TJFS: Turkish Journal of Fuzzy Systems (eISSN: 13091190)

An Official Journal of Turkish Fuzzy Systems Association

Vol.1, No.1, pp. 55-79, 2010.

From deterministic world view to

uncertainty and fuzzy logic: a critique of
artificial intelligence and classical logic
Ayten Ylmaz Yalner*
University of Sakarya, Faculty of Engineering, Department of Industrial Engineering
54187, Sakarya, Turkey
E-mail: [email protected]
*Corresponding author
Berrin Denizhan
University of Sakarya, Faculty of Engineering, Department of Industrial Engineering
54187, Sakarya, Turkey
E-mail: [email protected]
Harun Takn
University of Sakarya, Faculty of Engineering, Department of Industrial Engineering
54187, Sakarya, Turkey
E-mail: [email protected]
Received: March 3, 2010 - Revised: May 24, 2010 Accepted: June 5, 2010

Abstract
The purpose of this paper is to show paradigm shift about mechanistic and deterministic
world view or thinking that it has been a dominant role over centuries. This view is
based on three columns: First, Aristotelian Logic which it has nearly ruled for twenty
three centuries. Second is Newtonian Mechanics and Cartesian Dualism. Third
Determinism, which has been transformed Uncertainty in the 20th century. The central
theme of this paper is Critique of Classical Logic, Cartesian Dualism and Artificial
Intelligence. Finally we will show that natural thinking and system would be ruled in
the next century: Fuzzy World or Fuzzy Logic.
Keywords: Fuzzy logic, classical logic, Cartesian dualism, artificial intelligence

1. Introduction
This essential idea of this paper is to critise classical logic, mechanistic world or
deterministic world view, Cartesian dualism, machine/artificial intelligence. Our aim is
to prove the profound role of the fuzzy logc. Uncertainity and natural/human
intelligence. The contents of this paper are based on nine sections;

55

[1]
[2]
[3]
[4]
[5]
[6]
[7]
[8]
[9]

Introduction
Aristotelian Logic
Cartesian and Newtonian World View:
Mind-Body Problem and Dualism
Mind Intelligence and Artificial Intelligence
Human Intelligence versus Machine/Artificial Intelligence
Critique of Artificial Intelligence
Gdels Theorem: Incompleteness and Human Reasoning
Logic and Artificial Intelligence: Uncertainty and Fuzzy Logic
Epilogue

2. Aristotelian logic
The analysis of logical form, opposition and conversion are combined in syllogistic,
Aristotles the greatest invention in logic Aristotle may also be credited with the
formulation of several metalogical theses, most notably the Law of Noncontradiction,
the principle of the Excluded Middle, and the Law of Bivalence (King and Shapiro,
1995).
Fernand Schwarz, a French anthropologist and philosopher, in his book, was termed the
Aristotelian logic either/ or logic as metaphysical calamity or disaster (Schwarz,
1997).
After centuries it was understood that the world and human being can not be represent
with yes-no rules, laws and expressions..When we reach to 20th century, a new approach
to physical world takes place: Fuzzy World

2.1. Goodbye to the Aristotelian weltanschauung

In contrast to ineffective attempts in the past by different scholars to criticize or refute
one or the other of the Aristotelian principles in isolation, it successfully terminates the
whole Aristotelian paradigm that has been reigning over scientific reasoning and human
culture for the last 2300 years. In this sense, it represents a unique, unprecedented
example of Thomas Kuhns account of scientific change by paradigm shift. The allembracing paradigm shift caused by fuzzy theory that we are excitedly witnessing is too
far-reaching to allow any of the Aristotelian foundations to survive. It, thus, exercises
an unfuzzy break with a long-standing and deeply entrenched tradition.
At the highest level of generality we presently encounter, to our surprise, a particular
disciplinary matrix which has been nourishing all sciences and theories for the last 2300
years, i.e. the Aristotelian disciplinary matrix, because it contains the two-valued,
classical logic with which researchers reason and defend their work. What is being
eradicated by fuzzy theory is just this universal disciplinary matrix (Zadeh, 2001).

56

L. Zadeh, father of Fuzzy Logic, shows this paradigm shift from bivalent logic to fuzzy
logic is to represent better than Aristotalian (human) reason in fig.1
New Logical Systems by L. A. Zadeh
bivalent
logic

truth is bivalent
every
proposition is
either true or
false with no
intermediate
degree of truth
allowed

multivalent
logic

truth is
multivalent
almost all
concepts
are bivalent

fuzzy
logic

everything is or
is to allowed to
be graduated,
that is, be a
matter of degree
everything is or
is allowed to be
granulated

Figure1. Logical Systems (Zadeh, 2006)

To explain new paradigm shift before we will interpret Cartesian and Newtonian World
View.

3. Cartesian and Newtonian world view

In the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries the medieval worldview, based on
Aristotelian philosophy and Christian theology, changed radically. The notion of an
organic, living, and spiritual universe was replaced by that the world as a machine and
the world became the dominant metaphor of modern era. This radical change was
brought about the new discoveries in physics, astronomy and mathematics known as the
Scientific Revolution and associated with the names of Copernicus, Galileo, Descartes,
Bacon and Newton.
The conceptual framework created by Galileo and Descartes the world as a perfect
machine governed by exact mathematical laws- was completed triumphantly by Isaac
Newton, whose grand synthesis, Newtonian mechanics, was the crowning achievement
of seventeenth-century science (Capra, 1996).
The mathematical forms of these laws were sufficient to prescribe all of classical
mechanics. It was their rigorous minimalism, more than Newtons three principles that
came to characterize the ensuring Newtonianism.
Somewhat surprisingly one rarely finds the minimalist assumptions behind
Newtonianism spelled out in any detail one exception is by Kempis, Depew and Weber
to formulate the Newtonianism common in terms of fundamental postulates. According
to these authors;
1) Newtonian systems are deterministic
2) Newtonian systems are closed
3) Newtonian systems are reversible
4) Newtonian systems are strongly decomposable or atomistic

57

5) Newtonian laws are universal (Ulanowicz, 1999)

Descartes and Newton divide human being as body-mind and this view states dualist
view.
3.1. Dualism
Some philosophical problems, but unfortunately not very many, can receive a scientific
solution. We believe that one of these is the problem of consciousness. The central part
of the problem can be stated quite simply. How exactly are conscious states caused by
brain process and how exactly are they released in the brain? The two key phrases here
are caused by and realized in. In the history of philosophy, this has been the center of
the traditional mind-body problem: how exactly does consciousness relate to the brain
and the rest of the physical world? (Searle, 2007)

3.2. The mind-body problem

The so-called dualist position, as laid out by Rene Descartes in the seventeenth century,
states that there are two separate systems within a human being: a mental thing, the
rescogitians, and a physical thing, the res extansa. Descartes was concerned about how
these two worlds the mental and physical- talk to one another. His ideas have raised
many deep issues, which together are known as the mind-body problem (Pfeifer,
Bonguard, 2007).
Descartes perceived the mind as mankinds heavenly endowment and, in its essence,
distinct from body, the burden of mortality The first thing one can know with
certainty. Descartes argues that man, is a being or substance which is not of all
corporeal, whose nature is solely to think, for Descartes, the human intellect was godly
doubtless received from God. Descartes declared and was defined by precisely
those characteristics which the human being shared with God.
The body, on the other hand, reflected mankinds epistemological fallenness rather
than its divinity, and stands opposed to reason impediments to pure thought, the
bodys senses and passions deceive and disturb the intellect. The body is always a
hindrance to the mind in its thinking (Noble, 1999).
3.3. Critique of Descartes mind-body dualism
Substance dualism in its most radical form is called Cartesian Dualism, after its most
famous modern preperent, Rene Descartes. Descartes held that the mind (or the self-he
took these to be the same) is an immaterial soul, a substance the essence of which is
consciousness. All of the minds properties are conscious mental states, expressions of
this essence. By contrast all of a material substances properties are physical,
expressions of extension, the essence of bodies, mental and physical substances (and
their properties) are thus radically distinct.

58

This is, roughly, the content of Cartesian Dualism but why believes the view is true?
Descartes was impressed by some of the mental-physical differences listed earlier. But
his most powerful argument for dualism, and the one that has historically received the
most attention, proceeds from the more conceivability of ones own disembodied
existence (OConner, Robb, 2003)
Two arguments persuaded Descartes that he could virtually all his normal beliefs. The
first is the argument from dreaming. We believe that we are sitting by the fire with a
piece of paper in my hand. Why? Because my senses tell me so. But could I not be
dreaming? In dreams my senses present me with information of the same kind as I
receive waking. So how do I know that I am not dreaming now?
A similar argument can be mounted for the proposition that I think, which verifies itself
very act of being doubted. Neither I think nor I exist expresses a necessary truth: each
might have been false.
We should say that the truth that I exist is self-evident. Descartes wrote rather that its
manifest to the natural light of reason (Scruton, 2002).
Descartes has been painted as dividing the mental and the material so clearly that bodily
processes make no real contribution to guiding human behavior. Descartes has been
accused of disdain for the body and seeking liberation from the body ad emotions so
as became a purified or disembodied mind (Hatfield, 2007).

4. Definitions of mind and intelligence

We have some definitions related to Mind, Intelligence and AI related to Dualism and
Mechanistic World View.
4.1. Mind
The mind is a process that emerges from neuronal activity within the brain. The brain is
a machine and the mind is a process that occurs in the brain. It is the mind that sharply
distinguishes the human race from all other species. It is the mind that enables humans
to understand and use language, to manufacture an use tools, to tell stories, to compute
with numbers, and reason with rules of logic (Albus, Meystel, 2001).
Mind Mechanism / Philosophy: By mind we mean a system that produces thought,
viewed at a relatively high level of aggregation: say, at or above the level of elementary
process that require 100 milliseconds, or more for their execution. At that level, little or
nothing need be said about the structure or behavior of individual neurons, or even
small assemblages of them. Our units will be larger and more abstract (Simon, 1995).
The Concept of Mind: A Different Approach: To limit the field of mental processes
we must follow the criteria of folk psychology. There are three kinds of mind: human,
animal and mechanical. But the human mind is the paradigm or model of mind
(Martinez-Freire, 2008).

59

Philosophy of Mind: David Braddon-Mitchell and Frank Jackson propose that two
approaches are widely used to introduce the philosophy of mind. One approach is
historical: it is given a sketch of the views of some of the great scholars of the past. The
other approach is the one chosen by book. The reader learns about current views and as
a consequence learns only about the concepts that in use nowadays.
The authors argue that we all have an implicit knowledge of the mind, just like we have
an implicit knowledge of grammar of our mother tongue. In the case of grammar, our
implicit knowledge is revealed by our ability to formulate correct sentences and to
recognize incorrect sentences. Our knowledge about mind is revealed by our ability to
predict our own behavior as well as of other people these predictions are stated in terms
of mental states. Hence our commonly used mental terms are a window in to human
mind (Beudewijnse, 2008).
Another review on Dennetts Book, Writer of Descartes Error about Mind:
Dennett is one of the pioneers, is assuming increasing importance in contemporary
cognitive science. A second and equally important aim of the book is to challenge the
Cartesian, anthropomorphic and realist prejudices of the lay public.
Dennett begins, in his deceptively easy style, with a list of questions prompting the
reader to consider which organisms might or might not process minds (Dickins and
Frankish, 1997).
Physics of the Mind: As a physical theory of the mind possible? What kind of physics
would this be? We proceed assuming that the mind and brain refer to the same physical
system at different level of description. This situation is not new to physics. The world
is amenable to understanding at various levels. Understanding searched by physicists is
specific in certain ways: physics is a search for basic laws, a few universal first
principles describing a wealth of observed phenomena. Many other physics of the
mind and we will attempt to overcome this initial reaction. Some of the reasons for
discomfort are obvious: the mind is perceived as deeply personal, something that no
equation will ever be able to describe, no computer ever be able to simulate. The future
will tell how close a physical theory could come to understand individual minds.
Another reason for skepticism is that the mind the mind is both diverse and
unpredictable, therefore how can it be reduced to few basic laws? Newton nothing
wrong with developing physics of the mind, which he called spiritual substance.
However Newton failed and since then few physicists have dared to approach the
subject. Recently new data, new institutions and new mathematical tools have emerged,
and today we make a new attempt. We seek to identify a few basic principles of the
mind operation formulate these principles mathematically, use them to explain a wealth
of known data, and make predictions that can be tested in the lab (Perlovsky, 2006).

60

4.2. Reflections on intelligence: Practical versus theoretical

We define intelligence as the ability of a system to behave appropriately in an uncertain
environment, where appropriate behavior is that which maximizes the likelihood of
success in achieving the systems goals. (Albus, Meystel, 2001)
The American Heritage Dictionary defines intelligence as the ability to acquire and
apply knowledge (Kugel, 2004).
The goal of creating non-biological intelligence has been with us for a long time, the
nominal 1956 establishment of the field of artificial intelligence by centuries or, under
some definitions, even by millennia. For much of this history it was reasonable to recast
the goal of creating intelligence as that of designing intelligence (Spector, 2006).
There are of course risks involved in trying our discussion as closely to the concept of
Intelligence as is required by our adopted definition of technologies as practical
implementation of intelligence. It is worthy surveying the gourd from which we start
when we begin to ask epistemological questions about the kinds of thinking that
technology involves.
The definitions of intelligence are below:
a) Intelligence comes in Degrees and in a variety of styles
b) Intelligence is not unique to Human Beings
c) Intelligence relates to the capacity for Flexible Response
d) Intelligence varies with Speed of Response
e) Intelligence varies with fineness of Discrimination
f) Intelligence varies with Remoteness of Inference
g) Intelligence varies with synaptic Power
h) Intelligence varies with Effectiveness in Achieving Appropriate Goals
i) Intelligence Relates to Appropriateness of Goals themselves.
Practical Intelligence in action when we watch a rat learn the way through a maze: we
acknowledge theoretical Intelligence when we follow someones elegant mathematical
proof. What do these forms of intelligence have in common, and what are their
differences?
One common feature is that both are purposive. The general purpose of practical
intelligence is to survive or thrive: the general purpose of theoretical intelligence is to
know or understand. Other basic similarities consist in the extent to which both practical
and theoretical intelligence are found in degrees of greater and less (Ferre, 1998).

4.3. Artificial intelligence : as an intelligent machine

Mc Charthy, father of AI defines AI and intelligence like that: AI is the science and
engineering of making intelligent machines, especially intelligent programs. It is related
to similar task of using computers to understand human intelligence, but AI does not
have to confine itself to methods that are biologically observable.

61

And intelligence is the computational part of the ability to achieve goals in the world.
Varying kind and degrees of intelligence occur in people, many animals and some
machines.
The answer of to Isnt there a solid definition of intelligence that doesnt depend on
relating it to human intelligence? is that according to him: The problem is that we
cannot yet characterize in general what kinds of computational procedures we want to
call intelligence. We understand some of the mechanisms of intelligence and not others
(McCarthy, 2007).

4.4. Artificial intelligence: an empirical science

Herbert Simons View on AI: H.A. Simon one of the pioneers of AI and Nobel price
winner defines AI as empirical science.
AI deals with some of the phenomena surrounding computer, hence is a part of
computer science. It is also a part of psychology and cognitive science. It deals, in
particular with phenomena that appear when computers perform tasks that, if performed
by people, would be regarded as requiring intelligence-thinking.
Artificial Intelligence began in 1950s as an inquiry in to the nature of intelligence. It
used computers as a revolutionary tool to simulate, indeed exhibit intelligence, thereby
providing a means for examining it in utmost detail. B.C. means before computers,
the only observable examples of intelligence were the minds of living organisms,
especially human being. Now the family of intelligent systems had been joined by a
new genus, intelligent computer programs (Simon, 1995).
Simons work was motivated by the belief that neither the human mind, human
thinking, and decision making nor human creativity need be mysterious. His life work
was devoted to proving this point. His motto was Wonderful, but not
incomprehensible.
He helped create thinking machines that Simon came to understand human intuition
as subconscious pattern recognition.
Intuition is often described by what it not: intuition is a residual concept. The most
common terms used for intuition reveal intuitions residual nature: gut feeling, educated
hunch, and sixth sense.
Simons view of thinking affected by AI is that thinking is a form of informationprocessing. Both human thinking and information-processing programs perform three
similar operations: they scan data for patterns, they store the patterns in memory and
they apply the patterns to make inferences or extrapolations. AI also led him (human
thinking closely parallel the operations) to conclude that intuition is a subset of
thinking.
Machines who think: Simons machine think in that recognize patterns and apply ifthen in making decisions (Frantz, 2003).

62

It is important to specify what we mean by using the expression artificial intelligence

(AI). There are at least two different views about AI the first one quotes AI to the
science of the artificial, or the science of designing and building computer-based
artifacts performing various human tasks (Pomerol , 1997).
Definition of AI by M. Minsky: Artificial Intelligence is the science of making
machines to things that would require intelligence if done by men.
A visitor to our planet might be puzzled about the role of computers in our technology.
On the one hand, he would read and hear all about wonderful mechanical brains
baffling their creators with prodigious intellectual performance. In he (or it) warned that
these must be restrained, less they overwhelm us by might, persuasion or even by the
revelation of truths too terrible to be borne. On the other hand, our visitor would find
the machines being denounced, on all sides, for their slavish obedience, unimaginative
literal interpretations and in capacity for innovation or initiative, in short, for their
human dullness (Minsky, 1963).
As we known that AI have two approaches of point of capabilities: Strong AI and Weak
AI.
Strong and Weak AI: Can Machines act intelligent: The assertion that machines that
do so actually thinking is called the strong AI hypothesis.
Some philosophers have tried to prove that AI is impossible: that machines cannot
possibly act intelligently some have used their arguments to call-for a-stop to AI
research. (Russell and Norvig, 2003).
Limitation of AI: We know that a computer could have certain capabilities of the
human mind. Naturally, people want to know how far computer systems can go in this
direction. Can a computer be given all mental capabilities, or there are certain
limitations that a computer cannot pass, no matter how it is designed? When Turing
argued for the possibility of the intelligent machines, he did not believe in any such
limitation, and he used a large part of the paper to refute several claims of limitation he
anticipated.
Since then, the debates on the possibility of thinking machines, or the limitations of AI
research, have never stopped.
These debates have been focused on three claims:
An AI system is in principle an axiomatic system.
The problem solving process of an AI system is equivalent to a Turing machine.
An AI system is formal, and only gets meaning according to model theoretic
semantic (Wang 2006).
Contemporary artificial intelligence (AI) can be viewed as assays in the epistemology of
androids, an exploration of the principles underlying the cognitive behavior of any
possible kind of mechanical agents. Occasional hyperpole and flimflam aside, artificial
intelligence is wonderful subject, full of new ideas and possibilities, unfettered by

63

tradition or concern (other than inspirational) for the accidents of human constitution,
but disciplined by the limits of mechanical computation. More than other new sciences,
AI and philosophy have things to say to one to another: any attempt to create and
understand minds must be of philosophical interest. In fact, AI is philosophy, conducted
by novel means (Glymour, et al 2006).
Questions Currently Latent in Artificial Intelligence: Here we have identified two
questions which lie beneath the surface of the pluralistic AI of today.
The first question, to rephrase, ask why we do not have a mathematical theory of the
perception-action cycle. Of course there is work on active perception on sensory-motor
coordinate systems and engineering department robotics is full of mathematics. But the
kind of theory I mean is one that is as universally useful for characterizing cyclic
systems as Shannons information theory is characterizing communication channels.
Implicit in this is the second question. What would we want such a post-Shannon
system to do? What quantity should a perception-action cycle system maximize?
A third question was directed at AI researchers by Penrose and by the hostility and
controversy it caused, you know he had hit a weak spot in AI Penrose wondered if the
fact that physical substrate of the world, of which relativity and quantum mechanics are
our best accounts, might be sufficiently different from the digital substrate of computers
that it would render AI impossible. Is there something in the quantum that is necessary
for mind? (Bell, 1999)
May be we will never manage to build real artificial intelligence. The problem could be
too difficult for human brain over to solve (Bostrom, 2003).
Even in case scientists underline advantages of human over machine, human
intelligence is often approached by them unilaterally (Tikhemirov, 1975).

5. Human intelligence versus machine/artificial intelligence

5.1. Machine-human intelligence
We stand on the threshold of the most profound and transformative event in the history
of humanity, the singularity.
What is the Singularity? From Kurzweil perspective, the singularity is a future period
during which the pace of technological change will be so fast and far-reaching that
human existence on this planet will be irreversibly altered. We will combine our brain
power the knowledge, skills, and personality quirks that makes us human- with our
computer power in order to think, reason, communicate and create. In ways we can
scarcely even contemplate today.
This merger of man and machine, coupled with the sudden explosion in machine
intelligence and rapid innovation in gene research and nano-technology, will result in a

64

world where there is no distinction between biological and mechanical, or between

physical and virtual reality. These technological revolutions will allow us to transcend
our frail bodies with all their limitations (Kurzweil, 2000).

5.2. Definitions of MI (Machine Intelligence)

A fundamental problem in artificial intelligence is that nobody really knows what
intelligence is. The problem is especially acute when we need no consider artificial
systems which are significantly different to humans. Legg and Hutler approach this
problem in the following way: they take a number of well known informal definitions of
human intelligence that have been given by experts and extract their essential features.
These are then mathematically formalized to produce a general measure of intelligence
for arbitrary machines. They believe that this equation formally captures the concept of
machine intelligence in the broadest reasonable sense (Legg and Hutler, 2007).
There are fundamental differences between the human intelligence and todays machine
intelligence. Human intelligence is very good in identifying patterns and subjective
matters. However, it is usually not very good in handling large amounts of data and
doing massive computations. Nor can it process and solve complex problems with large
number of constraints. This is specially true when real time processing of data and
information is required. For these types of issues, machine intelligence is an excellent
substitute. In general human thinking is based on pattern recognition (PR), not fast
logical analysis (LA), and we are very good at PR but slow at LA compared to a
machine (Aminzadeh, 2005).
One of the most fundamental problems in artificial intelligence the frame problem.
Traditional artificial intelligence methods are based around logic programming which
retain their rigor on the assumption that logical thoughts are true eternally this is
theorem proving. Humans use emotional coloring to select courses of action. They are
capable of utilizing a sophisticated language for the communication of complex
concepts (Ellery, 2003).
Mind and Human Intelligence: Cognitive scientist and philosopher, Andy Clark, picks
up this (the idea that a living entity can be hybrid of both organic matter and mechanical
pasts) general theme and presents an empirical and philosophical case for the following
inextricably linked theses:
1. The human mind is naturally disposed to develop and incorporate tools,
2. Human have always been to a greater or lesser degree cyborgs (Marsh, 2005).
Dicks argument is simple, but firmly founded in the naturalistic evolutionary
worldview. The over arching argument may be stated as follows: Advanced
intelligence-defined as at least at the level of homosapiens- implies culture indeed some
consider culture part of very definition of advanced intelligence (Dick, 2007).

65

5.3. Artificial human nature

Artificial Intelligence (AI) critics repeatedly ask whether human can be placed by
machines: can human nature be duplicated by machines and if so are humans than just
a special sort of machine? By examining the present and history of AI criticism it is
possible to identify moments where specific critics have fixated and particular qualities
as the essential qualities of human nature. Reason, perception, emotion and the
body are four qualities that have been championed by AI critics (and proposrents) as
essential and (un)implementable as hardware or software machinery (Sack, 1997).
Nowadays, it is widely accepted that general purpose of artificial intelligence (AI) is to
develop (1) conceptual models (2) formal rewriting processes of these models and (3)
programming strategies and physical machines to reproduce as efficiently and
thoroughly as possible the most authentic, cognitive, scientific and technical tasks of
biological systems that we have labeled Intelligent (Miran,2008).
Machines as Intelligent as humans should be able to do most of things human can do.
Humans can think and so also should any machine processing human-level
intelligence.
Machines exhibitions true human-level intelligence should be able to do many of things
humans are able to do (Nilsson, 2005).

6. Critique of artificial intelligence

No computers actually function like human mind. The human mind does not depend on
formal or logic rules ascribed to computer. Thus, symbolic AI research has falsified the
rationalist assumption that the human mind reaches certainty by functioning formally
by virtue of its failure to create a thinking machine.
The Immortal Mind: Artificial Intelligence: If intelligent machines were viewed as
vehicles of human transcendence and immortality, they were also understood as having
lives of their own and an ultimate destiny beyond human experience. In the eyes of AI
and visionaries, mind machines represented the next step in evolution, a new species,
Machine sapiens, which would rival and ultimately supersede Homo sapiens as the most
intelligent beings in creation.
The manifest destiny of mankind is to pass the torch of life and intelligence on to the
computer Rucker proclaimed. Yet three and a half centuries after Descartes first
dreamed of releasing the immortal mind from its mortal mornings. A-Lifers were still
wrestling with the enigma of the Christian soul, the divinity of man new boldly being
passed forward to its mechanical progeny (Noble, 1999).

66

6.1. Dreyfus and the critique of artificial intelligence

Hubert Dreyfus, an American follower of Heidegger, has given what is perhaps the
most influential application of the phenomenological approach to technology in his
critique of artificial intelligence. Dreyfus argued that classical AI (Artificial
Intelligence) was based on mistaken assumption about thinking and meaning that were
shared by early modern philosophers such as Descartes and the British empiricists.
Dreyfus argues that the rules at the basis of thinking cannot be fully formalized or made
fully explicit. Behind our capacity to judge and reason are tacit or prereflective
orientation. Deryfus claims that the human rationality involves the ability to apply rules
to particular contexts in a manner that cannot be fully formalized.
According to Dreyfus, thought and intention assume a body, not the mechanical body,
as described by physics and chemistry, but a lived body, in the sense of Maurice
Merleau-Ponty (1907-61), a follower and a developer of the ideas of later Husserl. The
lived body is notion different from that of the pure mind as a spiritual or mental
entity, and also different from the body considered as mechanical body of physics
(Dusek, 2006).
Using Heidegger as a guide, Searle began to look for signs that the whole AI research
program was degenerating. I was particularly stuck by the fact that, among other
troubles, researchers were running up against the problem of representing of
significance and relevance a problem that Heidegger saw was implicit in Descartes
understanding of the world as a set of meaningless facts to which the mind assigned
what Descartes values, and John Searle now calls functions.
But Heidegger warned, values are just more meaningless fact (Dreyfus, 2007).
Dreyfus contends that it is impossible to create intelligent computer programs analogous
to the human brain because the workings of human intelligence are entirely different
from that of computing machines. For Dreyfus, the human mind functions intuitively
and not formally. Dreyfuss critique on AI proceeds from his critique on rationalist
epistemological assumptions about human intelligence. Dreyfuss major attack targets
the rationalist conception that human understanding or intelligence can be formalized.
Via Descartes and other nationalist or intellectualist thinkers, this was later extended to
the realm of the natural sciences and attained a very high explanatory power. And it is
this success that has in turn reinforced the idea that in any ordently domain there must
be some set of context-free elements and some abstract relations among those elements
that account for the order of that domain and for mans ability to act intelligently in the
Dreyfuss critique on AI is basically a critique on the rationalist or broadly speaking, the
intellectualist perspective that forms the view that we can formulate human thinking in
terms of proposition or primitives (Kenaw, 2008).

67

6.2. Weizenbaums critique of artificial intelligence

Joseph Weizenbaum, as a AI pioneer and a critic of AI, Computer power and human
reason is a mosaic of well-reasoned analysis and passionate pleading on the nature of
computers and of man, and about the place that computers (read technology if you
wish) should have in human affairs.
Weizenbaums may still be too much technocrat: witness his oversimplifications of
social movements as the immediate fruits of technical innovations.
Weizenbaum makes a conscientious effort to distinguish his assertions of faith from the
scientific consensus; but the non-specialist reader will still have to look closely to be
sure. As Weizenbaum insists. There are few things less well understand than human
creative imagination.
His own prophecy is that this will NEVER be emulated to any significant measure by
computing machines. This hypothesis is beyond the range of scientific criticism, short
of tangible advances to much to hope for right away; but his arguments are mainly
repetitious assertions of his personal faith.
The abrogation of human responsibility for moral decision whether it is be out of lazy
delegation to machines, or superstitious deference to super-human abstraction can
indeed once again ignite the holocaust.
Weizenbaum is particularly of the critical of the use of computer in the role of
psychotherapydoubtless in consternation that the machines patrons believed they
were talking to a sympathetic, understanding person.
The abuses might be either ideological or technological. If human intelligence were
more successfully mirrored in the machine, will that not justify treating human beings
as if they were mere machines? (Lederbeg, 1976)
6.3. Penroses critique of artificial intelligence
Machine consciousness has also criticized by Penrose, who claims that the processing of
an algorithm is not enough to evoke phenomenal awareness because subtle and largely
unknown physical principles are needed to perform the non-computational actions that
lie at the roots of consciousness. Electronic computers have their undoubted
importance in clarifying many of the issues that relate to mental phenomena (perhaps, to
a large extent, by teaching us what genuine mental phenomena are not) computers,
we conclude, do something very different from what we are doing when we bring our
awareness to bear upon same problem (Gamez, 2008).

68

6.4. Other controversies about artificial intelligence

Throughout history, developments in the sciences have caused people to change their
views of man and his place in the universe. The Copernican Revolution placed man on a
planet, adrift in space;
Darwinian revolution changed our view of human origins. Computers, too raise
questions about the nature of man: Can computers think the way we do, and, if so are
we like them- just thinking machines? Of course the question can a machine think?
has been raised before, as long ago as seventeenth century: by Descartes and Pascal,
who said no; by Hobbes: who said that thought was mechanical: and somewhat later by
La Mettrie, who saw man himself as a machine (Goertzel, 2007).
7. Gdels theorem; towards to Incompleteness, uncertainty, logic and human
reasoning
But only in our century, as a result of work in the mathematical sciences, has the
question can a machine think? been given widespread and rigorous discussion. Today
computer scientists have devised programs that solve problems which, it solved by
people, would seem to require intelligent thought. This point is made explicit by Josh
McCarthys name for the field Artificial Intelligence. As we shall see, the real
controversy about artificial intelligence (AI) is not about the nature and program, it is
about nature of man.
But first, how would we possibly decide whether computers can think at all? Alan
Turing suggested a way of testing the assertion that a machine could think.
Kurt Gdel had provided that there were limitations to the power of computers; any
reasonably rich formal system is incomplete and the consistency such a system cannot
be proved within the system.
J.R. Lucas, repelled by the idea that people are just instances of formal system, refused
to accept Turings response to the Gdel-based objection (Grabiner, 1986).
Gdels theorem related to mind-body problem: Gdels theorem defeats rationality
because it shows that logical systems that are rich enough to permit self reference are
incomplete, in the sense of not providing answers to all of the questions that they can
pose. By Gdels theorem, in any sufficiently rich logic same state able theorem (and
indeed, some true theorem) can neither be proved true or false. Moreover, in such logics
no general procedure can be devised that will decide whether any particular question
that is presented is decidable (Simon, 2000).
For many, it is still hard to conceive how the World of Subjective experience spring out
of merely physical events. This problem of qualia is the hardest and the main part of the
mind-body problem.
The problem is often summed up in the following question: How matter (i.e. body and
brain) becomes mind? All sorts of dualists think it never does and some of them, like

69

Lucas and Penrose, think that Gdels incompleteness theorem proves that. Their main
argument is that Gdels theorem implies man-machine non-equivalence in the
following sense:
There is no machine which could capture all our mathematical intuitions (iki, 2005).
For many decades now it has been claimed that Gdels two incompleteness theorems
preclude the possibility of the development of a true artificial intelligence which could
rival the human brain.
Gdel himself realized that the incompleteness theorems do not preclude the possibility
of a machine mind. In fact there is an interesting argument posed by Rudy Rucker
where he shows that it is possible to construct a Lucas style argument using
incompleteness theorems which actually suggests the possibility of aerating machine
minds (Sullins III, 1997).
Logic and Artificial Intelligence: Towards to Fuzzy AI: Throughout its relatively
short history, AI has been heavily influenced by the logical ideas. AI has drawn on
many research methodologies: the value and relative importance of logical formalisms
is questioned by some leading practioners, and has been debated in the literature from
time to time. But most members of the AI community would agree that logic has an
important role to play in at least some central areas of AI research, and on influential
minority considers logic to be the most important factor in developing strategic,
fundamental advances.
Logic is used in understanding problems intelligent reasoning and guiding the design of
mechanical reasoning systems.
Theoretical computer science developed out of logic, theory of computation (if this to
be considered a different subject from logic), and some related areas of mathematics
(SEP, 2003).
One of the most important contributions of artificial intelligence has been realization of
the importance of knowledge in the performance of many human tasks. This realization
has led AI researchers of concentrate on the issue of knowledge representation.
Attempts to represent human knowledge by AI researchers have led to development of
large number of clever paradigms for this purpose. However, in implementing these
paradigms the restriction to binary logic greatly reduced their power.
The use of fuzzy sets via the theory of approximate reasoning provides a very powerful
for extending the capability of binary logic in ways that enable a much better
representation of human knowledge (Yager, 1997).
Perhaps, the greatest success of artificial intelligence has been the expert system
paradigm. The typical structure of an expert system involves a collection rules, called
the rule base, which describe the knowledge about the domain in which expert system
works. There is a close parallel between fuzzy logic controller and expert system.

70

8. Uncertainty and fuzzy logic

There is a deep-seated tradition in science of dealing with uncertainty. Whatever its
form and nature-through the use of probability theory. Successes of this tradition are
undeniable. But we move further into the age of machine intelligence and automated
decision-making, a basic limitation of probability theory becomes a serious problem.
More specifically, in large measure, standard probability theory, call it PT, cannot deal
with information described in natural language: that is to put it simply, PT does not
have NL-capability (NL-Natural Language)
Uncertainty is an attribute of information. The path-breaking work of Shannon has led
to a universal acceptance of thesis that information is statistical in nature.
Concomitantly, existing theories of uncertainty are based on probability theory. The
generalized theory of uncertainty (GTU) departs from existing theories in essential
ways. First, the thesis that information is statistical in nature is replaced by a much more
general thesis that information is generalized constraint, with statistical uncertainty
being a special, albeit, important case. Equating information to a generalized constraint
is the fundamental thesis of GTU. Second, bivalence is abandoned through GTU, the
foundation of GTU is shifted from bivalent logic to fuzzy logic. As a consequence, in
GTU everything as or is allowed to be a matter of degree, or equivalently, fuzzy (Zadeh,
2006).
Among problems faced by knowledge engineering is that mechanizing inference and
decision. One reason why this problem is difficult is the existence of several facets to
uncertainty, and the discovery that traditional tools for representing uncertainty, such as
error interval analysis and probability theory are not able to grasp separately all facets of
uncertainty (Dubois, Prade, 1998).
Haziness, vagueness, fuzziness and classical logic: The theory of fuzzy sets in a
mathematical theory to deal with vagueness and other loose concepts, lacking strict
boundaries. It seems that vagueness as it has been used in philosophy and logic since
the 20th century, may be formalized by fuzzy sets, whereas haziness (a micro
geometrical approach) like other scientific concepts. E.g., interminancy is a concept that
needs to be formalized by probability theory and statics. Nevertheless, fuzzy
mathematics cannot be possibly be imagined without the use of t-norm and t-conorms
(Seising, 2008).
Fuzzy logic is an approach to computer science that mimics the way a human brain
thinks and solves problems. The idea of fuzzy logic is to approximate human decision
making using natural language terms instead of quantitative terms.
Interestingly, fuzzy science started in the questioning minds of philosophers. Confused
and inquisitive, from Buddha to Aristotle to Plato these ancient philosophers were
constantly searching for a rule of law beyond true or false.
Fuzzy logic comes in when conventional logic fails. Fuzzy logic can deal with virtually
any preposition expressed in natural language.

71

Fuzzy logic, by exploring uncertainty and unpredictability, continues to shape the world
in which we live (Bih, 2006).
Fuzzy logic not only deals with problems at the technological side of computational
intelligence. Since what a fuzzy set does represent is a concrete use of predicate (or
linguistic label), and as Wittgenstein assented the meaning of a word is its use in the
language, fuzzy logic also deals with what is as the Gordian Knot of computational
intelligence, the problem of meaning, and this is a side of fuzzy logic that, in the way
towards computing with words, seems to be a great interest (Trillas, 2006).
It is well known that logic is the study of the laws of thought that govern the operation
of our mind. In general, a logical system consists of syntax and semantics, i.e., a
formal system for description of states of affairs and a proof theory for deducing the
entailment of a set of sentences. All the classical logic, fuzzy logic, and other nonclassical logics are efficient tools that have been created by people to model statements
about all kinds of things and the interactions among objects in the real world we are
living in (Ma, et al, 2006).
As fuzzy theorists and practioners, we frequently find our self confronting significant
philosophical issues in our work. Indeed if we are not doing so, we are probably and
possibly missing out a lot. While different fuzzy theories and application approaches
may be founded upon different set of philosophical presuppositions, all such theories
rest upon some epistemological and ontological assumptions, whether explicitly
acknowledged or not.
A lack of appropriate treatment of the philosophical grounding creates a situation of
discord, or not least a level of misunderstanding, between fuzzy theorists and
practioners on the one hand and crisp theorists and practioners on the other (Trken,
2006).
Fuzzy set theory provides a means for representing uncertainties. Historically,
probability theory has been the primary tool for representing uncertainty in
mathematical models. Because of this, all uncertain was assumed to follow the
characteristics of random uncertainty. (Ross, 1956)
Our understanding of physical processes is based largely on impressive human
reasoning. This imprecision (When compared to precise quantities required by
computers) is nonetheless a form of information that can be quite useful to humans. The
ability to embed such reasoning in hitherto intractable and complex problem is the
criterion by which the efficacy of fuzzy logic is judged. (Ross, 1995)
The generalized theory of uncertainty (GTU) differs from other theories in three
important respects. First, the thesis that information is a generalized constraint, with
statistical uncertainty being a special, albeit important case. Second, bivalence is
abandoned though out GTU, and third, one of the principal objectives of GTU is
achievement of NL-capability (Zadeh, 2006).

72

8.1. Defending fuzzy logic / specific aspects of human reasoning

Bart Kosko in his book: Fuzzy Thinking; The New Science of Fuzzy Logic, says that
the central thesis is that everything is a matter of degree. The world is grey, not black
and white. But western scientists and philosophers have refused to face up to this fact:
they persist in describing the grey world in black and white language. Their doing so is
what author calls the mismatch problem a problem rooted in uncritical acceptance of
two-valued logic- binary faith. Binary logic says Kosko, sacrifices accuracy for
simplicity. Bivalence is a rounding off that works fine at extremes but fails everywhere
else. Indeed, the core principles of bivalent logic-the law of Excluded Middle and the
principle of Non-Contradiction- are merely limiting cases of a more proper multi-valued
logic (Kosko, 1993).
Kosko derived the conditional probability operator from first principle of fuzzy logic
and this proved that probability is a subset of fuzzy logic. Fuzzy logic is more effective
in representing complex causal mechanisms. The vertices and dimension of probability
are subsets of the fuzzy hypercube fuzzy logic are thus the larger science (Halgeson
and Jobe, 1998).
It is well known that logic is the study at the laws of thought that govern the operation
of our mind. In general, a logical system consists of syntax and semantics. All classical
logic, fuzzy logic and other non-classical logics are efficient tools that have been
created by people to model statements about all kinds of things and the interactions
among objects in real world we are living in. Fuzzy logic admits existence of the
intermediate states and assumes that each statement has a degree of truth ranging from
0-1 Human thinking is based on knowledge obtained from external nature after
thousand-of-years practicing and accumulating, which inherently is accompanied by
various kinds of uncertainty existing not only in the real world but also in the course of
outer information being reflected by human brain. The uncertainty comes into being
from the limitation of human recognition and in the course of information processing.
Fuzzy logic admits intermediate states of affairs and adepts a relatively flexible self
matching mechanism of inference that is convenient in the analysis and application of
uncertainty in natural way.
Classical as well as non-classical logics, including fuzzy one, are all investigations of
the world from different philosophical backgrounds and methodologies. All these logic
have special features suitable for particular problems.
What is artificial intelligence? People with different backgrounds give different
answers. For us, artificial intelligence is the study of giving machines ability to think in
human way and acting a people, i.e. to develop intelligence solve complex real
problems to realize machine, intelligence. Concretely, the goal of machine intelligence
is to give machines the ability of learning knowledge from the changing environment
and circumstances, to represent knowledge in appropriate and tractable forms, to make
proper decision using knowledge, and applying knowledge to resolve complex problems
in the real world. To achieve this aim, fuzzy logic can be taken as an alternative to the
classical logic (Ma et al, 2006).

73

The foundations fuzzy logic: The foundations fuzzy logic have became firmer and its
impact within the basic sciences- and especially in mathematical and physical scienceshas become more visible and more substantive. And yet, there are still many
misconceptions about the aims of fuzzy logic and misjudgments of its strengths and
limitations.
One of the common misconceptions is rooted in semantics: as a label, fuzzy logic, FL,
has two different meanings. More specifically, in a narrow sense fuzzy logic, FLn, is a
logical system which aims at a formalization of approximate reasoning.
In a wide sense, fuzzy logic, FLw, is a coexistence with fuzzy set theory, FST. FLw is
far broader than Fln and contains Fln as one of its branches (Zadeh, 1999).
There are many misconceptions about fuzzy logic. Fuzzy logic is not fuzzy. Basically,
fuzzy logic is a precise logic of imprecision and approximate reasoning. More
specifically, fuzzy logic may be viewed as an attempt at formalization/mechanization of
two remarkable human capabilities. First, the capabilities to converse, reason, and make
rational decisions in an environment of imprecision, uncertainty, incompleteness of
information, conflicting information, partiality of truth and partiality of possibility- in
short, in an environment of imperfect information and a second, the capability to
perform a wide variety of physical and mental tasks without any measurements and any
computations.
Fuzzy logic is much more than a logical system. It has many facets. The principal facets
are: logical, fuzzy set-theoretic, epistemic and relational (Zadeh, 2008).

9. Epilogue
Regarding some futurists in 21st century and beyond our world would be probably more
imprecise and complex. The End of Historys writer that in our past in our post human
future, Francis Fukuyama places bioethical problems into context by first explaining the
science behind the issues and then exploring the many way these issues (class
stratification, psycho tropic drug impact, and life expectancy) might affect society and
politics (Fukuyama, 2002). Jeremy Rifkins The Biotech Century discussed many of
the biological processes, technologies, moral dilemmas, and political issues that new
face humanity for first time (Rifkin, 1999). Michio Kaku future scientists deal with
more different approaches for visionary sights in his book, Visions of the Future deals
with three revolutions in the 21st century: The Intelligence Revolution, The Biotech
Revolution and The Quantum Revolution (Kaku, 1999).
Another fact are chaotic structures and systems. Nature, being composed of all of these
things, will always have novelty and beauty that can never be exhausted. As with the Mset, we can appreciate natures beauty precisely because we can simulate it, but only to
limited accuracy. If all natural phenomena were either perfectly describable or
absolutely indescribable, not only would they uninteresting, but life would be
impossible (Flake, 1999).

74

AI, man, machines and loves (Critique of AI by a film) and fuzzy poem
AI: Artificial Intelligence is Steven Spielbergs epic tribute to Stanley Kubrick.
Although written and directed by Spielberg, the idea behind the film was conceived by
Kubrick. And what an austere vision it is. The intrinsic desire far artificial intelligence
in western civilization is nothing more than an attempt to eternalize its presence, to
ensure that we accept its power as a natural phenomenon.
In the final analyses, AI represents a colossal failure of imagination. Indeed, it sees
imagination itself a commodity to be distributed and consumed like all other
commodities: Its vision of the future is totally one-dimension and totally colonized by
white man and their alienating technologies (Komninou, 2003).
Final result, the humanity would be needed immortal or eternal mind and soul or as
quoted philosophers we would needed poetical beauty, absolute truth goodness. Overall
these concepts are not precise.
What could fuzzy logic possibly to with a quote a 13th century Sufi poet? Fuzzy logic
can be an extremely versatile and flexible to with which to model systems that are
complex, vague and imprecise for new trust that the whole idea of going beyond right
and wrong. True and false is what fuzzy logic is all about. Fuzzy logic (like Rumi, I
suppose) is not a frequent topic around break tables at psychological conferences
(Mathe, 2002).
A voice and in interpretation about fuzzy word from Mevlana Jalaluddin Rumi (12071273):
Out beyond ideas of wrong-doing and right-doing, there is a field, Ill meet you there.
When the soul lies down in that grass, the world is too full to talk about. Ideas,
language, even the phrase each other doesnt make any sense.
Rumi
References
Albus J.S., Meystel A.M., Engineering of mind: An introduction to the science of
intelligent systems, John Wiley & Sons, Wiley Series on Intelligent Systems, New
York, 2001.
Aminzadeh F., Applications of AI and soft computing for changing problems in the oil
industry, Journal of Petroleum Science and Engineering, 47(1-2), 5-14, 2005.
Braddon-Mitchell D., Jackson F., Philosophy of mind and cognition, an introduction.
Victoria (Australia): Blackwell, Cognitive Systems Research, 9, 229231, 2008.
Bell A.J., Levels and loops: The future of artificial intelligence and neuroscience,
Philosophical Transactions of the Royal Society, London, 354, 2013-2020, 1999.

75

Bih J., Paradigma shiftan introduction to fuzzy logic, IEEE Potentials, 25-1, 6-21,
January/February 2006.
Bostrom N., When machines outsmart human, Futures, 35-7, 759-764, 2003.
Capra F., The web of life: A new scientific understanding of living systems, Anchor
Press, Norwell, 1997.
Dick S., The postbiological universe, Acta Astronautica, 62(8-9), 499-504, 2008.
Dickins T.E., Frankish K., Review ofDennet, D.C. (1996), Kinds of minds, History and
Philosophy of Psychology Newsletter, 24, 36-40, 1997.
Dreyfus H.L., Why Heideggerian AI failed and how fixing it would require making it
more Heideggreian, Philosophical Psychology, 20-2, 247-268, 2007
Dubois D., Prade H., An introduction to fuzzy systems, Clinical Chimica Acta, 270, 329, 1998.
Dusek V., Philosophy of technology: An introduction, Willey-Blackwell Publications,
2006.
Ellery A., Humans versus robots for space exploration and development, Space Policy,
19, 87-91, 2003.
Ferre F., Philosophy of technology, Prentice Hall, N. Jersey, 1988.
Flake G. W., The computational beauty of bature, Bradferd Book , The MIT Press ,
Cambridge , 1999.
Ford K., Glymour C., Hayes P. J., Android epistemology, AAAI. Press/MIT Press,
Menlo Park, CA, 1995.
Frantz R., Simon H., Artificial intelligence as a framework for understanding intuition,
Journal of Economic Psychology, 24, 265-277, 2003.
Fukuyama F., Our posthuman future: Consequences of biotechnology revolution,
Farrar, Straus and Giroux Publishing, New York, 2002.
Gamez D., Progress in machine consciousness, Consciousness and Cognition, 17, 887910, 2008.
Goertzel B., Human-level artificial general intelligence and possibility of a technical
singularity: A reaction to Ray Kurzweils the singularity is near and McDermotts
critique of Kurzweil, Artificial Intelligence, 171, 1161-1173, 2007.

76

Grabiner J.V., Computers and the nature of man: A historians perspective on

controversies about artificial intelligence, Bulletin of American Mathematical Society,
15, 113-126, 1986.
Hatfield G., The passions of the soul and Descartes machine psychology, Studies in
History and Philosophy of Science, 38, 1-35, 2007.
Helgason C. M., Jobe T. H., The fuzzy cube and causal efficacy: representation of
concomitant mechanisms in stroke, Neural Networks, 11, 549-555, 1998
Kaku M., Visions: How the science revolutionize the 21st century and beyond, Oxford
University Press, 1999.
Kenaw S., Hubert L. Dreyfuss critique of classical AI and its rationalist assumptions,
Minds and Machines, 18, 227-238, 2008.
King D., Shapiro S., The Oxford companion to philosophy, Oxford University Press,
1995.
Komninou E., AI: man, machines and love, Futures, 35, 793-798, 2003.
Kosko B., Fuzzy thinking the New science of fuzzy logic, Hyperion, New York, 1993.
Kugel P., Toward a theory intelligence, Theoretical Computer Science, 317, 13-30,
2004.
Kurzweil R., Reinventing humanity: the future of fachine-human intelligence, The
Futurist, pp. 39-42, March-April, 2006.
Lederberg J., Review of Joseph Weizenbaums computer power and human reason,
N.Y. Times, Book Review, March 1976.
Legg S., Hutter M., Universal intelligence: A definition of machine intelligence, Minds
and Machine, 17, 391-444, 2007.
Ma J., Chen S., Xu Y., Fuzzy logic from the viewpoint of machine intelligence, Fuzzy
Sets and Systems, 157, 87-91, 2006.
Marsh C., Review of Andy Clarks Natural-born cyborgs: Minds, technologies, and
the future of human intelligence, Cognitive Systems Research, 6, 405-409, 2005.
Martinez-Freire P.F., Mind, intelligence and spirit, Twentieth World Congress of
Philosophy, 10-15 August, Boston, Massachusetts U.S.A., 1998.
Mathe C., Fuzzy logic, www.authenticleadershipcenter.com/fuzzylogic, 2010
McCarthy J., What is artificial intelligence? Computer Science Department, Stanford
University, 2004.

77

Minsky M., Steps toward artificial intelligence, in Computers and Thought, McGrawHill, New York, 1963.
Mira J.M., Symbols versus connections: 50 years of artificial intelligence,
Neurocomputing, 71, 671-680, 2008.
Nilsson N.J., Human-level artificial intelligence? Be serious, AI Magazine, 25th
Anniversary Issue, pp. 65-75, December, 2005.
Noble D. F., The religion of technology: The divinity of man and the spirit of invention,
Penguin Books, New York, 1999.
OConnor T., Robb D. (Editor), Philosophy of mind: Contemporary readings, by
Routhledge Press, London, 2003.
Perlovsky L., toward physics of the mind: Concepts, emotions, consciousness, and
symbols, Physics of Life Reviews, 3, 23-55, 2006.
Pfeifer R., Bongard, J., How the body shapes the way think; A New View of
Intelligence , A Bradferd Book, The MIT Press , Cambridge, 2007.
Pomerol J-C., Artificial intelligence and human decision making, European Journal of
Operational Research, 99, 3-25, 1997.
Rifkin J., Biotech century, New York, Penguin Putnam, Inc., 1999.
Ross T. J., Fuzzy logic with engineering applications, McGraw-Hill Inc., New York,
1995.
Russell S., Norvig P., Artificial intelligence: A modern approach, Prentice Hall, New
Jersey, 2003.
Sack W., Artificial human nature, Design Issues, 13, 55-64, 1997.
Schwarz F., La tradition et Les Voises de la connaissance, Dhier et daujourdhui,
Interpreter: Aslan, A.M., Kadim bilgeliin yeniden kefi, nsan Yaynlar, stanbul,
1997.
Scruton R., A short history of modern philosophy, Routledge Press, London, 2002.
Searle J.R., Dualism revisited, Journal of Physiology-Paris, 101, 169-178, 2007.
Seising R., On the absence of strict boundaries- vagueness, haziness and fuzziness in
philosophy, Science and Medicine, Applied Soft Computing, 8, 1232-1242, 2008.
iki Z., Godels incompleteness theorem and man-machine non-equivalence, 11.
Mathematikertreffen, Zagreb-Graz, Grazer Math. Ber. ISSN 1016-7692, 75-78, 2005.

78

Simon H.A., Machine as mind, Competition and Intelligence, AAAI, MIT Press, 1995a.
Simon H.A., Artificial intelligence: An empirical science, Artificial Intelligence, V. 77,
pp. 95-127, 1995b.
Simon H.A., Barriers and bounds to rationality, Structural Change and Economic
Dynamics, 11, 243-253, 2000.
Spector L., Evolution of artificial intelligence, Artificial Intelligence, 170, 1251-1253,
2006.
Sullins III, J.P., Gdels incompleteness theorem and artificial life, Phil And Tech V. 2,
N:3-4, Spring, Summer, pp. 141-157, 1997.
Thomason R., Logic and artificial intelligence, Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy,
May, 2008.
Tikhomirov O.K., Philosophical and psychological problems of artificial intelligence,
Proceedings of the 4th International Joint Conference on Artificial Intelligence, San
Francisco, CA, USA, V. 1, pp. 932-937, 1975.
Trillas E., On the use of words of fuzzy sets, Information Sciences, 176, 1463-1487,
2006.
Trken . B., An ontological and epistemological perspective of fuzzy theory, Elsevier,
Inc., Amsterdam, 2006.
Ulanowicz R.E., Life after Newton: An ecological metaphysic, Biosystems, 50, 127142, 1999.
Wang P., Three fundamental misconceptions of artificial intelligence, Journal of
Experimental & Theoretical Artificial Intelligence, 19, 249-268, September 2007.
Yager R.R., Fuzzy logic and artificial intelligence, Fuzzy Sets and Systems, 90, 193198, 1997.
Zadeh L.A., Fuzzy logic and the calculi of fuzzy rules, fuzzy graphs, and fuzzy
probabilities, Computer and Mathematics with Applications, 37, 35, 1999.
Zadeh K. S., Fuzzy revolution: Goodbye to the Aristotelian Weltanschauung, Artificial
Intelligence in Medicine, 21, 1-25, 2001.
Zadeh L.A., Generalized theory of uncertainty (GTU)-principal concepts and ideas,
Computational Statics and Data Analysis, 51, 5-46, 2006.
Zadeh L.A., Is there a need for fuzzy logic, Information Sciences, 178, 2251-2279,
2008.

79