Municipality of Paranaque v VM Realty G.R. No. 127820.

July 20, 1998

Held: No to 1st Yes to 2nd. Petition dismissed.

Facts:

Ratio:

Under a city council resolution, the Municipality of Paraaque

filed on September 20, 1993, a Complaint for expropriation
against Private Respondent V.M. Realty Corporation over two
parcels of land of 10,000 square meters. The city previously
negotiated for the sale of the property but VM didnt accept.

1. Petitioner contends that a resolution approved by

the municipal council for the purpose of initiating an
expropriation case substantially complies with
the requirements of the law because the terms ordinance
and resolution are synonymous for the purpose of
bestowing authority [on] the local government unit through its
chief executive to initiate the expropriation proceedings in
court in the exercise of the power of eminent domain.

The trial court issued an Order dated February 4, 1994,

authorizing petitioner to take possession of the subject
property upon deposit with its clerk of court of an amount
equivalent to 15 percent of its fair market value based on its
current tax declaration.
According to the respondent, the complaint failed to state a
cause of action because it was filed pursuant to a resolution
and not to an ordinance as required by RA 7160 (the Local
Government Code); and (b) the cause of action, if any, was
barred by a prior judgment or res judicata. Petitioner claimed
that res judicata was not applicable.
The trial court dismissed the case. The petitioners MFR was
denied. The CA affirmed.

Issues:
1. WON a resolution duly approved by the municipal council
has the same force and effect of an ordinance and will not
deprive an expropriation case of a valid cause of action.
2. WON the principle of res judicata as a ground for dismissal
of case is not applicable when public interest is primarily
involved.

To strengthen this point, the petitioner cited Article 36, Rule VI

of the Rules and Regulations Implementing the Local
Government Code, which provides: If the LGU fails to acquire
a private property for public use, purpose, or welfare through
purchase, the LGU may expropriate said property through a
resolution of the Sanggunian authorizing its chief executive to
initiate expropriation proceedings.
Court-No. The power of eminent domain is lodged in the
legislative branch of government, which may delegate the
exercise thereof to LGUs, other public entities and public
utilities. An LGU may therefore exercise the power to
expropriate private property only when authorized by Congress
and subject to the latters control and restraints, imposed
through the law conferring the power or in other legislations.
Sec 19, RA 7160
A local government unit may, through its chief executive and
acting pursuant to an ordinance, exercise the power ofeminent
domain for public use, or purpose, or welfare for the benefit of
the poor and the landless, upon payment of just compensation,
pursuant to the provisions of the Constitution and pertinent
laws.

Thus, the following essential requisites must concur before an

LGU can exercise the power of eminent domain:

requires that the local chief executive act pursuant to an

ordinance.

1. An ordinance is enacted by the local legislative council

authorizing the local chief executive, in behalf of the LGU, to
exercise the power of eminent domain or pursue expropriation
proceedings over a particular private property.

Moreover, the power of eminent domain necessarily involves a

derogation of a fundamental or private right of the people.[35]
Accordingly, the manifest change in the legislative language -from resolution under BP 337 to ordinance under RA 7160
-- demands a strict construction.

2. The power of eminent domain is exercised for public use,

purpose or welfare, or for the benefit of the poor and the
landless.
3. There is payment of just compensation, as required under
Section 9, Article III of the Constitution, and other pertinent
laws.
4. A valid and definite offer has been previously made to the
owner of the property sought to be expropriated, but said offer
was not accepted.
In the case at bar, the local chief executive sought to exercise
the power of eminent domain pursuant to a resolution of
themunicipal council. Thus, there was no compliance with the
first requisite that the mayor be authorized through an
ordinance.
We are not convinced by petitioners insistence that the terms
resolution and ordinance are synonymous.
A municipalordinance is different from a resolution. An
ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a declaration of
the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on a specific
matter. An ordinance possesses a general and permanent
character, but a resolution is temporary in nature.
If Congress intended to allow LGUs to exercise eminent
domain through a mere resolution, it would have simply
adopted the language of the previous Local Government Code.
But Congress did not. In a clear divergence from the previous
Local Government Code, Section 19 of RA 7160 categorically

When the legislature interferes with that right and, for greater
public purposes, appropriates the land of an individual without
his consent, the plain meaning of the law should not be
enlarged by doubtful interpretation.
Petitioner relies on Article 36, Rule VI of the Implementing
Rules, which requires only a resolution to authorize an LGU to
exercise eminent domain. It is axiomatic that the clear letter
of the law is controlling and cannot be amended by a mere
administrative rule issued for its implementation.
Strictly speaking, the power of eminent domain delegated to
an LGU is in reality not eminent but inferior domain, since it
must conform to the limits imposed by the delegation, and
thus partakes only of a share in eminent domain.
2. As correctly found by the Court of Appeals and the trial
court, all the requisites for the application of res judicata are
present in this case. There is a previous final judgment on the
merits in a prior expropriation case involving identical
interests, subject matter and cause of action, which has been
rendered by a court having jurisdiction over it.
Be that as it may, the Court holds that the principle of res
judicata, which finds application in generally all cases and
proceedings, cannot bar the right of the State or its agent to
expropriate private property.
Eminent Domain can reach every form of property which the
State might need for public use whenever they need it.

While the principle of res judicata does not denigrate the right
of the State to exercise eminent domain, it does apply to
specific issues decided in a previous case.
In Republic vs De Knecht, the Court ruled that the power of the
State or its agent to exercise eminent domain is not diminished
by the mere fact that a prior final judgment over the property
to be expropriated has become the law of the case as to the
parties. The State or its authorized agent may still
subsequently exercise its right to expropriate the same
property, once all legal requirements are complied with.
SPOUSES ANTONIO and FE YUSAY,
COURT OF APPEALS, CITY MAYOR and CITY COUNCIL
OF MANDALUYONG CITY,
G.R. No. 156684
April 6, 2011
FACTS
The petitioners owned a parcel of land with an area of
1,044 square meters situated between Nueve de Febrero
Street andFernandez Street in Barangay Mauway,
Mandaluyong City. Half of their land they used as their
residence, and the rest they rented out to nine other families.
Allegedly, the land was their only property and only source of
income. Sangguniang Panglungsod of Mandaluyong City
adopted Resolution No. 552, Series of 1997, to authorize then
City Mayor Benjamin S. Abalos, Sr. to take the necessary legal
steps for the expropriation of the land of the petitioners for the
purpose of developing it for low cost housing for the less
privileged but deserving city inhabitants.
ISSUE
Whether or not the Sangguniang Panlungsod abused its
discretion in adopting Resolution No. 552.
HELD

No. A resolution is upon a specific matter of a temporary

nature while an ordinance is a law that is permanent in
character. No rights can be conferred by and be inferred from a
resolution, which is nothing but an embodiment of what the
lawmaking body has to say in the light of attendant
circumstances. A municipal ordinance is different from a
resolution. An ordinance is a law, but a resolution is merely a
declaration of the sentiment or opinion of a lawmaking body on
a specific matter. An ordinance possesses a general and
permanent character, but a resolution is temporary in nature.
Additionally, the two are enacted differently -- a third reading
is necessary for an ordinance, but not for a resolution, unless
decided otherwise by a majority of all the Sanggunian
members.
In simply expressing its sentiment or opinion through the
resolution, therefore, the Sangguniang Panglungsod in no way
abused its discretion, least of all gravely, for its expression of
sentiment or opinion was a constitutionally protected right.

CONCHITA CARPIO MORALES, IN HER CAPACITY AS THE

OMBUDSMAN, Petitioner, v. COURT OF APPEALS (SIXTH
DIVISION) AND JEJOMAR ERWIN S. BINAY,
JR., Respondents.

Facts:

A complaint/affidavit was filed by Atty. Renato L. Bondal

and Nicolas "Ching" Enciso VI before the Office of the
Ombudsman against Binay, Jr. and other public officers
and employees of the City Government of Makati (Binay,
Jr., et al), accusing them of Plunder11 and violation of
Republic Act No. (RA) 3019,12 otherwise known as "The
Anti-Graft and Corrupt Practices Act," in connection with

the five (5) phases of the procurement and construction

of the Makati City Hall Parking Building (Makati Parking
Building).
The Ombudsman constituted a Special Panel of
Investigators14 to conduct a fact-finding investigation,
submit an investigation report, and file the necessary
complaint, if warranted (1st Special Panel). the 1st
Special Panel filed a complaint16 (OMB Complaint)
against Binay, Jr., et al, charging them with six (6)
administrative cases17 for Grave Misconduct, Serious
Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best Interest
of the Service, and six (6) criminal cases18 for violation
of Section 3 (e) of RA 3019, Malversation of Public
Funds, and Falsification of Public Documents (OMB
Cases).
Binays First Term:
o Binay, Jr. issued the Notice of Award21 for Phase
III, IV and V of the Makati Parking Building
project to Hilmarc's Construction Corporation
(Hilmarc's), and consequently, executed the
corresponding contract without the required
publication and the lack of architectural
design,24 and approved the release of funds
therefor.
Binays Second Term:
o Binay, Jr. approved the release of funds for the
remaining balance of contract with Hilmarc's for
Phase V of the Makati Parking Building project;
and
o Approved the release of funds for the remaining
balance of the contract48 with MANA Architecture
& Interior Design Co. (MANA) for the design and
architectural services covering the Makati Parking
Building.
Before Binay, Jr., et al.'s filing of their counter-affidavits,
the Ombudsman, the subject preventive suspension
order, placing Binay, Jr., et al. under preventive
suspension for not more than six (6) months without
pay, during the pendency of the OMB Cases. 53 The
Ombudsman ruled that the requisites for the preventive
suspension of a public officer are present, 54 finding that:

(a) the evidence of Binay, Jr., et al.'s guilt was

strong given that
(1) the losing bidders and members of the
Bids and Awards Committee of Makati City
had attested to the irregularities attending
the Makati Parking Building project;
(2) the documents on record negated the
publication of bids; and
(3) the disbursement vouchers, checks, and
official receipts showed the release of
funds; and
o (b) (1) Binay, Jr., et al. were administratively
charged with Grave Misconduct, Serious
Dishonesty, and Conduct Prejudicial to the Best
Interest of the Service;
o (2) said charges, if proven to be true, warrant
removal from public service under the Revised
Rules on Administrative Cases in the Civil Service
(RRACCS), and
o (3) Binay, Jr., et al.'s respective positions give
them access to public records and allow them to
influence possible witnesses; hence, their
continued stay in office may prejudice the
investigation relative to the OMB Cases filed
against them.
Proceedings Before the Court of Appeals:
o Binay contends: that he could not be held
administratively liable for any anomalous
activity attending any of the five (5) phases of the
Makati Parking Building project since: (a) Phases I
and II were undertaken before he was elected
Mayor of Makati in 2010; and (b) Phases III to V
transpired during his first term and that his reelection as City Mayor of Makati for a
second term effectively condoned his
administrative liability therefor, if any, thus
rendering the administrative cases against him
moot and academic.61In any event, Binay, Jr.
claimed that the Ombudsman's preventive
suspension order failed to show that the
evidence of guilt presented against him is
o

strong, maintaining that he did not participate in

any of the purported irregularities. 62 In support of
his prayer for injunctive relief, Binay, Jr. argued
that he has a clear and unmistakable right to hold
public office, having won by landslide vote in the
2010 and 2013 elections, and that, in view of the
condonation doctrine, as well as the lack of
evidence to sustain the charges against him, his
suspension from office would undeservedly
deprive the electorate of the services of the
person they have conscientiously chosen and
voted into office.
At noon of the same day, the CA issued a
Resolution65 (dated March 16, 2015), granting Binay, Jr.'s
prayer for a TRO,66 notwithstanding Pena, Jr.'s
assumption of duties as Acting Mayor earlier that day.
o The OMB manifested71 that the TRO did not state
what act was being restrained and that since the
preventive suspension order had already been
served and implemented, there was no longer any
act to restrain
Proceedings before the SC:
o In view of the CA's supervening issuance of a WPI
pursuant to its April 6, 2015 Resolution, the
Ombudsman filed a supplemental
petition99 before this Court, arguing that the
condonation doctrine is irrelevant to the
determination of whether the evidence of guilt is
strong for purposes of issuing preventive
suspension orders. The Ombudsman also
maintained that a reliance on the condonation
doctrine is a matter of defense, which should
have been raised by Binay, Jr. before it during the
administrative proceedings, and that, at any rate,
there is no condonation because Binay, Jr.
committed acts subject of the OMB Complaint
after his re-election in 2013.

Issues:

1. Whether or not the CA has subject matter

jurisdiction to issue a TRO and/or WPI enjoining
the implementation of a preventive suspension
order issued by the Ombudsman;
2. Whether or not the CA gravely abused its
discretion in issuing the TRO and eventually, the
WPI in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453 enjoining the
implementation of the preventive suspension
order against Binay, Jr. based on the condonation
doctrine
Held:
1. YES
o OMB contends that the CA has no jurisdiction to issue
any provisional injunctive writ against her office to
enjoin its preventive suspension orders. As basis, she
invokes the first paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770 in conjunction with her office's independence
under the 1987 Constitution. She advances the idea that
"[i]n order to further ensure [her office's] independence,
[RA 6770] likewise insulated it from judicial
intervention,"157particularly, "from injunctive reliefs
traditionally obtainable from the courts,"158 claiming that
said writs may work "just as effectively as direct
harassment or political pressure would."
A. The concept of Ombudsman independence.

Section 5, Article XI of the 1987 Constitution guarantees

the independence of the Office of the Ombudsman:

Section 5. There is hereby created

the independent Office of the Ombudsman,
composed of the Ombudsman to be known as
Tanodbayan, one overall Deputy and at least one
Deputy each for Luzon, Visayas[,] and Mindanao.

A separate Deputy for the military establishment

may likewise be appointed.
Gonzales III v. Office of the President is the first case
which grappled with the meaning of the Ombudsman's
independence vis-a-vis the independence of the other
constitutional bodies. the concept of Ombudsman's
independence covers three (3) things:
First: creation by the Constitution, which means
that the office cannot be abolished, nor its
constitutionally specified functions and privileges, be
removed, altered, or modified by law, unless the
Constitution itself allows, or an amendment thereto is
made;
Second: fiscal autonomy, which means that the office
"may not be obstructed from [its] freedom to use or
dispose of [its] funds for purposes germane to [its]
functions;168hence, its budget cannot be strategically
decreased by officials of the political branches of
government so as to impair said functions; and
Third: insulation from executive supervision and
control, which means that those within the ranks of the
office can only be disciplined by an internal authority.
Evidently, all three aspects of independence intend to
protect the Office of the Ombudsman frompolitical
harassment and pressure, so as to free it from the
"insidious tentacles of politics."

That being the case, the concept of Ombudsman

independence cannot be invoked as basis to
insulate the Ombudsman from judicial power
constitutionally vested unto the courts. Courts
are apolitical bodies, which are ordained to act as
impartial tribunals and apply even justice to all.
Hence, the Ombudsman's notion that it can be
exempt from an incident of judicial power - that
is, a provisional writ of injunction against a
preventive suspension order - clearly strays from

the concept's rationale of insulating the office

from political harassment or pressure.
B. The first paragraph of Section 14, RA
6770 in light of the powers of Congress and the
Court under the 1987 Constitution.

The first paragraph of Section 14, RA 6770 textually

prohibits courts from extending provisional injunctive
relief to delay any investigation conducted by her office.
Despite the usage of the general phrase "[n]o writ of
injunction shall be issued by any court," the
Ombudsman herself concedes that the prohibition does
not cover the Supreme Court.

Despite the ostensible breach of the separation of

powers principle, the Court is not oblivious to the policy
considerations behind the first paragraph of Section 14,
RA 6770, as well as other statutory provisions of similar
import. Thus, pending deliberation on whether or not to
adopt the same, the Court, under its sole prerogative
and authority over all matters of procedure, deems it
proper to declare as ineffective the prohibition against
courts other than the Supreme Court from issuing
provisional injunctive writs to enjoin investigations
conducted by the Office of the Ombudsman, until it is
adopted as part of the rules of procedure through an
administrative circular duly issued therefor.
Hence, with Congress interfering with matters of
procedure (through passing the first paragraph of
Section 14, RA 6770) without the Court's consent
thereto, it remains that the CA had the authority to issue
the questioned injunctive writs enjoining the
implementation of the preventive suspension order
against Binay, Jr. At the risk of belaboring the point,
these issuances were merely ancillary to the exercise of

the CA's certiorari jurisdiction conferred to it under

Section 9 (1), Chapter I of BP 129, as amended, and
which it had already acquired over the main CA-G.R. SP
No. 139453 case.

(c) The respondent's continued stay in office may

prejudice the case filed against him.

B. The basis of the CA's injunctive writs is the

condonation doctrine.
2.
A. Subject matter of the CA's iniunctive writs is the
preventive suspension order.

By nature, a preventive suspension order is not a

penalty but only a preventive measure. Its purpose is to
prevent the official to be suspended from using his
position and the powers and prerogatives of his office to
influence potential witnesses or tamper with records
which may be vital in the prosecution of the case
against him
The law sets forth two (2) conditions that must be
satisfied to justify the issuance of an order of preventive
suspension pending an investigation, namely:

(1) The evidence of guilt is strong; and

(2) Either of the following circumstances co-exist with the first
requirement:
(a) The charge involves dishonesty, oppression or
grave misconduct or neglect in the performance
of duty;
(b) The charge would warrant removal from the
service; or

Examining the CA's Resolutions in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453

would, however, show that the Ombudsman's non-compliance
with the requisites provided in Section 24, RA 6770 was not the
basis for the issuance of the assailed injunctive writs.

The Ombudsman contends that it was inappropriate for the CA

to have considered the condonation doctrine since it was a
matter of defense which should have been raised and passed
upon by her office during the administrative disciplinary
proceedings.243 However, the Court agrees with the CA that it
was not precluded from considering the same given that it was
material to the propriety of according provisional injunctive
relief in conformity with the ruling in Governor Garcia, Jr.,
which was the subsisting jurisprudence at that time. Thus,
since condonation was duly raised by Binay, Jr. in his petition in
CA-G.R. SP No. 139453,244 the CA did not err in passing upon
the same. Note that although Binay, Jr. secondarily argued that
the evidence of guilt against him was not strong in his petition
in CA-G.R. SP No. 139453,245 it appears that the CA found that
the application of the condonation doctrine was already
sufficient to enjoin the implementation of the preventive
suspension order. Again, there is nothing aberrant with this
since, as remarked in the same case of Governor Garcia, Jr., if
it was established that the acts subject of the administrative
complaint were indeed committed during Binay, Jr.'s prior term,
then, following the condonation doctrine, he can no longer be

administratively charged. In other words, with condonation

having been invoked by Binay, Jr. as an exculpatory affirmative
defense at the onset, the CA deemed it unnecessary to
determine if the evidence of guilt against him was strong, at
least for the purpose of issuing the subject injunctive writs.
With the preliminary objection resolved and the basis of the
assailed writs herein laid down, the Court now proceeds to
determine if the CA gravely abused its discretion in applying
the condonation doctrine.

to remove him therefor; and

[T]hat the reelection to office operates as a condonation of the

officer's previous misconduct to the extent of cutting off the
right to remove him therefor.
Third, courts may not deprive the electorate, who are
assumed to have known the life and character of candidates,
of their right to elect officers:

D. Testing the Condonation Doctrine.

As held in Conant vs. Grogan
Pascual's ratio decidendi may be dissected into three (3) parts:
First, the penalty of removal may not be extended beyond the
term in which the public officer was elected for each term is
separate and distinct:

Offenses committed, or acts done, during previous term

are generally held not to furnish cause for removal and
this is especially true where the constitution provides that the
penalty in proceedings for removal shall not extend beyond
the removal from office, and disqualification from
holding office for the term for which the officer was
elected or appointed.
The underlying theory is that each term is separate from
other terms x x x.272
Second, an elective official's re-election serves as a
condonation of previous misconduct, thereby cutting the right

The Court should never remove a public officer for acts done
prior to his present term of office. To do otherwise would be to
deprive the people of their right to elect their officers. When
the people have elected a man to office, it must be
assumed that they did this with knowledge of his life
and character, and that they disregarded or forgave his
faults or misconduct, if he had been guilty of any. It is
not for the court, by reason of such faults or misconduct to
practically overrule the will of the people. 274

The doctrine of condonation is actually bereft of legal

bases.
To begin with, the concept of public office is a public trust
and the corollary requirement of accountability to the
people at all times, as mandated under the 1987
Constitution, is plainly inconsistent with the idea that an
elective local official's administrative liability for a misconduct
committed during a prior term can be wiped off by the fact

that he was elected to a second term of office, or even another

elective post. Election is not a mode of condoning an
administrative offense, and there is simply no constitutional
or statutory basis in our jurisdiction to support the notion that
an official elected for a different term is fully absolved of any
administrative liability arising from an offense done during a
prior term. In this jurisdiction, liability arising from
administrative offenses may be condoned bv the
President in light of Section 19, Article VII of the 1987
Constitution which was interpreted in Llamas v. Orbos293 to
apply to administrative offenses:

Also, it cannot be inferred from Section 60 of the LGC that the

grounds for discipline enumerated therein cannot anymore be
invoked against an elective local official to hold him
administratively liable once he is re-elected to office. In fact,
Section 40 (b) of the LGC precludes condonation since in the
first place, an elective local official who is meted with the
penalty of removal could not be re-elected to an elective local
position due to a direct disqualification from running for such
post. In similar regard, Section 52 (a) of the RRACCS imposes a
penalty of perpetual disqualification from holding public office
as an accessory to the penalty of dismissal from service.
To compare, some of the cases adopted in Pascual were
decided by US State jurisdictions wherein the doctrine of
condonation of administrative liability was supported by either
a constitutional or statutory provision stating, in effect, that an
officer cannot be removed by a misconduct committed during
a previous term,294 or that the disqualification to hold the
office does not extend beyond the term in which the
official's delinquency occurred.295 In one case,296 the
absence of a provision against the re-election of an officer
removed - unlike Section 40 (b) of the LGC-was the justification
behind condonation. In another case,297 it was deemed that

condonation through re-election was a policy under their

constitution - which adoption in this jurisdiction runs counter
to our present Constitution's requirements on public
accountability. There was even one case where the doctrine of
condonation was not adjudicated upon but only invoked by a
party as a ground;298 while in another case, which was not
reported in full in the official series, the crux of the disposition
was that the evidence of a prior irregularity in no way
pertained to the charge at issue and therefore, was deemed to
be incompetent.299Hence, owing to either their variance or
inapplicability, none of these cases can be used as basis for
the continued adoption of the condonation doctrine under
our existing laws. At best, Section 66 (b) of the LGC
prohibits the enforcement of the penalty of suspension beyond
the unexpired portion of the elective local official's prior term,
and likewise allows said official to still run for re-election.

Equally infirm is Pascual's proposition that the electorate,

when re-electing a local official, are assumed to have done so
with knowledge of his life and character, and that they
disregarded or forgave his faults or misconduct, if he had been
guilty of any. Suffice it to state that no such presumption exists
in any statute or procedural rule.302 Besides, it is contrary to
human experience that the electorate would have full
knowledge of a public official's misdeeds. The Ombudsman
correctly points out the reality that most corrupt acts by public
officers are shrouded in secrecy, and concealed from the
public.Misconduct committed by an elective official is easily
covered up, and is almost always unknown to the electorate
when they cast their votes.303 At a conceptual level,
condonation presupposes that the condoner has actual
knowledge of what is to be condoned. Thus, there could be no
condonation of an act that is unknown.

It should, however, be clarified that this Court's abandonment

of the condonation doctrine should beprospective in
application for the reason that judicial decisions applying or
interpreting the laws or the Constitution, until reversed, shall
form part of the legal system of the Philippines. 305 Unto this
Court devolves the sole authority to interpret what the
Constitution means, and all persons are bound to follow its
interpretation. Hence, while the future may ultimately uncover
a doctrine's error, it should be, as a general rule, recognized
as "good law" prior to its abandonment. Consequently, the
people's reliance thereupon should be respected.

E. Consequence of ruling.
As for this section of the Decision, the issue to be resolved
is whether or not the CA committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed injunctive writs.
It is well-settled that an act of a court or tribunal can only be
considered as with grave abuse of discretion when such act
is done in a capricious or whimsical exercise of
judgment as is equivalent to lack of jurisdiction. The
abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount
to an evasion of a positive duty or to a virtual refusal to
perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all in
contemplation of law, as where the power is exercised in an
arbitrary and despotic manner by reason of passion and
hostility.311 It has also been held that "grave abuse of
discretion arises when a lower court or tribunal
patently violates the Constitution, the law or existing
jurisprudence."312
As earlier established, records disclose that the CA's
resolutions directing the issuance of the assailed injunctive

writs were all hinged on cases enunciating the condonation

doctrine. To recount, the March 16, 2015 Resolution directing
the issuance of the subject TRO was based on the case
of Governor Garcia, Jr., while the April 6, 2015 Resolution
directing the issuance of the subject WPI was based on the
cases of Aguinaldo, Salalima, Mayor Garcia, and
again, Governor Garcia, Jr. Thus, by merely following settled
precedents on the condonation doctrine, which at that time,
unwittingly remained "good law," it cannot be concluded that
the CA committed a grave abuse of discretion based on its
legal attribution above. Accordingly, the WPI against the
Ombudsman's preventive suspension order was correctly
issued.
With this, the ensuing course of action should have been for
the CA to resolve the main petition forcertiorari in CA-G.R. SP
No. 139453 on the merits. However, considering that the
Ombudsman, on October 9, 2015, had already found Binay, Jr.
administratively liable and imposed upon him the penalty of
dismissal, which carries the accessory penalty of perpetual
disqualification from holding public office, for the present
administrative charges against him, the said CA petition
appears to have been mooted.313 As initially intimated, the
preventive suspension order is only an ancillary issuance that,
at its core, serves the purpose of assisting the Office of the
Ombudsman in its investigation. It therefore has no more
purpose - and perforce, dissolves - upon the termination of the
office's process of investigation in the instant administrative
case.

F. Exceptions to the mootness principle.

This notwithstanding, this Court deems it apt to clarify that the
mootness of the issue regarding the validity of the preventive
suspension order subject of this case does not preclude any of

its foregoing determinations, particularly, its abandonment of

the condonation doctrine. As explained in Belgica, '"the moot
and academic principle' is not a magical formula that can
automatically dissuade the Court in resolving a case. The Court
will decide cases, otherwise moot, if: first, there is a grave
violation of the Constitution; second, the exceptional
character of the situation and the paramount public interest is
involved; third, when the constitutional issue raised requires
formulation of controlling principles to guide the bench, the
bar, and the public; and fourth, the case is capable of
repetition yet evading review."314 All of these scenarios obtain
in this case:
First, it would be a violation of the Court's own duty to uphold
and defend the Constitution if it were not to abandon the
condonation doctrine now that its infirmities have become
apparent. As extensively discussed, the continued application
of the condonation doctrine is simply impermissible under the
auspices of the present Constitution which explicitly mandates
that public office is a public trust and that public officials shall
be accountable to the people at all times.

only involve an in-depth exegesis of administrative law

principles, but also puts to the forefront of legal discourse the
potency of the accountability provisions of the 1987
Constitution. The Court owes it to the bench, the bar, and the
public to explain how this controversial doctrine came about,
and now, its reasons for abandoning the same in view of its
relevance on the parameters of public office.
And fourth, the defense of condonation has been consistently
invoked by elective local officials against the administrative
charges filed against them. To provide a sample size, the
Ombudsman has informed the Court that "for the period of July
2013 to December 2014 alone, 85 cases from the Luzon Office
and 24 cases from the Central Office were dismissed on the
ground of condonation. Thus, in just one and a half years, over
a hundred cases of alleged misconduct - involving infractions
such as dishonesty, oppression, gross neglect of duty and
grave misconduct - were placed beyond the reach of the
Ombudsman's investigatory and prosecutorial
powers."315 Evidently, this fortifies the finding that the case is
capable of repetition and must therefore, not evade review.

Second, the condonation doctrine is a peculiar jurisprudential

creation that has persisted as a defense of elective officials to
escape administrative liability. It is the first time that the legal
intricacies of this doctrine have been brought to light; thus,
this is a situation of exceptional character which this Court
must ultimately resolve. Further, since the doctrine has served
as a perennial obstacle against exacting public accountability
from the multitude of elective local officials throughout the
years, it is indubitable that paramount public interest is
involved.

In any event, the abandonment of a doctrine is wholly within

the prerogative of the Court. As mentioned, it is its own
jurisprudential creation and may therefore, pursuant to its
mandate to uphold and defend the Constitution, revoke it
notwithstanding supervening events that render the subject of
discussion moot.

Third, the issue on the validity of the condonation doctrine

clearly requires the formulation of controlling principles to
guide the bench, the bar, and the public. The issue does not

VS. COMMISSION ON ELECTIONS AND JOSEPH EJERCITO

ESTRADA

G.R. No. 206666, January 21, 2015

ATTY. ALICIA RISOS-VIDAL, ALFREDO S. LIM PETITIONERINTERVENOR,

LEONARDO-DE CASTRO, J.:

NATURE:
These are petitions including:
1) a Petition for Certiorari filed by Atty. Alicia Risos-Vidal, which
essentially prays for the issuance of the writ
of certiorari annulling and setting aside the April 1, 2013 and
April 23, 2013 Resolutions of the Commission on Elections
(COMELEC), Second Division and En banc, respectively.
(2) a Petition-in-Intervention[ filed by Alfredo S. Lim praying to
be declared the 2013 winning candidate for Mayor of the City
of Manila in view of private respondent former President Joseph
Ejercito Estradas) disqualification to run for and hold public
office
FACTS:
On September 12, 2007, the Sandiganbayan convicted former
President Estrada, a former President of the Republic of the
Philippines, for the crime of plunder and was sentenced to
suffer the penalty of Reclusion Perpetua and the accessory
penalties of civil interdiction during the period of sentence and
perpetual absolute disqualification.
On October 25, 2007, however, former President Gloria
Macapagal Arroyo extended executive clemency, by way of
pardon, to former President Estrada explicitly states that He is
hereby restored to his civil and political rights.
On November 30, 2009, former President Estrada filed a
Certificate of Candidacy[7] for the position of President but was
opposed by three petitions seeking for his disqualification.
None of the cases prospered and MRs were denied by Comelec
En Banc. Estrada only managed to garner the second highest
number of votes on the May 10, 2010 synchronized elections.
On October 2, 2012, former President Estrada once more
ventured into the political arena, and filed a Certificate of
Candidacy,[10] this time vying for a local elective post, that of
the Mayor of the City of Manila.
Petitioner Risos-Vidal filed a Petition for Disqualification against
former President Estrada before the COMELEC because of

Estradas Conviction for Plunder by the Sandiganbayan

Sentencing Him to Suffer the Penalty of Reclusion Perpetua
with Perpetual Absolute Disqualification. Petitioner relied on
Section 40 of the Local Government Code (LGC), in relation to
Section 12 of the Omnibus Election Code (OEC)
In a Resolution dated April 1, 2013, the COMELEC, Second
Division, dismissed the petition for disqualification holding that
President Estradas right to seek public office has been
effectively restored by the pardon vested upon him by former
President Gloria M. Arroyo.
Estrada won the mayoralty race in May 13, 2013 elections.
Petitioner-intervenor Alfredo Lim garnered the second highest
votes intervene and seek to disqualify Estrada for the same
ground as the contention of Risos-Vidal and praying that he be
proclaimed as Mayor of Manila.
ISSUE:
Whether or not the COMELEC committed grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in ruling
that former President Estrada is qualified to vote and be voted
for in public office as a result of the pardon granted to him by
former President Arroyo.
HELD:
No. The COMELEC did not commit grave abuse of
discretion amounting to lack or excess of jurisdiction in
issuing the assailed Resolutions. The arguments forwarded
by Risos-Vidal fail to adequately demonstrate any factual or
legal bases to prove that the assailed COMELEC Resolutions
were issued in a whimsical, arbitrary or capricious exercise of
power that amounts to an evasion or refusal to perform a
positive duty enjoined by law or were so patent and gross
as to constitute grave abuse of discretion.
Former President Estrada was granted an absolute pardon
that fully restored allhis civil and political rights, which
naturally includes the right to seek public elective office, the
focal point of this controversy. The wording of the pardon
extended to former President Estrada is complete,

unambiguous, and unqualified. It is likewise unfettered by

Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code. The only
reasonable, objective, and constitutional interpretation of the
language of the pardon is that the same in fact conforms to
Articles 36 and 41 of the Revised Penal Code.
The proper interpretation of Articles 36 and 41 of the
Revised Penal Code.
A close scrutiny of the text of the pardon extended to former
President Estrada shows that both the principal penalty
of reclusion perpetua and its accessory penalties are included
in the pardon. The sentence which states that (h)e is hereby
restored to his civil and political rights, expressly remitted the
accessory penalties that attached to the principal penalty
of reclusion perpetua. Hence, even if we apply Articles 36 and
41 of the Revised Penal Code, it is indubitable from the text of
the pardon that the accessory penalties of civil interdiction and
perpetual absolute disqualification were expressly remitted
together with the principal penalty of reclusion perpetua.
The disqualification of former President Estrada under
Section 40 of the LGC in relation to Section 12 of the
OEC was removed by his acceptance of the absolute
pardon granted to him
While it may be apparent that the proscription in Section 40(a)
of the LGC is worded in absolute terms, Section 12 of the OEC
provides a legal escape from the prohibition a plenary pardon
or amnesty. In other words, the latter provision allows any
person who has been granted plenary pardon or amnesty after
conviction by final judgment of an offense involving moral
turpitude, inter alia, to run for and hold any public office,
whether local or national position.FALLO: Petition is
dismissed

Navarro and Tamayo vs CA [GR 141307; March 28, 2001]

Posted by Pius Morados on November 6, 2011

(Local Government, Permanent vacancies in the Sanggunian,

Section 45 (b) of the Local Government Code)
Facts: With the death of the Mayor Calimlim, a vacancy was
created in the Office of the Mayor so by operation of law, he
was succeeded by Aquino the then Vice-Mayor. Petitioner
Tamayo, the highest ranking member of the Sangguniang
Bayan was elevated to the position of the Vice Mayor pursuant
to the same law.
Since vacancy occurred in the Sangguniang Bayan by the
elevation of the petitioner, Governor Agbayani appointed
herein petitioner Navarro as Member of the Sangguniang
Bayan.
Aquino belonged to the political party Lakas NUCD-KAMPI,
while both Navarro and Tamayo belonged to REFORMA-LM
political party.
Private respondents seek to nullify the appointment of
petitioner Navarro arguing that it was the former vice-mayor,
succeeding to the position of the mayor, who created the
permament vacancy in the Sanggunian Bayan because under
the law he was also a member of the Sanggunian. Thus, the
appointee must come from said former vice-mayors political
party.
Petitioners, on the other hand, contended that it was the
elevation of petitioner Tamayo, who was the highest ranking
member of the Sanggunian Bayan, to the office of the ViceMayor which resulted in a permanent vacancy. The person to
be appointed to the position vacated by him should come from
the same political party affiliation as that of petitioner Tamayo.
However, the CA concluded that it was the appointment of the
8th councilor, to the number 7 position which created the last
vacancy; therefore, the person to be appointed to the vacant

position should come from the same political party to which

the latter belonged, which was Lakas-NUCD KAMPI.
Issue: WON the elevation of the highest ranking member of
the Sanggunian to the position of vice-mayor created the last
vacancy in the Sanggunian Bayan.
Held: Yes. Under Sec 44 of the LGC, a permanent vacancy
arises when an elective official fills a higher vacant office,
refuses to assume office, fails to qualify, dies, is removed from
office, voluntarily resigns, or is otherwise permanently
incapacitated to discharge the functions of his office.
Sec 45 (b) of the same law provides that only the nominee
of the political party under which the Sanggunian member
concerned has been elected and whose elevation to the
position next higher in rank created the last vacancy in the

Sanggunian shall be appointed in the manner herein provided.

The appointee shall come from the political party as that of the
Sanggunian member who caused the vacancy
The reason behind the right given to a political party to
nominate a replacement where a permanent vacancy occurs in
the Sanggunian is to maintain the party representation as
willed by the people in the election.
With the elevation of the petitioner, who belonged to
REFORMA-LM, to the position of vice-mayor, a vacancy
occurred in the Sanggunian that whould be filled up with
someone who should belong to the political party of petitioner
Tamayo. Otherwise, REFORMA-LMs representation would be
diminished.