A.C.

1928 December 19, 1980

In the Matter of the IBP Membership Dues Delinquency of Atty. MARCIAL A. EDILLION (IBP
Administrative Case No. MDD-1), petitioner,

force and effect. 5 It was pointed out in the resolution that such issues was raised on a previous case
before the Court, entitled 'Administrative Case No. 526, In the Matter of the Petition for the
Integration of the Bar of the Philippines, Roman Ozaeta, et al., Petitioners.' The Court exhaustively
considered all these matters in that case in its Resolution ordaining the integration of the Bar of the

FERNANDO, C.J.:
The full and plenary discretion in the exercise of its competence to reinstate a disbarred member of
the bar admits of no doubt. All the relevant factors bearing on the specific case, public interest, the
integrity of the profession and the welfare of the recreant who had purged himself of his guilt are
given their due weight. Respondent Marcial A. Edillon was disbarred on August 3, 1978,
being unanimous with the late.

the vote

Before doing so, a recital of the background facts that led to the disbarment of respondent may not
be amiss. As set forth in the resolution penned by the late Chief Justice Castro: "On November 29.
1975, the Integrated Bar of the Philippines (IBP for short) Board of Governors, unanimously adopted
Resolution No. 75-65 in Administrative case No. MDD-1 (In the Matter of the Membership Dues
Delinquency of Atty. Marcial A. Edillon) recommending to the Court the removal of the name of the
respondent from its Roll of Attorneys for 'stubborn refusal to pay his membership dues' to the IBP
since the latter's constitution notwithstanding due notice. On January 21, 1976, the IBP, through its
then President Liliano B. Neri, submitted the said resolution to the Court for consideration and
approval,. Pursuant to paragraph 2, Section 24, Article III of the By-Laws of the IBP, which. reads: ...
Should the delinquency further continue until the following June 29, the Board shall promptly
inquire into the cause or causes of the continued delinquency and take whatever action it shall deem
appropriate, including a recommendation to the Supreme Court for the removal of the delinquent
member's name from the Roll of Attorneys. Notice of the action taken should be submit by registered
mail to the member and to the Secretary of the Chapter concerned.' On January 27, 1976, the Court
required the respondent to comment on the resolution and letter adverted to above he submitted his
comment on February 23, 1976, reiterating his refusal to pay the membership fees due from him.
On March 2, 1976, the Court required the IBP President and the IBP Board of Governors to reply to
Edillon's comment: On March 24, 1976, they submitted a joint reply. Thereafter, the case was set for
hearing on June 3, 1976. After the hearing, the parties were required to submit memoranda in
amplification of their oral arguments. The matter was thenceforth submitted for resolution."

Reference was then made to the authority of the IBP Board of Governors to recommend to the
Supreme Court the removal of a delinquent member's name from the Roll of Attorneys as found in
Rules of Court: 'Effect of non-payment of dues. Subject to the provisions of Section 12 of this Rule,
default in the payment of annual dues for six months shall warrant suspension of membership in
the Integrated Bar, and default in such payment for one year shall be a ground for the removal of the
name of the delinquent member from the Roll of Attorneys.

Philippines, promulgated on January 9, 1973. 6 The unanimous conclusion reached by the Court
was that the integration of the Philippine Bar raises no constitutional question and is therefore
legally unobjectionable, "and, within the context of contemporary conditions in the Philippine, has
become an imperative means to raise the standards of the legal profession, improve the
administration of justice, and enable the Bar to discharge its public responsibility fully and
effectively."

Chief Justice Castro ponente. From June 5, 1979, he had repeatedly pleaded that he be reinstated.
The minute resolution dated October 23, 1980, granted such prayer. It was there made clear that it
"is without prejudice to issuing an extended opinion."

The submission of respondent Edillion as summarized in the aforesaid resolution "is that the above
provisions constitute an invasion of his constitutional rights in the sense that he is being compelled,
as a pre-condition to maintaining his status as a lawyer in good standing, to be a member of the IBP
and to pay the corresponding dues, and that as a consequence of this compelled financial support of
the said organization to which he is admittedly personally antagonistic, he is being deprived of the
rights to liberty and property guaranteed to him by the Constitution. Hence, the respondent
concludes, the above provisions of the Court Rule and of the IBP By-Laws are void and of no legal

As mentioned at the outset, the vote was unanimous. From the time the decision was rendered,
there were various pleadings filed by respondent for reinstatement starting with a motion for
reconsideration dated August 19, 1978. Characterized as it was by persistence in his adamantine
refusal to admit the full competence of the Court on the matter, it was not unexpected that it would
be denied. So it turned out. 8 It was the consensus that he continued to be oblivious to certain balic
juridical concepts, the appreciation of which does not even require great depth of intellect. Since
respondent could not be said to be that deficient in legal knowledge and since his pleadings in other
cases coming before this Tribunal were quite literate, even if rather generously sprinkled with
invective for which he had been duly taken to task, there was the impression that his recalcitrance
arose from and sheer obstinacy. Necessary, the extreme penalty of disbarment visited on him was
more than justified.
Since then, however, there were other communications to this Court where a different attitude on his
part was discernible. 9 The tone of defiance was gone and circumstances of a mitigating character
invoked the state of his health and his advanced age. He likewise spoke of the welfare of former
clients who still rely on him for counsel, their confidence apparently undiminished. For he had in his
career been a valiant, if at times unreasonable, defender of the causes entrusted to him.
This Court, in the light of the above, felt that reinstatement could be ordered and so it did in the
resolution of October 23, 1980. It made certain that there was full acceptance on his part of the
competence of this Tribunal in the exercise of its plenary power to regulate the legal profession and
can integrate the bar and that the dues were duly paid. Moreover, the fact that more than two years
had elapsed during which he war. barred from exercising his profession was likewise taken into
account. It may likewise be said that as in the case of the inherent power to punish for contempt and
paraphrasing the dictum of Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v. Lukban, 10 the power to discipline,
especially if amounting to disbarment, should be exercised on the preservative and not on the
vindictive principle.11
One last word. It has been pertinently observed that there is no irretrievable finality as far as
admission to the bar is concerned. So it is likewise as to loss of membership. What must ever be
borne in mind is that membership in the bar, to follow Cardozo, is a privilege burdened with
conditions. Failure to abide by any of them entails the loss of such privilege if the gravity thereof

warrant such drastic move. Thereafter a sufficient time having elapsed and after actuations
evidencing that there was due contrition on the part of the transgressor, he may once again be
considered for the restoration of such a privilege. Hence, our resolution of October 23, 1980.
The Court restores to membership to the bar Marcial A. Edillon.
FACTS:
Atty. Marcial Edillon was dibarred due to non-payment of his IBP dues, hence the petitioner on this
case. He claimed that the provisions of Sec. 10 of Rule 139-A of the Rules of Court is
unconstitutional as he is being compelled, as a precondition in maintaining his good standing as a
lawyer, to pay and settle his dues to the IBP. Petitioner stubbornly insisted his take and refused to
admit full competence of the court in this matter. But after some time in realization, his recalcitrance
and defiance were gone in his subsequent communication with the court. He appealed that his
health, advanced age, and concern to his former clients welfare be considered in his prayer so that
he can again practice law.

1. JUDICIAL ETHICS; ATTORNEYS; DUTIES. Among the duties of an attorney are: (1) to observe
and maintain the respect due to the courts of justice; and (2) to abstain from all offensive personality
and to advance no fact prejudicial to the honor or reputation of a party or witness unless required by
the justice of the cause with which he is charged. The Canons of Professional Ethics likewise exhort
lawyers to avoid all personalities between counsel.
2. ID.; ID.; ID.; USE OF INTEMPERATE LANGUAGE UNCALLED FOR IN THE CASE AT BAR;
PENALTY. Whether directed at the person of complainant or his manner of offering evidence, the
remark "bobo" or "Ay, que bobo" was offensive and uncalled for. Respondent had no right to interrupt
complainant which such cutting remark while the latter was addressing the court. In so doing, he
exhibited lack of respect not only to a fellow lawyer but also to the court. By the use of intemperate
language, respondent failed to measure up to the norm of conduct required of a member of the legal
profession, which all the more deserves reproach because this is not the first time that respondent
has employed offensive language in the course of judicial proceedings. He has previously been
admonished to refrain from engaging in offensive personalities and warned to be more circumspect
in the preparation of his pleadings. Respondent is hereby reprimanded for his misbehavior. He is
directed to observe proper decorum and restraint and warned that a repetition of the offense will be
dealt with more severely.

ISSUE:
Whether or not Atty. Edillon should be reinstated as member of the bar.
HELD:

RESOLUTION

PLANA, J.:

YES.
Atty. Jose M. Castillo, complainant, seeks the suspension of respondent from the practice of law for
the use of insulting language in the course of judicial proceedings.chanrobles.com : virtual law
library

RATIO:
Admission to the bar is a privilege burdened with condition. Failure to abide entails loss of such
privilege. Considered in addition was the two (2) years Atty. Edillon was barred to practice law, and
the dictum of Justice Malcolm in Villavicencio v. Lukban that the power to discipline, especially if
amounting to disbarment, should be exercised in a preservative and not on the vindictive principle.
After contrition on the part of the petitioner, the court finds reinstatement in order.

[A.C. No. 2339. February 24, 1984.]

JOSE M. CASTILLO, Complainant, v. ATTY. SABINO PADILLA, JR., Respondent.
Jose M. Castillo for complainant.
Anselmo M. Carlos for Respondent.

SYLLABUS

As the material facts are not in dispute, we have deemed the case submitted for resolution on the
basis of the pleadings of the parties.
Complainant was the counsel for the defendants (and at the same time, one of the defendants) in
Criminal Case No. 13331 for forcible entry before the Metropolitan Trial Court of Caloocan.
Respondent was counsel for the plaintiff. At the hearing of the case on November 19, 1981, while
complainant was formally offering his evidence, he heard respondent say "bobo." When complainant
turned toward respondent, he saw the latter looking at him (complainant) menacingly. Embarrassed
and humiliated in the presence of many people, complainant was unable to proceed with his offer of
evidence. The court proceedings had to be suspended.
While admitting the utterance, respondent denied having directed the same at the complainant,
claiming that what he said was "Ay, que bobo", referring to "the manner complainant was trying to
inject wholly irrelevant and highly offensive matters into the record" while in the process of making
an offer of evidence. The statement of Atty. Castillo referred to by respondent
was:jgc:chanrobles.com.ph
". . . The only reason why Atty. Jose Castillo was included in the present complaint for ejectment was
because defendant Erlinda Castillo wife of this representation called up this representation at his
house and crying over the phone, claiming that Atty. Sabino Padilla was harassing her and
immediately, this representation like any good husband would do in the defense of his wife
immediately went to the school and confronted Atty. Sabino Padilla, Jr. with a talk and asked for a

yes or no answer if he harassed the wife of this representation and if yes, right then and there l
would sock his face."cralaw virtua1aw library
Among the duties of an attorney are: (1) to observe and maintain the respect due to the courts of
justice; and (2) to abstain from all offensive personality and to advance no fact prejudicial to the
honor or reputation of a party or witness unless required by the justice of the cause with which he is
charged. (Rules of Court, Rule 138, Sec. 20 (b) and (f). The Canons of Professional Ethics likewise
exhort lawyers to avoid all personalities between counsel. (Canon 17.)
Whether directed at the person of complainant or his manner of offering evidence, the remark "bobo"
or "Ay, que bobo" was offensive and uncalled for. Respondent had no right to interrupt complainant
which such cutting remark while the latter was addressing the court. In so doing, he exhibited lack
of respect not only to a fellow lawyer but also to the court. By the use of intemperate language,
respondent failed to measure up to the norm of conduct required of a member of the legal profession,
which all the more deserves reproach because this is not the first time that respondent has employed
offensive language in the course of judicial proceedings. He has previously been admonished to
refrain from engaging in offensive personalities and warned to be more circumspect in the
preparation of his pleadings. (CA-G.R. No. 09753-SP, Court of Appeals; Civil Case No. C-7790 CFI of
Caloocan.)
The Court, however, notes that in the case at bar, respondents actuation was triggered by
complainants own manifest hostility and provocative remarks. Complainant is therefore not entirely
free from blame when respondent unleashed his irritation through the use of improper words.

respondents

as plaintiffs in a case then pending before respondent Judge

arose from the first two

paragraphs of the answer of petitioners 4 as defendants, worded as follows: "[Defendant], through

counsel, by way of answer to the complaint, respectfully, represents: 1. The averments of plaintiff's
alleged due organization and existence (par. 1, Complaint) is denied it falsifies the fact of its
creation and operation as an instrument and front for illegal and oppressive usurious loan
transactions; the averments on defendant's personal circumstances (supra) are admitted, with the
qualification that his dealings with plaintiff were based on good faith and reliance on his part, but
taken advantage of by scheming plaintiff. 2. That averments on the alleged loan secured on 3
December 1971 in the sum of P7,270.00 and accessory sums thereon, the supposed demands for
payment and requests for extensions, the alleged failure of defendant to pay (pars. 2, 3, 4, 5 and
6, supra) are specifically denied as fraudulent distortions of the facts and apparent disguises to
confuse and conceal the true agreements between the parties," 5 after which came the affirmative
defenses. The privileged character of such words employed in a pleading on a matter impressed with
relevance, usury being the defense, is not difficult to discern, if, as should be the case, there be
recognition of the basic constitutional right of free expression. So it would be in accordance with an
unbroken line of decisions of this Tribunal. It does appear, therefore, that petitioners are entitled to
the remedies prayed for.
The facts are undisputed. This litigation had its origin in a suit for collection filed by plaintiff Adez
Realty, Inc., now one of the private respondents, seeking the payment of P7,270.00 with 12% interest

WHEREFORE, respondent is hereby reprimanded for his misbehavior. He is directed to observe

proper decorum and restraint and warned that a repetition of the offense will be dealt with more
severely.chanrobles virtualawlibrary chanrobles.com:chanrobles.com.ph

and 25% of such amount as liquidated damages. 6 The principal allegation was that plaintiff, now
respondent, Adez Realty, Inc. agreed to extend to the defendant, now petitioner, Policarpio Mapua
and did deliver to him a loam in the amount of P7,270.00 on the condition that failure to liquidate
such loan on the date due would result in paying not only the principal with interest but the

SO ORDERED.

such overdue debt, hence the filing of this case for collection.

G.R. No. L-39258 November 15, 1982

RAYMUNDO A. ARMOVIT, ROBERTO L. BAUTISTA, OSCAR S. ATENCIO, and POLICARPIO
MAPUA,petitioners,
vs.
THE HONORABLE AMANTE P. PURISIMA, Presiding Judge, Branch VII, Court of First Instance
of Manila, ADEZ REALTY, INC., PILAR I. VDA. DE ZUZUARREGUI, PACITA JAVIER, ANTONIO
DE ZUZUARREGUI, JR., ENRIQUE DE ZUZUARREGUI, and VICTORINO GASKELL, respondents.
Raymundo Armovit, Roberto L. Bautista and Oscar S. Atencio for petitioners.

equivalent to 25% as liquidated damages.

The answer was filed with the alleged

principal indebtedness. 10 The language employed in such answer resulted, as had been stated, in a
complaint for damages filed with the Court of First Instance of Manila before respondent
11

Then came the motion to dismiss, which as set forth, was predicated on the matter

complained of being absolutely privileged.

to such opposition
dismiss,
futile.

FERNANDO, C.J.:

It was then stated that defendant Mapua had not paid

offending paragraphs thereof as duly noted at the outset of this opinion. 9 Moreover, the affirmative
defenses contained the following allegations: "3. The transactions between plaintiff and defendant
are in reality a loan of P5,000.00 secured way back in 1969 earning usurious interest at the rate of
5% monthly, or 60% per annum to the extent that defendant was unable to pay said usurious
interest and at the same time liquidate the principal amount of P5,000.00 by December 3, 1971,
such that 4. On 3 October 1971, plaintiff's jargon and double-talk caused defendant to sign the
alleged promissory note Annex A, Complaint, which plaintiff managed to facelift and veneer as a
lawful deed and agreement, but stripped of its gloss, it is null and void, for being contrary to the
laws policy against usury. 5. Considering the payments by defendant of 5% interest monthly on the
principal since 1969, or P250.00 monthly, until 3 December 1971, defendant had fully paid the

Judge.
Senen S. Ceneza for respondents.

15

14

12

When after an opposition to such motion

13

and a reply

were submitted, the lower court issued the order denying the motion to

this petition was filed with this Court, a motion for reconsideration having proved

16

To repeat, the petition is impressed with merit.

1

The invocation of the constitutional right to freedom of expression in a motion to dismiss an action
for damages flied by petitioners as defendants failed to obtain an affirmative response from
respondent Judge Amante P. Purisima. Hence this certiorari, prohibition and mandamus proceeding,
assailing on jurisdictional grounds the order denying such motion. The alleged grievance of private

1. "The prevailing rule," according to Justice Malcolm in the leading case of Santiago v. Calvo," 17 is
that parties, counsel and witnesses are exempted from liability in libel or slander for words otherwise
defamatory published in the course of judicial proceedings, provided the statements are pertinent or
relevant to the case."

18

Such doctrine was foreshadowed in the earlier case of Zurbito v.

Bayot, 19 decided in 1911. In the language of Justice Johnson: "If the persons presenting the claim
are, in the opinion of those opposing it, attempting to have a claim allowed which should not be
snowed, they have a right to state their reasons therefor, even though such opposition may

hardships.'"30 The language of the then Justice, later Chief Justice, Bengzon in Dorado v.

incidentally reflect upon the honor and credit of the person presenting the claim." 20 A year after the
Santiago ruling, a similar pronouncement came from the pen of another eminent jurist, Justice

infelicities of phrase." 32 It bears mentioning that in Deles, 33 such sentiment was pharaphrased by
Chief Justice Castro in this wise: "Lawyers, most especially, should be allowed a great latitude of
pertinent comment in the furtherance of the causes they uphold, and for felicity of their clients, they

Street in Baron v. David. 21 Thus: "It is clear that with respect to these damages the cross-action
cannot be maintained, for the reason that the affidavit in question was used in course of a legal

Pilar 31 is apropos: "Undoubtedly, lawyers should be allowed some latitude of remark or comment in
the furtherance of causes they uphold. For the felicity of their clients they may be pardoned some

may be pardoned some infelicities of language."

34

proceeding for the purpose of obtaining a legal remedy, and it is, therefore, privileged." 22 The then
Justice, now retired Chief Justice Concepcion in the leading case of Sison v. David 23 restated the
principle: "It is, thus, clear that utterances made in the course of judicial proceedings, including all
kinds of pleadings, petitions and motions, belong to the class of communications that are already
absolutely privileged."

24

As so emphatically stressed by the late Chief Justice Castro in Deles v.

Aragona:" 25 The doctrine of privileged communication is not an Idle and empty principle. It has
been distilled from wisdom and experience."

26

2. It is undoubted likewise, as held in Tolentino v. Baylosis, Justice J.B.L. Reyes being

the ponente,

27

that as to the degree of relevancy or pertinency necessary for the invocation of this

absolute privilege, "the courts favor a liberal rule." 28 He added: "The matter to which the privilege
does not extend must be so palpably wanting in relation to the subject matter of the controversy that
no reasonable man can doubt its irrelevancy and impropriety. In order that matter alleged in a
pleading may be privileged, it need not be in every case material to the issues presented by the
pleadings. It must, however, be legitimately related thereto, or so pertinent to the subject of the
controversy that it may become the subject of inquiry in the course of the trial." 29 He likewise quoted
from the aforesaid Santiago v. Calvo decision: "For, as aptly observed in one case, 'while the doctrine
of privileged communications is liable to be abused, and its abuse may lead to great hardships, yet to
give legal sanction to such suits as the present would, we think, give rise to far greater

3. The language of this Court on the question of what pleadings enjoy absolute immunity is not
swathed in obscurity. Nor has there been only change of mind - far from it. This Court has
consistently adhered to what it had stated with clarity as far as 1911. If at all, the later decisions
had been even more emphatic to dissipate any lurking doubt that the rule of liberality so
unequivocally set forth must be upheld. The principle that calls for application is crystal-clear. The
immunity parties and counsel enjoy is absolute as long as the test of relevance is met. There is
need, it would seem, to keep in mind that as Hokfeld pointed out, the correlative of immunity is
disability. Respondent Judge failed to heed such an imperative. It ought to have granted the motion
to dismiss. Petitioners, to repeat, are entitled to the remedies sought. So this Court has ruled in the
aforecited cases of Zurbito and Baylosis as wen as People v. Andres. 35
WHEREFORE, certiorari is granted and the assailed order denying the motion to dismiss is
annulled. Respondent Judge or whoever may be acting in his stead is prohibited from taking any
further action in Civil Case No. 94551 except to dismiss the same. To that extent, mandamus lies.
No costs.