COMMITTEE FOR A RESPONSIBLE FEDERAL BUDGET

Co-Chairmen

Bill Frenzel
Leon Panetta
Memo to: Board and Members
Directors From: Carol Cox Wait
Date: October 15, 2002
Roy L. Ash
Thomas L. Ashley
Nancy Kassebaum Baker SUBJECT: NO BUDGET; NO BUDGET RULES;
Charles Bowsher NO APPROPRIATIONS; NO END IN SIGHT
Jim Cooper
Willis Gradison
William H. Gray, III
Jim Jones End of Session?
Robert S. Kerr, Jr.
James T. Lynn
James T. McIntyre, Jr. Budget debates swing from emergency to ennui and back again. We only
David Minge hope that this is near the bottom of a budget cycle. In the normal course of
W. Henson Moore things, this would be an end of session memo—a quick overview and
Marne Obernauer, Jr. summary of the budget and related matters at the end of the second session
June O’Neill
Rudolph G. Penner
of the 107th Congress. But there is little to summarize and no end in sight.
Tim Penny
Peter G. Peterson Last week, the House passed the Iraq resolution and a continuing resolution
Robert Reischauer to expire December 15. Then they went home to campaign for reelection.
John J. Rhodes We understand that Senator Daschle intends to keep the Senate in session
Alice M. Rivlin
Jim Slattery right through the election—if only a couple of days a week. One thing is
David A. Stockman certain, with a CR that lasts well into December, Congress will be in session
Paul A. Volcker very nearly until Christmas again this year.
Carol Cox Wait
Joseph R. Wright, Jr.
This is not good. Congress is supposed to pass a budget in the spring each
Senior Advisors year. In 1984 and in 1990, Congress completed action on budget resolutions
Henry Bellmon in October. In 1998, the House and Senate failed to reach a conference
Robert N. Giaimo agreement. But the Senate’s failure even to consider a budget at all this year
Elmer Staats is an all time low. This is the first time since the Budget Act debuted in 1975
Robert S. Strauss
that either body has failed to pass any version of the budget at all. And that
failure has thrown a monkey wrench into the whole legislative process.

Carol Cox Wait Congress will be back in a “lame duck” session. They should call it a “lame
President
turkey”, as post-election sessions often are downright embarrassing. If the
elections do little to change the balance of power, there might be a deal on
spending levels and appropriations before the end of the year. If either or
both Houses of Congress changes hands stalemate seems nearly certain and
the new Congress will have to start all over again. In that event, many if not
most government departments could operate on continuing resolutions for the
entire fiscal year. That likelihood may increase if we are in a shooting war.

220 ½ E Street, N.E.*Washington, DC 20002*Tel. (202) 547-4484*Fax (202) 547-4476*CRFB

@ aol.com
Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget page 2
Update October 15, 2002

Budget Outlook under Current Policies

CBO Baseline Budget Projections August 2002 -- $ in billions, Totals may not add due to rounding

Total
FY 2002 FY 2003 FY 2004 FY 2005 FY 2006 FY 2007 2003-2007
Revenues 1,860 1,962 2,083 2,244 2,381 2,513 11,184
Outlays 2,017 2,017 2,195 2,283 2,366 2,461 11,413
Surplus/Deficit -157 -145 -111 -39 15 52 -229
On-Budget -314 -315 -299 -246 -209 -190 -1,259
Off-Budget 157 170 188 207 224 242 1,031
Debt Held By the Public 3,504 3,676 3,805 3,862 3,865 3,829 n.a.

The CBO Baseline almost certainly understates near-term budgetary pressures.

¾ The flat outlay forecast from 2002 to 2003 could be explained by large amounts expended in the
immediate aftermath of 9/11/01. On the other hand, much of the outlay stream from commitments
responding to 9/11 still lay ahead; and “homeland security” continues to provide political cover for
all kinds of proposals to increase spending on everything from aid to State and local governments
to education, transportation, etc.
¾ The discretionary outlay projection is based on new budget authority $5 billion below the
President’s and the House-passed budget levels and $18 billion below the Senate’s current working
assumptions.
¾ The forecast does not take into account other obvious budgetary pressures such as prescription
drugs, tax extenders, Medicare provider reimbursement increases, etc.

Blame Games and Budget Rules

Section 303 of the Budget Act prohibits consideration of any new spending or revenue legislation,
including appropriations, prior to adoption of a budget resolution. In 1998, the House and Senate each
passed budgets and when they failed to reach a conference agreement each took steps to enforce their
own budget resolution. We count it no accident that Congress’ first failure to pass a final budget
resolution coincided with the emergence of budget surpluses and the scramble over how to allocate the
new found resources among competing priorities.

The point of order against violations of §303 can be waived by majority vote. But the Senate has passed
only three appropriations bills: defense, legislative branch, and military construction.

The Budget Enforcement Act also established a number of 60-vote points of order in the Senate but the
BEA expired at midnight on September 30. (More about that later.)
Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget page 3
Update October 15, 2002

The House may consider appropriations bills if no budget is adopted by May 15. The House is supposed
to complete action on all appropriations by June 30. But the House passed only the defense, interior,
legislative branch, military construction and treasury postal bills. Big domestic bills languish because
conservatives insist on enforcing the House-passed Budget and other Members are reluctant to vote for
lower spending for popular programs as they view compromise with the Senate on higher numbers as
inevitable (see Attachment 1, Status of FY 2003 Appropriations Bills).

Democrats point to what they call unrealistically low domestic discretionary spending numbers in the
House-passed budget. Republicans blame the impasse on Senate failure to pass any budget at all.

The budget vacuum forces Congress simultaneously to grapple with overall spending levels and discrete
funding levels for literally thousands of programs, projects and activities. Passage of a budget makes the
appropriations process go more smoothly Committee and subcommittee allocations provide agreed
guidelines and tend to force trade-offs. It is much more difficult to compromise differences in the absence
of agreement on the aggregates.

On the face of it, this year’s differences over appropriations levels are relatively small—

¾ $8 billion on the face of it between the House and Senate;

¾ $5 billion± additional advance appropriations in Senate (but not House) bills; and
¾ $5 billion in “emergency” appropriations contained in the FY 2002 supplemental that passed both
Congress. The President declined to designate those funds “emergencies” effectively vetoing those
expenditures. Clearly, most of that money would have been spent in FY 2003 and the President’s
action may put further upward pressure on total appropriations for FY 2003.

Even if the total difference is $18 billion, that is about 2.5% of discretionary spending and less than one-
tenth of one percent of total Federal outlays.

Those amounts represent only the tip of the iceberg with regard to budgetary pressures and the longer
decision-makers delay the more pressure builds.

In 1998, the United States Budget balanced for the first time in thirty years. Surpluses grew like topsy.
Projected very large surpluses as far as the eye could see eroded budget discipline. Large spending
increases and tax cuts combined with recession and the war against terrorism to turn surpluses into
deficits. Economic and technical change caused about 50% change from surplus to deficit between
Fiscal Years 2002 and 2006—and about 40% of the change over ten years. Tax cuts and spending
increases contributed just about equally to cause the balance of the deterioration. (see Attachment 2.
Reductions in Projected Surpluses Due to Policy Change, 1998-2002) Economic downturns have far
greater impact on revenues than on spending. Tax cuts combined with recession actually to reduce
receipts in nominal dollars. Revenues are not projected to reach or exceed FY 2001 levels again until
FY 2004. (see Attachment 3, Revenue Collections by Source 2001-2003)

.
Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget page 4
Update October 15, 2002

The amounts in the table at Attachment 2 do not reflect costs associated with a prescription drug
program, extending popular provisions in the 2001 tax cut that are due to expire. (see Attachment
4, The Expriation of Revenue Provisions and Effect of Extending Tax Provisions that will Expire
before 2012) Nor do they reflect the potential cost of war with Iraq. (see Attachment 5, Estimated
costs of Deployment to, Combat Operations in, and occupation of Iraq)

In general, Democrats blame disappearing surpluses, the 2001 tax cut and, to a lesser extent,
increases in defense spending. Some suggest that tax provisions not yet effective should be
postponed or repealed. But no one in a leadership position has articulated that view. And most of
the tax cut’s opponents would, if they had the money, use it to finance higher spending on
domestic priorities not to balance the budget

Republicans tend to emphasize the role of rescission and the impacts of 9/11/01 for the swing
from surplus to deficits. Most Republicans argue that the 2001 tax cut came just in time to spur a
lagging economy. Many Republicans argue for further tax cuts to stimulate the economy and
most support making permanent most if not all provisions in the 2001 bill. In general, Republicans
argue that too much spending, not too little revenue causes deficits. On the other hand, many if
not most support some form of prescription drug coverage, defense and education increases, etc.
One final gross generalization: most Republicans would simply spend less than most Democrats
on domestic priorities.

Budget Enforcement post-BEA

Last week, the Committee hosted a roundtable discussion about budget enforcement post-BEA.
Some of the most knowledgeable people in Washington shared their frustration over the decline in
budget discipline and demise of the Budget Enforcement Act.

The budget caps and pay-as-you-go rules that served better than anything else to constrain
budgetary choices expired at midnight on September 30. The 60-vote points of order meant to
strengthen budget enforcement in the Senate also expired. (The House routinely adopts rules
waiving points of order but such barriers proved very effective in the Senate.) There is no
consensus about what should take their place. Senate leaders have attempted, on a bipartisan
basis to extend the pay-as-you-go rules for one year. So far, Senator Gramm has resisted on the
grounds that they do not also extend caps. And without caps, Senator Gramm argues large new
entitlements could be enacted as as part of appropriations bills, while the extended pay-as-you go
rules would stop new revenue reductions. (The Senate probably will not act on these issues
except by unanimous consent so one Senator can block action that appears to have broad
bipartisan support.)

Almost everybody agrees that we need a system to frame broad budget decisions, encourage
trade-offs among competing priorities, to keep spending and tax legislation consistent with
budgetary limits and hold politicians accountable. But there is little agreement about how to
accomplish those objectives and less hope that political leaders will forge such agreement any
time soon.

There is a school of thought that the budget must reach crisis before budgets and budget rules
will command widespread public and political attention.
Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget page 4
Update October 15, 2002

Current deficits—and deficit projections for the medium term future—are not large enough as a
percent of GDP to cause economic harm. Given modest discipline, the budget could even return
to surplus for a brief period of time. But economic growth cannot and will not close the gap
between projected spending and receipts over the longer term and that would be true even if huge
numbers of baby boomers were not expected to retire and exacerbate the problem.

The “fiscal margin” has disappeared. In the past we would put government on automatic pilot and
in a few years revenues would outstrip spending. That is no longer the case.

The challenge is how to set priorities today and leave something for our children and our
grandchildren tomorrow. That will not happen without some sort of orderly budget process. It
cannot happen if the choice remains gridlock or compromises that cut taxes and increase
spending. It will only happen when we return to some sort of orderly budget process and the kind
of hard choices that budget process presupposes. We hope to work with the Administration and
the new Congress toward that end.
Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget Attachment 1
Update October 15, 2002

Status of FY 2003 Appropriations Bills

House Approvals Senate Approvals Conference Approvals

Public
Committee Committee House Committee Committee Senate Conference House Senate Law
Report Vote Vote Report Vote Vote Report Vote Vote
Agriculture
HR5263 House Report 07/11/02 Senate Report 07/25/02
S2801 107-623 107-223
Commerce/
Justice/State Senate Report 07/18/02
S2778 107-218
Defense
HR5010 House Report 06/24/02 06/27/02 Senate Report 07/18/02 08/01/02
Senate 107-532 vv rc 107-213 rc
Committee
District of
Columbia House Report 09/26/02 Senate Report 07/25/02
HR5521 107-716 107-225
S2809
Energy & Water
HR5431 House Report 09/05/02 Senate Report 07/24/02
S2784 107-681 107-220
Foreign
Operations House Report 09/19/02 Senate Report 07/18/02
HR5410 107-663 107-219
S2779
Interior
HR5093 House Report 07/09/02 07/17/02 Senate Report 06/27/02
S2708 107-564 rc 107-201 (29-0)
Labor/HHS/
Education Senate Report 07/18/02
HR5320 107-216
S2766
Legislative
Branch House Report 07/11/02 07/18/02 Senate Report 07/11/02 07/25/02
HR5121 107-576 rc 107-209 rc
S2720
Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget Attachment 1
Update October 15, 2002

Military
Construction House Report 06/24/02 06/27/02 Senate Report 06/27/02 07/18/02
HR5011 107-533 vv rc 107-202 rc
S2709
Transportation
House 10/01/02 Senate Report 07/25/02
Committee 107-224
S2808
Treasury/Postal
HR5120 House Report 07/09/02 07/24/02 Senate Report 07/16/02
S2740 107-575 rc 107-212

VA/HUD Senate Report 07/25/02

S2797 107-222
1st Continuing
Resolution 09/25/02 09/26/02 09/26/02 PL 107-229
H.J. Res. 111 rc uc 09/30/02
2nd Continuing
Resolution 10/03/02 10/03/02 10/04/02
H.J. Res. 112 rc uc
3rd Continuing
Resolution
H.J. Res. 113
4th Continuing
Resolution
H.J. Res. 114
5th Continuing
Resolution
H.J. Res. 115
Committee Committee House Committee Committee Senate Conference House Senate
Report Vote Vote Report Vote Vote Report Vote Vote
Public
House Approvals Senate Approvals Conference Approvals Law
Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget Attachment 2
Update October 15, 2002
Reductions in Projected Surpluses Due to Policy Change, 1998-2002
Totals
1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 1998-2002

CBO 08/1998
Program Outlays 1 3 4 4 4 3 2 1 1 * 1
Revenues 1 1 1 1
Interest
CBO 01/1999
Program Outlays 17 7 2 2 2 1 1 1 1 1
Revenues 1 1 1 1
Interest 1 1 1 2 2 2 2 2 2
CBO 07/1999
Program Outlays 4 7 3 2 2 2 2 2 2 2 2
Revenues 1 1 1 1 1 1 2 2 2
Interest
CBO 01/2000
Program Outlays 32 7 6 6 6 2 2 3 2 2
Revenues 6 8 2 2 1 1
Interest 1 2 3 4 4 5 5 6 6 7
CBO 07/2000
Program Outlays 10 6 6 5 5 4 3 3 2 2 1
Revenues
Interest 1 1 2 2 2 3 3 3 4 4
CBO 01/2001
Program Outlays 12 38 44 41 45 46 49 50 52 54
Revenues 2 2 3 3 3 4 4 5 6 5
Interest 2 4 7 10 13 17 21 25 30
CBO 08/2001
Program Outlays 11 17 15 15 18 18 18 18 21 21 21
Revenues 70 31 84 101 100 126 142 151 158 176 117
Interest 4 9 16 23 31 41 53 65 79 92
CBO 01/2002
Program Outlays 38 45 47 47 49 50 50 51 51 53
Revenues 2 2 3 3 2 2 2 2 2
Interest 1 3 6 9 12 16 20 23 28 32
CBO 08/2002
Program Outlays 16 37 34 36 35 35 37 37 37 38 38
Revenues -43 -40 -30 -4 15 16 16 13 10 7 4
Interest * 3 8 12 14 16 18 21 23 26 29
TOTALS
Program Outlays 1 24 60 34 112 144 138 138 139 143 145 146 143 91 38 1496
Revenues 80 1 53 81 105 151 166 176 181 193 126 4 1317
Interest 2 4 12 27 45 63 80 101 123 145 164 150 29 945
SOURCE: CBO Economic and Budget Updates corresponding with dates above
NOTE: * = less than $500 million
Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget Attachment 3
Update October 15, 2002

Revenue Collections by Source, Fiscal Years 2001, 2002, and 2003 (est)
(In billions of dollars)
Fiscal Year Fiscal Year Fiscal Year
2001 2002 2003a
Individual Income Taxes 994 868 934
Corporate Income Taxesb 174 123 147
Social Insurance Taxes 694 702 735
All Other Taxes 152 144 147
Total 2,014 1,837 1,962
Sources: Congressional Budget Office; U.S. Department of Treasury
a
Projected
b
For the purposes of the comparison in this table, $23 billion in corporate taxes that were shifted from fiscal year 2001 to fiscal year 2002 under the
Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act have been shifted back.
Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget Attachment 4, Page 1
Update October 15, 2002

The Expiration of Revenue Provisions

Effects on Revenues of Extending Expiring Tax Provisions (In billions of dollars)

Total Total
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2003-2007 2003-2012

Provisions in the Economic Growth and Tax

Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001

Provisions expiring in 2010 -1 -1 -2 -2 -3 -3 -3 -4 -125 -228 -9 -371

Provisions expiring before 2010a n.a. n.a. -3 -12 -18 -22 -27 -29 -33 -37 -33 -181

Subtotal -1 -1 -5 -15 -20 -25 -29 -33 -157 -265 -43 -553

New Provisions in the Economic Stimulus Lawb -1 -6 -35 -43 -38 -34 -30 -28 -26 -25 -122 -264

Other Expiring Tax Provisionsc * -1 -5 -9 -14 -18 -20 -22 -25 -27 -29 -140

Total Effect on Revenues -1 -8 -45 -67 -72 -77 -79 -83 -208 -317 -194 -956

Memorandum:

Total Effect on Revenues Excluding the

Economic Stimulus Law -1 -2 -10 -24 -34 -43 -49 -56 -182 -292 -72 -693

Sources: Congressional Budget Office; Joint Committee on Taxation

Notes: n.a. = not applicable; * = between 0 and $500 million

a. Includes the increased exemption amount for the alternative minimum tax (expires in 2004), the deduction for qualified education expenses (expires in 2005), and the credit for individual retirement
accounts and 401(k)-type plans (expires in 2006).

b. The Job Creation and Worker Assistance Act of 2002. New provisions in that law that are scheduled to expire include special depreciation-expensing allowances for certain property, a five-year
carryback of net operating losses, and tax benefits for the area of New York City damaged in the September 11 terrorist attacks. These estimates do not include provisions in the law that had
existed and been extended in previous years. The effects of extending those provisions yet again are included in the line for other expiring tax provisions.

c. Includes numerous provisions, such as the tax credit for research and experimentation.
Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget Attachment 4, Page 2
Update October 15, 2002
Effect of Extending Tax Provisions That Will Expire Before 2012 (In billions of dollars)
Expiration Total Total
Tax Provision Date 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2003-2007 2003-2012

Provisions That Expired in 2001

Generalized System of
Preferences 09/30/2001 -0.3 -0.4 -0.4 -0.5 -0.5 -0.6 -0.6 -0.7 -0.7 -0.8 -0.8 -2.4 -6.0
Subpart F for Active Financing
Income 12/31/2001 -0.3 -1.5 -1.7 -1.9 -2.1 -2.4 -2.7 -3.1 -3.5 -4.0 -4.4 -9.6 -27.1
Treatment of Nonrefundable
Personal Credits Under the AMT 12/31/2001 -0.1 -0.7 -1.0 -1.7 -3.8 -4.7 -5.4 -6.2 -6.8 -8.3 -12.4 -11.8 -50.9

Other Expiring Provisionsa 12/2001 -0.2 -0.4 -0.6 -0.7 -0.8 -0.8 -0.9 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 -1.1 -3.9 -9.5

Provisions Expiring in 2002 and 2003

Total Expiring Provisionsb 2002-2003 0 0.2 -0.2 -0.7 -0.9 -0.9 -1.0 -0.9 -0.9 -0.9 -1.0 -2.4 -6.7

Provisions Expiring After 2003 and Before 2012

Credit for Research and
Experimentation 06/30/2004 n.a. n.a. -0.6 -3.7 -4.8 -5.8 -6.7 -7.4 -7.9 -8.4 -8.9 -14.9 -54.2
Increased AMT Exemption
Amount 12/31/2004 n.a. n.a. n.a. -3.7 -11.2 -15.6 -19.9 -24.0 -26.7 -23.3 -14.9 -30.5 -139.4
Deduction for Qualified
Education Expenses 12/31/2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -2.2 -3.0 -3.1 -3.2 -3.2 -3.2 -3.3 -5.2 -21.2
Puerto Rico Business Credits
12/31/2005 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a. -0.6 -1.5 -1.7 -1.8 -1.9 -2.1 -2.2 -2.1 -11.9
General Expiration of EGTRRA
Provisions 12/31/2010 n.a. -1.2 -1.5 -1.8 -2.3 -2.5 -2.7 -2.8 -4.0 -126.7 -229.0 -9.2 -374.4
c
Other Expiring Provisions 2004-2012 0 0 0 0.2 0.2 -0.5 -1.3 -1.3 -2.1 -3 -3 0.1 -10.7
d
All Expiring Provisions

Total -1.0 -4.0 -6.0 -14.6 -29.1 -38.3 -46.0 -52.2 -58.9 -188.5 -297.1 -92.0 -734.7
SOURCES: Joint Committee on Taxation, Congressional Budget Office
NOTES: AMT = Alternative Minimum Tax, FUTA = Federal Unemployment Tax Act, EGTRRA = Economic Growth and Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2001; n.a. = not applicable

a. Totals of the 2001 expired provisions that cost less than $10 billion through 2012. These provisions include the Andean Trade Preference Initiative, Credit for Electric Vehicles, Credit for Electricity
Production from Renewable Resources, Deductions for Clean Fuel Vehicles and Refueling Property, Net Income Limitation for Marginal Oil and Gas Wells, Qualified Zone Academy Bonds, Rum Excise
Tax Revenue to Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands, Welfare-to-Work Credit, and Work Opportunity Credit.

b. Totals of the 2002-2003 expiring provisions that cost less than $10 billion through 2012. These provisions include the Archer Medical Savings Accounts, Luxury Tax on Passenger Vehicles, IRS (Internal
Revenue Service) User Fees, Tax Return Information for Veterans’ Payments, Brownfields Environmental Remediation, Corporate Contributions of Computers to Schools, Depreciation for Business
Property on Indian Reservations, Indian Employment Tax Credit, and Tax Incentives for Investment in the District of Columbia.

c. Totals of the provisions expiring after 2003 and before 2012 that cost less than $10 billion through 2012. These provisions include Abandoned-Mine Reclamation Fees, Depreciation of Clean Fuel
Automobiles, Authority for Undercover Operations, Transfer of Excess Assets in Defined-Benefit Plans, Credit for IRA (Individual Retirement Account) and 401 (k)-Type Plans, FUTA Surtax of 0.2
Percentage Points, New Markets Tax Credit, and Empowerment and Renewal Zones.

d. The overall totals do not equal the sums of the separate provisions because they include estimated interactions among provisions in 2011 and 2012. Those interactions would occur if all of the provisions
were extended together.
Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget Attachment 5, Page 1
Update October 15, 2002

ESTIMATED COSTS OF DEPLOYMENT TO, COMBAT OPERATIONS IN, AND OCCUPATION OF IRAQ (In billions of 2003 dollars)
Subsequent
Deployment First Month of Months of Combate Redeployment Occupation
Cost Element (Three months) Combatd (Per Month) (Three months) (Per month)
Heavy Ground Force Option Personnel and
Personnel SupportA 4.3 1.4 1.4 4.3 n.a.

Operations Supportb 5.4 7.1 5.4 1.5 n.a.

Transportationc 2.8 0.7 0.7 1.5 n.a.

Total 12.5 9.2 7.5 7.3 1.4 to 3.8f

Heavy Air Force Option

Personnel and
Personnel SupportA 2.7 0.9 0.9 2.7 n.a.

Operations Supportb 4.2 6.2 4.7 1.1 n.a.

Transportationc 1.9 0.5 0.5 1.0 n.a.

Total 8.8 7.6 6.1 4.8 1.4 to 3.8f

SOURCE: Congressional Budget Office
NOTE: n.a. = not applicable
a. "Personnel" includes pay for reserve personnel called to active duty as well as special payments, such as hazardous duty pay, for both reserve and active-duty personnel.
The category also covers subsistence items, such as food and water. CBO's estimate also includes those costs for reserve and National Guard personnel called to active
duty in support of the Persian Gulf operations and to fill in for positions left vacant by troops deploying to the Gulf. "Personnel support" includes clothing and personal items
as well as medical support.

b. This category includes all incremental costs related to the operation and maintenance of air, land, and sea forces involved in the Persian Gulf conflict. It includes costs
associated with the incremental increase in flying hours and steaming days, such as costs for increased fuel consumption and repair parts. Operations support also includes
the costs of equipping and maintaining ground troops and purchasing equipment, as well as the costs associated with command, control, communications, and intelligence.
In addition, the category covers force reconstitution, which includes the replacement of munitions stocks and repair or replacement of damaged equipment--and the
incremental cost of increased depot maintenance for items such as aircraft, tanks, and ships.

c. "Transportation" includes the cost of moving personnel and equipment to the theater of operations from the continental United States and from bases around the globe.
Those costs are incurred by the U.S. Transportation Command, which operates DoD's heavy-lift aircraft, Navy sealift, and contracts for commercial air and shipping.

d. CBO assumes that in the first month of combat, 50 percent of the targets will be attacked by precision-guided munitions (PGMs).

e. CBO assumes that if combat operations continue beyond one month, 10 percent of the targets would be attacked by PGMs.

f. This estimate is based on an average cost per U.S. Army peacekeeper for occupation forces ranging from 75,000 to 200,000 peacekeepers. The estimate could be
significantly larger if the occupation included heavy construction, such as building bases, bridges, and roads. If the United States limited its role to providing logistical
support to other nations' occupying forces, costs could be significantly lower.
Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget Attachment 5, Page 2
Update October 15, 2002

Brief Summary of CBO Paper

The CBO estimates the incremental costs to deploy a force in Iraq to be between $9 billion and $13 billion. The monthly
costs of prosecuting such a war are estimated at $6 -$9 billion. The redeployment of forces back to the United States
over a three month period could be between $5-$7 billion. The incremental costs of postwar occupation, without cost
estimates for reconstruction and foreign aid, would be between $1-$4 billion. The CBO does not make any assumptions
about the duration of the conflict or the occupation.

The total cost estimates of a conflict in Iraq and the aftermath of such a war are very uncertain. Many factors such as: the
actual force size that is deployed, the duration of the conflict, the strategy employed, the number of casualties, the
equipment lost and the need for the reconstruction of Iraq’s infrastructure contribute significantly to the total costs of a war
but cannot be estimated in advance. The CBO has not attempted to include the estimates of these costs nor the
substantial costs of a war in later years because the extent of these costs cannot be assessed and the decisions made
about future policy concerning Iraq are uncertain.

The CBO estimates do include the incremental costs for the operation of two representative force-level options- the Heavy
Ground Option and the Heavy Air Option- being discussed. These are cost estimates of force structures that could
operate during the potential conflict in Iraq and its aftermath. In these estimates the CBO has assumed the forces will be
significantly smaller than those that were previously required by the Department of the Defense for fighting a major theater
war (MTW). Both of these options are significantly smaller than the forces used to fight the Desert Storm campaign.

Heavy Ground Option - The CBO approximates a U.S. force composed of five Army divisions, five Air Force wings, five
Navy aircraft carriers with associated escort and support ships and one Marine Corps expeditionary force.

Heavy Air Option – For this force option the U.S force will be composed of two and one-third Army divisions, 10 Air Force
tactical air wings, five Navy air craft carriers with associated support ships, and about one-third of a Marine expeditionary
force.

(Detailed CBO cost estimates for these force structures can be found in the table.)