IS THERE A GOD?

(1952)

Bertrand Russell

Bertrand Russell (18721970) studied mathematics at Trinity College, Cambridge, and

later took up a fellowship there. He began writing in the 1890s, and his Principles of

Mathematics (1903) is a landmark work on the philosophy of mathematics. The brief

paper On Denoting (1905) created a revolution in philosophy, especially in the
realms of epistemology and the philosophy of language; it was followed by such
works as Our Knowledge of the External World (1914), An Inquiry into Meaning

and Truth (1940), and Human Knowledge: Its Scope and Limits (1948). Russell
eventually came to believe that scientific knowledge must be the basis both of
philosophical inquiry and of human conduct. A prolific writer, Russell also
espoused numerous social and political causes: in his long life he protested both
World War I and the Vietnam War. He frequently criticized orthodox religion, and
thereby became embroiled in a celebrated controversy in 1940 when his
appointment as a visiting lecturer at City College, New York, was withdrawn as a
result of protests from Catholics who believed Russell to be an atheist and
proponent of free love (a view arrived at by misreadings of such works as Marriage

and Morals, 1929).* Ten years later he was awarded the Nobel Prize for literature.
Some of Russells writings on religion can be found in Skeptical Essays (1928),

Unpopular Essays (1950), and Why I Am Not a Christian (1957). In the following
essaycommissioned by Illustrated, a London magazine, in 1952 but not published
thereRussell refutes many of the standard arguments for the existence of God.

* A lawsuit was brought against him in 1940, which sought to apply a law ( ignored at
university level) that required all school teachers in the state of New York to be graduates of
a normal school (have a degree from a state pedagogy school). The judge applied this law
to bar Russell from teaching at NYU (New York State University). The unargued issues
where his proposal for trial marriages and his public atheism--JK

From Bertrand Russell, "Is There a God?" (1952), in The Collected Papers of
Bertrand
Russell, Volume 11: Last Philosophical Testament, 194368, ed. John C. Slater and Peter
Kollner (London: Routledge, 1997), pp. 543-48. Copyright C 1997 by Routledge.
Reprinted by permission of Taylor & Francis Books Ltd. and the Bertrand Russell
Peace Foundation.

QUESTION weither there is a God is one which is decided on very different grounds by different
communities and different individuals. The immense majority of mankind accept the prevailing
opinion of their own community In the earliest times of which we have definite history everybody
believed in many gods. It was the Jews who first believed in only one. The first commandment,
when it was new, was very difficult to obey because the Jews had believed that Baal and
Ashtaroth and Dagon and Moloch and the rest were real gods but were wicked because they
helped the enemies of the Jews. The step from a belief that these gods were wicked to the belief
that they did not exist was a difficult one. There was a time, namely that of Antiochus IV, when a
vigorous attempt was made to Hellenize the Jews. Antiochus decreed that they should eat pork
abandon circumcision, and take baths. Most of the Jews in Jerusalem submitted, but in country
places resistance was more stubborn and under the leadership of the Maccabees the Jews at last
established their right to their peculiar tenets and customs Monothiesm, which at the beginning of
the Antiochan persecution had been the creed of only part of one very small nation, was adopted
by Christianity and later by Islam, and so became dominant throughout the whole of the world
west of India. From India eastward, it had no success: Hinduism had many gods; Buddhism in its
primitive form had none; and Confucianism had none from the eleventh century onward. But, if
the truth of a religion is to be judged by its worldly success, the argument in favor of monotheism
is a very strong one, since it possessed the largest armies, the largest navies, and the greatest
accumulation of wealth. In our own day this argument is growing less decisive.[i] It is true that the
un-Christian menace of Japan was defeated. But the Christian is now faced with the menace of
atheistic Muscovite hordes, and it is not so certain as one could wish that atomic bombs will
provide a conclusive argument on the side of theism.
But let us abandon this political and geographical way of considering religions, which has been
increasingly rejected by thinking people ever since the time of the ancient Greeks. Ever since that
time there have been men who were not content to accept passively the religious opinions of their

neighbors, but endeavoured to consider what reason and philosophy might have to say about the
matter. In the commercial cities of lonia, where philosophy was invented, there were free-thinkers
in the sixth century B.C. Compared to modem free-thinkers they had an easy task, because the
Olympian gods, however charming to poetic fancy were hardly such as could be defended by the
metaphysical use of the unaided reason. They were met popularly by Orphism (to which
Christianity owes much) and, philosophically, by Plato, from whom the Greeks derived a
philosophical monotheism[ii] very different from the political and nationalistic monotheism of the
Jews. When the Greek world became converted to Christianity it combined the new creed with
Platonic metaphysics and so gave birth to theology. Catholic theologians, from the time of Saint
Augustine to the present day, have believed that the existence of one God could be proved by the
unaided reason. Their arguments were put into final form by Saint Thomas Aquinas in the
thirteenth century. When modem philosophy began in the seventeenth century, Descartes and
Leibnitz took over the old arguments, somewhat polished them up, and thus owing largely to their
efforts, piety, it remained intellectually respectable. But Locke, although himself a completely
convinced Christian, undermined the theoretical basis of the old arguments, and many of his
followers, especially in France, became Atheists. I will not attempt to set forth in all their subtlety
the philosophical arguments for the existence of God. There is, I think, only one of them which
still has weight with philosophers, that is the argument of the First Cause. This argument
maintains that, since everything that happens has a cause, there must be a First Cause from
which the whole series starts. The argument suffers, however, from the same defect as that of the
elephant and the tortoise. It is said (I do not know with what truth) that a certain Hindu thinker
believed the earth to rest upon an elephant. When asked what the elephant rested upon, he
replied that it rested upon a tortoise. When asked what the tortoise rested upon, he said, I am
tired of this. Suppose we change the subject. This illustrates the unsatisfactory character of the
First-Cause argument. Nevertheless, you will find it in some ultra-modem treatises on physics,
which contend that physical processes, traced backward in time, show that there must have been
a sudden beginning and infer that this was due to divine Creation. They carefully abstain from
attempts to show how this hypothesis makes matters more intelligible. The scholastic arguments
for the existence of a Supreme Being are now rejected by most Protestant theologians in favor of
new arguments which to my mind are by no means an improvement. The scholastic arguments
were genuine efforts of thought and, if their reasoning had been sound, they would have
demonstrated the truth of their conclusion. The new arguments, which Modernists prefer, are
vague; and the Modernists reject with contempt every effort to make them precise. There is an
appeal to the heart as opposed to the intellect. It is not maintained that those who reject the new
arguments are illogical, but that they are destitute of deep feeling or of moral sense. Let us nevertheless examine the modern arguments and see whether there is anything that they really prove.

One of the favourite arguments is from evolution. The world was once lifeless, and when life
began it was a poor sort of life consisting of green slime and other uninteresting things. Gradually
by the course of evolution, it developed into animals and plants and at last into MAN. Man, so the
theologians assure us, is so splendid a Being that he may well be regarded as the culmination to
which the long ages of nebula and slime were a prelude. I think the theologians must have been
fortunate in their human contacts. They do not seem to me to have given due weight to Hitler or
the Beast of Belsen.[iii] If Omnipotence, with all time at its disposal, thought it worth while to lead
up to these men through the many millions of years of evolution, I can only say that the moral and
aesthetic taste involved is peculiar. However, the theologians no doubt hope that the future
course of evolution will produce more men like themselves and fewer men like Hitler. Let us hope
so. But, in cherishing this hope, we are abandoning the ground of experience and taking refuge in
an optimism which history so far does not support.
There are other objections to this evolutionary optimism. There is every reason to believe that life
on our planet will not continue forever so that any optimism based upon the course of terrestrial
history must be temporary and limited in its purview. There may, of course, be life elsewhere but,
if there is, we know nothing about it and have no reason to suppose that it bears more
resemblance to the virtuous theologians than to Hitler. The earth is a very tiny corner of the
universe. It is a little fragment of the solar system. The solar system is a little fragment of the
Milky Way. And the Milky Way is a little fragment of the many millions of galaxies revealed by
modern telescopes. In this little insignificant corner of the cosmos there is a brief interlude
between two long lifeless
epochs. In this brief interlude, there is a much briefer one containing man. If really man is the
purpose of the universe, the preface seems a little long. One is reminded of some prosy old
gentleman who tells an interminable anecdote all quite uninteresting until the rather small point in
which it ends. I do not think theologians show a suitable piety in making such a comparison
possible.
It has been one of the defects of theologians at all times to over-estimate the importance of our
planet. No doubt this was natural enough in the days before Copernicus when it was thought that
the heavens revolve about the earth. But since Copernicus and still more since the modern
exploration of distant regions, this pre-occupation with the earth has become rather parochial. If
the universe had a Creator, it is hardly reasonable to suppose that He was specially interested in
our little corner. And, if He was not, His values must have been different from ours, since in the
immense majority of regions life is impossible.

There is a moralistic argument for belief in God, which was popularized by William James.[iv]
According to this argument, we ought to believe in God because, if we do not, we shall not
behave well. The first and greatest objection to this argument is that at its best, it cannot prove
that there is a God but only that politicians and educators ought to try to make people think there
is one. Whether this ought to be done or not is not a theological question but a political one. The
arguments are of the same sort as those which urge that children should be taught respect for the
flag. A man with any genuine religious feeling will not be content with the view that the belief in
God is useful, because he will wish to know whether, in fact, there is a God. It is absurd to
contend that the two questions are the same. In the nursery, belief in Father Christmas is useful,
but grown-up people do not think that this proves Father Christmas to be real.
Since we are not concerned with politics, we might consider this sufficient refutation of the
moralistic argument, but it is perhaps worthwhile to pursue this a little further. It is, in the first
place, very doubtful whether belief in God has all the beneficial moral effects that are attributed to
it. Many of the best men known to history have been unbelievers. John Stuart Mill may serve as
an instance. And many of the worst men known to history have been believers. Of this there are
innumerable instances. Perhaps Henry VIII may serve as typical. However that may be, it is
always disastrous when governments set to work to uphold opinions for their utility rather than for
their truth. As soon as this is done it becomes necessary to have a censorship to suppress
adverse arguments, and it is thought wise to discourage thinking among the young for fear of
encouraging dangerous thoughts. When such malpractices are employed against religion as they
are in Soviet Russia, the theologians can see that they are bad, but they are still bad when
employed in defense of what the theologians think good. Freedom of thought and the habit of
giving weight to evidence are matters of far greater moral import than the belief in this or that
theological dogma. On all these grounds it cannot be maintained that theological beliefs should
be upheld for their usefulness without regard to their truth.
There is a simpler and more naive form of the same argument, which appeals to many
individuals. People will tell us that without the consolations of religion they would be intolerably
unhappy. So far as this is true, it is a cowards argument. Nobody but a coward would consciously
choose to live in a fools paradise. When a man suspects his wife of infidelity, he is not thought the
better of for shutting his eyes to the evidence. And I cannot see why ignoring evidence should be
contemptible in one case and admirable in the other. Apart from this argument the importance of
religion in contributing to individual happiness is very much exaggerated. Whether you are happy
or unhappy depends upon a number of factors. Most people need good health and enough to eat.
They need the good opinion of their social milieu and the affection of their intimates. They need
not only physical health but mental health. Given all these things, most people will be happy
whatever their theology. Without them, most people will be unhappy, whatever their theology. In

thinking over the people I have known, I do not find that on the average those who had religious
beliefs were happier than those who had not.
When I come to my own beliefs, I find myself quite unable to discern any purpose in the universe,
and still more unable to wish to discern one. Those who imagine that the course of cosmic
evolution is slowly leading up to some consummation pleasing to the Creator, are logically
committed (though they usually fail to realize this) to the view that the Creator is not omnipotent
or, if He were omnipotent, He could decree the end without troubling about means. I do not
myself perceive any consummation toward which the universe is tending. According to the
physicists, energy will be gradually more evenly distributed and as it becomes more evenly
distributed it will become more useless. Gradually everything that we find interesting or pleasant,
such as life and light, will disappearso, at least, they assure us. The cosmos is like a theatre in
which just once a play is performed, but, after the curtain falls, the theatre is left cold and empty
until it sinks in ruins. I do not mean to assert with any positiveness that this is the case. That
would be to assume more knowledge than we possess. I say only that it is what is probable on
present evidence. I will not assert dogmatically that there is no cosmic purpose, but I will say that
there is no shred of evidence in favor of there being one.
I will say further that, if there be a purpose and if this purpose is that of an Omnipotent Creator,
then that Creator, so far from being loving and kind, as we are told, must be of a degree of
wickedness scarcely conceivable. A man who commits a murder is considered to be a bad man.
An Omnipotent Deity, if there be one, murders everybody [emphasis inserted by JK]. A man who
willingly afflicted another with cancer would be considered a fiend. But the Creator, if He exists,
afflicts many thousands every year with this dreadful disease. A man who, having the knowledge
and power required to make his children good, chose instead to make them bad, would be
viewed with execration. But God, if He exists, makes this choice in the case of very many of His
children. The whole conception of an omnipotent God whom it is impious to criticize, could only
have arisen under oriental despotisms where sovereigns, in spite of capricious cruelties,
continued to enjoy the adulation of their slaves. It is the psychology appropriate to this outmoded
political system which belatedly survives in orthodox theology.
There is, it is true, a Modernist form of theism, according to which God is not omnipotent, but is
doing His best, in spite of great difficulties. This view, although it is new among Christians, is not
new in the history of thought. It is, in fact, to be found in Plato. I do not think this view can be
proved to be false. I think all that can be said is that there is no positive reason in its favour. Many
orthodox people speak as though it were the business of sceptics to disprove received dogmas
rather than of dogmatists to prove them. This is, of course, a mistake. If I were to suggest that
between the Earth and Mars there is a china teapot revolving about the sun in an elliptical orbit,

nobody would be able to disprove my assertion provided I were careful to add that the teapot is
too small to be revealed even by our most powerful telescopes. But if I were to go on to say that,
since my assertion cannot be disproved, it is intolerable presumption on the part of human reason
to doubt it, I should rightly be thought to be talking nonsense. If, however, the existence of such a
teapot were affirmed in ancient books, taught as the sacred truth every Sunday, and instilled into
the minds of children at school, hesitation to believe in its existence would become a mark of
eccentricity and entitle the doubter to the attentions of the psychiatrist in an enlightened age or of
the Inquisitor in an earlier time. It is customary to suppose that, if a belief is widespread, there
must be something reasonable about it. I do not think this view can be held by anyone who has
studied history. Practically all the beliefs of savages are absurd. In early civilizations there may
be as much as one percent for which there is something to be said. In our own day (but at this
point I must be careful), we all know that there are absurd beliefs in Soviet Russia. If we are
Protestants, we know that there are absurd beliefs among Catholics. If we are Catholics, we know
that there are absurd beliefs among Protestants. If we are Conservatives, we are amazed by the
superstitions to be found in the Labour Party. If we are Socialists, we are aghast at the credulity of
Conservatives. I do not know, dear reader, what your beliefs may be, but whatever they may be,
you must concede that nine-tenths of the beliefs of nine-tenths of mankind are totally irrational.
The beliefs in question are, of course, those which you do not hold. I cannot, therefore, think it
presumptuous to doubt something which has long been held to be true, especially when this
opinion has only prevailed in certain geographical regions, as is the case with all theological
opinions.
My conclusion is that there is no reason to believe any of the dogmas of traditional theology and,
further, that there is no reason to wish that they were true. Man, in so far as he is not subject to
natural forces, is free to work out his own destiny. The responsibility is his, and so is the
opportunity.

[i] It is told that Genghis Khan made the opposite argument to an emissary of the Popes. When
the priest proposed conversion, the Khan replied that his gods had brought him success and that
he did not wish to offend them.--JK
[ii] These two statements of Russell I find objectionable. First, I have no recollection of Plato
denying the gods or of stating that there is but one. Second, if such be the case there are
elsewhere, such as in the Euthythro, references to gods. Thirdly, if there be such a position
somewhere in Platos over 1,500 pages of surviving works, it did not lead to a movement for
monotheism. As to the other proposition, that the Greek polytheism was indefensible by reason,
that is false. The Greeks based on observation proved there faith. There are many historical
accounts of the oracles being fulfilled.--JK.

[iii] The Beast of Belsen refers to Josef Kramer (1907-1945), the notoriously cruel commander of

the Nazi concentration camp at Bergen-Belsen.

William James (18421910), American philosopher, founder of Pragmatism, and author
of The Will to Believe (1897) and The Varieties of Religious Experience (1902). See also A. I.
Ayer on James (pp. 104105).
[iv]