Dantis V Maghinang

G.R. No. 191696.April 10, 2013.

*
ROGELIO DANTIS, petitioner, vs. JULIO MAGHINANG, JR., respondent.

Remedial Law; Evidence; Burden of Proof; It is an age-old rule in civil cases that he
who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a mere allegation is not evidence.It is
an age-old rule in civil cases that he who alleges a fact has the burden of proving it and a
mere allegation is not evidence. After carefully sifting through the evidence on record, the
Court finds that Rogelio was able to establish a prima facie case in his favor tending to
show his exclusive ownership of the parcel of land under TCT No. T-125918 with an area of
5,657 square meters, which included the 352-square meter subject lot. From the records, it
appears that TCT No. T-125918 is a derivative of TCT No. T-256228, which covered a bigger
area of land measuring 30,000 square meters registered in the name of Emilio Dantis; that
Emilio died intestate on November 13, 1952; that Emilios five heirs, including Rogelio,
executed an extrajudicial partition of estate
_______________
* THIRD DIVISION.
600

SUPREMECOURTREPORTSANNOTATED
00
Dantisvs.Maghinang,Jr.
on December 22, 1993 and divided among themselves specific portions of the property
covered by TCT No. T-256228, which were already set apart by metes and bounds; that the
land known as Lot 6-D-1 of the subdivision plan Psd-031421-054315 with an area of 5,657
sq. m. went to Rogelio, the property now covered by TCT No. T-125918; and that the
property was declared for realty tax purpose in the name of Rogelio for which a tax
declaration was issued in his name; and that the same had not been transferred to anyone
else since its issuance.
Same; Same; Best Evidence Rule; A secondary evidence is admissible only upon
compliance with Rule 130, Section 5, which states that: when the original has been lost or
destroyed, or cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence
and the cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a
copy, or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated.A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance
with Rule 130, Section 5, which states that: when the original has been lost or destroyed, or
cannot be produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the
cause of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy, or
by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of witnesses in
the order stated. Accordingly, the offeror of the secondary evidence is burdened to
satisfactorily prove the predicates thereof, namely: (1) the execution or existence of the
original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or its non-production in court; and (3)
the unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith on the part of the proponent/offeror.
Proof of the due execution of the document and its subsequent loss would constitute the
basis for the introduction of secondary evidence. InMCC Industrial Sales Corporation v.
Ssangyong Corporation, 536 SCRA 408 (2007), it was held that where the missing
document is the foundation of the action, more strictness in proof is required than where
the document is only collaterally involved.
Civil Law; Contracts; Contract of Sale; By the contract of sale, one of the contracting
parties obligates himself to transfer the ownership of, and to deliver, a determinate thing,
and the other to pay therefor a price certain in money or its equivalent. By the contract of
sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer
601
VOL.695,APRIL10,2013
601
the ownership of, and to deliver, a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a
price certain in money or its equivalent. A contract of sale is a consensual contract and,
thus, is perfected by mere consent which is manifested by the meeting of the offer and the
acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the contract. Until the
contract of sale is perfected, it cannot, as an independent source of obligation, serve as a
binding juridical relation between the parties. The essential elements of a contract of sale
are: a) consent or meeting of the minds, that is, consent to transfer ownership in exchange
for the price; b) determinate subject matter; and c) price certain in money or its equivalent.
The absence of any of the essential elements shall negate the existence of a perfected
contract of sale.
Same; Same; Same; An agreement anent the manner of payment goes into the price so
much so that a disagreement on the manner of payment is tantamount to a failure to agree
on the price.In Swedish Match, AB v. Court of Appeals, 441 SCRA 1 (2004), the Court
ruled that the manner of payment of the purchase price was an essential element before a
valid and binding contract of sale could exist. Albeit the Civil Code does not explicitly
provide that the minds of the contracting parties must also meet on the terms or manner of
payment of the price, the same is needed, otherwise, there is no sale. An agreement anent
the manner of payment goes into the price so much so that a disagreement on the manner
of payment is tantamount to a failure to agree on the price.
PETITION for review on certiorari of the decision and resolution of the Court of
Appeals.
The facts are stated in the opinion of the Court.
Vicente D. Millora for petitioner.
Roldan E. Villacorta for respondent.
602
602
MENDOZA,J.:
This is a petition for review on certiorari seeking to reverse and set aside the
January 25, 2010 Decision1 and the March 23, 2010 Resolution 2 of the Court of
Appeals (CA), in CA-G.R. CV No. 85258, reversing the March 2, 2005 Decision 3 of
the Regional Trial Court, Branch 18, Malolos, Bulacan (RTC), in an action for
quieting of title and recovery of possession with damages.
The Facts
The case draws its origin from a complaint 4 for quieting of title and recovery of
possession with damages filed by petitioner Rogelio Dantis (Rogelio) against
respondent Julio Maghinang, Jr. (Julio, Jr.) before the RTC, docketed as Civil Case
No. 280-M-2002. Rogelio alleged that he was the registered owner of a parcel of land
covered by Transfer Certificate of Title (TCT) No. T-125918, with an area of 5,657
square meters, located in Sta. Rita, San Miguel, Bulacan; that he acquired
ownership of the property through a deed of extrajudicial partition of the estate of
his deceased father, Emilio Dantis (Emilio), dated December 22, 1993; that he had
been paying the realty taxes on the said property; that Julio, Jr. occupied and built
a house on a portion of his property without any right at all; that demands were
made upon Julio, Jr. that he vacate the premises but the same fell on deaf ears; and
that the acts of Julio, Jr. had created a cloud of doubt over his title and right of
possession of his property. He, thus, prayed that judgment be rendered declaring
him to be the
_______________
1 Penned by Associate Justice Mario L. Guaria III with Associate Justice Sesinando E. Villon and
Associate Justice Franchito N. Diamante, concurring, Rollo, pp. 89-97.
2 Id., at p. 117.
3 Penned by Judge Victoria C. Fernandez-Bernardo, record, pp. 236-240.
4 Id., at pp. 3-7.
603
603
true and real owner of the parcel of land covered by TCT No. T-125918; ordering
Julio, Jr. to deliver the possession of that portion of the land he was occupying; and
directing Julio, Jr. to pay rentals from October 2000 and attorneys fees of
P100,000.00.
He added that he was constrained to institute an ejectment suit against Julio, Jr.
before the Municipal Trial Court of San Miguel, Bulacan (MTC), but the complaint
was dismissed for lack of jurisdiction and lack of cause of action.
In his Answer,5 Julio, Jr. denied the material allegations of the complaint. By way
of an affirmative defense, he claimed that he was the actual owner of the 352 square
meters (subject lot) of the land covered by TCT No. T-125918 where he was living;
that he had been in open and continuous possession of the property for almost thirty
(30) years; the subject lot was once tenanted by his ancestral relatives until it was
sold by Rogelios father, Emilio, to his father, Julio Maghinang, Sr. (Julio, Sr.); that
later, he succeeded to the ownership of the subject lot after his father died on March
10, 1968; and that he was entitled to a separate registration of the subject lot on the
basis of the documentary evidence of sale and his open and uninterrupted
possession of the property.
As synthesized by the RTC from the respective testimonies of the principal
witnesses, their diametrically opposed positions are as follows:
Plaintiff Rogelio Dantis testified that he inherited 5,657 square meters of land, identified
as Lot 6-D-1 of subdivision plan Psd-031421-054315, located at Sta. Rita, San Miguel,
Bulacan, through an Extrajudicial Partition of Estate of Emilio Dantis, executed in
December 1993 which land was titled later on under his name, Rogelio Dantis, married to
Victoria Payawal, as shown by copy of Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-125918, issued by
the Register of Deeds of Bulacan on September 29, 1998, declared for taxation purposes as
Tax Declaration with ARP No. C20-22-043-07-046. Accord_______________
5 Id., at pp. 28-31.
604
604
ing to him, defendant and his predecessor-in-interest built the house located on said lot.
When he first saw it, it was only a small hut but when he was about 60 years old, he told
defendant not to build a bigger house thereon because he would need the land and
defendant would have to vacate the land. Plaintiff, however, has not been in physical
possession of the premises.
Defendant Julio Maghinang, Jr., presented by plaintiff as adverse witness, testified that
he has no title over the property he is occupying. He has not paid realty taxes thereon. He
has not paid any rental to anybody. He is occupying about 352 square meters of the lot. He
presented an affidavit executed on September 3, 1953 by Ignacio Dantis, grandfather of
Rogelio Dantis and the father of Emilio Dantis. The latter was, in turn, the father of Rogelio
Dantis. The affidavit, according to affiant Ignacio Dantis, alleged that Emilio Dantis agreed
to sell 352 square meters of the lot to Julio Maghinang on installment. Defendant was then
11 years old in 1952.
Defendant Julio Maghinang, Jr. likewise testified for the defendants case as follows: He
owns that house located at Sta. Rita, San Miguel, Bulacan, on a 352 square meter lot. He
could not say that he is the owner because there is still question about the lot. He claimed
that his father, Julio Maghinang (Sr.), bought the said lot from the parents of Rogelio
Dantis. He admitted that the affidavit was not signed by the alleged vendor, Emilio Dantis,
the father of Rogelio Dantis. The receipt he presented was admittedly a mere photocopy. He
spent P50,000.00 as attorneys fees. Since 1953, he has not declared the property as his nor
paid the taxes thereon because there is a problem.
6
On March 2, 2005, the RTC rendered its decision declaring Rogelio as the true
owner of the entire 5,657-square meter lot located in Sta. Rita, San Miguel,
Bulacan, as evidenced by his TCT over the same. The RTC did not lend any
probative value on the documentary evidence of sale adduced by Julio, Jr. consisting
of: 1) an affidavit allegedly executed by Ignacio Dantis (Ignacio), Rogelios
grandfather, whereby said affiant attested, among others, to the sale of the subject
lot made by
_______________
6 Id., at pp. 236-237.
605
605
his son, Emilio, to Julio, Sr. (Exhibit 3)7; and 2) an undated handwritten receipt of
initial downpayment in the amount of P100.00 supposedly issued by Emilio to Julio,
Sr. in connection with the sale of the subject lot (Exhibit 4).8The RTC ruled that
even if these documents were adjudged as competent evidence, still, they would only
serve as proofs that the purchase price for the subject lot had not yet been
completely paid and, hence, Rogelio was not duty-bound to deliver the property to
Julio, Jr. The RTC found Julio, Jr. to be a mere possessor by tolerance. The
dispositive portion of the RTC decision reads:
WHEREFORE, Judgment is hereby rendered as follows:
1.quieting the title and removing whatever cloud over the title on the parcel of
land, with area of 5,647 sq. meters, more or less, located at Sta. Rita, San
Miguel, Bulacan, covered by Transfer Certificate of Title No. T-125918 issued
by the Register of Deeds of Bulacan in the name of Rogelio Dantis, married to
Victoria Payawal;
2.declaring that Rogelio Dantis, married to Victoria Payawal, is the true and
lawful owner of the aforementioned real property; and
3.ordering defendant Julio Maghinang, Jr. and all persons claiming under him
to peacefully vacate the said real property and surrender the possession
thereof to plaintiff or latters successors-in-interest.
No pronouncement as to costs in this instance.
SO ORDERED.9
Julio, Jr. moved for a reconsideration of the March 2, 2005 Decision, but the
motion was denied by the RTC in its May 3,
_______________
7 Id., at p. 205.
8 Id., at p. 206.
9 Id., at pp. 239-240.
606
606
2005 Order.10 Feeling aggrieved, Julio, Jr. appealed the decision to the CA.
On January 25, 2010, the CA rendered the assailed decision in CA-G.R. CV No.
85258, finding the appeal to be impressed with merit. It held that Exhibit 4 was
an indubitable proof of the sale of the 352-square meter lot between Emilio and
Julio, Sr. It also ruled that the partial payment of the purchase price, coupled with
the delivery of the res, gave efficacy to the oral sale and brought it outside the
operation of the statute of frauds. Finally, the court a quo declared that Julio, Jr.
and his predecessors-in-interest had an equitable claim over the subject lot which
imposed on Rogelio and his predecessors-in-interest a personal duty to convey what
had been sold after full payment of the selling price. The decretal portion of the CA
decision reads:
IN VIEW OF THE FOREGOING, the decision appealed from is reversed. The heirs of
Julio Maghinang Jr. are declared the owners of the 352-square meter portion of the lot
covered by TCT No. T-125968 where the residence of defendant Julio Maghinang is located,
and the plaintiff is ordered to reconvey the aforesaid portion to the aforesaid heirs, subject
to partition by agreement or action to determine the exact metes and bounds and without
prejudice to any legal remedy that the plaintiff may take with respect to the unpaid balance
of the price.
SO ORDERED.
11
The motion for reconsideration12 filed by Rogelio was denied by the CA in its
March 23, 2010 Resolution. Unfazed, he filed this petition for review
on certioraribefore this Court.
_______________
10 Id., at p. 247.
11 Rollo, p. 96.
12 Id., at pp. 98-115.
607
607
Issues:
The fundamental question for resolution is whether there is a perfected contract
of sale between Emilio and Julio, Sr. The determination of this issue will settle the
rightful ownership of the subject lot.
Rogelio submits that Exhibit 3 and Exhibit 4 are devoid of evidentiary value
and, hence, deserve scant consideration. He stresses that Exhibit 4 is inadmissible
in evidence being a mere photocopy, and the existence and due execution thereof had
not been established. He argues that even if Exhibit 4 would be considered as
competent and admissible evidence, still, it would not be an adequate proof of the
existence of the alleged oral contract of sale because it failed to provide a description
of the subject lot, including its metes and bounds, as well as its full price or
consideration.13
Rogelio argues that while reconveyance may be availed of by the owner of a real
property wrongfully included in the certificate of title of another, the remedy is not
obtainable herein since he is a transferee in good faith, having acquired the land
covered by TCT No. T-125918, through a Deed of Extrajudicial Partition of
Estate.14 He asserts that he could not be considered a trustee as he was not privy to
Exhibit 4. In any event, he theorizes that the action for reconveyance on the
ground of implied trust had already prescribed since more than 10 years had lapsed
since the execution of Exhibit 4 in 1953. It is the petitioners stance that Julio, Jr.
did not acquire ownership over the subject lot by acquisitive prescription contending
that prescription does not lie against a real property covered by a Torrens title. He
opines that his certificate of title to the subject lot cannot be collaterally attacked
_______________
13 Id., at pp. 37-39.
14 Record, pp. 126-127.
608
608
because a Torrens title is indefeasible and must be respected unless challenged in a

direct proceeding.15
The Courts Ruling
In the case at bench, the CA and the RTC reached different conclusions on the
question of whether or not there was an oral contract of sale. The RTC ruled that
Rogelio Dantis was the sole and rightful owner of the parcel of land covered by TCT
No. T-125918 and that no oral contract of sale was entered into between Emilio
Dantis and Julio Maghinang, Sr. involving the 352-square meter portion of the said
property. The CA was of the opposite view. The determination of whether there
existed an oral contract of sale is essentially a question of fact.
In petitions for review under Rule 45, the Court, as a general rule, does not
venture to re-examine the evidence presented by the contending parties during the
trial of the case considering that it is not a trier of facts and the findings of fact of
the CA are conclusive and binding upon this Court. The rule, however, admits of
several exceptions. One of which is when the findings of the CA are contrary to those
of the trial court.16 Considering the incongruent factual conclusions of the CA and
the RTC, this Court is constrained to reassess the factual circumstances of the case
and reevaluate them in the interest of justice.
The petition is meritorious.
It is an age-old rule in civil cases that he who alleges a fact has the burden of
proving it and a mere allegation is not evi_______________
15 Rollo, pp. 40-44.
16 Hyatt Elevators and Escalators Corp. v. Cathedral Heights Building Complex Association, Inc., G.R.
No. 173881, December 1, 2010, 636 SCRA 401, 406.
609
609
dence.17 After carefully sifting through the evidence on record, the Court finds that
Rogelio was able to establish aprima facie case in his favor tending to show his
exclusive ownership of the parcel of land under TCT No. T-125918 with an area of
5,657 square meters, which included the 352-square meter subject lot. From the
records, it appears that TCT No. T-125918 is a derivative of TCT No. T-256228,
which covered a bigger area of land measuring 30,000 square meters registered in
the name of Emilio Dantis; that Emilio died intestate on November 13, 1952; that
Emilios five heirs, including Rogelio, executed an extrajudicial partition of estate on
December 22, 1993 and divided among themselves specific portions of the property
covered by TCT No. T-256228, which were already set apart by metes and bounds;
that the land known as Lot 6-D-1 of the subdivision plan Psd-031421-054315 with
an area of 5,657 sq. m. went to Rogelio, the property now covered by TCT No. T125918; and that the property was declared for realty tax purpose in the name of
Rogelio for which a tax declaration was issued in his name; and that the same had
not been transferred to anyone else since its issuance.
In light of Rogelios outright denial of the oral sale together with his insistence of
ownership over the subject lot, it behooved upon Julio, Jr. to contravene the formers
claim and convince the court that he had a valid defense. The burden of evidence
shifted to Julio, Jr. to prove that his father bought the subject lot from Emilio
Dantis. InJison v. Court of Appeals,18 the Court held:
Simply put, he who alleges the affirmative of the issue has the burden of proof, and upon
the plaintiff in a civil case, the burden of proof never parts. However, in the course of trial in
a civil case, once plaintiff makes out a prima facie case in his favor, the duty or the
_______________
17 Heirs of Cipriano Reyes v. Calumpang, 536 Phil. 795, 811; 506 SCRA 56, 72 (2006).
18 350 Phil. 138; 286 SCRA 495 (1998).
610
610
burden of evidence shifts to defendant to controvert plaintiffsprima facie case, otherwise, a
verdict must be returned in favor of plaintiff. Moreover, in civil cases, the party having the
burden of proof must produce a preponderance of evidence thereon, with plaintiff having to
rely on the strength of his own evidence and not upon the weakness of the defendants. The
concept of preponderance of evidence refers to evidence which is of greater weight, or more
convincing, that which is offered in opposition to it; at bottom, it means probability of
truth.
19
Julio, Jr. failed to discharge this burden. His pieces of evidence, Exhibit 3 and
Exhibit 4, cannot prevail over the array of documentary and testimonial evidence
that were adduced by Rogelio. The totality of Julio, Jr.s evidence leaves much to be
desired.
To begin with, Exhibit 3, the affidavit of Ignacio, is hearsay evidence and, thus,
cannot be accorded any evidentiary weight. Evidence is hearsay when its probative
force depends on the competency and credibility of some persons other than the
witness by whom it is sought to be produced. The exclusion of hearsay evidence is
anchored on three reasons: 1) absence of cross-examination; 2) absence of demeanor
evidence; and 3) absence of oath.20
Jurisprudence dictates that an affidavit is merely hearsay evidence where its
affiant/maker did not take the witness stand. 21 The sworn statement of Ignacio is of
this kind. The affidavit was not identified and its averments were not affirmed by
affiant Ignacio. Accordingly, Exhibit 3 must be excluded from the judicial
proceedings being an inadmissible hearsay evidence. It cannot be deemed a
declaration against interest for the matter to be considered as an exception to the
_______________
19 Id., at p. 173; p. 532.
20 Estrada v. Hon. Desierto, 408 Phil. 194, 220; 356 SCRA 108, 128 (2001).
21 Unchuan v. Lozada, G.R. No. 172671, April 16, 2009, 585 SCRA 421, 435.
611
611
hearsay rule because the declarant was not the seller (Emilio), but his father
(Ignacio).
Exhibit 4, on the other hand, is considered secondary evidence being a mere
photocopy which, in this case, cannot be admitted to prove the contents of the
purported undated handwritten receipt. The best evidence rule requires that the
highest available degree of proof must be produced. For documentary evidence, the
contents of a document are best proved by the production of the document itself to
the exclusion of secondary or substitutionary evidence, pursuant to Rule 130,
Section 3.22
A secondary evidence is admissible only upon compliance with Rule 130, Section
5, which states that: when the original has been lost or destroyed, or cannot be
produced in court, the offeror, upon proof of its execution or existence and the cause
of its unavailability without bad faith on his part, may prove its contents by a copy,
or by a recital of its contents in some authentic document, or by the testimony of
witnesses in the order stated. Accordingly, the offeror of the secondary evidence is
burdened to satisfactorily prove the predicates thereof, namely: (1) the execution or
existence of the original; (2) the loss and destruction of the original or its nonproduction in court; and (3) the unavailability of the original is not due to bad faith
on the part of the proponent/offeror. Proof of the due execution of the document and
its subsequent loss would constitute the basis for the introduction of secondary
evidence.23 In MCC Industrial Sales Corporation v. Ssangyong Corporation,24 it was
held that where the missing
_______________
22 Sec.3.Original document must be produced; exceptions.When the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, no evidence shall be admissible other than the original document itself, x x x.
23 Santos v. Court of Appeals, 420 Phil. 110, 120; 368 SCRA 91, 98 (2001).
24 G.R. No. 170633, October 17, 2007, 536 SCRA 408, 463.
612
612
document is the foundation of the action, more strictness in proof is required than
where the document is only collaterally involved.
Guided by these norms, the Court holds that Julio, Jr. failed to prove the due
execution of the original of Exhibit 4 as well as its subsequent loss. A nexus of
logically related circumstance rendered Julio, Jr.s evidence highly suspect. Also, his
testimony was riddled with improbabilities and contradictions which tend to erode
his credibility and raise doubt on the veracity of his evidence.
First, the claim of Julio, Jr. that Emilio affixed his signature on the original of
Exhibit 4 in 1953 is highly improbable because record shows that Emilio died even
before that year, specifically, on November 13, 1952. Excerpts from Julio, Jr.s
testimony relative to this matter are as follows:
Atty. Vicente Millora
(On Cross-examination)
Q:You dont remember how old you were when this according to you you witnessed Emilio Dantis
signed this?
A:Eleven years old, Sir.
Q:So that was 1953?
A:Yes, Sir.
Q:And you were then?
A:I was born October 1942, Sir.
Q:You were eleven (11) years old?
A:Yes, Sir.
Q:And you mean to say that you witnessed the signing allegedly of the original of Exhibit 4 when you
were eleven (11) years old?
A:Yes, Sir.
Q:And you remember what was signed in this receipt. From your memory can you tell the title of this
Exhibit 4?
A:What I can say that it is a Sale, Sir.613
613
Q:So, when you said that you witnessed an alleged sale you are referring to Exhibit 4?
A:Yes, Sir.25 (Emphasis supplied)
Second, Julio, Jr.s testimony pertinent to the alleged loss of the original of
Exhibit 4 is laden with inconsistencies that detract from his credibility. His
testimony bears the earmarks of falsehood and, hence, not reliable. Julio, Jr.
testified in this wise:
Atty. Roldan Villacorta
(On Direct examination)
Q:Mr. Witness, I noticed that this document marked as Exhibit 4 is only a photocopy, where is the
original of this document?
A:The original was with the safekeeping of my parents because of the lapse of time the original was
misplaced, Sir.26
The above testimony of Julio, Jr. tends to give the impression that the original of
the document was lost while it was in the possession of his parents. During crossexamination, however, he testified that it was lost while it was in his possession.
Q:x x x Where did you keep that document?
A:I was the one keeping that document because I live in different places, [the said] it was lost or
misplaced, Sir.
Q:In other words, it was lost while the same was in your possession??
A:Yes, Sir.27 (Emphasis supplied)
_______________
25 TSN, dated February 17, 2004, pp. 19-20.
26 Id., at p. 14.
27 Id., at p. 17.
614
614
Still, later, Julio, Jr. claimed that his sister was the one responsible for the loss of
the original of Exhibit 4 after borrowing the same from him.
Q:So, who is your sister to whom you gave the original?
A:Benedicta Laya, Sir.
Q:In other words now, you did not lost the document or the original of Exhibit 4 but you gave it to
your sister, am I correct?
A:I just lent to her the original copy, Sir.
Q:So, you lent this original of Exhibit 4 to your sister and your sister never returned the same to
you?
A:Yes, Sir, because it was lost, that was the only one left in her custody.
Interpreter:
Witness referring to the xerox copy.
Q:In other words, it was your sister who lost the original, is that correct?
A:Yes, Sir, when I lent the original.28 (Emphasis supplied)
The Court also notes the confused narration of Julio, Jr. regarding the last time
he saw the original of Exhibit 4.
Q:And when did you last see the original?
A:When my mother died in 1993 that was the last time I tried to see the original of the document after
her interment, Sir.
Q:Where did you see this document?
A:From the safekeeping of my mother, Sir.29
_______________
28 Id., at p. 18.
615
615
xxxx
Q:When did you get this Exhibit 4 now, the photocopy from your sister?
A:When the interment of my mother in September 1993, Sir.

Q:Now, let us reform. Which one did you get after the interment of your mother, this Exhibit 4 or the
original?
A:I asked that xerox copy because I have lost the original and I could not find the same, Sir.
Q:So, from the safe of your mother after her interment, what used you found and got this Exhibit 4?
A:Yes, Sir, from my sister.
Q:So, not from your mother safe?
A:The original was taken from the safe of my mother, Sir.
Q:So after your mothers death you never saw the original?
A:I did not see it anymore because the original was lost before she died, Sir.30 (Underscoring supplied)
Third, it is quite strange that two receipts were prepared for the initial payment
of P100.00 in connection with the sale of the subject lot. The Court notes that the
contents of Exhibit 4 were similar to those of Annex A 31of Julio, Jr.s Answer,
dated June 9, 2002. Annex A, however, was typewritten and the name of the
recipient indicated therein was a certain Cornelio A. Dantis, whose identity and
participation in the alleged sale was never explained.
Fourth, apart from the lone testimony of Julio, Jr., no other witness who knew or
read Exhibit 4, much less saw it executed, was presented. In the absence of any
shred of corroborative evidence, the Court cannot help but entertain doubts on the
truthfulness of Julio, Jr.s naked assertion.
_______________
29 Id., at p. 17.
30 Id., at p. 19.
31 Record, p. 32.
616
616
Assuming, in gratia argumenti, that Exhibit 4 is admissible in evidence, there

will still be no valid and perfected oral contract for failure of Julio, Jr. to prove the
concurrence of the essential requisites of a contract of sale by adequate and
competent evidence.
By the contract of sale, one of the contracting parties obligates himself to transfer
the ownership of, and to deliver, a determinate thing, and the other to pay therefor a
price certain in money or its equivalent.32 A contract of sale is a consensual contract
and, thus, is perfected by mere consent which is manifested by the meeting of the
offer and the acceptance upon the thing and the cause which are to constitute the
contract.33 Until the contract of sale is perfected, it cannot, as an independent source
of obligation, serve as a binding juridical relation between the parties. 34 The
essential elements of a contract of sale are: a) consent or meeting of the minds, that
is, consent to transfer ownership in exchange for the price; b) determinate subject
matter; and c) price certain in money or its equivalent. 35 The absence of any of the
essential elements shall negate the existence of a perfected contract of sale. 36
Seemingly, Julio, Jr. wanted to prove the sale by a receipt when it should be the
receipt that should further corroborate the existence of the sale. At best, his
testimony only alleges but does not prove the existence of the verbal agreement.
Julio, Jr. miserably failed to establish by preponderance of evidence that there was a
meeting of the minds of the parties as to the subject matter and the purchase price.
_______________
32 Art. 1458 of the Civil Code.
33 Art. 1319 of the Civil Code.
34 Montecalvo v. Heirs of Eugenia T. Primero, G.R. No. 165168, July 9, 2010, 624 SCRA 575, 589.
35 Coronel v. Court of Appeals, 331 Phil. 294, 308-309; 263 SCRA 15, 26 (1996).
36 Manila Metal Container Corp. v. Philippine National Bank, 540 Phil. 451, 471; 511 SCRA 444, 464
(2006).
617
617
The chief evidence of Julio, Jr. to substantiate the existence of the oral contract of
sale is Exhibit 4. For a better understanding and resolution of the issue at hand,
Exhibit 4 is being reproduced here:
Alamin
ng
sino
mang
Makababasa
Akong si Emilio Dantis may sapat na Gulang may asawa naninirahan sa Sta Rita San
Miguel Bul. ay kusang nagsasasay ng sumosunod.
Na ako Tumanggap Kay Julio Maghinang ng P100.00 peso cuartang Pilipino, bilang
paunang bayad sa Lupa niyang nilote sa akin 400 apat na raan mahigit na metro cudrado.
Testigo
Tumangap,
Emilio a Dantis
A perusal of the above document would readily show that it does not specify a
determinate subject matter. Nowhere does it provide a description of the property
subject of the sale, including its metes and bounds, as well as its total area. The
Court notes that while Julio, Jr. testified that the land subject of the sale consisted
of 352 square meters, Exhibit 4, however, states that its more than 400 square
meters. Moreover, Exhibit 4 does not categorically declare the price certain in
money. Neither does it state the mode of payment of the purchase price and the
period for its payment.
In Swedish Match, AB v. Court of Appeals,37 the Court ruled that the manner of
payment of the purchase price was an essential element before a valid and binding
contract of sale could exist. Albeit the Civil Code does not explicitly provide that the
minds of the contracting parties must also meet on the terms or manner of payment
of the price, the same is needed, otherwise, there is no sale. 38 An agreement anent
the
_______________
37 483 Phil. 735, 752; 441 SCRA 1, 20 (2004).
38 San Miguel Properties Philippines, Inc. v. Huang, 391 Phil. 636, 646; 336 SCRA 737, 745 (2000).
618
618
manner of payment goes into the price so much so that a disagreement on the
manner of payment is tantamount to a failure to agree on the price. 39 Further,
in Velasco v. Court of Appeals,40 where the parties already agreed on the object of
sale and on the purchase price, but not on how and when the downpayment and the
installment payments were to be paid, this Court ruled:
Such being the situation, it cannot, therefore, be said that a definite and firm sales
agreement between the parties had been perfected over the lot in question. Indeed, this
Court has already ruled before that a definite agreement on the manner of payment of the
purchase price is an essential element in the formation of a binding and enforceable
contract of sale. The fact, therefore, that the petitioners delivered to the respondent the sum
of P10,000.00 as part of the down-payment that they had to pay cannot be considered as
sufficient proof of the perfection of any purchase and sale agreement between the parties
herein under Art. 1482 of the new Civil Code, as the petitioners themselves admit that
some essential matterthe terms of paymentstill had to be mutually covenanted.
41
The CA held that partial performance of the contract of salegiving of a

downpayment coupled with the delivery of the restook the oral contract out of the
scope of the Statute of Frauds. This conclusion arose from its erroneous finding that
there was a perfected contract of sale. The above disquisition, however, shows that
there was none. There is, therefore, no basis for the application of the Statute of
Frauds. The application of the Statute of Frauds presupposes the existence of a
perfected contract.42 As to the delivery of the res, it does not appear to be a voluntary
one pursuant to the purported
_______________
39 Platinum Plans Phil. Inc. v. Cucueco, 522 Phil. 133, 150; 488 SCRA 156, 172 (2006).
40 151-A Phil. 868; 51 SCRA 439 (1973).
41 Id., at p. 887; p. 453.
42 Rosencor Development Corp. v. Inquing, 406 Phil. 565, 577; 354 SCRA 119, 128 (2001).
619
619
sale. If Julio, Jr. happened to be there, it was because his ancestors tenanted the
land. It must be noted that when Julio, Jr. built his house, Rogelio protested.
WHEREFORE, the petition is GRANTED. The assailed January 25, 2010
Decision and the March 23, 2010 Resolution of the Court Appeals, in CA-G.R. CV
No. 85258, are REVERSED and SET ASIDE. The March 2, 2005 Decision of the
Regional Trial Court of Malolos, Bulacan, Branch 18, in Civil Case No. 280-M-2002,
is REINSTATED.
SO ORDERED.
Velasco, Jr. (Chairperson), Peralta, Abad and Leonen, JJ., concur.
Petition granted, judgment and resolution reversed and set aside.
Notes.The Best Evidence Rule states that when the subject of inquiry is the
contents of a document, the best evidence is the original document itself and no
other evidence (such as a reproduction, photocopy or oral evidence) is admissible as
a general ruleThe original is preferred because it reduces the chance of
undetected tampering with the document; There is no room for the application of
the Best Evidence Rule when there is no dispute regarding the contents of the
documents. (Marquez vs. Espejo, 629 SCRA 117 [2010])
Under the best evidence rule, the original document must be produced whenever
its contents are the subject of inquiry; A photocopy, being a mere secondary
evidence, is not admissible unless it is shown that the original is unavailable.
(Country Bankers Insurance Corporation vs. Lagman, 653 SCRA 765 [2011])
o0o
Copyright 2015 Central Book Supply, Inc. All rights reserved.

Dantis V Maghinang

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

Dantis V Maghinang

Uploaded by

Document Information

Original Description:

Original Title

Copyright

Available Formats

Share this document

Share or Embed Document

Sharing Options

Did you find this document useful?

Is this content inappropriate?

Copyright:

Available Formats

Dantis V Maghinang

Uploaded by

Copyright:

Available Formats

G.R. No. 191696.April 10, 2013.

because a Torrens title is indefeasible and must be respected unless challenged in a

A:When the interment of my mother in September 1993, Sir.

Assuming, in gratia argumenti, that Exhibit 4 is admissible in evidence, there

The CA held that partial performance of the contract of salegiving of a

You might also like