office of the Solicitor General, all other
indispensable parties should have been made respondents.They
include not only the declared father of the child but the child as
well, together with the paternal grandparents, if any, as their
hereditary rights would be adversely affected thereby. All other
persons who may be affected by the change should be notified or
represented. The truth is best ascertained under an adversary system
of justice.
The right of the child Victoria to inherit from her parents would
be substantially impaired if her status would be changed from
legitimate to illegitimate. Moreover, she would be exposed to
humiliation and embarrassment resulting from the stigma of an
illegitimate filiation that she will bear thereafter. The fact that the
notice of hearing of the petition was published in a newspaper of
general circulation and notice thereof was served upon the State
will not change the nature of the proceedings taken. Rule 108, like all
the other provisions of the Rules of Court, was promulgated by the
Supreme Court pursuant to its rule-making authority under Section
13, Article VIII of the 1973 Constitution, which directs that such rules
shall not diminish, increase or modify substantive rights. If Rule 108
were to be extended beyond innocuous or harmless changes or
corrections of errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the
understanding, so as to comprehend substantial and controversial
alterations
concerning citizenship,
legitimacy
of
paternity orfiliation, or legitimacy of marriage, without observing
the proper proceedings as earlier mentioned, said rule would thereby
become anunconstitutional exercise which would tend to increase
or modify substantive rights. This situation is not contemplated
under Article 412 of the Civil Code. [24] (emphasis, italics and
underscoring supplied)

As for the requirement of notice and publication, Rule 108 provides:

SEC. 4. Notice and publication.Upon the filing of the

petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and place for the
hearing of the same, and cause reasonable notice thereof to
be given to the persons named in the petition. The court shall
alsocause the order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general circulation in the
province.

SEC. 5. Opposition.The civil registrar and any person

having or claiming any interest under the entry whose
cancellation or correction is sought may, within fifteen (15)
days from notice of the petition, or from the last date of
publication of such notice, file his opposition thereto. (emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

A reading of these related provisions readily shows that Rule 108 clearly
mandates two sets of notices to different potential oppositors. The first notice is
that given to the persons named in the petition and the second (which is through
publication) is that given to other persons who are not named in the petition but
nonetheless may be considered interested or affected parties, such as
creditors. That two sets of notices are mandated under the above-quoted Section 4
is validated by the subsequent Section 5, also above-quoted, which provides for
two periods (for the two types of potential oppositors) within which to file an
opposition (15 days from notice or from the last date of publication).
This is the overriding principle laid down in Barco v. Court of Appeals.[25] In
that case, Nadina Maravilla (Nadina) filed apetition for correction of entries in the
birth certificate of her daughter June from June Salvacion Maravilla to June
Salvacion Gustilo, Armando Gustilo being, according to Nadina, her daughters real
father. Gustilo in fact filed before the trial court aCONSTANCIA wherein he
acknowledged June as his daughter. The trial court granted the petition.

After Gustilo died, his son Jose Vicente Gustilo filed with the Court of
Appeals a petition for annulment of the Order of the trial court granting the change
of Junes family name to Gustilo.
Milagros Barco (Barco), natural guardian of her minor daughter Mary Joy
Ann Gustilo, filed before the appellate court a motion for intervention, alleging
that Mary Joy had a legal interest in the annulment of the trial courts Order as
Mary Joy was, by Barcos claim, also fathered by Gustilo.
The appellate court dismissed the petition for annulment and complaint-inintervention.
On appeal by Barco, this Court ruled that she should have been impleaded in
Nadinas petition for correction of entries of the birth certificate of Mary Joy. But
since a petitioner, like Nadina, is not expected to exhaustively identify all the
affected parties, the subsequent publication of the notice cured the omission of
Barco as a party to the case. Thus the Court explained:
Undoubtedly, Barco is among the parties referred to in Section
3 of Rule 108. Her interest was affected by the petition for correction,
as any judicial determination that June was the daughter of Armando
would affect her wards share in the estate of her father.It cannot be
established whether Nadina knew of Mary Joys existence at the time
she filed the petition for correction. Indeed, doubt may always be
cast as to whether a petitioner under Rule 108 would know of all
the parties whose interests may be affected by the granting of a
petition. For example, a petitioner cannot be presumed to be
aware of all the legitimate or illegitimate offsprings of his/her
spouse or paramour. x x x x.
xxxx
The purpose precisely of Section 4, Rule 108 is to bind the
whole world to the subsequent judgment on the petition. The sweep
of the decision would cover even parties who should have been
impleaded under Section 3, Rule 108 but were inadvertently left
out. x x x x.[26] (emphasis, italics and underscoring supplied)

Meanwhile, in Republic v. Kho,[27] Carlito Kho (Carlito) and his siblings named the
civil registrar as the sole respondent in the petition they filed for the correction of
entries in their respective birth certificates in the civil registry of Butuan City, and
correction of entries in the birth certificates of Carlitos minor children. Carlito and
his siblings requested the correction in their birth certificates of the citizenship of
their mother Epifania to Filipino, instead of Chinese, and the deletion of the word
married opposite the phrase Date of marriage of parents because their parents
Juan and Epifania were not married. And Carlito requested the correction in the
birth certificates of their children of his and his wifes date of marriage to reflect the
actual date of their marriage as appearing in their marriage certificate. In the course
of the hearing of the petition, Carlito also sought the correction of the name of his
wife from Maribel to Marivel.
The Khos mother Epifania took the witness stand where she declared that
she was not married to Juan who died before the filing of the Khos petition.
The trial court granted the petition.
On the issue of whether the failure to implead Marivel and the Khos parents
rendered the trial of the petition short of the required adversary proceedings and
the trial courts judgment void, this Court held that when all the procedural
requirements under Rule 108 are followed, the publication of the notice of hearing
cures the failure to implead an indispensable party. In so ruling, the Court noted
that the affected parties were already notified of the proceedings in the case since
the petitioner-siblings Khos were the ones who initiated the petition respecting
their prayer for correction of their citizenship, and Carlito respecting the actual
date of his marriage to his wife; and, with respect to the Khos petition for change
of their civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, their mother Epifania herself
took the witness stand declaring that she was not married to their father.
What is clear then in Barco and Kho is the mandatory directive under
Section 3 of Rule 108 to implead the civil registrar andthe parties who would
naturally and legally be affected by the grant of a petition for correction or
cancellation of entries. Non-impleading, however, as party-respondent of one who
is inadvertently left out or is not established to be known by the petitioner to be
affected by the grant of the petition or actually participates in the proceeding is
notified through publication.

IN FINE, when a petition for cancellation or correction of an entry in the civil

register involves substantial and controversialalterations including those on
citizenship, legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, a strict
compliance with the requirements of Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is mandated.
WHEREFORE, the petition is, in light of the foregoing
discussions, GRANTED. The January 8, 2009 Decision of Branch 77 of the
Regional Trial Court of Quezon City in SP Proc. No. Q-0863058 is NULLIFIED.
SO ORDERED.
CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES
Associate Justice

Rule 103 and Rule 108 contradistinguished. .

REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES
vs. JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON
COSETENG-MAGPAYO (A.K.A.
JULIAN EDWARD EMERSON
MARQUEZ-LIM COSETENG), G.R.
No. 189476, February 2, 2011

x x x.

A person can effect a change of name under Rule 103

(CHANGE OF NAME) using valid and meritorious

grounds including (a) when the name is ridiculous,

dishonorable or extremely difficult to write or
pronounce; (b) when the change results as a legal
consequence such as legitimation; (c) when the
change will avoid confusion; (d) when one has
continuously used and been known since childhood
by a Filipino name, and was unaware of alien
parentage; (e) a sincere desire to adopt a Filipino
name to erase signs of former alienage, all in good
faith and without prejudicing anybody; and (f) when
the surname causes embarrassment and there is no
showing that the desired change of name was for a
fraudulent purpose or that the change of name would
prejudice public interest.[1] Respondents reason for
changing his name cannot be considered as one of, or
analogous to, recognized grounds, however.
The present petition must be differentiated from Alfon v. Republic of the
Philippines.[2] In Alfon, the Court allowed the therein petitioner, Estrella
Alfon, to use the name that she had been known since childhood in order to
avoid confusion. Alfon did not deny her legitimacy, however. She merely
sought to use the surname of her mother which she had been using since
childhood. Ruling in her favor, the Court held that she was lawfully entitled
to use her mothers surname, adding that the avoidance of confusion was
justification enough to allow her to do so. In the present case, however,
respondent denies his legitimacy.
The change being sought in respondents petition goes so far as to affect
his legal status in relation to his parents. It seeks to change his legitimacy
to that of illegitimacy. Rule 103 then would not suffice to grant respondents
supplication.
Labayo-Rowe v. Republic[3] categorically holds that changes which
may affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate . . . are substantial
and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate
adversary proceedings . . .

Since respondents desired change affects his civil

status from legitimate to illegitimate, Rule
108 applies. It reads:
SECTION 1. Who may file petition.Any person
interested in any act, event, order or decree
concerning the civil status of persons which has been
recorded in the civil register, may file a verified
petition for thecancellation or correction of any entry
relating thereto,with the [RTC] of the province where
the corresponding civil registry is located.
xxxx
SEC. 3. Parties.When cancellation or correction of
an entry in the civil register is sought, the civil
registrar andall persons who have or claim any
interest which would be affected thereby shall be
made parties to the proceeding.
SEC. 4. Notice and publication. Upon the filing of the
petition, the court shall, by an order, fix the time and
place for the hearing of the same, and cause
reasonable notice thereof to be given to the persons
named in the petition. The court shall also cause the
order to be published once a week for three (3)
consecutive weeks in a newspaper of general
circulation in the province. (emphasis, italics and
underscoring supplied)
Rule 108 clearly directs that a petition which concerns ones civil status
should be filed in the civil registry in which the entry is sought to be
cancelled or corrected that of Makati in the present case, and all persons

who have or claim any interest which would be affected thereby should be
made parties to the proceeding.
As earlier stated, however, the petition of respondent was filed not in
Makati where his birth certificate was registered but in Quezon City. And as
the above-mentioned title of the petition filed by respondent before the RTC
shows, neither the civil registrar of Makati nor his father and mother were
made parties thereto.
X x x.

SECOND DIVISION

REPUBLIC OF
THEPHILIPPINES,
Petitioner,

- versus -

MERLYN MERCADERA
through her Attorney-in-Fact,

G.R. No. 186027

Present:
CARPIO, J., Chairperson,
NACHURA,
PERALTA,
ABAD, and
MENDOZA, JJ.

Promulgated:

EVELYN M. OGA,
Respondent.

December 8, 2010

X -------------------------------------------------------------------------------------- X

DECISION

MENDOZA, J.:

This petition for review on certiorari assails the December 9,

2008 Decision[1] of the Court of Appeals (CA), in CA G.R. CV No. 00568-MIN,
which affirmed the September 28, 2005 Order of the Regional Trial Court of
Dipolog City, Branch 8 (RTC), in a petition for correction of entries, docketed as
Special Proceedings No. R-3427 (SP No. R-3427), filed by respondent Merlyn
Mercadera (Mercadera) under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court.
The Factual and Procedural Antecedents
On June 6, 2005, Merlyn Mercadera (Mercadera), represented by her sister
and duly constituted Attorney-in-Fact, Evelyn M. Oga (Oga), sought the correction
of her given name as it appeared in her Certificate of Live Birth - from Marilyn L.
Mercadera toMerlyn L. Mercadera before the Office of the Local Civil Registrar
of Dipolog City pursuant to Republic Act No. 9048 (R.A. No. 9048).[2]
Under R.A. No. 9048, the city or municipal civil registrar or consul general,
as the case may be, is now authorized to effect the change of first name or
nickname and the correction of clerical or typographical errors in civil registry
entries. Under said law, jurisdiction over applications for change of first name is
now primarily lodged with administrative officers. The law now excludes the

change of first name from the coverage of Rules 103 until and unless an
administrative petition for change of name is first filed and subsequently
denied[3] and removes correction or changing of clerical errors in entries of the civil
register from the ambit of Rule 108. Hence, what is left for the scope of operation
of the rules are substantial changes and corrections in entries of the civil register.[4]
The Office of the Local Civil Registrar of Dipolog City, however, refused to
effect the correction unless a court order was obtained because the Civil Registrar
therein is not yet equipped with a permanent appointment before he can validly act
on petitions for corrections filed before their office as mandated by Republic Act
9048.[5]
Mercadera was then constrained to file a Petition For Correction of Some
Entries as Appearing in the Certificate of Live Birthunder Rule 108 before
the Regional Trial Court of Dipolog City (RTC). The petition was docketed as
Special Proceedings No. R-3427 (SP No. R-3427). Section 2 of Rule 108 reads:
SEC. 2. Entries subject to cancellation or correction. Upon
good and valid grounds, the following entries in the civil register
may be cancelled or corrected: (a) births; (b) marriages; (c)
deaths; (d) legal separations; (e) judgments of annulments of
marriage; (f) judgments declaring marriages void from the
beginning; (g) legitimations; (h) adoptions; (i) acknowledgments
of natural children; (j) naturalization; (k) election, loss or
recovery of citizenship; (l) civil interdiction; (m) judicial
determination of filiation; (n) voluntary emancipation of a minor;
and (o) changes of name. [Underscoring supplied]

Upon receipt of the petition for correction of entry, the RTC issued an order,
dated June 10, 2005, which reads:
Finding the petition sufficient in form and substance, notice
is hereby given that the hearing of said petition is set on JULY 26,
2005 at 8:30 oclock in the morning, at the Session Hall of Branch
8, this Court, Bulwagan ng Katarungan, Dipolog City, on which
date, time and place, anyone appearing to contest the petition
shall state in writing his grounds there[for], serving a copy thereof
to the petitioner and likewise file copies with this Court on or
before the said date of hearing.

Let this order be published at the expense of petitioner once

a week for three (3) consecutive weeks in a newspaper edited and
published in Dipolog City and of general circulation therein, the
City of Dapitan and the province of Zamboanga del Norte, and
copies hereof be furnished to the Office of the Solicitor General of
(sic) 134 Amorsolo St., Legaspi Village, Makati, Metro Manila, the
City Civil Registrar of Dipolog, and posted on the bulletin boards
of the City Hall of Dipolog, the Provincial Capitol Building, and of
this Court.
IT IS SO ORDERED.

The Office of the Solicitor General (OSG) entered its appearance for the
Republic of the Philippines and deputized the Office of the City Prosecutor to
assist in the case only on the very day of the hearing. This prompted the court to
reset the hearing onSeptember 5, 2005. On said day, there being no opposition,
counsel for Mercadera moved for leave of court to present evidence ex
parte. Without any objection from the City Prosecutor, the trial court designated
the branch clerk of court to receive evidence for Mercadera.
On September 15, 2005, the testimony of Oga and several photocopies of
documents were formally offered and marked as evidence to prove that Mercadera
never used the name Marilyn in any of her public or private
transactions. On September 26, 2005, the RTC issued an order[6] admitting Exhibits
A to I[7] and their submarkings, as relevant to the resolution of the case.
The following facts were gathered from documentary evidence and the oral
testimony of Oga, as reported by the lower court:
Petitioner Merlyn M. Mercadera was born on August 19,
1970 at Dipolog City. She is the daughter of spouses Tirso U.
Mercadera and Norma C. Lacquiao. The fact of her birth was
reported to the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog City
on September 8, 1970. It was recorded on page 68, book no. 9, in
the Registry of Births of said civil registry. In the certification of
birth dated May 9, 2005 issued by the same registry, her given
name appears as Marilyn and not Merlyn (Exhibit C).

On September 29, 1979, petitioner was baptized according

to the rites and ceremonies of the United Church of Christ in
the Philippines. As reflected in her certificate of baptism issued by
said church, she was baptized by the name Merlyn L. Mercadera
(Exhibit D).
In her elementary diploma issued by the Paaralang Sentral
ng Estaka, Dipolog City; her high school diploma issued by the
Zamboanga del Norte School of Arts and Trades, Dipolog City;
and college diploma issued by the Silliman University, Dumaguete
City, where she earned the degree of Bachelor of Secondary
Education, uniformly show her name as Merlyn L. Mercadera
(Exhibits E, F, and G).
Presently, she is working in U.P. Mindanao,
Buhangin, Davao City. Her certificate of membership issued by
the Government Service Insurance System also bears his [sic]
complete name as Merlyn Lacquiao Mercadera (Exhibit H).
When she secured an authenticated copy of her certificate of
live birth from the National Statistics Office, she discovered that
her given name as registered is Marilyn and not Merlyn; hence,
this petition.

In its September 28, 2005 Decision,[8] the RTC granted Mercaderas petition
and directed the Office of the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog City to correct her
name appearing in her certificate of live birth, Marilyn Lacquiao Mercadera, to
MERLYN Lacquiao Mercadera. Specifically, the dispositive portion of the RTC
Decision reads:
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. Accordingly, the
Office of the City Civil Registrar of Dipolog City is hereby directed
to correct the given name of petitioner appearing in her certificate
of live birth, from Marilyn Lacquiao Mercadera to MERLYN
Lacquiao Mercadera.

In a four-page decision, the RTC ruled that the documentary evidence presented by
Mercadera sufficiently supported the circumstances alleged in her petition.
Considering that she had used Merlyn as her given name since childhood until she

discovered the discrepancy in her Certificate of Live Birth, the RTC was
convinced that the correction was justified.
The OSG timely interposed an appeal praying for the reversal and setting
aside of the RTC decision. It mainly anchored its appeal on the availment of
Mercadera of the remedy and procedure under Rule 108. In its Brief[9] filed with
the CA, the OSG argued that the lower court erred (1) in granting the prayer for
change of name in a petition for correction of entries; and (2) in admitting the
photocopies of documentary evidence and hearsay testimony of Oga.
For the OSG, the correction in the spelling of Mercaderas given name might
seem innocuous enough to grant but it is in truth a material correction as it would
modify or increase substantive rights.[10] What the lower court actually allowed was
a change of Mercaderas given name, which would have been proper had she filed a
petition under Rule 103 and proved any of the grounds therefor. The lower court,
may not substitute one for the other for purposes of expediency.[11] Further, because
Mercadera failed to invoke a specific ground recognized by the Rules, the lower
courts order in effect allowed the change of ones name in the civil registry without
basis.
The CA was not persuaded. In its December 9, 2008 Decision, [12] the
appellate court affirmed the questioned RTC Order in CA-G.R. CV No. 00568MIN. The CA assessed the controversy in this wise:
Appellants insistence that the petition should have been
filed under Rule 103 and not Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is off
the mark. This Court does not entertain any doubt that the
petition before the trial court was one for the correction on an
entry in petitioners Certificate of Live Birth and not one in which
she sought to change her name. In Co v. Civil Register of
Manila, G.R. No. 138496, February 23, 2004, the High Court
reiterated the distinction between the phrases to correct and to
change. Said the High Court:
To correct simply means "to make or set aright; to remove
the faults or error from." To change means "to replace something
with something else of the same kind or with something that
serves as a substitute. Article 412 of the New Civil Code does not

qualify as to the kind of entry to be changed or corrected or

distinguished on the basis of the effect that the correction or
change may be. Such entries include not only those clerical in
nature but also substantial errors. After all, the role of the Court
under Rule 108 of the Rules of Court is to ascertain the truths
about the facts recorded therein.
That appellee sought to correct an entry and not to change her
name is patent to the Court from the allegations in her petition,
specifically, paragraphs 7 and 8 thereof
xxxx

Anent the RTCs error in admitting the photocopies of Mercaderas

documentary evidence and in vesting probative value to Ogas testimony, the CA
cited the well-established rule that evidence not objected to may be admitted and
may be validly considered by the court in arriving at its judgment.[13]
On March 6, 2009, the OSG filed the present petition. On behalf of
Mercadera, the Public Attorneys Office (PAO) filed its Comment [14] on July 3,
2009. The OSG declined to file a reply claiming that its petition already contained
an exhaustive discussion on the following assigned errors:[15]
I
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW
IN GRANTING THE CHANGE IN RESPONDENTS NAME
UNDER RULE 103.

II
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED ON A QUESTION OF LAW
IN CONSIDERING SECONDARY EVIDENCE.

Rule 103 procedurally governs judicial petitions for change of given name or
surname, or both, pursuant to Article 376 of the Civil Code. [16] This rule provides
the procedure for an independent special proceeding in court to establish the status
of a person involving his relations with others, that is, his legal position in, or with
regard to, the rest of the community.[17] In petitions for change of name, a person
avails of a remedy to alter the designation by which he is known and called in the
community in which he lives and is best known. [18] When granted,
a persons identity and interactions are affected as he bears a new label or
appellation for the convenience of the world at large in addressing him, or in
speaking of, or dealing with him.[19] Judicial permission for a change of name aims
to prevent fraud and to ensure a record of the change by virtue of a court decree.
The proceeding under Rule 103 is also an action in rem which requires
publication of the order issued by the court to afford the State and all other
interested parties to oppose the petition. When complied with, the decision binds
not only the parties impleaded but the whole world. As notice to all, publication
serves to indefinitely bar all who might make an objection. It is the publication of
such notice that brings in the whole world as a party in the case and vests the court
with jurisdiction to hear and decide it.[20]
Essentially, a change of name does not define or effect a change of ones
existing family relations or in the rights and duties flowing therefrom. It does not
alter ones legal capacity or civil status.[21] However, there could be instances where
the change applied for may be open to objection by parties who already bear the
surname desired by the applicant, not because he would thereby acquire certain
family ties with them but because the existence of such ties might be erroneously
impressed on the public mind.[22] Hence, in requests for a change of name, what is
involved is not a mere matter of allowance or disallowance of the request, but a
judicious evaluation of the sufficiency and propriety of the justifications
advanced x x x mindful of the consequent results in the event of its grant x x x.[23]
Rule 108, on the other hand, implements judicial proceedings for the
correction or cancellation of entries in the civil registry pursuant to Article 412 of
the Civil Code.[24] Entries in the civil register refer to acts, events and judicial
decrees concerning the civil status of persons, [25] also as enumerated in Article 408
of the same law.[26] Before, only mistakes or errors of a harmless and innocuous

nature in the entries in the civil registry may be corrected under Rule 108 and
substantial errors affecting the civil status, citizenship or nationality of a party are
beyond the ambit of the rule. In the abandoned case of Chua Wee v. Republic,
[27]
this Court declared that,
x x x if Rule 108 were to be extended beyond innocuous or
harmless changes or corrections of errors which are visible to the
eye or obvious to the understanding, so as to comprehend
substantial and controversial alterations concerning citizenship,
legitimacy of paternity or filiation, or legitimacy of marriage, said
Rule 108 would thereby become unconstitutional for it would be
increasing or modifying substantive rights, which changes are not
authorized under Article 412 of the new Civil Code."

In the latter case of Wong v. Republic,[28] however, Justice Vicente Abad

Santos, in a separate concurrence, opined that Article 412, which Rule 108
implements, contemplates all kinds of issues and all types of procedures because
the provision does not say that it applies only to non-controversial issues and that
the procedure to be used is summary in nature. In Republic v. Judge De la Cruz,
[29]
the dissenting opinion penned by Justice Pacifico De Castro echoed the same
view:
It is not accurate to say that Rule 108 would be rendered
unconstitutional if it would allow the correction of more than
mere harmless clerical error, as it would thereby increase or
modify substantive rights which the Constitution expressly forbids
because Article 412 of the Civil Code, the substantive law sought
to be implemented by Rule 108, allows only the correction of
innocuous clerical errors not those affecting the status of persons.
As was stressed in the dissent on the aforesaid Wong Case, Article
412 does not limit in its express terms nor by mere implication,
the correction authorized by it to that of mere clerical errors. x x x
it would be reasonable and justified to rule that Article 412
contemplates of correction of erroneous entry of whatever nature,
procedural safeguards having only to be provided for, as was the
manifest purpose of Rule 108.
x x x proceedings for the correction of erroneous entry
should not be considered as establishing one's status in a legal
manner conclusively beyond dispute or controversion, x x x the

books making up the civil register and all documents relating

thereto x x x shall be prima facie evidence of the facts therein
contained. Hence, the status as corrected would not have a
superior quality for evidentiary purpose. Moreover, the correction
should not imply a change of status but a mere rectification of
error to make the matter corrected speak for the truth. x x x

Finally in Republic v. Valencia,[30] the above stated views were adopted by

this Court insofar as even substantial errors or matters in a civil registry may be
corrected and the true facts established, provided the parties aggrieved avail
themselves of the appropriate adversary proceeding. If the purpose of the petition
is merely to correct the clerical errors which are visible to the eye or obvious to the
understanding, the court may, under a summary procedure, issue an order for the
correction of a mistake. However, as repeatedly construed, changes which may
affect the civil status from legitimate to illegitimate, as well as sex, are substantial
and controversial alterations which can only be allowed after appropriate
adversary proceedings depending upon the nature of the issues involved. Changes
which affect the civil status or citizenship of a party are substantial in
character and should be threshed out in a proper action depending upon the nature
of the issues in controversy, and wherein all the parties who may be affected by the
entries are notified or represented and evidence is submitted to prove the
allegations of the complaint, and proof to the contrary admitted x x x. [31] Where
such a change is ordered, the Court will not be establishing a substantive right but
only correcting or rectifying an erroneous entry in the civil registry as authorized
by law. In short, Rule 108 of the Rules of Court provides only the procedure or
mechanism for the proper enforcement of the substantive law embodied in Article
412 of the Civil Code and so does not violate the Constitution.[32]
In the case at bench, the OSG posits that the conversion from MARILYN to
MERLYN is not a correction of an innocuous error but a material correction
tantamount to a change of name which entails a modification or increase in
substantive rights. For the OSG, this is a substantial error that requires compliance
with the procedure under Rule 103, and not Rule 108.
It appears from these arguments that there is, to some extent, confusion over
the scope and application of Rules 103 and Rule 108. Where a change of name will

necessarily be reflected by the corresponding correction in an entry, as in this case,

the functions of both rules are often muddled. While there is no clear-cut rule to
categorize petitions under either rule, this Court is of the opinion that a resort to the
basic distinctions between the two rules with respect to alterations in a persons
registered name can effectively clear the seeming perplexity of the issue. Further, a
careful evaluation of circumstances alleged in the petition itself will serve as a
constructive guide to determine the propriety of the relief prayed for.
The change of name contemplated under Article 376 and Rule 103 must not
be confused with Article 412 and Rule 108. A change of ones name under Rule 103
can be granted, only on grounds provided by law. In order to justify a request for
change of name, there must be a proper and compelling reason for the change and
proof that the person requesting will be prejudiced by the use of his official
name. To assess the sufficiency of the grounds invoked therefor, there must be
adversarial proceedings.[33]
In petitions for correction, only clerical, spelling, typographical and other
innocuous errors in the civil registry may be raised.Considering that
the enumeration in Section 2, Rule 108[34] also includes changes of name, the
correction of a patently misspelled name is covered by Rule 108. Suffice it to say,
not all alterations allowed in ones name are confined under Rule 103. Corrections
for clerical errors may be set right under Rule 108.
This rule in names, however, does not operate to entirely limit Rule 108 to
the correction of clerical errors in civil registry entries by way of a summary
proceeding. As explained above, Republic v. Valencia is the authority for
allowing substantial errors in other entries like citizenship, civil status, and
paternity, to be corrected using Rule 108 provided there is an adversary
proceeding.After all, the role of the Court under Rule 108 is to ascertain the truths
about the facts recorded therein.[35]
A serious scrutiny of this petition reveals a glaring lack of support to the
OSGs assumption that Mercadera intended to change her name under Rule 103. All
that the petition propounded are swift arguments on the alleged procedural flaws of
Mercaderas petition before the RTC. In the same vein, no concrete contention was
brought up to convince this Court that the dangers sought to be prevented by the

adversarial proceedings prescribed in Rule 103 are attendant in this case. Instead,
the RTC found the documents presented by Mercadera to have satisfactorily shown
that she had been known as MERLYN ever since, discounting the possibility that
confusion, or a modification of substantive rights might arise. Truth be told, not a
single oppositor appeared to contest the petition despite full compliance with the
publication requirement.
Thus, the petition filed by Mercadera before the RTC correctly falls under
Rule 108 as it simply sought a correction of a misspelled given name. To correct
simply means to make or set aright; to remove the faults or error from. To change
means to replace something with something else of the same kind or with
something that serves as a substitute.[36] From the allegations in her
petition, Mercadera clearly prayed for the lower court to remove the faults or error
from her registered given name MARILYN, and to make or set aright the same to
conform to the one she grew up to, MERLYN. It does not take a complex
assessment of said petition to learn of its intention to simply correct the clerical
error in spelling. Mercadera even attempted to avail of the remedy allowed by R.A.
No. 9048 but she unfortunately failed to enjoy the expediency which the law
provides and was constrained to take court action to obtain relief. Thus, the petition
was clear in stating:
7. That as such, there is a need to correct her given name as
appearing in her Certificate of Live Birth from MARILYN to
MERLYN to conform to her true and correct given name that she
had been using and had been known within the community x x x.
8. That herein petitioner went to the Office of the Local Civil
Registrar of Dipolog City and requested them to effect such
correction in her Certificate of Live Birth, however, the Local Civil
Registrar of Dipolog City will not effect such correctionunless an
order is obtained by herein petitioner from this Honorable Court
because the Local Civil Registrar therein is not yet equipped with
permanent appointment before he can validly act on petitions for
corrections filed before their office as mandated by Republic Act
9048, hence the filing of this petition. [Emphases supplied]

Indeed, there are decided cases involving mistakes similar to Mercaderas

case which recognize the same a harmless error. InYu v. Republic[37] it was held that
to change Sincio to Sencio which merely involves the substitution of the first
vowel i in the first name into the vowel e amounts merely to the righting of a
clerical error. In Labayo-Rowe v. Republic,[38] it was held that the change of
petitioners name from Beatriz Labayo/Beatriz Labayu to Emperatriz Labayo was a
mere innocuous alteration wherein a summary proceeding was
appropriate. In Republic v. Court of Appeals, Jaime B. Caranto and Zenaida P.
Caranto, the correction involved the substitution of the letters ch for the letter d, so
that what appears as Midael as given name would read Michael. In the latter case,
this Court, with the agreement of the Solicitor General, ruled that the error was
plainly clerical, such that, changing the name of the child from Midael C. Mazon to
Michael C. Mazon cannot possibly cause any confusion, because both names can
be read and pronounced with the same rhyme (tugma) and tone (tono, tunog,
himig).[39]
In this case, the use of the letter a for the letter e, and the deletion of the
letter i, so that what appears as Marilyn would read as Merlyn is patently a
rectification of a name that is clearly misspelled. The similarity between Marilyn
and Merlyn may well be the object of a mix- up that blemished Mercaderas
Certificate of Live Birth until her adulthood, thus, her interest to correct the same.
The CA did not allow Mercadera the change of her name. What it did allow
was the correction of her misspelled given name which she had been using ever
since she could remember.
It is worthy to note that the OSGs reliance on Republic vs. Hernandez[40] is
flawed. In that case, this Court said that a change in a given name is a substantial
matter and that it cannot be granted by means of any other proceeding that would
in effect render it a mere incident or an offshoot of another special
proceeding. While this Court stands true to the ruling in Hernandez, the said
pronouncement therein was stated in a different tenor and, thus, inapplicable to this
case. Hernandez was decided against an entirely different factual milieu. There
was a petition for adoption that must not have led to a corresponding change in the
adoptees given name because it would be procedurally erroneous to employ a
petition for adoption to effect a change of name in the absence of a corresponding

petition for the latter relief at law. In the present case, the issue is the applicability
of either Rule 103 or Rule 108 and the relief sought by Mercadera can in fact be
granted under the latter. This Court finds no attempt on the part of Mercadera to
render the requirements under Rule 103 illusory as in Hernandez.

Besides, granting that Rule 103 applies to this case and that compliance with
the procedural requirements under Rule 108 falls short of what is mandated, it still
cannot be denied that Mercadera complied with the requirement for an adversarial
proceeding before the lower court. The publication and posting of the notice of
hearing in a newspaper of general circulation and the notices sent to the OSG and
the Local Civil Registry are sufficient indicia of an adverse proceeding. The fact
that no one opposed the petition, including the OSG, did not deprive the court of its
jurisdiction to hear the same and did not make the proceeding less adversarial in
nature. Considering that the OSG did not oppose the petition and the motion to
present its evidence ex parte when it had the opportunity to do so, it cannot now
complain that the proceedings in the lower court were procedurally
defective. Indeed, it has become unnecessary to further discuss the reasons why the
CA correctly affirmed the findings of the lower court especially in admitting and
according probative value to the evidence presented by Mercadera.
WHEREFORE, the December 9, 2008 Decision of the Court of Appeals in
CA-G.R. CV No. 00568-MIN is AFFIRMED.
SO ORDERED.

JOSE CATRAL MENDOZA

Associate Justice