THIRD DIVISION

DIGITEL*TELECOMMUNICATIONS
PHILIPPINES,
INC.,
JOHNSON
**
ROBERT L. GO and ERIC J.
SEVERINO,***
Petitioners,

- versus -

MARIQUIT SORIANO,
Respondent.

G.R. No. 166039

Present:
QUISUMBING, J., Chairperson,
CARPIO,
CARPIO MORALES,
TINGA, and
VELASCO, JR., JJ.
Promulgated:
June 26, 2006

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DECISION
CARPIO MORALES, J.:
In issue in the present Petition for Review[1] is whether respondent, Mariquit
Soriano (Mariquit), was forced to resign, due to professional and sexual
harassment, thus amounting to constructive dismissal.
The Labor Arbiter and the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC)
held in the negative. The Court of Appeals held otherwise.
From the records of the case, the following antecedent facts are culled:
In the third quarter of 1998, petitioner Digitel Telecommunications
Philippines, Inc. (Digitel) hired Mariquit, then of 48 summers, a Bachelor of
Science in Nutrition graduate from the University of the Philippines and a graduate
school student of De La Salle University (she had not submitted her thesis), as
Director for Market and Communications effective August 15, 1998.

Digitels co-petitioners Senior Vice President for Business Division Eric J.

Severino (Severino) and Senior Executive Vice President Johnson Robert L. Go
(Go) were Mariquits immediate superior and next higher superior, respectively.
Working under Mariquit were Evelyn P. Inductivo (Evelyn), Manager of the
Promotion Section, Andrea S. Arnedo (Andrea), Manager of the Corporate and
Planning Information Section, and Joselito Macachor (Macachor), Ad and Promo
Manager.[2]
In the Performance Review conducted by Digitel for the period of August
17, 1998 up to February 15, 1999,[3] Mariquit obtained for her first six months of
work a rating of 92% (Above Average).
Mariquit later had a rift with Macachor regarding an advertisement
error. She thus sought his termination through petitioner Severino. To her dismay,
Severino merely arranged for the transfer of Macachor to another department.
Mariquits performance soon began to deteriorate. The Performance
Review[4] for the period of April 1, 1999 up to April 1, 2000 showed that she
obtained a rating of 60% (Average) with the following notes from petitioner
Severino:
REVIEW OF OVERALL PERFORMANCE:
(Special comments on performance in particular work areas, overall
performance and development under the covered period.)
Clearly, Ms. Soriano possesses the requisite traits to be successful in her
responsibility areas. The overall performance of the department assigned
to her in both quantitative and qualitative aspects, will increase
significantly with Ms. Sorianos commitment to focus on output
expectations.
TRAINING AND DEVELOPMENT:
(Please comment on the staff members training and development
needs in the year to come, taking into consideration his/her strengths
and areas for improvement.)

Ms. Soriano should endeavor to overcome whatever residual effects the

P. Macachor situation caused. She should return to her overall sunny and
cheerful disposition. This will significantly contribute to the positive
department work atmosphere with improved performance as a
result.[5] (Emphasis in the original; underscoring supplied)

Apparently in an attempt to shift the blame on the unfavorable evaluation

made on her, Mariquit gave unfavorable evaluation of her two remaining
managers, Evelyn and Andrea.
In a Memorandum of June 27, 2000[6] addressed to Severino, Evelyn
questioned the basis of her rating and charged Mariquit of harassing and framingup her very own managers. And she also charged Mariquit of violating company
rules and regulations.[7]
For her part Andrea, in a Memorandum of May 15, 2000[8] also addressed to
Severino, challenged the factual basis of her poor performance rating and appealed
for a new evaluation, she attributing as possible motive of Mariquit her hatred,
prejudice, revenge and a desire to get rid of her.[9]
Mariquits personal conflicts with her two managers continued, prompting
her to also demand the termination of their services.[10] As in the case of Macachor,
the management retained them, however.
Mariquit later filed on June 27, 2000 a letter of resignation bearing the
date June 28, 2000, to take effect at the closing of office hours on June 30,
2000.[11] Severino acknowledged receipt of the letter of resignation which Mariquit
left in his office.[12] Severino thereafter forwarded the letter to the Human
Resources Department where it was stamped received on June 28, 2000.[13]
On August 22, 2000, Mariquit executed a Deed of Quitclaim and
Release[14] acknowledging receipt from Digitel of the sum of P97,560.02, and
declaring therein that her resignation on June 30, 2000 was of her own free will
and that in consideration of the said amount, she was releasing and forever

discharging Digitel, its officers, managers or representatives or successors from all

claims or cause in connection with her employment therewith.
About five months after her execution of the Deed of Quitclaim and Release
or in January 2001, on the intercession of Mariquits friend Emma Teodoro
(Emma), Go and Mariquit, together with Emma, met during which Mariquit is said
to have pleaded for financial assistance. Go thus referred her to Digitel Executive
Vice President Policarpio B. Pau, Jr. (Pau).[15] Pau was to later relate what
transpired when Mariquit went to see him.
Eleven months after her resignation letter was filed or on May 28, 2001,
Mariquit filed criminal complaints against petitioners Go and Severino,[16] for
violation of R.A. 7877 (Anti-Sexual Harassment Law) and/or Article 336 of the
Revised Penal Code (Acts of Lasciviousness), before the Quezon City Prosecutors
Office which referred the complaints to the National Bureau of Investigation
(NBI).
The NBI recommended to the City Prosecutor the filing of a case for sexual
harassment against petitioner Go. The City Prosecutor later dismissed Mariquits
complaints but, on her motion for reconsideration, it issued a Resolution finding
probable cause to hale Go to court for acts of lasciviousness.[17] Go appealed the
Resolution to the Department of Justice (DOJ).
In Paus affidavit dated July 6, 2001 which Go submitted in connection with
Mariquits criminal complaint against him, Pau gave the following account of what
transpired during his meeting with Mariquit after Go had, as stated above, referred
her to him.
xxxx
14. Sometime in January 2001 Ms. Soriano and her son went to
my office; She told me that she had dinner with Mr. Johnson [Go] and a
common friend and that Mr. Johnson [Go] told her to see me;
15. On my part, I was already expecting that this was what Mr.
Johnson [Go] and I had agreed in principle earlier to extend financial
assistance, for humanitarians [sic], to Ms. Soriano;

16. To my surprise, Ms. Soriano told me that she was advised by

her lawyer to explore means in settling her case with Mr. Johnson
[Go]. She then told me that she needs money to: (a) send her children
abroad, (b) to start a business of her own and (c) to pay the fees of her
lawyers; Based on her insinuations I had the impression that she wanted
millions of pesos;
17. Clearly, she had a wrong impression and it appeared to me
that she is extorting money from the company; To end our conversation,
I told her that if that is what she wanted I have no authority to grant the
same, what the company intended was to give her a separation pay, even
though she is not entitled to it; I also told her that maybe she has
misunderstood
the
humanitarian
gesture
taken
by
the
company; Thereafter, she already left the office.
x x x x[18] (Underscoring supplied)

About one and a half years after she filed her letter of resignation or
on December 20, 2001, Mariquit filed a complaint[19] for illegal dismissal against
petitioners Digitel, Go and Severino before the NLRC, docketed as NLRC NCR
Case No. 12-06571-2001. During the initial mandatory conference which took
place on January 23, 2002, she clarified that her cause of action was
for constructive dismissal,[20] alleging that she was harassed by herein individual
petitioners to thus compel her to resign from Digitel.
By Decision of April 24, 2003,[21] the Labor Arbiter, finding insufficient
Mariquits evidence to support her claim that she was forced to resign, held that she
voluntarily resigned:
The factual background of this case clearly shows that
complainant voluntarily resigned from her employment. We sympathize
with her but we cannot sustain her contention that she was constructively
dismissed. With complainants educational and professional
background, it would be absurd to assume that she did not understand
the import of her own words and the consequences of her own acts of
voluntary resignation.

Complainants submission that she was forced to resign

because of the way she was sexually and professionally harassed by
respondents Eric J. Severino and Johnson Robert L. Go were not
sufficiently established by substantial, concrete and credible
evidence.
The affidavit of Ms. Sta. Clara [submitted by Mariquit] is
purely hearsay evidence. Her statements do not even qualify as part of
the res gestae. Ms. Sta. Clara was not personally present during the times
that respondent Go allegedly poked, several times, at complainants
private parts. Neither was she physically present when respondent
Severino was allegedly staring at complainants crotch and made
suggestive remarks to the latter. She, therefore, could not concretely,
credibly nor substantially testify as to those facts or circumstances that
she acquired through her own perception or organs of sense. Her
affidavit does not establish the truth of the facts stated therein.
The affidavit of Mr. Frank Wenceslao [also submitted by
Mariquit] is not only telling, so to speak; it is also highly suspect. It is
likewise hearsay, as that of Ms. Sta. Claras. It must be taken with
utmost precaution. It should be carefully scrutinized. Mr. Wenceslao
knew that respondent Go and his brother Henry were reputed to be
womanizers. Why then would he (Wenceslao) encourage the mother of
his own love child to apply and accept a job offered by respondent
company knowing fully well that she, with whom he was again sleeping
together at that time, would be working with and for Mr. Go who has a
questionable reputation with women? Why would he have prevailed
upon complainant who already wanted to resign from her job during
those periods that she was being allegedly professionally and sexually
harassed? His testimony is that of an interested person and should thus
be rejected.
Complainants own allegation, although they are so detailed,
appear incredible if not downright puny. An analysis of her statements
shows that her own conclusion that she was being sexually and
professionally harassed was on the basis of her own suppositions,
conjectures, and surmises. Some of her statements are inconsistent. She
could not satisfactorily explain her allegation that she was consistently
professionally harassed by respondent Severino. The latters alleged
words: How come you claim you know so much yet nothing ever gets
done in your department? do not jurisprudentially constitute nor clearly

establish professional harassment. Aside from these words, the

complainant could only venture to allege instances in general and vague
terms.
As to the facts allegedly constituting sexual harassment advanced
by Go and Severino, after an objective analysis over their assertions as
stated in their respective counter-affidavits and further considering the
other supporting documents attached to the respondents pleadings, it is
found that these far out weigh the complainants own
evidence.[22] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied.)
The Labor Arbiter also observed:
One last note: During the initial mandatory conference on January
23, 2003, while the respective parties counsels and the undersigned were
discussing on some matters, complainant who was seated opposite
respondent Severino discreetly showed him her middle finger (the dirty
finger sign) and later, took his cellular phone which he placed on the
table and banged it on the table. Mr. Severino then asked the
undersigned if it would be possible, at the next hearing, to have someone
officially record and take note of the deportment of the parties during the
hearings. When the undersigned asked what for, respondent Severino
narrated what had just transpired between him and the complainant.
When the undersigned asked if this was true, the complainant, looking at
respondent Go, rudely replied: Because you are not my boss anymore!
The conduct displayed by the complainant in the presence not
only of the undersigned, the parties respective legal counsels but also
with complainants own daughter around shows much of her
character.[23] (Underscoring supplied)

The Labor Arbiter thus disposed:

WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, judgment is hereby
rendered DISMISSING this complaint for constructive dismissal for lack
of merit.
The counterclaim of the respondents is likewise dismissed for lack
of merit.

All other claims herein sought and prayed for are hereby denied
for lack of legal and factual bases.[24]

On appeal, the NLRC referred the case to Labor Arbiter Thelma M.

Concepcion for review, hearing when necessary with power to cite the parties for
contempt under Article 218(d), Labor Code and submission of report for the
Commissions deliberation.[25]
Finding Labor Arbiter Concepcions July 30, 2003 REPORT with
recommendation[26] for the dismissal of Mariquits appeal to be supported by facts
on record and the law on the matter, the NLRC adopted it as its own. It accordingly
dismissed Mariquits appeal.
In holding that Mariquit voluntarily resigned and accordingly dismissing her
appeal, the NLRC, by Decision dated August 18, 2003,[27] observed, among other
things:
xxxx
With such tendency to threaten resignation everytime higher
management would refuse her demand to transfer subordinates who had
administrative differences with her, we therefore have no doubt that
complainant voluntarily resigned when respondent Severino refused to
heed her demand that Ms. Arnedo and Ms. Inductivo, her subordinates,
be transferred to other departments. We also have no doubt that such
resignation does not constitute constructive dismissal, much less an
illegal one.
x x x x[28] (Underscoring supplied)

Her motion for reconsideration having been denied by the NLRC by Order
of January 30, 2004,[29] Mariquit filed a Petition for Certiorari[30] before the Court
of Appeals.

The appellate court, by Decision of August 20, 2004,[31] taking exception to

the doctrine of finality of factual findings of labor tribunals,[32] reversed the NLRC
decision, disposing as follows:
WHEREFORE, premises considered, the present petition is
hereby GIVEN DUE COURSE and the questioned Decision and
Resolution of the NLRC dated August 18, 2003 and January 30, 2004,
respectively, are hereby both ANNULLED and SET ASIDE. Private
respondents are hereby declared liable for illegal dismissal and are
consequently ordered to pay petitioner jointly and severally the back
wages due to her computed from July 1, 2000 based on her latest salary
as of that date up to the time of the finality of this judgment. As
reinstatement is no longer feasible, private respondents are hereby also
ordered to pay petitioner separation pay equivalent to one (1) months
salary for every year of service, as prayed for by petitioner in her
complaint.
Further, private respondents are hereby ordered to pay petitioner
the sums of P200,000.00 and P100,000.00 as moral and exemplary
damages, respectively, as well as attorneys fees in the amount equivalent
to 10% of the total monetary award.
No pronouncement as to costs.[33]

Petitioners Motion for Reconsideration having been denied by Resolution

of November 10, 2004,[34] they lodged the present petition faulting the appellate
court as follows:
I.
THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN
GIVING RESPONDENTS PETITION FOR CERTIORARI DUE
COURSE,
THERE
BEING
NO
GRAVE
ABUSE
OF
DISCRETION EITHER BY THE NLRC OR THE LABOR ARBITER
AMOUNTING TO LACK OR EXCESS OF JURISDICTION.
II.

THE HONORABLE COURT OF APPEALS COMMITTED AN

ERROR OF LAW IN REVERSING AND DISTURBING THE
FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF AN
ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY WHICH ARE SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
A. THE FINDINGS AND CONCLUSIONS OF THE NLRC ARE
CONSISTENT WITH THE FINDINGS OF THE LABOR
ARBITER, AND BOTH ARE DULY SUPPORTED BY
SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE.
B. THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE
AGENCY HAVING THE OPPORTUNITY TO PRIMARILY
APPRECIATE THE FACTS ARE GIVEN GREAT WEIGHT
AND PREFERENCE.
C. THE FINDINGS OF THE ADMINISTRATIVE AGENCY MAY
BE REVERSED ONLY ON CLEAR SHOWING OF
PALPABLE ERROR.
III.
THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED WHEN IT FOUND
PETITIONERS GUILTY OF ILLEGAL DISMISSAL CONSIDERING
THAT THE HONORABLE COURT MADE SEVERAL FINDINGS OF
FACT WITH ABSOLUTELY NO EVIDENTIARY SUPPORT OR
BASIS ON RECORD, AND RULED ON SOME ISSUES WHICH
NEITHER RESPONDENT NOR PETITIONERS RAISED IN THE
PRESENT CASE.
A. THE COURT OF APPEALS GAVE UNDUE AND
UNDESERVED CREDENCE TO THE PSYCHOLOGICAL
EVALUATION REPORT SUBMITTED BY DR. MAGNO.
B. THE EVIDENCE ON RECORD DOES NOT ESTABLISH
THAT SEXUAL HARASSMENT DID OCCUR.
C. PETITIONERS SHOWED SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE BY WAY
OF AFFIDAVITS TO DISPUTE THE ALLEGATIONS OF
SEXUAL
HARASSMENT
AND
CONSTRUCTIVE
DISMISSAL. THESE SHOULD NOT HAVE BEEN SIMPLY
BRUSHED ASIDE BY THE COURT OF APPEALS.

D. THE COURT OF APPEALS MADE OTHER FACTUAL

FINDINGS THAT LACKED COHERENCE OR BASIS,
DEFIED LOGIC, OR WERE OTHERWISE IMMATERIAL TO
THE REOLUTION OF THE CASE, AND DISREGARDED
OTHER ARGUMENTS AND EVIDENCE PRESENTED BY
PETITIONERS.
E. THE COURT OF APPEALS ERRED IN AWARDING
BACKWAGES,
SEPARATION
PAY,
AND
DAMAGES, (Emphasis and underscoring supplied),

and pleading that

IV
JUSTIFIABLE REASONS REQUIRE THE SUPREME COURT
TO REVIEW THE FINDINGS OF FACT OF THE COURT OF
APPEALS.[35] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

The first two errors assigned by petitioners, along with their plea for a
review of the appellate courts findings of fact, being interrelated, shall be discussed
simultaneously.
Petitioners contend that in certiorari proceedings, judicial review does not
go as far as evaluating the sufficiency of evidence upon which the Labor Arbiter
and the NLRC had based their conclusion, and while the Court of Appeals
concluded that the factual findings of the NLRC are arbitrary and unfair, it failed to
show the basis thereof.
Further, petitioners contend that the factual findings of the Court of Appeals
are based on misapprehension of facts and speculations, surmises, or conjectures.
It is settled that factual findings of labor administrative officials, if supported
by substantial evidence, are accorded not only great respect but even finality,
unless there is a showing that they arbitrarily disregarded the evidence before them

or had misapprehended evidence of such nature as to compel a contrary conclusion

if properly appreciated.[36]
Judicial review of decisions of the NLRC via petition for certiorari under Rule 65
is confined only to issues of lack or excess of jurisdiction and grave abuse of
discretion on the part of the NLRC.[37] Thus Danzas Intercontinental, Inc. v.
Daguman[38] teaches:
x x x As a general rule, in certiorari proceedings under Rule 65 of the
Rules of Court under which the petition was brought to the Court of
Appeals, the appellate court does not assess and weigh the sufficiency of
evidence upon which the labor arbiter and the NLRC based their
conclusions, the query being limited to the determination of whether or
not the NLRC acted without or in excess of its jurisdiction or with grave
abuse of discretion in rendering its resolution, except if the findings of the
NLRC are not supported by substantial evidence.[39] (Italics in the
original;underscoring supplied)

In her petition for certiorari before the Court of Appeals, Mariquit attributed to the
NLRC the commission of grave abuse of discretion tantamount to lack or excess of
jurisdiction in dismissing the complaint for illegal dismissal[,] ignoring clear and
convincing proof of sexual harassment.[40] (Underscoring supplied)
It was thus incumbent for Mariquit to prove before the appellate court grave abuse
of discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction on the part of the
NLRC.[41]
Mariquit failed to discharge the burden, however.
Contrary to Mariquits submission, the NLRC did not disregard the evidence she
proffered to prove that sexual harassment forced her to resign. Thus the NLRC
observed:
Indeed, the record is replete with substantial evidence showing that the
complainant was not forced to resign through any act of sexual
harassment. Rather, as reported by Arbiter Concepcion andas admitted in
complainants position paper [dated April 26, 2002], she voluntarily
resigned when her repeated requests for the transfer to some other

department of two of her key personnel, Ms. Andrea Arnedo and Ms.
Evelyn Inductivo were refused by respondent Severino.[42] (Emphasis and
underscoring supplied)

Petitioners third assigned error which bears on her claim of sexual

harassment calls for a determination of the weight of Mariquits evidence of forced
resignation.
Significantly, after the Court of Appeals promulgated on August 20, 2004
its assailed Decision finding Mariquit to have been forced to resign, and on
November 10, 2004 its Resolution denying herein petitioners Motion for
Reconsideration, the DOJ, through Undersecretary Ernesto Pineda, acting on
petitioner Gos petition for review of the earlier-mentioned Quezon City
Prosecutors Resolution adverse to Go, issued a Resolution of April 4, 2005
reversing the Prosecutors Resolution.
Held the DOJ:
Under the circumstances, it is improbable for respondent Go to have
committed the alleged acts of lasciviousness. In the company party held
[on November 19, 1999] in Quezon City, more or less sixty (60) people
were present occupying the living room and lanai area of the residence
of Policarpio B. Pau, Jr. It is highly unthinkable that respondent Go
would make any sexual advances in the presence of so many people
and no one would notice. Aside from complainants allegations, there
is nothing on record to corroborate the same. In fact, not one of the
sixty (60) guests supported her claims. On the other hand, respondent
Go submitted the affidavit of the partys host, Policarpio B. Pau, Jr.,
stating that he never saw respondent Go make advances to complainant.
Moreover, according to another guest, Ms. Purisima Y. Velasco,
respondent Go talked to complainant for a while and proceeded to join
the other guests.
The conduct of the victim immediately following the alleged assault is of
utmost importance so as to establish the truth or falsity of the charge for
acts of lasciviousness. Complainants deportment seemed unnatural for
someone who allegedly went through a harrowing experience. For
evidence to be believed it must not only proceed from the mouth of a
credible witness but must be credible in itself such as the common

experiences and observation of mankind can approve under the

circumstances. In the instant case after the alleged sexual advances,
complainant continued working for Digitel until her resignation effective
on June 30, 2000. During her employment with Digitel, she never
initiated or filed any case for sexual harassment or acts of lasciviousness
against respondents. Further, when she eventually resigned, she did not
even state in her resignation letter that her resignation was due to sexual
harassment or sexual abuse.Finally, it took complainant almost two (2)
years before filing her complaint.
Indeed, complainants uncorroborated testimony is not sufficient to
sustain a finding of probable cause for acts of lasciviousness against
respondent Go.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, the assailed resolution is
hereby REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The City Prosecutor of Quezon
City is directed to cause the withdrawal of the Information for acts of
lasciviousness against respondent Robert Johnson L. Go and report to
this Office the action taken within ten (10) days from receipt
hereof.[43] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied).

At this juncture, this Court could stop and refrain from calibrating the evidence on
whether sexual harassment indeed forced Mariquit to resign. For Pono v. National
Labor Relations Commission[44] instructs:
x x x The Court takes cognizance of the fact that a criminal complaint
for attempted rape or acts of lasciviousness filed by Pono against
Castillo before the Prosecutors Office in Makati was eventually
dismissed due to lack of merit, which dismissal was affirmed by the
Department of Justice. Indisputably, an investigating fiscal is under no
obligation to file a criminal information where he is not convinced that
he has the quantum of evidence at hand to support the averments.
Thus, the determination of the persons to be prosecuted rests primarily
with the prosecutor who is vested with quasi-judicial discretion in the
discharge of this function. The courts should give credence, in the
absence of a clear showing of arbitrariness, to the findings and
determination of probable cause by prosecutors in a preliminary
investigation.[45] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Absent any showing that the DOJ acted with arbitrariness, this Court is bound to
accept its findings as it is this department which has control and supervision over
public prosecutors.
Nonetheless, this Court has given the evidence a hard look if only to put to rest any
nagging doubts on the correctness of the assessment thereof by the lower tribunals.
To prove that she was sexually harassed to thus force her to resign, Mariquit
submitted before the Labor Arbiter the following documents as part of her Position
Paper dated April 26, 2002: her Affidavit dated April 25, 2002;[46] Affidavit
dated April 25, 2002 of her friend Grace J. Sta. Clara;[47] and Affidavit dated April
25, 2002 of Francisco C. Wenceslao.[48]
In her April 25, 2002 Affidavit, Mariquit gave the following pertinent statements
as regards petitioner Go:
xxxx
8. Sometime in May 1999, during a cocktail party for the sales
department of Digitel held at the Summit Lounge of the Manila Galleria
Suites, Go, after noticing that I was wearing a short skirt, insisted that I
sit down so that he could take a better look at my legs.
9. On 20 August 1999, in a company-wide sales conference at Manila
Midtown Hotel in Ermita Manila, Go while purportedly asking questions
about my work, deliberately dropped his hand on my lap and
repeatedly stroked my thighs. I was shocked and deeply offended by
Gos indecent display of behavior;
10. After the sales conference, Go became more attentive to me and
began to drop by at my office to start a conversation with me. Such
sudden display of affection disturbed me as well as made me feel
awkward whenever Go approached me;
11. In October 1999, during a farewell party for departing Digitel
officers held at the residence of Digitel employee Matet Ruiz, Go
insisted that I dance with him. Fearful of causing a scene at a public

gathering, I agreed to dance a few steps with him and when I attempted
to sit down, Go blocked my way and pinched my waist;
12. On 19 November 1999, during another party given by an officer of
Digitel, Mr. Policarpio B. Pau at his residence in Quezon City, I could
no longer elude Gos advances because he cornered me on a sofa by
sitting so close and in such a way that I was virtually pinned against the
side of the sofa. Go held my hand and started massaging it in the guise of
looking at the ring that I was then wearing. Because I felt uncomfortable
and uneasy with Gos repulsive actions, I took off the ring and gave it to
him. To date, Go has not yet returned the ring to me.
13. Go then crept his hand under the throw pillow which I had
placed to separate me from Go to reach for my vagina and to poke it
several times. I could not escape because I was hemmed in by the arm
of the sofa.
14. When I was finally able to extricate myself from Gos clutches, I
stood up, but Go pulled me to the dance floor, pressed me close to him
and moved his hand across my back to feel my body. I tried to move
away from him and at the same time tried not to attract anyone [sic]
attention nor to cause a scene. Go then whispered in my ears, Do not
push me, I could make life in Digitel easy for you. I can take care of your
promotion and give you rewards.
15. In order to break free from Gos holds, I maneuvered to turn to the
beat of the music. Go then reached out his hand and groped my
breast, caressed my back and reached inside my blouse to rub me
from up my brassieres down to my buttocks. As I was trying to resist
Gos sexual advances, Go again hinted that my promotion would be
accelerated if I would only be nice to him.
16. On 11 February 2000, during a dinner party for Digitels sales force
held at the Manila Galleria Suites, Go called for me to start the line for
the buffet and again rubbed his hand across my back to feel my
brassiere.
x x x x[49] (Italics in the original; emphasis and underscoring supplied)

As regards petitioner Severino, Mariquit stated:

xxxx
18. I also caught Severino looking at my legs up to the back of my thighs
on several occasions, to wit: (a) in January 1999 when he intentionally
pointed to my legs to a fellow company officer who also looked at them;
(b) in the NEAX Training Room in February 1999 when I picked up
things I dropped on the floor, where Severino even walked behind me to
get a better view of my thighs; and (c) during our out-of-town strategic
planning session in September 1999 at the Princess Urduja Hotel in
Pangasinan.
19. Whenever Severino presided over meetings where I was asked to
attend, he always tilted his head to look at my legs and peek in between
my thighs thereby making me feel awkward and uncomfortable such that
I preferred to sit with my back facing him.
20. During my last few months in Digitel, specifically March to June
2000, Severino purposely sat near me during meetings and intentionally
brushed his legs on my legs;
21. After the 19 November 1999 incident with Go at the party of Mr.
Policarpio B. Pau, I reported my disgrace and outrage over the sexual
advances inflicted upon me by Go, to Severino to which he replied, I
saw what happened. I have eyes too.
x x x x (Italics in the original).[50]
Grace J. Sta. Clara, a licensed broker of the Insular Life Assurance Co., Ltd. and,
as stated above, a friend of Mariquit, declared in her affidavit:
xxxx
7. That Ms. Soriano told me she often caught Severino staring at her
crotch and made suggestive remarks, for instance, he asked her to wear
shorts during out of town trips.
8. That the real shock to me was when Ms. Soriano told me of the
incident at a party given by one of Digitel officials when she was
harassed by Johnson Go, a brother of Mr. John Gokongwei and Digitels
Senior EVP, which in her words ran, more or less, as follows: Hinipuan
ako sa boobs at dinukot yon pipi ko.

9. That I asked Ms. Soriano to sue Johnson Go for his dastardly act but
she hesitated understandably because, as a single parent with four
children, she did not want to lose her job and decided to just avoid Go.
10. That after the incident and Go must have felt that Ms. Soriano was
avoiding him, which he said so according to her, Severino suddenly
changed his attitude toward her and, in Ms. Sorianos words, began
making impossible demands she could not possibly comply with.
11. That Ms. Soriano told me Severino must have been under pressure
from Go to make her give in to his advances because he (Go) knew she
was a single parent who could not afford to lose her job, which was a
usual technique of a sexual predator like Go who reportedly used it in
the past with female employees.[51]
x x x x (Italics in the original; underscoring supplied)

For his part, Francisco C. Wenceslao, father of one of Mariquits four children,
stated in his Affidavit:
xxxx
6. That I knew, with due respect to the memory of Mr. Henry Go, that he
and his brother (Respondent Go) were reputed to be womanizers as, in
fact, Henry while married impregnated his secretary but who he married
eventually after reportedly divorcing his wife.
7. That even before I met Ms. Soriano and her joining Digitel, I already
knew about Respondent Gos said reputation that reportedly led to his
separation from his wife and the resignation of lady employees not only
from Digitel but also from other companies he was connected with.
8. That it was no surprise therefore when Ms. Soriano complained to
me that Go made undeniable advances to her on at least two (2)
occasions, to wit:
8.1 Sometime in late August 1999, Ms. Soriano confided to me
that in a company sales conference at Manila Midtown Hotel,
Respondent Go, who she barely knew then, sat close to her and
began a conversation. He immediately and repeatedly dropped his
hand on her lap and touched her thighs. She was naturally

outraged by such brazenness from which she excused herself and

moved away to join other Digitel employees on the dance floor.
8.2 In a party given by a company official, Mr. Policarpio Pau, in
November 1999 at his residence in Loyola Heights, Quezon City,
obviously with malicious forethought suddenly sat on the sofas
side while massaging her hand and pretending to be interested in
her ring. She removed the ring and gave it to him so he would
release her hand. Worse, Go suddenly put his hand under her
thigh and moved it as far as he could with clear intention to touch
her private parts. According to Ms. Soriano, she was so
embarrassed and would have melted if she were a candle because
she sensed that Go was speaking in Chinese and telling other
guests what he was doing to her.
9. That Ms. Soriano angrily related to me the above incidents immediately
upon arriving home from each of the said occasions because during the
time in question, Ms. Soriano and I were again sleeping together.
10. That Ms. Soriano was very angry and outraged on both occasions for
the humiliation she suffered because Go treated her so cheaply in front of
her fellow Digitel executives.[52]
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)

Wenceslao added:
xxxx
12. That Ms. Soriano told me about subsequent events in their office
such as when Go visited her in the office to ask why she had been
eluding him as if she did not like him at all.
13. That, according to Ms. Soriano, it was during that time when she
began avoiding Go that she noticed a big change in Mr. Eric Severinos
attitude towards her as though he wanted to make her job as miserable
and unbearable as he could possibly do because of the following
incidents:

13.1 He raised his voice and was virtually shouting at Ms. Soriano
during staff meetings with no apparent reason except to embarrass
her in front of her colleagues and subordinates. As a result, two
members of her staff, namely: Ms. Andrea Arnedo and Ms.
Evelyn Indu[c]tivo, became defiant and uncooperative and refused
to do the work Ms. Soriano assigned to them;
13.2 Severino refused Ms. Sorianos repeated requests to transfer
the two ladies to another department despite her imploring him to
understand that the hostility of the two to her made it impossible
to accomplish the work she assigned to them;
13.3 Severino became more demanding in imposing work
deadlines while denying Ms. Sorianos requests for approval of
programs and projects that would enhance the work of her
department, for instance, Severino cavalierly disapproved Digitels
Web Magazine that would have been an effective marketing tool;
13.4 Severino denied outright Ms. Sorianos recommendation to
promote Ms. Lorraine Javier from a senior supervisory to
managerial position without any explanation despite Ms. Sorianos
belief that the promotion was not only well deserved but would
also improve her staffs morale;
13.5 Their relationship became worse when Severino gave Ms.
Sorianos performance a rating of only 60% from 90% a year
earlier.[53] (Underscoring supplied)

On the other hand, petitioners submitted the affidavits of Grace D. RallosBakunawa,[54] Ma. Lourdes B.
Claveria,[55] Pau,[56] and Ma.
Purisima
Y.
[57]
Velasco, all executed in 2001 and which were priorly presented before the
Office of the City Prosecutor. Also submitted were the affidavits
of Andrea[58] and Evelyn.[59]
Grace D. Rallos-Bakunawa, former Vice President for Human Resource Division
of Digitel, stated the following:
xxxx

5. I have never seen Mr. Johnson [Go] shower any female employee,
moreso Mariquit with unusual attention or gaze for that matter that
would make anyone believe Mariquits allegations that Mr. Johnson [Go]
is interested in her sexually. I couldnt really imagine that, considering
Mariquits age and her being already a grandmother.
6. Owing to the character of Mr. Johnson, I wouldnt have entertained the
idea that he would harass her nor anyone sexually notwithstanding her
claim that she is physically attractive. Further, someone of Mariquits age
and stature would know how to conduct herself to avoid incidents, as she
is claiming, unless the provocation would actually come from her.
xxxx
20. I was present during the sales conference at Manila Midtown Hotel
in Ermita Manila on August 1999. During this occasion, she was never
seated as she described, with Mr. Johnson Go.There were other male
executives seated beside her and that I saw her disappear after dinner. I
know that being the organizer of the conference, she had a room with her
staff at the Midtown. I presumed she slept after that tiring day.
21. I was also present at the birthday party of Mr. Jun Pau on 19
November 1999. As my usual behavior in Digitel parties, I would go
around to check if people are interacting with each other. It has been
more than a month since I left the company, hence, I was excited to chat
with most of the people there. I noticed Mariquit somewhat feeling outof-place with other executives, as usual with her distant affect. I never
detected any unusual happenings between Mr. Johnson and her during
said party. I even sat in-between Mr[.] Johnson [Go] and Mariquit owing
to the space between them in the sofa, while Reby Magtuto was in the
single armchair perpendicular to the sofa.
22. My farewell party in Digitel, for clarification was on September 4,
1999 and not October 1, 1999 as Mariquit claims. Mr. Johnson [Go] was
seated in the middle of the party beside Camilo Tierro, Jun Pau, Isa
Alejandrino, Reby Magtuto and myself who would stand up to sing.
23. I never saw Mr. Johnson [Go] being seated beside Mariquit. Further,
that farewell party was exclusively tendered for me as it was my advance
birthday party, which was supposedly planned for October 3. Since I

would be in Cebu for a PMAP Conference, I decided to hold it in

advance and coincide it with my farewell party.[60]
x x x x (Underscoring supplied)

Pau, Executive Vice President of Digitel, stated:

xxxx
2. As an executive officer of Digitel I have been invited to both official
as well as social functions/gathering of company officers and employees;
3. On 19 November 1999 I organized a party at my residence
at Argentina St., Loyola Grand Villas, Quezon City to commemorate my
birthday;
4. The party was held in the living room, lanai and swimming pool area;
However, since it rained during the party; my guests stayed at the living
room and lanai area for most of the time; The lanai area and the living
room [are] separated by a door which was left open during the party
since the piano is located inside the living room; The said rooms are also
well lighted since I have two chandeliers in the living room;
5. I approximately had sixty guests all officers and employees of
Digitel; The party started from 7:30 PM until 12 midnight of the
following day;
6. Since I am the host of the party, I was all over the place entertaining
and seeing to the convenience of everybody specially the senior
executive officer, Mr. Johnson Robert Go;
7. I did not see any unusual event which took place during the party
including the preposterous allegations made by Ms. Mariquit E. Soriano
on the alleged indecent advances made against her by Mr. Johnson Go;
8. Since the party area is small, anyone can see everyones activity, any
incident activity will definitely be noticed by everybody in the house;
9. On May 1999 I was present at the cocktail party held by Digitel on the
Summit Lounge of Manila Galleria Suites (MGS); This was organized by
the company for reaching its sales target; The function room of MGS can
only accommodate 50-60 persons and there were 30-40 persons who
attended the said cocktail party; Thus, we could all see each other in the
room; As far as I can remember I did not notice any indecent or lascivious
act committed by Mr. Johnson Go against Ms. Mariquit Soriano;
10. Furthermore, the department of Ms. Soriano is in charge of these
functions. She is always busy preparing, organizing and coordinating

these functions, hence, she could not have the luxury of socializing with
the guests;
11. I was also present during the October 1999 party which was held at
the residence of Matet Ruiz; I am very familiar with Matets house since
it is very near Digitels office and we always hold parties there; The area
is approximately 40 sq. meters big; Since there were more or less 20-30
persons present, every body was literally very close with each other so
everybody can see and notice the activity of the other guests; Again there
was no unusual or indecent incident which took place during the said
party;
x x x x[61] (Underscoring supplied)

From the above-quoted statements of affiants Wenceslao and Sta. Clara, it is

readily gathered that they are hearsay. The Labor Arbiter thus correctly discredited
them as such, as it did correctly observe that Mariquit failed to present a single
witness to corroborate her charges. At any rate, why Mariquit, for the first time
raised the issue of sexual harassment which was, in the case of Go, allegedly
committed on five occasions from May 1999 to February 11, 2000 only on May
28, 2001 when she filed criminal complaints against herein individual petitioners,
about 11 months after her resignation or two years after the first alleged
occurrence, she did not even proffer the reason therefor.
In her Comment,[62] however, Mariquit argues that there is no prescription that
would bar the filing of cases involving sexual harassment [as] the period varies
depending on the needs, circumstances, and emotional threshold of the
employee. She cites Philippine Aelous Automotive United Corporation v.
NLRC[63] wherein the complainant therein cried sexual harassment after four years
and this Court held:
x x x Strictly speaking, there is no time period within which he or she
[alleged victim of sexual harassment] is expected to complain through
the proper channels. The time to do so may vary depending upon the
needs, circumstances, and more importantly, the emotional threshold of
the employee.
Private respondent admittedly allowed four (4) years to pass before
finally coming out with her employers sexual impositions. Not many

women, especially in this country, are made of the stuff that can endure
the agony and trauma of a public, even corporate, scandal. x x x[64]

The Labor Arbiter before which Mariquit also cited Philippine Aelous brushed
aside the same in this wise:
The ruling in the above-cited case does not squarely apply to the present
case. In that [case], the complainant thereat, Ms. Rosalinda C. Cortez,
did not resign from her job; she did not undergo psychological treatment;
and she was not an executive of the company she worked with.[65]

In Philippine Aelous, the therein complainant employee Rosalinda raised the issue
of sexual harassment as soon as she had the opportunity to do so. Thus, after the
company issued a memorandum terminating her employment in November 1994,
she filed a complaint before the Labor Arbiter on December 6, 1994, raising the
issue of sexual harassment committed four years earlier by her superior who had
charged her of committing gross acts of disrespect. The earliest opportunity for her
to cry foul thus came only after she was terminated in November 1994.
It bears noting that in Philippine Aelous, this Court observed: If petitioner
[Philippine Aelous] had not issued the third memorandum that terminated the
services of private respondent, we could only speculate how much longer she
would keep her silence.[66]
If Rosalinda kept her silence, she must have done so out of fear of losing her
job. When, however, she was fired, she immediately broke her silence.
The case of Mariquit is different. She voluntarily submitted on June 27, 2000 a
letter of resignation dated June 28, 2000, to become effective on June 30,
2000. She subsequently executed a Deed of Quitclaim and Release on August 22,
2000. There was no reason for her to be afraid of losing her job or not getting
anything from Digitel. Still, she waited for about 11 months, counted from the date
of filing of her letter of resignation or about nine months counted from the day she
executed the Deed of Quitclaim and Release before she, for the first time, charged
herein individual petitioners with sexual harassment.

While, as this Court stated in Philippine Aelous, there is, strictly speaking, no fixed
period within which an alleged victim of sexual harassment may file a complaint, it
does not mean that she or he is at liberty to file one anytime she or he wants
to. Surely, any delay in filing a complaint must be justifiable or reasonable as not
to cast doubt on its merits.
At all events, it is settled that the only test of whether an alleged fact or
circumstance is worthy of credence is the common experience, knowledge and
observation of ordinary men.
As New Jersey Vice Chancellor Van Fleet stated in the often-cited case of Daggers
v. Van Dyck:[67] Evidence to be believed, must not only proceed from the mouth of
a credible witness, but it must be credible in itself such as the common experience
and observation of mankind can approve as probable under the circumstances. We
have no test of the truth of human testimony, except its conformity to our
knowledge, observation, and experience. Whatever is repugnant to these belongs to
the miraculous and is outside of judicial cognizance.[68]
From the earlier-quoted narration of alleged facts by Mariquit, this Court finds that
it does not pass the test of credibility.
Mariquit claimed that as regards petitioner Severino, she often caught him looking
at her legs up to the back of her thighs on several occasions. If to her the acts
amounted to sexual harassment, why did she not bring the matter to the attention of
any company official to make sure that they wont happen again and she be spared
of any disgrace or vexation?
Following Mariquits narration, it would appear that the earliest harassment
committed by Severino took place in January 1999 when he intentionally pointed
to [her] legs to a fellow company officer who also looked at them, while the
earliest committed by Go occurred in May 1999 during a cocktail party at the
Manila Galleria Suites. Yet, she claimed to have reported and expressed to, oddly
enough, Severino, who was the first to allegedly harass her, her disgrace and
outrage over the sexual advances made by Go, and only during the party of Pau on
November 19, 1999, a claim denied by Severino.

As regards the five incidents of sexual harassment attributed to Go, a discussion of

even only one of them betrays its non-conformity to human experience.
In paragraphs 12 to 15 of her April 25, 2002 Affidavit which were quoted earlier,
Mariquit, narrating the November 19, 1999 incident which allegedly took place at
the residence of Pau, claimed that she was cornered by Go on a sofa in such a way
that she was virtually pinned against its side, making it impossible for her to elude
his advances. It is not disputed that it was raining at the time and that the about 60
guests had no choice but to stay in the living room and covered lanai of Paus
residence. Could not have at least one noticed the incident? She presented no one,
however. On the other hand, Pau belied her claim.
Mariquit went on to claim that Go crept his hand under a throw pillow and poked
her vagina several times. She justified her failure to flee by claiming that she was
hemmed in by the arm of the sofa. But if indeed Go did such condemnable act,
could she not have slapped him or stood up and/or left?
Yet still, by her claim, Mariquit danced on the same occasion with Go, albeit
allegedly thru force, during which he pressed her close to him and moved his hand
across her back to feel her body. Any woman in her right mind, whose vagina had
earlier been poked several times without her consent and against her will, would,
after liberating herself from the clutches of the person who offended her, raise
hell. But Mariquit did not.
Mariquit claimed that while dancing, in order to free herself from Gos hold, she
maneuvered to turn to the beat of the music. It was at this time, according to her,
that Go reached out his hand and groped [her] breast, caressed [her] back and
reached inside [her] blouse to rub [her] from up [her] brassieres down to [her]
buttocks. Since this alleged incident occurred while Mariquit and Go were dancing,
and surely there were a lot of people around in the well lighted small area as stated
by house owner Pau, would Go be that maniacal to forego the respect accorded to
him by virtue of his high position? To be sure, a person who holds a very exalted
position would normally behave at social gatherings, unless he is a proven maniac,
to deserve that respect.

Petitioners Go and Severino, on the other hand, presented affidavits of persons

who were present during the time when alleged incidents took place and who
declared in effect that no such incidents did take place and could have taken
place. The appellate court dismissed the claim of these affiants, however, as
obviously biased in favor of [petitioners], their superior and employer.[69]
In Lufthansa German Airlines v. CA,[70] this Court, citing the earlier case of Santos
v. Concepcion and Santos[71], ruled that the presence of an employer-employee
relationship where a witness is an employee of a party is not or itself sufficient to
discredit his testimony.
While it may be true, as the trial court opines[,] that testimony of
employees of a party is of course open to the criticism that they would
naturally testify, as far as they possibly could in favor of their employers,
and in weighing testimony such a relation between a witness and a party is
frequently noticed by the court, it is equally true that the witness is an
employee or an overseer of a party is not of itself sufficient to discredit
his testimony.[72] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Justifying her failure to present an eyewitness, Mariquit claimed that they

(eyewitnesses) were warned by Digitel of being dismissed from their jobs should
they testify in her favor. In support thereof, she presented the
affidavit[73] dated June 12, 2002 of Grace L. Murphy, a former classmate at St.
Theresas College in Manila.
A reading of the affidavit of Grace, who was never an employee nor present at the
party of Digitel, reveals, however, that she merely concluded that the employees of
Digitel were instructed or harassed not to testify in favor of Mariquit when they
failed to meet one Matet Ruiz, a Digitel employee who kept avoiding to meet
[Mariquit].
As petitioners put it: It is always easy to say that no one is willing to testify to
corroborate the accusers allegations against an employer for fear of retaliation on
ones livelihood. But courts should also not close their eyes to the possibility that
the failure to present a witness could only mean that the act complained of did not
actually happen.[74]

If indeed Mariquit was sexually harassed, her resignation would have been an
effective vehicle for her to raise it. Instead, however, of raising it in her resignation
letter,[75] she even thanked petitioner Severino for the opportunity of working with
[him]. Again, this is contrary to human nature and experience. For if indeed
petitioner Severino was her sexual harasser, she would have refrained from being
cordial to him on her resignation. Not only that. By her claim (in her
Affidavit),[76] she had an altercation with Severino onJune 27, 2000, the day she
filed her resignation letter postdated June 28, 2000. So why such cordiality?
Again, after submitting her resignation letter, why would she, by her claim, want to
withdraw the same. Even if it would mean working again with her alleged sexual
harassers?[77] Given her educational background and her work experiences, it
would not be difficult for her to land on another job, free from any
harassment.[78] To be sure, she would not wish to stay in Digitel any longer if she
was really harassed, sexually and professionally.
Parenthetically, a resignation once accepted by the employer cannot be withdrawn
without the consent of the employer.[79] As Intertrod Maritime, Inc. v.
NLRC[80] emphasized:
Once an employee resigns and his resignation is accepted, he no longer has
any right to the job. If the employee later changes his mind, he must ask for
approval of the withdrawal of his resignation from his employer, as if he
were re-applying for the job. It will then be up to the employer to determine
whether or not his service would be continued. If the employer accepts said
withdrawal, the employee retains his job. x x x[81]

Petitioners fault the appellate courts giving undue credence to the Psychological
Evaluation Report made by Dr. Estrella T. Tiongson-Magno, PhD dated December
14, 2000 (Magno Report) as it (the appellate court) noted what to it was the
NLRCs omission of the conclusion in said report that Mariquits behavioral
problems stemmed from the trauma she experienced confirming that indeed she
was a victim of sexual harassment.[82] They claim that the appellate court

selectively seized upon portions of the Magno Report and only highlighted the
following statements from the Report in its assailed decision:
Summary and Conclusion
She is a good, generous and hardworking person, there is no doubt about
this, and she has done her best to provide for the needs of her children.
Her achievements in this regard are remarkable and praiseworthy. But
she is emotionally immature and her comprehension of human situations
in surprisingly shallow (gullibility is her greatest weakness) for a person
of her intelligence and life experience. This explains how she can be
easily victimized by an abusive employer.
Diagnosis for MES:
Axis I Major Depression
Axis II Narcissistic/Borderline Personality
with compulsive and histrionic features
Axis III No diagnosis
Axis IV Psychosocial Stressors: Sexual Harassment and
job loss
Severity: severe[83] (Emphasis by the Court of Appeals).

In crediting the Magno Report, the appellate court described Dr. Magnos
experience in the field of psychology as extensive and specialized, whereas it
found petitioners witness-affiant Bakunawa to have just a degree in psychology
and human resource management background.[84]
The only indication on record of Dr. Magnos extensive and specialized
experience, however, is that appearing on the top page of the Magno Report-Annex
G[85] of Mariquits Reply-Position Paper wherein Dr. Magno is referred to as
Clinical Psychologist.
And, while sexual harassment is, in the Magno Report, mentioned as a
psychological stressor under the Summary and Conclusion portion, nothing
therein, as correctly pointed out by petitioners, mentions or discusses how Mariquit
was alleged to have been sexually harassed basis of the appellate court to hold that:

x x x Worse, the NLRC completely disregarded the findings of the

Clinical Psychologist who examined petitioner, Dr. Estrella T. TiongsonMagno, and selected only those portions of her evaluation report that
showed petitioners emotional dysfunction and omitting Dr. Magnos
conclusion that her behavioral problems stemmed from the trauma she
experienced confirming that indeed she was a victim of sexual
harassment x x x[86] (Emphasis and underscoring supplied)

Any employee, male or female, may charge an employer or superior with

sexual harassment, but the claim must be well substantiated.[87] As reflected above,
however, Mariquits claim does not pass the test of credibility.
The findings of the NLRC, which adopted those of the Labor Arbiter, being in
accordance with the evidence on record, and, as earlier stated, Mariquit failed to
discharge the onusof proving that the NLRC committed grave abuse of discretion,
it was error for the appellate court to give due course to Mariquits petition for
certiorari.
In fine, Mariquit having failed to prove that she was constructively dismissed, a
discussion of the award of backwages, separation pay and damages is rendered
unnecessary.
WHEREFORE, the Petition is GRANTED. The challenged Court of
Appeals Decision of August 20, 2004 and Resolution of November 10,
2004 are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The Decision dated August 18, 2003 of
the National Labor Relations Commission, which affirmed that of the Labor
Arbiter, is REINSTATED.
THIRD DIVISION
MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO,
Petitioner,
- versus ROGELIO I. RAYALA,
Respondent.

G.R. No. 155831

x-------------------------x
ROGELIO I. RAYALA,
Petitioner,

G.R. No. 155840

- versus OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT; RONALDO

V. ZAMORA, in his capacity as Executive
Secretary; ROY V. SENERES, in his capacity
as Chairman of the National Labor Relations
Commission (in lieu of RAUL T. AQUINO, in
his capacity as Acting Chairman of the
National labor Relations Commission); and
MA. LOURDES T. DOMINGO,
Respondents.
x-------------------------x
The REPUBLIC OF THE PHILIPPINES,
G.R. No. 158700
represented by the OFFICE OF THE
PRESIDENT; and ALBERTO G. ROMULO, Present:
in his capacity as Executive Secretary,
Petitioners,
YNARES-SANTIAGO, J.,
Chairperson,
AUSTRIA-MARTINEZ,
- versus CORONA,*
NACHURA, and
REYES, JJ.
Promulgated:
ROGELIO I. RAYALA,
Respondent.

February 18, 2008

x------------------------------------------------------------------------------------x
DECISION
NACHURA, J.:

Sexual harassment is an imposition of misplaced superiority which is

enough to dampen an employees spirit and her capacity for advancement. It affects
her sense of judgment; it changes her life.[1]
Before this Court are three Petitions for Review on Certiorari assailing the
October 18, 2002 Resolution of the CAs Former Ninth Division[2] in CA-G.R. SP
No. 61026. The Resolution modified the December 14, 2001 Decision[3] of the
Court of Appeals Eleventh Division, which had affirmed the Decision of the Office
of the President (OP) dismissing from the service then National Labor Relations
Commission (NLRC) Chairman Rogelio I. Rayala (Rayala) for disgraceful and
immoral conduct.
All three petitions stem from the same factual antecedents.
On November 16, 1998, Ma. Lourdes T. Domingo (Domingo), then
Stenographic Reporter III at the NLRC, filed a Complaint for sexual harassment
against Rayala before Secretary Bienvenido Laguesma of the Department of Labor
and Employment (DOLE).
To support the Complaint, Domingo executed an Affidavit narrating the
incidences of sexual harassment complained of, thus:
xxxx
4. Sa simula ay pabulong na sinasabihan lang ako ni Chairman Rayala
ng mga salitang Lot, gumaganda ka yata?
5. Sa ibang mga pagkakataon nilalapitan na ako ni Chairman at
hahawakan ang aking balikat sabay pisil sa mga ito habang ako ay
nagta-type at habang nagbibigay siya ng diktasyon. Sa mga
pagkakataong ito, kinakabahan ako. Natatakot na baka mangyari
sa akin ang mga napapabalitang insidente na nangyari na noon
tungkol sa mga sekretarya niyang nagbitiw gawa ng mga
mahahalay na panghihipo ni Chairman.
6. Noong ika-10 ng Setyembre, 1998, nang ako ay nasa 8th Floor, may
nagsabi sa akin na kailangan akong bumaba sa 7th Floor kung
nasaan ang aming opisina dahil sa may koreksyon daw na

gagawin sa mga papel na tinayp ko. Bumaba naman ako para

gawin ito. Habang ginagawa ko ito, lumabas si Chairman Rayala
sa silid ni Mr. Alex Lopez. Inutusan ako ni Chairman na sumunod
sa kaniyang silid. Nang nasa silid na kami, sinabi niya sa akin:
Chairman: Lot, I like you a lot. Naiiba ka sa lahat.
At pagkatapos ako ay kaniyang inusisa tungkol sa mga personal na
bagay sa aking buhay. Ang ilan dito ay tungkol sa aking mga magulang,
kapatid, pag-aaral at kung may boyfriend na raw ba ako.
Chairman: May boyfriend ka na ba?
Lourdes: Dati nagkaroon po.
Chairman: Nasaan na siya?
Lourdes: Nag-asawa na ho.
Chairman: Bakit hindi kayo nagkatuluyan?
Lourdes: Nainip po.
Chairman: Pagkatapos mo ng kurso mo ay kumuha ka ng
Law at ako ang bahala sa iyo, hanggang ako pa
ang Chairman dito.
Pagkatapos ay kumuha siya ng pera sa kaniyang amerikana at inaabot sa
akin.
Chairman: Kuhanin mo ito.
Lourdes: Huwag na ho hindi ko kailangan.
Chairman: Hindi sige, kuhanin mo. Ayusin mo ang dapat
ayusin.
Tinanggap ko po ang pera ng may pag-aalinlangan. Natatakot at
kinakabahan na kapag hindi ko tinanggap ang pera ay baka siya
magagalit kasabay na rito ang pagtapon sa akin kung saan-saan opisina o
kaya ay tanggalin ako sa posisyon.
Chairman: Paglabas mo itago mo ang pera. Ayaw ko ng
may makaka-alam nito. Just the two of us.
Lourdes: Bakit naman, Sir?
Chairman: Basta. Maraming tsismosa diyan sa labas. But I
dont give them a damn. Hindi ako mamatay sa
kanila.

Tumayo na ako at lumabas. Pumanhik na ako ng 8th Floor at pumunta

ako sa officemate ko na si Agnes Magdaet. Ikinwento ko ang nangyari sa
akin sa opisina ni Chairman. Habang kinikwento ko ito kay Agnes ay
binilang namin ang pera na nagkakahalaga ng tatlong libong piso (PHP
3,000). Sinabi ni Agnes na isauli ko raw ang pera, pero ang sabi ko ay
natatakot ako baka magalit si Sir. Nagsabi agad kami kay EC Perlita
Velasco at sinalaysay ko ang nangyari. Sinabi niya na isauli ko ang pera
at noong araw ding iyon ay nagpasiya akong isauli na nga ito ngunit
hindi ako nagkaroon ng pagkakataon dahil marami siyang naging
bisita. Isinauli ko nga ang pera noong Lunes, Setyembre 14, 1998.
7. Noong huling linggo ng Setyembre, 1998, ay may tinanong din sa
akin si Chairman Rayala na hindi ko masikmura, at sa aking palagay at
tahasang pambabastos sa akin.
Chairman: Lot, may ka live-in ka ba?
Lourdes: Sir, wala po.
Chairman: Bakit malaki ang balakang mo?
Lourdes: Kayo, Sir ha! Masama sa amin ang may ka livein.
Chairman: Bakit, ano ba ang relihiyon ninyo?
Lourdes: Catholic, Sir. Kailangan ikasal muna.
Chairman: Bakit ako, hindi kasal.
Lourdes: Sir, di magpakasal kayo.
Chairman: Huh. Ibahin na nga natin ang usapan.
8. Noong Oktubre 29, 1998, ako ay pumasok sa kwarto ni Chairman
Rayala. Ito ay sa kadahilanang ang fax machine ay nasa loob ng
kaniyang kwarto. Ang nag-aasikaso nito, si Riza Ocampo, ay naka-leave
kaya ako ang nag-asikaso nito noong araw na iyon. Nang mabigyan ko
na ng fax tone yung kausap ko, pagharap ko sa kanan ay nakaharang sa
dadaanan ko si Chairman Rayala.Tinitingnan ako sa mata at ang titig
niya ay umuusad mula ulo hanggang dibdib tapos ay ngumiti na may
mahalay na pakahulugan.
9. Noong hapon naman ng pareho pa ring petsa, may nag-aapply na
sekretarya sa opisina, sinabi ko ito kay Chairman Rayala:
Lourdes: Sir, si Pinky po yung applicant, magpapainterview po yata sa inyo.
Chairman: Sabihin mo magpa-pap smear muna siya

Chairman: O sige, i-refer mo kay Alex. (Alex Lopez, Chief

of Staff).
10. Noong Nobyembre 9, 1998, ako ay tinawag ni Chairman Rayala sa
kaniyang opisina upang kuhanin ko ang diktasyon niya para kay ELA
Oscar Uy. Hindi pa kami nakakatapos ng unang talata, may pumasok na
bisita si Chairman, si Baby Pangilinan na sinamahan ni Riza
Ocampo. Pinalabas muna ako ni Chairman. Nang maka-alis na si Ms.
Pangilinan, pinapasok na niya ako ulit. Umupo ako. Lumapit sa likuran
ko si Chairman, hinawakan ang kaliwang balikat ko na pinipisil ng
kanang kamay niya at sinabi:
Chairman: Saan na ba tayo natapos?
Palakad-lakad siya sa aking likuran habang nag-didikta. Huminto siya
pagkatapos, at nilagay niya ang kanang kamay niya sa aking kanang
balikat at pinisil-pisil ito pagkatapos ay pinagapang niya ito sa kanang
bahagi ng aking leeg, at pinagapang hanggang kanang tenga at saka
kiniliti. Dito ko inalis ang kaniyang kamay sa pamamagitan ng aking
kaliwang kamay. At saka ko sinabi:
Lourdes: Sir, yung kamay ninyo alisin niyo!
Natapos ko rin ang liham na pinagagawa niya pero halos hindi ko na
maintindihan ang na-isulat ko dahil sa takot at inis na nararamdaman
ko.[4]

After the last incident narrated, Domingo filed for leave of absence and
asked to be immediately transferred. Thereafter, she filed the Complaint for sexual
harassment on the basis of Administrative Order No. 250, the Rules and
Regulations Implementing RA 7877 in the Department of Labor and Employment.
Upon receipt of the Complaint, the DOLE Secretary referred the Complaint
to the OP, Rayala being a presidential appointee. The OP, through then Executive
Secretary Ronaldo Zamora, ordered Secretary Laguesma to investigate the
allegations in the Complaint and create a committee for such purpose. On
December 4, 1998, Secretary Laguesma issued Administrative Order (AO) No.
280, Series of 1998,[5] constituting a Committee on Decorum and Investigation

(Committee) in accordance with Republic Act (RA) 7877, the Anti-Sexual

Harassment Act of 1995.[6]
The Committee heard the parties and received their respective evidence. On
March 2, 2000, the Committee submitted its report and recommendation to
Secretary Laguesma. It found Rayala guilty of the offense charged and
recommended the imposition of the minimum penalty provided under AO 250,
which it erroneously stated as suspension for six (6) months.
The following day, Secretary Laguesma submitted a copy of the Committee
Report and Recommendation to the OP, but with the recommendation that the
penalty should be suspension for six (6) months and one (1) day, in accordance
with AO 250.
On May 8, 2000, the OP, through Executive Secretary Zamora, issued AO
119, the pertinent portions of which read:
[7]

Upon a careful scrutiny of the evidence on record, I concur with

the findings of the Committee as to the culpability of the respondent
[Rayala], the same having been established by clear and convincing
evidence. However, I disagree with the recommendation that respondent
be meted only the penalty of suspension for six (6) months and one (1)
day considering the circumstances of the case.
What aggravates respondents situation is the undeniable
circumstance that he took advantage of his position as the superior of the
complainant. Respondent occupies the highest position in the NLRC,
being its Chairman. As head of said office, it was incumbent upon
respondent to set an example to the others as to how they should conduct
themselves in public office, to see to it that his subordinates work
efficiently in accordance with Civil Service Rules and Regulations, and
to provide them with healthy working atmosphere wherein co-workers
treat each other with respect, courtesy and cooperation, so that in the end
the public interest will be benefited (City Mayor of Zamboanga vs. Court
of Appeals, 182 SCRA 785 [1990]).
What is more, public service requires the utmost integrity and
strictest discipline (Gano vs. Leonen, 232 SCRA 99 [1994]). Thus, a
public servant must exhibit at all times the highest sense of honesty and

integrity, and utmost devotion and dedication to duty (Sec. 4 (g), RA

6713), respect the rights of others and shall refrain from doing acts
contrary to law, and good morals (Sec. 4(c)). No less than the
Constitution sanctifies the principle that a public office is a public trust,
and enjoins all public officers and employees to serve with the highest
degree of responsibility, integrity, loyalty and efficiency (Section 1,
Article XI, 1987 Constitution).
Given these established standards, I see respondents acts not just
[as] a failure to give due courtesy and respect to his co-employees
(subordinates) or to maintain good conduct and behavior but defiance of
the basic norms or virtues which a government official must at all times
uphold, one that is contrary to law and public sense of morality.
Otherwise stated, respondent to whom stricter standards must apply
being the highest official [of] the NLRC had shown an attitude, a frame
of mind, a disgraceful conduct, which renders him unfit to remain in the
service.
WHEREFORE, in view of the foregoing, respondent Rogelio I.
Rayala, Chairman, National Labor Relations Commission, is found
guilty of the grave offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct and is
hereby DISMISSED from the service effective upon receipt of this
Order.
SO ORDER[ED].

Rayala filed a Motion for Reconsideration, which the OP denied in a

Resolution[8] dated May 24, 2000. He then filed a Petition for Certiorari and
Prohibition with Prayer for Temporary Restraining Order under Rule 65 of the
Revised Rules on Civil Procedure before this Court on June 14, 2000.[9] However,
the same was dismissed in a Resolution dated June 26, 2000 for
disregarding the hierarchy of courts.[10] Rayala filed a Motion for
Reconsideration[11] on August 15, 2000. In its Resolution[12] dated September 4,
2000, the Court recalled its June 26 Resolution and referred the petition to the
Court of Appeals (CA) for appropriate action.

The CA rendered its Decision[13] on December 14, 2001. It held that there
was sufficient evidence on record to create moral certainty that Rayala committed
the acts he was charged with. It said:
The complainant narrated her story complete with details. Her
straightforward and uninhibited testimony was not emasculated by the
declarations of Commissioner Rayala or his witnesses. x x x
Moreover, Commissioner Rayala has not proven any vicious
motive for Domingo and her witnesses to invent their stories. It is very
unlikely that they would perjure themselves only to accommodate the
alleged conspiracy to oust petitioner from office. Save for his empty
conjectures and speculations, Rayala failed to substantiate his contrived
conspiracy. It is a hornbook doctrine that conspiracy must be proved by
positive and convincing evidence (People v. Noroa, 329 SCRA 502
[2000]). Besides, it is improbable that the complainant would concoct a
story of sexual harassment against the highest official of the NLRC and
thereby expose herself to the possibility of losing her job, or be the
subject of reprisal from her superiors and perhaps public ridicule if she
was not telling the truth.

It also held that Rayalas dismissal was proper. The CA pointed out that
Rayala was dismissed for disgraceful and immoral conduct in violation of RA
6713, the Code of Conduct and Ethical Standards for Public Officials and
Employees. It held that the OP was correct in concluding that Rayalas acts violated
RA 6713:
Indeed, [Rayala] was a public official, holding the Chairmanship
of the National Labor Relations Commission, entrusted with the sacred
duty of administering justice. Occupying as he does such an exalted
position, Commissioner Rayala must pay a high price for the honor
bestowed upon him. He must comport himself at all times in such a
manner that the conduct of his everyday life should be beyond reproach
and free from any impropriety. That the acts complained of were
committed within the sanctuary of [his] office compounded the
objectionable nature of his wrongdoing. By daring to violate the
complainant within the solitude of his chambers, Commissioner Rayala
placed the integrity of his office in disrepute. His disgraceful and
immoral conduct warrants his removal from office.[14]

Thus, it dismissed the petition, to wit:

IN VIEW OF ALL THE FOREGOING, the instant petition is
hereby DISMISSED and Administrative Order No. 119 as well [as] the
Resolution of the Office of the President in O.P. Case No. 00-E-9118
dated May 24, 2000 are AFFIRMED IN TOTO. No cost.
SO ORDERED.[15]

Rayala timely filed a Motion for Reconsideration. Justices Vasquez and

Tolentino voted to affirm the December 14 Decision. However, Justice Reyes
dissented mainly because AO 250 states that the penalty imposable is suspension
for six (6) months and one (1) day.[16] Pursuant to the internal rules of the CA, a
Special Division of Five was constituted.[17] In its October 18, 2002 Resolution, the
CA modified its earlier Decision:
ACCORDINGLY, the Decision dated December [14], 2001 is
MODIFIED to the effect that the penalty of dismissal is DELETED and
instead the penalty of suspension from service for the maximum period
of one (1) year is HEREBY IMPOSED upon the petitioner. The rest of
the challenged decision stands.
SO ORDERED.

Domingo filed a Petition for Review[18] before this Court, which we denied
in our February 19, 2003 Resolution for having a defective verification. She filed a
Motion for Reconsideration, which the Court granted; hence, the petition was
reinstated.
Rayala likewise filed a Petition for Review[19] with this Court essentially
arguing that he is not guilty of any act of sexual harassment.

Meanwhile, the Republic filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the CAs

October 18, 2002 Resolution. The CA denied the same in its June 3, 2003
Resolution, the dispositive portion of which reads:
ACCORDINGLY, by a majority vote, public respondents
Motion for Reconsideration, (sic) is DENIED.
SO ORDERED.

The Republic then filed its own Petition for Review.[20]

On June 28, 2004, the Court directed the consolidation of the three (3)
petitions.
G.R. No. 155831
Domingo assails the CAs resolution modifying the penalty imposed by the
Office of the President. She raises this issue:
The Court of Appeals erred in modifying the penalty for the respondent
from dismissal to suspension from service for the maximum period of
one year. The President has the prerogative to determine the proper
penalty to be imposed on an erring Presidential appointee. The President
was well within his power when he fittingly used that prerogative in
deciding to dismiss the respondent from the service.[21]

She argues that the power to remove Rayala, a presidential appointee, is

lodged with the President who has control of the entire Executive Department, its
bureaus and offices. The OPs decision was arrived at after affording Rayala due
process. Hence, his dismissal from the service is a prerogative that is entirely with
the President.[22]
As to the applicability of AO No. 250, she argues that the same was not
intended to cover cases against presidential appointees. AO No. 250 refers only to
the instances wherein the DOLE Secretary is the disciplining authority, and thus,

the AO does not circumscribe the power of the President to dismiss an erring
presidential appointee.
G.R. No. 155840
In his petition, Rayala raises the following issues:
I.

CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE COURT OF

APPEALS, THE ACTS OF HEREIN PETITIONER DO NOT
CONSTITUTE SEXUAL HARASSMENT AS LAID DOWN
BY THE En Banc RULING IN THE CASE OF AQUINO vs.
ACOSTA, ibid., AS WELL AS IN THE APPLICATION OF
EXISTING LAWS.

II.

CONTRARY TO THE FINDINGS OF THE HONORABLE

COURT OF APPEALS, INTENT IS AN INDISPENSABLE
ELEMENT IN A CASE FOR SEXUAL HARASSMENT.
THE HONORABLE COURT ERRED IN ITS FINDING
THAT IT IS AN OFFENSE THAT IS MALUM
PROHIBITUM.

III.

THE INVESTIGATION COMMITTEE, THE OFFICE OF

THE PRESIDENT, AND NOW, THE HONORABLE
COURT OF APPEALS, HAS MISAPPLIED AND
EXPANDED
THE
DEFINITION
OF
SEXUAL
HARASSMENT IN THE WORKPLACE UNDER R.A. No.
7877, BY APPLYING DOLE A.O. 250, WHICH RUNS
COUNTER TO THE RECENT PRONOUNCEMENTS OF
THIS HONORABLE SUPREME COURT.[23]

Invoking Aquino v. Acosta,[24] Rayala argues that the case is the definitive
ruling on what constitutes sexual harassment. Thus, he posits that for sexual
harassment to exist under RA 7877, there must be: (a) demand, request, or
requirement of a sexual favor; (b) the same is made a pre-condition to hiring, reemployment, or continued employment; or (c) the denial thereof results in
discrimination against the employee.

Rayala asserts that Domingo has failed to allege and establish any sexual
favor, demand, or request from petitioner in exchange for her continued
employment or for her promotion. According to Rayala, the acts imputed to him
are without malice or ulterior motive. It was merely Domingos perception of
malice in his alleged acts a product of her own imagination[25] that led her to file
the sexual harassment complaint.
Likewise, Rayala assails the OPs interpretation, as upheld by the CA, that
RA 7877 is malum prohibitum such that the defense of absence of malice is
unavailing. He argues that sexual harassment is considered an offense against a
particular person, not against society as a whole. Thus, he claims that intent is an
essential element of the offense because the law requires as a conditio sine qua
non that a sexual favor be first sought by the offender in order to achieve certain
specific results. Sexual harassment is committed with the perpetrators deliberate
intent to commit the offense.[26]
Rayala next argues that AO 250 expands the acts proscribed in RA 7877. In
particular, he assails the definition of the forms of sexual harassment:
Rule IV
FORMS OF SEXUAL HARASSMENT
Section 1. Forms of Sexual Harassment. Sexual harassment may
be committed in any of the following forms:
a) Overt sexual advances;
b) Unwelcome or improper gestures of affection;
c) Request or demand for sexual favors including but not limited
to going out on dates, outings or the like for the same purpose;
d) Any other act or conduct of a sexual nature or for purposes of
sexual gratification which is generally annoying, disgusting or offensive
to the victim.[27]

He posits that these acts alone without corresponding demand, request, or

requirement do not constitute sexual harassment as contemplated by the law. [28] He
alleges that the rule-making power granted to the employer in Section 4(a) of RA
7877 is limited only to procedural matters. The law did not delegate to the
employer the power to promulgate rules which would provide other or additional
forms of sexual harassment, or to come up with its own definition of sexual
harassment.[29]
G.R. No. 158700
The Republic raises this issue:
Whether or not the President of the Philippines may validly dismiss
respondent Rayala as Chairman of the NLRC for committing acts of
sexual harassment.[30]

The Republic argues that Rayalas acts constitute sexual harassment under
AO 250. His acts constitute unwelcome or improper gestures of affection and are
acts or conduct of a sexual nature, which are generally annoying or offensive to the
victim.[31]
It also contends that there is no legal basis for the CAs reduction of the
penalty imposed by the OP. Rayalas dismissal is valid and warranted under the
circumstances. The power to remove the NLRC Chairman solely rests upon the
President, limited only by the requirements under the law and the due process
clause.
The Republic further claims that, although AO 250 provides only a one (1)
year suspension, it will not prevent the OP from validly imposing the penalty of
dismissal on Rayala. It argues that even though Rayala is a presidential appointee,
he is still subject to the Civil Service Law. Under the Civil Service Law,
disgraceful and immoral conduct, the acts imputed to Rayala, constitute grave
misconduct punishable by dismissal from the service.[32] The Republic adds that
Rayalas position is invested with public trust and his acts violated that trust; thus,
he should be dismissed from the service.

This argument, according to the Republic, is also supported by Article 215

of the Labor Code, which states that the Chairman of the NLRC holds office until
he reaches the age of 65 only during good behavior.[33] Since Rayalas security of
tenure is conditioned upon his good behavior, he may be removed from office if it
is proven that he has failed to live up to this standard.
All the issues raised in these three cases can be summed up in two ultimate
questions, namely:
(1) Did Rayala commit sexual harassment?
(2) If he did, what is the applicable penalty?

Initially, however, we must resolve a procedural issue raised by Rayala. He

accuses the Office of the Solicitor General (OSG), as counsel for the Republic, of
forum shopping because it filed a motion for reconsideration of the decision in CAG.R. SP No. 61026 and then filed a comment in G.R. No. 155840 before this
Court.
We do not agree.
Forum shopping is an act of a party, against whom an adverse judgment or
order has been rendered in one forum, of seeking and possibly securing a favorable
opinion in another forum, other than by appeal or special civil action
for certiorari.[34] It consists of filing multiple suits involving the same parties for
the same cause of action, either simultaneously or successively, for the purpose of
obtaining a favorable judgment.[35]
There is forum shopping when the following elements concur: (1) identity of
the parties or, at least, of the parties who represent the same interest in both
actions; (2) identity of the rights asserted and relief prayed for, as the latter is
founded on the same set of facts; and (3) identity of the two preceding particulars
such that any judgment rendered in the other action will amount to res judicata in
the action under consideration or will constitute litis pendentia.[36]

Reviewing the antecedents of these consolidated cases, we note that the CA

rendered the assailed Resolution on October 18, 2002. The Republic filed its
Motion for Reconsideration on November 22, 2002. On the other hand, Rayala
filed his petition before this Court on November 21, 2002. While the Republics
Motion for Reconsideration was pending resolution before the CA, on December 2,
2002, it was directed by this Court to file its Comment on Rayalas petition, which
it submitted on June 16, 2003.
When the CA denied the Motion for Reconsideration, the Republic filed its
own Petition for Review with this Court on July 3, 2003. It cited in its Certification
and Verification of a Non-Forum Shopping (sic), that there was a case involving
the same facts pending before this Court denominated as G.R. No. 155840. With
respect to Domingos petition, the same had already been dismissed on February
19, 2003. Domingos petition was reinstated on June 16, 2003 but the resolution
was received by the OSG only on July 25, 2003, or after it had filed its own
petition.[37]
Based on the foregoing, it cannot be said that the OSG is guilty of forum
shopping. We must point out that it was Rayala who filed the petition in the CA,
with the Republic as the adverse party. Rayala himself filed a motion for
reconsideration of the CAs December 21, 2001 Decision, which led to a more
favorable ruling, i.e., the lowering of the penalty from dismissal to one-year
suspension. The parties adversely affected by this ruling (Domingo and the
Republic) had the right to question the same on motion for reconsideration. But
Domingo directly filed a Petition for Review with this Court, as did Rayala. When
the Republic opted to file a motion for reconsideration, it was merely exercising a
right. That Rayala and Domingo had by then already filed cases before the SC did
not take away this right. Thus, when this Court directed the Republic to file its
Comment on Rayalas petition, it had to comply, even if it had an unresolved
motion for reconsideration with the CA, lest it be cited for contempt.
Accordingly, it cannot be said that the OSG file[d] multiple suits involving
the same parties for the same cause of action, either simultaneously or
successively, for the purpose of obtaining a favorable judgment.
We now proceed to discuss the substantive issues.

It is noteworthy that the five CA Justices who deliberated on the case were
unanimous in upholding the findings of the Committee and the OP. They found the
assessment made by the Committee and the OP to be a meticulous and
dispassionate analysis of the testimonies of the complainant (Domingo), the
respondent (Rayala), and their respective witnesses. [38] They differed only on the
appropriate imposable penalty.
That Rayala committed the acts complained of and was guilty of sexual
harassment is, therefore, the common factual finding of not just one, but three
independent bodies: the Committee, the OP and the CA. It should be remembered
that when supported by substantial evidence, factual findings made by quasijudicial and administrative bodies are accorded great respect and even finality by
the courts.[39] The principle, therefore, dictates that such findings should bind us.[40]
Indeed, we find no reason to deviate from this rule. There appears no valid
ground for this Court to review the factual findings of the CA, the OP, and the
Investigating Committee. These findings are now conclusive on the Court. And
quite significantly, Rayala himself admits to having committed some of the acts
imputed to him.
He insists, however, that these acts do not constitute sexual harassment,
because Domingo did not allege in her complaint that there was a demand, request,
or requirement of a sexual favor as a condition for her continued employment or
for her promotion to a higher position.[41] Rayala urges us to apply to his case our
ruling in Aquino v. Acosta.[42]
We find respondents insistence unconvincing.
Basic in the law of public officers is the three-fold liability rule, which states
that the wrongful acts or omissions of a public officer may give rise to civil,
criminal and administrative liability. An action for each can proceed independently
of the others.[43] This rule applies with full force to sexual harassment.
The law penalizing sexual harassment in our jurisdiction is RA
7877. Section 3 thereof defines work-related sexual harassment in this wise:

Sec. 3. Work, Education or Training-related Sexual Harassment

Defined. Work, education or training-related sexual harassment is
committed by an employer, manager, supervisor, agent of the employer,
teacher, instructor, professor, coach, trainor, or any other person who,
having authority, influence or moral ascendancy over another in a work
or training or education environment, demands, requests or otherwise
requires any sexual favor from the other, regardless of whether the
demand, request or requirement for submission is accepted by the object
of said Act.
(a) In a work-related or employment environment, sexual
harassment is committed when:
(1) The sexual favor is made as a condition in the hiring or in the
employment, re-employment or continued employment of said
individual, or in granting said individual favorable compensation, terms,
conditions, promotions, or privileges; or the refusal to grant the sexual
favor results in limiting, segregating or classifying the employee which
in a way would discriminate, deprive or diminish employment
opportunities or otherwise adversely affect said employee;
(2) The above acts would impair the employees rights or
privileges under existing labor laws; or
(3) The above acts would result in an intimidating, hostile, or
offensive environment for the employee.

This section, in relation to Section 7 on penalties, defines the criminal aspect of the
unlawful act of sexual harassment. The same section, in relation to Section 6,
authorizes the institution of an independent civil action for damages and other
affirmative relief.
Section 4, also in relation to Section 3, governs the procedure for administrative
cases, viz.:
Sec. 4. Duty of the Employer or Head of Office in a Work-related,
Education or Training Environment. It shall be the duty of the employer
or the head of the work-related, educational or training environment or

institution, to prevent or deter the commission of acts of sexual

harassment and to provide the procedures for the resolution, settlement
or prosecution of acts of sexual harassment. Towards this end, the
employer or head of office shall:
(a)

Promulgate appropriate rules and regulations

in consultation with and jointly approved by
the employees or students or trainees, through
their
duly designated representatives,
prescribing the procedure for the investigation
or sexual harassment cases and the
administrative sanctions therefor.
Administrative sanctions shall not be a
bar to prosecution in the proper courts for
unlawful acts of sexual harassment.
The said rules and regulations issued
pursuant to this section (a) shall include,
among others, guidelines on proper decorum
in the workplace and educational or training
institutions.

(b)

Create a committee on decorum and

investigation of cases on sexual harassment.
The committee shall conduct meetings, as the
case may be, with other officers and
employees, teachers, instructors, professors,
coaches, trainors and students or trainees to
increase understanding and prevent incidents
of sexual harassment. It shall also conduct the
investigation of the alleged cases constituting
sexual harassment.

In the case of a work-related environment, the committee shall be

composed of at least one (1) representative each from the management,
the union, if any, the employees from the supervisory rank, and from the
rank and file employees.
In the case of the educational or training institution, the committee
shall be composed of at least one (1) representative from the

administration, the trainors, teachers, instructors, professors or coaches

and students or trainees, as the case maybe.
The employer or head of office, educational or training institution
shall disseminate or post a copy of this Act for the information of all
concerned.

The CA, thus, correctly ruled that Rayalas culpability is not to be determined
solely on the basis of Section 3, RA 7877, because he is charged with the
administrative offense, not the criminal infraction, of sexual harassment. [44] It
should be enough that the CA, along with the Investigating Committee and the
Office of the President, found substantial evidence to support the administrative
charge.
Yet, even if we were to test Rayalas acts strictly by the standards set in
Section 3, RA 7877, he would still be administratively liable. It is true that this
provision calls for a demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor. But it is not
necessary that the demand, request or requirement of a sexual favor be articulated
in a categorical oral or written statement. It may be discerned, with equal certitude,
from the acts of the offender. Holding and squeezing Domingos shoulders, running
his fingers across her neck and tickling her ear, having inappropriate conversations
with her, giving her money allegedly for school expenses with a promise of future
privileges, and making statements with unmistakable sexual overtones all these
acts of Rayala resound with deafening clarity the unspoken request for a sexual
favor.
Likewise, contrary to Rayalas claim, it is not essential that the demand,
request or requirement be made as a condition for continued employment or for
promotion to a higher position. It is enough that the respondents acts result in
creating an intimidating, hostile or offensive environment for the
employee.[45] That the acts of Rayala generated an intimidating and hostile
environment for Domingo is clearly shown by the common factual finding of the
Investigating Committee, the OP and the CA that Domingo reported the matter to
an officemate and, after the last incident, filed for a leave of absence and requested
transfer to another unit.

Rayalas invocation of Aquino v. Acosta[46] is misplaced, because the factual

setting in that case is different from that in the case at bench. In Aquino, Atty.
Susan Aquino, Chief of the Legal and Technical Staff of the Court of Tax Appeals
(CTA), charged then CTA Presiding Judge (now Presiding Justice) Ernesto Acosta
of sexual harassment. She complained of several incidents when Judge Acosta
allegedly kissed her, embraced her, and put his arm around her shoulder. The case
was referred to CA Justice Josefina G. Salonga for investigation. In her report,
Justice Salonga found that the complainant failed to show by convincing evidence
that the acts of Judge Acosta in greeting her with a kiss on the cheek, in a `besobeso fashion, were carried out with lustful and lascivious desires or were motivated
by malice or ill motive. It is clear from the circumstances that most of the kissing
incidents were done on festive and special occasions, and they took place in the
presence of other people and the same was by reason of the exaltation or happiness
of the moment. Thus, Justice Salonga concluded:
In all the incidents complained of, the respondent's pecks on the
cheeks of the complainant should be understood in the context of having
been done on the occasion of some festivities, and not the assertion of
the latter that she was singled out by Judge Acosta in his kissing
escapades. The busses on her cheeks were simply friendly and innocent,
bereft of malice and lewd design. The fact that respondent judge kisses
other people on the cheeks in the 'beso-beso' fashion, without malice,
was corroborated by Atty. Florecita P. Flores, Ms. Josephine Adalem
and Ms. Ma. Fides Balili, who stated that they usually practice 'besobeso' or kissing on the cheeks, as a form of greeting on occasions when
they meet each other, like birthdays, Christmas, New Year's Day and
even Valentine's Day, and it does not matter whether it is Judge Acosta's
birthday or their birthdays. Theresa Cinco Bactat, a lawyer who belongs
to complainant's department, further attested that on occasions like
birthdays, respondent judge would likewise greet her with a peck on the
cheek in a 'beso-beso' manner. Interestingly, in one of several festive
occasions, female employees of the CTA pecked respondent judge on
the cheek where Atty. Aquino was one of Judge Acosta's well wishers.
In sum, no sexual harassment had indeed transpired on those six
occasions. Judge Acosta's acts of bussing Atty. Aquino on her cheek
were merely forms of greetings, casual and customary in nature. No
evidence of intent to sexually harass complainant was apparent, only that
the innocent acts of 'beso-beso' were given malicious connotations by the

complainant. In fact, she did not even relate to anyone what happened to
her. Undeniably, there is no manifest sexual undertone in all those
incidents.[47]

This Court agreed with Justice Salonga, and Judge Acosta was exonerated.
To repeat, this factual milieu in Aquino does not obtain in the case at bench. While
in Aquino, the Court interpreted the acts (of Judge Acosta) as casual gestures of
friendship and camaraderie, done during festive or special occasions and with other
people present, in the instant case, Rayalas acts of holding and squeezing
Domingos shoulders, running his fingers across her neck and tickling her ear, and
the inappropriate comments, were all made in the confines of Rayalas office when
no other members of his staff were around.More importantly, and a circumstance
absent in Aquino, Rayalas acts, as already adverted to above, produced a hostile
work environment for Domingo, as shown by her having reported the matter to an
officemate and, after the last incident, filing for a leave of absence and requesting
transfer to another unit.
Rayala also argues that AO 250 does not apply to him. First, he argues that
AO 250 does not cover the NLRC, which, at the time of the incident, was under the
DOLE only for purposes of program and policy coordination. Second, he posits
that even assuming AO 250 is applicable to the NLRC, he is not within its
coverage because he is a presidential appointee.
We find, however, that the question of whether or not AO 250 covers Rayala
is of no real consequence. The events of this case unmistakably show that the
administrative charges against Rayala were for violation of RA 7877; that the OP
properly assumed jurisdiction over the administrative case; that the participation of
the DOLE, through the Committee created by the Secretary, was limited to
initiating the investigation process, reception of evidence of the parties, preparation
of the investigation report, and recommending the appropriate action to be taken by
the OP. AO 250 had never really been applied to Rayala. If it was used at all, it
was to serve merely as an auxiliary procedural guide to aid the Committee in the
orderly conduct of the investigation.

Next, Rayala alleges that the CA erred in holding that sexual harassment is
an offense malum prohibitum. He argues that intent is an essential element in
sexual harassment, and since the acts imputed to him were done allegedly without
malice, he should be absolved of the charges against him.
We reiterate that what is before us is an administrative case for sexual
harassment. Thus, whether the crime of sexual harassment is malum in se or malum
prohibitum is immaterial.
We also reject Rayalas allegations that the charges were filed because of a
conspiracy to get him out of office and thus constitute merely political harassment.
A conspiracy must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. His bare assertions
cannot stand against the evidence presented by Domingo. As we have already
ruled, the acts imputed to Rayala have been proven as fact. Moreover, he has not
proven any ill motive on the part of Domingo and her witnesses which would be
ample reason for her to conjure stories about him. On the contrary, ill motive is
belied by the fact that Domingo and her witnesses all employees of the NLRC at
that time stood to lose their jobs or suffer unpleasant consequences for coming
forward and charging their boss with sexual harassment.
Furthermore, Rayala decries the alleged violation of his right to due process.
He accuses the Committee on Decorum of railroading his trial for violation of RA
7877. He also scored the OPs decision finding him guilty of disgraceful and
immoral conduct under the Revised Administrative Code and not for violation of
RA 7877. Considering that he was not tried for disgraceful and immoral conduct,
he argues that the verdict is a sham and total nullity.
We hold that Rayala was properly accorded due process. In previous cases,
this Court held that:
[i]n administrative proceedings, due process has been recognized
to include the following: (1) the right to actual or constructive notice of
the institution of proceedings which may affect a respondents legal
rights; (2) a real opportunity to be heard personally or with the assistance
of counsel, to present witnesses and evidence in ones favor, and to
defend ones rights; (3) a tribunal vested with competent jurisdiction and

so constituted as to afford a person charged administratively a reasonable

guarantee of honesty as well as impartiality; and (4) a finding by
said tribunalwhich is supported by substantial evidence submitted for
consideration during the hearing or contained in the records or made
known to the parties affected.[48]

The records of the case indicate that Rayala was afforded all these
procedural due process safeguards. Although in the beginning he questioned the
authority of the Committee to try him,[49] he appeared, personally and with counsel,
and participated in the proceedings.
On the other point raised, this Court has held that, even in criminal cases, the
designation of the offense is not controlling, thus:
What is controlling is not the title of the complaint, nor the
designation of the offense charged or the particular law or part thereof
allegedly violated, these being mere conclusions of law made by the
prosecutor, but the description of the crime charged and the particular
facts therein recited. The acts or omissions complained of must be
alleged in such form as is sufficient to enable a person of common
understanding to know what offense is intended to be charged, and
enable the court to pronounce proper judgment. No information for a
crime will be sufficient if it does not accurately and clearly allege the
elements of the crime charged. Every element of the offense must be
stated in the information. What facts and circumstances are necessary to
be included therein must be determined by reference to the definitions
and essentials of the specified crimes. The requirement of alleging the
elements of a crime in the information is to inform the accused of the
nature of the accusation against him so as to enable him to suitably
prepare his defense.[50]

It is noteworthy that under AO 250, sexual harassment amounts to

disgraceful and immoral conduct.[51] Thus, any finding of liability for sexual
harassment may also be the basis of culpability for disgraceful and immoral
conduct.
With the foregoing disquisitions affirming the finding that Rayala committed
sexual harassment, we now determine the proper penalty to be imposed.

Rayala attacks the penalty imposed by the OP. He alleges that under the
pertinent Civil Service Rules, disgraceful and immoral conduct is punishable by
suspension for a period of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. He also
argues that since he is charged administratively, aggravating or mitigating
circumstances cannot be appreciated for purposes of imposing the penalty.
Under AO 250, the penalty for the first offense is suspension for six (6)
months and one (1) day to one (1) year, while the penalty for the second offense is
dismissal.[52]On the other hand, Section 22(o), Rule XVI of the Omnibus Rules
Implementing Book V of the Administrative Code of 1987[53] and Section 52 A(15)
of the Revised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service[54] both
provide that the first offense of disgraceful and immoral conduct is punishable by
suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year. A second offense is
punishable by dismissal.
Under the Labor Code, the Chairman of the NLRC shall hold office during
good behavior until he or she reaches the age of sixty-five, unless sooner
removed for causeas provided by law or becomes incapacitated to discharge the
duties of the office.[55]
In this case, it is the President of the Philippines, as the proper disciplining
authority, who would determine whether there is a valid cause for the removal of
Rayala as NLRC Chairman. This power, however, is qualified by the phrase for
cause as provided by law. Thus, when the President found that Rayala was indeed
guilty of disgraceful and immoral conduct, the Chief Executive did not have
unfettered discretion to impose a penalty other than the penalty provided by law for
such offense. As cited above, the imposable penalty for the first offense of either
the administrative offense of sexual harassment or for disgraceful and immoral
conduct is suspension of six (6) months and one (1) day to one (1) year.
Accordingly, it was error for the Office of the President to impose upon Rayala the
penalty of dismissal from the service, a penalty which can only be imposed upon
commission of a second offense.
Even if the OP properly considered the fact that Rayala took advantage of
his high government position, it still could not validly dismiss him from the

service. Under theRevised Uniform Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil

Service,[56] taking undue advantage of a subordinate may be considered as an
aggravating circumstance[57] and where only aggravating and no mitigating
circumstances are present, the maximum penalty shall be imposed.[58] Hence, the
maximum penalty that can be imposed on Rayala is suspension for one (1) year.
Rayala holds the exalted position of NLRC Chairman, with the rank
equivalent to a CA Justice. Thus, it is not unavailing that rigid standards of conduct
may be demanded of him. In Talens-Dabon v. Judge Arceo,[59] this Court, in
upholding the liability of therein respondent Judge, said:
The actuations of respondent are aggravated by the fact that
complainant is one of his subordinates over whom he exercises control
and supervision, he being the executive judge. He took advantage of his
position and power in order to carry out his lustful and lascivious
desires. Instead of he being in loco parentis over his subordinate
employees, respondent was the one who preyed on them, taking
advantage of his superior position.

In yet another case, this Court declared:

As a managerial employee, petitioner is bound by more exacting
work ethics. He failed to live up to his higher standard of responsibility
when he succumbed to his moral perversity. And when such moral
perversity is perpetrated against his subordinate, he provides a justifiable
ground for his dismissal for lack of trust and confidence. It is the right,
nay, the duty of every employer to protect its employees from oversexed
superiors.[60]

It is incumbent upon the head of office to set an example on how his

employees should conduct themselves in public office, so that they may work
efficiently in a healthy working atmosphere. Courtesy demands that he should set a
good example.[61]
Rayala has thrown every argument in the book in a vain effort to effect his
exoneration. He even puts Domingos character in question and casts doubt on the

morality of the former President who ordered, albeit erroneously, his dismissal
from the service. Unfortunately for him, these are not significant factors in the
disposition of the case. It is his character that is in question here and sadly, the
inquiry showed that he has been found wanting.
WHEREFORE, the foregoing premises considered, the October 18, 2002
Resolution of the Court of Appeals in CA-G.R. SP No. 61026
is AFFIRMED. Consequently, the petitions in G.R. Nos. 155831, 155840, and
158700 are DENIED. No pronouncement as to costs.