Harshad Mehta Scam

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HARSHAD MEHTA SCAM

REPORT

- Team Morgan Stanley


Group-24

ABOUT HARSHAD MEHTA AND THE SCAM


Harshad Mehta was an Indian Stockbroker and is alleged to have engineered the rise in the BSE
stock exchange in the year 1992. He promised the ultimate rags to riches story -- from the small
town Raipur boy who was once rusticated from school to Sultan of Dalal Street with all the
trappings of wealth such as a fabulous house, a fleet of cars and multiple stock exchange
memberships
Mehta was born in a middle class Gujrati family, and spent his childhood in Mumbai where his
father was a small businessman. Later, the family moved to Raipur, Madhya Pradesh after
doctors advised his father to move to a drier place. Having completed his studies, he came back
to Mumbai to start working with well-known stockbrokers of BSE. Having gained experience as
a sub-broker, he teamed up with is brother for a new venture. His ex-employers helped him get
the brokers card in the BSE.
By 1990, he had made a big name in the stock market. He started buying shares heavily. He was
so attracted to the shares of Indias most prominent cement manufacturer Associated Cement
Company (ACC) that he took the price of the company from 200-9000 (approx.). When asked
for the reason for this high level bidding, he told that older companies should be valued on the
basis of the amount of money that should be needed to create another such company.
Mehta was accused of manipulating the rise in the Bombay Stock Exchange. He took advantage
of the many loopholes in the banking system and drained off funds from inter-bank transactions.
In the early 1990s, the bank had to maintain some particular amount of deposits in bonds. This
ratio was known as the Statutory Liquidity Ratio (SLR). Each bank had to submit its balance
sheet at the end of the day. Now, the government decided that banks need to show their balance
sheet only on Fridays. This meant that the banks would sell the bonds in the earlier parts of the
week and buy them back towards the end of the week. Now at the end of the week many banks
are desperate to buy bonds back. There comes the role of a broker. The brokers knew which bank
had bonds in excess and which had less than the requires amount. He acts as a middleman for the
banks. Harshad Mehta was one such broker who exploited this loophole.
Now what Harshad Mehta did was that he told the banker at A Bank that he was dealing with
many banks and hence did not know who he would deal in the end with. So he said that the bank
should write the cheque in his name rather than the other bank (which was forbidden by law), so
that he could make the payment to whichever bank was required. Since he was a trusted broker,
the banks agreed. Then, going back to the example of bank A and B, he took the money from A
and went to B and said that he would pay the money on the next day to B but he needed the
bonds right now (for A). But he offered a 15 % return for bank B for the one day extension. Bank
B readily agreed with this since it was getting such a nice return. Now since Harshad Mehta was
dealing with many banks at the same time he could then keep some capital with him at all times.
For example, he takes money from A on Monday, and tells B that hell pay on Tuesday, then he
takes money from C on Tuesday and tells D that hell pay on Wednesday and the money he gets
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from C is paid to B and as a result he has some working capital with him at all times if this goes
on with other banks throughout the week. The banks at that time were not allowed to invest in
the equity markets. Harshad Mehta had very cleverly squeezed some capital out of the banking
system. This capital he invested in the stock market and managed to stoke a massive boom. This
is actually how he got funds to buy the shares of ACC.

INSTRUMENTS USED IN SCAM


The crucial mechanism through which the scam was effected was the ready forward (RF) deal.
The RF is in essence a secured short-term (typically 15-day) loan from one bank to another. The
borrowing bank actually sells the securities to the lending bank and buys them back at the end of
the period of the loan, typically at a slightly higher price. It was this ready forward deal that
Mehta and his accomplices used with great success to channel money from the banking system.
In a ready-forward deal, a broker usually brings together two banks for which he is paid a
commission. Although the broker does not handle the cash or the securities, this was not the case
in the prelude to the Mehta scam.
The securities and payments were delivered through the broker in the settlement process. The
broker functioned as an intermediary who received the securities from the seller and handed
them over to the buyer; and he received the check from the buyer and subsequently made the
payment to the seller. Such a settlement process meant that both the buyer and the seller may not
even know the identity of the other as only the broker knew both of them. The brokers could
manage this method expertly as they had already become market makers by then and had started
trading on their account. They pretended to be undertaking the transactions on behalf of a bank to
maintain a faade of legality.

Mehta and his associates used another instrument called the bank receipt (BR). Securities were
not traded in reality like in a ready forward deal but the seller gave the buyer a BR which is a
confirmation of the sale of securities. A BR is a receipt for the money received by the selling
bank and pledges to deliver the securities to the buyer. In the meantime, the securities are held in
the sellers trust by the buyer.
Prepared with their evil mind, Mehta needed now banks which would readily issue fake BRs, or
ones without the guarantee of any government securities. His search ended when he found that
the Bank of Karad (BOK), Mumbai and the Metropolitan Co-operative Bank (MCB) two small
and little known lenders, were willing to comply. The two banks agreed to issue BRs as and
when required. Once they issued the fake BRs, Mehta passed them on to other banks who in turn
lent him money, under the false assumption that they were lending against government securities.
Mehta used the money thus secured to enhance share prices in the stock market. The shares were
then sold for significant profits and the BR retired when it was time to return the money to the
bank.

EXPOSURE OF THE SCAM


In April 1992, the first press report appeared indicating that there was a shortfall in the
Government Securities held by the State Bank of India. In a little over a month, investigations
revealed that this was just the tip of an iceberg which came to be called the securities scam,
involving misappropriation of funds to the tune of over Rs. 3,500-4,000 crores.
But the scams link to the culprits was actually exposed by journalist Sucheta Dalal on 23 April
1992. She exposed Mehtas illegal methods of how he was dipping illegally into the banking
system to finance his buying, in a column in The Times of India. She then investigated the Ketan
Parekh case and found its similarities to the Harshad Mehta case.

IMPACT ON STOCK MARKET AND ECONOMY

The immediate impact of the scam was a sharp fall in the share prices. The index fell
from 4500 to 2500 representing a loss of Rs. 100,000 crores in market capitalization.
Since the accused were active brokers in the stock markets, the number of shares which
had passed through their hands in the last one year was colossal. All these shares became
tainted shares, and overnight they became worthless pieces of paper as they could not
be delivered in the market. Genuine investors who had bought these shares well before
the scam came to light and even got them registered in their names found themselves
being robbed by the government. This resulted in a chaotic situation in the market since
no one was certain as to which shares were tainted and which were not.
The governments liberalization policies came under severe criticism after the scam, with
Harshad Mehta and others being described as the products of these policies.
Bowing to the political pressures and the bad press it received during the scam, the
liberalization policies were put on hold for a while by the government. The Securities
Exchange Board of India (SEBI) postponed sanctioning of private sector mutual funds.
The much talked about entry of foreign pension funds and mutual funds became more
remote than ever. The Euro-issues planned by several Indian companies were delayed
since the ability of Indian companies to raise equity capital in world markets was severely
compromised.

POST SCAM REGULATIONS

Post Mehta Scam in 1992, the GoI passed SEBI Act 1992 and conferred statutory
powers to it
MEASURES TAKEN:
Imposed an additional 10% volatility margin on A Group shares as well as margins on
ALBM and BLESS Schemes
Imposed volatility margins on net outstanding sale positions of FIIs, financial institutions,
banks and mutual funds
Banned naked short sales in March 2001

Reduced the gross exposure limit for brokers to 10 times the base capital for NSE and 15
times for other stock exchanges
Rolling settlements system made compulsory
Allowed banks to offer collateralized lending only through BSE & NSE, to increase
liquidity
Launched trade guarantee fund to guarantee all transactions

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