405 U.S.

134
92 S.Ct. 849
31 L.Ed.2d 92

Bob BULLOCK et al., Appellants,

v.
Van Phillip CARTER et al.
No. 70128.
Argued Nov. 17, 1971.
Decided Feb. 24, 1972.

Syllabus
Appellees who sought to become candidates for local office in the Texas
Democratic primary election challenged in the District Court the validity
of the Texas statutory scheme which, without write-in or other alternative
provisions, requires payment of fees ranging as high as $8,900. Appellees
claimed that they were unable to pay the required fees and were therefore
barred from running. Under the Texas statute, the party committee
estimates the total cost of the primary and apportions it among candidates
according to its judgment of what is 'just and equitable,' in light of 'the
importance, emolument, and term of office.' The fees for local candidates
tend appreciably to exceed those for statewide candidates. Following a
hearing, the District Court declared the fee system invalid and enjoined its
enforcement. Appellants contend that the filing fees are necessary both to
regulate the primary ballot and to finance elections. Held: The Texas
primary election filing-fee system contravenes the Equal Protection
Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. Pp. 140149.
(a) Since the Texas statute imposes filing fees of such magnitude that
numerous qualified candidates are precluded from filing, it therefore falls
with unequal weight on candidates and voters according to their ability to
pay the fees, it must be 'closely scrutinized' and can be sustained only if it
is reasonably necessary to accomplish a legitimate state objective and not
merely because it has some rational basis. Pp. 140144.
(b) Although a State has an interest in regulating the number of candidates
on the ballot and eliminating those who are spurious, it cannot attain these

objectives by arbitrary means such as those called for by the Texas statute,
which eliminates legitimate potential candidates, like those involved here,
who cannot afford the filing fees. Pp. 144147.
(c) The apportionment of costs among candidates is not the only means
available to finance primary elections, and the State can identify certain
bodies as political parties entitled to sponsorship if the State itself finances
the primaries, as it does general elections, both of which are important
parts of the democratic process. Pp. 147149.
Carter v. Dies, D.C., 321 F.Supp. 1358, affirmed.
John F. Morehead, Plainview, Tex., and Pat Bailey, Austin, Tex., for
appellants.
A. L. Crouch, Fort Worth, Tex., and Joseph A. Calamia, El Paso, Tex., for
appellees.
Mr. Chief Justice BURGER delivered the opinion of the Court.

Under Texas law, a candidate must pay a filing fee as a condition to having his
name placed on the ballot in a primary election.1 The constitutionality of the
Texas filing-fee system is the subject of this appeal from the judgment of a
three-judge District Court.

Appellee Pate met all qualifications to be a candidate in the May 2, 1970,

Democratic primary for the office of County Commissioner of Precinct Four
for El Paso County, except that he was unable to pay the $1,424.60 assessment
required of candidates in that primary. Appellee Wischkaemper sought to be
placed on the Democratic primary ballot as a candidate for County Judge in
Tarrant County, but he was unable to pay the $6,300 assessment for candidacy
for that office. Appellee Carter wished to be a Democratic candidate for
Commissioner of the General Land Office; his application was not
accompanied by the required $1,000 filing fee.2

After being denied places on the Democratic primary ballots in their respective
counties, these appellees instituted separate actions in the District Court
challenging the validity of the Texas filing-fee system. Their actions were
consolidated, and a three-judge District Court was convened pursuant to 28
U.S.C. 2281 and 2284. Appellee Jenkins was permitted to intervene as a
voter on his claimed desire to vote for Wischkaemper, and appellee Guzman
and others were permitted to intervene as voters desiring to cast their ballots for

Pate. On April 3, 1970, the District Court ordered that Wischkaemper and Pate
be permitted to participate in the primary conducted on May 2, 1970, without
prepayment of filing fees.3 Following a hearing on the merits, the three-judge
court declared the Texas filing-fee scheme unconstitutional and enjoined its
enforcement.4 321 F.Supp. 1358 (N.D.Tex.1970). A direct appeal was taken
under 28 U.S.C. 1253, and we noted probable jurisdiction. Dies v. Carter, 403
U.S. 904, 91 S.Ct. 2208, 29 L.Ed.2d 679.
4

Under the Texas statute, payment of the filing fee is an absolute prerequisite to
a candidate's participation in a primary election. There is no alternative
procedure by which a potential candidate who is unable to pay the fee can get
on the primary ballot by way of petitioning voters,5 and write-in votes are not
permitted in primary elections for public office.6 Any person who is willing
and able to pay the filing fee and who meets the basic eligibility requirements
for holding the office sought can run in a primary.

Candidates for most district, county, and precinct offices must pay their filing
fee to the county executive committee of the political party conducting the
primary; the committee also determines the amount of the fee. The party
committee must make an estimate of the total cost of the primary and apportion
it among the various candidates 'as in their judgment is just and equitable.'7 The
committee's judgment is to be guided by 'the importance, emolument, and term
of office for which the nomination is to be made.'8 In counties with populations
of one million or more, candidates for offices of two-year terms can be assessed
up to 10% of their aggregate annual salary, and candidates for offices of fouryear terms can be assessed up to 15% of their aggregate annual salary.9 In
smaller counties there are no such percentage limitations.10

The record shows that the fees required of the candidates in this case are far
from exceptional in their magnitude.11 The size of the filing fees is plainly a
natural consequence of a statutory system that places the burden of financing
primary elections on candidates rather than on the governmental unit, and that
imposes a particularly heavy burden on candidates for local office. The filing
fees required of candidates seeking nomination for state offices and offices
involving statewide primaries are more closely regulated by statute and tend to
be appreciably smaller. The filing fees for candidates for State Representative
range from $150 to $600, depending on the population of the county from
which nomination is sought.12 Candidates for State Senator are subject to a
maximum assessment of $1,000.13 Candidates for nominations requiring
statewide primaries, including candidates for Governor and United States
Senator, must pay a filing fee of $1,000 to the chairman of the state executive
committee of the party conducting the primary.14 Candidates for the State

Board of Education have a fixed filing fee of $50.15

7(1)
8

The filing-fee requirement is limited to party primary elections, but the

mechanism of such elections is the creature of state legislative choice and hence
is 'state action' within the meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment. Gray v.
Sanders, 372 U.S. 368, 83 S.Ct. 801, 9 L.Ed.2d 821 (1963); Nixon v. Herndon,
273 U.S. 536, 47 S.Ct. 446, 71 L.Ed. 759 (1927).16 Although we have
emphasized on numerous occasions the breadth of power enjoyed by the States
in determining voter qualifications and the manner of elections, this power must
be exercised in a manner consistent with the Equal Protection Clause of the
Fourteenth Amendment. See, e.g., Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 89 S.Ct. 5,
21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968); Evans v. Cornman, 398 U.S. 419, 90 S.Ct. 1752, 26
L.Ed.2d 370 (1970); Carrington v. Rash, 380 U.S. 89, 85 S.Ct. 775, 13 L.Ed.2d
675 (1965). The question presented in this case is whether a state law that
prevents potential candidates for public office from seeking the nomination of
their party due to their inability to pay a portion of the cost of conducting the
primary election is state action that unlawfully discriminates against the
candidates so excluded or the voters who wish to support them.17

The threshold question to be resolved is whether the filing-fee system should

be sustained if it can be shown to have some rational basis,18 or whether it must
withstand a more rigid stancard of review.

10

In Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16

L.Ed.2d 169 (1966), the Court held that Virginia's imposition of an annual poll
tax not exceeding $1.50 on residents over the age of 21 was a denial of equal
protection. Subjecting the Virginia poll tax to close scrutiny, the Court
concluded that the placing of even a minimal price on the exercise of the right
to vote constituted an invidious discrimination. The problem presented by
candidate filing fees is not the same, of course, and we must determine whether
the strict standard of review of the Harper case should be applied.

11

The initial and direct impact of filing fees is felt by aspirants for office, rather
than voters, and the Court has not heretofore attached such fundamental status
to candidacy as to invoke a rigorous standard of review.19 However, the rights
of voters and the rights of candidates do not lend themselves to neat separation;
laws that affect candidates always have at least some theoretical, correlative
effect on voters. Of course, not every limitation or incidental burden on the
exercise of voting rights is subject to a stringent standard of review. McDonald
v. Board of Election, 394 U.S. 802, 89 S.Ct. 1404, 22 L.Ed.2d 739 (1969).

Texas does not place a condition on the exercise of the right to vote,20 nor does
it quantitatively dilute votes that have been cast.21 Rather, the Texas system
creates barriers to candidate access to the primary ballot, thereby tending to
limit the field of candidates from which voters might choose. The existence of
such barriers does not of itself compel close scrutiny. Compare Jenness v.
Fortson, 403 U.S. 431, 91 S.Ct. 1970, 29 L.Ed.2d 554 (1971)With Williams v.
Rhodes, 393 U.S. 23, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24 (1968). In approaching
candidate restrictions, it is essential to examine in a realistic light the extent and
nature of their impact on voters.
12

Unlike a filing-fee requirement that most candidates could be expected to fulfill

from their own resources or at least through modest contributions, the very size
of the fees imposed under the Texas system gives it a patently exclusionary
character. Many potential office seekers lacking both personal wealth and
affluent backers are in every practical sense precluded from seeking the
nomination of their chosen party, no matter how qualified they might be, and
no matter how broad or enthusiastic their popular support. The effect of this
exclusionary mechanism on voters is neither incidental nor remote. Not only
are voters substantially limited in their choice of candidates, but also there is
the obvious likelihood that this limitation would fall more heavily on the less
affluent segment of the community, whose favorites may be unable to pay the
large costs required by the Texas system. To the extent that the system requires
candidates to rely on contributions from voters in order to pay the assessments,
a phenomenon that can hardly be rate in light of the size of the fees, it tends to
deny some voters the opportunity to vote for a candidate of their choosing; at
the some time it gives the affluent the power to place on the ballot their own
names or the names of persons they favor. Appellants do not dispute that this is
endemic to the system. This disparity in voting power based on wealth cannot
be described by reference to discrete and precisely defined segments of the
community as is typical of inequities challenged under the Equal Protection
Clause, and there are doubtless some instances of candidates representing the
views of voters of modest means who are able to pay the required fee. But we
would ignore reality were we not to recognize that this system falls with
unequal weight on voters, as well as candidates, according to their economic
status.

13

Because the Texas filing-fee scheme has a real and appreciable impact on the
exercise of the franchise, and because this impact is related to the resources of
the voters supporting a particular candidate, we conclude, as in Harper, that the
laws must be 'closely scrutinized' and found reasonably necessary to the
accomplishment of legitimate state objectives in order to pass constitutional
muster.

(2)
14
15

Appellants contend that the filing fees required by the challenged statutes are
necessary both to regulate the ballot in primary elections and to provide a
means for financing such elections.

16

The Court has recognized that a State has a legitimate interest in regulating the
number of candidates on the ballot. Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S., at 442, 91
S.Ct., at 1976; Williams v. Rhodes, 393 U.S., at 32, 89 S.Ct. 5, 21 L.Ed.2d 24.
In so doing, the State understandably and properly seeks to prevent the
clogging of its election machinery, avoid voter confusion, and assure that the
winner is the choice of a majority, or at least a strong plurality, of those voting,
without the expense and burden of runoff elections. 22 Although we have no
way of gauging the number of candidates who might enter primaries in Texas if
access to the ballot were unimpeded by the large filing fees in question here,
we are bound to respect the legitimate objectives of the State in avoiding
overcrowded ballots. Moreover, a State has an interest, if not a duty, to protect
the integrity of its political processes from frivolous or fraudulent candidacies.
Jenness v. Fortson, 403 U.S., at 442, 91 S.Ct., at 1976.

17

There is no escape from the conclusion that the imposition of filing fees
ranging as high as $8,900 tends to limit the number of candidates entering the
primaries. However, even under conventional standards of review, a State
cannot achieve its objectives by totally arbitrary means; the criterion for
differing treatment must bear some relevance to the object of the legislation.
Morey v. Doud, 354 U.S. 457, 465, 77 S.Ct. 1344, 1350, 1 L.Ed.2d 1485
(1957); Smith v. Cahoon, 283 U.S. 553, 567, 51 S.Ct. 582, 587, 75 L.Ed. 1264
(1931). To say that the filing-fee requirement tends to limit the ballot to the
more serious candidates is not enough. There may well be some rational
relationship between a candidate's willingness to pay a filing fee and the
seriousness with which he takes his candidacy,23 but the candidates in this case
affirmatively alleged that they were unable, not simply unwilling, to pay the
assessed fees, and there was no contrary evidence. It is uncontested that the
filing fees exclude legitimate as well as frivolous candidates. And even
assuming that every person paying the large fees required by Texas law takes
his own candidacy seriously, that does not make him a 'serious candidate' in the
popular sense. If the Texas fee requirement is intended to regulate the ballot by
weeding out spurious candidates, it is extraordinarily ill-fitted to that goal;24
other means to protect those valid interests are available.

18

Instead of arguing for the reasonableness of the exclusion of some candidates,

appellants rely on the fact that the filing-fee requirement is applicable only to

party primaries, and point out that a candidate can gain a place on the ballot in
the general election without payment of fees by submitting a proper application
accompanied by a voter petition.25 Apart from the fact that the primary election
may be more crucial than the general election in certain parts of Texas,26 we
can hardly accept as reasonable an alternative that requires candidates and
voters to abandon their party affiliations in order to avoid the burdens of the
filing fees imposed by state law. Appellants have not demonstrated that their
present filing-fee scheme is a necessary or reasonable tool for regulating the
ballot.
19

In addition to the State's purported interest in regulating the ballot, the filing
fees serve to relieve the State treasury of the cost of conducting the primary
elections, and this is a legitimate state objective; in this limited sense it cannot
be said that the fee system lacks a rational basis.27 But under the standard of
review we consider applicable to this case, there must be a showing of
necessity. Appellants strenuously urge that apportioning the cost among the
candidates is the only feasible means for financing the primaries. They argue
that if the State must finance the primaries, it will have to determine which
political bodies are 'parties' so as to be entitled to state sponsorship for their
nominating process, and that this will result in new claims of discrimination.
Appellants seem to overlook the fact that a similar distinction is presently
embodied in Texas law since only those political parties whose gubernatorial
candidate received 200,000 or more votes in the last preceding general election
are required to conduct primary elections.28 Moreover, the Court has recently
upheld the validity of a state law distinguishing between political parties on the
basis of success in prior election. Jenness v. Fortson, supra. We are not
persuaded that Texas would be faced with an impossible task in distinguishing
between political parties for the purpose of financing primaries.

20

We also reject the theory that since the candidates are availing themselves of
the primary machinery, it is appropriate that they pay that share of the cost that
they have occasioned. The force of this argument is diluted by the fact that
candidates for offices requiring statewide primaries are generally assessed at a
lower rate than candidates for local office, although the statewide primaries
undoubtedly involve a greater expense.29 More importantly, the costs do not
arise because candidates decide to enter a primary or because the parties decide
to conduct one, but because the State has, as a matter of legislative choice,
directed that party primaries be held. The Stae has presumably chosen this
course more to benefit the voters than the candidates.

21

Appellants seem to place reliance on the self-evident fact that if the State must
assume the cost, the voters, as taxpayers, will ultimately be burdened with the

expense of the primaries. But it it far too late to make out a case that the party
primary is such a lesser part of the democratic process that its cost must be
shifted away from the taxpayers generally. The financial burden for general
elections is carried by all taxpayers and appellants have not demonstrated a
valid basis for distinguishing between these two legitimate costs of the
democratic process. It seems appropriate that a primary system designed to give
the voters some influence at the nominating stage should spread the cost
among all of the voters in an attempt to distribute the influence without regard
to wealth. Viewing the myriad governmental functions supported from general
revenues, it is difficult to single out any of a higher order than the conduct of
elections at all levels to bring forth those persons desired by their fellow
citizens to govern. Without making light of the State's interest in husbanding its
revenues, we fail to see such an element of necessity in the State's present
means of financing primaries as to justify the resulting incursion on the
prerogatives of voters.
(3)
22
23

Since the State has failed to establish the requisite justification for this filingfee system, we hold that it results in a denial of equal protection of the laws. It
must be emphasized that nothing herein is intended to cast doubt on the validity
of reasonable candidate filing fees or licensing fees in other contexts. By
requiring candidates to shoulder the costs of conducting primary elections
through filing fees and by providing no reasonable alternative means of access
to the ballot, the State of Texas has erected a system that utilizes the criterion of
ability to pay as a condition to being on the ballot, thus excluding some
candidates otherwise qualified and denying an undetermined number of voters
the opportunity to vote for candidates of their choice. These salient features of
the Texas system are critical to our determination of constitutional invalidity.

24

Affirmed.

25

Mr. Justice POWELL and Mr. Justice REHNQUIST took no part in the
consideration or decision of this case.

See Arts. 13.07a, 13.08, 13.08a, 13.15, and 13.16 of the Texas Election Code
Ann., V.A.T.S. (Supp.19701971)

Carter also failed to have his application notarized and to have it accompanied
by a statutory loyalty affidavit. Since appellees Pate and Wischkaemper were in
all respects eligible to be candidates in the primary except for their failure to

pay the filing fees, Carter's participation in this appeal is superfluous and we
need not decide whether the additional defects in his application deprive him of
standing to attack the constitutionality of the filing-fee system.
3

The order provided that their ultimate liability for the fees would depend on the
outcome of this action. Preliminary relief was not granted to Carter because of
his noncompliance with requisites for candidacy unrelated to the challenged
filing fees. See n. 2, supra.

The specific provisions held unconstitutional are those listed in n. 1, supra.

Texas law does permit the names of independent candidates to appear on the
official ballot in the general election if a proper application containing a voter
petition is submitted. The number of eigible voters required to sign the petition
varies from 1% to 5% depending on the office sought. For district, county, and
precinct offices, candidates must obtain the signatures of 5% of the eligible
voters with a ceiling of 500 signatures. No person may sign the application of
more than one person for the same office, and no person who has voted in a
primary may sign the application of a candidate for an office for which a
nomination was made at such primary. Art. 13.50, Tex.Election Code Ann.
(1967).
No fees are assessed against candidates in general elections.

Art. 13.09(b), Tex.Election Code Ann. (Supp.19701971). Write-in votes are

permitted for the party offices of county chairman and precinct chairman in the
general primary but not in the run-off primary. Ibid.
Former Art. 13.08c (repealed, Acts 1967, 60th Leg., p. 1932, c. 723, 77)
permitted write-in votes in primary elections and provided that if a write-in
candidate in the first primary either received a majority of the votes or was one
of the two highest vote getters in a race in which no candidate received a
majority of the votes, he could not be the party's nominee in the general
election or participate in the run-off primary, unless and until he paid the filing
fee he would have been assessed had he originally sought a place on the
primary ballot.

Art. 13.08, Tex.Election Code Ann. (Supp.19701971).

Ibid.

Art. 13.08a, Tex.Election Code Ann. (Supp.19701971). This provision is

applicable to Members of Congress.

10

The $6,300 fee required of appellee Wischkaemper, for example, amounts to

32% of the $19,700 annual salary for County Judge in Tarrant County.
Similarly, in the May 2, 1970, Democratic primary, candidates for five county
offices in Ward County were assessed $6,250 for a filing fee; this fee
represented 76.6% of the $8,160 annual salary for four of these offices; for the
fifth office, that of County Commissioner, it represented 99.7% of the annual
salary of $6,270.

11

Assessments in excess of $1,000 appear to be common in many Texas counties,

and assessments exceeding $5,000 are typical for certain offices in several
counties. Filing fees for judgeships seem to run particularly high. Persons
seeking to run in the May 2, 1970, Democratic primary for the office of District
Judge in Tarrant County were required to pay $8,900 in order to have their
names appear on the ballot.
It should be noted, however, that amounts not needed to finance the primary are
refunded to the candidates, and that in some counties refunds tend to run as high
as 50% or more of the assessed filing fee.

12

Art. 13,08a, 13.16 subd. 2, Tex.Election Code Ann. (Supp.19701971):

Population of County

Filing Fee

less than 650,000..........

650,000 to 900,000.........
900,000 to 1,000,000.......
1,000,000 or more..........

$150
$600
$300
$500

It is not clear from the face of the statute why candidates from counties having
populations between 650,000 and 900,000 must pay more than candidates from
counties of larger sizes.
An additional provision requires that candidates for State Representative from
districts encompassing either eight or nine counties must pay $25 per county as
a filing fee. Art. 13.08a, Tex.Election Code Ann. (Supp.19701971).
13

Art. 13.08a, Tex.Election Code Ann. (Supp.19701971). There is a fixed-fee

schedule if nomination is sought from a county with a population of 650,000 or
more:

Population of County

Filing Fee

650,000 to 900,000 *..... $1,000

900,000 to 1,000,000 .... $ 300
1,000,000 or more ....... $1,000
* If part of such county is joined to two or more counties to

constitute a senatorial district, the filing fee is fixed at $250.

There is a ceiling on the filing fee if nomination is sought in a senatorial district

encompassing counties with less than 650,000 in population. Art. 13.16 subd. 1,
Tex.Election Code Ann. (Supp.19701971):
Population of County
per County

Filing Fee

Less than 5,000..........

5,000 to 10,000..........
10,000 to 40,000..........
40,000 to 125,000.........
125,000 to 200,000........
200,000 to 650,000........

$ 1
$ 5
$ 10
$ 50
$ 75
$100

Persons seeking nomination in a senatorial district constituting exactly two

counties must pay a filing fee of $200.
14

Art. 13.15, Tex.Election Code Ann. (Supp.19701971). Candidates for Justice

of the Court of Civil Appeals are also required to pay their filing fees to the
chairman of the state committee, at the rate of 5% of one year's salary. Ibid.

15

Art. 13.08(4), Tex.Election Code Ann. (Supp.19701971).

16

Appellants ask the Court to reconsider the scope of Smith v. Allwright, 321
U.S. 649, 64 S.Ct. 757, 88 L.Ed 987 (1944), in which the Court held that the
action of the Democratic Party of Texas in excluding Negroes from
participation in party primaries constituted 'state action.' See also Terry v.
Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 73 S.Ct. 809, 97 L.Ed. 1152 (1953); cf. Nixon v.
Condon, 286 U.S. 73, 52 S.Ct. 484, 76 L.Ed. 984 (1932). Appellants contend
that not every aspect of a party primary election must be considered 'state
action' cognizable under the Fourteenth Amendment. But we are here
concerned with the constitutionality of a state law rather than action by a
political party and thus have no occasion to consider the scope of the holding in
Smith v. Allwright, supra.

17

The Texas Legislature has enacted a 'contingent, temporary law' modifying the
filing-fee requirement involved in this case. C. 11, H.B. 5, 62d Leg., 1st Called
Sess. (1971). The new provisions allow persons unable to pay the filing fees to
have their names placed on the ballot in primary elections if they submit a
petition
'signed by qualified voters eligible to vote for the office for which the candidate
is running, equal in number to at least 10 percent of the entire vote cast for that
party's candidate for governor in the last preceding general election in the

territory . . . in which the candidate is running.' (Art. 13.08c(b).)

The Act provides that it is to go into effect only if '(1) the Supreme Court of the
United States does not dispose of the appeal (in this case) . . . before January 1,
1972; or (2) the Supreme Court of the United States affirms or refuses to review
the judgment of the district court in the aforesaid case . . .' ( 7(b)). The Act
expires of its own force on December 31, 1972, at which time the prior law
goes back into effect.
Although the Act has gone into effect due to the absence of decision by the
Court on this appeal before January 1, 1972, the change in the law does not
render this case moot. The effect of the 'contingent, temporary law' enacted by
the Texas Legislature is to suspend enforcement of the strict filing-fee
requirement during calendar year 1972. Since enforcement of the filing-fee
requirement under the prior law was permanently enjoined by the court below,
that injunction would continue to have force and effect after December 31,
1972. Furthermore, there is a continuing controversy with respect to appellees'
obligation to pay the filing fees for participation in the Democratic primary
held on May 2, 1970. The order of the District Court allowing appellees Pate
and Wischkaemper to run in the primary without payment of fees stated that
they would be liable for the fees if they did not ultimately prevail in this action.
See n. 3, supra.
We take note of the fact that in Johnston v. Luna, 338 F.Supp. 355 (ND
Tex.1972), the same three-judge court that issued the injunction appealed from
in this case declared the new law unconstitutional and enjoined its enforcement.
Our attention is confined to the case before us, and we intimate no view on the
merits of that controversy.
18

See Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485, 90 S.Ct. 1153, 1161, 25
L.Ed.2d 491 (1970); McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S. 420, 425426, 81 S.Ct.
1101, 11041105, 6 L.Ed.2d 393 (1961).

19

Cf. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S. 346. 362, 90 S.Ct. 532, 541, 24 L.Ed.2d 567
(1970); Snowden v. Hughes, 321 U.S. 1, 64 S.Ct. 397, 88 L.Ed 497 (1944).

20

See Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S. 663, 86 S.Ct. 1079, 16
L.Ed.2d 169 (1966); Kramer v. Union Free School Dist. No. 15, 395 U.S. 621,
89 S.Ct. 1886, 23 L.Ed.2d 583 (1969); Cipriano v. City of Houma, 395 U.S.
701, 89 S.Ct. 1897, 23 L.Ed.2d 647 (1969).

21

See Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533, 562, 84 S.Ct. 1362, 1381, 12 L.Ed.2d 506
(1964); Wesberry v. Sanders, 376 U.S. 1, 84 S.Ct. 526, 11 L.Ed.2d 481 (1964).

22

The Texas Election Code provides that no person shall be nominated at a

primary election for any office unless he receives a majority of the votes cast.
In the event that no candidate receives a majority, a runoff election is held
between the two candidates receiving the highest number of votes. Arts. 13.03,
13.07, Tex.Election Code Ann. (1967).

23

Cf. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S., at 684685, 86 S.Ct., at

1091, (Harlan, J., dissenting).

24

Cf. Turner v. Fouche, 396 U.S., at 364, 90 S.Ct., at 542.

25

Appellants stae that Texas requires only the signatures of 1% of the eligible
voters. Although this is true for offices voted for statewide, the candidates for
local offices in this case would have had to obtain the signatures of 5% of the
eligible voters up to a maximum of 500 signatures. Moreover, only those
persons not voting in the primary would have been eligible to sign a nominating
petition. See n. 5, supra.

26

See Carter v. Dies, 321 F.Supp. 1358, 1363 (N.D.Tex.1970) (Thornberry, J.,
concurring).

27

Cf. Harper v. Virginia Board of Elections, 383 U.S., at 674, 86 S.Ct., at 1085
(Black, J., dissenting).

28

Art. 13.02, Tex.Election Code Ann. (1967).

29

This would be a different case if the fees approximated the cost of processing a
candidate's application for a place on the ballot, a cost resulting from the
candidate's decision to enter a primary. The term filing fee has long been
thought to cover the cost of filing, that is, the cost of placing a particular
document on the public record.