ASSIGNMENT NO.

10
JAYSON ABABA

BELEN SAGAD ANGELESvs.

ALELI "CORAZON" ANGELES MAGLAYA
GARCIA, J.:
FACTS: Francisco Angeles died intestate leaving behind 4 parcels of land and a building, among
other valuable properties. Respondent Corazon claims that as the sole legitimate child of the
deceased and Genoveva Mercado, she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
required of an administrator.
Petitioner claims, as Franciscos second wife and surviving spouse, that she should be made
administratix of Franciscos estate. She claims that respondent could not be the daughter
of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Franciscos legitimate daughter, the
corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Further she said that respondent, despite
her claim of being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, she has not
presented the marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced any acceptable
document to prove such union. Belen likewise averred that she and Francisco had, during their
marriage, legally adopted Concesa A. Yamat, et al. Petitioner thus urged that she, being the
surviving spouse of Francisco, be declared as possessed of the superior right to the
administration of his estate.
Corazon in turn alleged that per certification of the appropriate offices, the records of marriages
of the Civil Registrar where the alleged Francisco-Genoveva wedding took place, were
destroyed. She also dismissed the adoption as of little consequence, owing to her having
interposed with the Court of Appeals a petition to nullify the decree of adoption entered by the
RTC. Respondent testified having been in open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child. Respondent also offered in evidence her birth certificate which contained an
entry stating that she was born wherein the handwritten word "Yes" appears on the space below
the question "Legitimate?; and a copy of her marriage contract. Likewise offered were her
scholastic and government service records.
After respondent rested her case following her formal offer of exhibits, petitioner filed a "Motion
to Dismiss" under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. In it, she prayed for the dismissal
of the petition for letters of administration on the ground that the petition failed "to state or prove
a cause of action", it being her stated position that Corazon, by her evidence, failed to establish
her filiation vis - -vis the decedent, i.e., that she is in fact a legitimate child of Francisco M.
Angeles."
The trial court dismissed the petition on its finding that respondent failed to prove her filiation as
legitimate child of Francisco. Hence, respondent went on appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA).

CA reversed and set aside the trial courts order of dismissal and directed it to appoint Corazon
as administratrix of the estate of Francisco.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent is the legitimate child of decedent Francisco M. Angeles
therefore be appointed as administratrix of his estate.
RULING: The Court of Appeals erred in giving respondent presumptive legitimacy. A legitimate
child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage (FC Art 146). However,
the presumption of legitimacy under Art 164 may be availed only upon convincing proof of the
factual basis therefor , i.e., that the childs parents were legally married and that his/her
conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. Respondent failed to
present evidence of Franciscos marriage to Genoveva, thus she cannot be presumed legitimate.
Further, the Birth Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco against whom legitimate
filiation is asserted. Not even by Genoveva. It was only signed by the attending physician
making it only proof of the fact of the birth of a child.
The legitimate filiation of a child is a matter fixed by law itself, it cannot be made dependent on
the declaration of the attending physician or midwife, or that of the mother of the newborn child.
None of the evidence respondent presented is enough to prove filiation or recognition. Further,
RTC Caloocan in the case respondent filed to nullify the adoption of Francisco and Belen of their
child, said that respondent is NOT a legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva; following the
rule on conclusiveness of judgment, herein respondent is precluded from claiming that she is the
legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado. In fine, the issue of herein
respondents legitimate filiation to Francisco and the latters marriage to Genoveva, having been
judicially determined in a final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction, has thereby
become res judicata and may not again be resurrected or litigated between herein petitioner and
respondent or their privies in a subsequent action, regardless of the form of the latter.
Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the
deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. When the law
speaks of "next of kin", the reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute of distribution,
to the decedent's property; one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to share in the estate
as distributed, or, in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for
letters of administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate court perforce has
to determine and pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate action will only result in a
multiplicity of suits. Upon this consideration, the trial court acted within bounds when it looked
into and pass upon the claimed relationship of respondent to the late Francisco Angeles.
G.R. No. 166520
March 14, 2008
VILMA C. TAN vs.
THE HON. FRANCISCO C. GEDORIO, JR.
CHICO-NAZARIO, J.:

FACTS: Gerardo Tan (Gerardo) leaving no will. Private respondents, who are claiming to be the
children of Gerardo, filed with the RTC a Petition for the issuance of letters of administration.
Petitioners, claiming to be legitimate heirs of Gerardo Tan, filed an Opposition to the Petition.

Private respondents then moved for the appointment of a special administrator, asserting the need
for a special administrator to take possession and charge of Gerardo's estate until the Petition can
be resolved by the RTC or until the appointment of a regular administrator. They prayed that
their attorney-in-fact, Romualdo D. Lim, be appointed as the special administrator. Petitioners
filed an Opposition to private respondents' Motion for Appointment, arguing that none of the
private respondents can be appointed as the special administrator since they are not residing in
the country. Petitioners contend further that Romualdo does not have the same familiarity,
experience or competence as that of their co-petitioner Vilma C. Tan who was already acting as
de facto administratrix of his estate since his death.

Atty. Nuevo, as court-appointed commissioner, issued directives to Vilma, in her capacity as de

facto administratrix. However, upon failure of Vilma to follow a court directive to account for
the income of the estate, the court granted Romualdo's appointment as special administrator.

Petitioners filed a Motion for Reconsideration of the foregoing Order, claiming that petitioner
Vilma should be the one appointed as special administratix as she was allegedly next of kin of
the deceased.
Respondent Judge Francisco Gedorio, in his capacity as RTC Executive Judge, denied
petitioners' Motion for Reconsideration. Petitioners went to the Court of Appeals, again insisting
on petitioner Vilma's right to be appointed as special administratix which petition was likewise
denied by the Court of Appeals. Hence, this instant petition.

ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals and the court a quo both grievously erred in denying
petitioners' plea to be given primacy in the administration of their father's estate.

RULING: The order of preference petitioners speak of is found in Section 6, Rule 78 of the
Rules of Court, which provides:

SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is

named in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or
fail to give bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in
the discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or
next of kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the
person selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or
next of kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it
may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to
serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to
such other person as the court may select.

However, this Court has consistently ruled that the order of preference in the appointment of a
regular administrator as provided in the afore-quoted provision does not apply to the selection of
a special administrator. The preference under Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court for the
next of kin refers to the appointment of a regular administrator, and not of aspecial administrator,
as theappointment of the latter lies entirely in the discretion of the court, and is not appealable.

Not being appealable, the only remedy against the appointment of a special administrator is
Certiorari under Rule 65 of the Rules of Court, which was what petitioners filed with the Court
of Appeals. Certiorari, however, requires nothing less than grave abuse of discretion, a term
which implies such capricious and whimsical exercise of judgment which is equivalent to an
excess or lack of jurisdiction. The abuse of discretion must be so patent and gross as to amount to
an evasion of a positive duty or a virtual refusal to perform a duty enjoined by law, or to act at all
in contemplation of law.

In the case at bar, private respondents were constrained to move for the appointment of a special
administrator due to the delay caused by the failure of petitioner Vilma to comply with the
directives of the court-appointed commissioner. It would certainly be unjust if petitioner Vilma
were still appointed special administratix, when the necessity of appointing one has been brought
about by her defiance of the lawful orders of the RTC or its appointed officials. Petitioners
submit the defense that petitioner Vilma was unable to comply with the directives of the RTC to

deposit with the court the income of Gerardo's estate and to provide an accounting thereof
because of the fact that Gerardo's estate had no income. This defense is clearly specious and
insufficient justification for petitioner Vilma's non-compliance. If the estate truly did not have
any income, petitioners should have simply filed a manifestation to that effect, instead of
continuing to disregard the court's orders.

G.R. No. 183053 : June 16, 2010

IN THE MATTER OF THE INTESTATE ESTATE OF CRISTINA AGUINALDOSUNTAY vs.
ISABEL COJUANGCO-SUNTAY
NACHURA, J.:

FACTS: Spouses Cristina and Federico Suntay died intestate and their only son, Emilio I,
predeceased them. When Cristina died, she was survived by her husband, Federico, and several
grandchildren, including herein petitioner Emilio III and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay.
During his lifetime, Emilio I was married to Isabel Cojuangco, and they begot three children,
including herein respondent, Isabel. Emilio I's marriage to Isabel Cojuangco was subsequently
annulled. Thereafter, Emilio I had two children out of wedlock, Emilio III and Nenita, by two
different women. Despite the illegitimate status of Emilio III, he was reared ever since he was a
mere baby by the spouses Federico and Cristina and was an acknowledged natural child of
Emilio I.
Consequently, because of the annulment of marriage of Emilio I and their mother, respondent
and her siblings, lived separately from their father and paternal grandparents. Significantly,
Federico, after the death of his spouse, Cristina, adopted their illegitimate grandchildren, Emilio
III and Nenita.
Respondent Isabel filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in her favor.
Federico filed his opposition stating that being the surviving spouse of Cristina, he is capable of
administering her estate and he should be the one appointed as its administrator; that as part
owner of the mass of conjugal properties left by Cristina, he must be accorded legal preference in
the administration thereof; that Isabel and her family had been alienated from their grandparents
for more than thirty (30) years; that the enumeration of heirs in the petition was incomplete as it
did not mention the other children of his son namely: Emilio III and Nenita; that he is better
situated to protect the integrity of the estate of Cristina as even before the death of his wife, he
was already the one who managed their conjugal properties; that the probable value of the estate
as stated in the petition was grossly overstated (sic); and that Isabel's allegation that some of the
properties are in the hands of usurpers is untrue.
Meanwhile, after a failed attempt by the parties to settle the proceedings amicably, Federico filed
a Manifestation, nominating his adopted son, Emilio III, as administrator of the decedent's estate

on his behalf, in the event he would be adjudged as the one with a better right to the letters of
administration.
Subsequently, the trial court granted Emilio III's Motion for Leave to Intervene considering his
interest in the outcome of the case. Emilio III filed his Opposition-In-Intervention, which
essentially echoed the allegations in his grandfather's opposition, alleging thatFederico, or in his
stead, Emilio III, was better equipped than respondent to administer and manage the estate.
In the course of the proceedings Federico died.
After hearing the testimonies and evidence of both party, the trial court rendered a decision,
appointing herein petitioner, Emilio III, as administrator of decedent Cristina's intestate estate.
Aggrieved, respondent filed an appeal before the CA, which reversed and set aside the decision
of the RTC, revoked the Letters of Administration issued to Emilio III, and appointed respondent
as administratrix of the intestate estate of the decedent, Cristina. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Article 992 Of The Civil Code applies in the appointment of an administrator
of the estate Under Section 6 Of Rule 78 of the Rules Of Court.
RULING:Section 6, Rule 78 of the Rules of Court lists the order of preference in the
appointment of an administrator of an estate:
SEC. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. - If no executor is named
in the will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give
bond, or a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the
discretion of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of
kin, requests to have appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person
selected by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of
kin, neglects for thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for
administration or to request that administration be granted to some other person, it may
be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing to serve;
(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such
other person as the court may select.
However, the order of preference is not absolute for it depends on the attendant facts and
circumstances of each case. Jurisprudence has long held that the selection of an administrator lies
in the sound discretion of the trial court. In the main, the attendant facts and circumstances of
this case necessitate, at the least, a joint administration by both respondent and Emilio III of their
grandmother's, Cristina's, estate.
The case of Uy v. Court of Appeals upheld the appointment by the trial court of a coadministration between the decedent's son and the decedent's brother, who was likewise a

creditor of the decedent's estate. In the same vein, in Delgado Vda. deDe la Rosa v. Heirs of
MarcianaRustiaVda. deDamia, it upheld that in the appointment of an administrator, the
principal consideration is the interest in the estate of the one to be appointed. The order of
preference does not rule out the appointment of co-administrators, specially in cases where
justice and equity demand that opposing parties or factions be represented in the management of
the estates, a situation which obtains here.
Similarly, the subject estate in this case calls to the succession other putative heirs, including
another illegitimate grandchild of Cristina and Federico, Nenita, but who was likewise adopted
by Federico, and the two (2) siblings of respondent Isabel, Margarita and Emilio II. In all,
considering the conflicting claims of the putative heirs, and the unliquidated conjugal partnership
of Cristina and Federico which forms part of their respective estates, we are impelled to move in
only one direction, i.e., joint administration of the subject estate.
Letters of Administration over the estate of decedent Cristina Aguinaldo-Suntay was issued to
both petitioner Emilio A.M. Suntay III and respondent Isabel Cojuangco-Suntay upon payment
by each of a bond.
G.R. No. 170243
April 16, 2008
NANCY H. ZAYCO vs.
ATTY. JESUS V. HINLO, JR.
CORONA, J.:

FACTS: Enrique Hinlo died intestate. His heirs filed a petition for letters of administration of his
estate in the Regional Trial Court (RTC). Ceferina, widow of Enrique, was initially appointed as
special administratrix of Enrique's estate. Petitioners Nancy and Remo were appointed as coadministrators in lieu of their mother Ceferina who was already sickly and could no longer
effectively perform her duties as special administratrix.

Respondent Atty. Jesus V. Hinlo, Jr., a grandson of Enrique and heir to his estate by virtue of
representation, filed a petition for the issuance of letters of administration in his favor and an
urgent motion for the removal of petitioners as co-administrators of Enrique's estate. Petitioners
opposed both the petition and the motion.

The RTC revoked the appointment of petitioners as co-administrators of the estate of Enrique
and directed the issuance of letters of administration in favor of respondent.

Petitioners moved for its reconsideration but denied by the RTC. Petitioners filed a notice of
appeal which the RTC likewise denied. It ruled that petitioners resorted to a wrong remedy as the
orders were interlocutory and not subject to appeal and it was also filed beyond the prescribed
period.

Petitioners sought reconsideration but the Court of Appeals denied it. Hence, this petition.

ISSUE: Whether the orders appointing respondent Hinlo as administrator of the estate of
Enrique were interlocutory and not appealable.

RULING: An order appointing an administrator of a deceased person's estate is a final

determination of the rights of the parties in connection with the administration, management and
settlement of the decedent's estate. It is a final order and, hence, appealable.

In appeals in special proceedings, a record on appeal is required. The notice of appeal and the
record on appeal should both be filed within 30 days from receipt of the notice of judgment or
final order. Pursuant to Neypes v. CA, the 30-day period to file the notice of appeal and record on
appeal should be reckoned from the receipt of the order denying the motion for new trial or
motion for reconsideration.
From the time petitioners received the order denying their motion for reconsideration, they had
30 days to file their notice of appeal and record on appeal. The Court ruled that the appeal was
made on time.

The petition is granted.

G.R. No. 170498
January 9, 2013
METROPOLITAN BANK & TRUST COMPANYvs.
ABSOLUTE MANAGEMENT CORPORATION
BRION, J.:
FACTS: Sherwood Holdings Corporation, Inc. (SHCI) filed a complaint for sum of money
against Absolute Management Corporation (AMC) alleging that it made advance payments to
AMC for some purchases covered by Metrobank Checks. These checks were all crossed, and
were all made payable to AMC. They were given to Chua, AMC's General Manager.

Chua died and a special proceeding for the settlement of his estate commenced before the RTC.
This proceeding was pending at the time AMC filed its answer with counterclaims and thirdparty complaint. SHCI made demands on AMC, after Chua's death, for allegedly undelivered
items. Upon investigation, AMC discovered that in 1998, Chua received from SHCI 18
Metrobank checks all payable to AMC and were crossed or "for payee's account only.
In its answer with counterclaims and third-party complaint, AMC averred that it had no
knowledge of Chua's transactions with SHCI and it did not receive any money from the latter.
AMC also asked the RTC to hold Metrobank liable for the subject checks in case it is adjudged
liable to SHCI.
Metrobank admitted that it deposited the checks in question to the account of Ayala Lumber and
Hardware, a sole proprietorship Chua owned and managed. The deposit was allegedly done with
the knowledge and consent of AMC. Further, Chua's records show that the proceeds of the
checks were remitted to AMC which cannot therefore now claim that it did not receive these
proceeds.
Metrobank also raised the defense of estoppel. According to Metrobank, AMC had knowledge of
its arrangements with Chua for several years but despite this, AMC did not object to nor did it
call the attention of Metrobank about Chua's alleged lack of authority to deposit the checks in
Ayala Lumber and Hardware's account. At this point, AMC is already estopped from questioning
Chua's authority to deposit these checks in Ayala Lumber and Hardware's account.
Subsequently, Metrobank filed a motion for leave to admit fourth- party complaint against Chua's
estate. It alleged that Chua's estate should reimburse Metrobank in case it would be held liable in
the third-party complaint filed against it by AMC. The RTC denied Metrobanks motion.
The RTC categorized Metrobank's allegation in the fourth-party complaint as a "cobro de lo
indebido l1 - a kind of quasi-contract that mandates recovery of what has been improperly paid.
Quasi-contracts fall within the concept of implied contracts that must be included in the claims
required to be filed with the judicial settlement of the deceased's estate under Section 5, Rule 86
of the Rules of Court. As such claim, it should have been filed not before the RTC as a fourthparty complaint.
Metrobank responded to the RTC ruling by filing a petition for certiorariunder Rule 65 before
the CA. The CA affirmed the RTC's ruling that Metrobank's fourth-party complaint should have
been filed in Special Proceedings No. 99-0023. Hence, this petition.
ISSUE: Whether Metrobank's fourth-party complaint against Chua's estate should be allowed.
RULING:Metrobank's fourth-party complaint, as a contingent claim, falls within the claims that
should be filed under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court
A distinctive character of Metrobank's fourth-party complaint is its contingent nature - the claim
depends on the possibility that Metrobank would be adjudged liable to AMC, a future event that

may or may not happen. This characteristic unmistakably marks the complaint as a contingent
one that must be included in the claims falling under the terms of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules
of Court:
Sec. 5. Claims which must be filed under the notice. If not filed, barred; exceptions. - All claims
for money against the decedent, arising from contract, express or implied, whether the same be
due, not due, or contingent, all claims for funeral expenses and expenses for the last sickness of
the decedent, and judgment for money against the decedent, must be filed within the time limited
in the notice. [italics ours]
Specific provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court prevail over general provisions of
Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court
Metrobank argues that Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court should apply because it
impleaded Chua's estate for reimbursement in the same transaction upon which it has been sued
by AMC. On this point, the Court supports the conclusion of the CA, to wit:
Notably, a comparison of the respective provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 and Section 5, Rule 86
of the Rules of Court readily shows that Section 11, Rule 6 applies to ordinary civil actions while
Section 5, Rule 86 specifically applies to money claims against the estate. The specific
provisions of Section 5, Rule 86 x xx must therefore prevail over the general provisions of
Section 11, Rule 6.rl1
The court read with approval the CA's use of the statutory construction principle of
lexspecialisderogatgenerali, leading to the conclusion that the specific provisions of Section 5,
Rule 86 of the Rules of Court should prevail over the general provisions of Section 11, Rule 6 of
the Rules of Court; the settlement of the estate of deceased persons (where claims against the
deceased should be filed) is primarily governed by the rules on special proceedings, while the
rules provided for ordinary claims, including Section 11, Rule 6 of the Rules of Court, merely
apply suppletorily.
In sum, on all counts in the considerations material to the issues posed, the resolution points to
the affirmation of the assailed CA decision and resolution. Metrobank's claim in its fourth-party
complaint against Chua's estate is based on quasi-contract. It is also a contingent claim that
depends on another event. Both belong to the category of claims against a deceased person that
should be filed under Section 5, Rule 86 of the Rules of Court and, as such, should have been so
filed in Special Proceedings.
G.R. No. L-35925
November 10, 1932
RICARDO SIKATvs.
QUITERIA VIUDA DE VILLANUEVA
VILLA-REAL, J.:
FACTS: Ricardo Sikat filed a complaint, as judicial administrator of the intestate estate of
Mariano P. Villanueva, against QuiteriaVda. de Villanueva, as judicial administratrix of the

intestate estate of Pedro Villanueva, praying that the decision of the committee on claims and
appraisal in the intestate proceedings of the aforesaid Pedro Villanueva with regard to the credit
of the late Mariano P. Villanueva be confirmed by the court, and the defendant as judicial
administratrix, be ordered to pay the plaintiff the amount of P10,192.92, with legal interest from
July 15, 1919 until fully paid, and the costs.
In answer to the complaint, the defendant denied each and every allegation thereof, and set up a
special defense of prescription, and a counterclaim for P15,536.69 which she alleges the estate of
Mariano P. Villanueva owes to the estate of Pedro Villanueva; and she prayed for judgment
absolving her from the complaint and sentencing the plaintiff to pay her said amount with
interest and costs.
The plaintiff and defendant are both of age, the former are residing in the municipality of
Malinao, and the latter in the municipality of Tabaco, Province of Albay, P. I.; that the plaintiff,
Ricardo Sikat, instituted the present action as judicial administrator of the estate of Mariano P.
Villanueva, duly appointed in place of the former administrator, Enrique V. Kare, by the Court of
Firts Instance of Albay;
QuiteriaVda. de Villanueva however questioned the jurisdiction of the Court of First Instance of
Albay over the intestate proceedings of the estate of Pedro Villanueva, and upon appeal the
Supreme Court decided that said Court of First Instance had no jurisdiction to take cognizance of
the said intestate proceedings.
In view of this decision of the Supreme Court holding the Court of First Instance of Albay
incompetent to take cognizance of the intestate proceedings in the estate of Pedro Villanueva,
these proceedings were instituted in the Court of First Instance of Manila through the application
of Enrique Kare, as judicial administrator of the intestate estate of Mariano P. Villanueva in case
No. 28244, filed on June 18, 1925, upon the ground that when Pedro Villanueva died he owed
the estate of Mariano P. Villanueva the sum of P10,192.92, with legal interest from June 15,
1919.
After the Court of First Instance of Manila had appointed QuiteriaVda. de Villanueva,
administratrix of the estate of Pedro Villanueva, and MamertoRoxas and NicanorRoxas as
commissioners to compose the committee on claims and appraisal, Enrique Kare, as
administrator of the estate of Mariano P. Villanueva, filed his claim with the committee on
September 22, 1925, and that the same claim appears in the present complaint.
The said committee on claims and appraisal, composed of MamertoRoxas and NicanorRoxas,
admitted the claim and decided in favor of the estate of Mariano P. Villanueva, filing their report
with the court accordingly.
In addition there was adduced evidence a document dated September 22, 1909, executed by the
late Pedro Villanueva in favor of his father, the late Mariano P. Villanueva, which states the
amount that Pedro owed to his father, Mariano P. Villanueva.
ISSUE: Whether at the time of Pedro Villanueva's death the right of Mariano P. Villanueva's
estate to collect the credit against him has already prescribed.

RULING: The court decided the question in the affirmative, citing section 49 of the aforecited
Act No. 190, which reads:
SEC. 49. SAVING IN OTHER CASES. If, in an action commenced, or attempted to be
commenced, in due time, a judgment for the plaintiff be reversed, or if the plaintiff fail otherwise
than upon the merits, and the time limited for the commencement of such action has, at the date
of such reversal or failure, expired, the plaintiff, or, if he die and the cause of action survive, his
representatives, may commence a new action within one year after such date, and this provision
shall apply to any claim asserted in any pleading by a defendant.
This provision of law speaks of an "action", which, according to section 1 of Act No. 190,
"means an ordinary suit in a court of justice, by which one party prosecutes another for the
enforcement or protection of a right, or the redress or prevention of a wrong". According to this
definition, the proceeding here in question is not an action but a special proceeding, which,
according to the same section, is any other remedy provided by law. The very reference in
section 49 to actions brought against debtors before their death clearly means ordinary actions
and not special proceedings.
The saving clause, then, in section 49 of Act No. 190 does not directly apply to special
proceedings.
In re Estate of De Dios (24 Phil., 573), cited in the aforementioned case of Santos vs. Manarang,
this court laid down the following doctrine:
The purpose of the law, in fixing a period within which claims against an estate must be
presented, is to insure a speedy settlement of the affairs of the deceased person and the early
delivery of the property, to the persons entitled to receive it.
The speedy settlement of the estate of deceased persons for the benefit of creditors and those
entitled to the residue by way of inheritance or legacy after the debts and expenses of
administration have been paid, is the ruling spirit of our probate law.
Thus section 642, paragraph 2, of the Code of Civil Procedure provides:
SEC. 642. TO WHOM ADMINISTRATION GRANTED. If no executor is named in the will,
or if a person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
x xxxxxxxx
2. If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected by
them, be unsuitable, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin neglect thirty days after the death
of the person to apply for administration, or to request that administration be granted to some
other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal creditors, if competent and willing
to serve. . . .

It can be seen that under section 689 of the Code, the maximum period for the presentation of
claims against the estate of a deceased person is eighteen months from the time fixed by the
committee on claims and appraisal in its notice, and this period may be extended one month if a
creditor applies for it within six months after the first term, according to section 690.
It may be argued in this case that inasmuch as none of the persons entitled to be appointed
administrators or to apply for the appointment of an administrator have taken any step in that
direction, and since no administrator or committee on claims and appraisal has been appointed to
fix the time for filing claims, the right of the plaintiff, as administrator of Mariano P. Villanueva's
estate, to present the latter's claim against Pedro Villanueva's estate could not prescribe.
The object of the law in fixing short special periods for the presentation of claims against the
estate of a deceased person is to settle the affairs of the estate as soon as possible in order to pay
off the debts and distribute the residue; and if a creditor having knowledge of the death of his
debtor is interested in collecting his credit as soon as possible; and if according to law the
persons entitled to the administration or to propose another person for administrator have thirty
days from the death within which to claim that right, after which time the court may appoint any
creditor of the intestate debtor: then the plaintiff herein as administrator of Mariano P.
Villanueva's estate, was guilty of laches in not instituting the intestate proceedings of Pedro
Villanueva in the Court of First Instance of Manila until after the lapse of three years after this
court had set aside the intestate proceedings begun in the Court of First Instance of Albay for
lack of jurisdiction over the place where the decedent had died, that is, from October 21, 1921, to
June 18, 1925.
Taking into account the spirit of the law upon the settlement and partition of estates, and the fact
that the administration of Mariano P. Villanueva's estate had knowledge of Pedro Villanueva's
death, and instituted the intestate proceedings for the settlement of the latter's estate in the Court
of First Instance of Albay and filed Mariano P. Villanueva's claim against it, which was not
allowed because this court held those proceedings void for lack of jurisdiction, the estate of
Mariano P. Villanueva was guilty of laches in not instituting the same proceedings in the
competent court, the Court of First Instance of Manila, until after three years had elapsed, and
applying the provisions of section 49 of theCode of Civil Procedure by analogy, we declare the
claim of Mariano P. Villanueva to have prescribed. To hold otherwise would be to permit a
creditor having knowledge of his debtor's death to keep the latter's estate in suspense indefinitely,
by not instituting either testate or intestate proceedings in order to present his claim, to the
prejudice of the heirs and legatees. Even in the case of the summary settlement of an estate under
section 598, as amended by Act No. 2331, the Code of Civil Procedure limits the time within
which a creditor may file his claim to two years after the settlement and distribution of the estate.
G.R. No. L-24098
November 18, 1967
BUENAVENTURA BELAMALAvs.
MARCELINO POLINAR, administrator
REYES, J.B.L., J.:

FACTS: The claimant Buenaventura Belamala is the same offended party in Criminal Case No.
1922 filed before the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BOHOL, against the same Mauricio
Polinar above mentioned and against other accused, for Frustrated Murder; The administrator
Marcelino Polinar is one of the legitimate children of the above mentioned Mauricio Polinar now
deceased;

On May 24, 1954, the complaint for Frustrated Murder was filed in the Justice of the Peace of
Clarin, Bohol against said Mauricio Polinar, et al, and when said case was remanded to the Court
of First Instance of Bohol, the Information on said Criminal Case No. 1922 was filed on March
12, 1955;

On May 28, 1966, the COURT OF FIRST INSTANCE OF BOHOL rendered a decision thereof,
convicting the said Mauricio Polinar of the crime of serious physical injuries and sentenced him
to pay to the offended party Buenaventura Belamala, now claimant herein, the amount of
P990.00, plus the amount of P35.80 as indemnity the amount of P1,000.00 as moral damages.

On June 18, 1956, the accused (the late Mauricio Polinar) appealed . However on July 27, 1956,
while the appeal of said Mauricio Polinar was pending before the Court of Appeals, he died; and
that there was no Notice or Notification of his death has ever been filed in the said Court of
Appeals.

The decision of the Court of Appeals in said Criminal Case No. 1922, has affirmed the decision
of the Court of First Instance of Bohol, in toto, and said decision of the Court of Appeals was
promulgated on March 27, 1958; but said Mauricio Polinar has already died on July 27, 1956.

ISSUE: Whether the civil liability of an accused of physical injuries who dies before final
judgment, is extinguished by his demise, to the extent of barring any claim therefor against his
estate.

RULING: We see no merit in the plea that the civil liability has been extinguished, in view of
the provisions of the Civil Code of the Philippines of 1950 (Rep. Act No. 386) that became
operative eighteen years after the Revised Penal Code. As pointed out by the Court below,

Article 33 of the Civil Code establishes a civil action for damages on account of physical
injuries, entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action.

Art. 33. In cases of defamation, fraud, and physical injuries, a civil action for damages,
entirely separate and distinct from the criminal action, may be brought by the injured
party. Such civil action shall proceed independently of the criminal prosecution, and shall
require only a preponderance of evidence.

Assuming that for lack of express reservation, Belamala's civil action for damages was to be
considered instituted together with the criminal action, still, since both proceedings were
terminated without final adjudication, the civil action of the offended party under Article 33 may
yet be enforced separately. Such claim in no way contradicts Article 108, of the Penal Code, that
imposes the obligation to indemnify upon the deceased offender's heirs, because the latter
acquired their decedents obligations only to the extent of the value of the inheritance (Civil
Code, Art. 774). Hence, the obligation of the offender's heirs under Article 108 ultimately
becomes an obligation of the offender's estate.

The appellant, however, is correct in the contention that the claim should have been prosecuted
by separate action against the administrator, as permitted by sections 1 and 2 of Revised Rule 87,
since the claim is patently one "to recover damages for an injury to person or property" (Rule 87,
sec. 1). Belamala's action can not be enforced by filing a claim against the estate under Rule 86,
because section 5 of that rule explicitly limits the claims to those for funeral expenses, expenses
for last sickness, judgments for money and "claims against the decedent, arising
fromcontract, express or implied;" and this last category (the other three being inapposite)
includes only "all purely personal obligations other than those which have their source
in delict or tort" (Leung Ben vs. O'Brien, 38 Phil. 182, 189-194) and Belamala's damages
manifestly have a tortious origin. To this effect was our ruling in Aguas vs. Llemos, L-18107,
Aug. 30, 1962.
G.R. NO. 159130, August 22, 2008
ATTY. GEORGE S. BRIONESv.
LILIA J. HENSON-CRUZ
BRION, J.:
FACTS: Ruby J. Henson filed on February 23, 1999 a petition for the allowance of the will of
her late mother, Luz J. Henson, with the Regional Trial Court (RTC) of Manila. Lilia HensonCruz, one of the deceased's daughters. opposed Ruby's petition. She alleged that Ruby
understated the value of their late mother's estate and acted with "unconscionable bad faith" in

the management thereof. Lilia prayed that her mother's holographic will be disallowed and that
she be appointed as the Intestate Administratrix.
Lilia subsequently moved for the appointment of an Interim Special Administrator of the estate
of her late mother, praying that the Prudential Bank & Trust Company-Ermita Branch be
appointed as Interim Special Administrator. The trial court granted the motion but designated
Jose V. Ferro (Senior Vice-President and Trust Officer, Trust Banking Group of the Philippines
National Bank) as the Special Administrator. Ferro, however, declined the appointment.
The trial court then designated petitioner Atty. George S. Briones as Special Administrator of the
estate. Atty. Briones accepted the appointment, took his oath of office, and started the
administration of the estate. On January 8, 2002, Atty. Briones submitted the Special
Administrator's Final Report for the approval of the court. He prayed that he be paid a
commission of P97,850,191.26 representing eight percent (8%) of the value of the estate under
his administration.
The respondents opposed the approval of the final report and prayed that they be granted an
opportunity to examine the documents, vouchers, and receipts mentioned in the statement of
income and disbursements. They likewise asked the trial court to deny the Atty. Briones' claim
for commission and that he be ordered to refund the sum of P134,126.33 to the estate.
On February 21, 2002, the respondents filed an audit request with the trial court. Atty. Briones
filed his comment suggesting that the audit be done by an independent auditor at the expense of
the estate. The trial court granted the request for audit and appointed the accounting firm Alba,
Romeo & Co. to conduct the audit.
The respondents moved for the reconsideration, alleging that in view of the partition of the estate
there was no more need for a special administrator. They also clarified that they were not asking
for an external audit; they merely wanted to be allowed to examine the receipts, vouchers, bank
statements, and other documents in support of the Special Administrator's Final Report and to
examine the Special Administrator under oath.
Respondents filed with the Court of Appeals (CA) a Petition for Certiorari, Prohibition, and
Mandamus which assailed the Order dated March 12, 2002 which appointed accounting firm
Alba, Romeo & Co. as auditors and the Order dated April 3, 2002 which reiterated the
appointment. The trial court, however, denied the appeal and disapproved the record on appeal
on May 23, 2002 on the ground of forum shopping. Respondents' motion for reconsideration was
likewise denied.
Respondents filed a petition for mandamus before the CA claiming that the trial court unlawfully
refused to comply with its ministerial duty to approve their seasonably-perfected appeal. The
Court of Appeals held that the trial court had neither the power nor the authority to deny the
appeal on the ground of forum shopping. It pointed out that under Section 13, Rule 41 of the
1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, as amended, the authority of the trial court to dismiss an appeal,

either motuproprio or on motion, may be exercised only if the appeal was taken out of time or if
the appellate court docket and other fees were not paid within the reglementary period.
The petitioner faults the appellate court for refusing to resolve the forum shopping issue in its
Decision of February 11, 2003 and the Resolution of July 17, 2003, thereby deciding the case in
a way not in accord with law or with applicable decisions of this Court. On the matter of forum
shopping, the appellate court simply stated in its decision that "In view of the fact that
respondent Judge had no power to disallow the appeal on the ground of forum shopping, we
deem it unnecessary to discuss whether or not petitioners committed forum shopping." Neither
did the appellate court pass upon the issue of forum shopping in its ruling on the petitioner's
motion for reconsideration, stating that forum shopping should be resolved either in the
respondent's appeal or in their petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus.
Hence, this petition for review.
ISSUE: Whether the Court of Appeals err in not dismissing the respondents' petition for
mandamus on the ground of forum shopping?
RULING: NO.
Forum shopping is the act of a litigant who "repetitively availed of several judicial remedies in
different courts, simultaneously or successively, all substantially founded on the same
transactions and the same essential facts and circumstances, and all raising substantially the
same issues either pending in or already resolved adversely by some other court to increase his
chances of obtaining a favorable decision if not in one court, then in another." It is directly
addressed and prohibited under Section 5, Rule 7 of the 1997 Rules of Civil Procedure, and is
signaled by the presence of the following requisites: (1) identity of parties, or at least such parties
who represent the same interests in both actions, (2) identity of the rights asserted and the relief
prayed for, the relief being founded on the same facts, and (3) identity of the two preceding
particulars such that any judgment rendered in the pending case, regardless of which party is
successful, would amount to res judicata in the other. In simpler terms, the test to determine
whether a party has violated the rule against forum shopping is where the elements of
litispendentia are present or where a final judgment in one case will amount to res judicata in the
other.
The court sees no forum shopping after considering the standards as neither litispendentia nor
res judicata would result in one case from a ruling in the other, notwithstanding that the appeal
that subsequently became the subject of CA-G.R. SP No. 71844 and the petition for certiorari in
CA-G.R. SP No. 70439 both stemmed from the trial court's Order dated April 3, 2002. The
simple reason - as already discussed above - is that the petition and the appeal involve two
different and distinct issues so that a ruling in either one will not affect the other.
Forum shopping is further negated when the nature of, and the developments in, the proceedings
are taken into account - i.e., an estate proceedings where the Rules expressly allow separate

appeals and where the respondents have meticulously distinguished what aspect of the RTC's
single Order could be appealed and what could not. Thus, the petitioner cannot take comfort in
the cases it cited relating to forum shopping; these cases, correct and proper in their own factual
settings, simply do not apply to the attendant circumstances and special nature of the present case
where the issues, although pertaining to the same settlement of estate proceedings and although
covered by the same court order, differ in substance and in stage of finality and can be treated
independently of one another for the purposes of appellate review.
Given our above discussion and conclusions, the court do not see forum shopping as an issue that
would have made a difference in the appellate court's ruling. Nor is it an issue that the appellate
court should, by law, have fully ruled upon on the merits. The court agrees with the respondent
that the appellate court is not required "to resolve every contention and issue raised by a party if
it believes it is not necessary to do so to decide the case."
The reality though is that the appellate court did rule on the issue when it stated that "it becomes
unnecessary to discuss whether the latter engaged in forum shopping. Apparently, the issue on
forum shopping was also raised in CA-G.R. SP No. 70349 and private respondent can again
raise the same in the appeal from the order dated April 3, 2002, where the issue should be
properly resolved." To the appellate court - faced with the task of ruling on a petition for
mandamus to compel the trial court to allow the respondents' appeal - forum shopping was not an
issue material to whether the trial court should or should not be compelled; what was material are
the requisite filing of a notice of appeal and record on appeal, and the question of whether these
have been satisfied. We cannot find fault with this reasoning as the forum shopping issue - i.e.,
whether there was abuse of court processes in the respondents' use of two recourses to assail the
same trial court order - has specific pertinence and relevance in the sufficiency and merits of the
recourses the respondents took.
G.R. No. 146989
February 7, 2007
MELENCIO GABRIELvs.
NELSON BILON
AZCUNA, J.:
FACTS: Respondents filed their separate complaints for illegal dismissal, illegal deductions, and
separation pay against petitioner with the National Labor Relations Commission (NLRC). These
were consolidated and docketed as NLRC-NCR Case No. 00-11-07420-95. On December 15,
1995, the complaint was amended, impleading as party respondent the Bacoor Transport Service
Cooperative, Inc., as both parties are members of the cooperative.
Respondents alleged that they were regular drivers of Gabriel Jeepney, driving their respective
units bearing under a boundary system of P400 per day, plying Baclaran to Divisoria via Tondo,
and vice versa driving five days a week, with average daily earnings of P400; That they were
required/forced to pay additional P55.00 per day for the following: a) P20.00 police protection;

b) P20.00 washing; c) P10.00 deposit; and [d)] P5.00 garage fees; That there is no law providing
the operator to require the drivers to pay police protection, deposit, washing, and garage fees
That on April 30, 1995, petitioner told them not to drive anymore, and when they went to the
garage to report for work the next day, they were not given a unit to drive; and That the boundary
drivers of passenger jeepneys are considered regular employees of the jeepney operators. Being
such, they are entitled to security of tenure. Petitioner, however, dismissed them without factual
and legal basis, and without due process.
On his part, petitioner contended that he does not remember if the respondents were ever under
his employ as drivers of his passenger jeepneys. Certain, however, is the fact that neither the
respondents nor other drivers who worked for him were ever dismissed by him. As a matter of
fact, some of his former drivers just stopped reporting for work, either because they found some
other employment or drove for other operators, and like the respondents, the next time he heard
from them was when they started fabricating unfounded complaints against him; He made sure
that none of the jeepneys would stay idle even for a day so he could collect his earnings; hence, it
had been his practice to establish a pool of drivers. Had respondents manifested their desire to
drive his units, it would have been immaterial whether they were his former drivers or not. As
long as they obtained the necessary licenses and references, they would have been
accommodated and placed on schedule; While he was penalized or made to pay a certain amount
in connection with similar complaints by other drivers in a previous case before this, it was not
because his culpability was established, but due to technicalities involving oversight and
negligence on his part by not participating in any stage of the investigation thereof; and
Respondents claim that certain amounts, as enumerated in the complaint, were deducted from
their days earnings is preposterous.
The Labor arbiter decided in favor of the respondents averring that their dismissal was illegal
and ordered the petitioner to pay for backwages and separation pay. Incidentally, petitioner
passed away. A copy of the above decision was delivered personally to petitioners house.
According to respondents, petitioners surviving spouse, Flordeliza Gabriel, and their daughter,
after reading the contents of the decision and after they had spoken to their counsel, refused to
receive the same. Nevertheless, Bailiff Alfredo V. Estonactoc left a copy of the decision with
petitioners wife and her daughter but they both refused to sign and acknowledge receipt of the
decision.
The labor arbiters decision was subsequently served by registered mail at petitioners residence
and the same was received on May 28, 1997. Counsel for petitioner filed an entry of appearance
with motion to dismiss the case for the reason that petitioner passed away. On June 5, 1997,
petitioner appealed the labor arbiters decision to the National Labor Relations Commission. The
NLRC reversed ha assiled decision for lack of employee-employer relationship.
ISSUE: Whether the appeal was filed on time.
RULING: YES. The Court considers the service of copy of the decision of the labor arbiter to
have been validly made on May 28, 1997 when it was received through registered mail. As

correctly pointed out by petitioners wife, service of a copy of the decision could not have been
validly effected on April 18, 1997 because petitioner passed away on April 4, 1997.
Section 4, Rule III of the New Rules of Procedure of the NLRC provides:
SEC. 4. Service of Notices and Resolutions. (a) Notices or summons and copies of
orders, resolutions or decisions shall be served on the parties to the case personally by the
bailiff or authorized public officer within three (3) days from receipt thereof or by
registered mail; Provided, That where a party is represented by counsel or authorized
representative, service shall be made on such counsel or authorized representative;
Provided further, That in cases of decision and final awards, copies thereof shall be served
on both parties and their counsel .
For the purpose of computing the period of appeal, the same shall be counted from receipt of
such decisions, awards or orders by the counsel of record.
(b) The bailiff or officer personally serving the notice, order, resolution or decision shall
submit his return within two (2) days from date of service thereof, stating legibly in his return,
his name, the names of the persons served and the date of receipt which return shall be
immediately attached and shall form part of the records of the case. If no service was effected,
the serving officer shall state the reason therefore in the return.
Section 6, Rule 13 of the Rules of Court which is suppletory to the NLRC Rules of Procedure
states that: "[s]ervice of the papers may be made by delivering personally a copy to the party or
his counsel, or by leaving it in his office with his clerk or with a person having charge thereof. If
no person is found in his office, or his office is not known, or he has no office, then by leaving
the copy, between the hours of eight in the morning and six in the evening, at the partys or
counsels residence, if known, with a person of sufficient age and discretion then residing
therein."
The foregoing provisions contemplate a situation wherein the party to the action is alive upon the
delivery of a copy of the tribunals decision. In the present case, however, petitioner died before
a copy of the labor arbiters decision was served upon him. Hence, the above provisions do not
apply. As aptly stated by the NLRC:
In the case at bar, respondent Melencio Gabriel was not represented by counsel during the
pendency of the case. A decision was rendered by the Labor Arbiter a quo on March 17, 1997
while Mr. Gabriel passed away on April 4, 1997, without having received a copy thereof during
his lifetime. The decision was only served on April 18, 1997 when he was no longer around to
receive the same. His surviving spouse and daughter cannot automatically substitute themselves
as party respondents. Thus, when the bailiff tendered a copy of the decision to them, they were
not in a position to receive them. The requirement of leaving a copy at the partys residence is
not applicable in the instant case because this presupposes that the party is still living and is not
just available to receive the decision.

The preceding considered, the decision of the Labor Arbiter has not become final because there
was no proper service of copy thereof to party respondent. Thus, the appeal filed on behalf of
petitioner on June 5, 1997 after receipt of a copy of the decision via registered mail on May 28,
1997 was within the ten-day reglementary period prescribed under Section 223 of the Labor
Code.
G.R. No. 102007 September 2, 1994
PEOPLE OF THE PHILIPPINESvs.
ROGELIO BAYOTAS y CORDOVA
ROMERO, J.:
FACTS: Rogelio Bayotas y Cordova was charged with Rape and was subsequently convicted.
Pending appeal of his conviction he died at the NationalBilibid Hospital due to cardio
respiratory arrest . The Supreme Court in its Resolution of May 20, 1992 dismissed the criminal
aspect of the appeal. However, it required the Solicitor General to file its comment with regard to
Bayotas civil liability arising from his commission of the offense charged.
The Solicitor General, relying on the case of People v. Sendaydiego insists that the appeal
should still be resolved for the purpose of reviewing his conviction by the lower court on which
the civil liability is based. Counsel for the accused-appellant, on the other hand, opposed the
view of the Solicitor General arguing that the death of the accused while judgment of conviction
is pending appeal extinguishes both his criminal and civil penalties. In support of his position,
said counsel invoked the ruling of the Court of Appeals in People v. Castillo and Ocfemia which
held that the civil obligation in a criminal case takes root in the criminal liability and, therefore,
civil liability is extinguished if accused should die before final judgment is rendered.
It is, thus, evident that as jurisprudence evolved from the rule established was that the survival
of the civil liability depends on whether the same can be predicated on sources of obligations
other than delict. Stated differently, the claim for civil liability is also extinguished together with
the criminal action if it were solely based thereon, i.e., civil liability ex delicto.
However, the Supreme Court in People v. Sendaydiego, et al.10 departed from this longestablished principle of law. In this case:
accusedSendaydiego was charged with and convicted by the lower court of malversation
thru falsification of public documents. Sendaydiegos death supervened during the
pendency of the appeal of his [Link] court in an unprecedented move resolved to
dismiss Sendaydiegos appeal but only to the extent of his criminal liability. His civil
liability was allowed to survive although it was clear that such claim thereon was
exclusively dependent on the criminal action already extinguished.
The legal import of such decision was for the court to continue exercising appellate jurisdiction
over the entire appeal, passing upon the correctness of Sendaydiegos conviction despite
dismissal of the criminal action, for the purpose of determining if he is civilly liable. In doing so,
this Court issued a Resolution of July 8, 1977 stating thus:

The claim of complainant Province of Pangasinan for the civil liability survived
Sendaydiego because his death occurred after final judgment was rendered by the Court
of First Instance of Pangasinan, which convicted him of three complex crimes of
malversation through falsification and ordered him to indemnify the Province in the total
sum of P61,048.23 (should be P57,048.23).
The civil action for the civil liability is deemed impliedly instituted with the criminal
action in the absence of express waiver or its reservation in a separate action (Sec. 1,
Rule 111 of the Rules of Court)
RULING: Whether the civil case arising from ex delicto is extinguished together with the
criminal case upon the death of the accused
RULING: When the action is for the recovery of money and the defendant dies before final
judgment in the court of First Instance, it shall be dismissed to be prosecuted in the manner
especially provided in Rule 87 of the Rules of Court The implication is that, if the defendant
dies after a money judgment had been rendered against him by the Court of First Instance, the
action survives him. It may be continued on appeal.
Moreover, the civil action impliedly instituted in a criminal proceeding for recovery of civil
liability ex delicto can hardly be categorized as an ordinary money claim such as that referred to
in Sec. 21, Rule 3 enforceable before the estate of the deceased accused. Ordinary money claims
referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 must be viewed in light of the provisions of Section 5, Rule 86
involving claims against the estate, which in the case of Sendaydiego was held liable for
Sendaydiegos civil liability. What are contemplated in Section 21 of Rule 3, in relation to
Section 5 of Rule 86,14 are contractual money claims while the claims involved in civil liability
ex delicto may include even the restitution of personal or real property.
Section 5, Rule 86 provides an exclusive enumeration of what claims may be filed against the
estate. These are: funeral expenses, expenses for the last illness, judgments for money and claim
arising from contracts, expressed or implied. It is clear that money claims arising from delict do
not form part of this exclusive enumeration. Hence, there could be no legal basis in (1) treating a
civil action ex delicto as an ordinary contractual money claim referred to in Section 21, Rule 3 of
the Rules of Court and (2) allowing it to survive by filing a claim therefor before the estate of the
deceased accused. Rather, it should be extinguished upon extinction of the criminal action
engendered by the death of the accused pending finality of his conviction.
Accordingly, the court rules: if the private offended party, upon extinction of the civil liability ex
delicto desires to recover damages from the same act or omission complained of, he must subject
to Section 1, Rule 11116 (1985 Rules on Criminal Procedure as (amended) file a separate civil
action, this time predicated not on the felony previously charged but on other sources of
obligation. The source of obligation upon which the separate civil action is premised determines
against whom the same shall be enforced.
If the same act or omission complained of also arises from quasi-delict or may, by provision of
law, result in an injury to person or property (real or personal), the separate civil action must be

filed against the executor or administrator17 of the estate of the accused pursuant to Sec. 1, Rule
87 of the Rules of Court:
SECTION 1. Actions which may and which may not be brought against executor or
[Link] action upon a claim for the recovery of money or debt or interest
thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; but actions to recover
real or personal property, or an interest therein, from the estate, or to enforce a lien
thereon, and actions to recover damages for an injury to person or property, real or
personal, may be commenced against him.

G.R. No. L-33006 December 8, 1982

NICANOR NACARvs.
CLAUDIO A. NISTAL
GUTIERREZ, JR., J.:
FACTS: Respondent Ildefonso Japitana filed the complaint entitled Claim against the
estate of the late IsabeloNacar with Preliminary Attachment to recover an outstanding
debt of the late IsabeloNacar. He further alleged that NicanorNacar is about to remove
and dispose the property (seven carabaos) in his possession, with intent to defraud him.
Considering that Mr. Japitana had given security according to the Rules of Court, Judge
Nistal issued the order commanding the provincial sheriff to attach the 7 cattles. Claiming
ownership of the attached carabaos, Antonio Doloricon filed a complaint in intervention.
NicanorNacar filed a motion to dismiss, to dissolve the writ of preliminary attachment, and to
order the return of the carabaos but it was denied by the court. Hence, NicanorNacar filed this
instant petition for certiorari, prohibition, and mandamus with preliminary injunction to annul the
order of Judge Nistal.
In a resolution, the Supreme Court, upon the posting of a bond in the amount of P1,000.00,
directed the issuance of a preliminary mandatory injunction. The respondents were enjoined from
further enforcing the writ of attachment and to return the seized carabaos. Judge Nistal was
restrained from further proceeding with Civil Case No. 65.
ISSUE: Whether the suit to recover the claim of private respondents may be filed against
NicanorNacar, having the possession of the properties.
RULING: The filing of an ordinary action to recover money claim against the administrator is
not allowed in any court. Even if settlement proceedings had been taken to settle the estate of
IsabeloNacar, the suit to recover the claim of the private respondents may not be filed against the
administrator or executor of his estate. This is expressly provided for in Section 1 of Rule 87 of
the Rules of Court, as follows: "No action upon claim for the recovery of money or debt or
interest thereon shall be commenced against the executor or administrator; . . . ." The claim of
private respondents, being one arising from a contract, may be pursued only by filing the same in
the administration proceedings that may be taken to settle the estate of the deceased

IsabeloNacar. If such a proceeding is instituted and the subject claim is not filed therein within
the period prescribed, the same shall be deemed "barred forever." (Sec. 5, Rule 86, Rules of
Court). Even if this action were commenced during the lifetime of IsabeloNacar, the same shall
have to be dismissed, and the claim prosecuted in the proper administration proceedings (Sec.
21,
Rule
3,
Ibid.).
It was error for the respondent court not to dismiss the case simply because respondent
Doloricon filed the complaint for intervention alleging that he owned the carabaos.
Moreover, even assuming that respondent Japitana had a legal right to the carabaos which were
in the possession of petitioner Nacar, the proper procedure would not be to file an action for the
recovery of the outstanding debts of the late IsabeloNacar against his stepfather, the petitioner
Nacar as defendant. As we said in Maspil v. Romero (61 SCRA 197):
"Appropriate actions for the enforcement or defense of rights must be taken in accordance with
procedural rules and cannot be left to the whims or caprices of litigants. It cannot even be left to
the untrammeled discretion of the courts of justice without sacrificing uniformity and equality in
the application and effectivity thereof."
Considering the foregoing, the respondent courts denial of the motion to dismiss the complaint
and its issuance of a writ of attachment based on the allegations of the complaint are improper.
With this conclusion, we find no need to discuss the other issue on whether or not the procedural
rules on the issuance of a writ of attachment were followed by the respondent court in issuing the
subject
writ
of
attachment.
The petition is granted. The preliminary mandatory injunction issued is made permanent and the
cash bond filed by the petitioner in connection therewith is ordered returned to him.
G.R. No. 147561
June 22, 2006
STRONGHOLD INSURANCE COMPANY, [Link].
REPUBLIC-ASAHI GLASS CORPORATION
PANGANIBAN, CJ:
FACTS: Respondent Republic-Asahi Glass Corporation (Republic-Asahi) entered into a contract
with JDS Construction (JDS), for the construction of roadways and a drainage system in
Republic-Asahi's compound which was supposed to be completed within a period of 240 days.
JDS executed, jointly and severally with petitioner Stronghold Insurance Co., Inc. (SICI)
Performance Bond in order to guarantee the faithful and satisfactory performance of its
undertakings to Republic Asahi.

Republic-Asahi paid to JDS P795,000.00 by way of downpayment. Thereafter, two progress

billings were submitted by JDS to Republic-Asahi, which the latter paid. According to RepublicAsahi, these two progress billings accounted for only 7.301% of the work supposed to be
undertaken by JDS under the terms of the contract.

Several times Republic-Asahi engineers called the attention of JDS to the alleged alarmingly
slow pace of the construction, however said reminders went unheeded by JDS. Hence,
dissatisfied with the progress of their work, Republic-Asahi informed JDS that they
extrajudicially rescinded the contract, but shall not be construed as a waiver of Republic-Asahi
right to recover damages and the latter's sureties according to Article XV of the contract. As a
result of the rescission of the contract, Republic Asahi had to hire another contractor to finish the
project, for which it incurred an additional expenses.

Republic-Asahi sent a letters to petitioner SICI demanding its claim for payment against the
bond but those were allegedly went unheeded.

Republic-Asahi then filed a complaint against JDS and SICI. It sought from JDS payment
representing the additional expenses they incurred for the completion of the project using another
contractor, and from JDS and SICI, jointly and severally, payment of damages in accordance
with the performance bond, exemplary damages and attorney's fees.

Summons were duly served on defendant-appellee SICI, however, Jose D. Santos, Jr., proprietor
of JDS, died the previous year and JDS Construction was no longer at its address and its
whereabouts were unknown.

SICI then filed its answer, alleging that the Republic-Asahi money claims against petitioner and
JDS have been extinguished by the death of Jose D. Santos, Jr.

The lower court dismissed the complaint of Republic-Asahi against JDS and SICI, on the ground
that the claim against JDS did not survive the death of its sole proprietor, Jose D. Santos, Jr.
Hence, Republic-Asahi filed a Motion for Reconsideration seeking reconsideration of the lower
court's order dismissing its complaint.

The lower court issued an Order, reconsidering and reinstating the order of dismissal of the case
against SICI. However, the case against defendant Jose D. Santos, Jr. (deceased) remains
undisturbed.
SICI filed its 'Memorandum for Bondsman/Defendant SICI (Re: Effect of Death of defendant
Jose D. Santos, Jr.)' reiterating its prayer for the dismissal of Republic-Asahis complaint.
The lower court then issued the assailed Order reconsidering its Order dated October 15, 1991,
and ordered the case, insofar as SICI is concerned, dismissed. Republic-Asahi filed its motion for
reconsideration which was opposed by SICI. The lower court denied Republic-Asahis motion
for reconsideration. Hence, case was elevated to CA.

The CA ruled that SICI's obligation under the surety agreement was not extinguished by the
death of Jose D. Santos, Jr. Consequently, Republic-Asahi could still go after SICI for the bond.

The appellate court also found that the lower court had erred in pronouncing that the
performance of the Contract in question had become impossible by respondent's act of
rescission. The Contract was rescinded because of the dissatisfaction of respondent with the slow
pace of work and pursuant to Article XIII of its Contract with JDS.

The CA ruled that performance of the contract was impossible, not because of respondent's fault,
but because of the fault of JDS Construction and Jose D. Santos, Jr. for failure on their part to
make satisfactory progress on the project, which amounted to non-performance of the same
Pursuant to the Surety Contract, SICI is liable for the non-performance of said Contract on the
part of JDS Construction."

ISSUE: Whether petitioner's liability under the performance bond was automatically
extinguished by the death of Santos, the principal.

RULING: Effect of Death on the Surety's Liability

Petitioner contends that the death of Santos, the bond principal, extinguished his liability under
the surety bond. Consequently, it says, it is automatically released from any liability under the
bond.

As a general rule, the death of either the creditor or the debtor does not extinguish the obligation.
Obligations are transmissible to the heirs, except when the transmission is prevented by the law,
the stipulations of the parties, or the nature of the obligation. Only obligations that are
personal or are identified with the persons themselves are extinguished by death.

Section 5 of Rule 86 of the Rules of Court expressly allows the prosecution of money claims
arising from a contract against the estate of a deceased debtor. Evidently, those claims are not
actually extinguished. What is extinguished is only the obligee's action or suit filed before the
court, which is not then acting as a probate court.

In the present case, whatever monetary liabilities or obligations Santos had under his contracts
with respondent were not intransmissible by their nature, by stipulation, or by provision of law.
Hence, his death did not result in the extinguishment of those obligations or liabilities, which
merely passed on to his estate. Death is not a defense that he or his estate can set up to wipe out
the obligations under the performance bond. Consequently, petitioner as surety cannot use his
death to escape its monetary obligation under its performance bond.

The liability of petitioner is contractual in nature, because it executed a performance bond.

As a surety, petitioner is solidarily liable with Santos in accordance with the Civil Code, which
provides as follows:
"Art. 2047. By guaranty a person, called the guarantor, binds himself to the creditor to
fulfill the obligation of the principal debtor in case the latter should fail to do so.

"If a person binds himself solidarily with the principal debtor, the provisions of Section
4, Chapter 3, Title I of this Book shall be observed. In such case the contract is called a
suretyship."

"Art. 1216. The creditor may proceed against any one of the solidary debtors or some or
all of them simultaneously. The demand made against one of them shall not be an
obstacle to those which may subsequently be directed against the others, so long as the
debt has not been fully collected."

Elucidating on these provisions, the Court in Garcia v. Court of Appealsstated thus:

"x xx. The surety's obligation is not an original and direct one for the performance of his
own act, but merely accessory or collateral to the obligation contracted by the principal.
Nevertheless, although the contract of a surety is in essence secondary only to a valid
principal obligation, his liability to the creditor or promisee of the principal is said to be
direct, primary and absolute; in other words, he is directly and equally bound with the
principal. x xx.

Under the law and jurisprudence, respondent may sue, separately or together, the principal debtor
and the petitioner herein, in view of the solidary nature of their liability. The death of the
principal debtor will not work to convert, decrease or nullify the substantive right of the solidary
creditor. Evidently, despite the death of the principal debtor, respondent may still sue petitioner
alone, in accordance with the solidary nature of the latter's liability under the performance bond.

The court denied the petition and the Decision of the Court of Appeals is affirmed.

G.R. No. 189121

July 31, 2013
AMELIA GARCIA-QUIAZONvs.
MA. LOURDES BELEN
PEREZ, J.:
FACTS: Elise Quiazon, the daughter of Eliseo Quiazon and Ma. Lourdes Belen claims that she
is the natural child of Eliseo having been conceived and born at the time when her parents were
both capacitated to marry each other. When Eliseo died intestate, Elise represented by her
mother, Ma. Lourdes, filed a Petition for Letters of Administration before the Regional Trial
Court (RTC) of Las Pias City in order to preserve the estate of Eliseo and to prevent the
dissipation of its value. She likewise sought her appointment as administratrix of her late fathers
estate.

Amelia Quiazon, to whom Eliseo was married, together with her two children Jenneth and Maria
Jennifer, filed an Opposition/Motion to Dismiss on the ground of improper venue asserting that
Eliseo was a resident of Capas, Tarlac and not of Las Pias City. In addition to their claim of
improper venue, the petitioners averred that there are no factual and legal bases for Elise to be
appointed administratix of Eliseos estate.
RTC rendered a decision directing the issuance of Letters of Administration to Elise upon
posting the necessary bond. On appeal, the decision of the trial court was affirmed in toto by the
Court of Appeals. In validating the findings of the RTC, the Court of Appeals held that Elise was
able to prove that Eliseo and Lourdes lived together as husband and wife by establishing a
common residence at No. 26 Everlasting Road, Phase 5, Pilar Village, Las Pias City, from 1975
up to the time of Eliseos death in 1992. For purposes of fixing the venue of the settlement of
Eliseos estate, the Court of Appeals upheld the conclusion reached by the RTC that the decedent
was a resident of Las Pias City. The petitioners Motion for Reconsideration was denied by the
Court of Appeals.
ISSUE: Whether Elise is qualified to be appointed as administrator of the estate of Eliseo.
RULING: There is no doubt that Elise, whose successional rights would be prejudiced by her
fathers marriage to Amelia, may impugn the existence of such marriage even after the death of
her father. Ineluctably, Elise, as a compulsory heir, has a cause of action for the declaration of
the absolute nullity of the void marriage of Eliseo and Amelia, and the death of either party to the
said marriage does not extinguish such cause of action. Consequently, in the absence of any
showing that such marriage had been dissolved at the time Amelia and Eliseos marriage was
solemnized, the inescapable conclusion is that the latter marriage is bigamous and, therefore,
void ab [Link]
Neither are we inclined to lend credence to the petitioners contention that Elise has not shown
any interest in the Petition for Letters of Administration.
Section 6, Rule 78 of the Revised Rules of Court lays down the preferred persons who are
entitled to the issuance of letters of administration, thus:
Sec. 6. When and to whom letters of administration granted. If no executor is named in the
will, or the executor or executors are incompetent, refuse the trust, or fail to give bond, or a
person dies intestate, administration shall be granted:
(a) To the surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or both, in the discretion
of the court, or to such person as such surviving husband or wife, or next of kin, requests to have
appointed, if competent and willing to serve;
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(b) If such surviving husband or wife, as the case may be, or next of kin, or the person selected
by them, be incompetent or unwilling, or if the husband or widow, or next of kin, neglects for
thirty (30) days after the death of the person to apply for administration or to request that
administration be granted to some other person, it may be granted to one or more of the principal
creditors,
if
competent
and
willing
to
serve;chanr0blesvirtualawlibrary

(c) If there is no such creditor competent and willing to serve, it may be granted to such other
person as the court may select.
Upon the other hand, Section 2 of Rule 79 provides that a petition for Letters of Administration
must be filed by an interested person, thus:
Sec. 2. Contents of petition for letters of administration. A petition for letters of administration
must be filed by an interested person and must show, so far as known to the petitioner:

a) The jurisdictional facts;

b) The names, ages, and residences of the heirs, and the names and residences of the
creditors, of the decedent;
c) The probable value and character of the property of the estate;
d) The name of the person for whom letters of administration are prayed.
But no defect in the petition shall render void the issuance of letters of administration.
An interested party, in estate proceedings, is one who would be benefited in the estate, such as
an heir, or one who has a claim against the estate, such as a creditor. Also, in estate proceedings,
the phrase next of kin refers to those whose relationship with the decedent is such that they are
entitled to share in the estate as distributees.
In the instant case, Elise, as a compulsory heir who stands to be benefited by the distribution of
Eliseos estate, is deemed to be an interested party. With the overwhelming evidence on record
produced by Elise to prove her filiation to Eliseo, the petitioners pounding on her lack of interest
in the administration of the decedents estate, is just a desperate attempt to sway this Court to
reverse the findings of the Court of Appeals. Certainly, the right of Elise to be
appointed administratix of the estate of Eliseo is on good grounds. It is founded on her right as a
compulsory heir, who, under the law, is entitled to her legitime after the debts of the estate are
satisfied.29 Having a vested right in the distribution of Eliseos estate as one of his natural
children, Elise can rightfully be considered as an interested party within the purview of the law.
The petition was denied for lack of merit. Accordingly, the Court of Appeals assailed Decision
and Resolution, are affirmed in toto.

G.R. No. 153798 September 2, 2005

BELEN SAGAD ANGELESvs.
ALELI "CORAZON" ANGELES MAGLAYA
GARCIA, J.:
FACTS: Francisco Angeles died intestate leaving behind 4 parcels of land and a building, among
other valuable properties. Respondent Corazon claims that as the sole legitimate child of the
deceased and Genoveva Mercado, she has all the qualifications and none of the disqualifications
required of an administrator.

Petitioner claims, as Franciscos second wife and surviving spouse, that she should be made
administratix of Franciscos estate. She claims that respondent could not be the daughter
of Francisco for, although she was recorded as Franciscos legitimate daughter, the
corresponding birth certificate was not signed by him. Further she said that respondent, despite
her claim of being the legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado, she has not
presented the marriage contract between her supposed parents or produced any acceptable
document to prove such union. Belen likewise averred that she and Francisco had, during their
marriage, legally adopted Concesa A. Yamat, et al. Petitioner thus urged that she, being the
surviving spouse of Francisco, be declared as possessed of the superior right to the
administration of his estate.
Corazon in turn alleged that per certification of the appropriate offices, the records of marriages
of the Civil Registrar where the alleged Francisco-Genoveva wedding took place, were
destroyed. She also dismissed the adoption as of little consequence, owing to her having
interposed with the Court of Appeals a petition to nullify the decree of adoption entered by the
RTC. Respondent testified having been in open and continuous possession of the status of a
legitimate child. Respondent also offered in evidence her birth certificate which contained an
entry stating that she was born wherein the handwritten word "Yes" appears on the space below
the question "Legitimate?; and a copy of her marriage contract. Likewise offered were her
scholastic and government service records.
After respondent rested her case following her formal offer of exhibits, petitioner filed a "Motion
to Dismiss" under Section 1(g), Rule 16 of the Rules of Court. In it, she prayed for the dismissal
of the petition for letters of administration on the ground that the petition failed "to state or prove
a cause of action", it being her stated position that Corazon, by her evidence, failed to establish
her filiation vis - -vis the decedent, i.e., that she is in fact a legitimate child of Francisco M.
Angeles."
The trial court dismissed the petition on its finding that respondent failed to prove her filiation as
legitimate child of Francisco. Hence, respondent went on appeal to the Court of Appeals (CA).
CA reversed and set aside the trial courts order of dismissal and directed it to appoint Corazon
as administratrix of the estate of Francisco.
ISSUE: Whether the respondent is the legitimate child of decedent Francisco M. Angeles
therefore be appointed as administratrix of his estate.
RULING: The Court of Appeals erred in giving respondent presumptive legitimacy. A legitimate
child is a product of, and, therefore, implies a valid and lawful marriage (FC Art 146). However,
the presumption of legitimacy under Art 164 may be availed only upon convincing proof of the
factual basis therefor , i.e., that the childs parents were legally married and that his/her
conception or birth occurred during the subsistence of that marriage. Respondent failed to
present evidence of Franciscos marriage to Genoveva, thus she cannot be presumed legitimate.
Further, the Birth Certificate presented was not signed by Francisco against whom legitimate

filiation is asserted. Not even by Genoveva. It was only signed by the attending physician
making it only proof of the fact of the birth of a child.
The legitimate filiation of a child is a matter fixed by law itself, it cannot be made dependent on
the declaration of the attending physician or midwife, or that of the mother of the newborn child.
None of the evidence respondent presented is enough to prove filiation or recognition. Further,
RTC Caloocan in the case respondent filed to nullify the adoption of Francisco and Belen of their
child, said that respondent is NOT a legitimate child of Francisco and Genoveva; following the
rule on conclusiveness of judgment, herein respondent is precluded from claiming that she is the
legitimate daughter of Francisco and Genoveva Mercado. In fine, the issue of herein
respondents legitimate filiation to Francisco and the latters marriage to Genoveva, having been
judicially determined in a final judgment by a court of competent jurisdiction, has thereby
become res judicata and may not again be resurrected or litigated between herein petitioner and
respondent or their privies in a subsequent action, regardless of the form of the latter.
Finally, it should be noted that on the matter of appointment of administrator of the estate of the
deceased, the surviving spouse is preferred over the next of kin of the decedent. When the law
speaks of "next of kin", the reference is to those who are entitled, under the statute of distribution,
to the decedent's property; one whose relationship is such that he is entitled to share in the estate
as distributed, or, in short, an heir. In resolving, therefore, the issue of whether an applicant for
letters of administration is a next of kin or an heir of the decedent, the probate court perforce has
to determine and pass upon the issue of filiation. A separate action will only result in a
multiplicity of suits. Upon this consideration, the trial court acted within bounds when it looked
into and pass upon the claimed relationship of respondent to the late Francisco Angeles.