Newtonian Studies - Alexandre Koyre

ALEXANDRE KOYRE

Newtonian Studies

CH APM A N & HALL

LO N D O N 1965
First published in 1965

() 1965 by the President
and Fellows o f Harvard College
Printed in Great Britain
for Chapman & Hall Ltd,
11 New Fetter Lane London E.C.4
by Billing and Sons Ltd Guildford and London
Contents
I. THE S IG N IF IC A N C E OF THE N EW T O N IA N
page 5
SY NTHESIS
Lecture, University of Chicago, November 3,1948; pub

lished in Archives Internationales d'Histoire des Sciences
3 (1950), 291-311; reprinted in Journal o f General Educa
tion 4 (1950), 256-268
II.
C O N C E PT AND E X PE R IE N C E IN N EW TO N S
25
S C IE N T IF IC T H O U G H T
Originally published as LHypothese et Iexperience

chez Newton, Bulletin de la Societe Frangaise de Philosophie 50 (1956), 59-79.
III.
N EW TO N AND DESCARTES
53
Study based on a Horblit Lecture on the History of

Science, Harvard University, March 8, 1961.
APPENDICES
Huygens and Leibniz on Universal Attraction

Attraction an Occult Quality ?
c Gravity an Essential Property of Matter ?
D The Void and Extension
E Rohault and Clarke on Attraction
F Copernicus and Kepler on Gravity
G Gassendi on Attraction and Gravity
H Hooke on Gravitational Attraction
I Gassendi and Horizontal Motion
J The State of Motion and the State of Rest
K Descartes on the Infinite and the Indefinite
L God and the Infinite
M Motion, Space, and Place
A
B
115
139
149
164
170
173
176
180
185
188
192
195
198
CONTENTS
IV.
N E W T O N , G A L IL E O , AND PLA TO
201
Read at the IXth International Congress of History of

Science in Madrid, 1959; first published in Actes du IX^
Congres International d'Histoire des Sciences (1960),
165-197; reprinted in Annales 6 (1960), 1041-1059.
V.
AN U N PU B L IS H E D LETTER OF ROBERT HOOKE TO
221
ISAAC N EW TO N
Preface
Published in Isis 43 (1952), 312-337.

VI.
n e w t o n s
r e g u l a e p h il o s o p h a n d i
261
Published in Archives Internationales d'Histoire des

Sciences 13 (I960), 3-14.
VII.
A T T R A C T IO N , N E W T O N , AND COTES
273
Published in Archives Internationales d'Histoire des

Sciences 74 (1961), 225-236.
283
Index
VI
The following collection of Newtonian Studies comprises essays

written during the last dozen years, each illustrating a diSerent
aspect of Newtons scientific thought. Although each one was
written separately and is to be considered independent of all the
others, the ensemble is, nevertheless, unified by more than the mere
fact that each essay deals with an aspect of the thought of the same
man. The central theme is the illustration by means of conceptual
analysis of the way in which fundamental scientific ideas are at the
same time related to the main currents of philosophical thought and
yet determined by empirical controls.
All of these essays save one (Newton and Descartes) have been
previously published, but each is here presented with some addi
tional material. This may consist of slight revisions, additions to
bring certain discussions up to date in the light of current research, or
in some cases merely the citation of recent studies which may add
new dimensions to several of the points discussed.
Three of the essays, Newton, Galileo, and Plato, Newtons
Regulae Philosophandi, and Concept and Experience in New
tons Scientific Thought (originally LHypothese et Iexperience
chez Newton), first printed in French, are given here in English
translation. Newton and Descartes, hitherto unpublished, is based
on the third Horblit Lecture on the History of Science at Harvard
University. I should like to express my thanks to Mr. Mark M.
Horblit, founder of these lectures, and the Committee on History of
Science at Harvard University for the privilege of having been invited
to participate in this series. For publication I have greatly expanded
the text of the lecture and have added a considerable number of notes
and appendices. This study explores but a small part, although a
most significant one, of the relations between these two great men. It
does not go into any details concerning a number of obvious contacts
vii
PREFA CE
between Newton and Descartes. For instance, I do not study the

relations between the geometry of Descartes and the geometrical
methods of Newton which were conceived on the Greek model.
Finally, I should like to express my gratitude to those who have
helped to prepare the manuscript for book publication. Professor
I. B. Cohen of Harvard University, Mrs. Helen R. Kessler and
Mr. Edward J. Collins of Cambridge, Massachusetts and Mme.
Mimica Cranaki Belaval of Paris.
A. K o y re
Paris, 20 January 1964
Professor Koyre died in Paris on 28 April 1964. Prior to his death,

he had carefully gone over each chapter, revising the typescript of
Newton and Descartes, checking the translations of the French
articles, and expanding and rewriting considerable portions of the
articles printed in English. Thus the versions published here represent
his final wishes.
Vlll
Newtonian Studies
I
The Significance
o f the Newtonian Synthesis
It is obviously utterly impossible to give in a brief space a detailed
history of the birth, growth, and decay of the Newtonian world view.
It is just as impossible even to give a reasonably complete account of
the work performed by Newton himself.^ Thus, by necessity, I am
obliged to restrict myself to the very essentials and to give the barest
outline of the subject. Moreover, in doing so I will assume a certain
amount of previous knowledge. It is, I believe, a legitimate assump
tion, because, as a matter of fact, we all know something about
Newton, much more, doubtless, than we know about any of the other
great scientists and philosophers whose common effort fills the seven
teenth century - the century of genius, as Whitehead has called it.
We know, for instance, that it is to Newtons insight and experi
mental genius - not skill: others, for instance, Robert Hooke, were
just as skilled, or even more so than he - that we owe the idea of
decomposition of light and the first scientific theory of spectral
colors;^ that it is to his deep philosophical mind that we owe the
^ The best general account of Newtons scientific work is still F. Rosenberger,
/. Newton und seine physikalischen Principien (Leipzig, 1895). See, however, H. W.
Turnbull, The Mathematical Discoveries o f Newton (London: Blackie, 1945); S. I.
Vavilov, Isaac Newton (Moscow: Akademiia Nauk, 1943), German translation (Berlin:
Akademie-Verlag, 1951); and I. B. Cohen, Franklin and Newton (Philadelphia: The
American Philosophical Society, 1956). The best biography is L. T. Mores Isaac New
ton (New York and London: Scribner, 1934).
The production of spectral colors by crystals and drops of water, and the concomi
tant theory of the rainbow, has a long history and even prehistory behind it extending
through the Middle Ages to antiquity. In the seventeenth century it had been studied
chiefly by Marcus Antonius de Dominis, De radiis visas et lads in vitris perspectivis
et iride tractatus {Wemce, 1611); by Descartes in Dioptrique and Meteores, essays
appended to his Discours de la mdhode (Leiden, 1637); by Marcus Marci, Thaumanthias,
liber de area coelesti deque colorum apparentium natura (Prague, 1648); by F. M. Gri
maldi, Physico-mathesis de lumine, coloribus et iride (Bologna, 1665); and especially by
Robert Boyle, Experiments and Considerations Upon Colours (London, 1664), and
Robert Hooke, Micrographia: or some Physiological Descriptions o f Minute Bodies
made by Magnifying Glasses (London, 1665). To Newton belongs not the discovery of
the phenomenon, but (1) the application of exact measurements to its study and (2) its
N E W T O N I A N STUDIES
THE S I G N I F I C A N C E OF THE NEWTONIAN SYNTHESIS
formulation - though not the discovery - of the fundamental laws

of motion^ and of action, together with the clear understanding of the
method and meaning of scientific inquiry; that it was his invention of
the calculus that enabled him to demonstrate the identity of terrestrial
and celestial gravitation and to find out the fundamental law of
attraction that binds - or at least until recently bound - together the
smallest and the largest bodies - stars and atoms - of the infinite
Universe. We know too, of course, that it is not to him, but to his
great rival Leibniz,^ that we owe de facto the actual spread and
development of the infinitesimal calculus, without which the gradual
extension and perfection of the Newtonian systema mundi would be
impossible.
Besides, all of us, or if not all still most of us, have been born and
bred - or better and more exactly, not born (as this is impossible)
but only bred - in the Newtonian or, at least, a semi-Newtonian
world, and we have all, or nearly all, accepted the idea of the New
tonian world machine as the expression of the true picture of the
universe and the embodiment of scientific truth - this because for
more than two hundred years such has been the common creed, the
communis opinio, of modern science and of enlightened mankind.
Thus it seems to me that I have the right to assume that when we
are speaking about Newton and Newtonianism we know more or less
what we are speaking of. More or less! Somehow this very ex
pression used in connection with Newton strikes me as improper,
because it is possible that the deepest meaning and aim of New
tonianism, or rather, of the whole scientific revolution of the seven-
teenth century, of which Newton is the heir and the highest expres
sion, is just to abolish the world of the more or less, the world
of qualities and sense perception, the world of appreciation of our
daily life, and to replace it by the (Archimedean) universe of pre
cision, of exact measures, of strict determination.
Let us dwell for a moment upon this revolution, one of the deepest,
if not the deepest, mutations and transformations accomplished - or
suffered - by the human mind since the invention of the cosmos by
the Greeks, two thousand years before.^ This revolution has been
described and explained - much more explained than described - in
quite a number of ways. Some people stress the role of experience
and experiment in the new science, the fight against bookish learning,
the new belief of modem man in himself, in his ability to discover
truth by his own powers, by exercising his senses and his intelligence,
so forcefully expressed by Bacon and by Descartes, in contradis
tinction to the formerly prevailing belief in the supreme and over
whelming value of tradition and consecrated authority.
Some others stress the practical attitude of modem man, who
turns away from the vita contemplativa, in which the medieval and
antique mind allegedly saw the very acme of human life, to the vita
activa; who therefore is no longer able to content himself with pure
speculation and theory; and who wants a knowledge that can be put to
use: a scientia activa, operativa, as Bacon called it, or, as Descartes has
said, a science that would make man master and possessor of nature.^
The new science, we are told sometimes, is the science of the
craftsman and the engineer, of the working, enterprising, and cal
culating tradesman, in fact, the science of the rising bourgeois classes
of modern society.^
There is certainly some truth in these descriptions and explana-
explanation as a decomposition (and recomposition) of white light into its colored

components by the prism, in contradistinction to the pre-Newtonian conception that
explained the appearance of the spectral colors by a process of qualitative change
suffered by white light in its passage through a prism. On the history of that question
see Vasco Ronchi, Storia della luce (Bologna: Zanichelli, 1939; 2nd ed., 1952), and
Roberto Savelli, Grimaldi e la rifrazione, Cesalpina, 1951.
* The laws of motion owe their discovery to Galileo and Descartes. See my tudes
galiliennes (Paris: Hermann, 1939); also R. Dugas, Histoire de la micanique (Paris:
Editions Dunod, 1950), and La Micanique au XVII^ slid e (Paris: Editions Dunod,
1954), and A. R. Hall, The Scientific Revolution (London: Longmans, Green, 1954).
^ Nobody doubts today the complete independence of Leibnizs invention of the
differential calculus; nobody has ever doubted the superiority of the Leibnizian sym
bolism. See H. G. Zeuthen, Die Geschichte der Mathematik im XVI. and XVII. Jahrhundert (Leipzig: Teubner, 1903); C. B. Boyer, The Concepts o f the Calculus (New York:
Columbia University Press, 1939; 2nd ed.. New York: Hafner, 1949). Therefore it is
very interesting to note that Professor Hadamard believes it to be just as inferior to the
Newtonian one as the conception of the differential is to that of the fluxion. See
Jacques S. Hadamard, Newton and the Infinitesimal Calculus, in the Royal Society
of London, Newton Tercentenary Celebration (Cambridge, England: University Press,
1947), pp. 35-42.
* See my Galileo and the Scientific Revolution of the Seventeenth Century,

Philosophical Review 52 (1943), 333-348.
* Philosophers are often inclined to misjudge the situation of contemporary philoso
phical positions and - when dealing with the past - to forget that, as often as not and
even more often than not, philosophical (and religious) teachings are not so much
expressing as opposing the prevailing trends of their time.
* The psychosociological explanations of the rise of modern science present us usually
with a mixture of two by no means equivalent theories: (1) modem science is the off
shoot of the technical development of the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries; it was
made by technicians, civil and especially military engineers (Leonardo, Stevinus), by
the proti of the Arsenal of Venice, and so on; and (2) modern science is made by
scientists who, because of the increasing importance of technics and the growing signi
ficance of the bourgeoisie in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries, started thinking
about problems of industry that they had persistently neglected since Archimedes
time. Both these theories seem to me to miss (1) the role of purely theoretical interest in
mathematics which led to - and was maintained by - the rediscovery of Greek science,
N EW T ON I A N STUDIES
THE S I G N I F I C A N CE OF THE N E W T O N I A N SYNTHESIS
tions: it is clear that the growth of modern science presupposes that

of the cities, it is obvious that the development of firearms, especially
of artillery, drew attention to problems of ballistics; that navigation,
especially that to America and India, furthered the building of clocks,
and so forth - yet I must confess that I am not satisfied with them.
I do not see what the scientia activa has ever had to do with the de
velopment of the calculus, nor the rise of the bourgeoisie with that
of the Copemican, or the Keplerian, astronomy. And as for ex
perience and experiment - two things which we must not only
distinguish but even oppose to each other - 1 am convinced that the
rise and growth of experimental science is not the source but, on the
contrary, the result of the new theoretical, that is, the new metaphysical
approach to nature that forms the content of the scientific revolution
of the seventeenth century, a content which we have to understand
before we can attempt an explanation (whatever this may be) of
its historical occurrence.
I shall therefore characterize this revolution by two closely con
nected and even complementary features; (a) the destruction of the
cosmos, and therefore the disappearence from science - at least in
principle, if not always in fact - of all considerations based on this
concept,^ and ib) the geometrization of space, that is, the substitution
of the homogeneous and abstract - however now considered as

real - dimension space of the Euclidean geometry for the concrete
and differentiated place-continuum of pre-Galilean physics and
astromony.
As a matter of fact, this characterization is very nearly equivalent
to the mathematization (geometrization) of nature and therefore the
mathematization (geometrization) of science.
The disappearance - or destruction - of the cosmos means that the
world of science, the real world, is no more seen, or conceived, as a
finite and hierarchically ordered, therefore qualitatively and ontologically differentiated, whole, but as an open, indefinite, and even
infinite universe, united not by its immanent structure but only by
the identity of its fundamental contents and laws;^ a universe in
which, in contradistinction to the traditional conception with its
separation and opposition of the two worlds of becoming and being,
that is, of the heavens and the earth, all its components appear as
placed on the same ontological level; a universe in which the physica
coelestis and physica terrestris are identified and unified, in which
astronomy and physics become interdependent and united because
of their common subjection to geometry.^
This, in turn, implies the disappearance - or the violent expulsion
- from scientific thought of all considerations based on value, per
fection, harmony, meaning, and aim, because these concepts, from
now on merely subjective, cannot have a place in the new ontology.
Or, to put it in different words: all formal and final causes as modes
of explanation disappear from - or are rejected by - the new science
and are replaced by efficient and even material ones. Only these
and (2) the overwhelming importance of the study, and the autonomous evolution, of
astronomy, promoted much less by practical needs, such as the determination of longi
tude at sea, than by theoretical interest in the structure of the universe. Besides, they
forget that mathematicians and astronomers (not to speak of experimental physicists)
need money as much as (or even more than) theologians and jurists and are therefore
likely to stress the practical value of their work in order to sell their science to
wealthy and ignorant patrons. This kind of propaganda is by no means a feature of the
twentieth century: it had already begun in the sixteenth. It is chiefly to his skill and
value as propagandist {buccinator) that Bacon owed his popularity among the seven
teenth- and eighteenth-century scientists. The psychosociological (Marxist and semiMarxist) theory is to be found at its best in F. Borkenau, Der Uebergang vom feudalen
zum biirgerlichen Weltbild(Paris: Alcan, 1934); B. Hessen, The Social and Economic
Roots of Newtons Principia, in Science at the Cross-roads: Papers Presented to the
International Congress o f the History o f Science and Technology Held in London, 1931,
by the delegates of the U.S.S.R. (London: Kniga, 1931); and E. Zilsel, The Socio
logical Roots of Science, American Journal o f Sociology 47 (1942), 544-562. For criti
cism see G. N. Clark, Science and Social Welfare in the Age o f Newton (London:
Oxford University Press, 2nd ed., 1949); H. Grossmann, Die gesellschaftlichen
Grundlagen der mechanistischen Philosophie und die Manufaktur, Zeitschrift fiir
Sozialforschung, 1935, pp. 161 sq. See equally P. M. Schuhl, Machinisme et philosophie
(Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1938; 2nd ed., 1947), and my papers Les
Philosophes et la machine, Critique 23 (1948), 324-333 and 27: 610-629; and Du
monde de Ia peu pres a Iunivers de la precision, Critique 28 (1948), 806-823, re
printed in Etudes d'histoire de la pensie philosophique (Paris: Armond Colin, 1961).
* As we shall see, Newtonian science, or at least the Newtonian world view, asserted
the purposeful character of the world (solar system). It did not explain its features by
deducing them from a purpose. Kepler still used this pattern of explanation.
* Geometrization of space implies necessarily its infinitization: we cannot assign

limits to Euclidean space. Accordingly, the destruction of the cosmos can be charac
terized - as by Miss M. Nicolson - as the breaking of the circle, or - as by myselfas the bursting of the sphere.
* See my tudes galiliennes and Galileo and Plato, Journal o f the History o f
Ideas 4 (1943), 400-428, reprinted in Philip Wiener and Aaron Noland, eds.. Roots o f
Scientific Thought (New York: Basic Books, 1957).
* It has often been said that modern science is characterized by the renunciation of
the search for causes and restriction to that of laws. Yet, as has been shown by P.
Duhem, SQ ZEIN TA 0AINOMENA, Essai sur la notion de la thiorie physique
de Platon a Galilee (Paris: Hermann, 1908), La Thiorie physique: Son object, sa
structure (Paris: Chevalier and Riviere, 1906), this positivistic attitude is by no means
modern but was widely represented in Greek and also medieval astronomy and philo
sophy, which, as often as not, considered the circles, eccentrics, and epicycles of Pto
lemy as pure mathematical devices and not as physical realities. The chief advocate
of that view in the Middle Ages was Averroes; as for Ptolemy himself, he seems to
adopt it in his Almagestum {Mathematical Syntax), though not in his Hypotheses o f the
Planets. On the other hand, as was conclusively shown by E. Meyerson, Identiti et
realiti (Paris: Vrin, 5th ed., 1951), trans. Kate Loewenberg as Identity and Reality
latter have right of way and are admitted to existence in the new
universe of hypostatized geometry and it is only in this abstract-real
(Archimedean) world, where abstract bodies move in an abstract
space, that the laws of being and of motion of the new - the classical
- science are valid and true.
It is easy now to understand why classical science - as has been
said so often - has substituted a world of quantity for that of quality:
just because, as Aristotle already knew quite well, there are no quali
ties in the world of numbers, or in that of geometrical figures. There
is no place for them in the realm of mathematical ontology.
And even more. It is easy now to understand why classical science
- as has been seen so seldom - has substituted a world of being for
the world of becoming and change: just because, as Aristotle has
said too, there is no change and no becoming in numbers and in
figures.^ But, in doing so, it was obliged to reframe and to reform
ulate or rediscover its fundamental concepts, such as those of matter,
motion, and so on.
If we take into account the tremendous scope and bearing of this
so deep and so radical revolution, we shall have to admit that, on the
whole, it has been surprisingly quick.
It was in 1543 - one hundred years before the birth of Newton - that
Copernicus wrested the earth from its foundations and hurled it into
the skies.2 It was in the beginning of the century (1609 and 1619)
that Kepler formulated his laws of celestial motions and thus de
stroyed the orbs and spheres that encompassed the world and held it
together; and did it at the same time that Galileo, creating the first
scientific instruments and showing to mankind things that no human
eye had ever seen before,^ opened to scientific investigation the two
connected worlds of the infinitely great and the infinitely small.
Moreover, it was by his subjecting motion to number that
Galileo cleared the way for the formulation of the new concepts of
matter and motion I have just mentioned, which formed the basis of
the new science and cosmology; concepts with the aid of which
- identifying matter and space - Descartes, in 1637, tried, and failed,
to reconstruct the world; concepts that - redistinguishing between
matter and space - Newton so brilliantly, and so successfully, used
in his own reconstruction.
The new concept of motion which so victoriously asserts itself in
the classical science is quite a simple one, so simple that, although
very easy to use - once one is accustomed to it, as we all are - it is
very difficult to grasp and fully to understand. Even for us, I cannot
analyze it here,^ yet I would like to point out that, as Descartes quite
clearly tells us, it substitutes a purely mathematical notion for a
physical one and that, in opposition to the pre-Galilean and preCartesian conception, which understood motion as a species of be
coming, as a kind of process of change that affected the bodies
subjected to it, in contradistinction to rest, which did not, the new or classical - conception interprets motion as a kind of being, that
is, not as a process, but as a status, a status that is just as permanent
and indestructible as rest and that no more than this latter affects
the bodies that are in motion. Being thus placed on the same ontolo
gical level, being deprived of their qualitative distinction, motion and
rest become indistinguishable. Motion and rest are still - and even
(New York: Dover, 1962), and De Vexplication dans les sciences (Paris: Payot, 1921),
this renunciation has always been temporary, and scientific thought has always attemp
ted to penetrate behind the laws and to find out the mecanisme de production of
the phenomena. I could add that on one hand it was just the search for causal laws
of the celestial motions which led Kepler to his New Astronomy conceived as
Celestial Physics, and on the other hand, that the absence of any theory of gravity led
Galileo to the erroneous conception of gravitation as constant force.
^ Thus Newtons Opticks denies the existence of any qualitative change in the light
passing through a prism: the prism acts only as a sieve; it disentangles a mixture and
sorts out the different rays which compose the white light, already present as such, in
the mixture in which it consists. According to Newton, the prism experiment, like
every good experiment, reveals something which is already there; it does not produce
anything new.
^ De revolutionibus orbium coelestium (Nuremberg, 1543).
^ The first two in the Astronomia nova AITIOAOFHTOZ sive physica coelestis
tradita commentariis de motibus stellae mortis (1609); the third one in the Harmonices
mundi (Lincii, 1619).
^ Sidereus nuncius (Venice, 1610).

* Dialogo . . . sopra i due massimi sistemi del mondo (Florence, 1632) and Discorsi
e dimostrazioni intorno d due nuove scienze (Leiden, 1638).
Discours de la methode pour bien conduire sa raison et chercher la veriti dans es
sciences (Leiden, 1637) and Principia philosophiae (Amsterdam, 1644); but already in
1629 and 1630 in his unpublished Monde ou traite de la lumifere.
* See my Etudes galiUennes.
Motion, therefore, persists sua sponte - just like rest - not needing for its persis
tence either an external or an internal motor, or cause. Accordingly, it persists change
less - as change implies a cause - that is, with the same speed, and in the same direction;
it is to this kind of motion - rectilinear and uniform - that Newton applied the term
inertial ; see Chapter III, Newton and Descartes. The term inertia originated
with Kepler, who gave it the meaning of resistance to change. Accordingly, motion
for Kepler being a change, inertia is resistance to motion; for Newton, for whom mo
tion is no longer change, inertia is the force of resistance to (positive or negative)
acceleration and change of direction.
* The equivalence of rectilinear motion and rest is asserted by Descartes expressis
verbis. In the Newtonian physics relative motion and rest are equivalent; absolute
motion and rest, of course, are not. Unfortunately, they remain indistinguishable,
at least for us, if not for God.
B
9
N E WT O NI A N STUDIES
THE S I G N I F I C A N C E OF THE N E W T O N I A N SYNTHESIS
more than ever - opposed to each other, but their opposition be

comes a pure correlation. Motion and rest no longer exist in the
bodies themselves; bodies are only in rest or in motion in respect to
each other, or to the space in which they exist, rest, and move; mo
tion and rest are relations, though, at the same time, they are con
sidered as states. It is this conception (of the inner difficulties of which
Newton was doubtless quite aware) that carries - and perhaps under
mines - the magnificent structure of classical science and it is about
this motion that in his famous first law or axiom Newton tells us that
corpus omne perseverare in statu suo quiescendi vel movendi uniformiter in directum nisi quatenus a viribus impressis cogitur statum ilium
mutare.^
The motion dealt with in this law is not the motion of the bodies
of our experience; we do not encounter it in our daily lives. It is the
motion of geometrical (Archimedean) bodies in abstract space. That
is the reason why it has nothing to do with change. The motion
of geometrical bodies in geometrical space changes nothing at all;
the places in such a space are equivalent and even identical. It is
a changeless change, if I may say so, a strange and paradoxical blend
ing together of the same and the other that Plato tried - and failed
- to effect in his Parmenides.
The transformation of the concept of motion by substituting for
the empirical concept the hypostatized mathematical one is inevit
able if we have to subject motion to number in order to deal with
it mathematically, to build up a mathematical physics. But this is
not enough. Conversely, mathematics itself has to be transformed
(and to have achieved this transformation is the undying merit of
Newton). Mathematical entities have to be, in some sense, brought
nearer to physics, subjected to motion, and viewed not in their
being but in their becoming or in their flux.^
The curves and figures of geometry have to be seen, and under
stood, not as built up of other geometrical elements, not as cut out
in space by the intersection of geometrical bodies and planes, nor
even as presenting a spatial image of the structural relations ex

pressed in themselves by algebraic formulas, but as engendered or
described by the motion of points and lines in space. It is a timeless
motion, of course, that we are here dealing with, or, even stranger,
a motion in a timeless time - a notion as paradoxical as that of
changeless change. Yet it is only by making changeless change pro
ceed in timeless time that we can deal - effectively as well as intellec
tually - with such realities as speed, acceleration, or direction of a
moving body in any point of its trajectory, or, vice versa, at any
moment of the motion describing that trajectory.
It is a thrilling story, the story of the successful and unsuccessful
efforts of the human mind to formulate these new and strange ideas,
to build up, or, as Spinoza so pregnantly has said, to forge, the new
tools and patterns of thinking and of understanding. It fills the fifty
years that separate the Discours de la methode from the Philoso
phiae naturalis principia mathematica. A series of great thinkers to mention only Cavalieri and Fermat, Pascal and Wallis, Barrow
and Huygens - had made their contributions to the final success,
and without them the Principia would not have been written; the
task would have been too arduous, even for Newton, qui genus humanum ingenio superavit.^
Thus, modifying somewhat the celebrated statement of Newton,
made in his famous letter to Robert Hooke, we could, with truth,
say that if Newton saw as far as he did, and so much farther than
anybody had seen before him, it was because he was a giant standing
on the shoulders of other giants.^
The physicomathematical current I have just been sketching is cer
tainly the most original and most important trend of seventeenthcentury scientific thought. Yet, parallel to it there runs another one,
less mathematical, less deductive, more empirical and experimental.
Being less pretentious (or more diffident), it does not attempt the
sweeping generalizations of the mathematicians. It views them with
misgiving and even with hostility and it restricts itself to the dis
covery of new facts and to the building up of partial theories explain
ing them.
This current is inspired not by the Platonic idea of the mathe-
' Every body perseveres in its state of rest, or of uniform motion in a right line, un
less it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed upon it (Isaac Newton,
Philosophiae naturalisprincipia mathematica, axiomata sive leges motus. Lex 1). Accord
ing to this law, whereas motion is a state, acceleration is a change. Circular motion,
being an accelerated one because it implies a continuous change of direction, is, there
fore, easily recognizable and distinguishable from rest. E. Mach in his famous criticism
of Newton seems to have overlooked this simple fact; see The Science o f Mechanics,
trans. T. J. McCormack (La Salle, Illinois: Open Court, 1942), pp. 276-285.
See Hadamard, Newton and the Infinitesimal Calculus, and Boyer, The Con
cepts of the Calculus.
10
* Zeuthen, Die Geschichte der Mathematik im XVI. und XVII. Jahrhundert; L.

Brunschvicg, Les Stapes de la philosophic mathematique (Paris: Alcan, 1912).
* This famous phrase is not Newtons invention, but originates in the Middle Ages
with Bernard of Chartres and was used also in the sixteenth and seventeenth centuries;
see Chapter V, p. 227, n. 3.
11
matical structure and determination of being, but by the Lucretian,

Epicurean, Democritean conception of its atomic composition
(strange as it may seem, most modern ideas lead back to some old
Greek fancy). Gassendi, Roberval, Boyle (the best representative of
their group), Hooke - they all oppose the more timid, more cautious,
and more secure corpuscular philosophy to the panmathematism of
Galileo and Descartes.^
Thus when Galileo tells us that the book of nature - that book in
which the medieval mind perceived the vestigia and the imagines Dei
and read the glory of God expressed in sensible symbols of beauty
and splendor revealing the hidden meaning and aim of the creation was, in truth, written in geometrical characters, in circles, triangles,
and squares, and only told us the intellectually marvelous story of
rational connection and order, Boyle protests: the book of nature,
said he, was certainly a well-contrived romance of which every part,
written in the stenography of Gods omniscient hand, stood in
relation to every other; but it was written not in geometrical but in
corpuscular characters.
Not mathematical structure but corpuscular texture formed for
him the inner reality of being. In the explanation of the universe we
have to start with - or stop at - matter, not homogeneous Cartesian
matter, but matter already formed by God into various, diversely de
termined corpuscles. These are the letters which motion forms into
the words of the divine romance.
Looking at things from this perspective we see quite clearly that
Newton presents us with a synthesis of both trends, of both views.
For him, just as for Boyle, the book of nature is written in corpus
cular characters and words. But, just as for Galileo and Descartes,
it is a purely mathematical syntax that binds them together and gives
its meaning to the text of the book.
Thus, in contradistinction to the world of Descartes, the world of
Newton is conceived as composed not of two (extension and motion)
but of three elements: (1) matter, that is, an infinite number of
mutually separated and isolated, hard and unchangeable - but not
identical - particles; (2) motion, that strange and paradoxical relationstate that does not affect the particles in their being, but only trans-
ports them hither and thither in the infinite, homogeneous void; and
(3) space, that is, this very infinite and homogeneous void in which,
unopposed, the corpuscles (and the bodies built of them) perform
their motions.^
There is, of course, a fourth component in that Newtonian world,
namely, attraction which binds and holds it together.^ Yet this is not
an element of its construction; it is either a hyperphysical power Gods action - or a mathematical stricture that lays down the rule
of syntax in Gods book of nature.^
The introduction of the void - with its correlative, attraction - in
to the world view of Newton, in spite of the tremendous physical
and metaphysical difficulties involved by this conception (action at a
distance; existence of the nothing), was a stroke of genius and a
step of decisive importance. It is this step that enabled Newton to
oppose and unite at the same time - and to do it really, and not
seemingly, like Descartes - the discontinuity of matter and the con
tinuity of space. The corpuscular structure of matter, emphatically
asserted, formed a firm basis for the application of mathematical
dynamics to nature.^ It yielded the fundamenta for the relations ex
pressed by space. The cautious corpuscular philosophy did not really
know what it was doing. But, as a matter of fact, it had been only
showing the way to the Newtonian synthesis of mathematics and
experiment.
* See K. Lasswitz, Geschichte der Atomistik (Leipzig, 1890), vol. II; R. Lenoble,
Mersenne et la naissance du mecanisme (Paris: Vrin, 1943); Marie Boas, The Estab
lishment of the Mechanical Philosophy, Osiris 10 (i952), 412-541; and E. J. Dijksterhuis. Die Mechanisierung des Weltbildes (Berlin: Springer, 1956), trans. C. Dikshoorn
as The Mechanization o f the World Picture (Oxford; Clarendon Press, 1961).
12
^ On Newtons conception of space, see Leon Bloch, La Philosophie de Newton

(Paris: Alcan, 1908); E. A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations o f Modern Physical
Science (London; Kegan Paul, 1925; 2nd ed., 1932); H61^ne Metzger, Attraction
universelle et religion naturelle chez quelques commentateurs anglais de Newton (Paris:
Hermann, 1938); also Max Jammer, Concepts o f Space (Cambridge, Mass.; Harvard
University Press, 1954); Markus Fierz, Ueber den Ursprung und die Bedeutung der
Lehre Isaac Newtons vom absoluten Raum, Gesnerus 11 (1954), 62-120; and my
From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1957).
See also A. J. Snow, Matter and Gravity in Newtons Physical Philosophy (New York:
Oxford University Press, 1926), and Stephen E. Toulmin, Criticism in the History of
Science: Newton on Absolute Space, Time and Motion, The Philosophical Review
(1959). Space for Newton (as for Henry More or Thomas Bradwardine) is the eter
nal realm of Gods presence and action - not only his sensorium but also, if one
may say so, his actorium.
* To be quite correct, I should mention also the repulsive forces that hold the cor
puscles apart and prevent them from gathering together in a cluster. However, these
repulsive forces are short-range forces, and, though very important in physics, they
play no role in the building of the universe so long as they are not used for the formu
lation of a theory of aether whose action on the bodies explains gravitation; see
Chapter III, Apps. A and B.
* As a matter of fact, it is both: a hyperphysical power acting according to a strict
mathematical law.
* The physics of central forces necessarily involves an atomic structure of matter,
even if the matter is reduced to mere points, as by Boscovich.
13
THE S I G N I F I C A N CE OF THE N EWT ON I A N SYNTHESIS
The void... action through the void.,. action at a distance (attrac

tion)-it was against these features and implications of the Newtonian
world view that the opposition of the great Continental contempor
aries of Newton - Huygens, Leibniz, Bernoulli - well trained in the
Cartesian rejection of unclear and unintelligible ideas, was directed.^
In his famous, brilliant Lettres anglaises, or, to give them their
official title, Lettres philosophiques^ - readable even today - Voltaire
very wittily sums up the situation: a Frenchman who arrives in Lon
don finds himself in a completely changed world. He left the world
full; he finds it empty. In Paris the universe is composed of vortices
of subtle matter; in London there is nothing of that kind. In Paris
everything is explained by pressure which nobody understands; in
London by attraction which nobody understands either.^
Voltaire is perfectly right: the Newtonian world is chiefly com
posed of void.^ It is an infinite void, and only a very small part of it
- an infinitesimal part - is filled up, or occupied, by matter, by
bodies which, indifferent and unattached, move freely and perfectly
unhampered in - and through - that boundless and bottomless abyss.
And yet it is a world and not a chaotic congeries of isolated and
mutually alien particles. This, because all of these are bound together
by a very simple mathematical law of connection and integration the law of attraction - according to which every one o f them is re
lated to and united with every o th e r .Thus each one takes its part
and plays its role in the building of the systema mundi.
The universal application of the law of attraction restores the
physical unity of the Newtonian universe and, at the same time, gives
it its intellectual unity. Identical relations hold together identical
contents. In other words, it is the same set of laws which governs all
the motions in the infinite universe: that of an apple which falls to
the ground and that of the planets which move round the sun. More
over, the very same laws explain not only the identical pattern (dis
covered by Kepler) of the celestial motions but even their individual
differences, not only the regularities, but also the irregularities (in
equalities). All the phenomena which for centuries baffled the sagacity
of astronomers and physicists (such, for instance, as tides) appear as a
result of the concatenation and combination of the same fundamental
laws.
The Newtonian law of attraction according to which its force
diminishes in proportion to the square of the distance is not only the
only law of that kind that explains the facts but, besides, is the only
one that can be uniformly and universally applied to large and small
bodies, to apples and to the moon. It is the only one, therefore, that
it was reasonable for God to have adopted as a law of creation.
Yet, in spite of all this, in spite of the rational plausibility and
^ The criticism of the conception of attraction was made by Descartes in his attack
on Roberval, who asserted universal attraction in his Aristarchi Sami De mundi systemate partibus et motibus eiusdem libellus cum notis. Addictae sunt /E. P. de Roberval
notae in eundem libellum (Paris, 1644), reissued by Mersenne in his Novarum observationum physico-mathematicarum (Paris, 1644), vol. III. Descartes points out (see his
letter to Mersenne of 20 April 1646, Oeuvres, ed. C. Adam and P. Tannery (Paris,
1897-1913), IV, 401) that, in order to be able to attract body B, body A should know
where to find it. Attraction, in other words (as W. Gilbert and also Roberval recog
nized without considering it an objection), involves animism. (See Chapter III, p.
59, n. 2.)
* The Lettres philosophiques were published first in English, under the title Letters
Concerning the English Nation (London, 1733); then in French under the title Lettres
philosophiques par M. de Voltaire (Amsterdam [in fact Rouen, by lore], 1734) and
Lettres icrites de Londres sur les anglais par M. de Voltaire (Basel [in fact London],
1734). Numerous other editions, more or less modified by Voltaire, followed. See the
introduction of G. Lanson to his critical edition of these letters: Lettres philosophiques,
2 vols. (Paris: Comely, 1909; 3rd ed., 1924). On Voltaire and Newton see Bloch La
Philosophie de Newton; Pierre Brunet, L'Introduction des theories de Newton en France
(Paris: Blanchard, 1931), vol. I; and R. Dugas, Histoire de la micanique au XVII
slid e (Paris: Dunod fiditeur, 1954).
It is well known that Voltaire had been converted to Newtonianism by Maupertuis
who, as Huygens did for Locke, assured him that the Newtonian philosophy of attrac
tion was tme. Maupertuis even agreed to read through the letters (XIV and XV) deal
ing with Descartes and Newton. On Maupertuis see Pierre Bmnet, Maupertuis (Paris:
Blanchard, 1929).
* See letter XIV, Lanson edition, II, 1.
* Not only are the heavenly spaces empty and void, but even the so-called solid
bodies are full of void. The particles that compose them are by no means closely
packed together, but are separated from one another by void space. The Newtonians,
from Bentley on, took an enormous pride and pleasure in pointing out that matter
proper occupies a practically infinitesimal part of space.
14
* According to Newton, only these corpuscular attractions, whatever they may be,
are real. Their resultants are by no means real forces, but only mathematical ones.
Thus, it is not the earth that attracts the moon, but each and every particle of the earth
attracts each and every particle of the moon. The resultant global attraction has no
other than mathematical existence.
* The famous story according to which Newtons thinking on gravitation had been
aroused by the sight of an apple falling to the ground, which has been treated as legend
by generations of historians, appears to be perfectly true, as has been convincingly
demonstrated by J. Pelseneer in La Pomme de Newton, d e l et terre 53 (1937),
190-193; see also Lychnos (1938), 366-371. See also I. B. Cohen, Authenticity of
Scientific Anecdotes, Nature 157 (1946), 196-197, and D. McKie and G. R. de Beer,
Newtons Apple, Notes and Records o f the Royal Society 9 (1951-52), 46-54, 333335.
The inverse-square law of the diminishing of attraction with distance is the only one
which makes possible a direct comparison between the earths attraction of an apple
and the earths attraction of the moon, because it is the only one according to which
the earth, or, generally, a spherical body, attracts all external bodies, irrespective of
their distance from it, as if all its mass were concentrated in its center. It is true that it
shares this mathematical property with another law, namely the one according to
which the force of attraction increases proportionally to the distance. But as in this
case all celestial bodies would accomplish their circuits in the same time, it is obviously
not the law of our world.
15
mathematical simplicity of the Newtonian law (the inverse-square

law is simply the law of extension of spherical surfaces identical with
that of the propagation of light), there was in it something that
baffled the mind. Bodies attract each other, act upon each other (or,
at least, behave as if they did). But how do they manage to perform
this action, to overcome the chasm of the void that so radically separ
ates and isolates them from each other? We must confess that no
body, not even Newton, could (or can) explain, or understand, this
how.
Newton himself, as we well know, never admitted attraction as a
physical force. Time and again he said, and repeated, that it was
only a mathematical force, that it was perfectly impossible - not
only for matter but even for God - to act at a distance, that is, to
exert action where the agent was not present; that the attractive
force, therefore - and this gives us a singular insight into the limits
of the so-called Newtonian empiricism - was not to be considered
as one of the essential and fundamental properties of bodies (or
matter), one of these properties such as extension, mobility, im
penetrability, and mass, which could neither be diminished nor in
creased;^ that it was a property to be explained; that he could not do
it,2 and that, as he did not want to give a fanciful explanation when
lacking a good theory, and as science (mathematical philosophy
of nature) could perfectly well proceed without one, he preferred
to give none (this is one meaning of his celebrated Hypotheses non
jingo), and leave the question open. Yet, strange, or natural, as it
may seem, nobody - with the single exception of Colin Maclaurin
- followed him in that point. The very first generation of his pupils
(Cotes, Keill, Pemberton) accepted the force of attraction as a real,
physical, and even primary property of matter and it was their
doctrine which swept over Europe and which was so strongly and
persistently opposed by Newtons Continental contemporaries.
Newton did not admit action at a distance. Yet, as Maupertuis

and Voltaire very reasonably pointed out, from the point of view of
purely empirical knowledge (which seemed to be the point of view of
Newton), the ontological distinction between the attraction and the
other properties of bodies could not be justified. We do not, of
course, understand attraction. But do we understand the other
properties? Not understanding is not a reason to deny a fact.^ Now
attraction is a fact. Thus we have to admit it just as we are admitting
other facts or properties of bodies. Who knows, besides, what un
known properties we may discover as pertaining to them? Who
knows with what sort of properties God has endowed matter?
The opposition to Newtonianism - understood as physics - was
in the beginning deep and strong. But gradually it crumbled away.
The system worked and proved its worth. And as for attraction,
progressively it lost its strangeness. As Mach has very finely ex
pressed it, the uncommon incomprehensibility became a com
mon incomprehensibility. Once used to it, people - with very few
exceptions - did not speculate about it any more. Thus fifty years
after the publication, in 1687, of the Philosophiae naturalis principia
mathematica - a title just as daring and just as consciously challeng
ing as the Physica coelestis of Kepler eighty years earlier or the
Evolution creatrice of Bergson two hundred years later - the leading
physicists and mathematicians of Europe - Maupertuis, Clairaut,
DAlembert, Euler, Lagrange, and Laplace - diligently began the
work of perfecting the structure of the Newtonian world, of deve
loping the tools and methods of mathematical and experimental
investigation (Desaguliers, sGravesande, and Musschenbroek),
and of leading it from success to success, till, by the end of the
eighteenth century, in the Mecanique analytique of Lagrange and the
Mecanique cileste of Laplace, the Newtonian science seemed to
reach its final and definitive perfection - such a perfection that
^ A property which can be neither increased nor diminished belongs to the essence
of the thing.
* As a matter of fact he tried - three times - to do it, that is, to explain attraction by
aetherical pressure. See Philip E. B. Jourdain, Newtons Hypotheses of Ether and
Gravitation, The Monist 25 (1915).
The famous Hypotheses nonfingo of the General Scholium of his second edition of
the Principia does not mean a condemnation of all hypotheses in science but only of
those that cannot be proved or disproved by mathematically treated experiment,
specifically, of global qualitative explanations such as were attempted by Descartes.
This pejorative meaning of the term coexists in Newton with a nonpejorative one
(in the first edition of the Principia the axioms or laws of motion are called hypo
theses) and is certainly inherited by him from Barrow and Wallis, or even from
Galileo.
^ For Malebranche as well as for Locke, all action of a body upon another - com
munication of motion - was understandable.
* See Brunet, L'Introduction des theories de Newton en France, vol. I.
* J. T. Desaguliers, Physicomechanical Lectures (London, 1717), in French transla
tion (Paris, 1717); A System o f Experimental Philosophy (London, 1719); A Course o f
Experimental Philosophy (London, 1725; 2nd ed. in 2 vols., London, 1744-1745);
W. J. sGravesande, Physices elementa mathematica experiments confirmata, sive introductio adphilosophiam Newtonianam, 2 vols. (Leiden, 1720-1721); Philosophiae
Newtonianae institutiones (Leiden, 1728); Aliments de physique ou introduction d la
philosophie de Newton (Paris, 1747); Petrus Musschenbroek, Epitome elementorum
physicomathematicorum {Leiden, 1726); Elementa physices (Leiden, 1734). See Pierre
Brunet, Les Physiciens hollandais et la mithode expirimentale en France au X V Ill sidcle
(Paris: Blanchard, 1926).
16
17
THE S I G N I F I C A N C E OF THE N E WT O N I A N SYNTHESIS
Laplace could proudly assert that his System o f the World left no
astronomical problem unsolved.
So much for the mathematicians and scientists. As for the others,
for those who could not understand the difficult intricacies of geo
metrical and infinitesimal reasoning and who, like Locke (reassured
by Huygens), took them for granted, there came forth a series of
books - and very good ones - such as Pembertons View o f Sir Isaac
Newtons Philosophy (London, 1728; French translation, Paris, 1755),
Voltaires Lettres philosophiques (1734) and Elements de la philosophie de Newton (Amsterdam, 1738), Algarottis II Newtonianismo
per le dame (Naples [Milan], 1737; 2nd ed., 1739; French transla
tion, Paris, 1738), Colin Maclaurins Account o f Sir Isaac Newton's
Philosophical Discoveries (London, 1746; French translation, Paris,
1749),^ Eulers Lettres a une princesse d'Allemagne (St. Petersburg,
1768-1772), and finally Laplaces Systeme du monde (1796), which
in a clear and accessible language preached to the honnete homme,
and even to the honnete femme, the Newtonian gospel of mathematicophysical and experimental science.
No wonder that (in a curious mingling with Lockes philosophy)
Newtonianism became the scientific creed of the eighteenth century,
and that already for his younger contemporaries, but especially for
posterity, Newton appeared as a superhuman being^ who, once and
for ever, solved the riddle of the universe.
Thus it was by no means in a spirit of flattery but in that of deep
and honest conviction that Edmund Halley wrote, nec fas est propius
Mortali attingere Divos.^ Did not, a hundred years later, Laplace,
somewhat regretfully, assign to the Principia the pre-eminence above
all other productions of the human mind ? Indeed, as Lagrange some
what wistfully put it, there being only one universe to be explained,
nobody could repeat the act of Newton, the luckiest of mortals.
Small wonder that, at the end of the eighteenth century, the cen
tury that witnessed the unfettered progress of Newtonian science.
Pope could exclaim:
Nature and natures laws lay hid in night;

God said. Let Newton be! and all was light.
* All these books, when not written in French, were immediately translated into it
and thus made accessible to all educated people throughout Europe.
* For Voltaire, as well as for Condorcet, Locke and Newton represent the summits
of science and philosophy.
* It is well known that the Marquis de LHopital asked - quite seriously - if Newton
ate and slept like other mortals.
* Nearer the gods no mortal may approach ; Isaac Newton, an Ode, trans.
Leon J. Richardson in Sir Isaac Newton's Mathematical Principles o f Natural Philo
sophy, trans. Andrew Motte, ed. Florian Cajori (Berkeley: University of California
Press, 1947), p. xv.
18
Pope could not know indeed that

T was not for long: for Devil, howling, Ho,
Let Einstein be! restored the status quo.
But let us now come back to Newton. It has often been said that
the unique greatness of Newtons mind and work consists in the com
bination of a supreme experimental with a supreme niathematical
genius. It has often been said, too, that the distinctive feature of the
Newtonian science consists precisely in the linking together of mathe
matics and experiment, in the mathematical treatment of the phen
omena, that is, of the experimental or (as in astronomy, where we
cannot perform experiments) observational data. Yet, though doubt
less correct, this description does not seem to me to be a complete
one: thus there is certainly much more in the mind of Newton than
mathematics and experiment; there is, for instance - besides religion
and mysticism - a deep intuition for the limits of the purely mechan
ical interpretation of nature.^ And as for Newtonian science, built,
as I have already mentioned, on the firm basis of corpuscular philo
sophy, it follows, or, better, develops and brings to its utmost
perfection, the very particular logical pattern (by no means iden
tical with mathematical treatment in general) of atomic analysis of
global events and actions, that is, the pattern of reducing the given
data to the sum total of the atomic, elementary components (into
which they are in the first place dissolved).
The overwhelming success of Newtonian physics made it prac
tically inevitable that its particular features became thought of as
essential for the building of science - of any kind of science - as
such, and that all the new sciences that emerged in the eighteenth
century - sciences of man and of society - tried to conform to the
Newtonian pattern of empirico-deductive knowledge, and to abide
by the rules laid down by Newton in his famous Regulae philosophandi, so often quoted and so often misunderstood.^ The results of
^ It seems to me quite certain that Newton arrived at the conclusion that a purely
mechanical explanation of attraction was perfectly impossible because, in order to do
so, he had to postulate another - less awkward, yet still nonmechanical - power,
namely, that of repulsion.
^ Thus (see p. 15, n. 1) the global effect of a body acting upon another body is the
sum total of atomic actions.
On the Regulae philosophandi, see Chapter VI.
19
this infatuation with Newtonian logic, that is, the results of the un
critical endeavor mechanically to apply Newtonian (or rather pseudo
Newtonian) methods to fields quite different from that of their
original application, have been by no means very happy, as we shall
presently see. Yet, before turning our attention to these, in a certain
sense illegitimate, offshoots of Newtonianism, we have to dwell for a
moment upon the more general and more diffuse consequences of
the universal adoption of the Newtonian synthesis, of which the
most important seems to have been the tremendous reinforcement of
the old dogmatic belief in the so-called simplicity of nature, and
the reintroducing through science into this very nature of very impor
tant and very far-reaching elements of not only factual but even struc
tural irrationality.
In other words, not only did Newtons physics use de facto such
obscure ideas as power and attraction (ideas suggesting scholasti
cism and magic, protested the Continentals), not only did he give up
the very idea of a rational deduction of the actual composition and
formation of the choir of heaven and furniture of earth, but even its
fundamental dynamic law (the inverse-square law), though plausible
and reasonable, was by no means necessary, and, as Newton had
carefully shown, could be quite different.^ Thus, the law of attraction
itself was nothing more than a mere fact.
And yet the harmonious insertion of all these facts into the
rational frame of spatiomathematical order, the marvelous compages
of the world, seemed clearly to exclude the subrationality of chance,
but rather to imply the suprarationality of motive; it seemed perfectly
clear that it had to be explained not by the necessity of cause, but by
the freedom of choice.
The intricate and subtle machinery of the world seemed obviously
to require a purposeful action, as Newton did not fail to assert. Or,
to put it in Voltaires words: the clockwork implies a clockmaker
{Vhorloge implique Vhorloger).
Thus the Newtonian science, though as mathematical philosophy
o f nature it expressedly renounced the search for causes (both physi
cal and metaphysical), appears in history as based on a dynamic
conception of physical causality and as linked together with
theistic or deistic metaphysics. This metaphysical system does not, of
course, present itself as a constitutive or integrating part of the New-
THE S IG N IF IC A N C E OF THE N EW T O N IA N SYNTHESIS
tonian science; it does not penetrate into its formal structure. Yet it is
by no means an accident that not only for Newton himself, but also
for all the Newtonians - with the exception only of Laplace - this
science implied a reasonable belief in God.^
Once more the book of nature seemed to reveal God, an en
gineering God this time, who not only had made the world clock,
but who continuously had to supervise and tend it in order to mend
its mechanism when needed (a rather bad clockmaker, this New
tonian God, objected Leibniz), thus manifesting his active presence
and interest in his creation. Alas, the very development of the New
tonian science which gradually disclosed the consummate skill of the
Divine Artifex and the infinite perfections of his work left less and
less place for divine intervention. The world clock more and more
appeared as needing neither rewinding nor repair. Once put in
motion it ran for ever. The work of creation once executed, the God
of Newton - like the Cartesian God after the first (and last) chiquenaude given to matter - could rest. Like the God of Descartes and of
Leibniz - so bitterly opposed by the Newtonians - he had nothing
more to do in the world.
Yet it was only at the end of the eighteenth century with Laplaces
Mecanique celeste that the Newtonian God reached the exalted
position of a Dieu faineant which practically banished him from the
world (I do not need that hypothesis, answered Laplace when
Napoleon inquired about the place of God in his system), whereas
for the first generation of Newtonians, as well as for Newton himself,
God had been, quite on the contrary, an eminently active and present
being, who not only supplied the dynamic power of the world mach
ine but positively ran the universe according to his own, freely
established, laws.^
It was just this conception of Gods presence and action in the
world which forms the intellectual basis of the eighteenth centurys
world feeling and explains its particular emotional structure: its
optimism, its divinization of nature, and so forth. Nature and natures
laws were known and felt to be the embodiment of Gods will and
reason. Could they, therefore, be anything but good? To follow
* Newton, Mathematical Principles o f Natural Philosophy, Book I, Theorem IV,

Corr. 3-7.
* See Metzger, Attraction universelle, and John H. Randall, The Making o f the
Modern Mind (Boston: Houghton Mifflin, 2nd ed., 1940).
* In a world made up of absolutely hard particles there is necessarily a constant loss
of energy; the Newtonian God, therefore, had not only to supply the initial amount
but constantly to replace the loss. Later, of course, he became a mere tinker and
repairman.
20
21
THE S I G N I F I C A N C E OF THE N EWT ON I A N SYNTHESIS
nature and to accept as highest norm the law of nature, was just
the same as to conform oneself to the will, and the law, of God.^
Now if order and harmony so obviously prevailed in the world of
nature, why was it that, as obviously, they were lacking in the world
of man? The answer seemed clear: disorder and disharmony were
man-made, produced by mans stupid and ignorant attempt to tam
per with the laws of nature or even to suppress them and to replace
them by man-made rules. The remedy seemed clear too: let us go
back to nature, to our own nature, and live and act according to its
laws.
But what is human nature? How are we to determine it? Not, of
course, by borrowing a definition from Greek or Scholastic philo
sophers. Not even from modern ones such as Descartes or Hobbes.
We have to proceed according to pattern, and to apply the rules which
Newton has given us. That is, we have to find out, by observation,
experience, and even experiment, the fundamental and permanent
faculties, the properties of mans being and character that can be
neither increased nor diminished; we have to find out the patterns of
action or laws of behavior which relate to each other and link
human atoms together. From these laws we have to deduce every
thing else.
A magnificent program! Alas, its application did not yield the
expected result. To define man proved to be a much more difficult
task than to define matter, and human nature continued to be
determined in a great number of different, and even conflicting, ways.
Yet so strong was the belief in nature, so overwhelming the pres
tige of the Newtonian (or pseudo-Newtonian) pattern of order
arising automatically from interaction of isolated and self-contained
atoms, that nobody dared to doubt that order and harmony would
in some way be produced by human atoms acting according to their
nature, whatever this might be - instinct for play and pleasure
(Diderot) or pursuit of selfish gain (A. Smith). Thus return to nature
could mean free passion as well as free competition. Needless to say,
it was the last interpretation that prevailed.
The enthusiastic imitation (or pseudo-imitation) of the Newton
ian (or pseudo-Newtonian) pattern of atomic analysis and recon-
struction that up to our times proved to be so successful in physics,^

in chemistry,^ and even in biology, led elsewhere to rather bad
results. Thus the unholy alliance of Newton and Locke produced an
atomic psychology, which explained (or explained away) mind as a
mosaic of sensations and ideas linked together by laws of associa
tion (attraction); we have had, too, atomic sociology, which reduced
society to a cluster of human atoms, complete and self-contained
each in itself and only mutually attracting and repelling each other.
Newton, of course, is by no means responsible for these, and other,
monstra engendered by the overextension - or aping - of his method.
Nor is he responsible for the more general, and not less disastrous,
consequence of the widespread adoption of the atomic pattern of
analysis of global events and actions according to which these latter
appeared to be not real, but only mathematical results and summings
up of the underlying elementary factors. This type of analysis led to
the nominalistic misconception of the relation between a totum and
its parts, a misconception which, as a matter of fact, amounted to a
complete negation of tota (a totum reduced to a mere sum of its
parts is not a totum) and which nineteenth- and twentieth-century
thought has had such difficulty in overcoming. No man can ever be
made responsible for the misuse of his work or the misinterpretation
of his thought, even if such a misuse or misinterpretation appears to
be - or to have been - historically inevitable.
Yet there is something for which Newton - or better to say not
Newton alone, but modern science in general - can still be made
responsible: it is the splitting of our world in two. I have been saying
that modern science broke down the barriers that separated the
heavens and the earth, and that it united and unified the universe.
And that is true. But, as I have said, too, it did this by substituting
for our world of quality and sense perception, the world in which
we live, and love, and die, another world - the world of quantity,
of reified geometry, a world in which, though there is place for every
thing, there is no place for man. Thus the world of science - the real
world - became estranged and utterly divorced from the world of
life, which science has been unable to explain - not even to explain
away by calling it subjective.
^ The eighteenth-century optimism had its philosophical source not only in the New
tonian world view but just as well in the rival world conception of Leibniz. More
importantly, it was based simply on the feeling of a social, economic, and scientific
progress. Life was rather pleasant in the eighteenth century and became increasingly so,
at least in the first half of it.
^ Contemporary physics has been obliged to transcend the atomic pattern of explana
tion : the whole is no longer identical to the sum of its parts, particles cannot be isolated
from their surroundings, and so forth.
* On Newtons influence on chemistry, see Hel6ne Metzger, Newton, Stahl, Boerhaave et la doctrine chimique (Paris; Alcan, 1930).
22
23
True, these worlds are every day - and even more and more connected by the praxis. Yet for theory they are divided by an abyss.
Two worlds: this means two truths. Or no truth at all.
This is the tragedy of modern mind which solved the riddle of the
universe, but only to replace it by another riddle: the riddle of
itself.^
II
Concept and Experience
in Newtons Scientific Thought
See Alfred North Whitehead, Science and the Modern World (New York: Macmil
lan, 1925); Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations o f Modern Physical Science.
Newtons hostility to hypotheses is a matter of common knowledge.

Everybody knows the famous first paragraph of the Opticks in which
Newton announces: My design in this Book is not to explain the
Properties of Light by Hypotheses, but to propose and prove them
by reason and experiments.^ And everybody knows, too, the even
more famous Hypotheses non jingo of the final General Scholium of
the Principia^ where Newton tells us - I quote the translation of
Andrew Motte about which I will say more later - Hitherto I have
not been able to discover the cause of those properties of gravity
from phenomena and I frame no hypotheses. For whatever is not
deduced from the phenomena is to be called a hypothesis; and
hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, whether of occult
qualities or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy. ^
It would be rather easy to supplement these quotations - which
form the basis for the current positivistic interpretation of Newtons
thought - by others which are very similar. It is much more difficult,
at least in my opinion, to find out exactly what Newton meant by
these pronouncements. The difficulties I have in mind are twofold:
availability of materials on the one hand, and semantic or historical
problems on the other. The latter difficulties are obvious.
^ Opticks or a Treatise o f the Reflexions, Refractions, Inflexions and Colours o f Light.
Also Two Treatises on the Species and Magnitudes o f Curvilinear Figures (London, 1704);
a Latin translation (without the mathematical treatises) appeared in 1706, followed by
a second English edition in 1717. The first (English) edition contains, at the end, 16
queries; the Latin one increases the number to 23; the second English edition adds
8 more. The most recent edition, with an introduction by I. B. Cohen and an analytical
table of contents prepared by Duane H. D. Roller, was published in New York by
Dover Publications in 1952. For the study of the queries see F. Rosenberger, Isaac
Newton und seine physikalischen Principien (Leipzig, 1895), pp. 302 sq.. Professor
Cohens preface to the above-mentioned edition, and my paper, Les Queries de
L'Optique," Archives Internationales d'Histoire des Sciences 13 (1960), 15-29.
* Andrew Mottes translation was published in two volumes in 1729. A revised edi
tion, prepared by Florian Cajori, was first published by the University of California
Press in 1934, and has been reprinted several times since then.
24
25
N E WT O NI A N STUDIES
Let US, therefore, begin looking at the material difficulties. First of

all, we do not yet have a good modern edition of Newton, as we have
for instance, of Descartes, Galileo, and Huygens. The Opera omnia,
edited by Horsley from 1779 to 1785, can bear this title only by
courtesy.^ England, which nearly divinized Newton, treated him as
we treat sacred things; we touch them as little as possible.^
We do not even have a good - I mean critical - edition of the
Principia. It is well known that the texts of the three editions - 1687,
1713, 1726 - are not identical and that among the differences there
are some, notably those between the first and the second editions,
that are rather important. Curiously enough, although the differences
between the second and third editions were noted - though not in a
complete and definitive way - in 1855 by the astronomer John Couch
Adams, he did not make a study of their significance. Apparently
nobody has had the idea of making a systematic comparison of the
first and second editions - other than to note that the final General
Scholium appeared for the first time in the second edition - and
hence we do not have in print a complete list of the alterations of the
first edition, which are more numerous and more important than
those introduced in the preparation of the third edition. So far as we
know, neither S. P. Rigaud nor J. Edleston very carefully collated the
first two editions, though Rigaud wrote a very important essay on the
publication of the Principia^ and Edleston edited Newtons corre
spondence with Roger Cotes, the very correspondence dealing with
the preparation of the second edition of the Principia.^ Such a com
parison was alleged to have been made by W. W. Rouse Ball,
^ Isaaci Newtoni Opera quae extant omnia, ed. Samuel Horsley, 5 vols. (London,
1779-1785).
2 Since this article was written, three volumes of the Royal Societys edition o f The
Correspondence o f Isaac Newton have been issued by the Cambridge University Press
(1959, 1960, 1961), and an edition of Newtons mathematical works has been under
taken by Dr. Derek Thomas Whiteside. There has appeared under the editorship of
I. B. Cohen, assisted by Robert E. Schofield (with explanatory prefaces by Marie Boas,
Charles C. Gillispie, Thomas S. Kuhn, and Perry Miller), a volume of Isaac Newton's
Papers and Letters on Natural Philosophy, and Related Documents (Cambridge: Har
vard University Press, 1958). A. Rupert Hall and Marie Boas Hall have edited Un
published Scientific Papers o f Isaac Newton (Cambridge, England: University Press,
1962). Although a critical edition of the Principia by A. Koyre and I. B. Cohen is
being completed, there is no prospect yet of a truly complete edition of all of Newtons
writings, published and unpublished.
This list has been published as appendix XXXIV to volume II of Sir David Brews
ter, Mewo/rj o/rAe Lj/e, Writings, and Discoveries o f Sir Isaac Newton (Edinburgh,
1855).
* Stephen Peter Rigaud, Historical Essay on the First Publication o f Sir Isaac Newton's
Principia (Oxford, 1838).
J. Edleston, Correspondence o f Sir Isaac Newton and Prof Cotes (London, 1850).
26
n e w t o n s
S C I E NT I F I C T HO U G H T
author of an excellent essay on the Principia, but this work was never
published and no one has ever seen it.^ As to later historians, it
would seem that not one of them - not even F. Rosenberger, who
is ordinarily so precise, nor Florian Cajori, who gives a compari
son of the relevant texts of the first, second, and third editions and
of those of the Tractatus de quadratura curvarum published by New
ton in 1704 as an addition to his Opticks and to whom we owe the
re-edition (in modernized form) of Andrew Mottes translation of the
Principia - ever made such a comparison.^
One must admit, however - and it is surely a mitigating circum
stance - that such a comparison has not been very easy to make,
for purely material reasons. Actually, the Principia - I speak of the
first edition, of which there were only 250 to 300 copies printed - is
an extremely rare and valuable book. It is generally to be found only
in the very large libraries. Those libraries which happen to possess
this treasure usually keep it under lock and key in order to preserve it
from degrading contact with readers. As to private collectors, very
few in number, they take good care that their copies are not spoiled
by being read. The publication by Messrs. WilUam Dawson & Son
of a facsimile reproduction of the first edition of the Principia
^ W. W. Rouse Ball, An Essay on Newton's "Principia" (London, 1893), p. 74:
I possess in manuscript a list of the additions and variations made in the second
edition. Presumably, he was referring to a curious copy of the first edition in his
personal library; into it some early eighteenth-century owner had transferred practi
cally all of the alterations introduced into the second edition (including the index).
This copy is now in the Trinity College Library. On p. 106 Rouse Ball makes an allu
sion to the first edition, stating that the Regulae philosophandi of the third edition are
much clearer than the Hypotheses of the first edition that they replace.
See p. 25, n. 1.
* Florian Cajori, A History o f the Conceptions o f Limits and Fluxions in Great Britain
from Newton to Woodhouse (Chicago and London: Open Court, 1919).
* Sir Isaac Newton's Mathematical Principles o f Natural Philosophy and His System
o f the World. Translated into English by Andrew Motte in 1729. The translation re
vised and supplied with a historical and explanatory appendix by Florian Cajori
(Berkeley: University of California Press, 1934; 2nd ed., 1946). In the appendix Cajori,
however, quotes (p. 634) three additions of the second edition of the Principia in
which Newton made his position [concerning gravity and attraction] clearer, and
(pp. 653 sq.) Augustus de Morgans article, On the Early History of Infinitesimals
in England, Philosophical Magazine [4] 4 (1852), 321-330, on the difference between
the first and the second editions in the treatment of infinitely small quantities and
fluxions.
See A. N. L. Munby, The Distribution of the First Edition of Newtons Principia
The Keynes Collection of the Works of Sir Isaac Newton at Kings College, Cam
bridge, Notes and Records o f the Royal Society o f London 10 (1952), 28-39,40-50, and
Henry P. Macomber, A Descriptive Catalogue o f the Grace K. Babson Collection of the
Works o f Sir Isaac Newton (New York: Herbert Reichner, 1950), p. 9. Macomber
estimates that about 250 copies were printed; Munby (p. 37) thinks there were at least
300 copies, and possibly 400.
27
N E W T O N S S C I E NT I F I C T H O U G H T
(1687)^ at last makes it less difficult for a comparison to be made of the

first and second editions and will facilitate the preparation of a criti
cal edition, or at least a list of variants, the need of which in scholarly
investigations is becoming more and more apparent.^ The text of
the third edition, prepared by H. Pemberton and published in 1726,^
was many times reprinted during the eighteenth and nineteenth cen
turies, and is readily available. But it should be added that, with the
exception of the Geneva edition of 1739-1742^ (and its reprints),
none of the editions of the Principia possesses a table of contents
worthy of the name, a table that is particularly necessary for a volume
that is rather bulky and so poorly put together.
Most editions of the Principia have an index (prepared by Cotes

for the second edition),^ but it is an index which, to put it mildly,
is not very helpful. Thus, for instance, if you look for the word
hypothesis, you will find in the index of Mottes translation of the
third Latin edition an entry, rejects all hypotheses, and a reference
to the passage of the General Scholium that I have quoted at the
beginning of this article. Yet if we do not confine ourselves to the
index and instead make a search of Newtons work itself (starting
with the third edition), we will find, in the second book of the Prin
cipia (Book II, The Motion of Bodies, Section IX, The circular
motion of fluids), a Hypothesis stating that the resistance arising
from the want of lubricity in the parts of a fluid, is, other things
being equal, proportional to the velocity with which the parts of the
fluid are separated from one another.** And in the third book of
Principia, the book that bears the title The System of the World,
we find two more propositions that are expressly called Hypotheses.
This is rather interesting and worthy to be studied more closely.
These hypotheses are:
Hypothesis I. The centre o f the system o f the world is immovable.^ This
is acknowledged by all, while some contend that it is the Earth, others
that the Sun, is fixed in the Centre.^
^ Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica (London, 1687; reproduced in facsi

mile by Wm. Dawson & Sons, Ltd., London, 1954).
^ A critical edition of Newtons Principia has been undertaken by A. Koyre and
I. B. Cohen, of which the text is based on a verbatim et litteratim collation of the three
printed editions, the original manuscript, the annotated and interleaved copies of the
first and second editions from Newtons own library, and certain other copies anno
tated and corrected by Newton, such as the copy of the first edition which Newton
presented to John Locke.
George J. Gray, A Bibliography o f the Works o f Sir Isaac Newton, Together with a
List o f Books Illustrating His Works (Cambridge: Macmillan and Bowes, 1888; 2nd
ed., revised and enlarged, Cambridge: Bowes and Bowes, 1907), and Macomber, A
Descriptive Catalogue o f the Babson Collection.
* Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica auctore Isaaco Newtone, 3 vols.
(Geneva, 1739, 1740, 1742); this edition has very careful and still interesting com
ments on Newtons mathematical treatment of the problems occurring in the Principia
based on the works of David Gregory, Pierre Varignon, Jacob Hermann, John Keill,
and J. L. Calandrin, who also supervised the printing. The third volume also contains
the Traiti sur le flux and le reflux de la mer by D&mQlBexnouWi (pp. 132-246), the De
causa physica fluxus et refluxus maris by Maclaurin (pp. 247-282), and the Inquisitio
physica in causam fluxus et refluxus maris by Euler (pp. 283-374). The edition is
dedicated to the Royal Society!
The first edition has none whatever, the second and third only a list (prepared by
Cotes) of the sections of each book. This table of contents is reproduced in all the
subsequent reprints of the Principia up to that of Sir William Thomson and Hugh
Blackburn (Glasgow, 1871) and its translations, from Motte and Mme. du ChStelet
to Cajori. The Geneva edition contains at the end of Book III (pp. 678-703) an Index
propositionum totius operis, where there are listed first the axioms or laws of motion
from Book I, followed by the statement of all the propositions of Book I, then the pro
positions of Book II, and finally the propositions of Book III. It must be observed,
however, that this index, while listing the propositions, that is, the theorems and prob
lems, of the Principia, does not mention either the scholia or the hypotheses occurring
in the book. Thus even this table of contents cannot be considered as complete and
satisfactory.
The Geneva edition, reprinted in 1760 in Cologne and in 1833 in Glasgow, is often
- but erroneously - called the Jesuits edition, although the title page explicitly says:
Perpetuis commentariis illustrata, communi studio PP. Thomae Le Seur & Francisci
Jacquier ex Gallicanfl Minimorum FamiliS. Any good dictionary, for instance, the
Merriam-Webster or Petit Larousse, would inform the reader that the Minims are a
type of Franciscans. The explanation of this transformation of the Minims into Jesuits
may be found in the fact that the editors of the last, Glasgow, edition (where, by the
way, the tables of contents are put at the end of each book of the Principia and not at
the end of the whole), though giving on the title page to Le Seur and Jacquier their
28
Hypothesis II. I f the bulk o f the Earth were taken away, and the remaining
ring was carried alone about the Sun in the orbit o f the Earth by the annual
motion, while by the diurnal motion it was in the meantime revolved about
its own axis, inclined to the plane o f the eclyptic by an angle o f 23\ degrees,
the motion o f the equinoctial points would be the same, whether the ring were
fluid, or whether it consisted o f a hard and rigid matter.^
Now if, encouraged by finding these two hypotheses in a place

where there should not be any, we start looking through the second*
rightful title of Minims of the Gallican province, announce in their own preface to the
reader that, Newtoni illustrissimi opus having become a rarity, cujus exemplaria . . .
immenso pretio parantur, they decided to republish it; and that they thought that they
could do no better than to reprint (under the supervision of John M. Wright) an im
proved edition of the work of Le Seur et Jacquier, Societatis Jesu Sociorum.
^ It is lacking, however, in the Geneva edition and also in Motte-Cajori.
* First edition. Book II, Sec. IX, De motu circulari fluidorum, p. 373; Cajori, p. 385.
Hypothesis-. Resistentiam, quae oritur ex defectu lubricitatis partium fluidi caeteris
paribus, proportionalem esse velocitati, qua partes fluidi separantur ab invicem.
This hypothesis is found in the same place in all three editions of the Principia. I shall
not study it here, as it is too technical. Neither this hypothesis nor the following two are
mentioned in the Index of the Minims edition.
* Hypothesis I follows Proposition X in the third edition.
* The elaboration of this hypothesis shows that the immovable center of the world that is to say, of the solar system - is found to be the center of gravity of the system,
and not the sun or the earth, both of which are in motion.
Hypothesis II follows Lemma III to Proposition XXXVIII in the third edition.
29
N E WT O N S SCI E NT I F I C T H O U G H T
(Latin) edition of the Principia, we will find the same hypotheses in

the same place. But if in pursuing our inquiry we proceed to the
first (Latin) edition, we will find that Hypothesis II of the third
edition is there called Lemma IV of Proposition XXXVIII. As for
Hypothesis I, it bears the number IV, and is surrounded by eight
other hypotheses. Indeed, at the very beginning of Book III of
the first edition, we find a title. Hypotheses, and a series of proposi
tions, nine in all, expressly designated by that name. This is rather
curious; perhaps even more than curious.
These hypotheses, to tell the truth, form a rather unwieldy group.
Let me quote the first three.
first two hypotheses are now called Rules} The third, which tells us
of the transformation of one body into another,^ disappears com
pletely, at least from the Principia} (although it comes back again
in the later Quaeries of the Opticks)} Hypotheses V to IX become
Phaenomena. Hypothesis IV remains a hypothesis, and, as I have
already said. Lemma IV of Proposition XXXVIII - stating that the
motions of a rotating sphere and a rotating ring are equivalent becomes a hypothesis. Whereupon Newton declares that he does
not frame hypotheses, and that hypotheses have no place in nat
ural philosophy.
One may well understand that, confronted by these terminological
- and even more than terminological - changes which accompanied
Newtons violent attack upon all hypotheses in the final Scholium
Generale, Roger Cotes, who was preparing the second edition, was
disconcerted and made certain objections. After all, is not the work
of Newton in fact filled with hypotheses ? And is not universal gravi
tation itself a hypothesis? Most certainly - at least as long as one
takes this term in its traditional and classical sense, which is the way
Newton takes it in the first edition of his Principia. Hypothesis
means then an assumption or a fundamental supposition of the theory.
Thus Copernicus spoke of principia et assumptiones quas Graeci
hypotheses vocant (principles and assumptions which the Greeks
call hypotheses) in the introduction to his De revolutionibus orbium
coelestium (published in 1543); and in his Commentariolus de
Hyp. I : We are to admit no more causes of natural things, than such

as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances.
Hyp. II: Therefore [of natural effects of the same kind] the causes are the
same.
Hyp. I l l : Every body can be transformed into another, of whatever kind,
and all the intermediary degrees of qualities can be successively induced in
it.
Hypotheses V to IX introduce astronomical data, such as: the

circumjovial planets (that is, the satellites of Jupiter) in their motion
about Jupiter obey Keplers second law; the five primary planets
revolve around the sun; the periodic times of these planets and of
the earth around the sun (or of the sun around the earth) are related
to their mean distances from the sun according to Keplers third law,
which would not hold if the primary planets all revolved around
the earth (although it does hold for the moon).
What does this mean? It means that Newtons Principia is, inter
alia, devoted to proving the truth of the Copernican hypothesis or
the Copernican-Keplerian astronomical system. (Indeed, at a meet
ing of the Royal Society on 28 April 1686, Newtons book was said
to contain a mathematical demonstration of the Copernican hypo
thesis as proposed by Kepler.^) Newton, accordingly, uses the word
hypothesis, though rather loosely, in the accepted and normal
meaning in astronomy: a premise or basic proposition of the theory
that he intends to develop.
Let us now return to the second edition. The title Hypotheses has
disappeared and has been replaced by Regulae philosophandi.^ The
* Quoted in Rouse Ball, Essay, p. 62.
* Motte translates Regulae philosophandi by Rules of Reasoning in Philosophy.
Mme. du ChStelet, in the French translation, writes, Regies quil faut suivre dans
l6tude de la physique.
30
^ For these transformations see Chapter VI, Newtons Regulae Philosophandi.

* In his Hypothesis explaining the Properties of Light, discoursed of in my several
Papers (1675), Newton insists rather strongly on the unity and universal transformability into each other of all things, all of which may be nothing else than diversely con
densed aether. See Thomas Birch, The History o f the Royal Society o f London (London,
1757), III, 250; reproduced in Cohen, Newton's Papers and Letters, p. 180.
We may find a trace of it in Newtons discussion of the vapori forming the
tails of the comets, which, spreading through space, may be at last dissipated and
scattered through the whole heavens, little by little be attracted towards the planets by
its gravity, and mixed with their atmosphere, renewing and restoring this latter. I
suspect moreover, adds Newton, that it is chiefly from the comets that spirit comes
which is indeed the smallest but the most subtle part of our air and so much required
to sustain the life of all things in it. See Principia (first edition). Book III, Prop. XLI,
Prob. XX, example, pp. 505-506; Cajori trans.. Book III, Prop. XLI, Prob. XXI,
example, pp. 529-530.
* See Query 22 of the Latin edition (Query 30 of the second English edition), where
Newton asserts the convertibility into one another of light and gross bodies; Cohen and
Roller edition, p. 374.
^ Lemma IV of Proposition XXXVIII of the first edition becomes Hypothesis II
in the second edition.
* Cotes to Newton, 18 February 1712/13, in Edleston, Correspondence, pp. 151-154,
especially p. 153. See Chapter VII, Attraction, Newton, and Cotes.
31
hypothesibus motuum coelestium a se constitutis^ he presented these

hypotheses as petitiones, quas axiomata vacant (assumptions
which are called axioms). Newton, in his turn, listed at the begin
ning of De systemate mundi (or Book III of the Principia) the hypo
theses, that is to say, the fundamental presuppositions, of his own
astronomy.^
We must not forget, furthermore, that the term hypothesis is
never a term with a univocal meaning and that it covers a whole
gamut of meanings which, moreover, slide very easily one into the
other. All the meanings have this in common, that they attenuate
(or suppress) provisionally (or definitively) the affirmative charac
ter and the relation to truth (or reality) of the hypothetical
proposition. A hypothesis then is not a judgment, properly speaking,
but an assumption or a conjecture that one examines in its conse
quences and implications, which should either verify or falsify
it. These consequences and implications can be internal ones, as in
the case of the hypotheses of the Parmenides of Plato and the
petitiones of Euclid and Archimedes, or they may be external ones,
like those of the natural sciences.
The term hypothesis can designate also a proposition, or a
group of propositions, that one poses purely and simply in order to
deduce the logical consequences. This is what the mathematicians do
when they say: let us suppose or admit that in a right triangle the
angle A has a given value . . . or, while a right line turns in a uniform
manner about one of its terminal points, a point moves along it
with a given uniform speed, or with a given uniformly accelerated
motion . . . or yet again, as Newton does himself, let us suppose or
admit that bodies attract each other not with a force that is in
versely proportional to the square, but with a force that is directly
proportional or inversely proportional to the cube, of the distance
between them. What then will be the result of these assumptions?
It may be pointed out, however, that when Newton analyzes the
consequences of just such different possible laws of attraction, in
Book I of the Principia, he does not actually use the term hypothe
sis, nor does he use it when he studies the movements of bodies in
n e w t o n s s c i e n t i f i c
T H O UG HT
various types of hypothetical resistant media. But the good New

tonian Clairaut, by contrast, uses this term expressly.
One can also, as all astronomers since the time of Ptolemy have
done, call by the name hypothesis a proposition, or a group of
propositions, which permit one to order and to deduce therefrom and thus to predict - the celestial phenomena (hence, to save the
phenomena), without affirming that the verification of these
propositions by observed data implies the ontological or material
truth of the hypothesis to the slightest degree. It is in this sense
that Osiander, in his (anonymous) preface to the De revolutionibus
orbium coelestium of Copernicus,^ presents the Copernican astro
nomical system as a mere hypothesis, a mathematical artifice pure
and simple, which in no sense implies the assertion of the truth of the
system, that is to say, the assertion of a real and actual motion of
the earth around the sun; this hypothesis as a computing device
is even perfectly compatible with a belief in the earths immobility.^
This is the very same meaning of hypothesis that was used by
Galileo to present the Copernican system in his Dialogue on the
Two Principal Systems o f the World,^ and also by the Holy Office,
which later reproached Galileo for having only simulated the pre
sentation of the condemned opinion quamvis hypothetice.
Nevertheless, it is clear that the same conclusions can be deduced
from very different premises, and that phenomena do not determine
a unique set of hypotheses which must save them. Indeed, as
Kepler put it in a famous letter to Maestlin (12/22 December 1616):
Astronomica hypothesis est quicquid se praebet ad computanda loca
planetarum (an astronomical hypothesis is whatever lends itself to
the comparison [computation] of planetary positions).
It is thus possible that there can be several different methods of
effecting these comparisons or computations, and that they may
even be equivalent. An example is given by the hypotheses of the
epicycles and of the eccentrics of Ptolemaic astronomy, as Kepler
^ See Edward Rosen, trans. and ed.. Three Copernican Treatises (2nd ed., New York:
Dover, 1959), p. 58.
* Newtons early tract De motu begins with a set of Definitiones, followed by
four Hypotheses which lead to the lemmas, theorems, and problems. See Rouse
Ball, Essay, pp. 33, 36; also Hall and Hall, Unpublished Scientific Papers, pp. 243, 267,
293.
^ Rosen, Three Copernican Treatises, pp. 57-90. For Osiander all astronomical
hypotheses are oniy mathematical devices, the obvious falsity of which, for in
stance, that of the Ptolemaic theory of Venus, does not affect their practical value.
This positivistic conception goes back to the Greeks and, during the Middle Ages,
was adopted by Averroes and his followers.
* See A. Koyre, La Revolution astronomique (Paris: Hermann, 1961), chap. 3. This
topic is discussed by Rosen in the introduction to Three Copernican Treatises, pp. 22-33.
* In the preface, Galileo wrote: I have personified the Copernican in this discourse,
proceeding upon an hypothesis purely mathematical ; see the Salusbury translation,
revised and annotated by Giorgio de Santillana (Chicago; University of Chicago Press,
1953).
32
33
explains to us at the very beginning of his Astronomia nova, the

First Part of which is specifically entitled De comparatione
hypothesium (Of the comparison of hypotheses).
It could be, then, that of two, or even three, hypotheses in con
flict - those of Ptolemy and Copernicus, or those of Ptolemy, Coper
nicus, and Tycho Brahe - each one could be capable of saving the
phenomena and that as a result, at least from the strictly astronomical
point of view, there is no reason to make any choice among them.
Each of them could be true and they could all be false. We know
that this is the point of view adopted, at least officially, by a number
of Catholic (and also Protestant) astronomers of the seventeenth
century; this enabled them to teach, or at least expound, the conflict
ing systems, though maintaining the geocentric one for religious
reasons.^
One can stress even more strongly the fictitious character of a
hypothesis, as in the famous declaration made by Descartes in his
Principia philosophiae (III, Sec. 44), where he tells us: I desire that
what I have written be only taken as a hypothesis, something that
is perhaps far removed from the truth; but however that may be, I
will believe myself to have really accomplished something if all the
things which are deduced from it are entirely in conformity with ex
perience. Descartes, furthermore, maliciously and wickedly, insists
upon the divorce between truth and the hypothetical premises ad
vanced by him, announcing, I will suppose here several [hypotheses]
which I believe to be false, though their falsity does not at all
prevent what may be deduced from them from being true.^
^ We may doubt, of course, whether this acceptance of the traditional geocentric
world view was always sincere - for instance, in the cases of Gassendi or Borelli; but
we can only smile when we see Le Seur and Jacquier announce in a declaratio published
at the beginning of volume III of their edition (the volume containing Book III of the
Principia, De mundi systemata ) that, as Newton in this book assumes the hypothesis
of the motion of the earth, they could not explain his propositions except on the basis
of this hypothesis caeterum latis a summis Pontificibus contra - Telluris motum
Decretis nos obsequi profitemur. Kepler himself, in his Astronomia nova, though
rejecting the positivistic point of view and insisting that astronomy has to discover
the true structure of the cosmos, studies the astronomical data (the phenomena )
according to the three fundamental hypotheses (Ptolemaic, Copernican, Tychonic) and
finally comes to total rejection of the hypotheses of Ptolemy and Tycho and to partial
rejection of that of Copernicus. He keeps the heliostatic feature of the Copernican
hypothesis, but abandons the mechanism of circles common to both Copernicus
and Ptolemy, in order to replace it by a celestial dynamics founded upon the motive
power of the sun, which produces elliptical rather than circular orbits for the planets,
it remains nevertheless true that from the strictly kinematic point of view the three
hypotheses - and above all, the last two - are perfectly equivalent.
* Principia philosophiae. III, 44, 45, 47; Oeuvres, ed. Adam and Tannery, VIII, 99101. It may be doubted, however, whether Descartes was entirely sincere in his state
ments; see Chapter III.
34
n e w t o n s
S C I E NT I F I C T H O UG HT
One may well understand that Petrus R am u s-in the face of

epistemologies of this kind, which led science to posit falsity in order
to deduce truth, epistemologies current already in his time, that is,
long before Descartes had given to the divorce of theory (hypothesis)
and truth the perfect formulation that I have just quoted voiced a
vehement protest, holding that it was absurdum naturalium rerum
reveritatem per falsas causas demonstrare (absurd to demonstrate
by false reasons the truth of natural things)^ and asked for an
astronomy without hypotheses, even offering his chair at the College
Royal (today the College de France) to anyone who could do this,^
and that Kepler, rejecting the positivistic interpretation of as
tronomy, claimed for science the pursuit of truth. One can also under
stand why, some hundred years later, Newton so strongly rejected as
not scientific the procedure of feigning hypotheses, and proudly
asserted that he, in any case, did not indulge in any such procedures.
Hypotheses non fingo, I do not feign hypotheses, thus means for
Newton: I do not make use of fictions, 1 do not use false propositions
as premises or explanations.
The reader will have noticed that I have translated Hypotheses non
fingo by I do not feign hypotheses, and not I do not frame hypo
theses, as is usually done. My reason for doing so is quite simple:
feign and frame do not have the same meaning. Feign feindre - implies falsehood, and frame does not, or at least does
not necessarily. To feign a hypothesis is thus by no means the
same thing as to frame one. Now, as a matter of fact,/go means
feign and not frame, and Newton, who knew his Latin as well
as his English, nowhere used the word frame, which is employed
by Motte in his translation of the Principia.^ When Newton said non
^ Scholarum mathematicarum libri X X X I (Basel, 1569), lib. II, p. 50. Ramus was
particularly affected by the above-mentioned preface of Osiander to the De revolutionibus of Copernicus, ali the more so as he thought it was written by Rheticus. See E.
Rosen, The Ramus-Rheticus Correspondence, Roots o f Scientific Thought (New
York; Basic Books, 1957), pp. 287 sq. On Petrus Ramus see Charles Waddington,
P. Ramus, sa vie, ses icrits, et ses opinions (Paris, 1855), and R. Hooykaas, Humanisme, science et reforme, Free University Quarterly, August 1958.
In a letter to his master Maestlin (October 1597; Gesammelte Werke, XIII, 140),
Kepler jestingly announces to him that by his Mysterium cosmographicum he has
acquired the chair (of Ramus) in the College Royal de France. It is rather amusing to
note that on the back of the title page of his Astronomia nova he repeats the claim that
he had accomplished the wish of Ramus and that therefore he had the right to the re
compense promised by the latter, that is to say, his chair at the College Royal. Kepler,
alas, was a little late. Furthermore, the absence of all hypotheses in his Astronomia
nova is more than questionable.
* In a parallel passage of the Opticks Newton writes: without feigning hypotheses ;
Query 28, Cohen-Roller edition, p. 369. The usage of feign by Newtonians is dis-
35
jingo he meant I do not feign, but so great a hold was gained by

the false interpretation of Andrew Motte that Mme. du Chttelet
followed suit, writing Je nimagine pas dhypotheses rather than
Je ne feins pas dhypotheses. Did Andrew Motte and Mme. du
Chatelet merely err ? Perhaps. As the Italian proverb has it, traduttore-traditore^ (translators are traitors). For my part, I hold that they
did something far worse. They did not limit themselves to trans
lating; they made an interpretation and in doing so they gave to
Newtons assertion a sense which was not exactly Newtons sense.
For Newton himself, the word hypothesis had two (or more) mean
ings in addition to the classical sense of the word which is to be found
in the first edition.^ First of all, there was the good, or at least
acceptable, meaning, according to which a hypothesis was a plaus
ible though not provable conception. Newton himself was willing to
use this kind of hypothesis. Opposed to this meaning was the bad
sense in which the term - and the train of thought corresponding to
it - was employed by Descartes, Hooke, Leibniz, and others, and
which for Newton was simply identical with fiction, and even a
gratuitous and necessarily false fiction. The use of hypotheses in
this latter and bad sense implies, therefore, a divorce between science
and reality or truth. It means either complete skepticism, if the fic
tion is conceived and presented as divorced from reality, or, as is
generally the case, it means the substitution of a fictitious reality
for the given one, or at least of a reality in itself inaccessible to per
ception and knowledge, a pseudo reality endowed with properties
imagined or fancied in an arbitrary manner for that very purpose.
Newton, from his very first publication on optics, objected to this
manner of using hypotheses in the construction of theories, as he also
objected to using explanations per causas which are false or which
are at least incapable of being either demonstrated or deduced
from experience - causes that we give ourselves the liberty to imagine,
or more exactly to feign, as we wish. Hypothesis, from that time
n e w t o n s
SCI E NT I F I C T H O U G H T
on, means for Newton something that cannot be proved. Accord

ingly, following a pattern of thought closely resembling that of Pascal
in his Experiences nouvelles touchant la vide,^ he always presents
his experiments in a pure or brute form, or - to use the term intro
duced by Samuel Clarke in his Latin translation of the Opticks, but
not to be found in Newtons original English version - in a naked
form. Thus he does not intermingle with the account of the experi
ments, as others such as Hooke and Grimaldi did, any hypotheses
which transcend the data and the demonstrable.
The bad sense of the term hypothesis seems to have been pre
dominant in Newtons mind in his old age. If you take the term in
this bad sense, or even in the sense of something that cannot be
proved, it becomes awkward to call the factual data of astronomy,
which Newton considers to have been demonstrated, hypotheses.
You will have to use some other term, for instance the old name
phenomena, though, as a matter of fact, that old name meant some
thing a little different. Nor can you continue to call hypotheses the
fundamental and true bases of your theory. You will thus need for
them some new designation and will call them rules, laws, or axioms.
That is precisely what Newton does in the second edition of the
Principia, establishing a distinction between general, logicometaphysical rules of reasoning in philosophy, axioms and laws of motion,
and experimental or observational data which, together with their
immediate implications, he calls phenomena. That is precisely what
Newton explains to Cotes, telling him that as in Geometry the word
Hypothesis is not taken in so large a sense as to include the Axiomes
& Postulates, so in Experimental Philosophy it is not to be taken in
so large a sense as to include the first Principles or Axiomes w^*' I call
the laws of motion. These Principles are deduced from Phaenomena
& made general by Induction ; w^ is highest evidence that a Propo
sition can have in this Philosophy. And the word Hypothesis is here
cussed in I. B. Cohen, The First English Version of Newtons Hypotheses non fingo,
/jti
(1962), 379-388.
^ See A. Koyr6, Traduttore-traditore. A propos de Copernic et de Galileo,
Isis 34 (1943), 209-210.
* An inventory of the various senses in which Newton used the word hypothesis
may be found in I. B. Cohen, Franklin and Newton (Philadelphia: American Philoso
phical Society, 1956), app. 1, Newtons Use of the Word Hypothesis.
Undoubtedly Newton was to some degree inspired by Bacon and by Boyle. A
comparative study of Boyle and Newton would be extremely interesting, but would
take us too far afield. For a notable essay on this topic, see Marie Boas, The Establish
ment of the Mechanical Philosophy, Osiris 10 (1952), 412-541.
See A. Koyre, Pascal savant, Cahiers de Royaumont, Philosophic No. 1, pp.
259-285 (Paris: Editions de Minuit, 1957).
* Newton actually includes under the designation phenomena not only the data
of observation, but also the Keplerian laws of planetary motion.
Thus, in the Principia Newton uses the expression axioms or laws of motion
{axiomata sive leges motus), whereas in his tract De motu of 1684-85 (see Rouse Ball,
Essay, pp. 35 sq.) he calls these propositions hypotheses. According to J. W. Herivel,
On the Date of Composition of the First Version of Newtons Tract De motu,
Archives Internationales d'Histoire des Sciences 13 (1960), 68, n. 7, this change of ter
minology had already occurred in Newtons University Lectures De motu of 1684-85.
36
37
used by me to signify only such a Proposition as is not a Phaenomenon

nor deduced from any Phaenomena but assumedor supposed without
any experimental proof. ^ Thus, in order to make his meaning per
fectly clear, Newton enjoins Cotes to add to the paragraph which they
are discussing the famous pronouncement: For whatever is not de
duced from the phenomena is to be called a hypothesis and hypo
theses, whether metaphysical or physical, whether of occult qualities or
mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy. In this philo
sophy particular propositions are inferred from the phenomena, and
afterwards rendered general by induction. Thus it was that impene
trability, the mobility, and the impulsive forces of bodies and the
laws of motion and gravitation, were discovered. And to us it is
enough that gravity does really exist, and act according to the laws
which we have explained, and abundantly serves to account for all
the motions of the celestial bodies, and of our sea.^ Hypotheses
metaphysical or physical, of occult qualities or mechanical. . .
I must confess that I have not been able to determine exactly what
Newton means by metaphysical hypotheses. These could be the
hypotheses of the Aristotelian cosmology or those of the Keplerian one; but they could also, and more probably, be the Cartesian
assertions which deduce the conservation of motion from Gods
immutability.^ Newton certainly did not mean by metaphysical
hypothesis the existence of God and his action in the world.^
Laplace may have called God a hypothesis - and a hypothesis which
he did not need - but for Newton the existence of God was a certain
ty, and a certainty by which the phenomena, all the phenomena,
had ultimately to be explained.
The occult qualities are, probably, the occult qualities of al
chemy, in which, as we know, Newton was deeply interested and
which, with his friend Boyle, he tried to transform into chemistry. A
passage in the Opticks (in the Quaeries) suggests this interpretation,
that is, that the occult qualities are not, once again, merely the Car
tesian preconceptions, as Cotes insinuates in his preface to the second
n e w t o n s
SC I E NT I F I C T H O UG HT
edition of the Principia when he writes: Those rather have recourse

to occult causes, who set imaginary vortices of a matter entirely
fictitious and imperceptible by our senses, to direct those motions.^
Mechanical hypotheses could be those of Bacon, but more prob
ably are those of Descartes and the Cartesians, which Newton re
jected for more than one reason. First of all, they were unable to explain
the astronomical phenomena, that is, Keplers laws.^ Moreover and this is perhaps just as important - mechanical hypotheses were
impious and led, according to Newton, to the exclusion of God
from the universe.
As to physical hypotheses, in my opinion Newton here has in
mind the frequent misinterpretations of his theory of universal at
traction by those who, like Bentley and Cheyne,* Huygens and
Leibniz, transformed gravitation into a physical force and made
it an essential or at least a primary property of bodies - the first pair
in order to accept, the others in order to reject, this hypothesis.
Mechanical and physical explanations taken in this sense are rightly
excluded from natural philosophy as false and unsubstantial fictions
or, even worse, flagrant absurdities, just because gravitation is not a
mechanical or even a physical force. Thus, physical hypotheses
would be hypotheses in the very worst sense of the word, that is,
false fictions which Newton quite properly refuses to feign.
This being so, it is all the more interesting to see Newton contin
uing to designate as hypotheses the immobility of the center of the
world, as well as the equivalence between a liquid or a rigid shell
and a solid earth. He takes the term here, of course, in a good or at
least intermediate sense. Still there seems to be some implication
that for Newton these two propositions - though plausible - were
somewhat doubtful. He could not demonstrate either of them and for
that reason with perfect honesty he called them hypotheses. Prob-
* Newton to Cotes, 28 March 1713, in Edleston, Correspondence, p. 155.

^ Motte-Cajori, p. 547.
See A. Koyre, Etudes galiliennes (Paris: Hermann, 1939), part III, Galilee et
la loi d inertie.
As has been suggested by E. W. Strong, Newton and God, Journal o f the History
o f Ideas 13 (1952), 147-167.
Query 31. This subject has been explored in A. Rupert Hall and Marie Boas Hall,
Newtons Chemical Experiments, Archives Internationales d'Histoire des Sciences
11 (1958), 113-152; Newtons Theory of Matter, / s'57 (1960), 131-144.
Motte-Cajori, p. xxvii.
Let us not forget that a criticism of the hypothesis of vortices is to be found at the
very beginning of the famous Scholium Generale, of which the opening sentence is:
The hypothesis of vortices is pressed with many difficulties. The Scholium at the end
of Book II of the Principia begins: Hence it is manifest that the planets are not carried
round in corporeal vortices.
This is also said by Roger Cotes in his preface to the second edition of the Principia.
See Chapter III, Newton and Descartes.
* On Dr. Cheyne see H61ene Metzger, Attraction universelle et religion naturelle
chez quelques commentateurs anglais de Newton (Paris: Hermann, 1938).
Leibniz even declared gravitation (attraction) to be an occult quality ; see Chap
ter 111; also M. Gueroult, Dynamique et mitaphysique Leibniziennes (Paris: Les Belles
Lettres, 1934). As a matter of fact, it was Roberval who first called attraction an occult
quality.
38
39
ably at the beginning he thought he could prove the second one.

Thus in the first edition of the Principia he designated it a lemma.
Then he found that he could not prove it (actually, it was Laplace
who found the proof) and so in the second edition made this lemma
a hypothesis, Hypothesis II. As to Hypothesis I of the second
and third editions, concerning the immobility of the center of the
system of the world [solar system], Newton no doubt was well aware
that it could, after all, be utterly false.
I think that we have now elucidated somewhat the meaning of the
term hypothesis as understood and used by Newton. In the first
edition of the Principia, this term is taken in its classical sense, as a
fundamental proposition of a theory. In the second edition, on the
contrary, a hypothesis is taken to be a fiction, and mostly a false one,
or, at the very least, an unproved assertion. Newtons view is not
the common one, as Roger Cotess not understanding it at first
sufficiently proves, yet one can interpret the Newtonian view as the
end product of the English tradition of empiricism, that of Bacon
and of Boyle. As I have already mentioned, the antihypothetical atti
tude is present - though in a much less rigid form - in the very first
works of Newton. It is to them that we shall now turn our attention,
because analysis of them will enlighten us somewhat about the role
that Newton ascribed to experiments.
In December 1671 Newton sent to the Royal Society for his
Majestys perusal a reflecting telescope made by him in the autumn
of that year. On 21 December he was proposed for membership by
Seth Ward and on 11 January 1672 he was elected a Fellow of the
Royal Society. On the 18th, in a letter to Oldenburg, he announced
his intention of sending the Society an account of a philosophical
discovery which, without false modesty, he describes as being the
oddest if not the most considerable detection which has hitherto
been made in the operations of nature.^
In this account Newton turned upside down the most firmly estab
lished bases of optics. He demonstrated that colors did not belong
to colored bodies but to the rays of light; that they were not modifi
cations of light, but original and connate properties of the rays; and
that white light, instead of being the fundamental and simple species
out of which colored rays were produced by the prism, was on the
contrary a confused mixture of variously colored rays pre-existing in
it. His letter describing his discovery was received on the 8th of
* Correspondence o f Isaac Newton, I, 82.
40
thought
February and, on the 19th, was published in the Royal Societys

Philosophical Transactions under the heading;
A letter of Mr. Isaac Newton, Mathematick Professor in the University
of Cambridge; containing his New Theory about Light and Colors: Where
Light is declared to be not Similar or Homogeneal, but consisting of difform
rays, some of which are more refrangible than others: And Colors are
affirmd to be not Qualifications of Light, derivd from Refractions of
Natural Bodies, (as tis generally believed;) but Original and Connate
properties, which in divers rays are divers: Where several Observations
and Experiments are alledged to prove the said Theory.^
In his letter to Oldenburg Newton gives him a historical account

of his discovery:
In the beginning of the Year 1666 (at which time I applyed my self to
the grinding of Optick glasses of other figures than Spherical^ I procured
me a Triangular glass-Prisme, to try therewith the celebrated P/iaeomea
of Colours___It was at first a very pleasing divertisement, to view the vivid
and intense colours produced thereby; but after a while applying my self to
consider them more circumspectly, I became surprised to see them in an
oblong form; which, according to the received laws of Refraction, I ex
pected should have been circular}
It was this surprise that induced Newton to make the experiments

and observations about which he reports to the Royal Society and
which led him to establish his new theory of colors. I will not
describe here the experiments presented by Newton - they are those
that are still made in classrooms the world over; it would be in
teresting, however, to compare them and their structure with the
^ Phil. Trans., No. 80, 19 February 1671/72, pp. 3075-3087; reprinted in facsimile
in Cohen, Newton's Papers and Letters, pp. 47-59, with a study of Newtons Optical
Papers, by Thomas S. Kuhn. On Newtons theory of colors see M. Roberts and E. R.
Thomas, Newton and the Origin o f Colours (London: Bell, 1934), and R. S. Westfall,
The Development of Newtons Theory of Color, Isis 53 (1962), 339-358.
* Cohen, Newton's Papers and Letters, p. 47; Correspondence, I, 92. It is rather sur
prising that Newton does not tell Oldenburg - or anybody else - that his new theory of
colors is based not only on the experiments and observations made in 1666, but also
on the investigations that he pursued in Cambridge and described in his Lectiones
opticae for the years 1669, 1670, and 1671. These Lectiones, however, were not pub
lished by Newton; thus they remained practically unknown till 1728, when they were
printed in an English translation under the title Optical Lectures Read in the Public
Schools o f the University of Cambridge. Anno Domini 1669. A Latin edition, Lectiones
opticae annis M DCLXIX, MDCLXX, M D C LXXI in scholis publicis habitae et nunc
primum in ex. M S in lucem editae, followed in 1729. Later these Lectiones were reprinted
by J. Castillon in his edition of Newtons Opuscula (Lausanne and Geneva, 1744),
and also by Horsley, Opera omnia (London, 1782), vol. III. The texts of those editions
are not identical.
* An excellent analysis of these experiments has been given by E. Mach, Principien
der physikalischen Optik (Leipzig; Barth, 1921); English translation. The Principles o f
Physical Optics (London; Methuen, 1926), reprinted by Dover Publications.
D
41
N E WT O N S S C I E NT I F I C T H O UG HT
experiments of Boyle and Hooke,^ who at nearly the same time as

Newton (or somewhat earlier, to be precise), studied the celebrated
phaenomena of colours.
The difference, in short, can be boiled down to an extremely
characteristic trait of Newton: the fact that he measures, whereas
Boyle and Hooke do not. They describe, admire, and explain the
lovely colors of birds feathers, of metals, of mica - and, though
Hookes explanation of the appearance of colors in plates of mica,
or (as they called it) Muscovy glass, and soap bubbles is re
markably good, it is not based on measurements. Newton, on the
other hand, finds it a very pleasing divertisement, to view the vivid
and intense colours produced by the prism, but he does not stop at
that; it is the elongation of the spectrum^ and the different places
occupied in it by different colors that seem to him to constitute the
most important feature of the phenomenon. It is because of this
quantitative approach - which transcends sensual perception - that
he turns to precise measurements of the angles of refraction, and he
thus discovers that divers colours are inseparably linked with divers
degrees of refrangibility, and that neither the colors nor the degrees
of refrangibility can be modified by any means at his disposal, that
is, neither by reflection nor by refraction. The meaning of his
experiment, especially of the experiment in which rays of light of a
determined pure spectral color are passed successively through prisms,
and which Newton calls an experimentum crucis,^ is perfectly clear
to him. Let him draw his conclusion in his own words:
colours in a continued series belong intermediate degrees of refrangibility.

And this Analogy twixt colours, and refrangibility, is very precise and
strict; the Rays always either exactly agreeing in both, or proportionally
disagreeing in both . . .
These things being so, it can be no longer disputed, whether there be
colours in the dark, nor whether they be the qualities of the objects we see,
no nor perhaps, whether Light be a Body, For, since Colours are the
qualities of Light, having its Rays for their intire and immediate subject,
how can we think those Rays qualities also, unless one quality may be the
subject of and sustain another; which in effect is to call it Substance. We
should not know Bodies for substances, were it not for their sensible quali
ties, and the Principal of those being now found due to something else,
we have as good reason to believe that to be a Substance also.
Besides, whoever thought any quality to be a heterogeneous aggregate,
such as Light is discovered to be. But, to determine more absolutely, what
Light is, after what manner refracted, and by what modes or actions it
produceth in our minds the Phantasms of Colours, is not so easie. And I
shall not mingle conjectures with certainties.^
To the same degree of Refrangibility ever belongs the same colour, and
to the same colour ever belongs the same degree of Refrangibility. The
least Refrangible Rays are all disposed to exhibit a Red colour, and contrarily those Rays, which are disposed to exhibit a Red colour, are all the
least refrangible: So the most refrangible Rays are all disposed to exhibit
a deep Violet Colour, and contrarily those which are apt to exhibit such a
violet colour, are all the most Refrangible. And so to all the intermediate
1 R. Boyle, Experiments and Considerations Upon Colours (London, 1663), reprinted
in Thomas Birch, ed., The Works o f the Hon. Robert Boyle (London, 1744), I, 662 sq.
R. Hooke, Micrographia o f some Physiological Descriptions o f Minute Bodies made by
magnifying glasses, with Observations and Inquiries thereupon (London, 1665), reprinted
by R. T. Gunther, Early Science in Oxford (Oxford: printed for the subscribers, 1938),
vol. XIII.
In his Lectiones opticae (pars II, sec. 1, XX, p. 92 of the edition of Castillon; p.
267 of that of Horsley) he even tries the prism experiment on the light coming from
Venus; the result is a lineola.
^ Professor H. W. Turnbull {Correspondence, I, 104) points out that the expression
experimentum crucis is a misquotation by Hooke {Micrographia, p. 54) of the Baconian
instantia crucis. Thus, Newton in using it is reminiscing from his reading of Hooke."
42
Thus the famous questio disputata - whether light is a substance

or only an attribute - appears to Newton to be definitely settled:
light is a substance. It may even be a body, though Newton, as we
have seen - and this is something that Hooke and the others will
fail to notice - does not assert this outright. He believes it, of course,
but he thinks that he did not demonstrate it: body and sub
stance are not identical concepts.
The results of the Newtonian experiments seem to me to throw a
light on their very structure. They presuppose in an axiomatic
fashion a mathematical structure of nature and their aim is to dis
entangle the confusion of the empirically given reality, to find out
or to isolate its real and simple components. The Newtonian experi
ments do not have as their aim the establishing of numerical or
functional relations between the phenomena, but the disclosing of
their true and sufficient causes.
The publication of Newtons Theory about Light and Colors
gave birth to an extremely interesting sequence of polemics that,
alas, it would be too long to discuss here. Pardies, Linus, Huygens,^
^ Phil. Trans., No. 80,19 February 1671/72, pp, 3081 and 3085; reprinted in facsimile
in Cohen, Newton's Papers and Letters, pp. 53 and 57; Correspondence, I, 97, 100.
It was the discovery of the unbreakable link between color and refrangibility that led
Newton to the conviction that it was impossible to get rid of the chromatic aberration
in refracting telescopes and that they had to be replaced by reflecting ones. Accordingly,
he abandoned his efforts to perfect the former and made for himself, in 1668, a reflect
ing telescope, an improved copy of which he presented to the Royal Society.
^ The documents of this polemic are now assembled in Cohen, Newton's Papers and
Letters', the best account of it is still to be found in Rosenberger, Isaac Newton und
43
and, first and foremost, Hooke objected to Newtons new hypothesis

that, if each ray of light was endowed with its own particular color,
it implied a nearly infinite multiplication of these. ^ Hooke insinu
ated, moreover,^ that there was nothing new (for him) in Newtons
experiments, and that, in any case, all of them, even his experimentum
crucis, did not demonstrate Newtons hypothesis that light is a body,
and can be explained just as well, if not better, by his own hypothesis
which he developed in his Micrographia and which interpreted light
as an undulation, or pulse, propagated with an enormous speed in an
aethereal medium, this pulse being straight, that is, perpendicular to
the direction of propagation, in the case of white light and oblique
in the case of colored.^ Or there might even be two or three other
[hypotheses] very differing from both Newtons and Hookes that
would explain the phenomena just as well.
Newtons reaction to Hookes attack is rather curious.^ He denies.
seine physikalischen Principien; see also L. Rosenfeld, La Theorie des couleurs de
Newton et ses adversaires, Isis 9 (1927), 44-65; and R. S. Westfall, Newton and His
Critics on the Nature of Colors, Archives Internationales d'Histoire des Sciences
15 (1962), 47-62, and Newtons Reply to Hooke and the Theory of Colors, Isis
54 (1963), 82-97.
^ See Hookes letter to Oldenburg, 15 February 1671/72, Cohen, Newton's Papers
and Letters, pp. 110 sq; Correspondence, I, 110 sq.: I have perused the Excellent Dis
course of Mr. Newton about colours and Refractions, and I was not a little pleased
with the niceness and curiosity of his observations. But though I wholy agree with him
as to the truth of those he has alledged, as having, by many hundreds of tryalls found
them soe, yet as to his Hypothesis of salving the phaenomena of Colours thereby, I confesse, I cannot see yet any undeniable argument to convince me of the certainty thereof.
^ Cohen, Newton's Papers and Letters, p. 113; it is wholly useless to multiply enti
ties without necessity, says Hooke, who himself recognized only two fundamental
colors, namely red and blue. Newton, on the other hand, though ascribing to each ray
of light its particular color, admitted a certain number of original or primary ones. In
the Lectiones opticae (pars II, sec. 1, p. 185 of the Castillon edition; vol. Ill, p. 352,
of the Horsley one) he lists as such: Ruhr urn, Flavum, Viridem, Caeruleum et Violaceum;
in the New Theory about Light and Colors (Cohen, Newton's Papers and Letters,
p. 54), "Red, Yellow, Green, Blew, and a Violet-purple, together with Orange, Indico,
and an indefinite variety of Intermediate gradations. In the Hypothesis explaining
the Properties of Light, discoursed of in my several Papers of 1675 {ibid., p. 192) he
says that possibly colour may be distinguished into its principal degrees, red, orange,
yellow, green, blue, indigo, and deep violet, on the same ground, that sound within
an eighth is graduated into tones.
Micrographia, p. 64: Blue is an impression on the Retina of an oblique and con
fusd pulse of light whose weakest part precedes and whose strongest follows . . . Red
is an impression on the Retina of an oblique and confusd pulse of light, whose strong
est part precedes and whose weakest follows.
* See Newtons reply to Hooke, Phil. Trans., No. 88, 18 November 1672, pp. 50845103; reprinted in Cohen, Newton's Papers and Letters, pp. 116-135; Correspondence,
1, 171 sq. The text published in the Correspondence reproduces the original letter of
Newton and is somewhat different from the text printed by Oldenburg in the Philoso
phical Transactions. Oldenburg shortened it and made it impersonal, suppressing the
name of Hooke and replacing it by expressions such as opponent or animadversor.
44
n e w t o n s
SC I E NT I F I C T H O UG HT
of course, having advanced a hypothesis: what he presented was a

theory. He reproaches Hooke (a) for having ascribed to him a hypo
thesis that he did not make, that of light being a body (did he not
say perhaps ?) and (6) for not understanding that his, Hookes,
hypothesis, besides being unable to explain the rectilinear propagation
of light,^ is just one of those hypotheses that had been disproved
and refuted by Newtons crucial experiment.
Newton is obviously right and wrong at the same time, and even
somewhat unfair - wrong and unfair because nobody, not even Hooke,
ever presented a hypothesis without accompanying it, at least in his
own mind, with a perhaps or a maybe. It is just for this that
Newton himself reproaches people who use hypotheses. One cannot
therefore deny - and Hooke is quite right on this point - that in New
tons communication to the Royal Society he had in effect proposed
a hypothesis, the materiality of light.^ But Newton is right, too, in
the sense that, though he suggested the materiality of light rays, he
did not use that assumption as a base of his theory, in contra
distinction both to Descartes, who built up his optics on precon
ceived and, moreover, incompatible hypotheses, and to Hooke him
self, who founded his own optics on a false hypothesis and filled the
Micrographia with all kinds of hypotheses to suit his needs as he
went along.
Newton does not deny that his experiments might be explained by
means of several mechanical hypotheses. This is why he has not
proposed any hypotheses, but has limited himself to the elaboration
of a theory which conforms strictly to what is demonstrable - and
has been demonstrated - namely, the indestructible linkage between
degree of refrangibility and color. That his theory suggests, and even
makes likely, the corpuscular nature of light is quite true. But this is
something perfectly legitimate: this hypothesis, if one wishes that it
be a hypothesis, is formulated as a result of the data of experiment;
it is not presented as demonstrated, and it does not form an integral
part of his theory.
* According to Newton, if light was constituted by undulations or waves, it would
bend around corners.
* Newton says, of course (Cohen, Newton's Papers and Letters, p. 119), that he
knew, that the Properties which [he] declard of Light, were in some measure capable
of being explicated. . . by m any. . . Mechanical Hypotheses. And therefore [he] chose
to decline them all, and to speak of Light in general terms, considering it abstractly,
as something or other propagated every way in streight lines from luminous bodies,
without determining, what that Thing is. But did not Newton assert that light is a
substance? And a substance endowed with sensible qualities cannot be anything else
but a body.
45
As we know, Newton does not deal in conjectures. Thus it is

rather amusing to find him explaining that, if he were to propound
a hypothesis, he would do it differently and in a much better way
than his very esteemed friend Hooke, whose hostility toward the
hypothesis of the corpuscular structure of light Newton does not
understand. Newton himself has no such hostility toward the undulatory hypothesis, and, as a matter of fact, he needs both hypotheses.
Thus if he were to construct a hypothesis, he would begin by estab
lishing the facts, that is to say, the experimental data, thus to ground
his hypothesis on phenomena and strict measurement. He would,
then, begin by supposing that the rays of light are composed of ex
ceedingly small corpuscles - an assumption, according to Newton, that
is necessary in order to explain the rectilinear propagation of light.
But Newton would join to this corpuscular hypothesis a further one,
namely that of the existence of an aetheric medium in which these
corpuscles of light excite vibrations or waves of different bigness,
these bignesses corresponding to the different colors of light,
and use them both for a full explanation of refraction, reflection,
and the appearance of colors in thin plates. He would thus make a
synthesis of the two views, in a manner of which his answer to Hooke
already gives a sketch.
In 1675, having observed that the heads of some great virtuosos^
. . . run much upon hypotheses,^ so much that they do not under
stand his discourses when he speaks about light abstractedly,
although they readily apprehend them when he supplements his
theory by a hypothesis which makes it more concrete - as if my dis
courses wanted an hypothesis to explain them by - Newton sent to
Oldenburg, that is, to the Royal Society, a very long paper contain
ing An hypothesis explaining the Properties of Light, discoursed of
in my several Papers.^ He specified, however, that he was propound
ing this hypothesis only as an illustration of his theory, and that
he was not assuming it as true, even though speaking as if it were,
which means that, although he believes his view to be true, he knows
that he cannot demonstrate it. He tells us;
^ The term virtuosos was, in the language of the day, neither prejorative nor
ironic.
Birch, History o f the Royal Society, III, 249; reprinted in Cohen, Newton's Papers
and Letters, p. 179.
This Hypothesis, on Newtons request, was not published in the Philosophical
Transactions and appeared in print only in Birchs History o f the Royal Society, III,
247-305; see Cohen, Newton's Papers and Letters, pp. 178-235.
46
thought
It is to be supposed [Newton likes the term supposition ; a supposition

is not a hypothesis, and of course we are entitled to make suppositions]
. . . that there is an aethereal medium^ much of the same constitution with
air, but far rarer, subtler, and more strongly elastic ..
It is to be supposed, that the aether is a vibrating medium like air, only
the vibrations far more swift and minute; those of air, made by a mans
ordinary voice, succeeding one another at more than half a foot or a foot
distance; but those of aether at a less distance than the hundred thousandth
part of an inch. And, as in air the vibrations are some larger than others,
but yet all equally swift. . . so, I suppose, the aethereal vibrations differ
in bigness, but not in swiftness.
It is also to be supposed (Birch, p. 255) that light and aether

mutually act upon one another, aether in refracting light and light in
warming aether; and that the densest aether acts more strongly.
Indeed, since aether is not homogeneous but differs in density,^ a
ray of light is pressed or urged by a denser medium toward a rarer
and is curved in toward the rarer one - a process that explains re
fraction, and also complete reflection if light is supposed to pene
trate obliquely into succeeding layers of a denser and denser medium.
And this process even explains simple reflection if we admit that the
aethereal fluids, like fluids generally, near their superficies are less
^ Newton seems to have been influenced by Hookes idea of luminiferous aether
nearly as much as Hooke was influenced by Newtons suggestion of various big
nesses of aethereal waves or pulses corresponding to different colors.
* Birch, History o f the Royal Society, HI, 249; Cohen, Newton's Papers and Letters,
p. 179. Newton adds: Of the existence of this medium the motion of a pendulum in a
glass exhausted of air almost as quickly as in the open air, is no inconsiderable argu
ment. It is interesting to note that in the Scholium Generale to Sec. VI of the second
and third editions of the Principia (it is lacking in the first edition), Newton discusses the
opinion (in the second edition, Receptissima Philosophorum aetatis hujus opinio, p. 292
of the Amsterdam ed. of 1714 and simply nonnulorum opinio in the third [Horsley, II,
379; Motte-Cajori, 325/607]), that there is a certain etheral medium extremely rare
and subtile which freely pervades the pores of all bodies; and from such a medium, so
pervading the pores of the bodies, some resistance must needs arise. Newton then
proceeds to relate (p. 326), by memory, the paper being lost in which I had described
it, the pendulum experiments which demonstrate that the resistance of the internal
parts of a body really exists and that the greater resistance of the full box (compared to
that of an empty one) arises not from any other latent cause, but only from the action
of some subtle fluid upon the included metal.
* Birch, History o f the Royal Society, III, 251; Cohen, Newton's Papers and Letters,
p. 181. The aethereal vibrations or waves of Newton - just like those of Hooke - are,
of course, longitudinal pulses like vibrations or waves of air that produce sounds.
The bigness of the vibrations is thus their wavelength. Newton assumes that as
sounds of various tones correspond to air vibrations of various bignesses (p. 262, p.
192) so also to light rays of different color correspond aethereal vibrations of different
bigness and strength, the biggest and strongest being those that are produced in the
aether by red rays, and the weakest and shortest those that are produced by violet
ones. This explains why red light rays are less refracted than violet rays.
* Aether that is contained in the bodies is considered by Newton as being less dense
than aether that is outside them.
47
pliant and yielding in their more inward parts, and that, therefore,
a ray of light is sometimes unable to break through the more stiff
and tenacious aethereal superficies of reflecting bodies.
We must further suppose (Birch, p. 263) that though light be
unimaginably swift, yet the aethereal vibrations excited by a ray,
move faster than the ray itself,^ and so overtake and outrun it one
after another. This enables us to explain the phenomena of semi
reflection and the appearance of colors in thin plates: the rays that
break through the first superficies are overtaken by the aethereal
waves on their way toward the second surface and are there reflected
or refracted accordingly as the condensed or expanded part of the
wave overtakes it there.
It is this synthetic, corpuscular, undulational hypothesis that New
ton applies - and with great success - to the study of the rings that
now bear his name^ and also to the study of the diffraction of light
which had been discovered by Grimaldi.^
As for himself, Newton writes;
I suppose light is neither aether, nor its vibrating motion, but something
of a different kind propagated from lucid bodies.
Then he raises two possibilities. First, he says.
They, that will, may suppose it an aggregate of various peripatetic
qualities.
Clearly, this is not Newtons own view. Next, he introduces those
others (among whom we doubtless must include Newton himself)
who
' At the time he wrote his hypothesis, Newton assumed that light is not so swift
as some are apt to think, and might spend an hour or two, if not more, in moving
from the sun to us (p. 263, p. 193). Thirty years later in his Opticks (Book II, Part III,
Prop. XII), when presenting a hypothetical explanation of the fits of easy transmis
sion and easy reflection, Newton, though knowing the velocity of light, maintains that
the vibrations of the refracting or reflecting medium excited in it by light rays move
faster than these rays.
* Birch, History o f the Royal Society, III, 263 sq.; Cohen, Newton's Papers and
Letters, pp. 193 sq. The study of colors in thin plates by Hooke and Newton exempli
fies once more the difference of which I have already spoken: Newton measures, where
as Hooke does not. Hooke, indeed, studies these colors in thin plates of mica, or soap
bubbles, the thickness of which he does not, and cannot, measure. Newton uses large
convex and planoconvex lenses pressed together, measures the diameters of the rings
that appear, and thus is able to calculate the thickness of the air layer between them.
* Ibid., pp. 269 sq., 199 sq. Strangely enough, Newton will never use the Grimaldian
term diffraction, but replaces it by that of inflexion used by Hooke, though in a
different sense.
48
n e w t o n s s c i e n t i e i c
thought
may suppose it multitudes of unimaginable small and swift corpuscles of

various sizes, springing from shining bodies at great distances one after
another; but yet without any sensible interval of time, and continually
urged forward by a principle of motion, which in the beginning accelerates
them.^
Furthermore, Newton states explicitly that any type of hypothesis
may serve, as long as it provides a quantitative scale, and he illus
trates his view by referring to both a type of particle (grains of sand)
and a form of wave (water):
To avoid dispute, and make this hypothesis general, let every man here
take his fancy: only, whatever light be, I suppose, it consists of rays differ
ing from one another in contingent circumstances, as bigness, form, or
vigour; like as the sands on the shore, the waves of the sea, the faces of
men, and all other natural things of the same kind differ.^
In his Opticks of 1704 Newton seems to have abandoned the syn
thetic theory that he had developed in his Hypotheses. Then in order
to explain refraction and reflection he does not make an appeal to
the existence of aether, but to explain refraction he appeals to an
(attractive) force that urges the body (light particle) toward the
refracting surface; and concerning reflection he only informs us
that the Reflexion of a Ray is effected . . . by some power of the
[reflecting] Body which is evenly diffused all over its surface, and
by which it acts upon the Ray without immediate contact.* Even
when he comes to treat the phenomena of semitransparence and of
rings, he carefully avoids any mention of aether and only tells us
that every Ray of light in its passage through any refracting surface
is put into a certain transient condition or state which in the progress
of the Ray returns at equal intervals, because in its progress through
the glass plate the ray is influenced by some action or disposition
propagated from the first to the second surface of the plate. The
existence of these conditions or stages, which he calls Fits of easy
Reflexion and Fits of easy Transmission, is not a hypothesis.
As usual, he tells us that he does not inquire what kind of action
or disposition it is that puts the rays of light into these conditions.
1 Ibid., p. 254, p. 184.
* Ibid., p. 255, p. 185.
* The explanation of refraction and total reflection on the basis of the conception of
attraction was developed by Newton in Book I, Sec. XIV, of the Principia.
* Opticks, Book II, Part III, Prop. VIII; Cohen-Roller edition, p. 268.
Ibid., Prop. XII; p. 278. The fits of the Opticks replace the aethereal vibrations
of the Hypotheses, and play exactly the same role as these: they introduce periodicity
into the light rays.
49
Those that are averse from assenting to any new Discoveries, but such
as they can explain by an Hypothesis may for the present suppose that as
Stones by falling upon Water put the water into an undulating Motion,
and all Bodies by percussion excite vibrations in the Air; so the Rays of
Light, by impinging on any refracting or reflecting Surface . . . excite
vibration in the refracting or reflecting Medium or Substance. . . much after
the manner that vibrations are propagated in the Air for causing Sound,
and move faster than the Rays so as to overtake them [and thus produce
the fits].^
But, adds Newton, whether this Hypothesis be true or false, I do

not here consider.*
Once more we see Newton faithful to his extremely rigorous dis
tinction between things which can be demonstrated and those which
cannot; faithful also to his aversion for what A. N. Whitehead has
called misplaced concreteness.
The Queries added by Newton at the end of the first English
edition (1704) of the Opticks go still further. Newton there abandons
any pretension to neutrality, or, if one prefers, to disinterestedness,
with regard to the truth or falsity of the hypotheses which he pro
poses, allegedly only to be better understood by those that cannot
do without. Nevertheless, he does not use the term hypothesis.*
Yet there is no doubt that he believes the suppositions which he
advances to be true. Thus he uses the equivalent and convenient
form of the rhetorical question: Do not Bodies act upon Light at a
distance . .. ? and Is not this action {caeteris paribus) strongest at
the least distance? (Query 1) or Do not Bodies and Light act
mutually upon one another . . . ? (Query 5).^
In later years Newton adds further Queries to the Latin edition
(1706) and the second English edition (1717) of the Opticks.^ He
^ Optick, Book II, Part III, Prop. XII, p. 280. Yet as Newton adds that probably
[light] is put into such fits at its first emission from luminous bodies and continues in
them during all its progress it is pretty clear that this medium cannot be anything else
than the aether of the Hypotheses.
* Which is to say that Newton - and with good reason - finds himself ineapable of
demonstrating this conjecture.
^ See A. Koyre, Les Queries de VOptique."
* Cohen-Roller edition, p. 339.
It should be noted that in the second English edition of the Opticks (and later
editions). Query 17, which does not appear in the Opticks of 1704 or in the Latin one of
1706, presents exactly the same hypothesis which Newton had introduced in Book II,
Part III, Prop. XII as necessary for those who without a hypothesis are averse to
assenting to any new discoveries. See a discussion of this point in Cohen, Franklin
and Newton, pp. 162-163. Newtonians generally assumed that Newton believed the
suppositions (hypotheses) of the Queries to be valid. Thus Stephen Hales, referring to
Queries 18 and 21, mentioned the aethereal medium by which (the great Sir Isaac
Newton supposes) light is refracted and reflected. David Gregory, who in 1705 saw
the new Queries in MS before they were printed, wrote that in them Newton has by
50
n e w t o n s
S C I E NT I F I C T H O UG HT
Still does not assert outright the truth of his views: he continues
to use the convenient and equivalent form of rhetorical question.

Thus he asks: Is not the Heat of the warm room conveyd through
the Vacuum by the Vibrations of a much subtler Medium than Air,
which, after the Air was drawn out, remained in the Vacuum ? And
is not this Medium the same with that Medium by which Light is
refracted and reflected .. . and is put into Fits of easy Reflexion and
easy Transmission?^
The Queries are full of these rhetorical questions. If we did not
know that Newton does not ever make hypotheses, we could easily
mistake them for a most exciting set of the boldest and even the
most extravagant, and yet at the same time most fruitful and in
fluential, hypotheses.* But of course we would be wrong. Hypotheses
have no place in Newtons philosophy. Newton, one must remember,
has told us this explicitly in the Scholium Generale. But, in fact, it
is very well explained in Query 28, one of those first printed in the
Latin edition of the Opticks (1706), and then again in the second
English edition (1717), where Newton tells us that his own views are
practically the same as those of the old Greek and Phoenician philo
sophers, who all admit the void, and also nonmechanical causes.
Alas,
later Philosophers banish the Consideration of such a (Tause out of natural
Philosophy, feigning Hypotheses for explaining all things mechanically,
and referring other Causes to Metaphysicks; Whereas the main Business
of natural Philosophy is to argue from Phaenomena without feigning
Hypotheses, and to deduce Causes from Effects, till we come to the very
first Cause, which certainly is not mechanical.
The foregoing text projects a singular light on the end of the

Scholium Generale, in which, after having announced that he has
not yet been able to discover the cause of gravity, and that he does
not feign hypotheses, Newton tells us:
And now we might add something concerning a certain most subtle
spirit which pervades and lies hid in all gross bodies; by the force and ac
tion of which spirit the particles of bodies attract one another at near dis
tances, and cohere, if contiguous; and electric bodies operate to greater
distances, as well repelling as attracting the neighboring corpuscles; and
light is emitted, reflected, refracted, inflected, and heats bodies; and all
way of quaere explained . . . J. T. Desaguliers also held that the Queries contained an
exposition of Newtons beliefs. See Cohen, Franklin and Newton, chap. 7.
^ Query 18. In Queries 19 and 20 this medium is frankly called aetherial.
^ See Cohen, Franklin and Newton, chap. 7.
51
sensation is excited, and the members of animal bodies move at the com
mand of the will, namely, by the vibrations of this spirit, mutually propaga
ted along the solid filaments of the nerves, from the outward organs of
sense to the brain, and from the brain into the muscles. But these are things
that cannot be explained in few words, nor are we furnished with the suffi
ciency of experiments which is required to an accurate determination and
demonstration of the laws by which this spirit operates.^
Apparently, then, to admit the existence of the void, of atoms,
of aethereal spirit, and of nonmechanical forces is not to feign hypo
theses; while to postulate the fullness of space, vortices, and the
conservation of the quantity of motion in the universe is, on the
contrary, to be guilty of using this method. The expression hjrpothesis thus seems to have become, for Newton, toward the end
of his life, one of those curious terms, such as heresy, that we
never apply to ourselves, but only to others. As for us, we do not
feign hypotheses, we are not heretics. It is f/tey, the Baconians, the
Cartesians, Leibniz, Hooke, Cheyne, and others they feign hypo
theses and they are the heretics.
^ In Mottes version, reprinted by Cajori, the General Scholium concludes; the
laws by which this electric and elastic spirit operates. The words electric and elastic
have been shown by A. R. Hall and M. B, Hall, Newtons Electric Spirit: Four Oddi
ties, Isis 50 (1959), 473-476, to be additions by Motte which are not in the printed
Latin text. Curiously enough these words are to be found in Newtons own annotated
copy of the second edition of the Principia, but never found their way into the third
edition; see A. Koyrd and I. B. Cohen, Newtons Electric and Elastic Spirit, Isis
51 (1960), 337. It is to be noted that this spirit acts only at small distances and does
not produce gravity or attraction. In the Opticks of 1717 these are, on the contrary,
explained by the action of the same aethereal medium that produces reflection, refrac
tion, and inflexion (diffraction) of light (Queries 17-22). Newton naturally adds that he
does not know what this aether is (Query 21).
III
Newton and Descartes
The seventeenth century has been called, and rightly, the century
of genius. Indeed, there is hardly another one that can pride itself
on having produced such a galaxy of first-rate minds; Kepler and
Galileo, Descartes and Pascal, Newton and Leibniz, not to mention
Fermat and Huygens. Yet even in the skies, as we know, the stars
are not all equal in glory. Thus it seems to me that in this galaxy
there are two stars that outshine the others; Descartes, who con
ceived the ideal of modern science - or its dream? - the somnium de
reductione scientiae ad geometriam, and Newton, who firmly put
physics back on its own feet. I felt therefore that it would be in
teresting to examine, or re-examine, their relation, all the more so
as the recent study of the Newtonian manuscripts has uncovered
some hitherto unknown material that throws a new light upon this
problem.
The comparison, or confrontation, of Newton and Descartes,
somewhat on the Plutarchian pattern, was very often made in the
eighteenth century.^ It is no longer done. And we can understand
See, for instance, Fontenelles filoge de M. Newton, Histoire de VAcademic
Royale des Sciences, annee 1727 (Paris: De L lmprimerie Royale, 1729), pp. 151-172;
I quote the English translation. The Elogium o f Sir Isaac Newton . . . (London, 1728),
pp. 15 sq., reprinted with a very interesting introduction by C. C. Gillispie, Fontenelle and Newton, in I. B. Cohen, ed., Isaac Newton's Papers and Letters on Natural
Philosophy (Ca.mhn6.ge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958), pp. 457 sq.;
These two great men, whose Systems are so opposite, resembled each other in several
respects, they were both Geniuss of the first rank, l5oth born with superior under
standings, and fitted for the founding of Empires in Knowledge. Being excellent Geo
metricians, they both saw the necessity of introducing Geometry into Physicks; For
both founded their Physicks upon discoveries in Geometry, which may almost be
said of none but themselves. But one of them taking a bold flight, thought at once to
reach the Fountain of All things, and by clear and fundamental ideas to make himself
master of the first principles; that he might have nothing more left to do, but to descend
to the phenomena of Natures as to necessary consequences; the other more cautious,
or rather more modest, began by taking hold of the known phenomena to climb to un
known principles; resolved to admit them only in such manner as they could be pro
duced by a chain of consequences. The former sets out from what he clearly under
stands, to find out the causes of what he sees; the latter sets out from what he sees, in
order to find out the cause, whether it be clear or obscure. The self-evident principles of
the one do not always lead him to the causes of the phenomena as they are; and the
52
53
N E WT O N AND DESCARTES
why: Cartesian science, for us, belongs entirely to the past, whereas
Newtonian science, though superseded by Einsteins relativistic
mechanics and contemporary quantum mechanics, is still alive.
And very much so.^ But it was different in the eighteenth century,
at least in its first half. Then Cartesian philosophy, which in the
later part of the seventeenth century inspired most of the scientific
thinking of continental Europe,^ was still an active force; Newtons
infiuence was practically restricted to England.^ It is well known
that only after a long and protracted struggle against Cartesianism
did Newtonian physics, or, to use the term by which it designated
itself, Newtonian Natural Philosophy,^ gain universal recognition
in Europe.
The result of this state of affairs was, on one hand, a complete

divorce between British and Continental world views. As Voltaire
in his famous Lettres anglaises wittily puts it,
phenomena do not always lead the other to principles sufficiently evident. The boun
daries which stopd two such men in their pursuits through different roads, were not
the boundaries of Their Understanding, but of Human understanding it self.
^ Thus the sputniks constitute the first experimental proof of Newtonianism on a
cosmic scale.
Even those who, like Huygens and Leibniz, rejected some of the fundamental
theses of Descartes, such as the identification of extension and matter and the con
servation of momentum, and who therefore considered themselves as non-Cartesians
(Huygens) or anti-Cartesians (Leibniz), were very deeply influenced by Descartes and
accepted his ideal of a purely mechanical science; see P. Mouy, Le Developpement de la
physique cartdsienne, 1646-1712 (Paris; Vrin, 1934).
Even in England the influence of Cartesianism was very great, owing to the excel
lent textbook of Jacques Rohault, Traiti de physique (Paris, 1671; 12th ed., 1708)
which was translated into Latin by Theophile Bonet, and published in Geneva as early
as 1674 (Jacobi Rohaulti Tractatus physicus). Thus it was the masterstroke - a kind of
Trojan-horse technique - of Samuel Clarke to use Rohaults textbook, of which he
published a new and much better Latin translation in 1697 (Jacobi Rohaulti Physica
[London, 1697; 4th ed., 1718; we shall cite this fourth Latin edition]), for the propaga
tion of Newtons ideas by means of the Annotationes (from the third edition of 1710
they became footnotes) that flatly contradicted the text. The success of this rather un
usual combination was so great that the book was reprinted several times (the last,
sixth, edition appeared in 1739), and was even translated into English by Samuel
Clarkes brother, John Clarke, in 1723 (reprinted in 1729 and 1735) under the significant
title of Rohault's System o f Natural Philosophy, illustrated with Dr. Samuel Clarke's
notes taken mostly out o f Sir Isaac Newton's philosophy . . . done into English by John
Clarke, D.D., Prebendary o f Canterbury, 2 vols. (London: James Knapton, 1723;
we shall cite this edition). On the Continent, Rohaults Physica appeared, in Latin,
cum animadversionibus Antonii Le Grand, in Amsterdam in 1700; and was reprinted
in Cologne in 1713, cum animadversionibus of Legrand and of Clarke. See Michael A.
Hoskin, Mining All Within: Clarkes Notes to Rohaults Traite de physique," The
Thomist 24 (1961), 353-363.
* Newtons Op ticks gained recognition rather easily and quickly: it was translated
into French by Coste in 1720 (Traite d'optique, Paris, 1720); a second edition beaucoup plus correcte que la premiere appeared in 1722.
For the history of this struggle and the role played in it by the Dutch physicists
P. Musschenbroeck and W. J. sGravesande on one side, and P. L. Maupertuis on the
other, see P. Brunet, Les Physiciens hollandais et la methode experimentale en France au
XVIII^ sidcle (Paris; Blanchard, 1926), and L'Introduction des theories de Newton en
France au XVIIF si^cle (Paris: Blanchard, 1931). See also D. W. Brewster, Memoirs o f
the Life, Writings and Discoveries o f Sir Isaac Newton (Edinburgh, 1855), vol. I,
54
A Frenchman who arrives in London finds a great change in philosophy,

as in everything else. He left the world full, he finds it empty. In Paris one
sees the Universe composed of vortices of subtle matter. In London one
sees nothing of this. In Paris it is the pressure of the moon that causes the
flux of the sea; in England it is the sea that gravitates toward the moon.
With your Cartesians, everything is done by an impulsion that nobody
understands; with Mr. Newton, it is by an attraction, the cause of which
is not better known.^
On the other hand, the protracted struggle for and against Des
cartes and Newton transformed both of them into symbolic figures;
the one, Newton, embodying the ideal of modern, progressive, and
successful science, conscious of its limitations and firmly based upon
chap. XII; F. Rosenberger, Isaac Newton und seine physikalischen Principien (Leipzig,
1895), Buch I, Theil IV, Kap. 1: Die erste Aufnahme der Principien der Naturlehre ; Ren6 Dugas, La Micanique au XF// si^cle (Paris: Dunod, 1954).
Lettres philosophiques, edition critique par Gustave Lanson (Paris: Edouard Cornely, 1909, and later editions), letter 14, vol. 2, p. 1. Voltaires Le/fres philosophiques
appeared first in English (anonymously) under the title Letters Concerning the English
Nation (London, 1733); then in French under the titles Lettres philosophiques par M.
de V*** (Amsterdam, 1734; in fact they were printed by Jore in Rouen) and Lettres
icrites de Londres sur les anglais.. .par M. D. V*** (Basle, 1734; but in fact London,
1734). For the complete history of the Lettres philosophiques, see Gustave Lansons
Introduction to his above-mentioned edition. According to Descartes, the sun and all other fixed stars - were surrounded by huge liquid vortices composed of
luminous and luminiferous matter, the first and the second elements respec
tively (see p. 62, n. 2), in which the planets, endowed with their own, smaller, vortices,
swam as specks of straw or bits of wood swim in a river, and were carried along by these
vortices around the central body of the big vortex, in our case, around the sun. It is to
the action or counteraction of these vortices, each restricted in its expansion by the
surrounding vortices, that Descartes ascribed the centripetal forces that retained the
planets in their orbits; and it is by an analogous action of the small, planetary vortices
that he explained gravity. With his usual malevolence against Descartes, Leibniz
accused him of having borrowed the vortex conception from Kepler, without ack
nowledging his debt, as was his habit ; see Tentamen de motuum coelestium causis,
in C. J. Gerhardt, ed., Leibnizens mathematische Schriften (Halle, 1860), VI, 148, and
L. Prenant, Sur les references de Leibniz contre Descartes, Archives Internationales
d'Histoire des Sciences 13 (1960), 95-97. See also E. J. Alton, The Vortex Theory of
Planetary Motion, Annals o f Science 12 (1957), 249-264, 14 (1958), 132-147, 157172; The Cartesian Theory of Gravity, ibid., 15 (1959), 24-49; and The Celestial
Mechanics of Leibniz, ibid., 16 (1960), 65-82. Sir Edmund Whittaker, A History o f
the Theories o f Aether and Electricity (London: Nelson, 2nd ed., 1951; New York:
Harper, 1960), II, 9, n. 2, points out the relation of the Cartesian vortices to modern
cosmological conceptions: It is curious to speculate on the impression which would
have been produced had the spirality of nebulae been discovered before the overthrow
of the Cartesian theory of vortices. On the other hand there can hardly be any doubt
about the analogy between the conceptions of Faraday, Helmholtz, and Maxwell,
all based on the rejection of action at a distance (see Whittaker, I, 170 sq., 291 sq.),
and the Cartesian conceptions, especially the small vortices of Malebranche. For
the views of Huygens and Leibniz on gravitational attraction, see Appendix A.
55
experimental and experiential-observational data which it subjected

to precise mathematical treatment; the other, Descartes, symbol of
a belated, reactionary - and fallacious - attempt to subject science
to metaphysics, disregarding experience, precision, and measure
ment, and replacing them by fantastic, unproved, and unprovable
hypotheses about the structure and behavior of matter. Or, even
more simply, the one, Newton, representing the truth, and the other,
Descartes, a subjective error.^
This is, of course, the Newtonians image. The Cartesians, need
less to say, held a different view. They recognized, indeed, the great
superiority of Newtonian precision as compared to the vagueness
of the Cartesian cosmology, and the immense progress achieved
by Newton in his reduction of Keplers three descriptive laws of
planetary motion to their dynamic foundation; they admitted the
necessity of developing and improving Descartess physics. Yet
they rejected outright Newtonian attraction, in which they persisted
in seeing immediate action at a distance, that is, an occult quality,^
or, even worse, magic or a miracle,^ and this in spite of Newtons

repeated declarations that he did not take the term attraction in
its literal meaning and did not ascribe gravity to bodies as their own
inner and essential property.^ Nor could they, with the exception of
Huygens, admit the existence of a perfectly void space, that is, the
existence of nothing,^ through which that attraction was supposed
to act.
Thus Fontenelle, in his famous Elogium of Sir Isaac Newton,
voiced their and his own misgivings; having presented and duly
praised the Newtonian system of universal gravitation and having
mentioned Sir Isaacs unwillingness to explain its true nature, he
continues:
^ Voltaire, Lettre a M. de Maupertuis sur les filaments de la philosophie de New

ton, Oeuvres completes (Paris: Baudouin Frferes, 1828), XLII, 31-32: Descartes
has hardly made any experiments . . . if he had made them he would not establish
false laws of motion . . . if he had only deigned to read his contemporaries, he would
not have made the blood of the Pacteous veins pass through the liver, fifteen years after
the discovery of the true path by Azellius . . . Descartes has neither observed the laws
of the fall of bodies and seen a new heaven, like Galileo, nor guessed the rules of the
motion of the Stars, like Kepler, nor found the weight (heaviness) of air, like Torri
celli, nor calculated the centrifugal forces and the laws of the pendulum, like Huygens,
etc. On the other hand, Newton, with the aid of geometry and experience. . . has dis
covered the laws of gravitation between all bodies, the origin of colors, the properties
of light, the laws of the resistance of fluids.
Against this accusation of having introduced occult qualities into philosophy
(which incidentally Newton resented all the more strongly since in the very first lines
of the Praefatio ad lectorem of the first edition of the Principia he had already writ
ten: Cum veteres Mechanicam in rerum Naturalium investigatione maximi fecerunt,
et recentiores [by whom he obviously meant also himself], missis formis substantialibus et qualitatibus occultis. Phenomena Natura ad leges Mathematicas revocare
agressi sunt: Visum est in hoc Tractatu Mathesin excolere quatenus ea ad Philosophiam
spectat), he defended himself in Query XXIII of the Latin Opticks (of 1706, p. 335;
this is Query XXXI of the second English edition of 1717), attacking Cartesians on
their own ground. Thus he writes {Opticks, ed. I. B. Cohen and D. H. D. Roller [New
York: Dover, 1952], p. 388; I am quoting the English text): The parts of all homogeneal hard bodies which fully touch another, stick together very strongly. And for
explaining how this may be, some have invented hooked Atoms, which is begging the
question; and others [Descartes] tell us that bodies are glued together by rest, that is,
by an occult Quality or rather by nothing . . . I had rather infer from their cohesion
that their Particles attract one another by some Force, which in immediate contact is
exceeding strong, at small distances performs the chymical Operations . . . and reaches
not far from the particles with any sensible effect. Somewhat later (pp. 344 sq. of the
Latin edition; p. 401 of the English edition) he says: It seems to me further that these
particles [the Latin text has primigeniae] have not only a Vis inertiae accompanied
with such passive Laws of Motion as naturally result from that force, but also that they
56
It is not known in what Gravity consists. Sir Isaac Newton himself was
ignorant of it. If Gravity acts only by impulse, we may conceive that a
block of marble falling, may be pushed towards the Earth, without the
Earth being in any manner pushed towards it; and in a word all the centers
to which the motions caused by Gravity have relation, may be immoveable.
But if it acts by Attraction the Earth cannot draw the block of marble,
unless the block of marble likewise draw the Earth, why should then that
attractive power be in some bodies rather than others? Sir Isaac always
supposes the action of Gravity in all bodies to be reciprocal and in propor
tion only to their bulk; and by that seems to determine Gravity to be really
an attraction. He all along makes use of this word to express the active
power of bodies, a power indeed unknown, and which he does not take
upon him to explain; but if it can likewise act by Impulse, why should not
that clearer term have the preference? for it must be agreed that it is by no
means possible to make use of them both indifferently, since they are so
are moved by certain active Principles such as that of Gravity, and that which causes
Fermentation, and the Cohesion of Bodies. These Principles I consider not as occult
qualities supposed to result from the specific Forms of Things [Latin: oriri fingantur]
but as general Laws of Nature, by which the things themselves are formed. Their truth
appearing to us by Phenomena, though their causes be not yet discovered [Latin:
licet ipsorum Causae quae sint, nondum fuerit explicatum]. To tell us that every species
of things is endowed with an occult specific Quality by which it acts and produces mani
fest effects [Latin: per quas eae Vim certam in Agendo habeant], is to tell us nothing.
But to derive two or three general Principles of Motion from Phaenomena and after
wards to tell us how these Properties and Actions of all corporeal Things follow from
those Principles, would be a very great step in Philosophy though the Causes of those
Principles were not yet discovered. And therefore I scruple not to propose the Prin
ciples of motion above-mentiond, they being of a very general extent, and leave their
causes to be found out.
* For further discussion of the controversy about Newtonian attraction as a miracle
or an occult quality, see Appendix B.
^ For a further discussion of the controversy about whether gravity is an essential
property of matter, see Appendix C.
As is well known, Descartes and many of the Cartesians denied the existence of a
void or vacuum, and held instead that extension and matter were identical. For a fur
ther discussion of this topic, see Appendix D.
E
57
N EW T ON AND DESCARTES
opposite. The continual use of the word Attraction supported by great

authority, and perhaps too by the inclination which Sir Isaac is thought to
have for the thing itself, at least makes the Reader familiar with a notion
exploded by the Cartesians, and whose condemnation had been ratified
by the rest of the Philosophers; and we must now be upon our guard, lest
we imagine that there is any reality in it, and so expose our selves to the
danger of believing that we comprehend it . . .
to that of Copernicus, according to whom similar bodies - earthen,

lunar, and so forth - were endowed (or animated) by an inner ten
dency to come together and build a whole attraction was also
used by RobervaP - as Leibniz did not fail to point out - whose
We must be upon our guard . . . but most people are not:

Thus attraction and vacuum banished from Physicks by Des Cartes,
and in all appearance for ever, are now brought back again by Sir Isaac
Newton, armed with a power entirely new, of which they were thought
incapable, and only perhaps a little disguised.^
Fontenelle was right, of course. Words are not neutral. They have,
and convey, meanings. They also have a history. Thus the term
attraction, even if mutual attraction be meant, implies, or sug
gests - as Fontenelle rightly points out - a certain active relation
between the attracting and the attracted body: the former is active,
the latter is not. Thus the magnet attracts iron by the means of a
force or virtue that has its seat within the magnet; it acts upon a
piece of iron ab extra: the piece of iron is pulled toward the mag
net by the magnet; it does not tend toward the magnet by itself;
nor is it pushed toward it by the surrounding medium. William
Gilbert, for example, who made the earth an immense magnet, when
dealing with the mutual attraction of two magnets, characteristi
cally does not use this term; he speaks instead of their coitio. ^
So much for the meaning. As for the history, attraction was, of
course, widely used by writers on magnetism; and - much more
important - it was borrowed from them by Kepler, who explained
gravity as the effect of a magnetic or, more exactly, magnetiform
force, a vis attractiva, or vis tractoria, inherent in bodies, by which
they drag, or pull, trahunt, each other when they are similar; the
vis by which the earth drags toward itself stones, and also the moon;
the force by which the moon attracts our sea. Indeed, Kepler chose
the terms attraction and traction in order to oppose his theory
1 Fontenelle, /og/m, pp. 11 sq.; Cohen, Newton's Papers and Letters, pp. 453 sq.
On Fontenelle, see J. R. Carre, La Philosophie de Fontenelle ou le sourire de la raison
(Paris: Alcan, 1932). For a discussion of the controversy about attraction as it is found
in the Physica of the Cartesian Rohault and in the notes added to it by the Newtonian
Samuel Clarke, see Appendix E.
^ See William Gilbert, De magnete, magnetisque corporibus et de magno magnete
tellure physiologia nova (London, 1600), pp. 65 sq.
58
^ The views held by Copernicus and Kepler on gravity are discussed in Appendix F.
^ The explanation of gravity by attraction was formulated by Roberval, as a hypo
thesis, as early as 1636. Thus in a Letter of fitienne Pascal and Roberval to Fermat,
16 August 1636, in Leon Brunschvicg and Pierre Boutroux, ed.. Oeuvres de Blaise
Pascal (Paris: Hachette, 1923), I, 178 sq., or Paul Tannery and Charles Henry, ed..
Oeuvres de Fermat (Paris, 1894), II, 36 sq., we find:
3. It may be that gravity is a quality that resides in the very body that falls itself;
it may be that it is in another, that attracts the one which descends, as in the earth. It
may also be, and it is very probable, that it is a mutual attraction, or a natural desire
of bodies to unite together as is obvious in the case of iron and magnet, which are such
that, if the magnet is arrested, the iron, being not hindered, will move toward it. If
the iron is arrested, the magnet will move toward it, and if they are both free, they will
approach each other reciprocally. Thus, however, that the stronger of the two will
traverse a lesser distance . . .
9. We do not know which of these three causes of gravity is the true one, and we
are not even assured that it is one of these, it being possible that it is a different o n e . . .
As for us, we call those bodies equally or unequally heavy that have an equal or
unequal power to tend to the common center of heavy things; and the same body is
said to have the same weight when it has always the same power: but if this power in
creases or diminishes, then, though it be the same body, we do not consider it as [hav
ing] the same weight. Whether it happens to bodies that move farther away from this
center, or approach it, that is what we would like to know, but having found nothing
concerning this question that would give us satisfaction, we leave it undecided.
Some years later, Roberval published his System o f the World. In order to avoid the
censure of the Church, he published it as the work of Aristarchus of Samos, claiming,
moreover, that he had only corrected the style of a poor Latin version of an Arabic
translation of the Greek astronomers original book; Roberval thus could not be held
responsible for the views of the author, although he did acknowledge that the system
of Aristarchus seemed to him the simplest. Aristarchi Samii de mundi systemate partibus
et motibus ejusdem libellus (Paris, 1644); reprinted by Mersenne in his Novarum
observationum physico-mathematicarum . . . tomus III. Quibus accessit Aristarchus Samius (Paris, 1647).
In his System o f the World, Roberval asserts that each part of the (fluid) matter which
fills the universe is endowed with a certain property, or accident, that makes all parts
draw together {nisus) and attract each other reciprocally {sese reciproce attrahant, p.
39). At the same time he admits that in addition to this universal attraction there are
other, similar, forces proper to each of the planets (something that Copernicus and Kep
ler also admitted) which hold them together and explain their spherical shapes.
Twenty-five years later, on the occasion of a debate in the French Academy of
Sciences on the causes of gravity ( Debat de 1669 sur les causes de la pesanteur,
in C. Huygens, Oeuvres completes [The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1937], XIX, 628645), Roberval read a memoir on 7 August 1669 (pp. 628-630) in which he practically
reproduced the contents of his letter to Fermat, asserting that there are three possible
explanations of gravity, and further that the explanation by mutual attraction, or the
tendency of the different parts of matter to unite, was the simplest one. Curiously
enough, in this memoir he called attraction an occult quality.
Robervals cosmology, as it is presented in his System o f the World, is extremely
vague and even full of confusion. It is understandable that it was heartily condemned
by Descartes and that Newton was deeply angered by Leibnizs identification of New
tons views with those of Roberval (see Appendix B). Yet, historically, Robervals work
is interesting not only because it was the first attempt to develop a system of the
world on the basis of universal attraction, but also because it presented some charac59
N E W T O N I A N STUDI ES
cosmology was subjected by Descartes to scathing criticism, and by

Gassendi, who tried to combine the Keplerian conception with that
of Copernicus and both of them with his own atomism, and finally
by Hooke, in his Attempt to prove the motion o f the Earth by
Observations (London, 1674).^
Fontenelle did not mention, of course, the historical precedents I
am quoting; but he was perfectly aware of them. Thus we can well
understand him: was not Sir Isaac reviving all these obsolete,
mythical, irrational conceptions from which Descartes had freed
us? By no means, answers Voltaire:
portions. The cause of this is in the bosom of God. Procedes hue, et non
ibis ampHus.^
Nearly all Frenchmen, learned and others, have repeated this reproach.
One hears everywhere: why did Newton not use the word impulsion which
we understand so well, instead of attraction which we do not understand?
- Newton could have replied to his critics: first, you no more understand
the word impulsion than attraction . . Secondly, I could not accept im
pulsion, because it would be necessary, in that case, that I should know
that celestial matter effectively pushes the planets; but not only do I not
know of this matter, I have proved that it does not exist. . . Thirdly, I use
the word attraction only to express an effect that I have discovered in
nature, a certain and indisputable effect of an unknown principle, a quality
inherent in matter, the cause of which someone other than myself will,
perhaps, find. It is the vortices that one can call an occult quality, be
cause their existence has never been proved. Attraction, on the contrary,
is something real because we demonstrate its effects and calculate its proteristic features, or patterns of explanation, which, or at least the analogies of which,
we shall find discussed later by Hooke and advocated by Newton and Leibniz.
Thus, according to Roberval, the fluid and diaphanous matter which fills or con
stitutes the great system of the world (^magnum systerna mundi) forms a huge but finite - sphere in the center of which is the sun. The sun, a hot and rotating body,
exerts a double influence on this fluid matter: (a) It heats and thus rarefies it; it is this
rarefaction and the ensuing expansion of the world-matter that counterbalances
the force of the mutual attraction of its various parts and prevents them from
falling upon the sun. This rarefaction also confers on the world-sphere a particular
structure; the density of its matter increases with the distance from the sun. (b) The
suns rotating motion spreads through the whole world-sphere, the matter of which turns
around the sun with speeds diminishing with its distance from the sun. The planets are
considered as small systems, analogous to the great one, which swim or place them
selves at distances from the sun corresponding to their densities, that is, in regions the
density of which is equal to their own; thus they are carried around the sun by the
circular motion of the celestial matter, as is the case with bodies swimming in a rotating
vessel. Strangely enough, Roberval - who never takes any account of centrifugal
forces - believes that these bodies will describe circular trajectories!
Roberval has never been studied as he deserves: most of his works remain un
published; see, however, the excellent Study o f the Traite des indivisibles" o f Gilles
Persone de Roberval. . . by Evelyn Walker (New York: Bureau of Publications, Tea
chers College, Columbia University, 1932) and the semipopular book by Leon Auger,
Un Savant miconnu: Gilles Personne de Roberval. . . (Paris: Blanchard, 1962).
* Gassendis views on attraction and gravity are further discussed in Appendix
G, and Hookes in Appendix H.
60
Thus, it is not Newton, it is Descartes who made the error of be

lieving that he understood something that he did not, namely
matter, than which there is nothing more alien to our minds. This is
the reason why he conceived it as filling universal space, whereas, as
Newton has shown, it is not certain that there is a cubic inch of solid
matter in the whole universe. Newton, on the contrary, has taught
us to admit that there are things that we do not understand, and to
accept the obvious and palpable qualities of things - of which the
force of attraction is one - without trying to get behind them and
explain them by fancies.^
Geometry, which Descartes had, in a sense, created, was a good guide
and would have shown him a safe path in physics. But at the end he aban
doned this guide and delivered himself to the spirit of system. From then
on his philosophy became nothing more than a ingenious romance . .
He erred [in what he said] about the nature of the soul, the laws of motion,
the nature of light; he admitted innate ideas, invented new elements, created
a world
that existed only in his imagination and filled it with vortices of subtle
matter, the speed of which some people - a nice jibe at Huygens even calculated, alleging it to be seventeen times that of the earths
rotation without bothering to ascertain whether these vortices existed
in rerum natura.*
For Voltaire, Descartes is another Aristotle, more dangerous even

than the old one, because he seems to be more rational. Indeed,
Voltaire says,
^ Voltaire, Lettres philosophiques, letter XV (vol. 2, p. 27 of Lansons edition).
The scriptural text, which is from the Book of Job, chap. 38, v. 11, should read:
Usque hue venies, et non procedes amplius." In dealing with Newtons philosophy
(letters XV and XVI), Voltaire drew his inspiration chiefly from Fontenelle, loge (see
p. 53, n. 1), Pemberton, A View o f Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophy (London, 1728), and
Maupertuis, Discours sur les differentes figures des astres . . . avec une exposition
abbregie des systimes de M. Descartes & de M. Newton (Paris: 1732). Indeed, it was
under Maupertuiss influence that Voltaire became converted to Newtonianism;
accordingly he asked Maupertuis to read his Lettres philosophiques in manuscript at
the end of 1732; see Lansons edition of the Lettres philosophiques, vol. 2, pp. 8 and
29. On Maupertuis, see P. Brunet, Maupertuis (Paris: Blanchard, 1929).
* Lettres philosophiques, letter XVI, vol. 2, p. 46. See Pemberton, A View o f Sir
Isaac Newton's Philosophy, p. 291. All Newtonians - Bentley, Keill, Desaguliers,
Pemberton - seem to have felt a great satisfaction in proving that there was in the
world infinitely more void than solid matter, and that even solid matter was chiefly
composed of void.
* Lettres philosophiques, letter XIV, vol. 2, p. 7.
* Ibid., letter XV, vol. 2, pp. 17 sq.
61
the system of Descartes seems to give a plausible reason for the phenomena,
and that reason appeared all the more true as it seemed simple and intel
ligible to everyone. But in philosophy we have to defend ourselves against
things that we believe we understand too easily as well as against things
that we do not understand.^
A harsh judgment. And Sir Isaac, in spite of his aversion to Des

cartes, and the Cartesians, would probably have made it less harsh.
Yet we have to admit that there is in it some measure - and even a
great measure - of truth. But it is not the whole truth. Of course it is
true that Descartes, who started with a program of a purely rational
physics - There is nothing in my Physics that is not in geometry,
he wrote to Mersenne - ended by building a purely imaginary phy
sics, a philosophical romance, as Huygens and Leibniz have called it.
It is true that there are in the world neither subtle matter nor twisted
(screwformed) particles nor even round ones of the second element
that for Descartes constitutes light; it is also true that there are no
vortices, and that, if there were any, they would not explain attrac
tion and gravity; last, but not least, it is also true that matter and
space are not identical and that, therefore, physics cannot be re
duced to geometry,^ and that, paradoxically, it is the very attempt to
do so - something that I have called geometrisation a outrance - that
led Descartes into a quandary.
The Cartesians believed that philosophy could never renounce the

ideal of perfect intelligibility, which was so forcefully enhanced by
Descartes, and that science could never accept as its basis nonunderstandable facts. Yet the victorious Newtonian science with its
nonunderstandable forces of attraction and repulsion was doing
precisely that. And with what success! But the victors not only make
history, they also write it. And they are seldom lenient toward those
they have vanquished. Thus Voltaire - I am quoting Voltaire be
cause he is the most brilliant and the most influential of all the
promoters of Newton - in his famous preface to the French transla
tion of the Principia, that of Mme. du Ch^telet (and Clairaut), which
announced to the world the definitive victory of Newtonian science,
pronounced the judgment:
Everything that is given here as principle is indeed worthy of that name;
they are the first springs [ressorts] of nature, unknown before him; and
it is no longer possible to call oneself a physicist without knowing them.
If there were still somebody absurd enough to defend subtle and twisted
(screwformed) matter, to assert that the Earth is an encrusted Sun, that the
Moon has been drawn into the vortex of the Earth, that subtle matter pro
duces gravity, and all those other romantic opinions that replaced the ignor
ance of the Ancients, one would say: this man is a Cartesian; if he should
believe in monads, one would say he is a Leibnizian. But there are no New
tonians, as there are no Euclideans. It is the privilege of error to give its
name to a sect.^
One could argue that, in spite of its falseness, the idea of cosmic
vortices was not so ridiculous as Voltaire suggests; after all, quite
a number of people, among them such unromantic minds as Huy
gens and Varignon, not to speak of Leibniz, accepted it, though with
certain improvements, and Newton himself did not reject it out
right, but subjected it to a careful and serious criticism and analysis.^*
1 Lettres philosophiques, letter XV, vol. 2, pp. 16 sq.

^ Principes mathimatiques de la philosophie naturelle par feue Madame la Marquise
du Chastelet (Paris, 1759), p. vii. In the Cartesian world matter is primitively divided
by God into cubes - the simplest geometric figure into which it can be divided - and
put in motion or agitation, in pursuance of which the angles of the cubes are scraped
away and the cubes themselves become little spheres. These scraps form the first ele
ment, the agitation of which constitutes light which is transmitted by the small
spheres of the second element. Besides the luminous and the luminiferous (first and
second) elements, there is also a third one, constituted by the reunion of the scraps
into twisted, screwformed or channeled {cannelis, striatae) particles that, on one
hand, could twist through the intervals or interstices of the closely packed round
particles of the second element, and, on the other hand, could combine with one
another and thus form the larger chunks of gross matter that constitute the surface of
the earth and the planets. See Descartess Principia philosophiae, pars 3, art. 52; and
Whittaker, History o f the Theories o f Aether and Electricity, I, 8 sq. In his youthful
Monde, Descartes associated his three elements with the traditional elements of fire,
air, and earth {Oeuvres, ed. C. Adam and P. Tannery [Paris: 1897-1913], XI, 24).
According to Descartes, all heavenly bodies started their existence as luminous and
fiery stars, and only later became encrusted by the accumulation of gross matter on
their surfaces; thus they are all extinguished Suns, a conception by no means as
absurd as Voltaire believes it to be. On Descartess physics, see J. F. Scott, The Scientific
Work o f Reni Descartes (London: Taylor and Francis, 1952), and G. Milhaud,
Descartes savant (Paris: Alcan, 1921).
^ Physics cannot be reduced to geometry - but attempts to so reduce it belong to its
nature. Is not Einsteins theory of relativity an attempt to merge together matter and
space, or, better, to reduce matter to space?
* See infra, pp. 97 sq. It may be that he even accepted them in his youth. Whiston,
indeed, in his autobiography, says so; see Memoirs o f the Life of Mr. William Whiston by
Himself (London, 1749), pp. 8 sq.: I proceed nowin my own history. After I had taken
Holy Orders, I returned to the College, and went on with my own Studies there, parti
cularly the Mathematicks and the Cartesian Philosophy; which was alone in Vogue
with us at that Time. But it was not long before I, with immense Pains, but no Assis
tance, set myself with the utmost Zeal to the Study of Sir Isaac Newton's wonderful
Discoveries in his Philosophiae Naturalis Principia Mathematica, one or two of which
Lectures I had beared him read in the Publick Schools, though I understood them
not all at that Time---- We at Cambridge, poor Wretches, were ignominiously studying
the fictitious Hypotheses of the Cartesian, which Sir Isaac Newton had also himself
done formerly, as I have beared him say. What the Occasion of Sir Isaac Newton's
leaving the Cartesian Philosophy, and of discovering his amazing Theory of Gravity
was, I have beared him long ago, soon after my first Acquaintance with him, which was
1694, thus relate, and o f which Dr. Pemberton gives the like Account, and somewhat
more fully, in the Preface to his Explication of his Philosophy: It was this. An In-
62
63
N EWT O N AND DESCARTES
One could argue, indeed, that it was rather natural to extend to the
skies the mode of action that, on this earth, pulled or pushed things
toward the center of a rotating fluid and thus seemed to present a
model of a mechanism able to engender centripetal forces; and that
the need of such a mechanism was so strongly felt that Newton himself,
not once but three times, tried to provide it by postulating motion
in, or the pressure of, an aethereal medium, the existence of which
was just as uncertain as that of the subtle matter from which it de
scends, And finally one could argue that, somewhat later, the idea of
cosmic vortices served as a model for Kant and Laplace; one could
also argue that, though there are always limits to our understanding
of nature, and that, therefore, we are always obliged to admit things
as mere facts without being able to understand and explain them, we,
that is, human thought, have never accepted these limits as final, and
have always attempted to get beyond them, Comte and Mach not
withstanding. But we cannot dwell on these points. Let us rather
remind ourselves that there are other things in Cartesian physics
which are of a more lasting value than the vortices and the three
elements. Thus, for instance, we find there the first consistent.
though of course unsuccessful, attempt at a rational cosmology, an

identification of celestial and terrestrial physics, and therefore the
first appearance in the skies of centrifugal forces; neither Kepler
nor even Galileo dared to attribute such forces to the motion of
celestial bodies and, accordingly, did not need centripetal forces to
counteract them.^ That is not a mean merit. Voltaire could ignore it;
Newton, however, could not. Yet he did not mention it, as he did
not mention the Cartesian origin of the concept quantity o f motion
(mv), which he stubbornly maintained as a measure of force against
the Huygenian and Leibnizian vis viva (m \% even while he rejected
the Cartesian assertion of the conservation of motion in our world.^
Nor did he mention that it was Descartess formulation of the prin
ciple of inertia, which placed motion and rest on the same ontological
level, that inspired his own.
We shall not judge the Newtonians, nor even Newton, for being un
fair to Descartes. Human thought is polemic; it thrives on negation.
New truths are foes of the ancient ones which they must turn into
falsehoods. It is difficult to acknowledge ones debts to ones enemies.
Now Newtons thought, nearly ab ovo, had been formed and deve
loped in opposition to that of Descartes. Accordingly, we cannot
expect to find praise, or even historical justice, for Descartes in a
book whose title. Mathematical Principles o f Natural Philosophy,
contains an obvious reference to, and a rejection of, his Principles
o f Philosophy. We, however, have to try to be more impartial.
clination came into Sir Isaac's mind to try, whether the same Power did not keep the
Moon in her Orbit, notwithstanding her projectile Velocity, which he knew always
tended to go along a strait Line the Tangent of that Orbit, which makes Stones and all
heavy Bodies with us fall downward, and which we call Gravity! Taking this Postulatum, which had been thought of before, that such Power might decrease in a duplicate
Proportion of the Distances from the Earths center. Upon Sir Isaac's first Trial, when
he took a Degree of a great Circle on the Earths Surface, whence a Degree at the
Distance of the Moon was to be determined also, to be 60 measured miles only, accord
ing to the gross Measures then in Use. He was, in some Degree, disappointed, and the
Power that restrained the Moon in her Orbit, measured by the versed Sines of that
Orbit, appeared not to be quite the same that was to be expected, had it been the
Power of Gravity alone, by which the Moon was there influencd. Upon this Dis
appointment, which made Sir Isaac suspect that this Power was partly that of Gravity,
and partly that of Cartesius's Vortices, he threw aside the Paper of his Calculation,
and went to other Studies. However, some time afterward, when Monsieur Picart
had much more exactly measured the Earth, and found that a Degree of a great Circle
was 69^ such miles. Sir Isaac, in turning over some of his former Papers, light[ed]
upon this old imperfect Calculation; and, correcting his former Error, discoverd that
this Power, at the true correct Distance of the Moon from the Earth, not only tended
to the Earths center, as did the common Power of Gravity with us, but was exactly
of the right Quantity; and that if a Stone was carried up to the Moon, or to 60 Semid[i]ameters of the Earth, and let fall downward by its Gravity, and the Moons own men
strual Motion was stopt, and she was let fall by that Power which before retained her
in her Orbit, they would exactly fall towards the same Point, and with the same Velo
city ; which was therefore no other Power than that of Gravity. And since that Power
appeard to extend as far as the Moon, at the Distance of 240000 Miles, it was natural,
or rather necessary, to suppose it might reach twice, thrice, four Times, etc., the same
Distance, with the same Diminution, according to the Squares of such Distances
perpetually. Which noble Discovery proved the happy Occasion of the Invention of
the wonderful Newtonian Philosophy.
64
^ For Kepler, circular motion is still the natural motion; his planets, therefore, being
pushed by the species matrix of the sun, would naturally move in circles without deve
loping any tendency to run away; in other words, their circular motion does not give
rise to centrifugal forces, and if in the case of the moon (see p. 174) he needs a
force preventing its fall upon the earth, it is to an animal or vital force that he
recurs, and not to a centrifugal force. It is nearly the same for Galileo; his planets, of
course, no longer need moving forces, motors, that would push them around the sun:
motion is naturally conserved by itself - but no more than for Kepler do the planets
develop centrifugal forces, and thus they do not have to be retained in their orbits by
centripetal forces.
* The quantity of motion (momentum), in the Cartesian sense, that is, taken as an
absolute, positive value, is of course not conserved, either in the world, or even in
impact where it has to be taken algebraically, as was discovered by Wren and Huygens,
whereas the vis viva (kinetic energy) is. It is, however, Descartess great merit to have
posited that some kind of energy is, or must be, conserved; the subsequent develop
ment of scientific thought fully maintained this fundamental principle, though sub
stituting progressively for particular kinds of energy the general concept of it. On the
history of the struggle between the Cartesians (and Newtonians) with the Leibnizians
about the measurement of forces by /wv or /nv, see Erich Adickes, Kant als Naturforscher (Berlin, 1924-1925); J. Vuillemin, Physique et metaphysique kantiennes
(Paris; Presses Universitaires de France, 1955); and Erwin N. Hiebert, Historical
Roots o f the Principle o f Conservation o f Energy (Madison, Wisconsin; State Historical
Society of Wisconsin, 1962).
65
I shall not develop here a full historical examination of the three

Axioms or Laws of Motion (and the corresponding Definitions)
that open Newtons Principia, though I am convinced that all of
them, even the third law, that of equality of action and reaction, are
connected with the Cartesian conception of the transmission of
motion from one body to another in such a manner that a body can
not give or communicate to another more or less than it loses. I
shall concentrate on the first law, the law of inertia, which Newton
ascribes to Galileo.
This celebrated law tells us that every body continues in its state
of rest or of uniform motion in a right line, unless it is compelled to
change that state by forces impressed upon it, or in Latin, which ex
presses Sir Isaacs thought much better than the modern English
translation: corpus omne perseverare in statu suo quiescendi vel
compared them to darkness and light, tenebrae et lux. Now it is

precisely and only because it is a s ta te -} u st like rest - that motion is
able to conserve itself and that bodies can persevere in motion with
out needing any force or cause that would move them, exactly as
they persist at rest. It is obvious that bodies could not do so as long
as motion was considered a process of change. Nothing changes
without a cause - at least before quantum physics - as Newton
expressly states. Thus, so long as motion was a process, it could not
continue without a mover. It is only motion as state that does not
need a cause or mover. Now, not all motion is such a state, but only
that which proceeds uniformly and in a right line, in directum, that
is, in the same direction and with the same speed. No other motion,
and particularly no circular or rotational motion, even if it be uni
form, is such a state, even though rotation seems able to conserve
itself just as well as or perhaps better than rectilinear motion, which,
in our experience at least, always comes to a rather quick end.^
As a matter of fact, as the Greeks observed long ago, the only per
petual motion that we encounter in this world is the circular motion
of the skies. The Greeks even thought that circular motion was the
only one that was truly uniform and unchanging and could conceive
of no other as perpetual. They were wrong, of course. Yet not as
wrong as would seem at first - our first - glance. One could even
maintain that, for their world, a finite world, they were right: the
law of inertia implies an infinite world. We must bear this in mind in
order not to be too harsh on those who could not liberate themselves
from the spell of circularity and who could not replace the circle by
the straight line.
Alas, Galileo was one of them. His great merit was to destroy the
scholastic, Aristotelian conception of motion as process, and to assert
its perpetual conservation, that is, to assert that a body, once put in
motion, will forever continue to move by itself and will never slow
down and revert to rest, provided, of course, it does not encounter
an outside resistance. But he also assumed such conservation for
movendi uniformiter in directum, nisi quatenus a viribus impressis cogitur statum ille mutare} Every word of this formulation is important,
both in se and for Newton who, as we now know, was an extremely
careful writer, who wrote and rewrote the same passage, sometimes
five or six times, until it gave him complete satisfaction. Moreover,
this was not the first time that he had endeavored to formulate these
axioms, or laws, which, by the way, started by being called hypo
theses. Each and every word is important, for instance, the per
severare, which is rather badly rendered as continues. Yet among
these words there are two or three that seem to me to be more im
portant than the others; key words, so to speak. Such are, in my
opinion, status and in directum.
Status of motion: by using this expression Newton implies or
asserts that motion is not, as had been believed for about two thou
sand years - since Aristotle - a process of change, in contradistinc
tion to rest, which is truly a status,^ but is also a state, that is, some
thing that no more implies change than does rest. Motion and rest
are, as I have just said, placed by this word on the same level of being,
and no longer on different ones, as they were still for Kepler, who
^ Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica (London, 1687), Axiomata sive
Leges Motus, lex I, p. 12; Sir Isaac Newton's Mathematical Principles o f Natural
Philosophy, translated by Andrew Motte, the translation revised by Florian Cajori
(Berkeley; University of California Press, 1934), p. 13. The original Motte transla
tion (London, 1729), p. 19, renders the Latin of Newton much better than the MotteCajori translation: Every body perseveres in its state of rest, or uniform motion in a
right line, unless it is compelled to change that state by forces impressed thereon.
^ See p. 32. n. 2.
Status comes from sto, stare, to stay, and means station, position, condition.
Status movendi is just as paradoxical as statical dynamics.
66
* Thus the best example of conservation of motion, according to Rohault, is given

by a rotating sphere (see Physica, pars I, cap. XI, p. 50; System, vol. I, p. 53; 11.
Thirdly, if a body moves almost wholly within itself, so as to transfer very little of its
Motion to the Bodies that surround it, it ought to continue moving longest o f all: Thus
we find by Experience, that a smooth well polished Brass Ball, of half a Foot Dia
meter, supported by two Pivots, will, with a small Stroke, continue to run around for
three or four Hours.) This does not imply that Rohault misunderstands the principle
of inertia; Newton, indeed, gives the same example; see Lex I : Trochus . . . non cessat
rotari. Majora autem Planetarum & Cometarum corpora motus suos & progressivos
et circulares . . . conservant diutius.
67
circular motion, the eternal motion of the heavenly bodies, and of

the earth. And as for rectilinear motion, he, as a matter of fact,
never speaks about it as motion in a straight line; he speaks about
horizontal motion or motion on a horizontal plane.^ But at least
once he does speak about motion as being a state, although this
conception, indeed, is implied in all his discussions of motion.^
This conception is lacking in Gassendi, who rightly is credited
with having been one of the first to publish a formulation of the
principle of inertia in his De motu impresso a motore translate (1642).
Gassendi, indeed, asserted that stones and other bodies that we
qualify as heavy do not have that resistance to motion that is com
monly {vulgo) thought of and that in the void space, the imaginary
space outside the world where bodies would be neither resisted by
other bodies nor attracted by them, all bodies, once put in motion,
would move eternally and uniformly in the same direction {parte)
line when asserting that motion will be in the same p a rt ; that he did
not equate motion and rest, and did not treat them as states, though
asserting conservation of motion as such and stating that nothing
but motion is impressed on the moved [body] by the moving one,
the same motion which the moving [body] has as long as the
moved one is conjoined with it, and that would be continued, and
would be eternal, if it were not weakened by a contrary one.^
It is only in Descartes, and this already in his unfinished and un
published Monde^ (1630), that is, long before Gassendi, and also be
fore Cavalieri and Baliani, that we find not only the clear assertion
of the uniformity and rectilinearity of inertial motion, but also
the explicit definition of motion as a status. It is precisely the in
stitution of the concept of status of motion for actual motion that
enables Descartes - and will enable Newton - to assert the validity
of his first law or rule of motion, though postulating a world in
which pure inertial motion, uniform and rectilinear, is utterly im
possible. Actual motion, indeed, is essentially temporal; a body takes
a certain time to move from a certain place. A, to another place,
B, and during that time, be it as short as we want, the body is neces
sarily subjected to the action of forces qui cogent it statum suum
mutare. The status as such, however, is connected with time in a
different way: it can either endure, or last only an instant. Accord
ingly, a body in curvilinear, or accelerated, motion changes its status
every instant, as every instant it changes either its direction or its
speed; it is nevertheless every instant in statu movendi uniformiter
in directum. Descartes expresses this clearly by telling us that it is
not the actual motion of a body but its inclination, conatus, that is
in whatever direction {in quacumque partem) they be impelled:
wherefrom he concludes that all motion, of its own nature, is of

such a kind, and that if, de facto, in our world, bodies do not move
in this way, that is, neither perpetually, nor uniformly, nor in the
same direction, it is because they are prevented from doing so and
diverted from their path by the attraction of the earth which pulls
them down.^ We have to recognize the advance made by Gas
sendi; we have to recognize also that he did not use the term straight
^ See Galileo Galilei, Opere (Edizione Nazionale; Florence, 1897), VIII, 268, 269,
272, 285. For an English translation, see Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences,
trans. by Henry Crew and Alfonso De Salvio (New York: Dover, n.d.), pp. 244, 245,
248, 262.
* In Galileos Letters on Sunspots, in Stillman Drake, trans.. Discoveries and
Opinions of Galileo (Garden City, New York; Doubleday Anchor Books, 1957), we
find: And therefore, all external impediments removed, a heavy body . . . will
maintain itself in that state in which it has once been placed; that is, if placed in a
state of rest, it will conserve that; and if placed in movement toward the west (for
example), it will maintain itself in that movement. But this is an example of motion
on a spherical surface concentric with the earth, and so illustrates circular rather
than linear inertia.
One could claim for Bonaventura Cavalieri the distinction of having been the first,
in his Lo specchio ustorio, overo tratato delle settioni coniche et Alcuin loro mirabili
effetti intorno al lume, caldo, freddo, suono et moto ancora . . . (Bologna, 1632), cap.
XXXIX, pp. 153 sq., to assert that a body, thrown in any direction whatever, would if it were not deflected by gravity - continue to move uniformly in that direction
by the virtue impressed in it, and, if gravity were added, it would describe a parabola.
See my tudes galilênnes (Paris: Hermann, 1939), part III, p. 133. J. B. Baliani, for
whom this distinction has also been claimed, in fact asserted the equivalence of direc
tions only in the second edition of his De motu gravium solidorum et liquidorum
(Geneva, 1646).
* Petri Gassendi, De motu impresso a motore translato, epistolae duae (Paris, 1642),
cap. XV, p. 60. Also see my Etudes galileennes, part III, p. 144, and infra. Appendix I.
68
1 Gassendi, De motu . . . . cap. XIX, p. 75; Etudes galileennes, part III, p. 144;
and infra. Appendix I.
* Le Monde ou traite de la lumiere; written in or about 1630, published for the first
time in 1662, in Leiden; Descartes, Oeuvres, vol. XL
Descartes, of course, does not use this Keplerian term, which means resistance to
motion (since Newton, of course, inertia means resistance to acceleration); on the
contrary, Descartes expressly denies that there is in bodies any kind of inertia. See
Lettre a Mersenne, December 1630, Oeuvres, II, 466 sq: 1 do not recognize any
inertia or natural tardity in bodies, any more than M. Mydorge . . . But I concede to
M. de Beaune that larger bodies, pushed by the same force, such as larger boats by the
same wind, always move more slowly than the others, and this, perhaps, may be suffi
cient for his reasons, without having recourse to a natural inertia that cannot at all be
proved . . . I hold that there is a certain Quantity of Motion in all the created matter
that never increases nor diminishes; so that when a body moves another, it loses as
much of its motion as it gives to it . . . Now, if two unequal bodies receive as much
motion, the one as the other, this same quantity of motion does not give as much speed
to the larger as to the smaller, and because of that we can say, in this sense, that the
more matter a body contains the more Natural Inertia it has.
69
rectilinear. Newton puts it more cryptically, using only the Cartesian

formula quantum in se est.
It is, of course, in quite different ways that Descartes and Newton
explain that bodies persevere in their states. Newton does it by ascrib
ing to matter a certain vis insita, a certain power of resisting by
which every body as much as in it lies perseveres in its present state
whether it be rest or moving uniformly in a right line - potentia
nature suffice to bring order out of chaos and to build up a world like ours - without any special act of God giving it its present
shape.^
The supreme law of the monde is the law of constancy, or con
servation. What God has created, he maintains in being; thus we
do not need to inquire about the first cause of the motion of things,
primum movens and mobile; we can simply admit that things started
to move at the same time the monde was created; and, this being so, it
follows therefrom that this motion will never cease, but only pass
from subject to subject.
Yet, what is this motion and what are the laws relevant to it? It
is not at all the motion of the philosophers, actus ends in potentia
prout est in potentia, a congeries of words that Descartes declares
to be so obscure that he fails to understand them,* nor even the
motion that the philosophers call local motion. Indeed, they tell us on
the one hand that the nature of motion is difficult to understand,
and on the other that motion has a much greater degree of reality
than rest, which they assert to be a privation. For Descartes, on the
contrary, motion is something about which we have a perfect and
complete understanding. In any case, he says that he will deal with
that motion which is easier to understand than the lines of geometers
and that makes bodies pass from one place to another and occupy
successively all the spaces that are between them. This motion has
not a higher degree of reality than rest; quite the contrary, I con
ceive that rest is just as much a quality that has to be attributed to
matter when it remains in a place as motion is one that has to be
resistendi qua corpus unumquodque, quantum in se est, perseverat in

statu suo vel quiescendi vel movendi uniformiter in directum. This
power, or force, borrowing a Keplerian term and enlarging its mean

ing (for Kepler it meant, as we know, resistance to motion), Newton
calls vis inertiae.^
Now Descartes did not believe in endowing bodies with powers,
not even the power of self-conservation. He believed in continuous
creation, the continuous action of God on the world without which,
abandoned, so to speak, to itself, the world would immediately
revert to the nihil out of which it had been created. Thus it is not a
vis insita, it is God that he entrusts with the task of conserving the
bodies in their states of motion and rest. It is clear that, being immut
able, God can only conserve them in their rectilinear (right)
motions, mouvements droits,^ and not in the curved ones, just as it
is because of this immutability that he conserves in the world the
quantity of motion he has put into it.
In his Monde, Descartes tells us that he will not describe our
world, but another one, a world that God has, or could have,
created somewhere, far from ours, in the imaginary spaces beyond
our world. It is a trick, of course. Descartes wants to avoid criticism;
he wants also, and even in the first line, to show that this new monde,
where there is nothing but extension and motion, will turn out to be
absolutely indistinguishable from ours and thus to suggest - without
incurring the danger of being accused of impiety - that the laws of
^ Newton is perfectly aware of the origin of the term and of the new meaning that
he gives to it. Thus, as Professor I. B. Cohen of Harvard informed me, Newton, in his
own annotated and interleaved copy of the second edition of his Principia, made the
following note, which he probably planned to insert in a later edition: Non intelligo
vim inertiae Kepleri qua corpora ad quietem tendunt, sed vim manendi in eodem seu
quiescendi seu movendi statu. This and similar annotations will appear in our criti
cal edition of the Principia. On the difference between the two concepts of inertia, see
E. Meyerson, Identite et realiti (Paris: Alcan, 1908), app. Ill, pp. 528 sq.
* Descartes makes a word play: droit = right and droit = straight. See Oeuvres,
XI, 46; see also infra, p. 74.
^ Newton will do the same in his youthful De gravitatione et aequipondio fluidorum
(see Newtons Unpublished Scientific Papers-, cited below in note 2, p. 82).
70
^ See Le Monde, Oeuvres, XI, 37. In his Principia philosophiae (pars 3, art. 43),
Descartes says that, although it is hardly possible that causes from which all pheno
mena can be clearly deduced should be false, he nevertheless (art. 44) will hold those
causes that he will write about only as hypotheses (the French translation says that
he will not assert that those hypotheses which he proposes are true); and he says
further (art. 45) that he will even assume some causes that are clearly false (the
French translation says that he will suppose some causes that he believes to be
false); for example, those cosmological hypotheses from which one deduces that the
world evolved from chaos to cosmos are certainly false; they must be false because
Decartes does not doubt that the world was created by God with all the perfections
which it now has, as the Christian religion teaches.
^ Ibid., p. 39.
Ibid.-. Geometers . . . explain the line by the motion of a point and the surface
by that of a line ; Descartes adds: Philosophers suppose also several motions that,
as they think, can be performed without the body changing its place, as those that they
call: motus ad for mam, motus ad calorem, motus ad quantitatem and a thousand others.
As for myself, I do not know any which is easier to conceive than the lines of geo
meters: which allows bodies to pass from one place to another, and occupy succes
sively all the spaces that are between.
71
attributed to matter when it changes place.^ Moreover, the motion

of the philosophers is of such a strange nature that it tends toward its
own destruction in rest, whereas the Cartesian motion, like every
thing else, tends to its self-preservation.
The rules or laws of nature which Cartesian motion obeys, that is,
the rules according to which God makes nature act, are derived here
from very easily,^ The first is that every particular part of matter
continues always in the same state {etat) as long as the encounter
of other parts of matter does not force it to change. That is, if it has
a certain bulk it will never become smaller, if not divided by others;
if it is round or square, it will never change that shape without being
compelled to do so by others; if it is at rest somewhere, it will never
depart therefrom, if not driven by others; and if it has once begun to
move, it will continue forever, with the same force, and in the same
direction until others stop or retard it.
exempt from the trouble in which the Docti find themselves when they
want to give a reason why a stone continues to move for some time after
having left the hand of the one who threw it; for one should rather ask
why it does not continue to move forever? But the reason is easy to give.
For who can deny that the air in which it moves opposes to it some resis
tance?^
There is nobody who believes that this rule is not observed in the
ancient [our] world concerning bulk, figure, rest, and similar things; but
the Philosophers have made an exception for motion, which, however, is
what I want most expressly to be comprised under this rule. However, do
not think, therefore, that I wish to contradict them: the motion they are
speaking about is so much different from the one that I conceive, that it is
quite possible that what is true concerning one is not true concerning the
other. 3
though everything that our senses have ever experienced in the Old World,
would seem manifestly contrary to what is contained in these two Rules,
the reason which taught them to me seems so strong that I feel myself
obliged to suppose them in the new world that I am describing to you. For
what more firm and solid foundation could be found on which to establish
a truth, even if one could choose according to ones wish, than the con
stancy and immutability of God?^
The second rule concerns the conservation of motion in the action

of one body upon another.
When one body pushes another, it cannot impart any motion to the
other, unless it loses at the same time as much of its own; nor take away
[motion] from the other unless its own increases as much. This Rule, to
gether with the preceding one, tallies very well with all those experiences
in which we see that a body begins or ceases to move because it is pushed
or stopped by another. For, having supposed the preceding Rule, we are
^ Le Monde, Oeuvres, XI, 40.
* Ibid., p. 38. See Rohault, Fhysica, pars I, cap. XI, p. 51; System, vol. 1, p. 53: 13.
Because the World is full, a Body moving in a straight Line, must of Necessity push
another, and that a Third, but it ought not to go on thus infinitely; for some of those
which are thus pushed, will be forced to turn out of the Way, in order to take the Place
of that which was first moved, that being the only Place where they can go, and which
is free for them. Wherefore when any Body is moved, a certain Quantity of Matter
must always necessarily be moved in the Form of a Ring or a Circle, or some way equi
valent thereto. See Newton, Principia (1687), Book II, Prop. XLIII, Th. XXXIII,
pp. 359-360; (1713), Book II, Prop. XLIII, Th. XXXIV, Cor. 2, p. 334; MotteCajori, Prop. XLIII, Th. XXXIV, p. 372.
s Descartes is perfectly right, even more than he is aware: indeed his motion status - is quite different from the motion - process - of the philosophers ; accord
ingly what is true concerning one is not true concerning the other.
72
However, it is not the resistance as such that has to be taken into

account, but only that part of it that the moving body succeeds in
overcoming; that is, the moving body slows down in direct propor
tion to the motion it imparts to the resisting body. In spite of his
appeal to experience - resistance of air - Descartes is fully conscious
that the rules that he is formulating - not to mention those that he
will formulate later (the rules of impact) - do not agree very well
with the common-sense experience of everyday life. So much the
worse for this latter! Indeed,
Yet not only the two preceding rules follow manifestly from the
immutability of God, but also a third one. I shall add, continues
Descartes,
that when a body moves, though its motion is most frequently performed
in a curved line . . . nevertheless each of its particular parts tends always
to continue its own [motion] in a right line. Thus their action, or the in
clination that they have to move, is different from their [actual] motion.
1 Le Monde, Oeuvres, XI, 41; see Rohault, Physica, pars I, cap. XI, p. 44; System,
vol. 1, p. 47: How it comes to pass that a Body in Motion, should continue to be
moved, is one of the most considerable Questions relating to Motion, and has very
much perplexed the Skill of Philosophers; but upon our Principles, it is not difficult to
account for it: For, as was before observed, nothing tends to the Destruction of itself,
and it is one of the Laws of Nature, that all Things will continue in the State they
once are, unless any external Cause interposes; thus that which exists to Day, will en
deavour, as far as it can, to exist always; and on the contrary, that which has no Exis
tence, will endeavour, if I may so speak, never to exist; for it never will exist of itself,
if it be not produced by some external Cause: So also that which is now a Square, will,
as far as is in its Power, always continue a Square. And as that which is at Rest, will
never of it self begin to move, unless something move it; so that which is once in Mo
tion, will never of itself cease to move, unless it meets with something that retards or
stops its Motion. And this is the true Reason why a Stone continues to move after it is
out of the Hand of him that throws it.
* Le Monde, Oeuvres, XI, 43.
F
73
[Thus for instance, if one turns a wheel on its axis,] its parts, though mov
ing circularly, have an inclination to move in a straight line. [Thus, also,]
when a stone is whirled in a sling, it not only moves [in a] straight [line]
as soon as it leaves the sling, but, moreover, all the time that it is in the sling,
it [the stone] presses the center of the sling [showing thereby that it follows
the circular path by compulsion.] This Rule - the rule of rectilinear motion
- is based on the same foundation as the other two, namely on the principle
that God conserves everything by one continuous action, and consequently,
does not conserve it as it may have been some time previously, but precisely
as it is at the very instant in which He conserves it. But of all movements,
it is only right-line motion that is entirely simple, and whose whole nature
is comprised in an instant. For,^ in order to conceive right-line motion,
it is sufficient to think that a body is in action to move toward a certain side,
which is something that is found in each of the instants that can be deter
mined during the time that it moves. Whereas, in order to conceive circu
lar motion, or any other that may occur, one needs to consider at least two
of its instants, and the relation that there is between them.^
not changed, but enriched and developed in the Principles so as to

enable Descartes to derive from it the rules of impact - something
that he neglected to do in the Monde.
As he did in the Monde, Descartes here introduces the fundamen
tal law of nature, the law of conservation, by an appeal to divine
immutability according to which God acts always in the same man
ner, maintaining in the world the same quantity of motion and rest
that he put in the world when he created it:^
As we see, rectilinear - right - motion is endowed with very parti

cular ontological properties, or perfections; it is literally the right
motion. Descartes thus concludes with a jest:
According to this Rule, we have to say that God alone is the Author of
all motions that there are in the world in so far as they are, and in so far as
they are right; but that it is the diverse dispositions of matter that makes
them irregular and curved, just as the Theologians teach us that God is also
the Author of all our actions in so far as they are, and in so far as they
have any goodness, but that it is the diverse dispositions of our will that
may render them vicious.
Descartess Principles o f Philosophy, the Latin edition of which

appeared in 1644 and the French translation in 1647,^ changes the
order of the rules of nature that govern motion (now consistently
called laws) - thus the third becomes the second, and the second,
the third - as well as the manner in which they are presented; the
Principles was - or was intended to be - a textbook, whereas the
Monde was not. But Descartes does not change their derivations,
nor their contents, at least for the rules or laws of motion proprio
sensu. The rule concerning the action of bodies on one another
(the second rule of the Monde, the third law of the Principles) and
asserting the conservation of (the quantity of) motion in percussion is
^ Le Monde, Oeuvres, XI, pp. 43, 49.
* Ibid., p. 45.
* Ibid., pp. 46, 69.
* The text of the French translation, due to the Abbe Petit, who made it under Des
cartess supervision, is sometimes more explicit than the Latin original. It is, therefore,
indispensable to use both.
74
Indeed, though this motion is only a mode of the moved matter, it has
nevertheless a certain and determined quantity, which, as we can easily
understand, is always the same in the whole universe, though it can change
in its singular parts. Thus, for instance, we have to think, that when a part
of matter moves twice as quickly as another, and this other is twice as
large as the first, there is as much motion in the small as in the large part;
and that every time the motion of one part becomes slower, the motion of
the other becomes proportionally quicker. We understand also that it is
a perfection in God that not only is He immutable in Himself, but also
that He acts in a most constant and immutable manner . . . Wherefrom
it follows that it is in the highest degree conformable to reason to think
. . . that He maintains in matter the same quantity of motion with which
He created it.
From divine immutability we can also derive the knowledge of

certain rules, or laws or nature,
of which the first is that every thing, considered as simple and undivided,
perseveres, as far as it can, in the same state and never changes [its state]
but for external causes. Thus, if a certain part of matter is square, we are
convinced very easily that it will perpetually remain square . . . If it is at
rest, we do not believe that it will ever begin to move if not compelled by
some cause. Nor is there any reason to think that, if it moves . . . and is
not impeded by anything, it should ever by itself cease to move with the
same force. It is therefore to be concluded that a thing which moves, will
move forever as far as it can [and will not tend to rest because] rest is
contrary to motion, and nothing by its own nature can tend toward its
contrary, that is toward its own destruction; [therefrom comes] the first
law of nature, that everything, as much as in it lies, perseveres always in
the same state; thus that which once started to move will continue to move
forever.^
* Principia philosophiae, pars 2, art. 36: Deum esse primariam motus causam, et
eandem semper motus quantitatem in universe conservare.
* Descartes makes an exception for the mutatio about which we are informed by
divine Revelation.
Principia philosophiae, pars 2, art. 37.
* Ibid.: Prima lex naturae: quod unaquaeque res, quantum in se est, semper in
eodem statu perseveret: sicque quod semel movetur, semper moveri pergat.
The Latin expression quantum in se est is not easy to render in a modern language.
75
As in the Monde, Descartes tells us that the rectilinearity of the

status of motion in which bodies persevere quantum in se sunt follows
We have to admit, however, that this complete equivalence of motion

and rest led Descartes to his unfortunate conception of rest as re
sistance (a kind of antimotion) and to attribute to the body at rest a
force of resistance (a quantity of rest) opposed and parallel to the
moving force (quantity of motion) of a body in motion, and it is
from this conception that, with perfect logic, he deduces his utterly
wrong rules of impact, according to which a smaller body, with
whatever speed it might move, will never be able to put in motion a
larger one, because it will not be able to overcome the force of re
sistance of the larger and stronger one.^ It will, therefore (pro-
equally from the immutability of God, wherefore the second law of

nature asserts quod omnis motus ex se ipso sit rectus though, as a
matter of fact, no actual motion is such in rerum natura, where, in
deed, all motions proceed in a kind of circle.^ As in the Monde,
centrifugal forces that arise in the circular motion are cited as proof. ^
As in the Monde, nay, much more strongly than in the Monde,
Descartes insists that it is a vulgar error to put motion and rest on
different levels of being and to think that one needs more power in
order to put in motion a body that is at rest than, conversely, to
put at rest a body that is in motion. He is right, of course: the onto
logical equivalence or equiperfection of motion and rest is the very
center of the new conception of motion, as Newton will tacitly re
cognize by using the Cartesian term status.^ It is, moreover, some
thing that the contemporaries not only of Descartes but also of
Newton found very difficult to admit, or even to understand; thus
neither Malebranche nor Leibniz was ever able to grasp it.^
The French translation of Descartess Principia philosophiae has autant quii se
pent ; John Clarke, in his translation of Rohauit (see p. 54, n. 3), says as far as it can ;
the Motte-Cajori translation of Newtons Principia says as much as in it lies
(Definition III, p. 2). I am using the text of the French translation of Descartes, since it
is more explicit than the Latin text.
* Principia philosophiae, pars 2, art. 33: Quomodo in omni motu integer circulus
corporum simul moveatur. See p. 72, n. 2.
* Ibid., art. 39: Altera lex naturae: quod omnis motus ex se ipso sit rectus; et ideo
quae circulariter moventur, tendere semper ut recedant a centro circuli quern describunt. It is interesting to note that Descartes, still fully conscious that the conserva
tion of motion does not immediately imply its rectilinearity, asserts conservation and
rectilinearity in two different laws, whereas Newton reunites them in one.
For a further discussion of motion and rest as states, see Appendix J.
* Clarke will not fail to point this out. Thus he mentions Malebranches De la
recherche de la viriti (Paris, 1674-1675; 6th ed., Paris, 1712), which had been transla
ted into English in 1694-1695 and 1700. See Rohauit, Physica, pars I, cap. X, p. 39;
System, vol. 1, p. 41, note 1: As to the Definition of Rest, all are very well agreed in
it: But whether Rest be a mere privation of Motion, or any Thing positive, this is
sharply disputed. Cartes and some others contend, that That which is at Rest, has
some kind of Force by which it continues at Rest, and whereby it resists every thing
that would change its State; and that Motion may as well be called a Cessation of Rest
as Rest a Cessation of Motion. Malebranch in his Enquiry after Truth, Book 6 Chap. 9
and others, contend to the contrary, that Rest is a mere privation of Motion; their
Arguments may be seen briefly exposed in M. Le Clercs Physics Book 5, Chap. 5.
One thing only I would observe by the way, relating to this Matter, and that is, that
Malebranch and M. Le Clerc, who follows his opinion, in the following Argument,
beg the Question. Suppose, say they, a Ball at Rest; suppose that God should cease to
Will any Thing concerning it; what would be the consequence? It would be at rest still.
Suppose it be in Motion; and that God should cease to will that it should be in Motion,
what would follow then? It would not be in Motion any longer. Why not? Because
the Force, whereby the Body in Motion continued in the State it was, is the positive
Will of God, but that whereby it is at Rest is only privative: This is a manifest beg76
ging of the Question. In reality the Force or Tendency by which Bodies, whether in
Motion or at Rest continue in the State in which they once are, is the mere Inertia of
Matter; and therefore, if it could be that God should forbear willing at all; a Body that
is once in Motion, would move on for ever, as well as a Body at Rest, continue at Rest
for ever.
And as for Leibniz, Clarke adds to the edition of his polemics with the learned
M. Leibniz (see The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, ed. by H. G. Alexander
[Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1956], p. 135) a long choice of quotations
from the works of the latter that demonstrate rather clearly that Leibniz has never
understood the principle of inertia. Which, by the way, was a blessing. . . how could he,
otherwise, have conceived the principle of least action?
Malebranches De la recherche de la v4rit6 oit Ton traite de la nature de Vesprit de
Vhomme et de Vusage qu'il en doit pour iviter Verreur dans les sciences was first pub
lished in Paris in 1674-1675 by A. Pralard, but without the name of the author; only in
the fifth edition, published in Paris by M. David in 1700, was the author identified
as Nicholas Malebranche, Pretre de IOratoire de J6sus. English translations ap
peared in 1694-1695 and in 1700. The best modern critical edition of the Recherche
de la v M ti is that of Mile. Genevieve Lewis in 3 volumes (Paris: Vrin, 1946). The dis
cussion on motion and rest is to be found in Book 6 ( De la methode), part 2, ch. 9
(vol. 2, pp. 279 sq. of the Lewis edition).
Le Clerc, Opera philosophica, tomus IV, Physica sive de rebus corporeis libri
quinque (Amsterdam, 1698, fifth ed., 1728; also Leipzig, 1710; and Nordlusae, 1726),
lib. V, cap. V, De motu et quiete, sec. 13, Regulae sive leges motus, says that a body
once put in motion in eodem statu manet; he raises the question (sec. 14), however,
whether rest, quae est motui opposita sit aliquid positivum an vero privatio dum taxat
motus, and concludes that it is only a privation - an opinion accepted by all philo
sophers but Descartes. Le Clerc does not quote Malebranche, but he does follow his
reasoning closely: Fingamus Deum nunc globo motum induere, qui opus est ab
eo fieri ut motus sistantur? Nihil profecto, nisi ut desinat velle globum moveri.
* See Descartess fourth rule, Principia philosophiae, pars 2, art. 49. The Latin text is
rather short and simply says, If body C were at rest, and were somewhat larger than
B, then, with whatever speed B should move toward C, it would never move this C;
but would rebound from it in the opposite direction; this because the body at rest
resists the greater speed more than the lesser, and that in proportion to the excess of
the one over the other; and therefore the force of C to resist B will always be greater than
that of B to impel. The French translation adds an explanation: As B would not be
able to push C without making it move as quickly as it would move thereafter it
self, it is certain that C must resist as much more in proportion to the speed with which
B approaches it as B comes toward it more quickly, and that this resistance must pre
vail over the action of B, because it is larger than it. Thus, for instance, if C is double B,
and if B has three degrees of motion, it cannot push C, which is at rest, if it does not
transfer to it two degrees, that is one for each half of it, and retains for itself only the
third; this is because it [B] is not larger than each of the halves of C, and cannot move
77
vided both bodies are hard), rebound and return with the same speed:
least force suffices to move hard bodies surrounded by a fluid, that

is, all bodies that exist in the world.^
It is not my intention to discuss here the Cartesian laws of impact,
in spite of the inherent interest of such a study. As I have already
mentioned, they are all wrong, as Newton could not fail to recognize,
and their perusal could only strengthen his aversion to Descartess
physics - mathematical physics without mathematics - and justify
the famous error, error that he allegedly wrote upon the margins
of his copy of the Principia philosophiae.^ Yet, be that as it may.
Here we are dealing only with Newtons first law of motion, that of
inertia, and it is enough for us to have shown that, in its conception
as well as in its formulation in the Philosophiae naturalis principia
mathematica, Newton was directly influenced by Descartes.
As we have seen, the rules or laws of motion of Descartess
Principia are in full agreement with those that he established in the
Monde. There is, however, in his later work something that, in
respect to the former, constitutes an important change, namely, a
semirelativistic conception and a purely relativistic definition of
motion together with the identification of his notions in the Monde
with the common, or vulgar, conception. Thus he explains first that
Third law: that a body that encounters another, stronger [than itself],
loses none of its own motion [wherefore the stronger gains nothing];
and, when it encounters a weaker one, it loses as much as it gives [trans
fers] to this latter.^
Of course this is not so in common experience, and Descartes has
to admit it, as he did in the Monde. This time, however, he does not
reject common experience; he explains that his law, valid in itself,
presupposes conditions that are not realized - and cannot be
realized - in rerum natura, namely, that the bodies in question are
completely separated not only from each other, but also from the
rest of the world, that they are absolutely rigid, and so on. De facto
they are immersed in a more or less liquid medium, that is, they are
in the midst of other matter that moves in all possible directions and
presses and pushes the rigid bodies from all sides. Accordingly, a
body that pushes another in a fluid has the help of all the particles
of the fluid that move in the same direction, and therefore the
thereafter more quickly than they. In the same way, if B has thirty degrees of speed,
it would be necessary for it to transfer twenty of these to C; and if it has three hundred,
it must transfer two hundred and so on conferring always the double of what it would
retain for itself. But as C is at rest, it resists ten times more the reception of twenty de
grees than that of two, and a hundred times more the reception of two hundred; thus,
in proportion as C has more speed, it finds in B more resistance. And because each
half of C has as much force to remain in its rest as B has to push it, and as they resist
it both at the same time, it is obvious that they must prevail and compel it to rebound.
Accordingly, with whatever speed B should move toward C, at rest and larger than it,
it can never have the force to move it.
The reasoning of Descartes appears, at first glance, utterly absurd. As a matter of
fact, it is perfectly correct, provided, of course, we accept his premises, that is, the ab
solute rigidity of C and B; in this case, indeed, the transmission of motion, that is, its
acceleration, should be instantaneous and, accordingly, a body would resist ten times
as strongly its jumping from rest to twenty degrees of speed as it would resist its jump
ing to two.
1 Principia philosophiae, pars 2, art. 40. It is usually admitted that of the Cartesian
rules of impact the first one, according to which two equal (hard) bodies, moving to
ward each other in a straight line and with equal speed, rebound after impact with the
same speed but in opposite directions, is correct, in contradistinction to the others that
are false. As a matter of fact, as Montucla has already noticed (Histoire des mathematiques [nouvelle ed.; Paris, 1799], II, 212), the first law is just as false as the rest: per
fectly hard bodies (not infinitely elastic, but rigid) will not rebound, and if Des
cartes asserts that they will it is only because he cannot admit the loss of motion that
would result if they did not.
The Cartesian rules of impact are so false, and appear even so utterly absurd (for
instance, rule IV, dealt with in the preceding note), that they are usually dismissed with
a shrug by historians who do not recognize the perfect logic with which they are de
duced by Descartes from his premises, that is, conservation of motion and absolute
rigidity of the bodies that hit each other.
78
the words place [locus] and space do not signify anything really different
from the body which we say is in a certain place, and designate only the
dimension, the figure of the body, and the way in which it is situated among
other bodies. For it is necessary, in order to determine this situation, to
take into account some other [bodies] that we consider to be at rest; but as
' Principia philosophiae, pars 2, art. 56. It is because he did not take into account the
abstract (Descartes does not use this term) character of the laws of impact that
Rohault raised objections against this law; see Rohault, Physica, pars I, cap. XI, p. 50;
System, vol. 1, p. 53: But because a Body cannot so transfer its Motion to another as
not to partake with that Body to which it is transferred, but will retain some to itself,
though it be never so little; therefore it should seem that a Body once in Motion should
never afterwards be entirely at rest, which is contrary to Experience. But we ought to
consider, that two Bodies which have but very little Motion, may be so connected and
adjusted to each other, as to be in a manner at Rest, which is all that Experience
shows us.
*See Voltaire, Lettres philosophiques, letter XV (Amsterdam [ = Rouen], 1734), p.
123: M. Conduitt, nephew of Newton, assured me that his uncle had read Descartes
when he was 20 years of age, that he put pencil notes on the margins of the first pages,
and that it was always the same note that he repeated: error-, but that, tired of having
to write error everywhere, he threw the book away and never re-read it. In the sub
sequent editions of the Lettres philosophiques, Voltaire suppressed this passage (see
Lansons edition, vol. 2, p. 19). According to Sir David Brewster, Memoirs o f the
Life, Writings and Discoveries o f Sir Isaac Newton (Edinburgh, 1855), I, 22, n. 1,
it was in the margins of Descartess Geometry and not in the margins of his Principia
philosophiae that Newton wrote error, error-. Newtons copy of Descartess Geometry
I have seen among the family papers. It is marked in many places in his own hand:
Error, Error, non est Geom."
79
N E W T O N AND DESCARTES
those which we so consider can be different, we can say that the same thing,
at the same time, changes its place and does not change it. For instance, if
we consider a man sitting at the stern of a boat which the wind drives away
from the harbor, and take into account only this vessel, it will seem to us that
this man does not change his place, because we see that he remains always
in the same situation with respect to the parts of the vessel on which he is;
and if we refer to the neighboring lands, it will seem to us that this man
changes incessantly his place because he goes away from them; if, besides
that, we suppose that the Earth turns on its axis and that it makes as much
way from sunset to sunrise as the vessel makes from sunrise to sunset, it
will, once more, seem to us that the man who is sitting at the stern does
not change his place, because we determine this place by reference to some
immobile points that we imagine to be in the Heaven.^
another only because place is a relative concept, and that,

accordingly, all kinds of motion can be attributed to a given body;
whereas, if we take his definition of motion, there will be only one
motion that we will attribute to a body as being its own and proper
motion. He adds, moreover, that his definition implies reciprocity
of motion, and that
Having thus explained the relativity of place, Descartes

continues:
Motion (that is, local motion - 1 find no other in my thought, and there
fore think there is no other to be feigned in rerum natura), as it is commonly
understood, is nothing else than the action by which a body passes from
one place to another. And therefore, in the same way that, as we have
previously mentioned, the same thing can at the same time be said to
change and not to change its place, it can be said to move and not to move.
For example, someone who sits in a boat while it departs from the harbor
thinks that he is moving if he refers himself to the shore and considers it
unmoved; but not if [he refers himself] to the very boat in the midst of the
parts of which he maintains his position. And since we commonly [vulgo]
think that there is action in every motion, but in rest a cessation of action,
he is more properly said to be at rest than to move, as he does not feel
in himself any action.
But if we consider what must be understood as motion, not according to
the vulgar use [of the term] but according to the truth [ex rei veritate],
in order to attribute to it a determinate nature, we shall say that it is a
translation of a part of matter, or of a body, from the vicinity of those
bodies that immediately touch it, and that are considered at rest, to the
vicinity of others.^
Descartes explains that he said from the vicinity of those that

touch it to the vicinity of others^ and not from one place to
^ Principia philosophiae, pars 2, art. 13.
* Ibid., art. 25: [ Motum esse] translationem unius partis materiae, sive unius
corporis ex vicinia eorum corporum quae illud immediate contingunt et tanquam
quiescentia spectantur, in viciniam aliorum. Descartes insists upon referring moving
bodies to bodies considered as being at rest, something to which Newton will object
(see infra, pp. 105 sq).
Ibid., art. 28. It is rather curious to see Descartes oppose to the concept of place
(locus) his concept of the vicinity of bodies that immediately touch it, since this is
nothing else than an adaptation of the Artistotelian definition of place: surface sur
rounding a body.
80
we cannot conceive that a body AB could be transported from the vicinity

of a body CD without knowing also that the body CD is transported from
the vicinity of the body AB, and that there is needed, obviously, as much
force and action for the one as for the other. Thus, if we should want to
attribute to motion a proper nature, not related to anything else, we would
say that, when two reciprocally contiguous bodies become mutually separ
ated, and transported one to one side and the other to the other, there will
be as much motion in the one as in the other.^
The insertion of a semi-Aristotelian conception of place into a

world in which everything is in motion and in which there is no fixed
point to which motion could be referred enabled Descartes to save
the relativistic conception of motion with its full choice of the point
of reference, the value of which is sufficiently obvious, and to give a
precise meaning to the concept of the proper motion of a body,
which was rather important.^ Also, which was even more important,
it gave him the means to circumvent the condemnation of the
Copernican system by the Church; this condemnation - the trial of
Galileo - frightened Descartes and made him decide not to pub
lish his Monde. Ten years later he found, or at least believed he found,
a way out; his new definition of motion enabled him to maintain
that, secundum veritatem, the earth, though carried in and by its
vortex around the sun, did not move. Accordingly, Descartes
claimed, the condemnation did not touch him; indeed he did not
ascribe motion to the earth; quite the contrary, he asserted that it was
at rest.^ It is hardly surprising that this attempt, so subtle and at the
^ Ibid., art. 29. This statement is obviously incompatible with Descartess third
law of motion.
* After all, we move with respect to the earth, houses, and so forth, and we partici
pate in a number of motions, as does a sailor on a ship, or the watch in his pocket.
Having explained that the hypotheses of Copernicus and Tycho are not different
in quantum hypotheses (Principia philosophiae, pars 3, art. 17), Descartes continues:
That I deny the motion of the earth with more care than Copernicus, and more truth
than Tycho [art. 19]; that the earth is at rest in its heaven, being nevertheless trans
ported by it [art. 26]; the earth, properly speaking, does not move, nor the planets,
though they are transported by the heavens [art. 28]; even if motion were taken im
properly and according to the vulgar usage, no motion should be attributed to the
earth; in this case, however, it would be proper to say that the other planets move
[art. 29]. See Rohaults Physica, pars II, cap. 24, pp. 303 sq.; System, vol. 2, p. 62.
81
same time so naive, of the trop precautionneux philosophe, as

Bossuet has called him, to dissociate himself from Copernicus and
Galileo did not deceive anyone, except some modern historians.
Yet it worked.^
On the other hand, it was this relativistic definition of motion a definition which indeed became official in the Cartesian school that first aroused Newtons opposition to Cartesian physics, and not
the theory of vortices, which later became the main focus of his
attack on Descartes in the Principia mathematica. This definition, or
conception, together with some of Descartess most fundamental
philosophical theses, such as the identification of extension and
matter and the concomitant rejection of the void and the indepen
dent reality of space, the radical distinction of thinking and extended
substances, and, curiously enough, Descartess assertion that the
world is only indefinite but not infinite - these are subjected
by Newton to a long and searching criticism in one of his hitherto
unknown papers to which I have already referred.
This paper, a long manuscript of 40 pages, the transcript of which
Dr. John Herivel and Professor Rupert Hall have kindly put at my
disposal, is only a fragment.^ Newtons aim, as he tells us at the very
beginning, was to treat the problems of the equilibrium of fluids
and of bodies in fluids, and to treat them in two different ways:
insofar as this matter pertains to mathematics . . . in the manner
of geometers, deriving particular propositions from abstract, selfevident principles ; and, insofar as it is a part of natural philosophy,
to illustrate the propositions thus arrived at by numerous experi
ments in a series of scholia et lemmata.^ As a matter of fact he did
neither: instead of writing a hydrostatic paper, he wrote a philoso
phic one. I, at least, do not regret it. I think, indeed, that it is for us
of exceptional value, as it enables us to get some insight into the
formation of Newtons thought, and to recognize that preoccupa
tion with philosophical problems was not an external additamentum
but an integral element of his thinking.^ Unfortunately, we cannot

assign a precise date to this manuscript; it is some time around 1670.^
Newton, as he will always do, starts with Definitions and informs
us that the terms quantity, duration, and space do not need definitions
and, moreover, cannot be defined, as they are better known than all
the terms by which we may try to define them. But he defines
* It was only in 1664 that the jPnnc/p/a philosophiae was put on the Index librorum
prohlbitorum, and even then not because of the obvious Copernicanism of Descartes,
but because of the incompatibility of his conception of matter with the dogma of
transubstantiation.
* MS. Add. 4003, De gravitatione et aequipondio fluidorum. It is now included
in A. Rupert Halt and Marie Boas Hall, Unpublished Scientific Papers o f Isaac Newton,
A Selection from the Portsmouth Collection in the University Library, Cambridge
(Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1962), pp. 89 sq. I shall give
references to this publication.
* Unpublished Scientific Papers, p. 90. It is interesting to note that this is exactly the
manner in which he will write his Principia.
82
I.
II.
III.
IV.
Place as the part o f space which a thing fills adequately;

Body as that which fills a place;
Rest as continuation in the same place;
Movement as change o f place, or, if one prefers, transition,
translation, or migration o f a body from place to place, the term body
being taken not in a philosophical manner as a physical substance

endowed with sensible quafities, but, abstracting from these much in
the same way as geometers, only as something extended, mobile, and
impenetrable.^
Newtons definitions, especially the listing of impenetrability as a

fundamental characteristic of body - for Descartes it was a deriva
tive one - imply clearly the rejection of the Cartesian identification
of extension and matter, as well as Descartess relativistic definition
of motion. Newton, of course, is perfectly conscious of this. Thus,
he writes:
Since in these definitions I have supposed that there is space apart from
bodies, and [have defined] motion with respect to the parts of this space
itself and not with respect to the position of neighboring bodies . . . lest this
should be thought to have been assumed gratuitously against the Carte
sians, I shall now try to demolish his fictions.*
One of the worst, if not the worst, of these fictions is the re
lativistic view of motion, insofar as it is considered to be the true
view - or, in Newtons terminology, the philosophical view and opposed to the common view, which Newton identifies with
his own, and which Descartes considered as vulgar and false.
Newton therefore tries to demolish it by a series of arguments,
good, bad, and even sophistic, of which the most important - it
appears in the Principia mathematica - makes an appeal to the effects
* It shows also that Newton had very thoroughly studied the Principia of Descartes.
* The Halls {UnpublishedScientific Papers, p. 90) think that it was an essay written
by a young student . . . between, say, 1664 and 1668, or, if later, in any case before
1672.
Ibid., p. 91.
Ibid.
83
engendered, or not engendered, for the definition of true and real

motion and, conversely, of false and only apparent motion. Thus,
in particular, it is clear that it is not the philosophical rest of the
earth and the planets, but their vulgar motion around the sun
that gives rise to centrifugal forces. It is also clear that a purely
relative philosophical motion will never produce such forces.
It is clear, therefore, which of the two should be treated as real.
Descartes, moreover, seems to admit it,
quently of local motion, be referred to some immovable entity, such as

extension or space alone, as it is regarded as something actually distinct
from bodies {quale est sola extensio vel spatium quatemis ut quid a corporibus revera distinctum spectatur)}
in contradicting himself. For he says that the Earth and the other planets,
properly speaking and in the philosophical sense, do not move and that
he who says they are moved because of their translation in respect to the
fixed stars speaks without reason, in the vulgar sense.^ Yet later he posits
in the Earth and Planets an endeavor \conatus] to recede from the Sun
as from a centre about which they are moved, by which [conatus, and]
through a similar conatus of the revolving vortex, they are librated in their
distances from the Sun. What then? Does this conatus result from the,
according to Descartes, true and philosophical rest, or from the vulgar
and non-philosophical motion
The conclusion is obvious: it is the motion that has true and real
effects - and not that which has none - that is the true and real
motion: that is, absolute and physical motion is not change of posi
tion with respect to other bodies - this is only an external denomina
tion - but change of place in, or with respect to, the unmoved and
unmovable space that exists apart from bodies and that, later, will
be called absolute space. And it is only in such a space that the
velocity of a body whose motion is unimpeded could . . . be said
to be uniform, and the line of its motion straight.
It is interesting to note that in his opposition to the relativistic
conception of motion Newton goes so far as to reject the contention
that, if two bodies move with respect to each other, motion can be
ascribed, ad libitum, to the one or to the other, and to object to
Descartes, that, if one accepted the Cartesian theory, it would be
impossible, even for God, to determine exactly the place that celes
tial bodies had occupied, or will occupy, in some previous or future
moment - this because there are, in the Cartesian world, no
stable landmarks with respect to which these places could be
calculated:
It is necessary therefore that the determination of place, and conse' Principia philosophiae, pars 3, arts. 26, 27, 28, 29.
^ Unpublished Scientific Papers, Tpp. 92 sq.; see supra, p. 81, n. 3.
* Ibid., p. 97. Newton is perfectly right; the law of inertia implies absolute space.
84
Still, a doubt remains. Did not Descartes demonstrate that there is

no space distinct from bodies, that extension, matter, and space are
identical? This he did, on one hand, by showing that body in no
wise differs from extension, that is, if we abstract from body all the
sensible and dispensable qualities, such as hardness, color,
weight, cold, heat, etc. . . . only one remains, its extension in length,
breadth, and depth, and, on the other hand, by pointing out that
void space is nothing and cannot therefore have any determinations,
all of which, such as distance, dimension, and so on require a sub
ject, or a substance, in which to inhere.^
We have thus to respond to these arguments by showing, in turn,
what is extension and body and how they differ from one another.
We must go even further and, since the distinction of substances
into thinking and extended . . . is the main foundation of the Carte
sian philosophy, we have to attempt its utter destruction. Accord
ing to Newton, the great mistake made by Descartes was to try to
apply to extension the old division of being into substance and
accident, whereas, as a matter of fact, it is neither.^ It is not a sub1 Unpublished Scientific Papers, p. 98.
^ Ibid., pp. 98 sq.
Ibid., p. 98.
* Ibid., p. 99: [Extensio] habet quendam sibi proprium existendi modum qui
neque substantiis, neque accidentibus competit. It is interesting to note that the tradi
tional division of being into substance and accident is inapplicable to space (and time),
they being neither, as was asserted by Pascal, in 1648, in his letter to M. Le Pailleur
(see Pascal, Oeuvres complites [Paris: Bibliothfeque de la P16iade, 1954], p. 382):
" Ni substance ni accident. Cela est vrai. Ton entend par le mot substance, ce qui est
ou corps ou esprit; car en ce sens, Iespace ne sera ni substance, ni accident; mais il
sera espace, comme, en ce m6me sens, le temps n est ni substance, ni accident, mais il
est temps, parce que pour Stre, il n est pas nicessaire detre substance ou accident.
It is also asserted by Gassendi, who may have been the source for both Pascal and New
ton; see Syntagma philosophicum, Physica, pars I, sec. I, lib. II, cap. I, p. 182, col. 1
{Opera philosophica [Lyons, 1658]), 1.1: Being {ens) in the general acceptance of this
term, is not adequately divided into substance and accident; but place and time must
be added as two (supplementary) members of the division, as if we said: all being
{ens) is substance, or accident, or place in which are all substances and all accidents, or
time in which all substances and all accidents perdure. Ibid., p. 183: Besides it is
clear that by the name of space and spatial dimensions we do not understand anything
else but the spaces commonly called imaginary, which the greatest part of the Holy
Doctors admit to exist outside of the world ; ibid., lib. IV, cap. IV, p. 307: It seems
that place is nothing else than space which, if it is occupied by a body is called full
{plenum), if unoccupied is called empty {inane) ', see also his earlier animadversiones
against the tenth book of Diogenes Laertius (dealing with the philosophy of Epicurus)
of 1649 (Petri Gassendi, Animadversiones in decimum librum Diogenis Laertii . . .
85
stance because it does not, as substances do, sustain or support

isubstat) affections, and also because it does not subsist absolutely
by itself. In truth, extension is a certain effect of God, effectus
emanativus} and also, or thus, a certain affection of every entity, that
is, of everything that is. But it is also not an accident,
are deeply Cartesian; and finally (c) that, to a certain extent at least,
his objections parallel those that Henry More raised against the
Cartesian distinction.^
since we are able clearly to conceive extension as existing alone without

any subject as when we imagine spaces beyond the world or spaces void
of bodies; since we believe it to exist wherever we imagine bodies to be
absent, and are unable to believe that it would perish with a given body if
God were to destroy that [body]; it follows [therefrom] that it [extension]
does not exist in the manner of an accident inhering in a subject. It is,
therefore, not an accident.^
As for the negation of the reality of void space, Descartes is also
in error, an error of which he can be convicted by his own principles.
It is true, of course, that there is no clear idea of nothing, since it has
no properties; but we have a most clear idea of space unlimited in
length, breadth, and depth. And there are many properties of space
that we conceive quite as clearly. Space, therefore, is by no means
nothing.^ It is, as we have just said, an effectus emanativus Dei.
Space, of course, is conceived by Newton as being infinite, which
is neither surprising nor very original.^ But it is interesting to note
{a) that Newton feels himself to be in opposition to Descartes, who,
indeed, asserted space - or, more exactly, the world - to be only
indefinite, in contradistinction to God, whom alone he conceived
to be infinite; {b) that Newtonian demonstrations, in their spirit.
[Lyons, 1649]. I, 613): Enim vero videtur [Peripatetici] primum in generali ilia seu
Entis, seu Rei distributione peccari; quoniam illis duobus divisionis membris. Sub
stantiae nempe, et Accidenti, adjicienda alia duo sunt, ipsis etiam generaliora, videlicet
Locus et Tempus, res exclusissimae a Substantia, Accidentisque categoriis ; ibid.,
p. 614: Hoc igitur modo tam Locus, quam Tempus, neque Substantia, neque Accidens sunt; et res tamen sunt, seu nihil non sunt; Sunt enim omnium Substantiarum,
Accidentarumque Locus et Tempus (in this way neither place nor time is either sub
stance or accident; and nevertheless they are entities, that is, they are not nothing;
they are, indeed, the place and time of all substances and accidents). On Gassendis
possible influence on Newton, see R. S. Westfall, The Foundations of Newtons
Philosophy of Nature, British Journal for the History o f Science 1 (1962), 171-182.
^ The expression effectus emanativus gives us to understand that space, though not
independent of God (independens et improductum; see Gassendi, Syntagma, p. 182)
is not, proprie loquendo, a creature produced in being by Gods will; it is an effectus
(and not an attribute), but a necessary one.
* Hall and Hall, Unpublished Scientific Papers, p. 99.
* Ibid., pp. 98 sq. Newton turns Descartess reasoning (see supra, p. 85) upside down.
^ Ibid., p. 101.
^ Descartes, in the Principia philosophiae, asserted the indefinite extension of space,
stating that we cannot feign a limit without imagining at the same time that it extends
beyond that limit (pars 1, art. 26). We shall recognize, moreover, that this world, or
86
Space, indeed, is extended in all directions to infinity. For we are unable

to imagine any limit [of it] without, at the same time, understanding (intelligendo) that there is space beyond it. And hence all lines, straight, para
bolic, hyperbolic, and all cones and cylinders, and all other figures [that
we may conceive inscribed in it] extend to infinity and are nowhere limited
though [they may be] intercepted here and there by lines and surfaces of all
kinds proceeding transversely to them.
The infinity we are dealing with here is an actual one; and the
demonstration of this actuality that Newton gives us is rather in
teresting: he asks us to consider a triangle in which we increase one
of the angles at the base. The apex then will continually recede from
this base until, when the angles become supplementary, that is,
when the sides of the triangle become parallel, the distance of this
apex, or point of intersection,
will be greater than any assignable value . . . nor can anyone say
that it is infinite in imagination only and not actually so, [as] the point
where the produced lines [sides of the triangle] meet will always be actual,
even if it is imagined to be beyond the limits of the world.
If, on the other hand,
someone objects that we are unable to imagine an infinite distance, this
I concede; contending nevertheless that we are able to understand it . . .
the totality of corporeal substance, has no limits of its extension. Indeed, wherever
we should feign such limits to be, we shall not only imagine that there are beyond them
some indefinitely extended spaces, but we shall also perceive that they are truly imagin
able and real; and, for that reason, they contain also an infinitely extended corporeal
substance (pars 2, art. 21). We shall, however, not call it infinite but only indefinite:
Of all the things in which, under certain considerations, we cannot find a limit, we
shall, however, not assert that they are infinite, but shall consider them as indefinite.
Thus, as we cannot imagine so large an extension that we would not understand that it
can be still larger, we shall say that the multiplicity of possible things is indefinite
(pars 1, art. 26). Thus also the number of parts into which matter can be divided, the
number of stars, and so on: All these we shall call indefinite rather than infinite,
in order to reserve the term infinite to God alone, because in Him alone in all respects
we not only do not recognize any limits, but also understand positively that there are
none; and also because concerning other things we do not understand in the same posi
tive way that (in certain respects) they lack limits, but only, in a negative way, we
confess that their limits, if they had them, cannot be found by us (pars 1, art. 27).
* See my From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins
Press, 1957).
Newton {Unpublished Scientific Papers, p. 100) conceives space as the locus of all
kinds of figures (spheres, cubes, triangles, straight lines, and so forth) inscribed in it ab
aeternitate, and only revealed by material delineation : we firmly believe that space
was spherical before the sphere occupied it. This space is all figures in mathematical
actuality, but in physical potentiality it is the receptacle, the platonic chora.
87
We are able to understand that a greater extension exists than we can ever
imagine. Which faculty of understanding has to be clearly distinguished
from imagination.^
Indeed, space is connected not with matter but with being,

spatium est entis quatenus ens affectio.
Which is undoubtedly true. But it is also purely Cartesian, as

purely Cartesian as the following passage in which Newton asserts
the positive nature of the concept of infinity:
If one says further that we do not conceive what is infinite except by the
negation of the limits of what is finite, and that it is a negative and there
fore worthless concept, I deny it. Quite the contrary. It is the concept of
limit that contains a negation, and so infinitude , since it is the negation of
a negation (that is, of finitude), will be a word which, with respect to both
its meaning and our conception, is most positive, even though grammati
cally it seems negative.
Yet, if this is so, why does Descartes assert that extension is

not infinite but indefinite? An assertion which is not only false but
even wrong with respect to grammar indefinite, indeed, always
denotes something future, that is, not yet determined, whereas the
world, which may have been indefinite before it was created, is cer
tainly not indefinite now. And if Descartes maintains that we do
not know, positively, that the world has no limits, but are only
ignorant whether it has them, this has nothing to do with the matter,
since God knows positively that there are no such limits; further
more, we ourselves very certainly understand that extension, or
space, transcends all limits.
As a matter of fact, Newton knows very well why Descartes denies
the infinity of space and ascribes it only to God. For Descartes, in
finity means perfection of being.^ Thus he fears [metuit] that if he
asserts space to be infinite he would have to identify it with God
because of the perfection of infinity. Yet he cannot do this, because
for him space or extension is identical with material substance, which
is utterly and absolutely opposed to thinking, or spiritual, substance.
But for Newton all of this is erroneous: space is not the same thing as
body; infinity, as such, is not a perfection; and extension and mind
belong close together.
^ Unpublished Scientific Papers, p. 101.
^ Ibid., pp. 101 sq. Descartess views on the infinite and the indefinite are discussed
in Appendix K.
Newton says: a Grammaticis corrigendus est, Unpublished Scientific Papers, p.
102.
* Ibid. For a brief history of ideas about God and the infinite until the time of Des
cartes, see Appendix L.
88
No being exists, or can exist, which is not related to space in some way.
God is everywhere, created minds are somewhere, and body is in the
space that it occupies; and whatever is neither everywhere nor anywhere
[nee ubique, nec ullibi] does not exist. And hence it follows that space is an
emanative effect of the primary existing being [that is, of God: spatium sit
entis primario existentis effectus emanativus] because, if an entity is
being posited, space is posited also. And the same can be said about dura
tion; namely, both are affects, or attributes, according to which is denomi
nated the quantity of existence of any individual [entity] with respect to the
amplitude of its presence and of its perseverance in being. Thus, the
quantity of existence of God with respect to duration is eternal and with
respect to the space in which he is [present], infinite. And the quantity of
existence of a created thing with respect to duration is as great as its dura
tion since the beginning of its existence, and with respect to the amplitude
of presence, as great as the space in which it is.^
Rather curious, this complete parallelism of time and space which

leads Newton to frame the concept of quantity (or magnitude) of
presence that supplements the Cartesian conception of duration as
quantity (or magnitude) of being. Curious, and important. Indeed,
it seems to me that we can perceive its echo in the famous texts of the
Principia in which Newton insists so strongly on Gods being always
{semper) and everywhere {ubique), not only by his action but also
by his substance.^ Where does the idea come from? Probably from
Henry More, who criticized Descartess contention that the world
is only indefinite and not infinite; who opposed Descartess nega
tion of void and his identification of extension and matter, asserting
that the essence of matter was different from mere extension and
included impenetrability and solidity, and that, vice versa, extension,
or space, was different from matter and existed quite independently
of it - whence the possibility and even the necessity of space void
of matter; and who rejected the Cartesian radical separation of
extended and thinking substances, asserting that every thing, not
only matter but also minds and even God, was extended - space
for More being just Gods extension as opposed to the Cartesian
conception which would exclude minds and God from the world by
making them unable to be in it, neither somewhere {alicubi) nor
* Unpublished Scientific Papers, p. 103.
* Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica (2nded., Cambridge, England, 1713);
Scholium Generale, p. 485; Motte-Cajori, p. 545.
G
89
everywhere (ubique), thereby compelling them to be nowhere

(nullibi). More, therefore, called Cartesians nullibistae.^
Let us dwell for a moment on young Newtons conception of space
in its being and in its relation to God and time. The connection be
tween Newtons earlier view and the view which he develops, or hints
at, in the Queries and in the Principia is rather striking. Thus from
the young Newton we learn that space is necessary, eternal, immut
able, and unmovable, that though we can imagine there is nothing
in space we cannot think that space is not (More had said that we
cannot disimagine space), and that if there were no space God

would be nowhere. We learn also that all points of space are simul
taneous ; we learn finally that space is not divisible and that, there
fore, the divine omnipresence does not introduce composition
in God, any more than our presence to, or in, our body introduces
divisibility or partition in our soul. Nay, in the same way as we
conceive one moment of duration to spread throughout universal
space without having parts, so is it not contradictory that mind
should be diffused throughout space without being divided in parts.^
There is, of course, nothing more traditional - and anti-Cartesian
- than the idea of the mind, or soul, being present in the body tota
in toto et tota in omnibus partibus; still, in spite of the traditional
assertion of Gods omnipresence, this idea had seldom been applied
to the relation of God and the world.^ Yet, for Newton, it is just this
presence that explains how God is able to move bodies in space by
his will - just as we move our body by the command of our will and that even explains how he could have created bodies out of pure
space, or at least - and here Newton follows the Cartesian pattern
of presenting his idea as a mere hypothesis - how he could have
created something that, without being body, would nevertheless be
able to exhibit all the phenomena that are actually produced by
bodies.
As a matter of fact, all God had to do was to endow some deter
mined parts of space with impenetrability with respect to each other,
with the ability to reflect light, and also with mobility and percepti
bility. There was no need to create matter, because in order to obtain
the phenomena of bodies it is not necessary to postulate the
existence of an incomprehensible material substance: the impene
trable and mobile parts or particles of space explain the pheno
mena perfectly; thus, they would impede each others motion, and
reflect one another, as well as light, and, generally speaking, behave
exactly like, or at least in a manner very similar to, material bodies.
In his first letter to Descartes, 11 December 1648, More writes (Oeuvres, V, 238):
"First, you establish a definition of matter, or of body, which is much too wide. It
seems, indeed, that God is an extended thing (res), as well as the Angel; and in general
everything that subsists by itself, so that it appears that extension is enclosed by the
same limits as the absolute essence of things, which however can vary according to the
variety of these very essences. As for myself, I believe it to be clear that God is extended
in His manner just because He is omnipresent and occupies intimately the whole
machine of the world as well as its singular particles. How indeed could He communi
cate motion to matter, which He did once, and which, according to you. He does even
now, if He did not touch the matter of the universe in practically the closest manner,
or at least had not touched it at a certain time? Which certainly He would never be
able to do if He were not present everywhere and did not occupy all the spaces. God,
therefore, extends and expands in this manner; and is, therefore, an extended thing
(res) . . .
"Fourth, I do not understand your indefinite extension of the world. Indeed this
indefinite extension is either simpliciter infinite, or only in respect to us. If you under
stand extension to be infinite simpliciter, why do you obscure your thought by too low
and too modest words? If it is infinite only in respect to us, extension, in reality, will be
finite; for our mind is the measure neither of the things nor of truth. And therefore,
as there is another simpliciter infinite expansion, that of the divine essence, the matter of
your vortices will recede from their centers and the whole fabric of the world will be
dissipated into atoms and grains of dust.
This is not quite correct, as in the Cartesian world there is no expansion into
which the vortices could recede; they are bound and limited by other vortices, and so
on ad infinitum, or, to speak with Descartes, ad indefinitum. It is different, of course, for
Henry More, who believes in infinite space, which he considers to be an attribute of
God, and in finite matter, utterly different from space. Yet he understands that
Descartes, who identifies space (extension) and matter, can hardly admit the infinity
of such (material) extension. Thus he tells him (ibid.): I admire all the more your
modesty and your fear of admitting the infinity of matter as you recognize, on the
other hand, that matter is divided into an actually infinite number of particles. And if
you did not, you could be compelled to do so.
Descartes answers, of course, that, though he does not want to dispute about words,
and thus will not object if someone wants to say that God is extended because he is
everywhere, he has to deny that there is any real extension in a spiritual substance,
such as God, or an angel; he adds (letter of 5 February 1649 to Henry More, Oeuvres,
V, 267 sq.) that it is not as an affectation of modesty, but as a precaution, and, in my
opinion, a necessary one, that I call certain things indefinite rather than infinite. For
it is God alone whom I understand positively to be infinite; as for the others, such as
the extension of the world, the number of parts into which matter is divisible, and so
on, whether they are simpliciter infinite or not, I confess not to know. I only know that
I do not discern in them any end, and therefore, in respect to me, I say they are inde
finite. And though our mind is not the measure of things or of truth, it must, assuredly,
be the measure of things that we affirm or deny. What indeed is more absurd or more
inconsiderate than to wish to make a judgment about things which we confess to be
unable to perceive with our mind?
90
And if they were bodies, then we should be able to define bodies as being
^ Unpublished Scientific Papers,^. 104; see infra,pp. 112. sq. On Newtons view of time
(and its relation to that of Barrow), see E. A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations of
Modern Physical Science (Garden City, New York: Doubleday Anchor Books, 1954),
pp. 155 sq.
2 Newtons God is not the soul of the world and the world is not his body. See New
tons Opticks (New York: Dover, 1952), Query 31, p. 403; and the General Scho
lium at the end of Book III of the 1713 and later editions of Newtons Principia (p.
544 of the Motte-Cajori edition).
Unpublished Scientific Papers, p. 105.
91
determinate quantities of extension that God, present everywhere, endows

with certain conditions, which are (1) that they be movable and therefore I
essential and it was the great error of Descartes to fail to recognize

this, and thus fail to recognize that impenetrability is something that
does not belong to extension as such, but that God has to confer
impenetrability on some parts of extension by a special act of his
will, which, of course, being present in all extension, or space, he
could easily do.
Newtons insistence on Gods presence in the world and on the
analogy between his action upon it and the way in which we move
our own bodies is rather amazing. It leads him to certain assertions
that one does not expect to find from his pen. Thus he tells us that, if
we knew how we move our limbs, we would be able to understand
how God causes a given space to become impenetrable and to put
on the form of a body. It is clear that God created the world by
no other action than that of willing in the same way as we also by the
sole action of willing move our bodies. Wherefrom it follows that
that analogy between our faculties and the divine faculties is greater
than Philosophers have . . . supposed it to be; it is stated in the
Scripture that we have been created in the image of God. ^ Accord
ingly even the creative power of God is somehow adumbrated in us.
This creation of matter out of pure space invincibly reminds us
of the manner in which, in the Timaeus, bodies are formed out of the
chaos - the Cartesian extension, incidentally, is only a modernized
re-edition of Platos chaos; yet it is not to Plato but to Aristotle
that Newffon refers his conception, telling us that between exten
sion and the form imprinted on it there is nearly the same relation
that the Aristotelians posit between primary matter and substantial
form, insofar as they say that matter is able to assume all forms.^
A rather curious statement, which shows that Newtons knowledge
of the history of philosophy was just as bad as Descartess. But let
us go back to Newtons comments on Descartes. According to New
ton, his own conception of the relation of God to space and of mind
to body has a great advantage over Descartess, as it clearly involves
the most important truths of metaphysics and best confirms and
explains them. Indeed,
have not said [that they are] numerical parts of space that are absolutely
immobile, but only definite quantities that can be transferred from space
to space; (2) that two [particles] of this kind be not able to coincide in
whatever part, that is, that they be impenetrable and therefore when they
meet by mutual motion, they stop and are reflected according to certain
laws; (3) that they be able to excite in created minds different perceptions
of the senses and phantasy and conversely be moved by them [the created
minds]. . . They would be no less real than bodies, and no less entitled to be
called substances.^
Nay, they would be substances. And even intelligible ones.

Thus, as we see, all that God had to do was to make some parts of
the Cartesian extension impervious to each other - some, but not all:
the persistence of void spaces between these impervious parts is
1 Unpublished Scientific Papers p. 106. See the Halls comment in the introduction
to Part II (Mechanics) of Ibid., (p. 81): Berkeley . . . invoked God . . . in order that
matter should exist. Newton, on the other hand, denied matter in order that God
should exist. The scientist was more a theologian than a philosopher. I shall not dis
cuss here the Halls interpretation of Berkeleys philosophy, but, as for Newton, it is
interesting to note that, according to Pierre Coste - Coste translated Newtons Opticks
into French (Amsterdam, 1720; 2nd ed., Paris, 1722) and knew Newton rather well Newton did not abandon his view of immaterial matter and its creation by God,
even in his old age. Indeed, in a footnote to the third edition of his translation of
Lockes Essay Concerning Human Understanding, which was published in Amsterdam
in 1735 (the first edition of Costes translation of the fourth English edition of Lockes
Essay, Essai philosophique concernant Ventendement humain . . . was published in
Amsterdam by Henri Schelte in 1700), Coste reports a conversation that he had with
Newton a long time after Lockes death about a particularly obscure passage of the
Essay. In this passage (Book IV, ch. X, par. 18; see A. C. Frasers critical edition of the
Essay [Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1894], II, 321) Locke tells us that if we made an
effort we could, though very imperfectly, conceive the creation of matter by God. As
Locke, however, does not say anything about the manner of this creation, Coste could
not make any sense out of the passage until he was enlightened by Newton; see p. 521,
note, of the above-mentioned Amsterdam, 1735, third edition, which is partially quoted
by Helene Metzger, Attraction universelle et religion naturelle (Paris: Hermann,
1938), p. 32, and partially translated by Fraser in note 2, p. 321, of his previously cited
edition of Lockes Essay: Enfin, longtemps apres sa mort, M. le Chevalier Newton, ^
qui je parlais, par hazard, de cet endroit du Livre de M. Locke me decouvrit tout le
mystere. Souriant il me dit d abord que cetait lui mSme qui avait imaging cette maniere
dexpliquer la creation de la matiere, que la pensee lui en 6toit venue dans Iesprit un
jour quil vint a tomber sur cette question avec M. Locke et un Seigneur Anglois (le
feu comte de Pembroke, mort au mois de Fevrier de la presente annee 1733). Et void
comment il expliqua sa pensee: On pourrait, dit-il, se former en quelque maniire une
idê de la creation de la matiire en supposant que Dieu eut empechepar sa puissance que
rien ne put entrer dans une certaine portion de Vespace pur, qui de sa nature est pin^trable, iternel, nicessaire, infini, car dis la cette portion d'espace aurait Vimpenetrability,
Pune des qualitis essentielles d la matiere', et comme Vespace pur est absolument uni
forme, on n'a qu'd supposer que Dieu aurait communique cette espice d'impenetrabilite
a autre pareille portion de Vespace, et cela nous donnerait en quelque sorte une idee de la
mobilite de la matiere, autre quality qui lui est aussi tris essentielle. It is difficult to
understand why Newton told Coste that this view occurred to him during a convers
ation with Locke and Pembroke and did not tell him that he had developed it in his
youth - but we cannot doubt Costes report.
92
we are not able to posit bodies without at the same time positing that
God exists and that he has created bodies in empty space out of nothing
. . . But if with Descartes we say that extension is body, are we not opening
the way to atheism? . . . Extension is not created but was from eternity
and since we have an absolute conception of it without having to relate
Unpublished Scientific Papers, pp. 107-108.
93
* Ibid., p. 107.
it to God, we are able to conceive that it exists though imagining at the

same time that God is not. [This all the more so since] if the division of
substance into extended and thinking is legitimate and perfect, then God
would not contain in himself extension even in a preeminent manner and
would therefore be unable to create it; God and extension would be com
plete and absolute entities and the term substance would be applicable to
each of them in the same sense [mivoce].'^
Principia, I have already said that it is, in my opinion, anti-Cartesian
It may seem rather unfair to raise an accusation of opening the way

to atheism against a philosophy which asserts that Gods existence
is known per se and is the first and most certain truth in our posses
sion, on which everything else is based; which so far rejects the auto
nomy and the autarchy of the world that it denies to it the very faculty
of existing and maintaining itself in being - even with Gods habi
tual concourse - and requires instead a continuous creation; and
which, conversely, so far magnifies the creative power of God that it
makes not only the existence of the world but also the eternal
truth of mathematics dependent on his will.^ Yet, as we know,
such an accusation was made by More,^ and was repeated by New
ton and Cotes,^ who thought the Cartesian world was too complete
and too self-sufficient to need, or even admit, any intervention of
God. According to Newton, Descartes had confused created bodies
with the eternal, infinite, and uncreated extension - that is, with
void space - a confusion which leads to metaphysical errors as it leads
to physical ones, rendering the motion of planets and even projec
tiles impossible. For it is impossible that a corporeal fluid should
not oppose the motions of projectiles . . . And if aether were a
corporeal fluid without any pores, it would, however subtilised by
division, be as dense as any other such fluid and would yield with no
less inertia to the motion of projectiles.This is an argument which
Newton will use in the Principia, and in the Opticks.^ As for the
^ Unpublished Scientific Papers, p. 109.
2 According to Descartes, even the eternal ideas and truths of mathematics are
created by God, who could have made twice two be equal to five, etc., etc., etc. Could
have - but did not; for if twice two was really five and not four, God would be deceiving
us and that is something that he cannot do.
* See supra, pp. 89 sq. See also p. 271, n. 4.
* See infra, p. 95; though primarily directed against Leibnizs conception of God as
intelligentia supra mundana, the insistence of the Scholium Generale that God is Dominus
and not Ens perfectissimum aims certainly also at Descartes; see infra, p. 112, n. 1,
and p. 271, n. 4.
Unpublished Scientific Papers, p. 113.
* See Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica (1687), Book III, Prop. VI, Th.
VI, Cor. 3, p. 411; Motte-Cajori, p. 414; Op//ce(London, 1706), Qu. 20, pp. 310sq.:
Opticks (second English edition of 1717 and later editions), Qu. 28. The first edition of
the Opticks appeared in English in 1704; a Latin edition appeared in 1706; a second
English edition appeared in 1717; a third in 1721; a fourth in 1730, reprinted 1952
(New York, Dover).
94
to the core; its aim is to oppose to the Cartesian philosophy, with

its apriorism and its attempt at global deduction, another and rather
different philosophy, a philosophy more empirical and at the
same time more mathematical than that of Descartes, a philosophy
which restricts itself to the knowledge of la surface des choses, to
use the expression of Jean Perrin, and which sees its goal in the study
of the mathematical framework of nature, and the mathematical
laws of the forces acting in nature. Or, to quote Newton himself,
from the phenomena of motion to investigate the forces of nature,
and from these forces to demonstrate other phenomena.
Yet, in spite of this radical opposition, we do not find in the
Principia an open criticism of the philosophy of Descartes; what we
find is a detailed and decisive criticism of his purely scientific theories,
or hypotheses. There are, of course, good reasons for this, the best
one being the very structure of the Principia : it is essentially a book on
rational mechanics, which provides principles for physics and for
astronomy. In such a book there is a normal place for the discussion
of Cartesian optics, or of the vortices, but not of his conception of
the relations of mind and body, and other such things. The criticism,
however, is not absent but only hidden behind, or in, the carefully
worded definitions of the fundamental concepts of Newtons own
physics, or of Newtons own world: space, time, motion, and
matter. Moreover, such criticism becomes more apparent in the
Latin Opticks of 1706, and in the second edition of the Principia.
It is even quite explicit in Cotess Preface.
We shall come back to this philosophical criticism of, and opposi
tion to, Descartes. Let us now turn our attention to Newtons treat
ment of his more concrete scientific hypotheses.
We could, as a matter of fact, consider the whole second book of
the Principia, which deals with the motion of bodies in resisting
media, as a criticism, a positive criticism, of Cartesian conceptions,
and as the execution of the program that the young Newton set
for himself. Descartes, indeed, denied the existence of vacuum;
all space - in Newtonian terminology - was for him filled with mat
ter, or even - in his own - identical with matter. Accordingly, bodies
moving in that space-matter had to encounter resistance. But what
was this resistance? Descartes did not ask this question, and it is
very characteristic of Newton and his way of thinking that it was
precisely this question that he asked in his very first attempt to criti95
cize Descartes. He did not then work out an answer to the question
in any great detail. But in the Principia he treats the problem in all
generality; this, too, is characteristic of Newton: not to attach him
self to particular problems but to deal with them as cases of a more
general nature. Thus, it is only after having analyzed all possible,
and even impossible, cases of motion, and of propagation of motion,
in elastic and inelastic media, in media whose resistance grows in
proportion to speed or to the square of speed, media that pulsate
like air or undulate like water, that he comes down to the specific
problems of optics and cosmology. Even then he treats them as
cases, as problems; he reconstructs them and gives the solution,
mentioning neither the name of Descartes nor even, in his criticism
of Cartesian optics, that he is dealing with Descartess hypothesis
on the nature and structure of light.
Of course, he is right. Descartess conception of a luminiferous
element (second element) made up of hard, round particles closely
packed together, and of light as pressure transmitted by and
through this medium, is only a case of a more general problem,
that of the propagation of pressure, or motion, through fluids (Book
II, Sec. VIII). Thus the results arrived at are general to o : pressure
will not be propagated in straight lines; moreover, it will turn around
corners. Or, to quote Newton himself:
Yet it is not only to pressure that these results apply, but to all kinds
of motion:
A pressure is not propagated through a fluid in rectilinear directions except

where the particles o f the fluid lie in a right line.
If the particles a, b, c, d, e lie in a right line, the pressure may be indeed
directly propagated from ato e; but then the particle e will urge the ob
liquely posited particles / and g obliquely and those particles / and g will
not sustain this pressure unless they be supported by the particles h and k
lying beyond them; but the particles that support them are also pressed
by them; and those particles cannot sustain that pressure without being
supported by, and pressing upon, those particles that lie still farther, as /
and m and so on in infinitum. Therefore the pressure, as soon as it is pro
pagated to particles that lie out of right lines, begins to deflect towards one
hand and the other, and will be propagated obliquely in infinitum', and
after it has begun to be propagated obliquely if it reaches more distant
particles lying out of the right line, it will deflect again on each hand; and
this it will do as often as it lights on particles that do not lie exactly on a
right line. Q.E.D. Cor. If any part of a pressure, propagated through a
fluid from a given point, be intercepted by any obstacle, the remaining part,
which is not intercepted, will deflect into the spaces behind the obstacle.^
^Principia (1687), Book I, Prop. XLI, Th. XXXI, p. 354; (1713), Book II, Prop.
XLI, Th. XXXII, p. 329; Motte-Cajori, p. 367. See also Optice (1706), Qu. 20,
pp. 310 sq.; Opticks, Qu. 28, p. 362.
96
All motion propagated through a fluid diverges from a rectilinear progress

into the unmoved spaces.^
The conclusion, which Newton does not draw himself, but leaves
to the reader, is clear: the hypotheses of Descartes, of Huygens, and
of Hooke^ are all false; they are all cases of the general mechanism
that has just been studied and therefore incompatible with the rectilinearity of light rays. This negative conclusion, however - and I
should like to stress this point - is not arrived at directly; it is only a
counterpart, or a sous-produit, of a positive result.
It is nearly in the same way - enlarging and generalizing the prob
lem, studying its different cases, calculating the effects of such or
such disposition - that Newton deals with the Cartesian vortices.
Here, however, he tells us what he aims at, though here, too, he does
not mention names. But just as in the case of optics, the rejection of
the vortices is a by-product of a positive investigation that yields
results incompatible with the firmly established - astronomical data. Thus the problem of the vortices becomes the general problem
(Book II, Sec. IX) of the circular motion of fluids, which circular
motion can be considered as taking place either in an infinite fluid
or in a fluid enclosed in a vessel, as occurring in only one place, or
simultaneously in different places, and so on and on. What is aimed
at in each case is a mathematical, numerical determination of the
structure of the corresponding motion.
Thus we learn:
If a solid cylinder, infinitely long, in an uniform and infinite fluid,
revolves with an uniform motion about an axis given in position, and the
fluid be forced round by only this impulse of the cylinder, and every part
of the fluid continues uniformly in its motion: I say that the periodic times
of the parts of the fluid are as their distances from the axis of the cylinder.^
On the other hand:

If a solid sphere, in an uniform and infinite fluid, revolves about an axis
Principia (1687), Book II, Prop. XLII, Th. XXXII, p. 356; (1713), Book II, Prop.
XLII, Th. XXXIII, p. 331; Motte-Cajori, p. 369.
^ Newton is wrong, of course: waves, if they are small enough in comparison to the
opening through which they pass, do not turn around the corner. But we cannot
blame Newton for not having anticipated the development of the wave theory of light,
or even for not having appreciated at its just value Huygenss explanation of this fact.
Principia (1687), Book II, Prop. LI, Th. XXXVIII, p. 373; (1713), Book II, Prop.
LI, Th. XXXIX, p. 345; Motte-Cajori, p. 385.
97
given in position with an uniform motion, and the fluid be forced round
by only this impulse of the sphere; and every part of the fluid continues
uniformly in its motion; I say that the periodic times of the parts of the
fluid are as the squares of their distances from the centre of the sphere . . .
[because the rotation of the sphere] will communicate a whirling motion
to the fluid, like that of a vortex, and that motion will by degrees be pro
pagated onwards in infinitum', and this motion will be increased continually
in every part of the fluid, till the periodical times of the several parts be
come as the squares of the distances from the centre of the globe.^
Applied to the cosmic, or astronomical, reality, this conclusion

means that in the vortex hypothesis a system such as the solar system
would lack stability and persistence. It would disintegrate if some
force - a force not accounted for by the vortex mechanism - did not
restrain it. Even a smaller system, with only one planet, or satel
lite, would not be stable without such a force. Moreover, as motion is
continuously transferred from the rotating globes to the matter of
the fluid that surrounds them, and as they cannot impart motion
without surrendering motion in the same amount, this imparted
motion (1) would be swallowed up and lost in the boundless
space; and, (2) if the globes were not constantly receiving new
motion from some active principle, their motion would languish
by degrees and they, and also the vortices, at last would quite
stand still. A most important result, as it shows that the vortex
conception is incompatible with the principle of conservation of
motion, in which the Cartesians believed, but Newton did not.
Further, Newtons result shows that the vortex theory implies a
continuous replacement of the loss by an active principle, that
is, it implies something in which Newton believed, but the Carte
sians did not.
Until now Newton had only investigated the case of a single vortex
system in infinite space. But in the Cartesian world conception there
is not one but an infinite - or indefinite - number of such systems
(each star is one) which, so to say, surround each other and thus
mutually prevent each others expansion. It is in se a false conception:
the boundaries of the vortex systems would not remain stable, the
vortices would not remain separated but would merge into one
another. This notwithstanding, the case of a finite vortex, that is,
of a whirling motion that takes place in a limited and closed space,
is different from that of a vortex that can freely expand in infinitum.
Newton therefore proceeds to the study of it; he does not, however,
as I did, make any reference to the impossible Cartesian conception,
namely, that of the vortices limiting each other; on the contrary,
he substitutes the quite possible and even empirically realizable
motion of a fluid in a circular vessel. The result is rather surprising:
the enclosure does not change the behavior of the fluid and the
periodical times will be as the squares of the distances from the
centre of the vortex. No constitution of a vortex can be permanent
but this.i
A very important conclusion, as we shall see in a moment.

Now, what would happen if the whirling sphere, that is, the central
body (the sun or the earth), influenced another sphere, that is, a
planet or a satellite? A corollary enlightens us:
If another globe should be swimming in the same vortex at a certain
distance from its centre, and in the meantime by some force revolve
constantly about an axis of a given inclination, the motion of this globe
will drive the fluid round after the manner of a vortex; and at first this new
and small vortex will revolve with its globe about the centre of the other;
and in the meantime its motion will creep on farther and farther, and by
degrees be propagated in infinitum, after the manner of the first vortex.
And for the same reason that the globe of the new vortex was carried about
before by the motion of the other vortex, the globe of this other will be
carried about by the motion of this new vortex, so that the two globes will
revolve about some intermediate point, and by reason of that circular
motion mutually fly from each other, unless some force restrains them,^
But in the solar system there are not one but several globes
swimming in the vortex of the sun and turning on their axes. In such
a case:
If several globes in given places should constantly revolve with deter
mined velocities about axes given in position, there would arise from them
as many vortices going on in infinitum. For upon the same account that
any one globe propagates its motion in infinitum each globe apart will
propagate its motion in infinitum also; so that every part of the infinite
fluid will be agitated with a motion resulting from the actions of all the
globes. Therefore the vortices will not be confined by any certain limits,
but by degrees run into each other; and by the actions of the vortices
on each other, the globes will be continually moved from their places . . .
Neither can they possibly keep any certain position among themselves,
unless some force restrains them.^
Principia (1687), Book II, Prop. LII,Th. XXXIX, p. 375, Cor. 2, p. 378; (1713),
Book II, Prop. LII, Th. XL, p. 347, Cor. 2, p. 349; Motte-Cajori, pp. 387, 389-390.
Ibid. (1687), Cor. 5, pp. 378-379; (1713), p. 350; Motte-Cajori, p. 390.
* Ibid. (1687), Cor. 6, p. 379; (1713), p. 350; Motte-Cajori, p. 391.
98
* Principia (1687), Cor. 7, p. 379; (1713), p. 351; Motte-Cajori, p. 391.
99
But
if the vessel be not spherical [as a matter of fact, the shape of the Cartesian
vortices is not spherical] the particles will move in lines not circular but
answering to the figure of the vessel; and the periodic times will be nearly
as the squares of the mean distances from the centre [and] in the spaces
between the centre and the circumference the motions will be slower where
the spaces are wide and swifter when narrow.^
This for the motion of the vortices themselves; as for the motion
of bodies swimming in or carried round by them, we have to dis
tinguish the case of bodies having the same density as the whirling
fluid from the case of bodies whose densities are different - either
greater or smaller - from the density of the whirling fluid. As a
matter of fact, it is only in the former case (same densities) that bodies
will move in closed orbits: a solid if it be of the same density with
the matter of the vortex, will move with the same motion as the
parts thereof, being relatively at rest in the matter that surrounds
it. 2
Conversely, if a body carried about in a vortex returns in the

same orbit, it must be of the same density as the vortex. In that case,
indeed, it would revolve according to the same law with those
parts of the fluid that are at the same or equal distances from the
centre of the vortex. It would, therefore, be relatively quiescent
in the fluid that carries it. And if the vortex be of a uniform density,
the same body may revolve at any distance from the centre. How
ever,
if [the body in question] be more dense, it will endeavour more than before
to recede from the centre: and therefore, overcoming that force of the
vortex by which, being as it were, kept in equilibrium, it was retained in
its orbit, it will recede from the centre, and in its revolution describe a
spiral returning no longer into the same orbit. And, by the same argument,
if it be more rare, it will approach to the centre. Therefore it can never
continually go round in the same orbit unless it be of the same density with
the fluid.
That is, if we translate these conclusions into cosmological terms,

only if the earth and the planets are of the same density as the
matter of interplanetary spaces could they be moved around the
sun by its vortex.
This seems to be rather a strong objection against the vortex hypo

thesis. Newton, however, does not use it. Possibly because difference
in density (as he explains and later develops in Book III of the
Principia, and as he had pointed out in CUL 4003) is im
possible in the Cartesian world; indeed, it is this impossibility
that will form the basis of his general criticism of Descartess
identification of extension and matter. Yet, be this as it may, it
remains that for his rejection of the vortex hypothesis Newton puts
forward a purely astronomical reason: it is incompatible with Kep
lers laws. Newton, indeed tells us:
I have endeavoured . . . to investigate the properties of vortices that
I might find whether the celestial phenomena can be explained by them;
for the phenomenon is this, that the periodic times of the planets revolving
about Jupiter are as the f power of their distances from Jupiters centre;
and the same rule obtains also among the planets that revolve about the
Sun . . , Therefore if those planets are carried round in vortices revolving
about Jupiter and the Sun, the vortices must revolve according to that law.
But here we found the periodic times of the parts of the vortex to be as
the square of the distances from the centre of motion; and this ratio can
not be diminished and reduced to the f power . . . If, as some think, the
vortices move more swiftly near the centre, then slower to a certain limit,
then again swifter near the circumference, certainly neither the f power
nor any other certain and determinate power can obtain in them.^
Having dealt this blow to Descartes - the theory ascribed to some
is exactly that of Descartes - Newton concludes: Let philosophers
[Cartesians] then see how that phenomenon of the f power can be
accounted for by vortices.
As a matter of fact, not only the periodic times of the planets but
also the speeds with which they move in their orbits would be quite
different in the vortex hypothesis from those that they must have
according to Kepler, and that they have in fact:
Scholium. Hence it is manifest that the planets are not carried round
in corporeal vortices; for, according to the Copernican hypothesis, the
planets going round the sun revolve in ellipses having the sun in their
common focus; and by radii drawn to the sun describe areas proportional
to the times. But the parts of a vortex can never revolve with such a
^ Principia (1687), Scholium, p. 381; (1713), p. 352; Motte-Cajori, p. 393.

* Ibid. (1687), Book II, Prop. LIII, Th. XL, p. 383; (1713), Book II, Prop. LIII, Th.
XLI, p. 354; Motte-Cajori, pp. 394-395.
Ibid.
* Principia (1687), Book II, Prop. LII, Th. XXXIX, Scholium, pp. 381-382; (1713),
Book II, Prop. LII, Th. XL, Scholium, pp. 352-353; Motte-Cajori, p. 393. An excel
lent resume of Newtons criticism of the vortex hypothesis is given by Cotes in his
Preface to the second edition (1713) of the Principia.
* Newton, of course, knew perfectly well that Copernicus never taught anything of
the kind, and that it was not Copernicus but Kepler who formulated the two laws of
planetary motion which he referred to (the first and the second of Keplers laws).
100
101
motion. For let AD, BE, CF [Fig. 1] represent three orbits described about
the sun S, of which let the outmost circle CF be concentric to the sun;
let the aphelions of the two innermost be A, B, and their perihelions D, E.
Hence a body revolving in the orb CF, describing by a radius drawn to the
sun, areas proportional to the times, will move with an uniform motion.
And, according to the laws of astronomy, the body revolving in the orbit
BE will move slower in its aphelion B, and swifter in its perihelion E;
whereas according to the laws of mechanics the matter of the vortex ought
to move more swiftly in the narrow space between A and C than in the
wide space between D and F, that is more swiftly in the aphelion than in
the perihelion. Now these two conclusions contradict each other . . . So
that the hypothesis of vortices is utterly irreconcilable with astronomical
phenomena and rather serves to perplex than to explain the heavenly
motions. How these motions are performed in free spaces without vortices
may be understood by the first Book; and I shall now more fully treat of it
in the following Book.^
Why did he speak instead of the Copernican hypothesis, thus attributing these laws
to Copernicus and not to their rightful owner? Was it because - like Galileo before
him - he felt an aversion for Kepler, for his continuous mixture of metaphysical
hypotheses with natural philosophy ? This may have been the case, and would ex
plain why he did not name Kepler among his predecessors, even though he borrowed
from him the term, and the concept, of inertia, though modifying its contents (see
supra, p. 70, n. 1); nor mention that the sesquialterate proportion of the periodic
times which, according to Book I of the Principia, implies the inverse-square law of
attraction ( If the periodic times are as the sesquialterate powers of the radii, and there
fore the velocities inversely as the square roots of the radii, the centripetal forces will
be inversely as the squares of the radii ), is nothing else than Keplers third law, from
which not only Sir Christopher Wren, Dr. Hooke, and Dr. Halley, but also he himself
deduced it. Ibid. (1687), Book I, Prop. IV, Th. IV, Cor. 6, and Scholium, p. 42; (1713),
Book I, Prop. IV, Cor. 6, and Scholium, p. 39; Motte-Cajori, p. 46. In the same way,
in Book HI he does not mention Kepler, either in connection with his second law ( areas
which planets describe by radii drawn to the Sun are proportional to the times of
Description ; ibid. [1687], Book III, Hypothesis VIII, p. 404; [1713], Book III,
Phaenomenon V, p. 361; Motte-Cajori, p. 405) or with the first ( the planets move in
ellipses which have their common focus in the center of the Sun ; ibid. [1687],
Book III, Prop. XIII, Th. XIII, p. 419; [1713], Book III, Prop. XIII, Th. XIII, p. 375;
Motte-Cajori, p. 420). On the other hand, he does mention Kepler as the discoverer
of the third law {ibid. [1687], Book III, Hypothesis VII, p. 403; [1713], Book III,
Phaenomenon IV, p. 360; Motte-Cajori, p. 404). We must, however, take into account
that through the whole of the seventeenth century heliocentric astronomy was called
Copernican, as Kepler himself did in calling Epitome astronomiae Copernicanae a
book in which, besides heliocentrism, there was nothing Copernican; and as for the
term hypothesis, it, too, was a common and standing expression. Indeed, Newtons
Principia was announced at the Royal Society as a work designed to demonstrate
the Copernican hypothesis. See supra, p. 30.
102
Without vortices . . . in free spaces. . . Indeed, both the third book,

which describes the System of the World, and the first book,
which develops the fundamental theories of rational mechanics,
postulate the existence of free, or void, spaces. The third book does
it explicitly, the first implicitly, by studying the motion of bodies
without taking any account of the medium in which such motions
are performed. And it is by implication also that the rejection of
vortices is hinted at in the definitions that assert the reality of abso
lute time, absolute space, and absolute motion, as distinguished
from and opposed to relative time, relative space, and relative
motion. The implication here was, of course, perfectly clear to New
tons contemporaries. I think that the texts of the manuscript that
I have quoted make it also quite clear to us. Everyone knows, of
course, these celebrated definitions. I would like, nevertheless, to
repeat them;
Absolute true and mathematical time, of itself, and from its own
nature, flows equably without relation to anything external, and by an
other name is called duration', relative apparent and common time is some
sensible and external (whether accurate or unequable) measure of duration
by the means of motion which is commonly used instead of true time.^
That is, time is not the measure (number) of motion, as the

sehool tradition defined it; nor is it the duration of things, their
amount of being, as Descartes defined it. Time has its own nature,
independent of everything external, that is, independent of the
existence or nonexistence of the world.^ If there were no world,
* Principia (1687), Book II, Prop. LIII.Th. X L, Scholium, pp. 383-384; (1713), Book
II, Prop. LIII, Th. XLI, Scholium, pp. 354-355; Motte-Cajori, pp. 395-396.
^ Ibid. (1687), Scholium to Definitiones, p. 5; (1713), Scholium to Definitiones, p. 5;
Motte-Cajori, p. 6.
* See The Geometric Lectures o f Isaac Barrow, ed. J. M. Child (Chicago: Open Court,
1916), Lecture I, pp. 35 sq.
103
N E W T O N AND DESCARTES
there would still be time, and duration.^ The duration of what?

Newton does not tell us, but we know the answer: the duration of
God. Yet this time, this duration - Newton has lost something
of his youthful enthusiasm and confidence - is not our duration or
our time. Our time and our duration are only sensible, relative, and
imperfect measures of the steady and equable flow of absolute true
and mathematical time. Even astronomical time, by which we
correct our common time measures, is no more than an approxi
mation. Time, indeed, is measured by motion. But
Absolute space, in its own nature without relation to anything external,

remains always similar and immovable. Relative space is some movable
dimension or measure of the absolute spaces; which our senses determine
by its position to bodies.^
it may be that there is no such thing as an equable motion, whereby

time may be accurately measured. All motions may be accelerated and
retarded, but the flowing of absolute time is not liable to any change. The
duration or perseverance of the existence of things remains the same,
whether the motions are swift or slow, or none at all; and therefore this
[absolute] duration ought to be distinguished from what are only sensible
measures thereof.^
as it is defined by Descartes or the scholastics. Bodies are in places;

but they do not stay there; they move, that is, they change places places, not their situation among, or with respect to, other bodies,
as Descartes had put it. Thus, because there are two kinds of places,
there are also, and consequently, two kinds of motion:
Space, like time, is not directly and essentially connected with the
world, or with matter. The world, of course, is in space as it is in
time; but if there were no world there would still be space. In the
manuscript from which I have been quoting Newton told us out
right what it was; Gods space. He still thinks so; but he does not say
so; he calls it instead absolute space. It is true that absolute space is not
directly given to us; in perception we perceive only bodies, and it is
in relation to bodies, to movable bodies, that we determine our
space, or our spaces. Still it is an error not to recognize that our
relative, movable spaces are possible only in an unmovable space.
Newton writes therefore:
* For Descartes - as for Aristotle - if there were no world, there would be also no
time. Henry More, following the Neoplatonic tradition, objects that time has nothing
to do with the world (see Second Letter to Descartes, 5 March 1649, Descartes,
Oeuvres, ed. C. Adam and P. Tannery, V, 302); for, if God annihilated this universe
and then, after a certain time, created from nothing another one, this intermundium or
this absence of the world would have its duration which would be measured by a cer
tain number of days, years or centuries. There is thus a duration of something that does
not exist, which duration is a kind of extension. Consequently, the amplitude of nothing,
that is of void, can be measured by ells or leagues, just as the duration of what does
not exist can be measured in its inexistence by hours, days and months. Descartes,
however, maintains his position (see Second Letter to Henry More, 15 April 1649,
Oeuvres, V, 343): I believe that it implies a contradiction to conceive a duration be
tween the destruction of the first world and the creation of the second one; for, if we
refer this duration or something similar to the succession of G ods ideas, this will be an
error of our intellect and not a true perception of something.
* Principia (1687), Scholium to Definitiones, p. 7; (1713), Scholium to Definitiones, p.
7; Motte-Cajori, p. 8. Newton tells us that we determine, or try to determine, the
absolute time from the phenomena by means of astronomical equations. Alas, we
cannot do it for space.
104
One step further: bodies are in space, that is, they have places, or
they are in places, which they fill, or occupy. But:
Place is a part of space which a body takes up, and is, according to the
space, either absolute or relative. I say, a part of space; not the situation,
nor the external surface of the body,*
Absolute motion is the translation of a body from one absolute place

into another; and relative motion, the translation from one relative place
into another. Thus in a ship under sail, the relative place of a body is that
part of the ship which the body possesses or that part of the cavity which
the body fills and which therefore moves together with the ship; and rela
tive rest is the continuance of the body in the same part of the ship or of
its cavity. But real, absolute rest is the continuance of the body in the same
part of that immovable space in which the ship itself, its cavity, and all that
it contains, is moved . . .
As the order of the parts of time is immutable, so also is the order of the
parts of space. Suppose those parts to be moved out of their places and
they will be moved (if the expression may be allowed) out of themselves.
For times and spaces are, as it were, the places as well of themselves as of
all other things. All things are placed in time as to order of succession; and
in space as to order of situation. . . And that the primary places of things
should be movable is absurd. These are therefore the absolute places;
and translations out of those places are the only absolute motions.^
We remember how strongly Newton reproached Descartes for

making all motion relative, thereby precluding the determination of
the true places and true motions of the heavenly bodies; since then
Newton had recognized that he was too severe; such a determina
tion is nearly impossible - at least for us: we cannot refer motion
directly to absolute places.
^ Principia (1687), p. 5; (1713), p. 6; Motte-Cajori, p. 6.
^ Ibid. See also Rohauit, Physica, pars I, cap. X, note 1, p. 36; System, I, 39 sq.;
and infra. Appendix M.
For Leibniz, it is these orders that constitute time and space.
* Principia (1687), Scholium to Definitiones, p. 6; (1713), Scholium to Definitiones,
p. 6; Motte-Cajori, pp. 7-8. See also Clarkes comments in Rohauits Physica, pars
I, cap. X, note 1, p. 36; System, I, 39 sq.; and infra. Appendix M.
H
105
But because the parts of space cannot be seen or distinguished from one
another by our senses, therefore in their stead we use sensible measures
of them. For from the positions and distances of things from any body
considered as immovable, we define all places; and then with respect to
such places, we estimate all motions . . . And so, instead of absolute places
and motions, we use relative ones.^
force on a body in order to generate or to change its absolute

motion; we need not do so in order to produce relative motion; we
can instead impress a force on other bodies. Conversely, absolute
motion does produce effects that relative motion does not have, at
least in the one case of circular motion.
This causes no inconveniences in common affairs. Yet - Newton

has not abandoned his old ideal - in philosophical disquisitions
we ought to abstract from our senses, and consider things themselves,
distinct from what are only sensible measures of them. But we
cannot do this by referring all motions to a body at absolute rest.
For it may be that there is no body really at rest, to which places
and motions of others may be referred. And even if there were
in the region of the fixed stars, or perhaps far beyond them such a
body,^ it would be impossible to know it from the positions of
bodies in our region.
Thus we cannot determine absolute motion as a motion relative
to a body at absolute rest; and yet we cannot, as does Descartes,
abandon the idea of absolute motion. Accordingly we have to main
tain that
The effects which distinguish absolute from relative motion are the
forces of receding from the axis of circular motion. For there are no such
forces in a circular motion purely relative, but in a true and absolute cir
cular motion, they are greater, or less, according to the quantity of
motion.1
entire and absolute motions cannot be otherwise determined than by

immovable places; and for that reason I did before refer those absolute
motions to immovable places, but relative ones to movable places. Now
no other places are immovable but those that from infinity to infinity do
all retain the same given position one to another; and upon this account
must ever remain unmoved and do thereby constitute immovable space.^
From infinity to infinity. . . . It is obvious that Newton does not

mean spatial infinity; he means temporal infinity. From infinity to
infinity means from eternity to eternity, from the infinite past to the
infinite future, through the whole infinite flow of absolute time.
Once more we are reminded of the nature of space as described in the
manuscript.
And again: how can we determine motion with respect to the un
movable places ? As a matter of fact, we already know the answer;
by its effects, or causes: The causes by which true and relative
motions are distinguished, one from the other, are the forces im
pressed upon bodies to generate motion. We have to impress
^ Principia (1687), p. 7; (1713), p. 7; Motte-Cajori, p. 8. Considered immov
able . .
see supra, p. 80.
^ The body a of C. Neumann.
Principia (1687), pp. 8-9; (1713), p. 8; Motte-Cajori, p. 9.
106
Thus in the famous Newtonian experiment of a rotating vessel

hung by a long cord in which water forms itself in a concave
figure, it is the absolute motion of that water, and not its relative
motion with respect to the sides of the vessel nor with respect to
the ambient bodies (Descartess definition of the true or philoso
phical motion), that produces this effect. We can even, by measur
ing these forces, determine both the direction and the absolute
speed of the circular motion, for
there is only one real circular motion of any one revolving body, corre
sponding to only one power of endeavouring to recede from the axis of
its motion, as its proper and adequate effect; but relative motions in one
and the same body are innumerable, according to the various relations it
bears to external bodies, and like other relations, are altogether destitute of
any real effect . . . And therefore in their system who suppose that our
heavens, revolving below the sphere of the fixed stars, carry the planets
along with them; the several parts of those heavens, and the planets, which
are indeed relatively at rest in their heavens, do yet really move. For they
change their position one to another. . . and as parts of revolving wholes,
endeavour to recede from the axis of their motions.*
Thus, absolute motion emerges victorious from the contest, and

with it absolute space, which, as such, having no essential relation
to things that it contains, can be free. But is it? The third book of the
Principia gives us the answer.
In this book, in which Newton describes the System of the
World, that is, the system of the planetary motions that demon
strate the action of a gravitational force and, conversely, are ex
plained by it, Newton reinforces the argument that he had already
^ Principia (1687), p. 9; (1713), p. 8; Motte-Cajori, p. 10.
* Ibid, {[(til), Tp. 10; (1713), p. 9; Motte-Cajori,p. 11; seeinfra, pp. 119,sq., on Huy
genss experiment. Huygens, having enclosed his vessel by a glass plate, did not notice
the phenomenon observed by Newton.
107
used in his manuscript, telling us that if all spaces were equally full, as
they should be according to Descartes, all bodies would be equally
dense, which is absurd.^ It is clear that the quantity of matter in a
given space can be rarefied, and even extremely so; if it could not,
the motion of the planets would encounter strong resistance, but,
in fact, the planets encounter hardly any resistance, the comets
none at all. But if the quantity of matter can by rarefaction be
diminished, what hinders its diminishing to infinity ? Itaque vacuum
necessario datur.
Ten years later, in one of the Queries appended to the Latin
edition of his Opticks, Newton becomes more explicit:
Thus we see that Newtons anti-Cartesianism is not purely scientific;

it is also religious; Cartesianism is materialism that banishes from
natural philosophy all teleological questions, that reduces every
thing to blind necessity,^ which obviously cannot explain the variety
and the purposeful structure of the universe, whereas the main
business of Natural Philosophy is just to ask these questions and,
without feigning hypotheses, deduce causes from effect till we come
to the very first Cause which is certainly nonmechanical. It is
therefore unphilosophical to pretend that it might arise out of
Chaos by the mere laws of nature.
Cartesians banish from nature all nonmaterial forces, whereas,
in fact, there are active principles operating that cannot be en
tirely reduced to material forces chief of these is the force of gravity,
as the ancient philosophers of Chaldea and Greece had already seen.
These active principles derive directly from the
Against filling the heavens with fluid mediums, unless they be exceeding
rare, a great objection arises from the regular and very lasting motion
of the planets and comets in all manner of courses through the heavens.
For thence it is manifest that the heavens are void of all sensible resistance,
and by consequence, of all sensible matter . . .
[Indeed,] if the Heavens were as dense as water, they would not have
much less resistance than water; if as dense as quick-silver, they would
not have much less resistance than quick-silver; if absolutely dense, or
full of matter without any Vacuum, let the matter be never so subtle and
fluid, they would have a greater resistance than quick-silver.^
Thus there cannot be any continuous matter in the skies; there

might be very thin vapours, perhaps, or an exceedingly rare
aethereal medium, but no dense, Cartesian fluid. Such a fluid
can be of no use for explaining the phenomena of nature; the motion of the
planets and comets being better explained without it. It serves only to dis
turb and retard the motions of those great bodies and make the Frame of
Nature languish. . . And as it is of no use . . . so there is no evidence for its
existence and therefore it ought to be rejected.
This, however, is not all. There are deeper, philosophical reasons

for rejecting this medium. For doing so
we have the authority of those the oldest and most celebrated philosophers
of Greece and Phoenicia, who made a Vacuum and Atoms, and the gravity
of Atoms the first principles of their philosophy; tacitly attributing gravity
to some other cause than dense matter. Later philosophers banished the
consideration of such a cause out of natural philosophy, feigning hypo
theses for explaining all things mechanically and referring other causes to
metaphysics.
* Principia (1687), Book II, Prop. VI, Th. VI, Cor. 3, p. 411; (1713), Book III, Prop.
VI, Th. VI, Cor. 3, p. 368; Motte-Cajori, pp. 414.
Optice (1706), Qu. 20, pp. 310, 313; Opticks (1952), Qu. 28, pp. 364-365, 368.
Ibid., p. 314; p. 368-369.
108
powerful ever-living agent Who being in all places is more able by His will
to move the bodies within His boundless uniform Sensorium [that is, with
in absolute space] and thereby to form and reform the parts of the Uni
verse, than we are by our will to move the parts of our own bodies.^
^ See supra, p. 94. As we see. Cotes in his condemnation of Cartesianism and Leibnizianism faithfully expresses the views of Newton himself.
2 Optice (1706), Qu. 23, pp. 322, 341, 343, 344-345, 346; Opticks (1952), Qu. 31,
pp. 375-376, 397, 399, 401, 403.
Ibid. (1706), Qu. 23 and 20, pp. 346 and 315; Opticks (1952), Qu. 31 and Qu. 28,
pp. 403 and 370. The attribution of a sensorium to God and the identification of space
with this sensorium was one of the main objections raised by Leibniz against Newton
and his philosophy ( Letter to the Abbe Conti, see infra, p. 144, n. 1; Letter to
the Princess of Wales, in The Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, ed. H. G. Alexander
[Manchester, England: Manchester University Press, 1956], p. 11). In his answer to
Leibniz, Clarke p r o te s te d S ir Isaac has never said that space was the sensorium Dei;
he only compared it with the sensoria of living beings and said that God perceived
things in Space tanquam in sensorio suo. In order to prove his assertion, Clarke quoted
a passage from the Optice ([1706], Qu. 20, p. 315; Opticks [1952], Qu. 28, p. 370),
which said indeed: annon ex phaenomenis constat, esseEntem incorporeum, viventem,
intelligentem, omnipraesentem qui in spatio infinito tanquam Sensorio suo res ipsas in
time cernat penitusque perspiciat. As a matter of fact, Newton used the very term
sensorium on the same page {Optice [1706], Qu. 20, p. 315; Opticks [1952], Qu. 28, p.
370; see also Optice [1706], Qu. 23, p. 346; Opticks [1952], Qu. 31, p. 403); as for the
passage quoted by Clarke, Newton first wrote, Annon Spatium Universum Sensorium
estEntis Incorporei, Viventis et Intelligentis . . ., then, the volume having been already
printed, decided to change his text, introducing into it a face-saving tanquam,
probably because Dr. Cheyne, with whom Newton did not want to be associated (see
infra, p. 156, n. 1), expressed the same view in his Philosophical Principles o f Natural
Religion (London, 1705), P. II, Def. IV, p. 4, A Spirit is an extended, penetrable,
active indivisible, intelligent Substance ; Cor. IV, p. 53, Universal Space, is the
Image and Representation in Nature of the Divine Infinitude ; Cor. V, p. 53, Hence
Universal Space may be very aptly called the Sensorium Divinitatis since it is the Place
where the natural Things, or the whole System of material and compounded Beings is
presented to the Divine Omniscience. It is rather amusing to find Addison, ten years
later, praising this conception as the noblest and most exalted way of considering
109
Some years later Newton became even more explicit, no doubt

angered by the persistent opposition of the Cartesians, with whom
Leibniz, forgetting for a moment his own hostility toward Descartes,
had joined forces in the war against the common foe. Thus in the
third of his Regulae philosophandi, which in the second edition of the
Principia he added to the two Hypotheses of the first, which he also
now called Regulae (the other Hypotheses of the first edition he
now calls Phaenomena), he insisted on the experimental, empirical
character of natural philosophy and in the General Scholium pro
nounced his celebrated condemnation of hypotheses - Hypotheses
non fingo^ - that have no place in experimental philosophy; We are
certainly not to relinquish the evidence of experiments for the sake
of dreams and vain fictions of our own devising,^ and he listed
hardness, impenetrability, mobility, and inertia together with ex
tension as essential properties of matter, which in whole bodies result
from these same properties which are possessed by the least particles
of bodies. And, though denying that gravity is essential to bodies,
he asserts nevertheless that their mutual universal gravitation is
more certain even than their extension, because gravitation is in
ductively derived from phenomena, and argumentum inductionis
must not be abandoned for the sake of hypotheses. Whose hypo
theses? The Cartesians, of course, with their insistence on clear
and distinct innate ideas. Indeed, in a fifth Rule, which, however,
he did not publish, he says quite clearly:
considerations - Newtonian science is after all still Natural Philo

sophy - he starts by an attack on the hypothesis of vortices which
is pressed by many difficulties,^ most notably that the periodic
times of the planets cannot on the vortex hypothesis obey Keplers
law. Nor would the motion of their satellites. As for the comets,
the motion of which is exceedingly regular and governed by the
same laws as the motion of the planets, their motions can by no
means be accounted for by the hypothesis of vortices, for the
comets are carried with eccentric motions through all parts of the
heavens indifferently, with a freedom that is incompatible with the
motion of a vortex.
This for the vortices. As for the identification of extension with
matter and the denial of the vacuum;
Everything that is not derived from things themselves, either through

the external senses or by the sensation of the cogitationes, must be con
sidered as hypotheses. Thus I feel that I think, which could not be if I did
not feel at the same time that I am. But I do not feel that any idea is innate.^
And in the famous General Scholium, a curious conglomerate of

what we would call today purely scientific and purely metaphysical
infinite Space ; see Spectator, no. 565 (July 1714), quoted by H. G. Alexander, Cor
respondence . . . , p. xvi. For a further discussion of Newtons views on the Sensorium
Dei, see E. A. Burtt, The Metaphysical Foundations o f Modern Physical Science (2nd
ed.; London: Kegan Paul, 1932), pp. 128, 233, 258 sq.; (Garden City, New York:
Doubleday Anchor Books, 1954), pp. 135, 236 sq., 259 sq. See also A. Koyr6 and I. B.
Cohen, Newton and the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence, Archives Internationales
d'Histoire des Sciences 15 (1962), 63-126.
^ On hypotheses, see I. B. Cohen, Franklin and Newton: An Inquiry into Specula
tive Newtonian Experimental Science and Franklin's Work in Electricity as an Example
Thereof (Philadelphia: American Philosophical Society, 1956), Appendix One, pp.
575-589; and A. Koyre, Concept and Experience in Newtons Scientific Thought,
supra. Chapter II.
* Principia (1713), Book III, Regula III, p. 357; Motte-Cajori, p. 398.
* See A. Koyre, Newtons Regulae Philosophandi," infra. Chapter VI.
no
Bodies projected in our air suffer no resistance but from the air. With
draw the air, as is done in Mr. Boyles vacuum and the resistance ceases;
for in this void a bit of fine down and a piece of solid gold descend with
equal velocity. And the same argument must apply to the celestial spaces
above the earths atmosphere.^
These spaces do not resist the motion of planets and must, therefore,
be void. Besides, the Cartesian idea that the well-ordered system of
the world could be the result of mere mechanical causes is absurd.
This most beautiful system of the sun, planets, and comets, could only
proceed from the counsel and dominion of an intelligent and powerful
Being.
Not only this system, but the whole of the infinite universe in which
lest the systems of the fixed stars should by their gravity fall on each other.
He hath placed those systems at immense distances from one another.
This Being governs all things, not as the soul of the world but as Lord
over all and on account of his dominion he is wont to be called Lord God
navxox^dxtaQ, or Universal Ruler . . . The supreme God is a Being eternal,
infinite, absolutely perfect.
But not only th at: an ens infinitum et perfectissimum is not God.

Newton writes therefore: He [the true God] is a living, intelligent,
and powerful Being . . . He is eternal and infinite, omnipotent and
omniscient.
This, of course, is purely traditional. Newton adds, however:
His duration reaches from eternity to eternity; His presence from
Principia (1713), Book III, Scholium Generale, p. 481; Motte-Cajori, p. 543.
* Ibid.
Ill
N EW TO N AND DESCARTES
infinity to infinity. It is impossible - at least so it seems to me - not

to connect this addition with the texts that express the convictions
of the young Newton, and not to see in it the rejection of Descartess
God,^ who for Newton is absent from the world, and now also the
God of Leibniz.2 And this especially when we read that God is
not eternity and infinity, but eternal and infinite. As a matter of
fact, for Newton he is not eternal in the traditional sense of the
word, but sempiternal,^ that is, he is not above time but extended
in time and in space.
Thus perhaps it is more than curious: it reveals the way in which

Newton thought about Gods substantial presence in this world.
He is not duration, or space, but He endures and is present. He endures

forever, and is everywhere present, and by existing always and everywhere
[semper et ubique'] He constitutes duration and space. Since every particle
of space is always, and every indivisible moment of duration is everywhere,
certainly the Maker and Lord of all things cannot be never and nowhere
[nullibi].
We remember the insistence of the young Newton on Gods presence
in the world; he does not seem to have changed his mind since then.
Thus he tells us that God
is omnipresent not virtually only [as for Descartes], but also substantially,
for virtue cannot subsist without substance.* In Him are all things con
tained and moved; yet neither affects the other; God suffers nothing from
the motion of bodies; bodies find no resistance from the omnipresence of
God.
A rather curious assertion, since assuredly Newton knew as well

as we do ourselves that nobody had ever thought Gods omnipresence
could constitute a hindrance to the motion of bodies. Yet it is there.
It is allowed by all that the Supreme God exists necessarily; and by the
same necessity He exists always and everywhere.
Always and everywhere - that is, in infinite time and eternal

space, the existence of which is therefore as necessary as that of God;
nay, necessary even for the existence of God who cannot be if not
semper and ubique; it is in this space, the absolute space, that God and not blind metaphysical necessity, which is certainly the same
always and everywhere and could not produce a variety of things
- creates the world, that is, hard, impenetrable, passive, inert
particles, upon which he acts by an electric and elastic spirit,^
which seems now to be entrusted with the production of all shortrange phenomena such as the attraction and repulsion of particles
and the reflection and refraction of light,^ and by the power of gravity,
which propagates its virtue to immense distances.^
Metaphysical hypotheses, so Newton told us, have no place
in experimental philosophy. Yet it seems quite clear that meta
physical convictions play, or at least have played, an important
part in the philosophy of Sir Isaac Newton. It is his acceptance of two
absolutes - space and time - that enabled him to formulate his fun
damental three laws of motion, as it was his belief in an omnipresent
and omniactive God that enabled him to transcend both the shallow
empiricism of Boyle and Hooke and the narrow rationalism of
^ In the drafts of the Scholium Generale (see Hall and Hall, Unpublished Scientific
Papers, p. 357), Newton writes; Aeternus estifeinfinitus, sen duratinaeternum&adest
ab infinito in infinitum. Duratio ejus non est nunc stans sine duratione neque praesentia ejus est nusquam ; and (p. 359): Qui Ens perfectum dari demonstraverit, &
Dominum seu TravroKpaTopa universorum dari nondum demonstraverit, Deum dari
nondum demonstraverit. Ens aeternum, infinitum, sapientissimum, summe perfectum
sine dominio non est Deus sed natura solum. Haec nonnullis aeterna, infinita,
sapientissima, et potentissima est, & rerum omnium author necessario existens. Dei
autem dominium seu Deitas non ex ideis abstractis sed ex phaenomenis et eorum
causis finalibus optime demonstratur. It seems that for Newton, as for Pascal, the
God of the philosophers was not the God of faith.
* Leibnizs God, an Intelligentia supramundana, is a Dieu faineant. See Clarkes
criticism of Leibniz in his Correspondence with him, and my From the Closed World.
According to the classical definition of Boethius, who was inspired by Platos idea
of time as a mobile image of an unmovable eternity, aeternitas est innumerabilis
vitae simul tota et perfecta possessio, that is, an everlasting present, without past or
future, nor any kind of succession; it is a nunc. Newton, however, explicitly rejects this
conception in his above-mentioned drafts; see p. 112, n. 1.
* Traditionally, and also for Descartes, God is present in the world by his power.
^ The Latin text of the Principia does not mention the elastic and electric nature of
this spirit; it says only spiritus subtilissimus. But Motte, in his translation, writes
electric and elastic and Newton himself adds these terms in his own copy of the
Principia; see A. R. Hall and M. Boas Hall, Newtons Electric Spirit: Four Oddities,
Isis 50 (1959), 473-476; I. B. Cohen and A. Koyr6, Newtons Electric and Elastic
Spirit, Isis 51 (1960), 337; and Henry Guerlac, Francis Hauksbee: exp^rimentateur
au profit de Newton, Archives Internationales d'Histoire des Sciences 16 (1963),
113-128.
* On Newtons conception of short-range attractive forces, both inter- and extramolecular, and their reduction of electrical forces, see Hall and Hall, Unpublished
Scientific Papers, pp. 349-355. According to Professor H. Guerlac, Francis
Hauksbee, Newton was influenced by Hauksbees experiments.
It is interesting to note that Newton does not ascribe the production of gravity
to the action of electric and elastic spirits, but maintains the distinction of gravita
tional and electric forces. To use todays language, he maintains the distinction between
the gravitational and electromagnetic fields. Thus, even in the Queries of the Opticks,
where he presents an explanation of gravity by aethereal pressure {Opticks [1952], Qu.
21, 22, pp. 350-353), he nevertheless repeats th at Nature will be very conformable to
herself and very simple, performing all the great motions of the heavenly bodies by the
attraction of gravity which intercedes those bodies, and almost all the small ones of
their particles by some other attractive and repelling powers which intercede the par
ticles (Optice [1706], Qu. 23, p. 340-341; Opticks [1952], Qu. 31, p. 397).
112
113
Descartes, to renounce mechanical explanations, and, in spite of

his own rejection of all action at a distance, to build up his world
as an interplay of forces, the mathematical laws of which natural
philosophy had to establish. By induction, not by pure speculation.
This because our world was created by the pure will of God; we have
not, therefore, to prescribe his action for him ; we have only to find
out what he has done.
The belief in creation as the background of empiricomathematical
science - that seems strange. Yet the ways of thought, human
thought, in its search for truth are, indeed, very strange.
Itinerarium mentis in veritatem is not a right line. That is why the
history of this search is so interesting, so passionate; or, to quote
Kepler, who knew something about it: ''Non minus admirandae
videntur occasiones quibus homines in cognitionem rerum coelestium
deveniunt, quam ipsa natura rerum coelestium'
AP P E N DI X A
Huygens and Leibniz on Universal Attraction

It was Newtons conception of universal attraction, or gravitation his greatest triumph - understood or misunderstood as meaning an
action at a distance, that formed the strongest obstacle to the accept
ance of Newtonianism. Thus the very first review of the Principia
that appeared in France,^ having praised to the skies its value as
mechanics, rather harshly condemns its physics :
The work of M. Newton is a mechanics, the most perfect that one could
imagine, as it is not possible to make demonstrations more precise or
more exact than those that he gives in the first two books on lightness, on
springiness, on the resistance of fluid bodies, and on the attractive and
repulsive forces that are the principal basis of Physics, But one has to
confess that one cannot regard these demonstrations otherwise than as
only mechanical; indeed, the author recognizes himself at the end of page
four and the beginning of page five that he has not considered their Prin
ciples as a Physicist, but as a mere Geometer.
He confesses the same thing at the begiiming of the third book, where he
endeavors nevertheless to explain the System of the World. But it is [done]
only by hypotheses that are, most of them, arbitrary, and that, conse
quently, can serve as foundation only to a treatise of pure mechanics.
He bases the explanation of the inequality of the tides on the principle that
all the planets gravitate reciprocally toward each other. , . But this supposi
tion is arbitrary as it has not been proved; the demonstration that depends
on it can therefore only be mechanics.
In order to make an opus as perfect as possible, M. Newton has only to
give us a Physics as exact as his Mechanics. He will give it when he sub
stitutes true motions for those that he has supposed.
The author of this review - according to Mouy he may have been

Regis - was a Cartesian of rather strict observance; moreover, he
probably was not able to appreciate at its just value the immense
mathematical progress achieved by Newton in the Principia.
Much more interesting, from these points of view, are the reactions
of Huygens and Leibniz, Huygens, who some twenty years earlier*
* Journal des Sgavans (2 August 1688), pp. 153 sq., quoted in part by P. Mouy, Le
Ddveloppement de la physique cartisienne (Paris, 1934), p. 256.
114
115
N E W T O N I A N STUDI ES
HUYGE NS AND L EI BNI Z ON UNI VERSAL A T T R AC T I O N
had devised and (in 1669) even presented to the Academic Royale
des Sciences a rather elaborate theory of terrestrial gravity in which
he replaced the Cartesian vortex by an ensemble of circular motions
of small particles turning around the earth on spherical surfaces in
all possible directions, voiced his misgivings. He wrote to Fatio de
Dullier (11 July 1687): I have nothing against his not being a Car
tesian, provided he does not give us suppositions like that of attrac
tion.^
But the persual of the Principia seems to have overwhelmed him.
Thus, on 14 December 1688, he makes a note:
sun. Thus, in his Penseesprivies (1686), he wrote: Planets swim in

matter. For, if they did not, what would prevent the planets from
fleeing, what would move them? Kepler wants, but wrongly, that it
should be the sun,^ and in 1688 he still wrote:
The famous M. Newton has brushed aside all the difficulties [concern
ing the Keplerian laws] together with the Cartesian vortices; he has shown
that the planets are retained in their orbits by their gravitation toward
the Sun. And that the excentrics necessarily become elliptical.
It may seem rather strange to see Huygens trying to replace by a

set of smaller vortices the huge Cartesian vortices that Newton had
destroyed and swept from the skies. Yet what could he do ? He could
no more admit Newtonian attraction than Keplerian attraction; thus
he had to retain the vortices that prevented the planets from moving
away from the sun. As for gravity, he felt that his own theory could
still hold its own, especially if he proved it somewhat by extending
as far as the moon the sphere of motion of his weight-producing par
ticles. He even felt that he could and should oppose his theory of
gravity to Newtons. Thus, in 1689, during his visit to London, where
he met Newton and was received by the Royal Society, he gave a
lecture on the cause of gravity. We do not know exactly what he
said in his lecture; but we cannot doubt that its contents were not
different from those of his Discourse on the Cause o f Gravity of 1690,
which comprises a somewhat corrected version of his Discourse of
1669 plus a discussion of the shape of the earth written, as he tells
us, some years later, plus Additions in which, having read the
very learned work of M. Newton, he discusses some of Newtons
conceptions, among them universal gravity or attraction, understood
as a direct, or at least nonmechanical, action of one body upon
another. About this he says in a letter to Leibniz of 18 November
1690:
This means that Newton had achieved something that Huygens,

having discovered the law of centrifugal force, could have done . . .
but did not: (1) from his inverse-square law of universal gravitation
he was able to demonstrate the ellipticity of the planetary orbits
about which Huygens, being unable to reconstruct them by purely
mechanical means (that is, by means of circular motions) had doubts;
and (2) he decided this law of universal gravitation by extending the
Keplerian attraction between the earth and the moon to the whole
solar system (something that Huygens, who did not admit such an
attraction, did not and could not do), and he determined the cen
tripetal force that retained the planets in their orbits by means of
the theorem about centrifugal force (which Huygens established be
fore Newton, but failed to apply to celestial motions). Huygens paid
a tremendous price for his fidelity to the Cartesian rationalism a
outrance.
It must have been hard for Huygens to recognize, and to admit,
that he missed the great discovery. Yet he did so with good grace, as
we shall see in a moment. But he did not become converted to New
tonian views; nor did he abandon his firm convictions concerning
the necessity of a mechanical explanation of gravity and the impos
sibility of dispensing with some kind of vortices: without them plan
ets would not remain in their orbits, but would run away from the
^ Oeuvres completes (The Hague: Martinus Nijhoff, 1888-1950), IX, 190.
Ibid., XXI, 143.
In the Additions to the Discours de la cause de la pesanteur that he published in
1690 as an appendix to his Traits de la lumiire (Leiden, 1690), Oeuvres completes,
XXI, 443 sq.
116
Vortices destroyed by Newton. Vortices of spherical motion in their

place.
To rectify the idea of vortices.
Vortices necessary; [without them] the earth would run away from the
sun; but very distant the one from the other, and not, like those of M.
Des Cartes, touching each other.
Concerning the Cause of the flux given by M. Newton, I am by no

means satisfied [by it], nor by all the other Theories that he builds upon
his Principle of Attraction, which to me seems absurd, as I have already
mentioned in the addition to the Discourse on Gravity. And I have often
wondered how he could have given himself all the trouble of making such a
* Oeuvres completes, XXI, 366.
^ Varia astronomica, ibid., XXI, 437-439.
Ibid., IX, 333, n. 1; XXI, 435, n. 31, 443, n. 34, 466.
117
H UY GE NS AND L E I BN I Z ON U NI VE RSAL A TT R A C T I O N
number of investigations and difficult calculations that have no other

foundation than this very principle.^
which is called gravity, their motion is naturally straight or circular; the

first one pertaining to them when they move without hindrance, the other
when they are retained around some center, or when they turn on this very
center. We know sufficiently the nature of straight motion and the laws that
bodies, when they meet, observe in the communication of their motions.
But as long as one considers only this kind of motion and the reflections
that are produced by it among the parts of matter, one does not find any
thing that [would] determine them to tend toward a center. We have, thus,
necessarily to turn to the properties of circular motion and to see whether
there are some that could serve us.
I know that M. Des Cartes has also endeavored in his Physics to explain
gravity by the motion of a certain matter that turns around the Earth;
and it is a great merit to have been the first to have that idea. But we shall
see by the remarks that I shall make in the sequel to this Discourse, that his
manner is different from the one that I shall propose, and also in what
respect it seems to me to be defective.^
As a matter of fact, Huygens, a polite and well-mannered gentle

man, does not tell the readers of his Discourse on the Cause o f
Gravity that he considers Newtonian attraction an absurdity. He
only informs them (a) that he does not accept it because such an
attraction would be unexplainable by mechanical means, (b) that it
seems to him superfluous for the explanation of gravity, and (c) that he
has nothing against the Newtonian vis centripeta, provided, of course,
that he can explain it away and that he need not admit gravity as an
inherent quality of bodies, which is something, he adds, that Newton
himself certainly does not admit. Thus he writes;
I do not agree with a Principle according to which all the small parts
that we can imagine in two or several different bodies mutually attract each
other or tend to approach each other.
That is something I would not be able to admit because I believe that I
see clearly that the cause of such an attraction is not explainable by any
of the principles of Mechanics, or of the rules of motion. Nor am I con
vinced of the necessity of the mutual attraction of whole bodies, since I
have shown that, even if there were no Earth, bodies would not cease to
tend toward a center by that which we call gravity.
Yet, what is it that we call gravity? Or even: what is gravity?

For Huygens, who, in this respect, is a good Cartesian, gravity is
not, of course, as it is for the Aristotelians, a constitutive property
of some bodies (the heavy ones), as levity is a property of some
others (the light ones); nor is gravity, as for Archimedes and his
sixteenth- and seventeenth-century followers, an essential property of
all bodies; nor is it, as for Copernicus and possibly even for Gali
leo, the expression of an inner tendency of homogeneous parts to
reunite and build up a whole; nor is it, as for Kepler and Roberval,
the effect of the mutual attraction of these parts and the whole.
Instead, gravity is for Huygens, as for Descartes, the effect of an
extraneous action: bodies are heavy because, and insofar as, they
are pressed and pushed toward the earth by some other bodies more precisely by a whirlwind of subtle or liquid matter that, with
immense speeds, turns around the earth. Thus:
If we look at bodies simply, without [taking into account] that quality
Ôeuvres completes, XXI, 538; C. J. Gerhardt, ed., Leibnizens philosophische
Schriften (Berlin, 1882), Abt. I, Bd. II, p. 57.
* Huygens, Discours sur le cause de la pesanteur, p. 159; Oeuvres completes, XXI,
471.
118
Having reminded the reader of the properties of centrifugal force,

Huygens continues:
The effort to move away from the center is, thus, a constant effect of
circular motion and though this effect seems to be directly opposed to that
of gravity, and though it was accordingly objected to Copernicus that by
the rotation of the Earth in 24 hours houses and men would be thrown in
the air, I will show nonetheless that the same effort which bodies turning
round are making in order to move away from the center, is the cause
that other bodies concur toward that same center.
In order to explain, or better to show, this rather paradoxical

effect, Huygens reminds us of an experiment that he had made
especially for that purpose, which is worthy of being noticed as it
makes accessible to the eye an image of gravity. In this experiment,
which he performed in 1668 and which became very famous - Rohault describes it in his System o f Natural Philosophy^ - Huygens
took a cylindrical vessel 8 or 10 inches in diameter, put it on a
turntable so that it could be rotated around its axis, filled it with
water, to which he added pieces of Spanish wax, and closed it in
the top by a glass plate. When he started to turn it, he noticed that the
pieces of Spanish w ax-a substance heavier than water - received the
circular motion more quickly and easily than the water and moved
toward the sides of the vessel. Yet if he turned the vessel long
* Discours (Leiden, 1690), p. 135; Oeuvres completes, XXI, 455; see Discours of
1669, Oeuvres completes, XIX, 634.
* Discours, p. 131; Oeuvres completes, XXI, 452.
* Physica, pars II, cap. XXVIII, sec. 8, p. 326; Rohault's System o f Natural Philo
sophy, trans. John Clarke (London, 1723), II, 94.
119
HUY GE NS AND L EI BN I Z ON UNI VERSAL A TT R A C T I O N
enough, so that the water fully participated in the circular (rotational)

motion of the vessel, and then suddenly stopped it, he observed that
surfaces around the center of this space which becomes, so to say, the cen
ter of the Earth. ^
This being admitted, Huygens goes o n :

Instantly all the Spanish wax flew in a heap toward the center [and that]
represented to me the effect of gravity. And the reason of it was that water,
the rest (immobility) of the vessel notwithstanding, continued its circular
motion, whereas the Spanish wax had lost it, or nearly so, because it
touched the bottom of the vessel that was stopped. I noticed also that this
powder, in going to the center, followed spiral lines because water dragged
it somewhat along.
But [Rohault did not describe this phase of the experiment] if, in that
vessel, we place a body in such a manner that it should not at all be able
to follow the [circular] movement of the water but only move toward the
center, it will then be pushed directly there. Thus if L is a small ball that
can freely roll on the bottom between the threads AA, BB and a third one,
placed somewhat higher, KK, stretched horizontally through the middle of
the vessel, we shall see that when the motion of the vessel is stopped, this
ball will at once move toward the center D.^
Having thus presented to us a case where centrifugal force produces

centripetal motion - in fact an excellent model of a Cartesian vortex
- Huygens uses the same dynamical scheme for the explanation of
gravity, improving it, however, in order to avoid the difficulties im
plied in Descartes conception. Indeed, Cartesian vortices, (a) just
like the water in the Huygens vessel, turn around the axis, wherefore
the centripetal motion resulting from their rotation is also directed
toward an axis, and not toward a center, as is the case with gravity,
and, (b) since all matter constituting them moves in one direction
- once more like water in the vessel - drag along bodies immersed
in them and make such bodies describe spirals and not straight lines.
Huygens postulates, therefore, that the particles of the vortex
turn not in the same direction and in parallel planes, but in all direc
tions and in all planes that pass through the center of the earth:
I shall suppose that in the spherical space which comprises the Earth and
the bodies that are around it up to a very great distance, there is a fluid
matter that consists of very small particles and that is diversely agitated
in all directions, with a very great speed. I say that the motion of this
matter, being unable to leave this space, which is surrounded by other
bodies, must become partially circular around the center; not in such a
manner however that its particles should turn all in the same way, but in
the manner that most of its movements should be made on spherical
It is not difficult to explain how, by this motion, gravity is produced.

For, if among the fluid matter that turns in space as we have supposed
there happen to be parts that are much bigger than those that compose the
fluid matter, or else bodies made up of bundles of small particles linked
together, and [if] these bodies do not follow the rapid motion of the said
[fluid] matter, they will necessarily be pushed toward the center of the
movement, and will form there the terrestrial globe, if we suppose that the
Earth should not yet be [in existence]. And the reason is the same as that
which, in the above-mentioned experiment, makes the Spanish wax con
gregate at the center of the vessel. Thus it is in this [effect] that, probably,
the gravity of bodies consists, and we can say that it [that is, gravity] is
the effort that the fluid matter makes to move away from the center and to
push into its place bodies that do not follow its movement. Now the reason
why heavy bodies that we see descending in the air do not follow the spheri
cal movement of the fluid matter is rather clear; for, as there is motion
toward all sides, the impulses that a body receives from them follow each
other so quickly that it [is acted upon during] less time than it would need
in order to acquire a sensible movement. ^
Having thus solved the problem of gravity to his own satisfaction,

Huygens proceeds to the determination of the speed with which the
fluid matter should move around the earth in order to overcome the
centrifugal force of the earths rotation and to give to falling bodies
the acceleration that they actually have. The result of these calcu
lations is rather striking: the fluid matter has to move 17 times more
quickly than a point on the equator. I know, admits Huygens,
that this speed may seem strange to those who would want to compare
it with the motions that are seen here among us. But this should not make
any difficulty; and even in respect to the sphere, or to the dimensions of
the Earth, it will not appear extraordinary. For if, for instance, looking at a
terrestrial globe from outside, we imagine on this globe a point which
advances only one degree in 14 seconds, or pulse-strokes, we will find this
motion very moderate, and it could even seem slow.
Having thus discovered the causa gravitatis to be motion, and not

the mechanically unexplainable force of attraction, Huygens con
cludes:
Thus I have nothing against the Vis Centripetal as M. Newton calls it,
by which he makes planets gravitate toward the Sun and the Moon toward
*Discours, p. 135; Oeuvres completes, p. 455.
Ibid., p. 143; p. 460.
^ Huygens, Discours, p. 133; Oeuvres completes, XXI, 453.
120
121
" Ibid., p.
137; p. 456.
HUY GE NS AND L E I BN I Z ON UNI VERSAL ATT R AC T I O N
the Earth, but am in agreement [with him] without [feeling] any difficulty:
because not only is it known by experience that there is in nature such a
manner of attraction or impulsion, but also that it is explainable by the
laws of motion as one has seen in what I have written supra concerning
gravity. Indeed, nothing prohibits that the cause of this Vis Centripeta
toward the Sun be similar to that which makes the bodies that we call heavy
descend toward the Earth. It was long ago that it was imagined that the
spherical figure of the Sun could be produced by the same [cause] that,
according to me, produced the sphericity of the Earth; but I had not ex
tended the action of gravity to such great distances as those between the
Sun and the Planets, or between the Moon and the Earth; this because the
vortices of M. Descartes which formerly seemed to me rather likely, and
that I still had in mind, crossed them. I did not think, either, about this
regular diminishing of gravity, namely, that it was in reciprocal proportion
to the squares of the distances from the centers: which is a new and re
markable property of gravity, which it is, indeed, worth while to investigate.
But seeing now by the demonstrations of M. Newton that, supposing such
a gravity toward the Sun, and that it diminishes according to the said pro
portion, it counterbalances so well the centrifugal forces of the planets and
produces precisely the effect of the elliptical motion that Kepler had
guessed and proved by observation, I cannot doubt the truth either of
these hypotheses concerning gravity or of the System of M. Newton, in
so far as it is based upon i t . . .
It would be different, of course, if one should suppose that gravity is a
quality inherent in corporeal matter. But that is something which I do not
believe that M. Newton would admit because such a hypothesis would
remove us far away from Mathematical or Mechanical Principles.^
provide a mechanical basis for gravitational action. Accordingly

he concluded his criticism of Newton by saying:
There was, moreover, something else in Newtons conception of

the world that Huygens could not accept, namely, the perfect, or
nearly perfect, vacuity of the celestial spaces. Not that Huygens
wanted them to be full: as we know, he did not accept the Cartesian
identification of extension and matter, and he had no objection
(metaphysical) against a void; nay, being an atomist, he had to
postulate its existence. But, to use traditional terms, he accepted
only the vacuum interspersum, or disseminatum, and not the vacuum
separatum. This for a very good reason: he believed - in opposition
to Newton - that light was constituted not of particles, but of waves
or the pulses of particles, and as he did not believe - also in opposition
to Newton - in the existence of a luminiferous aether distinct from
matter, he had to conclude that a perfect vacuum, or even a vacuum
not quite perfect but nearly perfect like Newtons, would not trans
mit light. And, of course, such a rare medium would not be able to
' Discours, pp. 160, 162; Oeuvres competes, pp. 472, 474.
122
There is only this difficulty, that M. Newton, rejecting the vortices of

Descartes, wants the celestial spaces to contain [nothing] but a very rare
matter in order that the Planets and the Comets encounter a minimum of
resistance in their course. Which rareness being posited, it seems not pos
sible to explain the action of Gravity, or that of Light, at least by the ways
which I used. In order to examine this point, I say, that the aethereal
matter can be considered rare in two manners, namely that its particles
are distant one from the other leaving a large void between them; or that
they touch each other, but that their tissue is rare and interspersed with a
great number of small void spaces. Concerning the void, I admit it without
difficulty and even believe it to be necessary for the motion of the little
corpuscles among themselves, as I am not of the opinion of M. Des Cartes,
who wants extension alone to constitute the essence of body; I add to it
[extension] also the perfect hardness that makes it impenetrable and un
able to be broken or dented. However, if one considered rareness in the
first manner, I do not see how one could account for gravity; and, con
cerning light, it seems to me utterly impossible, admitting such voids, to
explain its prodigious velocity which, according to the demonstration of
M. Roemer which I have reported in the Traite de lumiere, must be six
hundred thousand times greater than that of Sound. That is [the reason]
why I hold that such a rareness cannot be suitable for celestial spaces.^
Thus Huygens. He never changed his mind, and never accepted
Newtonian attraction. He also - wisely - never made a serious at
tempt to revive the medieval conception of celestial orbs by substi
tuting for the huge sun vortex of Descartes a series of separate plane
tary vortices: his Cosmotheoros of 1698 is just as vague about them
as his notes of 1688:
I think that every Sun [that is, every star] is surrounded by a certain
vortex of matter in quick movement, but that these vortices are very dif
ferent from the Cartesian vortices as well in respect to the space that they
occupy as in respect to the manner in which their matter is moving.*
Huygens then reminds us that it is gravity which retains the planets
in their orbits, as Alphonse Borelli and especially Isaac Newton have
shown, and continues:
Now according to our opinion about the nature of gravity by which the
planets tend toward the Sun by their own weight, it is necessary that the
vortex of the celestial matter turn around it not in one direction only, but
in such a manner that it moves in different, very quick, movements, in all
' Discours, p. 161; Oeuvres completes, p. 473.
Huygens, Cosmotheoros (The Hague, 1698); Oeuvres complites, XXI, 819-821.
123
H UYGE NS AND L EI BN I Z ON U NI VE RSAL A T T R AC T I O N
possible directions . . . It is by a vortex of this kind that we have endeav

oured, in our Discourse, to explain the gravity of bodies toward the Earth
and all its effects. For the nature of the gravity of planets toward the Sun
is the same according to our opinion.
the Acta eruditorum and another that was found among Leibnizs
papers (published by Gerhardt as the second version).^ The se
cond version is very similar to the published one, but it contains a
rather important addition dealing with the nature and structure of
gravity. As this addition was obviously written by Leibniz some time
after the publication of his paper in the Acta, I shall deal with the
two versions in the same order, that is, first with the published
version, and only thereafter with the additions. It must be mentioned
also that for his published paper Leibniz projected, and even wrote,
an introductory preface intended to show the authorities of the Cath
olic Church that, if they recognized, as they should, that motion was
a relative concept, they would also recognize that the systems of
Copernicus, Tycho Brahe, and Ptolemy were equivalent, and that
therefore the condemnation of Copernicus was meaningless and
should be lifted. He did not, however, publish it: he learned from
his Catholic friends that it was better for him to keep quiet.
The Tentamen is based on Keplerian astronomy, which Leibniz
considers to be true in all its descriptive laws of celestial motion; it
can be interpreted as an investigation of the possibility of their
validity in a world full of matter, that is, a world where motion, in
general, encounters resistance, and where, therefore, planets would
also encounter resistance (a possibility that Kepler has never consi
dered) unless either - this is the Leibnizian solution - this matter itself
moves with the planets or, conversely, the planets move together
with the matter that surrounds them. In other words, the Tentamen
is an investigation of planetary motion in which the planets are thought
to be transported through the skies by fluid orbs in the midst of
which they remain at rest, the orbs and the planets all the while
obeying in their motion the fundamental - Keplerian - law, which
Leibniz calls harmonic. Accordingly, Leibniz starts with over
whelming praise of Kepler, to whom, in order to belittle Descartes
and not to acknowledge his indebtedness to him, he even ascribes
discoveries that he did not make (for instance, that the planetary
motions engender centrifugal forces) and whom he presents as the true
author of the vortex conception that Descartes had stolen from him.
Thus Leibniz writes:
Another difference between Huygenss and Descartess theories

consists in the dimensions attributed to vortices: As I have said,
I make the spaces occupied by these vortices much smaller than he
does and separate them by vast distances wherefore they do not in
terfere one with the other.
Curiously enough, it was Leibniz who, in his Tentamen de motuum
coelestium causis,^ did what Huygens failed to do. And it is rather
significant that Huygens did not approve. The Tentamen does not
take issue with the Newtonian conceptions. Leibniz tells us, more
over, that when he wrote it he was in Rome and had not read - or
even seen - Newtons Principia, having learned about it only from
the review published in 1688 in the Acta eruditorum(sQQinfra,Tp. 133).
In the Illustratio tentaminis de motuum coelestium causis,^ defending
himself against D. Gregory, who expressed his astonishment at the
publication of the Tentamen two years after Newtons Principia,
Leibniz repeats (quoting Sec. 20 of the Tentamen) that he did not read
the Principia but only the report of it in the Acta: But this report
incited me to publish my thoughts, not seen nor heard by others, and
till then not published. Leibniz adds that the difference between his
approach and derivation of the inverse-square law and Newtons,
and the interconnection of the propositions of the Tentamen, are a
sufficient proof of his having had these thoughts before having read
the report in the Acta.
We have no reason to doubt Leibnizs assertion, all the more
so as the study of the Principia would have prevented him from
making the glaring mistakes about celestial motions and their causes
that we find in his paper. And yet the Tentamen is certainly an at
tempt made by Leibniz - doubtless prompted by the appearance of
the above-mentioned review - to oppose Newtons celestial mecha
nics with a sketch of his own, and to try to save the plenum against
Newtons onslaught.
The Tentamen exists in two versions: the one that was printed in
* Acta eruditorum (1689); see C. J. Gerhardt, ed., Leibnizens mathematische Schriften
(Halle, 1860), VI, 144 sq., 161 sq.
* Mathematische Schriften, VI, 255.
Astronomiae physicae et geometricae elementa (London, 1702), lib. I, prop.
LXXVII, p. 99.
124
Kepler has found that each primary planet describes an elliptical orbit
* Mathematische Schriften, VI, 161 sq.
* L. Prenant, Sur les r6ferences de Leibniz contre Descartes, Archives Interna
tionales d'Histoire des Sciences 13 (1960), 95.
125
HUY GE NS AND L E I BN I Z ON UNI VERSAL A TT R AC T I ON
in one of the foci of which is the sun, their motion being [performed accord
ing] to the law that by the radii drawn toward the sun are always deter
mined areas proportional to times. He also discovered that the periodic
times of the several planets of the same system are in a sesquialteral pro
portion to the mean distances to the sun; he would, indeed, be exceedingly
triumphant if he knew that (as stated by the illustrious Cassini) even the
satellites of Jupiter and Saturn observe, in respect to their primary planet,
the same laws as these in respect to the sun. But he could not assign the
causes of these so numerous and so constant truths, either because he had
a mind hampered by [the belief in] intelligences and sympathetic radiations,
or because in his time geometry and the science of motion were inferior to
what they are now.
Yet it is to him that we owe the first disclosure of the true cause of gravity,
and of the law of nature, on which gravity depends, namely that bodies
moving circularly [around a center] tend to recede from this center by the
tangent; thus, if a stalk or a straw swim in water, and if by the rotation of
the vessel [this water] is moved in a vortex, the water being more dense
than the stalks and being therefore driven out from the center more strongly
than the stalks, then forces will push the stalks toward the center, as he has
himself clearly explained in two and more places in his Epitome of the
Astronomy.^
made ample use though, according to his habit, he hid their author. And
I have often wondered that, as far as we know, Descartes has never
attempted to give the reasons of the celestial laws discovered by Kepler,
be it that he could not sufficiently reconcile them with his own principles,
or that he ignored the fruitfulness of the discovery, and did not believe
it to be so faithfully observed by nature.
Now, as it seems hardly to conform to physics and even unworthy of the
admirable workmanship of God to assign to the stars particular intelli
gences, as if God lacked the means to achieve the same [result] by corporeal
laws; and as the solid orbs have since been destroyed [Leibniz, once more,
uses Keplers expressions], whereas sympathies and magnetic and other
abstruse qualities of the same sort are either not understandable, or,
where they are understood, are judged to be effects of a corporeal impres
sion; I think that there remains nothing else but to admit that the celestial
motions are caused by the motions of the aether, or, to speak astronomi
cally, by [the motions of] the deferent orbs [which are, however, not solid]
but fluid.
This opinion is very old, though it has been neglected: for Leucippus
already before Epicurus expressed it, so that in forming the system [of the
world] he attributed to it the name of divrj (vortex) and we have seen how
Kepler vaguely represented [adumbravit] gravity by the motion of water
moved in a vortex. And from the itinerary of Monconys,^ M. de Mon
conys tells, indeed, that during his voiage XX in Italy he paid a visit to
Torricelli (November 1646, pp. 130 sq.) and that;
Le dit Torricelle mexpliqua aussi, comme les corps se toument
sur leur centre, come le [soleil] la terre et Jup. font toumer tout IEter,
qui les environne, mais plus viste les parties prochaines que les eloignees,
aussi que Iexperience le montre a une eau ou Ton tourne un baton dans le
centre, et le mesme en arrive aux pianettes, au respect d u # [soleil], et a la })
[lune], au respect de la terre; aux Medicees au respect de Jup. et me dit
aussi que Galilei a observe que la tache de la Lune quon nomme Mare
Caspium est par fois plus proche de la circonference, et quelquefois plus
eloignee, qui fait reconnoistre quelque petit mouvement de trepidation en
son corps.
We learn that it was also the opinion of Toricelli (and, as I suspect, even
of Galileo of whom he was a disciple) that the aether, together with the
planets turned aroimd the sun, moved by the motion of the sun around its
center, as water [is moved] by a stick rotated around its axis in the middle of
a quiescent vessel; and just like straw or stalks swimming in water, the
stars [planets] nearer to the center turn around more quickly. But these more
general [considerations] come rather easily to mind. Our intention, how
ever, is to explain the laws of nature more clearly . . . And as in this matter
we have gained some light and as the investigation seems to proceed easily
As a matter of fact Kepler, as I have already mentioned, never

admitted that planets tend to recede by the tangent from their cir
cular orbits; and if in the Astwnomia nova^ he had actually pre
sented the exemplum of a vortex, he used this vortex not for counter
acting the centrifugal force by a centripetal force produced by this
vortex, but in order to explain (on the pattern of a ferry moving
forward and back across a river) the periodic variations of the dis
tances (access and recess) of the planets from the sun. Moreover, in
the Epitome astronomiae Copernicanae^ he did not reassert a vortex
but on the contrary rejected it and replaced it by the theory of mag
netic attraction and repulsion of the planets by the sun.^ It is diffi
cult to tell whether Leibniz was aware of all this or not. In any case
he continues, stating that Kepler
remained somewhat in doubt about [his vortex conception], ignorant of
his own riches [Leibniz applies to Kepler what Kepler said about Coper
nicus], and insufficiently conscious how many things follow therefrom both
in Physics and, especially, in Astronomy. But of these Descartes has later
* Mathematische Schriften, VI, 148 sq., 162 sq.
* Cap. XXXVIII; see Kepler, Opera omnia,ed. Frisch (Frankfurt, 1858-1891), III,
313 sq.; Gesammelte Werke, ed. M. Caspar (Munich, 1938-1959), III, 254 sq.
* Opera omnia, VI, 345 sq.; Gesammelte Werke, VII, 300 sq.
* See A. Koyre, La Revolution astronomique (Paris: Hermann, 1961), part III,
Kepler et Iastronomie nouvelle, chap. 1.
126
* Journal des voyages de Monsieur de Monconys, conseiller du roy en ses conseils

d estat et privi, et lieutenant criminel au sUge presidial de Lyon, public par le Sieur de
Liergves son Fils (Lyon: Chez Horace Boissat et George Remeurs, 1665), Premiere
Partie, Voyage de Portugal, Provence, Holie, figypte, Syrie, Constantinople et
Natolie.
127
HUYGE NS AND L EI BN I Z ON UNI VERSAL A TT R AC T I O N
and naturally, and with success, I do hope that we have approached [the
knowledge of] the true causes of celestial motions,
around the center decrease in the same proportion in which the distances
from the center increase, or, in short, if the velocities of circulation in
crease in proportion to the nearness [to the center]. Thus, indeed, if the
radii or distances increase uniformly or in arithmetical proportion, the
velocities will decrease in a harmonic progression. In this way the har
monic circulation can take place not only in the arcs of a circle, but also in
all kinds of curves described [by one body]. Let us posit that the moved
Leibniz then says:

First of all it can be demonstrated that, according to the laws of nature,
all bodies which, in a fluid, describe a curved line, are carried along by the
motion o f this fluid. For indeed all [bodies] describing a curve tend to re
cede from it by the tangent (because of the nature of motion); there must
therefore be something that forces [them not to do it]. But there is nothing
contiguous but the fluid (by hypothesis), and no conatus is restrained un
less by (something) contiguous and moving (because of the nature of body);
it is therefore necessary that the fluid itself be in motion . . .
It follows therefrom that planets are moved by their aether, that is to
say, that they have deferent or moving fluid orbs. For it is generally ad
mitted that they describe curved lines, and it is not possible to explain the
phenomena by supposing only rectilinear motions. Accordingly (by what
precedes) they are moved by the ambient fluid. The same thing can be
demonstrated from the fact that the motion of a planet is not uniform, that
is, it describes equal spaces in equal times. Wherefrom it follows that they
must be moved by the motion of the ambient.^
Thus far we are on purely Cartesian or Huygenian ground: a
planet is swimming in an aethereal vortex, or orb, and is carried
along by it. This motion, however, is somewhat different from that
of Cartesian or Huygenian vortices: it is a harmonic motion.
Yet what is a harmonic motion or circulation ? As a matter
of fact, it is the motion, or circulation, in which, according to Kepler
(who, by the way, does not call it harmonic), planets are actually
moving around the sun; that is, as Kepler erroneously deduced from
the area law of planetary motion,^ the planets move in such a way
that their speeds are always inversely proportional to their distances
from the sun. Leibniz, however, who did not recognize the error
committed by Kepler, does not tell us anything about the astrono
mical origin of his concept (nor that it is Keplerian); quite the
contrary, he gives an abstract definition of the harmonic cifculation, wherefrom, triumphantly (but also erroneously), he deduces
Keplers second law (historically, the first), that is, the law of
areas. Thus he writes:
[body] M moves in a certain curve M M Mi (or Mi M M ) and in equal

elements of time describes the elements M M , Mg Mi, of the curve
[Fig. 2]; [this motion] can be understood as composed of circular motion
around some center, e.g., [the sun] (such as M T , M Ti) and a
rectilinear [one] such as T M , Ti Mi (assuming T to be equal to
M , and Ti equal to
M ); which motion can furthermore be under
stood from one assumption that a rule or an indefinite rigid straight [line]
0 C [passing through the planet] moves around the center and at the
same time the mobile moves on this straight [line] C [toward ].^
3
I call a circulation harmonic, if the velocities of the circulation of a cer

tain body are reciprocally proportional to the radii or distances from the
center of circulation; or (what is the same) if the velocities of circulation
^ Mathematiscke Schriften, VI, 149, 166.

* Koyr6, La Rivolution astronomique.
128
^ Mathematiscke Schriften, VI, 150 sq., 167 sq. Fig. taken from E. J. K\Xon, Annals
o f Science 16 (1960), 69.
129
Acx:ording to Leibniz, the harmonic character of the curvilinear

circulation is not affected by the fact
orbs of inconsiderable thickness, the circulation of each of them would be

proportionally much quicker as each [of them] is nearer to the sun.^
that the motion by which [the mobile] approaches the center or recedes
from it, is rectilinear (I call it paracentric motion), as long as the circulation
of the mobile M, such as M T , is [in the same proportion] to another cir
culation of the same mobile, M Ti, as Mi is to
M ; that is, as long
as the circulations performed in the same elements of time are reciprocally
as the radii. For, as these arcs of the elementary circulations are in the
composite ratios of the times and velocities, and as the elementary times
are assumed to be equal, the circulations will be as the velocities, and thus
the velocities inversely as the radii; therefore the circulation will be a
harmonic one. . . .
If the mobile moves in a harmonic circulation (whatever the paracentric
motion), the areas swept out by the radii drawn from the center of the
circulation to the mobile will be proportional to the assumed times and
vice versa.
Leibniz is right, of course: if we assume that planets move in the

aether and that their motion is not hampered by this aether, we have
to assume that this aether moves in exactly the same way as the
planets. But why should the aether move in this particular manner?
Leibniz does not raise this rather natural question. Moreover, his
aether, formed into fluid planetary orbs, not only accompanies the
planets in their motion, but also determines i t :
Alas, it is not so. Retracing backward Keplers analysis of the

planetary motions - the only new elements in Leibnizs presentation
are the terms harmonic and paracentric which he gives to
motions that Kepler called
t o (and Newton, centripetes) - Leibniz
commits the same error as Kepler: as a matter of fact, harmonic
circulation, elliptic orbits, and the area law are incompatible and
planets do not move on their orbits with speeds inversely propor
tional to their distances from the sun. Leibniz, fortunately or unfor
tunately, did not notice this (Newton did, however; Hooke did not,
nor did Wren or Halley); he concludes therefore:
It follows herefrom that the planets move in a harmonic circulation, the
primary around the sun, the satellites around their primaries as centers.
For the radii drawn from the center of circulation describe areas propor
tional to times (according to observation).^
Having established the fact, we have to explain it. Why do planets
move in this way ? According to Leibniz, they do so because they are
carried along by a harmonically circulating aether:
It is therefore necessary that the aether, or the fluid orb of each planet
should move in a harmonic circulation; for it has been shown supra that no
body [can] by itself move in a fluid in a curved line; there will therefore be a
circulation in the aether, and it conforms to reason to believe that it will be
in agreement with the circulation of the planet, and that the circulation of
the aether of each planet will also be harmonic; so that if the fluid orb of
the planet were divided by thought into innumerable circular concentric
Mathematische Schriften, VI, 151, 168.
130
We posit thus that the planet moves in a double or composite motion

[resulting] from the harmonic circulation o f its deferent fluid orb and the
paracentric motion, as [is produced] by a certain gravity or attraction, that
is, by impulse towards the sun, or the primary planet. Indeed the circulation
of the aether makes the planet circulate harmonically, and not its own
motion, by which it is only quasi quietly swimming in the deferent fluid, the
motion of which it follows; wherefore it does not retain the quicker im
petus of circulation which it had in an orb inferior or nearer [to the sun]
when it is transported to a superior [orb] (which resists a velocity greater
than its own), but it accommodates itself insensibly to the orb to which it
accedes, continuously abandoning the quicker impetus for a feebler one.
Vice versa, when it [the planet] tends from a superior to an inferior [orb],
it takes its impetus.
The paracentric motion, at first glance, seems superfluous: do
not the planets swim quietly in the fluid orbs that carry them along
in a harmonic motion ? By no means: they only quasi do so, and with
out this paracentric ^waji-attractive or ^wflî-gravitational motion
they would run away along the tangent; Leibniz therefore continues:
The harmonic circulation having been explained, we must consider
the paracentric motion of the planets, which originates from the extruding
[excussorius] impression of the circulation [centrifugal force] and the solar
attraction combined together. We may call it attraction, though in truth it
should be impulse; indeed the sun can, with some reason, be regarded as a
magnet; however, its magnetic actions derive, doubtless, from the impulses
of fluids. Therefore we shall call it also Solicitation of Gravity, considering
the planet as a heavy body tending towards the center, that is, the sun.
But the shape of the orb depends on a special law of attraction. Let us see
therefore which law of attraction produces the elliptic line.^
Once more Leibniz is right: different laws of attraction determine
different orbits. And yet one is somewhat astonished to see him use
terms and concepts that one would expect him to avoid, or even
* Mathematische Schriften, VI, 152, 169.
131
reject. One is, moreover, somewhat puzzled: it is, indeed, not quite
clear whether the law of attraction determines the form of the fluid
orb and thus the orbit of the planet, or, on the contrary, whether it
determines the orbit of the planet to which the fluid orb must be
adapted. Or does this law of attraction only express the particular
structure of the fluid orbs? Yet, be this as it may, it is obvious that
Leibniz - though, after all, Newton did the same thing - wants to use
the concept of attraction without committing himself to admit it as
a real, physical force. Thus:
it is perpetually solicited to descend towards the sun by a certain new

impression four times more strongly, and [being] three times nearer, nine
times more strongly. This is obvious because of what precedes, namely,
because the planet has been posited as describing an ellipse, as circulating
harmonically, and furthermore as being continuously impelled towards the
sun.^
As every moving body tends (conatur) to recede by the tangent from the
curved line that it describes, we can well call this conatus ^'excussorius
[extruding], as in the motion of the sling, in which there is required an
equal force which compels the moving body not to run away. We can re
present this conatus by the perpendicular to the next point of the tangent, in
sensibly distant from the preceding point. And as the line is circular, the
famous Huygens, who was the first to deal with it geometrically, called
it centrifugal [force].^
Indeed, the infinitesimal curve from a point on the tangent to the
next point can be considered as circular, and therefore Huygenss
law of centrifugal force can be used for determining the conatus in
question. Leibniz deduces therefrom that: The centrifugal or ex
truding conatus of the circulation can be expressed by the sinus versus
of the angle of the circulation, ^ that is, of the angle formed by the
radii drawn from the center to the moving body.
Thence, using the methods of the infinitesimal calculus and mak
ing some rather heavy blunders - such as The centrifugal conatus
of a body in harmonic circulation is in the inverse cube proportion
of the radii - he can finally assert:
I f a mobile that has gravity, or is drawn toward a certain center, as is the
case of the planets in respect to the sun, moves in an ellipse (or in another
section of the cone) in a harmonic circulation, and if the focus of the ellipse
is the center of the circulation as well as of the attraction, the attractions or
solicitations of gravity will be directly as the squares of the circulations, or as
the squares of the radii or distances from the center reciprocally.^
In other words:
The same planet is differently attracted by the sun, and namely in the
duplicate ratio of its nearness, so that [being] twice nearer [to the sun]
^ Mathematische Schriften, VI, 152, 169.
Ibid., 156, 176.
132
* Ibid., 153, 170.
As we see, the inverse-square law of attraction (about the modus

producendi of which, however, we learn nothing) is deduced by Leib
niz from Keplers first law, and not from the third law, as was done
by Newton (and also by Hooke, Wren, and Halley). Moreover, it is
deduced despite the erroneous assumption that the motion of the
planets is a harmonic one - a truly marvelous achievement which can only be compared with Keplers own: two errors cancel
out.
There can, therefore, be no doubt about Leibnizs originality,
though we have to admit - as he does himself - that he knew that
the inverse-square proportion^ had already been recognized also by
the very famous Isaac Newton, since this was mentioned in the re
view in the Acta eruditorum, and we must suspect that, though
therefrom [he] could not find out how he [Newton] arrived at it,
it was this review that not only prompted his writing of the Tentamen
but also incited him to borrow from Newton the concept of attraction
which Newton himself so successfully used. Alas, in doing so he
committed a number of rather appalling errors, as we have seen. Yet
as they can only be explained by the haste with which he composed
his Tentamen, I shall not deal with them here, all the more so as some
of them were corrected by him in 1706 and all of them were enumer
ated by Newton in his (unpublished) review of Leibnizs Tentamen,
written sometime in 1712.
Let us now turn our attention to the second version of the Ten
tamen. As I have mentioned, its text is practically identical with that
of the first one; it contains, however, an important addition about the
concepts of gravity and attraction that Leibniz inserted between the
passage in which he expressed his hope of having advanced toward
the true explanation of the celestial motions and the passage which
contains the exposition of his theory.*
* Mathematische Schriften, VI, 157, 181.
* Ibid., 157, 181; letter to Huygens, 13 October 1690, ibid., 189; Huygens, Oeuvres
computes, IX, 522 sq.
See J. Edleston, Correspondence o f Sir Isaac Newton and Professor Cotes (London,
1850), App. XXXII, pp. 308 sq.
* Mathematische Schriften, VI, 163-166.
133
HUY GE NS AND L EI BNI Z ON UNI VERSAL ATT R AC T I O N
From the considerations of the famous Gilbert it is clear that every larger
body of the world insofar as it is known to us, has the nature of a magnet,
and that, besides the directing power (vis directiva) [in virtue of which]
it looks at certain poles, it has a force of attracting the parent [similar]
bodies [placed] inside its sphere [of force], which [force] in things terres
trial we call gravity, and which, by a certain analogy, we attribute to the
stars. But it is not sufficiently clear, what is the true cause of this very obvi
ous phenomenon, and whether this cause is the same as in the magnet.
is to be explained by the device of Kepler, it must not be deduced from the

motion of the aether along the equator and the parallels which would drive
[bodies] toward the axis of the earth, but, as I remember having observed
already long ago, [from motions] along great circles having the same center
as that of the globe, analogous to the motions that appear in the atmo
sphere of the magnet... In this way the diverse causes... coincide one with
the other . . . in our explanation [of gravity] and we have at the same time
the spherical radiation, the attraction of the magnet, the driving away of
the perturbing [matter], the internal motion of the fluid, the circulation of
the atmosphere, [all of them] conspiring [in the production] of the centri
fugal [centripetal] force. Yet whatever the cause of gravity it is sufficient
for us [to admit] that the attracting globe pushes out material rays analog
ous to the rays of light or emits lines of impulses receding in all directions
from the center; not, however, [in such a way] that it should be necessary
for parts of the earth to reach the heavy body, but that, matter impelling
matter, the impetus be propagated, as in light and sound and moved liquids.
Leibniz admits that this problem cannot yet receive a demon

strative solution; he thinks, however, that he can formulate a prob
able one.
In any case it can be asserted that attraction is produced by a certain
corporeal radiation; indeed, immaterial [causes] must not be used for the
explanation of corporeal phenomena. Furthermore; it conforms to reason
that there is in the globe a conatus to drive out [from itself] the incon
venient or perturbing matter, or [matter] not sufficiently apt to perform
freely its motions in the [interior] place assigned to it [in the globe];
wherefrom [it results] that other [matter] is attracted by circumpulsion,
matter agreeing with the inner motion of the attracting body or having a
motion of a kind that disturbs it less. An example of this is the flame, which
to the sense perception itself shows the expulsion of the one and the attrac
tion of the other.
Yet we can pursue this example further and conceive a fluid
globe swimming in the aether as a drop of oil does in water. (A rather
amusing example: where did Leibniz see a drop of oil swimming
in water?) Now
it is in the nature of a fluid to have various internal motions, which, where
they are restrained by the ambient [medium] so that the matter does not fly
away, turn back, are transformed into circular motions, and strive to de
scribe great circles, for in this way they retain most of their conatus to
recede. By this [conatus] those bodies in which less of this fluid is included,
or in which there is a lesser conatus to recede, are pushed down.
Thus far, Leibnizs explanation of gravity follows the lines of the
Cartesian vortex conception, in which centripetal forces are deduced
from centrifugal ones, the outward pressure of the driven-out mat
ter pushing back in its place other matter which thereby is driven or
drawn in toward the attracting body or its center. Leibniz, how
ever, improves the explanation, and in exactly the same way Huygens
did, substituting for the circular motion around the axis a multi
tude of such motions around the center of the globe:
But if the centrifugal [an obvious error : it should be centripetal] force
134
These rays of impulse originate in the centrifugal forces devel

oped in the innumerable vortices of aetherial matter that turns with
great speed around the center of the attracting body, both inside
and outside of it, which forces exert a pressure on the surrounding
medium. Leibniz warns us, however, that this pressure, or impulse,
is propagated in time, and not in an instant, as had been erroneously
assumed (by Descartes): no sensible effect can be propagated in an
instant - in any case, not in the world of Leibniz, who denies the
existence of absolutely hard bodies and who knows, moreover, that
the propagation of light is not instantaneous.
But let us go back to the, so to say, magnetic rays, by which attraction
is produced. They consist in the recessive conatus of a certain insensible
fluid, the parts of which are most closely pressed together, although the
fluid itself is divisible in a most subtle way; when porous bodies, such as
terrestrial bodies, which contain less matter tending to recede from the
center than does an equal volume of the insensible fluid and thus are en
dowed with less levity, are introduced into the sensible fluid, it follows with
necessity that, the emitted fluid prevailing, the terrestrial [bodies] are
pushed down towards the center.
It is interesting to note that Leibniz defines heavy bodies as those
that have less levity, in opposition to the prevailing conception
that sees in light bodies those that have less gravity. But he is per
fectly right: it is centrifugal motion and centrifugal pressure, that is,
motion and pressure upward, that are to be considered as primary
factors; motion downward, or toward the center, is only a
secondary effect of motions and pressure upward.
135
HUY GE NS AND L EI BN I Z ON UNI VERSAL A T T R AC T I O N
The causa gravitatis seems thus to be determined with sufficient

probability (though, to tell the truth, with by no means sufficient
clarity). Leibniz, however, is not satisfied and, in order to explain
different specific gravities of terrestrial bodies, he deems it necessary
to postulate a second, and much more subtle, fluid, a fluid that can
penetrate pores of solid bodies too small to admit the particles of the
gravitational fluid. But he does not insist upon this and continues;
possible that the thing is already brought so far that an understanding poet
will not dare any longer to tell astronomers that they are searching in vain.^
But, caeteris paribus^ the specific gravity being the same, the solicitation
to tend towards the center will nonetheless be greater or less, according to
the quantity of radiation [received by the body] which is to be estimated
as in the case of light. Indeed, as was demonstrated some time ago by
learned men [as a matter of fact, by Kepler], just as bodies are illuminated
in the inverse square ratio of their distances from the source of light, so
also must attracted bodies gravitate so much less as the square of the dis
tance from the attracting one is greater. The reason of both is the same
and is obvious. [Indeed, both spread uniformly in space, and therefore]
illuminations and solicitations of gravity are reciprocally as the squares of
distances from the radiating or the attracting center.^
Thus far we have proceeded a priori, and it is by pure reasoning
that the inverse-square law of gravitation has been determined. But
that is not enough, and Leibniz announces that the same law will
be established by him a posteriori, that is, deduced by the analytical
calculus from the common phenomena of the planets (that is, from
their elliptical orbits), thus producing a marvelous consensus of rea
son and observations and an extraordinary confirmation of truth.
No doubt. Yet - and this is rather astonishing and utterly unexpected
- Leibniz concludes this (second) preface to the Tentamen by a hyperpositivistic pronouncement that leaves diose of Newton far behind:
What follows [that is, the Tentamen] is not based on hypotheses, but
is deduced from phenomena by the laws of motion; whether there is an
attraction of the planets by the sun, or not, it is sufficient for us to be able
to determine [their] access and recess, that is, the increase or decrease of
their distance [from the sun] which they would have if they were attracted
according to the prescribed law. And whether in truth they do circulate
around the sun, or do not circulate, it is enough that they change their
positions in respect to the sun as if they moved in a harmonic circulation;
we obtain therefrom the Principles of Understanding, wonderfully simple
and fertile, such as I do not know whether of yore men ever dared even to
hope for.
But what herefrom must be concluded about the very causes of the
motions we leave to be estimated by the wisdom of each one; indeed it is
^ Mathematische Schriften, VI, 165.
136
I have mentioned already that Huygens did not like the Leibnizian
orb-vortices . . . which is rather natural: he felt that his own were
sufficient, and that Leibniz, as a matter of fact, had been inspired by
them. Thus, making himself advocatus diaboli and willfully misunder
standing Leibniz as accepting fully the Newtonian attraction, and
disregarding Leibnizs contention that attraction could be explained
mechanically - indeed, Huygens could think that compared to him
Leibniz did not even attempt to give a mechanical explanation (but did
not Newton himself tell his readers that attraction could be pres
sure or impulse?) - he tells Leibniz that his endeavor to reconcile
Newton and Descartes by using both attraction and harmonic circu
lation is perfectly redundant, the latter being completely superfluous:
I see that you [and M. Newton] have met in what concerns the natural
cause of the elliptic trajectories of the planets; but as in dealing with this
matter you have seen only an extract of his book and not the book itself,
I would very much like to know whether you did not change your theory
since, because you introduce into it the vortices of M. Descartes [not a
very nice remark] which to my mind are superfluous if one admits the
system of M. Newton in which the movement of the planets is explained
by the gravity towards the sun and the vis centrifuga that counterbalance
each other.
Huygenss objection (he will repeat it in another letter to Leibniz of
II August 1693) seems rather pertinent (the editors of Huygenss
Oeuvres completes even believe that it convinced, or at least impressed,
Leibniz himself).^
As a matter of fact, neither for Leibniz nor even for Huygens him
self is the objection as impressive as it seems at first glance, because
it implies the acceptance not only of the Newtonian attraction, but
also of the Newtonian vacuum, which neither of them has ever ad
mitted. Indeed, it is only in empty spaces, that is, in spaces where
bodies move without encountering any resistance, that planets sub
jected to Newtons laws would be able to move in elliptical orbits;
in spaces full of matter (Leibniz), or even only half full (Huygens),
they would not be able to move even in circles; they would all be
^ Mathematicshe Schriften, VI, 166.
^ See Huygens to Leibniz, 8 February 1690, ibid., II, 41; Huygens, Oeuvres com
pletes, IX, 367 sq.
* Mathematische Schriften, II, 187; Huygens, Oeuvres completes, X, 267 sq.
* Oeuvres completes, IX, 368, n. 10.
137
drawn into the sun. Huygens neglects this problem, Leibniz, however,
is fully aware of it. Thus in a desperate endeavor to save the plenum
he makes an attempt to eliminate the resistance of the surrounding
medium. Now, the only way to do this is to endow the medium with
the same movement as that of the body in question. In this case, as
Descartes has already explained, the body will be at rest in the mov
ing medium, it will be carried along by or freely swim in it. Thus
Leibniz is perfectly right in maintaining that his harmonic circu
lation is not superfluous but absolutely necessary,^ because he be
lieves (wrongly, alas) that a body which moves in such a way moves
as if it were moved in the void by its simple impetuosity [inertial
motion] joined to gravity. And the same body is also moved in the
aether as if it swam quietly in it without having its own impetuosity
. . . and did only obey in an absolute manner the aether that sur
rounds it. As for the paracentric motion, that is, the motion
toward the center, it is true that Leibniz does not explain it; but
Huygens himself gives such an explanation only for terrestrial grav
ity, not for cosmic attraction or gravitation.
The result of Leibnizs attempt is to reconcile vortices with attrac
tion, that is, Descartes with Newton; making the Cartesian vortex
move in a harmonic circulation is, of course, not successful and
Huygens is right in pointing out that, in this case, planets would not
observe Keplers third law. To attempt to save the situation by the
postulation - as in the case of gravity - of a second subtle matter is,
as Leibniz suggests, to indulge in hypotheses of a kind that Huy
gens does not even condescend to discuss. And yet, we cannot blame
Leibniz for not succeeding in doing something that could not be
done. And, in any case, it was not Huygens who could reproach
him for not doing it.^
^ Letter to Huygens, 13 October 1690, Mathematische Schriften, VI, 189; Huygens,
Oeuvres completes, IX, 525.
* On the discussion between Huygens and Leibniz, see F. Rosenberger, Isaac Newton
und seinephysikalischen Principien (Leipzig, 1895), pp. 235 sq.; and R. Dugas, Histoire
de la micanique au XVIN siicle (Paris: Dunod, 1954), esp. pp. 491 sq.
A P P E N D IX B
Attraction an Occult Quality?

As a matter of fact, it was Leibniz who, in spite - or because - of his
own use of - or play with - the concept of attraction in his Tentamen
de motuum coelestium causis of 1689,^ stressed the analogy between
Newtonian attraction and an occult quality and reinforced his ana
logy by asserting attraction to be a miracle. He did this, however,
rather late. At first, in 1690,^ he only expressed his astonishment that
Newton seemed to consider gravity a certain incorporeal and inex
plicable virtue and did not beheve in the possibility of explaining it
mechanically - had not Huygens done it very well? But in 1690 Leib
niz did not speak about occult qualities, or about miracles. As a
matter of fact, it was Huygens whom he reproached for introducing
miracles into natural philosophy: is not the indivisibihty of atoms,
which Huygens believed in, a perpetual miracle? It is only in 1703,
in his Nouveaux essais (which, however, he did not publish because
of Lockes death: he did not want to attack a dead adversary) that
he mentions occult qualities and miracles. Thus, referring to
Lockes letter to Stillingfleet, Leibniz writes:
He cites the example of the attraction of matter [p. 99, but especially
p. 408], where he speaks of the gravitation of matter towards matter attri
buted to M. Newton . .. confessing that one would never be able to con
ceive its how. This is, in effect, to return to occult qualities, and even,
which is worse, to inexplicable ones.^
Having explained that God does not attribute to things proper
ties that are not compatible with their essence, but only those that
are natural to them and that can be understood (except in the case
of a miracle), Leibniz goes on:
^ C. J. Gerhardt, ed., Leibnizens mathematische Schriften (Halle, 1860), VI, 144 sq.,
161 sq.
* Letter to Huygens, October 1690, in Huygens, Oeuvres completes (The Hague:
M. Nijhoff, 1901), IX, 521.
See Mr. Locke's Reply to the Right Reverend Lord Bishop o f Worcester, Answer
to his Second Letter . . . (London, 1699), infra, p. 155, n. 1.
* Erdmann, ed., Nouveaux essais sur Vintendement humain, Avant propos (Berlin,
1840), 202 sq. Also, C. J. Gerhardt, ed.. Die philosophischen Schriften von G. W.
Leibniz (Berlin, 1875-1890), V, 58 sq.
138
139
A TT R A C T I O N AN O C C U L T Q U A L I T Y ?
Thus we can assert that matter will not naturally have [the faculty of]
attraction, mentioned above, and will not move by itself in a curved line
because it is not possible to conceive how this could take place there, that
is, to explain it mechanically; whereas that which is natural must be able
to become distinctly conceivable . . . This distinction between what is
natural, and what is unexplainable and miraculous, solves all the difficul
ties. By rejecting it one would maintain something worse than occult
qualities; one would renounce Philosophy and Reason, opening an asylum
for ignorance and laziness by a dead system which admits not only that
there are qualities which we do not understand - of which there are only
too many - but also that there are such [qualities] which the greatest mind,
even if God gave him every possible opening, could not understand, that is,
they would be either miraculous or without rhyme or reason; and it would
also be without rhyme or reason that God should work miracles; thus this
lazy hypothesis would destroy equally our philosophy which seeks reasons
and divine wisdom which furnishes them.^
and that it is easy to make fictions, but difficult to make them

reasonable ; Hartsoeker, however,^ does not agree that atoms are
unreasonable, and adds that if one were to call them miraculous one
could, not without reason, maintain that everything is a perpetual
miracle.
Answering this letter,^ Leibniz re-expressed his astonishment at
Hartsoekers inability to understand his conception of conspiring
motions, renewed his attack on atoms, the existence of which he
reasserted to be unreasonable, and demanded an explanation; he
then goes o n :
If you allege only the will of God for it, you have recourse to a miracle,
and even to a perpetual miracle; for the will of God works through a
miracle whenever we are not able to account for that will and its effects
from the nature of the objects. For example, if any one should say, it is
Gods will that a planet should move round in its orb without any other
Cause of its Motion, I maintain that it would be a perpetual miracle: for
by the nature of things, the planet going round tends to move from its orb
along the tangent, if nothing hinders it; and God must continually pre
vent it, if no natural cause does . . .
It may be said in a very good sense, that everything is a continued miracle
that is, worthy of admiration: but it seems to me that the example of a
planet, which goes round, and preserves its motion in its orb without any
other help but that of God, being compared with a planet kept in its orb
by the matter which constantly drives it towards the sun, plainly shows what
difference there is between natural and rational miracles, and those that
are properly so called, or supernatural; or rather between a reasonable
explication, and a fiction invented to support an ill-grounded opinion.
Such is the method of those who say, after M. de Robervals Aristarchus,
that all bodies attract one another by a law of nature, which God made
in the beginning of things. For alleging nothing else to obtain such an
effect, and admitting nothing that was made by God, whereby it may
appear how he attains to that end, they have recourse to a miracle, that is,
to a supernatural thing, which continues for ever, when the question is to
find out a natural cause . . .
Thus the ancients and the moderns, who own that gravity is an occult
quality, are in the right, if they mean by it that there is a certain mechanism
unknown to them, whereby all bodies tend towards the center of the earth.
But if they mean, that the thing is performed without any mechanism, by
a simple primitive quality, or by a law of God, who produces that effect
without using any intelligible means, it is an unreasonable occult quality,
and so very occult, that tis impossible it should ever be clear, tho an
Angel, or God himself, should undertake to explain it.^
It is only in 1711, in a letter to N. Hartsoeker,^ that he does this.

As a matter of fact, the three letters published in the Memoires de
Trevoux and the Memoirs o f Literature are only part of the corres
pondence between Leibniz and Hartsoeker. This correspondence
started in 1706 and became active in 1710 after the publication by
Hartsoeker of his Eclaircissements sur les conjectures physiques (Am
sterdam, 1710). In one of the letters that precede the published one
(of 1711) Leibniz tells Hartsoeker that he does not admit the existence
of atoms, which Hartsoeker asserts; Hartsoeker^ nastily replies by
associating the conspiring motions of Leibniz with the small
vortices of the very Reverend Father Malebranche ; Leibniz then
states that to assume the existence of atoms, that is, the original
and primordial indivisibility of certain parts of matter, is to have
recourse to a miracle or an occult quality; Hartsoeker answers that
the conspiring motions of his opponent are a much greater, and
even a perpetual, miracle, and that there is no reason why God could
not have created atoms. Once more Leibniz explains that God
cannot create natural atoms, or indivisible bodies as it would be
absurd, that atoms are effects of the weakness of our imagination,
^ Nouveaux essais, pp. 203 sq.
* 6 February 1711, published first in the Memoires deTrdvoux (1711), and then in an
English translation, in the Memoirs o f Literature of 1712; see Die philosophischen
Schriften, III, 516 sq., letter XI.
^ Ibid., p. 497, letter V.
Ibid., p. 498, letter VI, 8 July 1710.
Ibid., p. 306, letter VII.
Ibid., pp. 501 sq., letter VIII.
Ibid., pp. 506 sq., letter IX, 30 October 1710.
140
^ Die philosophischen Schriften, III, p. 514, letter X, 10 December 1710.

^ Ibid., pp. 516 sq., letter XI, 6 February 1711, the first of the letters published in the
Memoires de Trivoux.
Ibid., pp. 517 sq.
141
A TT R A C T I O N AN O C C U L T Q U A L I T Y ?
I have mentioned already that it was this letter, to which Cotes

drew Newtons attention, that motivated Newtons statements in the
Scholium Generale which he instructed Cotes to insert in the second
edition of the Principia (see Appendix C). Cotes did, of course, but,
in addition, he lumped together Cartesians and Leibniz, and ans
wered them in his preface by an impassioned counterblast:
subtile fluid, and following its motion, cant choose but describe the same
figure. But the fluid moves in parabolic curves, and therefore the stone must
move in a parabola, of course. Would not the acuteness of this philosopher
be thought very extraordinary, who could deduce the appearances of
Nature from mechanical causes, matter and motion, so clearly that the
meanest man may understand it? Or indeed should not we smile to see
this new Galileo taking so many mathematical pains to introduce occult
qualities into philosophy, from whence they have been so happily excluded ?
But I am ashamed to dwell so long upon trifles.^
Some I know. . . mutter something about occult qualities. They continu

ally are cavilling with us, that gravity is an occult property, and occult
causes are to be quite banished from philosophy. But to this the answer is
easy: that those are indeed occult causes whose existence is occult, and
imagined, but not proved; but not those whose real existence is clearly
demonstrated by observations. Therefore gravity can by no means be
called an occult cause of the celestial motions, because it is plain from the
phenomena that such a power does really exist. Those rather have recourse
to occult causes who set imaginary vortices of matter entirely fictitious and
imperceptible by our senses to direct those motions . . . Some there are
who say that gravity is praeternatural and call it a perpetual miracle.
Therefore they would have it rejected, because praeternatural causes have
no place in physics. It is hardly worthwhile to spend time in answering this
ridiculous objection which overturns all philosophy. For either they will
deny gravity to be in bodies, which cannot be said, or else they will therefore
call it praeternatural because it is not produced by the other properties of
bodies and therefore not by mechanical causes. But certainly there are
primary properties of bodies; and because they are primary, they have no
dependence on the others. Let them consider that all these are in like
manner praeternatural, and in like manner to be rejected. And then what
kind of philosophy are we like to have?^
Moreover, having already in his letter to Bentley of 10 March
1712/13 offered to attack Leibniz for his want of candour exem
plified in his Tentamen de motuum coelestium causis. Cotes added,
not naming Leibniz, of course, a parody of Leibnizs harmonic
circulation :
Galileo has shown that when a stone projected moves in a parabola, its
deflection into that curve from its rectilinear path is occasioned by the
gravity of the stone towards the earth, that is, by an occult quality. But now
somebody, more cunning than he, may come to explain the cause after this
manner. He will suppose a certain subtile matter, not discernible by our
sight, our touch, or any other of our senses, which fills the spaces which
are near and contiguous to the surface of the earth, and that this matter is
carried with different directions, and various, and often contrary, motions,
describing parabolic curves. Then see how easily he may account for the
deflection of the stone spoken of above. The stone, says he, floats in this
Principia, Motte-Cajori, p. xxvi.
142
And since Hartsoeker also had rejected void and attraction, though
in a manner different from that of Leibniz - he filled space with an
immaterial, living, and even intelligent fluid - and had been guilty
of criticizing Newton in his tclaircissements sur les conjectures phy
siques (Amsterdam, 1710), Cotes wrote a paragraph about Hart
soeker:
Allowing men to indulge in their own fancies, suppose any man should
affirm that the planets and comets are surrounded with atmospheres like
our earth, which hypothesis seems more reasonable than that of vortices;
let him then affirm that these atmospheres by their own nature move about
the sun and describe conic sections, which motion is much more easily
conceived than that of the vortices penetrating one another; lastly, that the
planets and comets are carried about the sun by these atmospheres of
theirs: and then applaud his own sagacity in discovering the causes of the
celestial motions. He that rejects this fable must also reject the other; for
two drops of water are not more alike than this hypothesis of atmospheres,
and that of vortices.*
It is rather tempting to compare the angry diatribe of Cotes with
the rather mild and serene answer of Newton in the General Scho
lium. Yet, as a matter of fact, Newtons first reaction to Leibnizs
attack was neither mild nor serene. He was deeply angered by it,
especially by Leibnizs association of his attraction with that of Roberval, which was the same as to call it romantic, and he started to
write a reply to be published in the Memoirs o f Literature, though,
on second thought, he did not send it to them; he also wrote a bitter
criticism of the Tentamen de motuum coelestium causis, and of some
other works of Leibniz concerning physics; but did not publish them
either.^
J. Edleston, Correspondence o f Sir Isaac Newton and Professor Cotes (London,
1850), p. 149.
Principia, Motte-Cajori, p. xix.
* See supra, p. 59, n. 2.
* See I. B. Cohen and A. Koyre, Newton and the Leibniz-Clarke Correspondence,
Archives Internationales d'Histoire des Sciences IS (1962), 63-126; and for the criticism
of the Tentamen, Edleston, Correspondence, pp. 308 sq.
143
A T T R A C T I O N AN O CC U L T Q U A L I T Y ?
In 1715 (Novembei or December), in a letter to the Abbe Conti,

Leibniz renewed his attack:
Leibnizs death (14 November 1716) did not put an end to the
polemics; Newton, indeed, continued them. Thus, in the second Eng
lish edition of his Opticks, he added to the text of Query XXIII
(which became Query XXXI), which I have quoted,^ after by rest,
that is, . . . by nothing, the words . . . and others that they stick
together by conspiring motions, that is by relative rest among them
selves ;and to that which states that the active principles of nature
are not occult qualities but general laws of nature, he added the
following explanation:
His philosophy appears to me rather strange and I cannot believe it can

be justified. If every body is heavy, it follows (whatever his supporters may
say, and however passionately they deny it) that Gravity will be a scholastic
occult quality or else the effect of a miracle . . . It is not sufficient to say:
God has made such a law of Nature, therefore the thing is natural. It is
necessary that the law should be capable of being fulfilled by the nature of
created things. If, for example, God were to give to a free body the law of
revolving around a certain center, he would have either to join to it other
bodies which by their impulsion would make it always stay in a circular
orbit, or to put an Angel at its heels; or else he would have to concur ex
traordinarily in its motion. For naturally it would go off along a tangent
. . . I am strongly in favour of experimental philosophy, but M. Newton is
departing very for from it when he claims that all matter is heavy (or
that every part of matter attracts every other part) which is certainly not
proved by experiment. . . And because we do not yet know in detail how
gravity is produced, or elastic force, or magnetic force, this does not give us
any right to make of them scholastic occult qualities or miracles; but it
gives us still less right to put bounds to the wisdom or power of God.^
The Abbe Conti having communicated this letter to him, Newton
answered:
As for philosophy, he colludes in the signification of words, calling those
things miracles which create no wonder, and those things occult qualities
whose causes are occult, though the qualities themselves be manifest.^
Nearly at the same time, the problem of attraction, that is, the
question whether it is an occult quality and a miracle, or a respectable
force and law of nature, formed one of the main topics of the famous
polemics between Leibniz and Clarke, together with the problem
of the reality or impossibility of void space, absolute motion, and
other problems of metaphysics and natural philosophy.^
^ Raphson, Historia fluxionum (London, 1715 [actually 1717]); and Des Maiseaux,
Recueil de diverses pieces sur la philosophie, la religion naturelle, Vhistoire, les mathematiques, etc., par Mss Leibniz, Clarke, Newton et autres auteurs celibres (Amsterdam,
1720), vol. II.
* 26 February 1716; see Des Maiseaux, Recueil, II, 22.
A Collection o f Papers which passed between the late learned M. Leibniz and Dr.
Clarke in the years 1715 and 1716 relating to the Principles o f Natural Philosophy and
Religion (London, 1717), republished in 1720 as vol. I of Des Maiseaux, Recueil', today
available in English in the excellent edition of H. G. Alexander, The Leibniz-Clarke
Correspondence (Manchester: Manchester University Press, 1956), and in the original
in the critical edition of A. Robinet, Correspondance Leibniz-Clarke, pr6sent6e
d aprfes les MS originaux des bibliothfeques de Hannovre et de Londres (Paris: Presses
Universitaires de France, 1957).
* On this correspondence see A. Koyre, From the Closed World to the Infinite
Universe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1956), and A. Koyr6 and I. B. Cohen, The
Case of the Missing Tanquam," Isis 52 (1961), 555-566.
144
For these are manifest qualities and their causes only are occult. And the
Aristotelians gave the name of occult qualities, not to manifest qualities,
but to such qualities only as they supposed to lie hid in bodies, and to be
the unknown causes of manifest effects: such as would be the causes of
gravity, and of magnetick and electrick attractions, and of fermentations,
if we should suppose that these forces or actions arose from Qualities un
known to us, and uncapable of being discovered and made manifest. Such
occult qualities put a stop to the improvement of natural philosophy, and
therefore of late years have been rejected.^
Finally, at the end of the review of the Commercium epistolicum
that he published anonymously in the Philosophical Transactions
(which review - recensio - translated into Latin was published as a
preface to the second edition of the Commercium, in 1722), Newton
settled his account with Leibniz:
The Philosophy which Mr. Newton in his Principles and Optiques has
pursued is Experimental; and it is not the Business of Experimental Philos
ophy to teach the Causes of things any further than they can be proved
by Experiments. We are not to fill this Philosophy with Opinions which
cannot be proved by Phaenomena. In this Philosophy Hypotheses have
no place, unless as Conjectures or Questions proposed to be examined by
Experiments. For this Reason Mr. Newton in his Optiques distinguished
those things which were made certain by Experiments from those things
which remained uncertain, and which he therefore proposed in the End
of his Optiques in the Form of Queries. For this Reason, in the Preface to
his Principles, when he had mentiond the Motions of the Planets, Comets,
Moon and Sea as deduced in this Book from Gravity, he added: Utinam
caetera Naturae Phaenomena ex Principiis Mechanicis eodem argumentandi genere derivare liceret. Nam multa me movent ut nonnihil suspicer ea
omnia ex viribus quibusdam pendere posse, quibus corporum particulae per
causas nondum cognitas vel in se mutuo impelluntur et secundum regulares
figuras cohaerent, vel ab invicem fugantur et recedunt: quibus viribus
ignotis Philosophi hactenus Naturam frustra tentarunt. And in the End of
* See supra, p. 56, n2.
* See supra, p. 56, n2.
Optice, p. 335; Opticks (1952), p. 364. * Optice, p. 344; Opticks i\952), p. 401.
145
A TT R A C T I O N AN O C C UL T Q U A L I T Y ?
this Book in the second Edition, he said that for want of a sufficient Num
ber of Experiments, he forbore to describe the Laws of the Actions of the
Spirit or Agent by which this Attraction is performed. And for the same
Reason he is silent about the Cause of Gravity, there occurring no Experi
ments or Phaenomena by which he might prove what was the Cause there
of. And this he hath abundantly declared in his Principles, near the Be
ginning thereof, in these Words: Virium causas et sedes Physicas iam non
expendo. And a little after: Voces Attractionis, Impulsus, vel Propensionis
cuiuscunque in centrum indifferenter et pro se mutuo promiscue usurpo, has
Vires non Physice sed Mathematice tantum considerando. Unde caveat Lec
tor ne per huiusmodi voces cogitet me speciem vel modum actionis, causamve
aut rationem physicam alicubi definire, vel Centris {quae sunt puncta Mathematica) vires vere et physice tribuere, si forte aut Centra trahere aut vires
Centrorum esse dixero. And in the End of his Opticks: Qua causa efficiente
hae attractiones [sc. gravitas, visque magnetica & electrica] peragantur, hie
non inquiro. Quam ego Attractionem appello, fieri sane potest ut ea ejficiatur
impulsu vel alio aliquo modo nobis incognito. Hanc vocem Attractionis ita
hie accipi velim ut in universum solummodo vim aliquam significare intelligatur qua corpora ad se mutuo tendant, cuicunque demum causae attribuenda
sit ilia vis. Nam ex Phaenomenis Naturae illud nos prius edoctos esse oportet
quaenam corpora se invicem attrahant, et quaenam sint leges et proprietates
istius attractionis, quam in id inquirere par sitquanam ejficiente causa peragatur attractio. And a little after he mentions the same Attractions as Forces
which by Phaenomena appear to have a Being in Nature, tho their Causes
be not yet known; and distinguishes them from occult Qualities which are
supposed to flow from the Specifick Forms of things. And in the Scholium
at the End of his Principles, after he had mentioned the Properties of
Gravity, he added: Rationem vero harum Gravitatis proprietatum ex Phae
nomenis nondum potui deducere, et Hypotheses non fingo. Quicquid enim ex
Phaenomenis non deducitur Hypothesis vocanda est; et Hypotheses seu
Metaphysicae seu Physicae, seu Qualitatum occultarum, seu Mechanicae,
in Philosophia experimentali locum non habent.----- Satis est quod Gravitas
revera existet et agat secundum leges a nobis expositas, et ad Corporum
coelestium et Maris nostri motus omnes sufficiat. And after all this, one
would wonder that Mr. Newton should be reflected upon for not explain
ing the Causes of Gravity and other Attractions by Hypotheses; as if it
were a Crime to content himself with Certainties and let Uncertainties
alone. And yet the Editors of the Acta Eruditorum^ (a) have told the
World that Mr. Newton denies that the cause of Gravity is Mechanical,
and that if the Spirit or Agent by which Electrical Attraction is performed,
be not the Ether or subtile Matter of Cartes, it is less valuable than an Hypo
thesis, and perhaps may be the Hylarchic Principle of Dr. Henry Moor:
and Mr. Leibnitz (b) hath accused him of making Gravity a natural or
essential Property of Bodies, and an occult Quality and Miracle. And by
this sort of Railery they are perswading the Germans that Mr. Newton
wants Judgment, and was not able to invent the Infinitesimal Method.
It must be allowed that these two Gentlemen differ very much in Philo
sophy. The one proceeds upon the Evidence arising from Experiments and
Phaenomena, and stops where such Evidence is wanting; the other is taken
up with Hypotheses, and propounds them, not to be examined by Experi
ments, but to be believed without Examination. The one for want of Ex
periments to decide the Question, doth not affirm whether the Cause of
Gravity be Mechanical or not Mechanical; the other that it is a perpetual
Miracle if it be not Mechanical. The one (by way of Enquiry) attributes
it to the Power of the Creator that the least Particles of Matter are hard:
the other attributes the Hardness of Matter to conspiring Motions, and
calls it a perpetual Miracle if the Cause of this Hardness be other than
Mechanical. The one doth not affirm that animal Motion in Man is purely
mechanical: the other teaches that it is purely mechanical, the Soul or
Mind (according to the Hypothesis of an Harmonia Praestabilitd) never
acting upon the Body so as to alter or influence its Motions. ITie one
teaches that God (the God in whom we live and move and have our Being)
is Omnipresent; but not as a Soul of the World: the other that he is
not the Soul of the World, but I n telligen tia Su pra m u n d a n a , an
Intelligence above the Bounds of the World; whence it seems to follow that
he cannot do any thing within the Bounds of the World, unless by an in
credible Miracle. The one teaches that Philosophers are to argue from
Phaenomena and Experiments in the Causes thereof, and thence to the
Causes of those Causes, and so on till we come to the first Cause: the other
that all the Actions of the first Cause are Miracles, and all the laws im
prest on Nature by the Will of God are perpetual Miracles and occult
Qualities, and therefore not to be considered in Philosophy. But must the
constant and universal Laws of Nature, if derived from the Power of God
or the Action of a Cause not yet known to us, be called Miracles and occult
Qualities, that is to say. Wonders and Absurdities? Must all the Arguments
for a God taken from the Phaenomena of Nature be exploded by new
hard Names! And must Experimental Philosophy be exploded as miracu
lous and absurd, because it asserts nothing more than can be proved by
Experiments, and we cannot yet prove by Experiments that all the
Phaenomena in Nature can be solved by meer Mechanical Causes? Cer
tainly these things deserve to be better considered.^
" March 1714, pp. 141-142.
' Pp. 55 sq.; Opera omnia, ed. Horsley, IV, 492 sq.
146
One would think that after this protracted discussion nothing

would remain of Leibnizs sly and mischievous accusations and that
everyone would be persuaded that Newtonian attraction was toto coelo
different from any occult quality of the scholastics. And yet, ten
years after the conclusion of the debate, Fontenelle was still not
convinced, and in the Elogium of Newton he says:
He declares very freely that he lays down this attraction, only as a cause
which he knows not, and whose effects he only considers, compares and
calculates; and in order to avoid the reproach of reviving the Occult
147
qualities of the Schoolmen, he says, that he establishes none but such

Qualities as are manifest and very visible by their phenomena, but that the
causes of these Qualities are indeed occult, and that he leaves it to other
Philosophers to search into them; but are they not properly causes which
the Schoolmen called occult Qualities; since their effects are plainly seen?
besides, could Sir Isaac think that others would find out these Occult
causes which he could not discover? with what hopes of success can any
other man search after them ?^
The Elogium o f Sir Isaac Newton (London, 1728), p. 21; reprinted in Isaac Newton's
Papers and Letters on Natural Philosophy, ed. I. Bernard Cohen (Cambridge, Massa
chusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958), p. 463.
A PPE N D IX C
Gravity an Essential Property o f Matter?

It is well known that Newton did not believe gravity to be an innate,
essential and inherent property of matter ; indeed, in 1675, in his
Hypothesis Explaining the Properties o f Light,^ and in 1679, in a let
ter to Boyle (28 February 1678/9),^ he attempted to explain gravity
by mechanical means - that is, by the motions of subtle matter or
an ethereal medium - but he did not pursue these hopeless attempts,
at least for some time; in 1692, in a letter to Bentley,^ he asked Bentley
not to ascribe to him that Epicurean notion; attraction as action at
a distance through vacuum without mediation, he told Bentley,^ was
an utter absurdity that nobody could believe in, stating moreover
rather clearly that this mediation had to be performed by something
which is not material, that is, by God.
Yet the Letters to Bentley were written about five years after the
publication of the Principia, and published only in 1756; thus they
could not enlighten readers of the Principia, who, especially those of
the first edition (London, 1687), could hardly fail to misunderstand
Newtons position and to ascribe to him just those opinions which
he so vehemently rejected in these letters. All the more so as Bentley,
in spite of Newtons admonition, said in his Confutation o f Atheism
that a constant Energy [is] infused into Matter by the Author of all
things and that Gravity may be essential to Matter. As for
Newton himself, he did not, in the Principia, express his own views
about the nature of gravitation, nor did he tell his readers that
action at a distance, without mediation, was an impossibility and
that bodies could not, in this sense, attract each other. He took, how* Thomas Birch, The History o f the Royal Society o f London (London, 1757), III,
250 sq.; I. B. Cohen, ed., Isaac Newton's Papers and Letters on Natural Philosophy
(Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958), pp. 180 sq.
2 Thomas Birch, The Works o f the Honourable Robert Boyle (London, 1744), I,
70 sq.; Cohen, Newton's Papers and Letters, pp. 250 sq.; Newton, Correspondence,
II, 288.
^ Four Letters from Sir Isaac Newton to Doctor Bentley (London, 1756), p. 20;
Cohen, Newton's Papers and Letters, p. 298.
Ibid., p. 25; p. 302.
Richard Bentley, A Confutation o f Atheism from the Origin and Frame o f the
World (London, 1693), part III, p. 11; Cohen, Newton's Papers and Letters, p. 363.
148
149
GRAVI TY AN ESSENTIAL P R O P E R TY OF M A T TE R ?
ever, great pains to explain that the forces of attraction and repulsion
dealt with in natural philosophy, forces by which bodies either ap
proach each other or, on the contrary, flee and recede from each
other, are not to be taken as causes of these phenomena of motion,
but as mathematical forces, the causes of which are yet unknown.
Thus in the Praefatio ad lectorem, having explained that common
mechanics takes its origin from the practical arts, he continues:
truly be called impulses [verius dicantur impulsusy^ He will do this

because he is dealing with mathematical problems and has therefore
to use a way of speaking more easily understood by mathematical
readers.
Rather interesting and strange this: verius dicantur impulsus.
Strange because, as a matter of fact, attraction and impulse are not
equivalent, at least not completely equivalent, as Huygens and Fontenelle did not fail to observe^ and as Newton himself hints in the
General Scholium added to the second edition of the Principia, where
he states that attraction or gravitation has properties that mechanical
forces do not possess;^ thus it is strange that he nonetheless consis
tently asserts their equivalence. Interesting because it reveals that
for Newton - just as for his mechanistic opponents - impulse is the
only acceptable mode of action for a physical force, and that he
himself is conscious of the danger implied in the use of the term
attraction. Yet the term impulse is no less dangerous if taken
in its literal sense: it suggests a real, physical, mechanism; it yields
too much to Cartesians. Newton, accordingly, explains that, like
attraction, impulse is not to be taken as implying a definite
physical meaning: both terms are to be understood in a purely mathe
matical way, that is, as being devoid of any reference to the modus
producendi of the effects ascribed to them, or else as being neutral
with respect to any such modus.
Thus, in the Scholium which concludes this same section, Newton
explains:
But I consider philosophy rather than arts . . . and consider chiefly

those things which relate to gravity, levity, elastic force, the resistance of
fluids, and the like forces, whether attractive or impulsive; and therefore
I offer this work as the mathematical principles of philosophy, for the
whole burden of philosophy seems to consist in thisfrom the phenomena
of motions to investigate the forces of nature, and then from these forces
to demonstrate other phenomena . . . for I am induced by many reasons
to suspect that they may all depend upon certain forces by which the par
ticles of bodies, by some causes hitherto unknown, are either mutually
impelled towards one another, and cohere in regular figures, or are re
pelled and recede from one another. These forces being unknown, philo
sophers have hitherto attempted the search of Nature in vain; but I hope
the principles here laid down will afford some light either to this or some
truer method of philosophy.
Later on he explains that all the expressions which he uses in
order to designate centripetal forces, or forces by which bodies
approach one another, are devoid of physical meaning and are to be
taken only as mathematical terms that can be substituted one for the
other:
I . . . use the words attraction, impulse, or propensity of any sort to
wards a center, promiscuously, and indifferently, one for another; con
sidering those forces not physically, but mathematically: wherefore the
reader is not to imagine that by those words I anywhere take upon me to
define the kind, or the manner of any action, the causes or the physical
reason thereof, or that I attribute forces, in a true and physical sense, to
certain centers (which are only mathematical points); when at any time I
happen to speak of centers as attracting, or as endued with attractive
powers.^
And in the introduction to Section XI of Book I, dealing with the
motion of spherical bodies which tend to each other by centripetal
forces, and which, therefore, revolve about a common center of
gravity, Newton says that he will consider the centripetal forces as
if they were attractions [tanquam attractiones] though perhaps, if we
used the language of physics [physice loquendo], they would more
Principia (1687), Definitio VIII, pp. 3-4; Motte-Cajori, pp. 5-6.
150
I here use the word attraction in general for any endeavor [conatu]
whatever, made by bodies to approach to each other, whether that en
deavor arise from the action of the bodies themselves, as tending [petentium]
to each other or agitating each other by spirits emitted; or whether it arises
from the action of the ether or of the air, or of any medium whatever,
whether corporeal or incorporeal, in any manner impelling bodies placed
therein towards each other. In the same general sense I use the word im
pulse, not defining in this treatise the species or physical qualities of forces,
but investigating the quantities and mathematical proportions of them;
as I observed [explicui] before in the Definitions.^
Newtons position seems thus to be perfectly clear: the forces he is
dealing with are mathematical forces; or else he is dealing with
them insofar and only insofar as they are subjected, or subjectable, to
* De motu corporum sphericorum viribus centripetis se mutuo petentium, p. 162,
p. 164.
* See supra, pp. 121-122 and 57-58.
See infra, p. 158.
Principia (1687), p. 191; Motte-Cajori, p. 192.
151
GRA VI TY AN ESSENTIAL P R OP E R TY OF M A T T E R ?
mathematical treatment. We do not care, or at least do not inquire,

what they are in themselves; our aim is not to speculate about their
true nature (or about the causes that produce them) but to investigate
the manner in which they are acting; or, to express it in a slightly mod
ernized way, to find out the how and not the why, to establish
the laws and not look for the causes.
It may seem rather surprising, in spite of these very decided and
definite declarations by Newton, which are not very different, more
over, from those that were made by him in connection with his optical
work and which the very contents of the Principia {Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematicd) - a book on rational mechanics and
mathematical astronomy - seemed fully to confirm, that his teaching
could be, and was, interpreted as positing action at a distance by an
attractive force residing in the bodies. This all the more so as the
positivistic indifference toward explanatory hypotheses, together with
the skeptical admission of the multiplicity of such possible explana
tions of the phenomena, was by no means a surprising and unheardof attitude; quite the contrary, it was rather widespread and was
adopted by such well-known figures as Boyle and Hooke.
As for gravity proper, it was long before, in 1636, that Galileo
proclaimed that we do not know what it is - we know only the name
- that all explanations of it given by philosophers are merely words,
and that it is not profitable to inquire into the nature of gravity: it
is sufficient to know that its action follows precise mathematical
laws,^ And John Wallis, in 1669, declared in his Mechanics that he
would not inquire about the cause of gravity; he would instead take
it simply as a force (whatever it might be) due to which bodies go
down:
with and even in preference to impulse could not but rehabilitate

this expression - and with it the conception - which had been so
radically rejected by the Cartesians; and the consistent parallelism of
attraction and impulse (in the texts I have quoted and in many others
that I have not, such as the Optical Section [XIV], of the First Book)
maintained by Newton, could not fail to produce the impression
that he was dealing in both cases with analogous physical forces,
even though he might disregard, or make an abstraction of, their
physical reality and consider only their mathematical aspect.
Moreover, Newtons example of mathematical force as dis
tinguished from physical force was by no means convincing. It is
certain that we cannot attribute forces to mathematical points, that
it is not the central point of a spherical body that attracts bodies
placed outside of it, and that two bodies which describe similar
orbits around their common center of gravity are not attracted by
their common center of gravity - though they behave as if they were
and as i f all the mass of each spherical body was concentrated in its
center.^ Yet is it not obvious that, if bodies do so behave, they do
so because the force that acts upon them, and which we well may call
mathematical, results from the by no means mathematical for
ces that we ascribe to the innumerable particles of the central spheri
cal body, or the revolving bodies themselves?
Finally, as Huygens had noticed, impulse or pressure is not
interchangeable with attraction : the former are not toward a
body, and can be directed as well or even better toward a void. And
even if they are directed toward a body they do not give rise to mutual
forces and - as Newton himself will recognize^ - they do not depend
on the mass of this body. Besides, the Newtonian justification of his
use of the term attraction is rather misleading ; as a matter of fact, it
is not a mathematical concept, and for the mathematical reader the
expression vis centripeta (formed on the pattern of Huygenss vis centrifuga and as homage to him) would be just as good, and even much
better. Indeed, in the first ten sections of Book I, where Newton dis
cusses the motion of bodies describing all sorts of curves, and especi
ally conic sections, he consistently uses the term vis centripeta.^
Gravitas est vis matrix, deorsum, sive ad Centrum Terrae. Quodnam sit,
in consideratione Physica Gravitatis Principium, non hie inquirimus. Neque
etiam, an qualitas did debeat, aut Corporis Affectio, aut quo alio nomine
censeri par sit. Sive enim ab innata qualitate in ipso gravi corpore; sive a
communi circumstantium vergentia ad centrum; sive ab electrica vel magnetica Terrae facultate quae gravia ad se alliciat (de quo non est ut hie moveamus litem:) suffidt ut Gravitatis nomine earn intelligamus, quam sensu deprehendimus. Vim deorsum movendi tarn ipsum corpus grave, tarn quae
obstant minus efficatia impedimenta.^
Yet the very fact that Newton used the term attraction along
^ Galileo, Dialogo II, in Opere, Edizione nazionale, ed. A. Favaro (Florence,
1897), VII, 260.
J. Wallis, Mechanica sive de motu tractatus geometricus (London, 1669), Def. XII,
p. 3; Opera mathematica (Oxford, 1695), I, p. 576.
152
^ Principia (1687), Book I, Sec. XII, pp. 192 sq. and 200 sq.; Motte-Cajori, pp. 193
sq. and 200 sq.
* See infra, p. 157.
For example, Principia (1687), Sec. Ill, Prop. XI, Prob. VI, p. 50, and Prop. XII,
Prob. VII, p. 51, where he determines the law for centripetal forces directed to one focus
for bodies moving on ellipses or hyperbolas; or Sec. VIII, p. 128, which deals with the
orbits of bodies acted upon by centripetal forces of any kind.
L
153
GRAVI TY AN ESSENTIAL P R OP E R TY OF M A T TE R ?
Moreover, in order to designate these centripetal forces by which

bodies tend {petunt) toward each other, Newton as often as not does
not use the term attractio alone, but uses it in connection with the
much more concrete Keplerian term tractio, giving tractio an active
meaning, and attractio a passive one; thus bodies trahunt each other
and are attracta by each other (the English translation that renders
both words by attraction, though countenanced by Newton him
self,^ blurs this rather important nuance).
Thus even the mathematical reader, learning that attractiones . . .
fieri solent ad corpora (and not ad puncta mathematica) and are
proportional to their masses; that corporum trahentium & attractorum actiones semper mutuae sunt & aequalesf that corpora duo
se invicem trahentia descrihunt. . .figuras similes f that vires quibus
corpora se mutuo trahunt diminish with distance; that, in partic
ular, if each of the bodies of the System A, B, C, D, etc., do each
singly pull {trahunt) all the others with accelerative forces that are
either inversely or directly in the ratio of any power whatever of the
distances from the pulling body {a trahente) . . . [then] it is plain that
the absolute forces of these bodies are as the bodies themselves,
because it is conformable to reason that forces which are directed
to bodies depend on their nature and quantity as they do in mag
nets,^ and so forth; learning this, then, the mathematical reader will
doubtless understand - or misunderstand - Newton as asserting the
existence in bodies of forces by which they act upon each other (pull
each other, trahunt), in spite of the distance that separates them. And,
as he never encounters a mention of any medium that transmits this
action, the reader will conclude, like Huygens and Liebniz, and also
Cotes, that Newton postulates action at a distance, not wanting,
however, to commit himself, just as in 1672 in his New Theory about
Light and Colors he asserted the corpuscular structure of light, at the
same time denying that he did so.
As for the nonmathematical reader, he accepted the nonunderstandable attraction as one of the ways in which God acts upon the
world. Indeed, God did not have to conform this action to our under
standing of it. Thus Locke:
If God can give no Power to any parts of Matter, but what Men can
account for from the Essence of Matter in general: If all such Qualities
and Properties must destroy the Essence or change the essential Properties
of Matter, which are to our Conceptions above it, and we cannot conceive
to be the natural Consequence of that Essence; it is plain, that the Essence
of Matter is destroyed and its essential Properties changed in most of the
sensible parts of this our System: For tis visible, that all the Planets have
Revolutions about certain remote (Denters, which I would have any one
explain, or make conceiveable by the bare Essence or natural Powers de
pending on the Essence of Matter in general, without something added to
that Essence, which we cannot conceive; for the moving of Matter in a
crooked Line, or the attraction of Matter by Matter, is all that can be said
in the (2ase; either of which, it is above our Reach to derive from the
Essence of Matter or Body in general; though one of these two must un
avoidably be allowed to be superadded in this instance to the Essence of
Matter in general. The Omnipotent Creator advised not with us in the mak
ing of the World, and his ways are not the less Excellent, because they are
past our finding out.^
Locke recognizes that Newton had made him change his mind:
1 admit that I said {Essay on Human Understanding, Book II, ch. VUI,
par. 11) that body acts by impulse and not otherwise. This also was my
view when I wrote it and even now I cannot conceive its action in any
other way. But since then I have been convinced by the judicious Mr.
Newtons incomparable book that there is too much presumption in wish
ing to limit the power of God by our limited conceptions. The gravitation
of matter toward matter in ways inconceivable to me is not only a demon
stration that God, when it seems to Him good, can put into bodies powers
and modes of acting which are beyond what can be derived from our idea
of body or explained by what we know of matter; but it is furthermore
an incontestable instance that He has really done so. I shall therefore take
care to correct this passage in the new edition of my book.
Which, by the way, he did. Indeed, as noticed already by A. C.
Fraser in his edition of the Essay:
In the first three editions this section stands thus; The next thing to be
considered, is how bodies operate on one another; and that is manifestly
by impulse, and nothing else. It being impossible to conceive that body
should operate on what it does not touch (which is all one as to imagine it
can operate where it is not), or when it does touch operate any other way
than by motion. In the subsequent edition, Locke suppressed this passage
and replaced it by: The next thing to be considered is how bodies
produce ideas in us; and that is manifestly by impulse, the only way we can
conceive bodies to operate in.^
* See his letter to Cotes of 28 March 1713 in J. Edleston, Correspondence o f Sir

Isaac Newton and Professor C oto (London, 1850), p. 154.
* Principia (1687), p. 162; Motte-Cajori, p. 164.
Ibid.
* Principia (16S1), Prop. LXlX,Th. XXIX, and j c Ao // ot, pp. 190 sq.; Motte-Cajori,
pp. 191 sq.
154
* See Mr. Locke's Reply to the Right Reverend Lord Bishop o f Worcester, Answer
to his Second Letter . . . (London, 1699), pp. 398 sq.
2 Ibid., p. 408.
J. Locke, Essav Concerning Human Understanding, ed. A. C. Fraser (Oxford,
1894), I, 171, note 1.
155
GRAVI TY AN ESSENTIAL P R O P ER T Y OF M A T T E R ?
The appearance of the Opticks (London, 1704) did not improve

the situation; quite the contrary. Indeed, though in order to explain
the fits of easy reflection and easy refraction, and even reflection
and refraction in general, Newton made an appeal to the hypothesis
of a vibrating medium (which Anally, in the second English edition,
turns out to be a luminiferous elastic aether), he at the same time
asked in Query I (and IV) whether bodies do not act upon light
at a distance. Moreover, Dr. George Cheyne (who was considered
as a follower of Newton and expressed, concerning the relation of
God, space, and the world, views pretty similar to those that Newton
held himself but did not want to profess) asserted that, though not
essential in the full meaning of the term, gravity or attraction was
nevertheless a primary quality of matter. Thus he wrote:
of the 1717 second English; these texts being somewhat different, I

quote them both):
Qua causa efficiente hae Attractiones peragantur, in id vero hie non
inquire. Quam ego Attractionem appello, fieri sane potest ut ea efficiatur
Impulsu vel alio aliquo modo nobis ignoto. Hanc vocem Attractionis itahic
accipi velim ut in universum solummodo vim aliquam significare intelligatur
qua Corpora ad se mutuo tendant cuicunque demum causae attribuenda
sit ilia vis. Nam ex phaenomenis Naturae illud nos prius edoctos oportet
quaenam corpora se invicem Attrahant et quaenam sint Leges et Proprietates istius Attractionis quam in id inquirere par sit, quanam efficiente
causa peragatur Attractio. Attractiones gravitatis, virtutisque magneticae
et electricae, ad satis magna seextendunt illae quidem intervalla; adeoque
etiam sub vulgi sensum notitiamque ceciderunt. At vero fieri potest ut sint
praeterae aliae quoque aliquae quae tarn augustis finibus contineantur,
ut usque adhuc omnem observationem fugerint.
How these Attractions may be performed I do not here consider. What
I call attraction may be performed by impulse, or by some other means
unknown to me. I use that word here to signify only in general any force
by which Bodies tend towards one another, whatsoever be the cause. For
we must learn from the Phaenomena of Nature what bodies attract one
another, and what are the Laws and Properties of the Attraction, before we
inquire the Cause by which the Attraction is performed. The Attractions of
Gravity, Magnetism, and Electricity, reach to very sensible distances, and
so have been observed by vulgar Eyes, and there may be others that reach
to so small distances as hitherto escape observation; andperhaps electrical
Attraction may reach to such small distances, even without being excited
by Friction [italicized words added in the third English edition].
In the second edition of the Principia, in the third of his Regulae
philosophandi} in which he deals with the essential properties of
bodies, that is, with those which intendi et remitti nequeunt (it is
curious to see Newton use the medieval terminology of the Oxford
and Parisian schoolmen), he lists as such extensio, durities, impenetrabilitas, mobilitas, and vis inertiae - but not gravity - though
stating at the same time that it is a universal force. Indeed, he said
that corpora omnia in se mutuo gravitant was just as certain or even
more so than that they are extended.
In the Scholium Generale by which he enriched this second edition^
he stated that, though he had explained the phenomena of the heav
ens and of our sea per Vim gravitatis, he did not assign the cause of
gravity because he could not deduce from the phenomena its rather
peculiar properties and was not prepared to feign hypotheses to do
so. Indeed,
Attraction or Gravitation is not essential to matter but seems rather an

original Impress which continues in it by virtue of the Omnipresent Activ
ity in the Divine Nature of which it is a Copy or an Image in the low
degree suitable for the gross creatures and so may be now recond among
the primary Qualities of Matter without which as it is now constituted
matter cannot be.^
Cheyne added^ that attraction could not be explained mechanically.
Confronted with this glaring misinterpretation of his teaching,
Newton reacted. He did not, however, state outright that for him
gravity was in no sense a property of body but was produced by
the action of an immaterial cause - as Clarke had done meanwhile f
Newton preferred to explain that he did not mean what he seemed to
say. Thus in the Latin edition of his Opticks (London, 1706), in which
he reprinted without change Query I asserting an action at a dis
tance of bodies upon light, and in Query XXII, in which he explained
that mutual attraction of light particles and gross bodies was
,
, , ,
times as strong as that between the gross
bodies themselves, he published a Query (XXIII; XXXI in the second
English edition) in which, having discussed the various forces - gravi
tational, chemical, electrical - by which bodies act upon one another
at a distance and having said that there may be in nature other at
tractive powers, he added (p. 322 of the 1706 Latin edition, p. 351*
1
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0
0 0 0 ,0 0 0
* G. Cheyne, Philosophical Principles o f Natural Religion (London, 1705; 2nd ed.,

1715), p. 41. On Cheyne, see Mme. Hdl^ne Metzger, Attraction universelle et religion
naturelle chez quelques commentateurs anglais de Newton (Paris; Hermann, 1937).
^ Ibid., p. 42.
In a note to pars I, cap. XI, par. 15, of Rohaults Physica; see infra, p. 171.
156
* Principia (1713), pp. 357 sq.; Motte-Cajori, pp. 398 sq.

^ Ibid., p. 483; p. 546.
157
GRAVI TY AN ESSENTIAL P RO P E R T Y OF M A T T E R ?
this is certain, that it must proceed from a cause that penetrates to the
very centres of the sun and planets, without suffering the least diminution
of its force; that operates not according to the quantity of the surfaces of
the particles upon which it acts (as mechanical causes use to do), but accord
ing to the quantity of the solid matter which they contain, and propagates
its virtue on all sides to immense distances, decreasing always as the in
verse square of the distances . . . But hitherto I have not been able to dis
cover the cause of those properties of gravity from phenomena, and I
feign no hypotheses.
ye Attractive force resides in the Central Body^) in his famous

Preface tO the second edition of the Principia - which everyone, with
good reason, considered to have been, if not written under Newtons
direction, at least read and approved by him and thus to constitute
an authoritative expression of his views - seemed to confirm this
conviction. He did not, of course, assert that gravity was an essential
property of body - he was taught not to do so - yet, like Cheyne, he
called it a primary one and asserted that
To which weighty statement he added (on Cotess suggestion and in

order to defend himself against the attack of Leibniz, who, in a let
ter to Hartsoeker, accused him of reintroducing into natural philo
sophy not only occult qualities but even a perpetual miracle):
either gravity will have a place among the primary qualities of all bodies,
or Extension, Mobility and Impenetrability will not. And the nature of
things will either be rightly explained by gravity of bodies or it will not
be rightly explained by their extension, mobility and impenetrability.*
For whatever is not deduced from the phenomena is to be called a hypo

thesis, and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, whether of occult
qualities or mechanical have no place in experimental philosophy. In this
philosophy particular propositions are inferred from the phenomena and
afterwards rendered general by induction. Thus it was that the impenetra
bility, the mobility, and the impulsive force of bodies, and the laws of
motion and gravitation, were discovered. And to us it is enough that gravity
does really exist, and act according to the laws which we have explained,
and abundantly serves to account for all the motions of the celestial bodies,
and of our sea.^
As a matter of fact. Cotes first wrote essential - this, by the way,

shows how easy it was for a serious and well-informed student of
Newton to misunderstand him - and only when corrected by Clarke,
to whom he submitted the draft of his preface, did he recognize his
error and improve his text. At the same time, in his letter to Clarke,
he expressed a rather far-reaching anti- and pre-Cartesian skepticism,
shared, as a matter of fact, by Newton himself, concerning our know
ledge, or understanding, of the relation between substance and pro
perty, a skepticism that, owing to the influence of Locke, was to be
come general in the seventeenth century. Newton, indeed, in the
Scholium Generale addedto the second edition of the Principia, stated
that
This celebrated pronouncement, which on one hand seemed to

reassert, more strongly than ever, the pure empiricism professed in
the first edition and in the third Rule of Reasoning in Philosophy,
which seemed to reject all causal explanation of the phenomena
and, in a positivistic-agnostic manner, to accept gravity - or gravita
tion - as a mere fact, and, on the other hand, associated it with such
truly essential properties of bodies as impenetrability, mobility, and
inertia, asserting at the same time that it was not to be explained
mechanically, did not, and obviously could not, achieve the effect
desired by Newton, any more than the hints of the Latin Opticks.
His readers remained convinced not only that gravity, or universal
attraction, was a real cosmic force - which according to Newton it
was - but also that it was a physical one - which according to him it
was not - and even that it was a real, though perhaps not essential,
property of matter. And Cotes (who, by the way, expressed his doubts
about Newtons assertion of a mutual attraction of bodies, object
ing that it implied that Newton tacitly [made] this supposition that
what the real substance of anything is we know not. In bodies we see only
their figures and colours, we hear only the sounds, we touch only their out
ward surfaces, we smell only the smells, and taste the savours; but their
inward substances are not to be known either by our senses, or by any
reflext act of our minds.^
In the unpublished drafts of this passage he went even further in his
rejection of the moderns and in going back to the traditional
Aristotelian-scholastic views;
Substantias rerum non cognoscimus. Nullas habemus earum ideas.
Ex phaenomenis colligimus earum proprietates solas & ex proprietatibus
quod sint substantiae. Corpora se mutuo non penetrare colligimus ex
solis phaenomenis: substantias diversi generis se mutuo non penetrare ex
* Principia (1713), p. 484; p. 547. See Edleston, Correspondence, pp. 153, 155.
^ See Edleston, Correspondence, p. 153, and infra. Chapter VII, Attraction, Newton,
and Cotes.
2 Principia, Motte-Cajori, p. xxvi.
* Principia (1713), p. 483; Motte-Cajori, p. 546.
158
159
G RAVI TY AN ESSENTIAL P RO P E R T Y OF M A T TE R ?
phaenomenis minime constat. Et quod ex phaenomenis minime colligitur

temere affirmare non debet.
Ex phaenomenis cognoscimus proprietates rerum & ex proprietatibus
colligimus res ipsas extare easque vocamus substantias sed ideas substantiarum non magis habemus quam caecus ideas colorum . . .
Ideas habemus attributorum ejus sed quid sit rei alicujus substantia
minime cognoscimus.^
1675; indeed, he enhanced the role of the aether, explaining by

aethereal pressure phenomena such as reflection and refraction that
formerly (especially in the Principia, Book I, Sec. XIV) were explained
by the action at a distance of attractive and repulsive forces; he also
presents - hypothetically, of course - an explanation of gravity by
aethereal pressure which he announced in the Preface to this edition;
And to shew that I do not take Gravity for an Essential Property of
Bodies, I have added a question (Qu. XXI) concerning its Cause,
chusing to propose it by way of a Question because I am not yet
satisfied about it for want of Experiments. Furthermore, in order to
make his new aethereal theories more acceptable and to reduce the
glaring contradictions between them and the assertions of the Queries
that postulate action at a distance, Newton suppressed part^ of
Query XXII in the Latin Optice (Qu. XXX of the English), where he
asserted that attraction between light particles and gross matter is
*^ times stronger than terrestrial gravity, and added at the end of
Query XXIX; What I mean in this question by vacuum and by
Attraction of the Rays of Light towards glass or crystal may be
understood as meaning aether and action of the aether.^ And in
the third edition of the Principia (1727) he added to the text of the
third regula philosophandi the following statement: Attamen
Gravitatem corporibus essentialem esse minime affirmo. Per vim
insitam intelligo solam vim inertiae. Haec immutabilis est. Gravitas
recedendo a Terra diminuitur.
Yet it was too late. It seems that nobody paid much attention to
the hypothesis of the Opticks, which, on one hand, explained
gravitation by postulating an aethereal medium of a most improbable
structure, a medium which was
As for Cotes, he wrote to his censor Clarke:

Sir; I return you my thanks for Your correction of the Preface and parti
cularly for Your advice in relation to that place where I seemed to assert
Gravity to be Essential to Bodies. I am fully of Your mind that it would
have furnishd matter for Cavilling and therefore I struck it out immediately
upon Dr. Cannons mentioning Your Objection to me, and so it never was
printed. . . My design in that passage was not to assert Gravity to be essen
tial to Matter, but rather to assert that we are ignorant of the Essential
properties of Matter and that in respect to our Knowledge Gravity may
possibly lay as fair a claim to that Title as the other Properties which I
mentiond. For I understand by Essential Propertys such propertys with
out which no other belonging to the same substance can exist: and I would
not undertake to prove that it were impossible for any of the other Pro
pertys of Bodies to exist without even extension. (Cambridge, June 25,
1713.)*
Cotes, as we have seen, replaced essential by primary. Strictly
speaking, primary and essential do not mean the same thing.
An essential property is a property without which a thing can neither
be, nor even be thought of; such, for instance, is the case of extension,
but not that of gravity, as we cannot think of a body as being de
prived of extension but can very well think of it as possessing no
gravity. Yet, in praxi, it was hardly better; all the more, or all the
less, so as Cotes, suppressing the term essential altogether, charac
terized as primary not only gravity but also extension, mobility, and
impenetrability, thus putting all these qualities on the same level
and making gravity a quality of the body, just as Dr. Cheyne had
done. Thus it was rather natural that he was understood, or mis
understood, as placing gravity among the essential properties of
matter and as endowing matter with the force of attraction.
Once more, or even twice more, Newton protested. Thus in the
Queries added to the second English edition of his Opticks (1717),
he revived the aethereal conceptions developed in his Hypothesis of
1 0
much rarer within the dense bodies of the Sun, Stars, Planets and Comets
than in the empty celestial Spaces between them [and which] passing from
them to great distances grows denser and denser perpetually . . . and there
by causes the gravity of those great Bodies towards one another and of
their parts towards the Bodies,
and on the other hand suggested in Query XXII (a hypothesis not
more probable than that of Query XXI) that such a medium should
be 7(X),000 times rarer, being, nevertheless, as many times more elas
tic than the air, in order not to disturb the motions of the planets and
^ See A. R. Hall and M. Boas Hall, A Selection from the Unpublished Scientific Papers
o f Sir Isaac Newton in the Portsmouth Collection, Cambridge University Library
(Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1962), pp. 356 sq.
* See Edleston, Correspondence, pp. 151 sq.
^ Optice, pp. 320 sq.

* See my fitudes newtoniennes II: Les Queries de L'Optique," Archives Interna
tionales d'Histoire des Sciences 13 (1960), 15-29.
160
161
GRAVI TY AN ESSENTIAL P RO P E R T Y OF M A T TE R ?
to oppose to them so small a resistance as would scarce make any

sensible alteration . . . in ten Thousand years. Indeed, it explained,
or explained away, the action at a distance of the attractive forces,
but only by replacing them by repulsive ones, which was not much
better; besides, the Newtonian hypothesis (not very different from
that which Hooke examined and rejected fifty years earlier, and even,
horribile dictu, from that which Roberval proposed in his Aristarchus^)
was obviously unable to explain the mutual attraction of bodies. And
as to the statement of the third edition of the Principia, it certainly
was beside the point: it was not gravitas as weight (pondus) that was
in question but gravitas as an attracting power, the pondus of which
was only an effect. Thus it could - and according to Newton himself
did - remain constant, all changes of weight notwithstanding.
Furthermore - and this seems to me to be more important still the subtle differences maintained by Newton between physical and
nonphysical (transphysical) forces, essential and nonessential
properties of matter, were lost for the eighteenth-century reader; they
distinguished, of course, fundamental or primordial properties of
bodies, as extension, hardness, and so on, from the more particular
ones, as figure, colour, odour, etc. but they felt that, as Maupertuis
in his Discours sur la differente figure des astres has very aptly formu
lated it,
dogmatically the exclusion of all others: as if we had the measure of the

capacity of the subjects while we know them only by this small number of
properties. [Accordingly], attraction is, so to say, no more than a question
of fact: it is into the system of the Universe that we have to look in order
to find out whether it is a principle that effectively has a place in nature,
how far it is necessary [to admit it] in order to explain the phenomena, or,
finally, whether it is gratuitously introduced for explaining facts that are as
well explained without it.^
As we see, for Maupertuis - and it is the same for Voltaire - gravity,
or attraction, has become a purely factual question. But it ceased to
be a problem as it was for Newton himself.
Eighteenth-century thought became reconciled to the ununderstandable - with very few exceptions.^ As Ernst Mach expressed it: It
became accustomed to use forces acting at a distance as a given
starting point of explanation, and the incentive to inquire about
their origin disappeared nearly completely. ^ Later, the problem was
very successfully hidden in the concept of field.'*
^ Maupertuis, Discours sur la diffirente figure des astres (Paris, 1732); Oeuvres
(Lyons, 1756), 1 ,98,94,96,103.
* See C. Isenkrahe, Das Ratsel von Schwerkraft (Brunswick: Vieweg, 1879).
* Ernst Mach, Die Mechanik in ihrer Entwicklung (9th ed.; Leipzig: Brockhaus,
1933), p. 185.
* See M.-A. Tonnelat, De lid6e de milieu a la notion de champ. Archives Inter
nationales d'Histoire des Sciences 12 (1959), 337-356.
the manner in which the properties reside in a subject is always incon

ceivable for us. People are not astonished when they see a body in motion
communicate this motion to others; the habit that they have of seeing this
phenomenon prevents them from seeing how marvellous it is [Maupertuis
hints at Malebranche, who thought such communication impossible:
Malebranche, indeed, denied all causality and all action to bodies, and,
generally speaking, to creatures, and referred all effectivity to God], but
philosophers will not make the error of believing that the impulsive force
is more conceivable than the attractive one. [Indeed], is it more diflBcult for
God to make bodies tend or move towards each other, these bodies being
at a distance, than to wait, in order to move them, that one body be met
by the other [as, according to Malebranche, he had to do] ? If we had com
plete ideas of bodies, if we knew well what they are in themselves and what
are their properties, how and in what number they reside in them, we
would not be embarrassed to decide whether attraction is a property of
matter. But we are very far from having such ideas: we know bodies only
by sense, without any knowledge of the subject in which these properties
find themselves united . . . It would be ridiculous to want to assign to
bodies other properties besides those that experience has taught us are
found in them; but it would, perhaps, be still more ridiculous to pronounce
See supra, p. 59, n. 2.
162
163
THE VOID AND EXTENSI ON
APPENDIX D
The Void and Extension

The conception of void space was repudiated by Descartes as
strongly as, or even more strongly than, by Aristotle. For the latter,
indeed, void space merely did not exist in rerum natura, or at most
was actually impossible; for the former it was much more than that:
it was a contradictio in adjecto. Indeed, having established that the
nature of body consists not in weight, hardness, colour or similar
things, but only in extension,^ Descartes was bound to identify
extension (space) and matter and to assert that
space or internal locus and corporeal substance do not differ, in reality, but
only in the way in which they are apt to be conceived by us. But in truth,
extension in length, breadth and depth that constitutes space is clearly the
same that constitutes body.*
Wherefrom it followed immediately that it is repugnant that there
be a vacuum or [a place] where there would be absolutely no thing,
and that
it is clear that vacuum in the philosophical sense, that is [a place] in which
there would be absolutely no substance, cannot exist, because the exten
sion of space, or internal place, does not differ from the extension of body.
For just as from the fact alone that body is extended in length, breadth and
depth we conclude that it is a substance, because it is totally repugnant that
there be any extension of nothing, we have in the same way to conclude
also about space which is supposed to be void: namely, as there is exten
sion in it, there is also necessarily substance.^
The concept of absolute void arises from an erroneous extension
of the vulgar use and acceptance of the word, which, as a matter of
fact, does not mean a space where there is nothing, but only a space
where we do not find something that, as we think, should be there,
as when we call a bottle empty, though it is full of air, or when we
* Descartes, Principia philosophiae, pars II, art. 4, in Oeuvres, ed. C. Adam and P.
Tannery (Paris, 1897-1913), VIII, 42; French translation, Principes de philosophie,
ibid., IX 65; and already in Le Monde, ibid., XI, 35 sq., and Discours de la m^thode,
ibid., VI, 42 sq.
* Principia philosophiae, pars II, art. 10, ibid., VIII, 45; IX, 68.
Ibid., art. 16, VIII, 49; IX, 71.
164
say that there is nothing in a fish pond, if there are no fish, though
it is full of water,^ and so on. Accustomed to this way of thinking,
or not thinking, we go on and assume that a container could be
made empty of all contents, so that there would really be nothing in
it. Which is completely absurd:
in truth we can no more conceive a vessel with nothing in it than we can
conceive a mountain without a valley: it would mean conceiving the inside
of that vessel without its extension, or that extension without the extended
substance: of nothing, indeed, there can be no extension . . .
Thus, if one asked, what would happen if God destroyed all body that is
contained in a certain vessel, and would not allow any other [body] to
come into the locus of the destroyed, we have to answer: the walls of that
vessel would, eo ipso, be contiguous. This is so because if there is nothing
between two bodies, it is necessary that these bodies mutually touch each
other; and it is manifestly repugnant that they be distant, or that there be
distance between them, and that, nonetheless, this distance be nothing;
for all distance is a mode of extension and therefore cannot be without
the extended substance.*
Indeed, Rohault, having in cap. VII of his System o f Natural Philo
sophy posited Descartess determination of the essence of matter identification of extension and body - cannot but conclude the non
existence of void. Thus, for example, Ex his, quae de Natura materiae posuimus, colligere licet... inane, quod vocant Philosophi nul
lum esse posse,^ and Nihilum sive inane nullas habet proprietates,^
not even that of existence. To which Clarke replies, Consentaneum
hoc quidem ei dicere qui essentiam materiae extensionem dicit.
Verum ex gravitatis natura . . . constat jam omnino aliquod inane et
multo id quidem maxime in rebus esse ; moreover, according to
Clarke, the Cartesians - Rohault - are making a logical error in
identifying the vacuum with nihil: space void of matter is undoubtedly
space in which there is nothing, but this does not make it itself noth
ing; furthermore, the identification of extension and matter leads to
very awkward and even absurd consequences, namely, its necessity
and eternity; indeed, infinity implies necessity (it is rather interesting
to see Clarke, as Newton did before him, accept this Cartesian axiom
as a premise of his reasoning, a premise so certain and evident that
1 Ibid.,&Tt. 17, VIII, 49; IX, 72.
> Ibid., art. 18, VIII, 50; IX, 73.
Rohault, Physica, pars I, cap. 8, p. 26; Rohault's System o f Natural Philosophy,
trans. John Clarke (London, 1723), Book 1, cap, VIII, p. 27.
* Ibid., cap. XII, par. 26, p. 64.
5 Ibid., cap. VIII, p. 27.
See infra, p. 94.
165
THE VOID AND EXTENSI ON
they do not even feel the need to formulate it, or, of course, to
mention its Cartesian origin). Accordingly,
principle that Professor Lovejoy has so aptly called the principle

of plenitude and contended that the existence of the vacuum was
in contradiction to Gods infinite perfection and implied a limitation
of his power of creation. Indeed, it is obvious that there is more
reality in the plenum than in the vacuum. Accordingly it would be
unworthy of God not to create matter wherever it was possible to do
so, that is, everywhere, and thus to create a poorer and less perfect
world though being able to create a more perfect one. Besides, accord
ing to Leibniz, the existence of a void space, with some chunks of
matter dispersed in it here and there, contradicted the principle of
sufficient reason; why, indeed, space being homogeneous and iso
form, should God create matter here and not there?
Needless to say, Leibnizs arguments did not convince the New
tonians. They did not think that by their conception they impover
ished the world or put a limitation on Gods creative power. Quite
the contrary, they felt elated by the discovery that there was in the
world so much more void than m atter: it seemed to them to reduce this
latters importance to nothing, or almost nothing, and to administer
a hard blow to materialism. Thus already Bentley in his Confutation
o f Atheism explains enthusiastically that the empty Space of our
Solar Region . . . is 8575 hundred thousand million million times
more ample than all the corporeal substance in it and that the
Summ of Empty Spaces within the Concave of the Firmament is 6860
million million million times bigger than All the Matter containd in
it,^ and it is obviously with great satisfaction that Voltaire informs
us that it is not certain that there is a cubic inch of solid matter in the
whole universe. ^ Moreover, Newtonians thought that God should
not, and could not, be bound by the principles of plenitude and
sufficient reason, and that Leibniz, by imposing them upon God,
limited or even destroyed his freedom and subjected him to necessity.
Or, to express it somewhat differently, though agreeing that every
thing must have a reason, Clarke maintained that Gods will was a
more than sufficient one.^
Thus for Clarke. As for Voltaire, he naturally defends the void,
combining a positivistic-agnostic attitude toward matter, obviously
Si Extensio esset materiae Essentia, ideoque Materia idem quod

Spatium ipsum; sequeretur ubique et infinitam esse materiam et necessario aeternam, quae neque creari poterit, nec possit in Nihilum redigi,
quod est absurdum.^
Thus it is clear that space is different from matter, and that it is not
extensio, sed extensio solida that should be considered as the essence
of matter. Furthermore, the unhindered motion of planets and comets
in the celestial spaces clearly leads to the conclusion that these
spaces are empty.
Some years later the problem of the void became one of the topics
of the polemics between Clarke and Leibniz.^ Clarke defended the
distinction of space from matter and the existence of a vacuum;
Leibniz accepted the former and rejected the latter. Matter being
finite and space infinite, argued Clarke, there must necessarily be a
void. Moreover, from the very infinity of space followed its necessary
existence; and this, in turn, implied a direct and immediate relation
to God. Clarke, therefore, asserted that space was an attribute, a
quality, or a property of God. Somewhat later, in the Avertissement
published in the preface to Des Maiseauxs edition of the Correspon
dence,^ and, as a matter of fact, written by Newton himself, he some
what toned down his assertions - probably because of their
Spinozistic flavor - explaining that they should not be taken literally
and that space and duration are not qualities or properties, but modes
of existence of the substance which is really necessary and substan
tially omnipresent and eternal. This, according to him - and to Henry
More, whom he follows closely in his conception of space - does not
imply a divisibility of Gods substance, as space itself is indivisible
or indiscerptible.^
As for Leibniz, who denied the metaphysical reality of both space
and time and reduced them to a set of relations in order of coexistence
for space and of succession for time - he based his reasoning on the
^ Rohault's System, note to cap. VII, par. 8, p. 24.
* A Collection o f Papers which passed between the late learned M. Leibniz and Dr.
Clarke in the Years 1715 and 1716 relating to the Principles o f Natural Philosophy and
Religion (London, 1717).
* Recueil de diverses pieces sur la philosophic, la religion naturelle, Vhistoire, les
math^matiques, etc., par Mss Leibniz, Clarke, Newton et autres auteurs celibres
(Amsterdam, 1720), vol. I.
* On Newton, Clarke, and More, see A. Koyre, From the Closed World to the
Infinite UmverAg (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1957).
166
* Richard Bentley, A Confutation o f Atheism from the Origin and Frame o f the World
(London, 1693), part II, pp. 14 sq.; I. B. Cohen, Isaac Newton's Papers and Letters on
Natural Philosophy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958), pp.
326 sq.
* Voltaire, Lettres philosophiques, Edition critique par Gustave Lanson (Paris:
Edouard Comely, 1909, and later editions), letter 16, vol. II, p. 20.
* Rohault's System o f Natural Philosophy, I, 20 sq., Clarkes second reply.
167
THE VOI D AND EXTENSI ON
inspired by Maupertuis, with a theory of space that follows closely

the teaching of Clarke. In his Elements de la philosophie de Newton
he writes:
It is interesting to note that, whereas in the first and second editions

of the Elements Voltaire, as we have seen, completely espoused the
views of Newton and Clarke and presented them as his own, in the
third edition (1748), which he modified and enlarged by a whole
book (the first) devoted to The Metaphysics of Newton, he pre
sents them as those of Newton, and of Clarke, a philosopher as
great or even greater than Newton himself.^
Those who cannot conceive the Void, object that this Void would be
nothing, that nothing can have no properties, and that, thus, nothing can
take place in the Void.
One answers that it is not true that the Void is nothing; it is the locus
of bodies, it is space, it has properties, it is extended in length, breadth and
depth, it is penetrable, it is inseparable, etc.^
Îbid.
It is true, concedes Voltaire, that we cannot form an image of the

Void; but I cannot form an image of myself as a thinking being
either, and this does not preclude me from being convinced that I
think. Indeed, We can form images only of what is corporeal; and
Space is not corporeal. Nevertheless, I conceive Space very well.
There is no other possible answer to this argument, continues
Voltaire, than to say that matter is infinite; that is what several
philosophers asserted, and that is what Descartes did after them.^
Yet this infinitization of matter is based only on the supposition that
matter and extension are identical, and proves only how dangerous
it is to rely, in your reasoning, upon suppositions. Indeed,
it is false that matter and extension are the same thing: all matter is
extended, but all extension is not matter . . . we do not know at all what
matter is; we know only some properties of it and nobody can deny that
it is possible that there are millions of other extended substances different
from what we call Matter.^
In identifying extension and matter Descartes not only made an
error, he also contradicted himself, for he admitted a God; but
where is God? He is not in a mathematical point, he is immense;
what is his immensity if not the immense Space? Indeed, the
existence of an infinite matter is a contradiction in terms. Not,
however, that of an infinite space:
Space exists necessarily, because God exists necessarily; it is immense, it
is, as duration, a mode, an infinite property of a necessary and infinite Be
ing. Matter is nothing of that kind; it does not exist necessarily; and if this
substance were infinite, it would be an essential property of God, or God
himself: but it is neither the one nor the other; therefore it is not and can
not be infinite.^
1 Voltaire, Elements de la philosophie de Newton, mis d la portie de tout le monde par
Mr. de Voltaire (Amsterdam, 1783), ch. XVII, p. 210.
2 lbid.,v>. 211.
Ibid., pp. 212 sq.
Ibid.
168
169
R OH A U L T AND C LAR KE ON A TT R A C T I O N
A P P E N D IX E
Rohault and Clarke on Attraction

The Cartesians rejected attraction, whether magnetic or gravita
tional, together with a number of other analogous concepts, because
of their inherent obscurity: they were not clear and distinct, as,
according to Descartes, all our concepts should be, and therefore
had no place in philosophy. Thus Rohault, having explained that
in the world, which is full of matter without any void, all motion of
a body implies a circular motion of a certain part of the surrounding
matter - it pushes away, or aside, that of which it takes the place
and its own place is taken by that which is behind it - which leads
to very important consequences, namely, the mechanical explanation
of a series of different phenomena, continues:
14. That this Motion in a Circle, is the Cause of many surprizing Motions:
This Truth, though it was known long ago, yet Philosophers, for want of
duly attending to it, and well weighing and considering its Consequences,
have thought it impossible to account for all the Motions we see in Nature
by Impulse alone, which is the only way that we can conceive clearly, by
which one Body moves another by pushing it; and which so naturally
follows from the Impenetrability of Matter, which all the World agree in.
And this is the Reason why they introduced into their Philosophy Things,
indeed very specious, such as Attraction, Sympathy, Antipathy, the Fear of
a Vacuum, etc. but which, at the Bottom, are mere Chimeras, invented to
make them appear to give a Reason of that which they did not at all
understand, and therefore ought not to be used in the better sort of Natural
Philosophy.
15. The obscurity of the Words Attraction, Sympathy and Antipathy.
For as to (1) Attraction, Sympathy, and Antipathy, they ought not to be
allowed at all, by reason of their Obscurity. That they are obscure, is very
evident; for if we take a Loadstone, for Example, It is manifest to all the
World, that to say it has an attractive Vertue or a Sympathy with the Iron,
does not at all explain the Nature or the Properties of it. And as to the
Fear of a Vacuum, I reserve the Notion of That to the following Chapter,
where we shall compare the Reasoning of the Antients and our own to
gether.^
To this statement of Rohaults Samuel Clarke replies:
^ Physica, pars I, cap. XI, 14, p. 49; System, I, 54.
170
Note 1: Attraction: Since nothing acts at a Distance, that is, nothing

can exert any Force in acting where it is not; it is evident, that Bodies (if
we would speak properly) cannot at all move one another, but by Contact
and Impulse. Wherefore Attraction and Sympathy and all occult Qualities,
which are supposed to arise from the Specifick Forms of Things are justly
to be rejected. Yet because, besides innumerable other Phaenomena of
Nature, that universal Gravitation of Matter, which shall be more fully
handled afterwards, can by no means arise from the mutual impulse of
Bodies (because all Impulse must be in proportion to the Superficies, but
Gravity is always in proportion to the Quantity of solid Matter, and there
fore must of Necessity be ascribed to some Cause that penetrates the very
inward Substance it self of solid Matter) therefore all such Attraction, is
by all means to be allowed, as is not the Action of Matter at a Distance,
but the Action of some immaterial Cause which perpetually moves and
governs Matter by certain Laws.^
As for gravity proper, Rohault explains^ that it is produced by the
circular (vortex) motion of matter which recedes from the center and
pushes back toward it its more sluggish parts, as Descartes has ex
plained and as Huygens has very well demonstrated in his famous
experiment. He then proceeds to expose that experiment and
concludes: The Matter will recede from the Center, and force the
Body to approach towards the Center, in the same Manner as they
who affirm all Bodies to be heavy, say that the water forces Cork to
rise up.^
Once more, Clarke replies:
(1) Force the Body to approach towards the Center, etc. This was a very
ingenious Hypothesis, and so long as the World was thought to be full, a
very probable one. But since it has been made appear by a great many very
exact Observations of modem Philosophers, that the World is not full;
and that Gravity is the most ancient and most universal Property of Matter,
and the principal of all in maintaining and keeping together the whole
Universe; we must proceed in another Method, and find out another
Theory of Gravity. To be short, the celebrated Sir Isaac Newton has pur
sued this Enquiry with that Success, that the most simple Nature of
Gravity, being supposed, he has established the true System of the World
beyond all Controversy, and most clearly explained the most considerable
Phaenomena of all Nature. And his Opinion of the Nature and Properties
of Gravity is this.
Every single Particle of all Bodies whatever, gravitates to every single
Particle of all Bodies whatsoever; that is, they are impelled towards each
other by Gravity, See the Notes on Part I, Chap. II, Art. 15.
Ibid.
* Physica, pars II, cap. XXVIII, 13, pp. 328 sq.; System, II, 96.
See supra, pp. 119 sq.
Physica, pars II, cap. XXVIII, 13, pp. 328 sq.; System, II, 96.
171
This gravitating Force is Universal as to the Extent of it; that is, all
Bodies whatsoever, so far as we know, where-ever they are placed, not
only on the Earth, but also in the Heavens, whether in the Moon or Planets,
in the Sun or any other Place, are endued with this Power.
This Force is also universal as to the Kinds of Bodies; that is, all Bodies,
whatever their Figure, Form or Texture be whether they be simple or com
pound, fluid or solid; whether they be great or small; whether they be in
Motion or at Rest, are endued with this Power.
This Force is also universal as to Time; that is, all other Conditions being
the same, it never increases or diminishes.
The Quantity of this Gravity at equal Distances, is always exactly in
Proportion to the Quantity of Matter in the gravitating Bodies. For in
stance, if a cubick Foot of Gold has a Thousand Pound Weight upon the
Superficies of the Earth, two cubick Feet will have two Thousand Pound
Weight upon the same Superficies; and if the Earth contained but half the
quantity of Matter that it does now, the same cubick Foot of Gold which
has now a thousand Pound Weight upon the Superficies of the Earth, would
have but Five Hundred only.
This Gravity in given Bodies is greater or less according to the Distance
of those Bodies from each other; for Example a Stone which near the
Superficies of the Earth, is very heavy, if it were carried up as high as the
Moon would be very light.
Lastly, The Proportion of the Increase or Decrease of this Gravity in
Bodies approaching to or receding from each other is such that its Force is
reciprocally in a duplicate Proportion or as the Squares of their Distances.
For Example, a Body which at the Distance of ten Diameters of the Earth,
weighs a hundred Pounds; would, if its Distance were but half so far,
weigh four Times as much; and if but a third Part so far, nine Times as
much. So likewise, the Force which upon the Superficies of the Earth,
could support a Hundred Pound Weight; if it were twice as far off" the
Center, could support four times the Weight, if three Times as far off, it
could support nine Times the Weight.^
^ Physica, pars II, cap. XXVIII, 13, pp. 328 sq.; System, II, 96.
A P P E N DI X F
Copernicus and Kepler on Gravity

For pre-Copernican physics and cosmology, gravity was a natural
tendency of heavy bodies to move toward the center of the world,
which coincided with the center of the earth. Having removed this
latter from its central position, Copernicus had, accordingly, to mod
ify the theory of gravity. He did it by substituting for the unique
cosmic gravity several planetary ones. Thus he writes:
I myself think that Gravity or heaviness is nothing else but a natural
Appetency implanted in the parts by the divine providence of the Universal
Artisan in order that they should unite with one another in their oneness
and wholeness and come together in the form of a Globe. It is believable
that this affect is present in the Sun, Moon and the other bright planets
and through its efficacy they remain in the Spherical figure in which they
are visible, though they nevertheless accomplish their circular movements
in many different ways.^
It is quite an analogous conception that we encounter in William
Gilbert: he does not explain gravity by magnetic attraction - the mag
netic virtue of the earth explains its rotation - but by the presence
in each of the cosmic globes - the earth, the moon, the sun, and the
planets - of particular and proper forms that make their parts
come together {coacervatio and coitio), and parts separated from the
whole tend toward their whole, terrestrial to the earth, lunar to the
moon, solar to the sun.^
As for Kepler, he shares Copernicus and Gilberts conviction
that gravitational forces, properly so called, are particular to each
of the celestial bodies; the planets do not attract each other, nor
does the sun, in this sense, attract them ; there is no universal gravi
tation. On the other hand (a) he stresses the active character of the
gravitational attraction which he interprets as being analogous to the
magnetic one (sometimes he calls it magnetic) and (b) he asserts
that this mutual gravitational attraction takes place between the
* De revolutionibus orbium coelestium (Thorn, 1873), lib. I, cap. 9, p. 24.
* W. Gilbert, De magnete, magneticisqiie corporibus et de magno magnete tellure
physiologia nova (London, 1600), pp. 65, 225, 227; De mundo nostro sublunari philoSophia nova (Amsterdam, 1651), pp. 115 sq.
172
173
C OP ER N I CU S AND KEPL E R ON GRAVI TY
earth and the moon because of their fundamental similarity, so that

the attractive virtue of the moon reaches as far as the earth (and
thus causes the tides) and that of the earth even much farther than
the moon. Thus he writes:
How does this attraction act? Kepler, of course, does not know;
but in the letter to Fabricius just quoted, discussing the traditional
arguments against the motion of the earth revived by Tycho Brahe
(a body thrown upward would not fall on the same place, and so
forth), he suggests an image,^ which, perhaps, is more than an image,
as he also makes use of it in the Epitome: bodies do not lag behind
the rotating Earth because it drags them with it by the force of gravity,
as if they were attached to it by innumerable chains or sinews. Indeed,
if there were no such chains or sinews stretched the stone would
remain in its place and not follow the motion of the Earth.^ But
there are; or at least gravity acts as if there were. Thus he tells us in
the Epitome astronomiae Copernicanae:
A mathematical point, be it the center of the world or not, cannot move

heavy bodies, either effectively or objectively, so that they approach i t __
It is impossible that the [natural] form of a body, moving its body, should
seek a mathematical point, or the center of the world. . . Thus the common
theory of gravity appears to be false . . . As for the true theory of gravity,
it is based upon these axioms: all corporeal substance insofar as it is cor
poreal is apt to remain at rest at any place in which it is placed alone, out
side of the virtue of a cognate body . . . Gravity is a mutual corporeal
affection of cognate bodies toward their reunion or conjunction (of a
similar kind is also the magnetic faculty) such that the Earth drags [trahat]
the stone much more than the stone tends toward the Earth.
Heavy bodies (even if we place the Earth in the center of the world) do
not move toward the center of the world as to the center of the world, but
toward the center of a cognate round body, that is, the Earth. Thus,
wherever the Earth be placed, or wherever it should transport itself by its
animal [vital] faculty, always the heavy bodies will move toward it. If the
Earth were not spherical, heavy bodies would not move from everywhere
toward the central point of the Earth, but would move from divers direc
tions toward divers points.
If two stones were placed in a certain place of the world, near each other
and outside the orb of the virtue of a third cognate body, these stones, in a
manner similar to two magnetic bodies, would meet in an intermediate
place, each nearing the other by an interval proportional to the bulk
[moles] of the other.
If the Moon and the Earth were not retained each in its circuit by an
animal [vital] force, or by some other, equivalent, the Earth would ascend
toward the Moon by a fifty-fourth part of the interval [separating them],
and the Moon would descend by fifty-three parts, or about, of this
interval; and there they would meet; provided, however, that their sub
stance is of the same density.^
Heavy bodies seek the body of Earth as such and are sought by it; there
fore they will move more strongly toward the parts of the Earth that are
nearer, than toward those that are farther away . . . just as if they were
attached to the parts above, which they are by the very perpendicular and
also by infinite oblique lines or sinews, less strong than this [perpendicular]
that all of them contract in themselves.
1 Opera omnia. III, 458; Gesammelte Schriften, XVI, 196.
* Opera omnia. III, 461; Gesammelte Schriften, XVI, 197.
* Epitome astronomiae Copernicanae, lib. 1, pars V; Opera omnia, VII, 181; Gesam
melte Schriften, VII, 96.
In this case, indeed, the mass {moles) of the earth would be about
fifty-three times that of the moon, and it will attract the moon fiftythree times as strongly as it will be attracted by it. This because,
as Kepler informed his friend Fabricius, gravity is a magnetic force
that reunites similar [bodies], which is the same in a large and a
small body, is divided according to the moles of the bodies, and re
ceives the same dimensions as these. ^
^ Astronomia nova, Introductio, Opera omnia, ed. Frisch, III, 151; Gesammelte
Schriften, ed. M. Caspar, III, 24 sq.
* Letter of 10 November 1608, Opera omnia. III, 459; Gesammelte Schriften, XVI,
193 sq.
174
175
GASSENDI ON A TT R A C T I O N AND GRAVI TY
pushing implies the pulling of that instrument, he tells us that he

considers
APPENDIX G
Gassendi on Attraction and Gravity

Gassendi was a not very good physicist, a bad mathematician - he
did not understand Galileos deduction of the law of falling bodies
and wanted to supplement the action of gravity by that of a pressure
of the air - and a rather second-rate philosopher. Yet, in his own
time, and even through the whole seventeenth century, he was both
very famous and very influential; even Newton speaks about him with
great favor and it may be^ that he was influenced by him. Moreover,
from the point of view of the history of science he has the merit of
having, in a most effective and spectacular way, in a series of ex
periments performed in the harbor of Marseille on a galley that the
governor of the province, the Count dAllais, put at his disposal
(in 1641), demonstrated the truth of the assertion of Galileo (and
Bruno) that a stone, or a bullet, let fall from the mast of a moving
ship will fall at the foot of the mast, and not lag behind. He was not
the first to make this experiment yet he was the first to make it pub
licly and to describe it, in his De motu impresso a motore translato
(Paris, 1641); he has also the great merit of having been able to go
beyond Galileo in freeing himself from the spell of circularity and to
give, in the same De motu, a correct formulation of the principle of
inertia. As I have shown elsewhere,^ and as we shall see, it was be
cause of his conception of gravity as an effect of attraction that he
was able to do it. As for this conception he obviously formed it under
the joint influence of Copernicus and Kepler, though he modified
both of them by an admixture of the notion of effluvia.
Thus, having explained that attraction is not very different from
impulsus, since to attract is nothing else than to push {impellere)
something toward oneself by an incurved instrument,while this
' See supra, p. 85, n. 4.
* A. Koyre, Gassendi savant, Actes du Congris du Tricentenaire de Gassendi
(Paris, 1957).
* See supra, p. 68.
* Etudes galiUennes (Paris: Hermann, 1939), part III.
See infra. Appendix I.
De motu, ep. I, cap. XVII, p. 68.
176
gravity, which is in the very parts of the Earth, and in the terrestrial bodies,
to be not so much an innate force [vis insita], as a force impressed by the
attraction of the Earth; indeed, we can understand it from the hereadjoined example of the magnet: let us take and hold in the hand a small
plate of iron of some ounces; if then a most powerful magnet should be
put under the hand, we would experience a weight no longer of ounces, but
of several pounds. And because we will have to admit that this weight is
not so much innate [insitum] to the iron, as impressed [in it] by the attrac
tion of the magnet placed under the hand; thus also where we deal with the
weight or the gravity of a stone or of another terrestrial body, we can un
derstand that this gravity is in this kind of body not so much from itself
[its own nature] as from the attraction of Earth that is below it.^
How does this attraction act? Gassendi, taking Keplers image
of chains, strings, or sinews as expressing the literal truth of the
matter, assumes that each particle of the heavy body is linked with
the earth by thin strings that pull it toward it. Which, by the way,
makes clear the cause of the difference in weight of small and large
bodies - more particles, more strings - and explains, at the same time,
why small and large bodies fall to the ground in the same time: the
heavier one is pulled down with a force proportional to the moles,
that is, the number of particles, it includes, and it resists this pull in
the same proportion:
Thus it happens, that if two stones or two globes [made] of the same
material, for instance, of lead, the one small and the other very large, were
simultaneously let fall from the same altitude, they will reach the Earth
at the same momentand with a not lesser speed, the small one, though it
should be not heavier than one ounce, and the large one, though it [should
weigh] a hundred or more pounds; it is evident that the large one is
attracted by a greater number of small strings, and that there are more
particles that attract it; so that there results therefrom a proportion be
tween the force and the mass [moles] and from both of them [the force and
the mass] results in both cases [a force] sufficient for the accomplishment
of the motion in the same time. Most astonishing: if the globes were of
different material, for instance the one of lead and the other of wood, the
one will reach the Earth hardly later than the other, that is the wooden
than the leaden; for the proportion will take place in the same manner, as
long as to the same number of particles will be attached the same number
of strings.
How far does this attractive power reach? Very far, possibly to the
* Ibid., ep. I, cap. XV, p.61.
1 Ibid.,ep. II, cap. VIII, p. 116.

177
GASSENDI ON A TT R A C T I O N AND GRAVI TY
p l an e ts bu t, assuming that the attraction is produced by the mag

netic rays emanating from the earth, the bodies in the region of the
planets will be drawn much less strongly, because in these regions
the density and the number of these rays will decrease with the dis
tance. For the same reason it will not extend to the fixed stars, as no
rays, or hardly any, will reach so far: For, if the cause [of the fall]
be the attraction produced by the magnetic rays, as these rays are so
much rarer and become so much lesser in number as the distance
from the Earth increases, it may be that they pull the globe from the
region of the Planets, but not so strongly; but not from the region of
the fixes. ^
Strangely enough, or perhaps characteristically for Gassendi, from
these considerations he does not draw the conclusion that bodies
falling to the earth from the region of the planets will move, at least
at the beginning, much more slowly than they do on earth, and that,
from the region of the fixed stars, they will not come down at all.
Quite the contrary; he proceeds to the determination of the incredible
speed with which bodies would move if we admitted that they will
fall to the earth frpm everywhere. In this case, he says, they will start
with the velocity that they have here, and increase it gradually, as
here, and will come from the moon in two and a half hours, from the
sun in less than eleven and a quarter hours, and from the fixed stars
in one day, eleven and a quarter hours.
Gassendis conception of gravity as strings pulling bodies toward
the earth - a rather naive one, but after all not very much more so
than that of Faradays lines of force - entails a rather interesting and
unexpected consequence: for him no more than for Descartes is
there an action through the void. In order that a body be attracted by,
or tend toward, another - for instance, a heavy body by the earth something, some kind of effluvium from the attracting one, must
reach the attracted. Indeed, let us
but the whole world is reduced to nothing, and that these spaces are com
pletely empty as [they were] before God created the world; then, indeed,
as there will be no center, all the spaces will be similar; it is obvious that the
stone will not come here, but will remain motionless in its place. Now let
the world, and in it the Earth be put back again: will the stone immediately
drive here? If you say that it will, it is necessary [to admit] that the Earth
will be felt by the stone, and therefore the Earth must transmit to it a cer
tain force, and send out the corpuscles, by which it gives to it an impres
sion of itself, in order, so to say, to announce to it that it [the Earth] is
restored in being and put back in the same place. How, otherwise, could
you understand that the stone should tend towards the Earth ?^
It is difficult to tell whether these particles that reach the body
excite it and make it tend or drive toward the earth, or
whether they build the string that pulls it. Probably both. Why not?
After all, even Kepler speaks about bodies seeking the earth;
and do not magnets that pull small bodies toward them move them
selves toward the large ones? In any case,
if some space of the air that surrounds it should, by God, be made com
pletely void, so that neither from the Earth, nor from elsewhere could any
thing penetrate it: would a stone placed in it move toward the Earth, or its
center? Assuredly not more than [the stone] placed in the ultramundial
spaces; because for this stone, which would have no communication what
ever either with the Earth or with any other thing in the world, it would
be the same as if the world, and the Earth, or the center were not and as if
nothing whatever existed.
^ De motu, ep. I, cap. XV, p. 59.
* Ibid., ep. I, cap. XV, p. 60. On Gassendi, see B. Rochot, Les Travaux de Gassendi
sur Epicure et Vatomisme (Paris: Vrin, 1944), and of course K. Lasswitz, Geschichte
der Atomistik (Hamburg and Leipzig, 1890), vol. II.
conceive a stone in those imaginary spaces that are extended beyond this
world, and in which God could create other worlds; do you think that,
at the very moment that it [the stone] would be formed there, it would
fly towards the Earth and not, rather, remain unmoved where it was first
placed, as if, so to say, it had no up, nor down where it should tend and
wherefrom it should withdraw?
But if you think that it will come here, imagine that not only the Earth
^Syntagma philosophicum physicae, sec. I, lib. V, cap. Ill, p. 352; Opera omnia
(Lyons, 1657), vol. I.
* Syntagma, sec. I, lib. V, cap. Ill, p. 352.
178
179
HOOKE ON G RA V I TA T I O N A L A TT R A C T I O N
A P P E N D IX H
Hooke on Gravitational Attraction

In May 1666, Hooke presented to the Royal Society a paper . . .
concerning the inflexion of a direct motion into a curve by a super
vening attractive principle, in which, curiously enough, he devises,
and rejects, a possible explanation of gravitational attraction by
aetheric pressure, quite analogous to that which Newton formulated
fifty years later in Query XXI of his English Opticks of 1717:^
I have often wondered, why the planets should move about the sun
according to Copernicus' supposition, being not included in any solid
orbs (which the ancients possibly for this reason might embrace) nor tied
to it, as their centre, by any visible strings; and neither depart from it be
yond such a degree, nor yet move in a straight line, as all bodies, that have
but one single impulse, ought to do: For a solid body, moved in a fluid,
towards any part (unless it be protruded aside by some near impulse, or
be impeded in that motion by some other obviating body; or that the
medium, through which it is moved, be supposed not equally penetrable
every way) must preserve in its motion in a right line, and neither deflect
this way nor that way from it. But all the celestial bodies, being regular
solid bodies, and moved in a fluid, and yet moved in circular or elliptical
lines, and not straight, must have some other cause, besides the first im
pressed impulse, that must bend their motion into that curve. And for the
performance of this effect I cannot imagine any other likely cause besides
these two: The first may be from an unequal density of the medium,
through which the planetary body is to be moved; that is, if we suppose
that part of the medium, which is farthest from the centre, or sun, to be
more dense outward, than that which is more near, it will follow, that the
direct motion will be always deflected inwards, by the easier yielding of the
inward, and the greater resistance of the outward part of that medium.
This hath some probabilities attending it; as, that if the ether be somewhat
of the nature of the air, tis rational that that part, which is nearer the sun,
the fountain of heat, should be most rarefied; and consequently that those,
which are most remote, should be most dense: But there are other improb
abilities, that attend this supposition, which being nothing to my present
purpose I shall omit.
But the second cause of inflecting a direct motion into a curve may be
from an attractive property of the body placed in the centre, whereby it
continually endeavours to attract or draw it to itself. For if such a principle
See pp. 160-161.
180
be supposed, all the phenomena of the planets seem possible to be ex

plained by the common principle of mechanic motions; and possibly the
prosecuting this speculation, may give us a true hypothesis of their motion,
and from some few observations their motions may be so far brought to a
certainty that we may be able to calculate them to the greatest exactness
and certainty that can be desired.^
Hooke endeavored to explicate this inflection by the example
of the conical pendulum, stating, however, that in this case the
conatus of returning to the centre . . . is greater and greater according
as it is farther and farther removed from the centre, which seems to
be otherwise in the attraction of the sun. In spite of this very im
portant difference between the law of gravitational attraction and
that of the conical pendulum, this latter presented indeed a very good
analogy of the planetary motions: its bob described circles, or vari
ously directed ellipses, according to the force of the impetus conferred
to it:
May 23d. 1666. There was read a Paper of Mr. Hooke's explicating the
Inflexion of a direct motion into a Curve, by a supervening, attractive
Principle, which was orderd to be Registerd. The Discourse containd
therein is an Introduction to an Experiment to shew that Circular Motion,
is compounded of an indeavour by a direct motion by the Tangent, and of
another indeavour tending to the Center: To which purpose there was a
Pendulum fastened to the Roof of the Room with a large wooden Ball of
Lignum Vitae on the end of it; and it was found, that if the Impetus of the
indeavour by the Tangent, at the first setting out, was stronger than the
indeavour to the Center, there was generated such an Elliptical Motion,
whose longest Diameter was parallel to the direct indeavour of the Body
at the first Impulse: But if that Impetus were weaker than that indeavour to
the Center, there was generated such an Elliptical Motion, whose shorter
Diameter was parallel to the direct indeavour of the Body in the first point
of the Impulse; if both were equal there was made a perfect Circular Mo
tion. There was also made another Experiment, by fastening another
Pendulous Body by a short String on the lower part of the Wire, by which
the greater weight was suspended, that it might freely make a Circular or
Elliptical Motion round the bigger, whilst the bigger movd Circularly or
Elliptically about the first Center. The intention whereof was to explicate
the manner of the Moons motion about the Earth, it appearing evidently
thereby, that neither the bigger Ball, which represented the Earth, nor the
less which represented the Moon, were movd in so perfect a Circle or
Ellipsis, as otherwise they would have been, if either of them had been
suspended and movd singly: But that a certain Point which seemd to be
^ See Richard Waller, The Life of Dr. Robert Hooke, in The Posthumous Works
o f Robert Hooke (London, 1705), p. xii; Thomas Birch, History o f the Royal Society
(London, 1757), 1, 90 sq.; E. Gunther, Early Science in Oxford (Oxford, 1930), VI, 265
sq.
181
HOOKE ON G RA V I TA T I O N A L A T T R AC T I O N
the Center of Gravity of the two Bodies (howsoever posited and considerd
as one) seemd to be regularly movd, in such a Circle or Ellipsis, the two
Balls having other peculiar motions in small Epicicles about the said
Point.^
But this I durst promise the undertaker, that he will find all the great
motions of the world to be influenced by this principle, and that the true
understanding thereof will be the true perfection of astronomy.^
Hooke rightly concluded therefrom that

by this hypothesis the phenomena of the comets, as well as of the planets,
may be solved; and the motions of the secondary as well as of the primary
planets. The motions also of the progression of the apsides are very evident,
but as for the motion of libration or latitude that cannot be so well made
out by this way of pendulum; but by the motion of a wheel upon a point
is most easy.^
Somewhat later, in his lectures given to the Royal Society at Gres
ham House in 1670, Hooke wrote:
I shall . . . hereafter explain a system of the world differing in many
particulars from any yet known, but answering in all things to the common
rules of mechanical motions. This depends upon three suppositions: First,
That all celestial bodies whatsoever have an attraction or gravitating power
towards their own centres, whereby they attract not only their own parts,
and keep them from flying from them, as we may observe the Earth to do,
but that they also do attract all the other celestial bodies that are within the
sphere of their activity, and consequently that not only the Sun and Moon
have an influence upon the body and motion of the Earth, and the Earth
upon them, but that Mercury, Venus, Mars, Jupiter, and Saturn also, by
their attractive powers, have a considerable influence upon its motion,
as in the same manner the corresponding attractive power of the Earth
hath a considerable influence upon every one of their motions also. The
second supposition is this, that all bodies whatsoever that are put into a
direct and simple motion, will so continue to move forward in a straight
line till they are, by some other effectual powers, deflected, and sent into a
motion describing a circle, ellipsis, or some other more compounded
curve line. The third supposition is, that these attractive powers are so
much the more powerful in operating by how much the nearer the body
wrought upon is to their own centres. Now, what these several degrees are,
I have not yet experimentally verified, but it is a notion which, if fully
prosecuted, as it ought to be, will mightily assist the astronomers to reduce
all the celestial motions to a certain rule, which I doubt will never be done
without it. He that understands the nature of the circular pendulum, and of
circular motion, will easily understand the whole of this principle, and will
know where to find directions in nature for the true stating thereof. This
I only hint at present to such as have ability and opportunity of prosecuting
this inquiry, and are not wanting of industry for observing and calculating,
wishing heartily such may be found, having myself many other things in
hand which I would first complete, and therefore cannot so well attend it.
* Birch, History o f the Royal Society, 1,90 sq.
Ibid.
182
Hooke was right, of course, in stating that the true under

standing of the principle of universal attraction would lead to the
true perfection of astronomy ; it is precisely what Newton did in his
Principia. His explanation, however, of why he does not himself
prosecute this inquiry, and thus did not himself make the greatest
discovery in nature that ever was made since the worlds creation,^
sounds rather lame: the truth of the matter is that Hooke did not
understand the nature of the circular pendulum and of circular
motion (something for which we cannot blame him: at that time 1670 - nobody but Huygens and Newton did) and failed in his un
workable attempts to verify the law of attraction experimentally.
Still it is rather surprising that he not only published in 1674 (that is,
after the publication in 1673 of Huygenss Horologium oscillatorium,
where the nature of the circular pendulum and of circular motion was
stated for the first time) his lectures of 1670 but even let them be in
cluded, without alteration, in the Lectiones Cutlerianae in 1679. All
the more so as it is well known that some time in the late seventies
(certainly long after the perusal of Huygenss Horologium oscilla
torium of 1673, which contained the formulation of the law of centri
fugal force that he was unable to deduce himself), Hooke - as also
Halley and Wren - discovered the inverse-square law of gravitational
attraction and even mentioned it in a letter to Newton of 6 January
1680. Yet he could not deduce from it the elliptical trajectory of the
planets {a) because he lacked sufficient mathematical ability and
(b) because he accepted as correct Keplers erroneous assumption
that the speed of a planet was, in each point of the trajectory, in
versely proportional to its distance from the sun. This latter point
seems to me to invalidate his claims to the discovery of the law of
universal gravitation before Newton. Curiously enough, it has been
missed by the latest defenders of Hookes priority rights.^ It is, how' An Attempt to prove the motion o f the Earth by Observation (London, 1674), pp.
27 sq., republished in the Lectiones Cutlerianae (London, 1679), and in Gunther,
Early Science in Oxford, vol. VIII.
* Letter of T. Aubrey to Antony Wood, 15 September 1689; see Hookes Diary
in Gunther, Early Science in Oxford, VII, 714.
A. Koyre, An Unpublished Letter of Robert Hooke to Isaac Newton, infra.
Chapter V.
* Miss D. Patterson, Hookes Gravitation Theory, Isis 40 (1949), 327-341; 41
(1950), 32-45; Jobs. Lohne, Hooke versus Newton, Centaurus 7 (1960), 6-52.
183
ever, interesting to note that in 1680 Hooke devised an extremely in

genious mechanical theory of gravitational attraction, which he
explained by the action of quick vibrations of the aether on the bodies
immersed in it.
Suppose then that there is in the Ball of the Earth such a Motion, as I,
for distinction sake, will call a Globular Motion, whereby all the Parts
thereof have a Vibration towards and fromwards the Center, or of Expan
sion and Contraction; and that this vibrative Motion is very short and very
quick, as it is in all very hard and very compact Bodies: That this vibrative
Motion does communicate or produce a Motion in a certain Part of the
Aether, which is interspersed between these solid vibrating Parts; which
communicated Motion does cause this interspersed Fluid to vibrate every
way in Orbem, from and towards the Center, in Lines radiating from the
same. By which radiating Vibration of this exceeding Fluid, and yet exceed
ing dense. Matter, not only all the Parts of the Earth are carried or forced
down towards the Center; but the Motion being continued into the Aether,
interspersed between the Air and other kinds of Fluids, it causeth those
also to have a tendency towards the Center; and much more any sensible
Body whatsoever, that is anywhere placed in the Air, or above it, though at
a vast Distance; which Distance I shall afterwards determine, and shew
with what proportioned Power it acts upon Bodies at all Distances both
without and within the Earth: For this Power propagated, as I shall then
shew, does continually diminish according as the Orb of Propagation does
continually increase, as we find the Propagations of the Media of Light
and Sound also to do; as also the Propagation of Undulation upon the
Superficies of Water. And from hence I conceive the Power thereof to be
always reciprocal to the Area or Superficies of the Orb of Propagation, that
is duplicate of the Distance; as will plainly follow and appear from the con
sideration of the Nature thereof, and will hereafter be more plainly evinced
by the Effects it causes at such several Distances.^
Though Hookes role in the history of science is better understood
today than it was in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries,^ and
though his works and diaries have been published and republished,^
he still has not received the full monographical treatment to which
he is doubtless entitled.^
* Of Comets and Gravity, Posthumous Works, pp. 184 sq.
* E. N. da C. Andrade, Robert tiooke,' Proceedings o f the Royal Society (^London
[A] 201 (1950), 439-473.
* Gunther, Early Science in Oxford, vols. V-VIIl, X, XIII; and The Diary o f
Robert Hooke, 1672-1680, ed. H. Robinson and W. Adams (London: Taylor and
Francis, 1935).
* For the literature on Hooke, see Lohne, cited on p. 183, n. 4; for his vibrational
theory of gravitation, see J. Zennek, Gravitation , Encyclopddie der mathematischen
Wissenschaften (Leipzig, 1903-1921), Bd. V, Physik.
184
A P PE N DI X I
Gassendi and Horizontal Motion

As I have mentioned,^ it is his belief in attraction, that is, his explana
tion of gravity by attraction, that enables Gassendi to go beyond
Galileo and not only to free himself from the spell of circularity,
but also to deny the privileged character of horizontal and ver
tical (up and down) directions and to assert the equivalence of all
of these.
Gassendi starts by suggesting that though, of course, nothing vio
lent can be perpetual, this famous dictum does not apply to horizon
tal m o t i o n q u i t e the contrary: horizontal motion could and even
should be considered a natural motion, and this not only in the case
in which the earth turns on its axis and stones and other terrestrial
objects participate in this motion, but also if it stood still. Horizon
tal motion is, as a matter of fact, a circular one, a motion that follows
the surface of the earth, and thus does not change its distance from
the center: it moves neither up nor down. Let us imagine,
continues Gassendi, a perfectly round ball placed on a horizontal
surface - that is, the surface of the earth - that we assume to be per
fectly smooth and polished (an example used already by Nicolaus of
Cusa and Galileo):^ is it not clear that it will never cease to move,
and will never slow down or accelerate its motion, as we have sup
posed all external obstacles removed from its path and as at every
instant of its motion it will be in the same position in respect to the
surface upon, and to the center around, which it moves?
A body thrown horizontally in the air will not, of course, behave
in this manner, because with its horizontal motion will be admixed
a perpendicular one; in other words, because of its gravity, it will
go down and describe a curve.
Galileo, who still thought of gravity as pertaining to the body it
self, could not go further: he could not make an abstraction from
it; he needed therefore a surface - be it spherical as in the Dialogo
' Supra, p. 176.
* De motu impresso a motore translato, cap. X, pp. 38 sq.
A. Koyr6, Etudes galiliennes (Paris: Hermann, 1939), part III, pp. 148, 149.
N
185
GASSENDI AND H O R I Z O N T A L MOTION
or truly horizontal, that is, plane, as in the Discorsi - that had to

support the bodies in order to prevent them from going down.
Gassendi, however, for whom gravity was only an effect of an
attraction, that is, of a force external to the body, could very well
make an abstraction from it: in order to deprive a body of its gravity
he had only to suppress (in thought or in imagination) all other
bodies that could act upon it, and place it in the void, for instance,
in the imaginary spaces that extend ad infinitum beyond the world.^
Vice versa, in order to explain the real behavior of heavy bodies, that
is, their not continuing their motion in a horizontal line, in other
words, the admixture of the perpendicular motion that incurves it
toward the earth, it is necessary, besides the impellent cause, to
recur to an attracting one which accomplishes this task. Indeed, what
else is this power than that which pertains to the whole Earth and
can be called magnetic ?^ But in the imaginary spaces the body will
not be subjected to this attraction; moreover, there will be no
center around which to turn; the horizontal motion will therefore
become rectilinear and the body, once put in motion, will move
forever, in the same direction and with the same speed.
that all motion that is impressed on a body is in itself of that kind; so that in
whatever direction you throw a stone, if you suppose that, at the moment
in which it leaves the hand, by divine power, everything besides this stone is
reduced to nothing, it would result that the stone will continue its motion
perpetually and in the same direction in which the hand has directed it.
And if it does not do so [in fact], it seems that the cause is the admixion
of the perpendicular motion which intervenes because of the attraction of
the Earth, which makes it deviate from its path (and does not cease until
it arrives at the Earth), just as iron scrapings thrown near a magnet do not
move in a straight line but are deviated toward the magnet.^
' Ibid., ep. I, cap. XVI, pp. 69 sq.
You ask me, what will happen to that body which I assumed can be
conceived [to exist] in these void spaces, if, removed from rest, it should be
impelled by a certain force? I answer that it is probable that it will move
uniformly and incessantly; and that slowly or quickly according to whether
a small or a great impetus will be impressed upon it. As for the argument,
I take it from the uniformity of the horizontal motion already explained.
Indeed this latter seems not to cease but for the admixion of the perpendicu
lar motion; so that, as in the void spaces there is no admixion of the per
pendicular motion, in whatever direction the motion should begin, it
would be akin to the horizontal, and will neither accelerate, nor slow down,
and therefore, will never cease.
Thus, in the imaginary void spaces, motion is conserved. But
not only there: as a matter of fact, it is conserved on this very earth.
In order to demonstrate it, Gassendi gives a careful description and
analysis of the pendular motion, of which, following Galileo, he
asserts the perfect isochronism, and concludes:
All that has no other aim than to make us understand that motion im
pressed [on a body] through void space where nothing either attracts, or
resists, will be uniform, and perpetual; and that, therefrom, we conclude
' See supra, p. 178.
De motu, ep. I, cap. XIII, p. 46.
Ibid., ep. I, cap. XVI, pp. 62 sq.
186
187
THE STATE OF MOTI ON AND THE STATE OF REST
APPENDIX J
The State o f Motion and the State o f Rest

I would like to point out that the expressions state of motion and
state of rest are used neither by Huygens, nor by Wallis, nor even
by Hooke. Thus Huygens, in his De motu corporum ex percussione^
(published only posthumously in 1703, but written in 1656), states as
Hypothesis I: A body in motion, when it does not encounter any
obstacle, tends to move perpetually with the same speed and in a
straight line ; and in the Horologium oscillatorium of 1673, Hypo
thesis I asserts: If there were no gravity, and the air did not oppose
the motion of bodies, any body, having once started its motion, would
continue it with a uniform speed in a straight line.^
Wallis, as a matter of fact, does not even give a special formulation
of the principle of inertia. He states, at the very beginning of his De
motu, that
under motion we understand local motion; though logicians deal with
several kinds of motion, such as generation, augmentation, alteration, etc.
(I do not want to discuss here whether all these can be reduced to the local
motion); we shall take here Motus in its more common acceptance as mean
ing local motion that is usually called (poqd, or latio,^
Having then explained that he will call momentum that which

produces motion and impedimentum that which opposes it, that if
the momentum is stronger than the impedimentum motion will be
produced, or accelerated, and contrariwise, retarded or arrested if the
impedimentum is stronger than the momentum, and that, if the momen
tum and the impedimentum are of equal strength {si aequipollent)
motion will neither be produced nor arrested, but that whatever was
there before, whether motion or rest, will persevere,^ he says in a
scholium:
It seems that the last part of this proposition, that is, that motion once
begun (provided no obstacle be posited) will persevere by its own force
* Huygens, Oeuvres complites, XVI, 30.
* Pars II, De descensu gravium et motu eorum in cycloide, ibid., XVII, 125.
* Mechanica, sive tractatus de motu geometricus (London, 1670), pars I, cap. I, def.
II, p. 2.
* Ibid., pars I, cap. II, prop. XI, p. 18.
188
(spontaneously) without a motor adjoined, no less than the already existing

rest (if no motor be joined), was postulated by Galileo, Descartes, Gassendi,
and others; and herefrom they drew conclusions of no small importance.
But I do not remember any one that has seen it demonstrated.^
However, he later says, Motion, if there be no impedimentum,

will persevere with the same speed, even if there were no cause of
motion joined to it.^ Hooke^ makes only the supposition that all
bodies whatsoever that are put into a direct and simple motion will
so continue to move forward in a straight line, and so forth.'*
As for Newton, in his Waste Book of 1664 he writes:
2. A
quantity will always move in the same straight line (nor changing
the determination or celerity of its motion) unless some external
cause divert it. He states, however, following Descartes, that every
thing perseveres in its actual state unless disturbed by some external
cause.
In the De gravitate et aequipondio fluidorum, Newton uses the Car
tesian formula in his definition of force (vis) and inertia:
Def. V. Force is the causal principle of motion and rest. And it is either
an external principle, which generates or destroys or in some way changes
the motion impressed on any body, or it is an internal principle by which
the existing motion or rest is conserved in a body, and by which any being
endeavours to persevere in its state and opposed resistance . . .
Def. VIII. Inertia is the internal force of a body, so that its state cannot
be easily changed by an externally applied force.
In the Propositiones de motu sent to the Royal Society in 1684, he

states that he will call inherent or innate force the force owing to
which a body tends to persevere in its rectilinear motion {vim cor
poris, seu corpori insitam, qua id conatur perseverare in motu suo
' Ibid., pars I, cap. I, prop. XI, scholium, p. 19.
* Ibid., pars III, cap. X, p. 645, where he refers to pars I, cap. I, prop. XI.
See supra, p. 182.
* Mechanica, pars III, cap. X, p. 645.
Cambridge University Library MS. Add. 4004. See J. W. Herivel, Sur les pre
mieres recherches de Newton en dynamique, Revue d'Histoire des Sciences 15 (1962),
110.
A. R. Hall and M. B. Hall, editors, A Selection from the Unpublished Scientific
Papers o f Sir Isaac Newton in the Portsmouth Collection, Cambridge University Library
(Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1962), p. 114:

Def 5. Vis est motus et quietis causale principium. Estque vel externum quod in
aliquod corpus impressum motum ejus vel generat vel destruit, vel aliquo saltern modo
mutat, vel est internum principium quo motus vel quies corpori indita conservatur,
et quodlibet ens in suo statu perseverare conatur & impeditum reluctatur . . .
Def 8. Inertia est vis interna corporis ne status ejus externa vi illata facile
mutetur.
189
secundum lineam rectamy and that every body by the innate force
alone advances in infinitum along a straight line provided nothing
external hinders it {corpus omne sola vi insita uniformiter secundum
lineam rectam in infinitum progredi, nisi aliquid extrinsecus impediat).^
In the De motu sphaericorum corporum in fiuidis^ which must be
somewhat later than the Propositiones de motu (its beginning - the
definitions - is identical with that of the Propositiones de motu), MSS
B and C have Hypothesis I: By the innate force alone the body
moves uniformly in a straight line perpetually if nothing hinders it
{sola vi insita corpus uniformiter in linea recta semper pergere si nil
impediat). But Hypothesis II introduces the term state of motion
or rest : The changing of the state of motion or rest is propor
tional to the impressed force and occurs in the straight line that the
[said] force impresses. MS D has the same text as B and C, but
changes hypothesis into lex:
THE STATE OF MOTION AND THE STATE OF REST
each other; nor do those [bodies] truly rest that are commonly regarded as
at rest.^
1 MS A, De motu corporum, ibid., pp. 239 sq.:
3. Materiae vis insita est potentia resistendi qua corpus unumquodque quantum in
se est perseverat in statu suo vel quiescendi vel movendi uniformiter in directum. Estque
corpori suo proportionalis, neque differt quicquam ab inertia massae nisi in modo
conceptus nostri. Exercet vero corpus hanc vim solummodo in mutatione status
sui facta per vim aliam in se impressam estque Exercitium ejus Resistentia et Impetus
respectu solo ab invicem distinct!: Resistentia quatenus corpus reluctatur vi impressae.
Impetus quatenus corpus difficulter cedendo conatur mutare statum corporis alterius.
Vulgus insuper resistentiam quiescentibus & impetum moventibus tribuit: sed motus
et quies ut vulgo concipiuntur respectu solo distinguuntur ab invicem: neque vere
quiescunt quae vulgo tanquam quiescentia spectantur.
Law I : A body always continues uniformly in a straight line by its innate

force alone if nothing impedes it.
Law II: Change in the state of motion or rest is proportional to the
impressed force and occurs along the right line in which that force is
impressed.^
Finally, the De motu corporum, which I believe to be still later, has
the full formula of the Principia:
Def. 3: The innate force of matter is the power to resist, by which the
body, so far as in it is, perseveres in its state either of being at rest or mov
ing uniformly in a straight line. And it is proportional to its body and does not
differ at all from the inertia of the mass, but in the manner of our concep
tion. And the body exercises this force only in the changes of its state
produced by an external force impressed upon it. And in its action the
Resistance and Impetus are only respectively distinct from each other in
this respect: it is Resistance in so far as the body opposed the impressed
force. Impetus in so far as a body yielding with difficulty endeavours to
change the state of the other body. The vulgar, moreover, attribute resist
ance to [bodies] at rest, and impetus to the moving [ones]; but motion and
rest, as they are commonly conceived, are only respectively distinct from
^ Def. II. See W. W. Rouse Ball, An Essay on Newton's Principia (Cambridge, 1892),
pp. 35 sq.
* Hypothesis II, ibid., pp. 36.
* Unpublished Scientific Papers, pp. 243 sq.
Ibid., p. 243:
"Lex /: Sola vi insita corpus uniformiter in linea recta semper pergere si nil impediat,
"Lex II: Mutationem status movendi vel quiescendiproportionalem esse vi impressae et
fieri secundum lineam rectam qua vis ilia imprirnitur.
190
191
DESCARTES ON THE I N F I N I T E AND THE I N D E F I N I T E
AP P EN DI X K
Descartes on the Infinite and the Indefinite

Though Giordano Bruno^ had stated that the concept of the actual
infinite {in actu) is perfectly accessible to human intellect (not, how
ever, to human senses or imagination), it was left to Descartes to
assert not only that this concept is a positive one, whereas that of
finitude is negative (and not vice versa), but also that the concept of
the infinite not only is accessible but is even the first one that is given
to the human mind, which can conceive finitude only by the negation
of it. Accordingly, in contradistinction to the traditional teaching
which places the idea of God beyond the reach of human intelligence
(whence the rejection of Saint Anselms proof by Saint Thomas and
the Thomistic scholastics), Descartes asserts that the idea of God as
the absolutely, that is, infinitely, perfect being {ens infinitum et in
finite perfectum) is the very first, innate, idea of the human mind,
prior even to that of self. Indeed, I cannot conceive myself, that is, a
finite thought, if not in opposition to the idea of infinite thought,
that is, of God!
I must not think that I do not perceive the infinite by a true idea, but
only by the negation of the finite, as I perceive rest and darkness by the
negation of motion and light; but on the contrary I obviously understand
that there is more reality in the infinite substance than in a finite one, and
therefore in a certain manner the perception of the infinite is prior in me to
[that of] the finite, that is of God to that of myself. By what reason, indeed,
could I understand that I doubt, that I desire, that is, that I am lacking
something, and that I am not wholly perfect, if I had no idea of a perfect
being by comparison to which I recognize my defects?
In a letter to Clerselier, 23 April 1649, Descartes says:

I never use the word infinite [infini] in order to signify only not having
an end, which is negative, and to which I have applied the word indefinite,
but to signify a real thing which is incomparably greater than all those
* De I'infinito universo et memdi (Venice [actually London], 1584); see Mrs. D. W.
Singers English translation, On the Infinite Universe and the Worlds, adjoined to her
Giordano Bruno, His Life and Thought (New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1950), First
Dialogue, pp. 250 sq.
See Meditationes, III, in Oeuvres, VII, 45.
192
that have an end. The notion that I have of the infinite is in me before that
of the finite because, from that alone that I conceive being or that which is
without thinking whether it is finite or infinite, it is the infinite being that
I conceive; but, in order that I could conceive a finite being, it is necessary
that I remove something from this general notion of being, which, con
sequently, must precede.^
Descartess position concerning the infinite has often been mis

understood by historians, who have even deemed it to be inconsistent.
Descartes, on the one hand, firmly maintains the priority of the
concept of the infinite, and, accordingly, its perfect validity, asserting
that there is no contradiction in the idea of an infinite number and
that matter not only is indefinitely divisible (which implies the im
possibility of atoms) but is even actually divided into an infinite
number of parts; and, on the other hand, he just as firmly refuses to
deal with problems concerning the composition of the continuum
or to answer questions such as whether the infinite number is odd or
even, whether there are infinities larger or smaller than others, and
so on.^ This because, though it is a clear and therefore true idea, it is
however not a distinct one, and even cannot be distinct for finite
minds. This being so;
We have to observe two things carefully: the first being that we always
keep before our eyes that Gods power and goodness are infinite, in order
that this should make us understand that we must not fear to fail in imagin
ing His works too great, too beautiful, or too perfect; but that, on the
contrary, we can fail if we suppose in them any boundaries or limits of
which we have no certain knowledge . . . We must always keep before our
eyes that the capacity of our mind is very mediocre, and that we must not
be so presumptuous as it seems we would be if we supposed that the uni
verse had any limits, without being assured of it by divine revelation or, at
least, by very evident natural reasons; because it would [mean] that we
want our thoughts to be able to imagine something beyond that to which
Gods power has extended itself in creating the world.
It may be, of course, that, besides the systematic reasons for not
applying the term infinite to the world, Descartes had also tac
tical ones. Thus, answering a letter of Chanut (11 May 1647),
who informs him about a doubt of Queen Christina of Sweden
concerning the compatibility of the hypothesis of an infinite
world with the Christian religion, Descartes writes:
* Oeuvres, V, p. 356.
^ Principia philosophiae, pars I, Sec. 26, in Oeuvres, IX, 36.
Ibid., pars III, Secs. 1 and 2; pp. 80 sq. and 103 sq.
193
I remember that the Cardinal of Cusa and several other Doctors have
supposed the world infinite, without having ever been reproved by the
Church on this subject; on the contrary, it is believed that to conceive His
works very great is to honor God. And my opinion is less difficult to receive
than theirs; for I do not say that the world is infinite, but indefinite. In
which there is a rather remarkable difference; for [in order] to say that
a thing is infinite, one has to have some reason which makes it known [to
be] such, and this can be the case concerning God alone; but for saying
that it is indefinite, it is sufficient not to have any reason by which one could
prove that it has limits. Thus it seems to me that one cannot prove, nor
even conceive, that there should be limits to the matter of which the world
is composed. Not having thus any reason for proving, and even being un
able to conceive, that the world has limits, I call it indefinite. But I cannot
deny . . . that it may have some that are known by God, though they are
incomprehensible to me, and that is why I do not say absolutely that it is
infinite.^
^ Oeuvres, V, 19 sq.
194
A P P E N DI X L
God and the Infinite

It is well known that in contradistinction to the Greek philosophical
tradition in which - at least usually and mostly - the concept of the
infinite - amiqoiv - means imperfection, indetermination, lack (priva
tion) of form, in the Christian one this concept acquires a positive
meaning denoting the highest perfection of God, who in his essence
and being surpasses all limitation and finitude. Or, as St. Thomas
explains it, this concept is to be understood negative et non privative.
Accordingly, the traditional division of being (divisio entis) into
necessarium and contingens, creans and creation, is closely paralleled
by that of the ens into finitum and infinitum, the infinity being the
privilege of Gods perfection, and the finiteness the unavoidable
defectum of the necessarily imperfect creature. The idea of an in
finite creature is therefore felt to be a contradictio in adjecto and the
question whether God could have made an infinite creature usually
receives a negative answer, which, moreover, is not considered as
imposing a limitation upon Gods (infinite) creative power: the im
possible is not a limit. It is not God who, so to say, is unable to make
an infinite creature, it is the creature {ens creatum) that is unable to
sustain its infinitization. Even those who, like St. Thomas, admitted
the possibility of an actually infinite multitude of (finite) things and
also considered that the ontological structure of the created being
{ens creatum) was not incompatible with a certain kind of successive
infinity - thus the world, once created, could be considered as able to
exist in aeternum and even, creation in time being impossible to de
monstrate, as having existed forever ^ - did not assert the possibility
of its actual infinity,^ but maintained its actual finitude. We have to
mention, however, that in the wake of the protracted, intensive, and
very interesting discussions on the concept of the infinite - in both
of its aspects, that is, the infinitely small and the infinitely great by the philosophers and logicians of the fourteenth century, quite a
number of them went far beyond St. Thomas and even Duns Scotus
' Thomas Aquinas, Summa theologiae, pars I, qu. X, art. 5, ad 4.
* Ibid., pars I, qu., VII, art. 3.
195
GOD AND THE I NF I N I T E
and, rejecting outright the condemnation of the infinite by Aristotle,

accepted unreservedly not only the infinite in potentia (which, mak
ing a sharper logical analysis of the concept, they called syncategorematic) but also of the infinite in actu (that they called categorematic). Thus, for example, Francois de Meyronne, Jean de Bassols,
Robert Holkot, and especially Nicolas Bonnet and Gregorius of
Rimini, the last of whom was one of the greatest logicians of the age,
asserted the divisibility of the continuum into an actually infinite
number of parts, which, moreover, Aristotles contention notwith
standing, could be and even were, all of them, traversed in any finite
movement; they also asserted the possibility - for God - of drawing
an actually infinite line, and so forth. They concluded, accordingly,
that it was possible for God to produce an actually infinite number of
things, for instance of stones, and even to reunite them all in an in
finitely large one. The best formulation of this infinitistic stand
point is to be found in Gregorius of Rimini, who, discussing the
question - Utrum Deus per infinitam suam potentiam posset
producere effectum aliquem infinitum - affirms that God can pro
duce not only an infinite multiplicity of things, existing at the same
time (actual infinity), but also an infinite magnitude as, for instance,
a corpus infinitum (something that St. Thomas had denied and Kepler
will deny), and even raise to infinity, that is, to an infinite intensity, a
certain form or quality, such as heat, or charity, whatever that may
mean, if it means anything.^
It is rather clear that a large part of these discussions about the
possibility, for God, of producing an infinite stone or an infinite
degree of charity - in contradistinction to those that deal with the
composition of the continuum and the eternity of the world - are
logico-metaphysical exercises and deal with purely logico-metaphysical possibilities. Indeed, even Gregorius of Rimini did not assert
that God had, in fact, done all that he could d o ; he only maintained
that he could have done it, though he did not.
It is only with Nicolaus of Cusa that we encounter the idea that
God did everything that he could do in order to explicate in the
world his infinitas complicata. Yet though the idea of Creation
may be considered as strongly attenuated with him, he never asserts

the infinity of the creature (nothing determinate as such can be in
finite: an infinite line is not a line, but infinity; an infinite quantity is
not quantity, but infinity, and so on and he never affirms the infinity
of the world (as Descartes mistakenly assumed him to do) but always
calls it interminate and opposes its limitlessness to the positive
infinity of God. And if Giordano Bruno does it, though distinguish
ing the utterly simple incorporeal infinitude of God from the cor
poreal infinitude of the Universe in which the former becomes ex
plicit, this latter, the infinite and boundless image of the Prime
Origin,^ becomes its necessary adjunct and can hardly be called
creatum.^
As for Descartes, his fundamental proof of Gods existence from
the idea of God - a modification of St. Anselms argument fore
shadowed already by Duns Scotus - is based explicitly upon the
necessary connection of infinity and existence: God exists, and exists
as causa sui in virtue of his infinity, that is, his infinite perfection.'*
But, since at the same time Descartes maintains as strongly as pos
sible the contingent character of the world fully dependent in its
being and structure on Gods creative will, he has to distinguish, as
he does in fact, Gods positive and absolute infinity, which implies
unity, simplicity, and indivisibility from the mere boundlessness
(indefinity) of the world, consistent with multiplicity, divisibility, and
change. Thus, for instance, he says:
* On these medieval discussions see Jean Mair (Johannes Majoris), a late follower
of Gregorius of Rimini, Le Traiti de Vinfini, nouvelle edition, avec traduction et notes
par Hubert Elie (Paris, 1938); and Pierre Duhem, Le Systim e du monde (Paris, 1956),
vol. V II; on the history of the idea of infinity, see Jonas Cohn, Geschichte des Unendlichkeitsproblems im abendldndischen Denken (Leipzig, 1896; Hildesheim, 1960), and
Louis Couturat, De Vinfini matkematique (Paris, 1896).
196
By an infinite substance I understand a substance having true and rea

and actually infinite and immense perfections. This [infinity] is not an
accident superadded to the concept of substance, but the very essence of the
substance taken absolutely, and not limited (terminated) by any defects;
these defects, with respect to the substances, are accidents; but not the
infinity or infiniteness.
^ De visione Dei, cap. XIII; on Nicolaus of Cusa see M. de Gandillac, La PhiloSophie de Nicolas de Cues (Paris: Montaigne, 1942).
* De infinito universo e mondi (Venice [actually London], 1584); see Mrs. D. W.
Singers English translation. On the Infinite Universe and the Worlds, adjoined to her
Giordano Bruno, His Life and Thought (New York: Abelard-Schuman, 1950), First
Dialogue, p. 257.
* A. O. Lovejoy, The Great Chain o f Being (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1936; New York, 1960), and A. Koyre, From the Closed World
to the Infinite Universe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1957).
* A. Koyr6, Essai sur Videe de Dieu et les preuves de son existence chez Descartes
(Paris: Leroux, 1922).
Meditationes, III, in Oeuvres, VII, 40.
197
M O T I O N , S PA C E , AND PLACE
The Dispute about the Nature and Definition of Motion, amongst the
Writers of Philosophy, has always been very perplexed. I suppose, because,
not sufficiently attending to the different Senses of an ambiguous Word,
they endeavoured to comprehend that in one Definition, which ought to
have been very exactly distinguished into its different Parts. That Motion
(or rather the Effect of Motion) in general, is a Translation of a Body from
one Place to another, is pretty well agreed amongst them all. But what is
meant by being translated from one place to another here the Controversy
lies and Philosophers differ widely. They who define Motion by comparing
the Thing which is moved, not with the Bodies that encompass it, but only
with Space which is immoveable and infinite, can never know or under
stand, whether any Body at all rests, nor what the absolute Celerity of those
Bodies that are moved is; for besides, that this whole Globe of the Earth
revolves about the Sun, it can never be known whether or no the Center
of this whole System, in which all the Bodies relating to us is contained,
rests, or is moved uniformly in a streight Line. Again, they who define
Motion, by comparing the Thing which is moved, not with infinite Space,
but with other Bodies, and those at a very great Distance, these necessarily
make some Body the Mark by which all Motion is to be measured, which,
whether it self is at rest, or, with respect to Bodies at a still greater distance,
is moved, is impossible to be known likewise. Lastly, They who define
Motion by comparing the Thing which they say is moved, not with distant
Bodies, but only with that Superficies which immediately touches it; it is
very weak in them to say, that those Things are truly at rest, which being
connected with the Particles of other Bodies, are moved with the greatest
Swiftness; as the Globe of the Earth which is incompassed with Air, and
revolves about the Sun. And on the contrary, that they only can be said to
be moved, that with the utmost Force, and Resistance which they can make,
can do no more than barely hinder themselves from being carried along
with other Bodies, as Fishes which strive against the Stream.
But if we rightly distinguish the different Sense of the ambiguous Word,
this whole Mist will immediately vanish. For a Thing in Motion, may be
considered in three Respects, by comparing it with the Parts of infinite and
immoveable Space, or with Bodies that surround it at a distance, or with that
Superficies which immediately touches it. If these three Considerations be
exactly distinguished into their several Parts, all future Disputes about
Motion will be very easy. First then, a Thing in Motion may be compared
with the Parts of Space: And, because the parts of Space are infinite and
immoveable, and cannot undergo any Change like Matter, therefore that
Change of Situation, which is made with respect to the Parts of Space,
without any regard had to the Bodies which encompass it, may rightly be
called, absolutely and truly proper Motion. Secondly, a Thing in Motion
may be compared with distant Bodies, and because a Body may in this
manner be transferred along with other Bodies which immediately surround
it; therefore that Change of Situation which is made with respect to those
Bodies which are at a distance, and not to those which are near, may pro
perly be called, relatively common Motion. Lastly, a Thing in Motion,
may be compared with the Superficies of those Bodies which immediately
touch it: And because, whatsoever is thus moved, may possibly have no
absolute or common Motion at all (as if an Arrow were shot towards the
West, with the same Swiftness, that the Earth turns towards the East;)
and on the contrary, that which in this respect is at rest, may really be
transferred with both absolute and common Motion (as Bodies hid in the
Bowels of the Earth) therefore that Change of Situation which is made with
respect to those Superficies, which immediately touch the Thing moved,
may rightly be called Motion relatively proper.
First, Absolutely and truly proper Motion, is the Application of a Body,
to the different parts of infinite and immoveable Space. And this is indeed
alone absolute and proper Motion, which is always generated and changed
by the Forces impressed upon the Body that is moved, and by them only;
and to which alone are owing the real Forces of all Bodies to move
other Bodies by their impulse, and to which they are in proportion {See
Newt. Princip. Book I. Def. 2, 8). But this only true Motion cannot be
found out or determined by us, nor can we distinguish, when two Bodies
any way strike against each other, which the true Motion, and consequently
the true Force from whence that Impulse arises, belongs to; whether to
that which seems to us to move swiftest, or to that which moves slowest, or
perhaps seems to be quite at rest; because it cannot be demonstrated
whether the Center of Gravity, as was said before, or of the whole System
(which we may properly enough define to be. One Point in Infinite Space,)
be at rest or no.
Secondly, Motion relatively common is the Change of Situation which
is made with respect, not to those Bodies which are nearest, but to some that
are at a distance. And this sort of Motion we mean, when we say, that
Men, and Trees, and the Globe of the Earth it self revolve about the Sun:
And we mean this Motion also when we consider the Quantity of Motion,
or the Force of a Body in Motion to strike against any Thing. For Example,
when a Ball of Wood, with a piece of Lead in it to make it heavy, is thrown
out of our Hand, we commonly reckon the Quantity of Motion, or the
Force with which the Ball strikes, from the Celerity of the Ball, and the
Weight of the included Lead together. I say we commonly reckon it so,
and indeed truly, with respect to the Force it self, or any sensible Effect of
it; but whether that Force or true Motion be really in the Ball that strikes,
or in the Earth which seems to be stnick, this, as was said before, we cannot
certainly determine.
198
199
A PPE N D IX M
Motion, Space, and Place

Newtons friend Samuel Clarke discussed motion, space, and place
in his notes to Rohaulfs System o f Natural Philosophy".
Lastly, Motion relatively proper, is the successive Application of a Body

to the different Parts of Bodies which immediately touch it. And this is the
Motion we generally mean in PhDosophical Disputes, where we enquire
into the Nature of particular Things, as when we say, that Heat, or Sound,
or Liquidness, consist in Motion. But particular notice ought to be taken,
that the successive Application of a Body is so to be understood, that it is
to be applied successively to the different Parts of the Bodies immediately
touching it, with its whole Superficies taken together {par tout ce qu'il a
dexterieur, as the French expresses it;) as when a Ball that is thrown, glides
against the different Parts of the Air with its whole Superficies; and when
our Hand is moved up and down, it is successively applied with its whole
Superficies, to the different Parts of the Air on the one Side, and of the
Joint by which it is fastned to the Body on the other Side. It was to no
purpose therefore for Mr. Le Clerc to find fault with this Definition, in his
Phys. lib. 5. Chap. 5. It willfollow, says he, that the Banks and the Channel
o f the River are as much moved as the Water, because they are as far re
moved from the Water that runs by, as the Water is from the other Parts
of the Channel and Banks. But the Case of the Water is very different from
that of the Banks. The whole Superficies of the Water is successively applied
to different Parts of the Bodies which surround it, and immediately touch
it, and therefore is transferred from some of those surrounding Bodies to
others. But the Banks are partly fixed to the Earth, and therefore are not
transferred from those Bodies which immediately surround them. For
when we say, that a Body is transferred, we mean that the Whole of it is
transferred. Wherefore an Island sticking up in the middle of a River, is
not moved (not so much as with this mere relative Motion) tho the Water
slides by it, because it is firmly fixed in the Earth, and is not transferred
from that which immediately touches it. So a Body equally poised in a
Liquor whose Parts run upon it with equal Force, is not moved; because
though every particular Part of the Superficies of it be every Moment
applied to different Parts of the Liquid that surrounds it, yet the whole
Superficies of it is not transferred at once from the concave Superficies of
the Parts which surround it, considered as one whole Superficies.
Further, according to these different Definitions of Motion, are we
to understand the Word Place in different Senses. For when we speak of
truly or absolutely proper Motion (or Resf^ then by Place we mean, that
Part of infinite and immoveable Space which the Body possesses; when we
speak of Motion relatively common, then by Place is meant, a Part of some
particular Space or moveable Dimension, which Place it self is truly and
properly moved, along with that which is placed in it: And when we speak
of Motion relatively proper (which indeed is very improper) then by Place,
is meant the Superficies of the Bodies (or sensible Spaces) which immediately
surround the thing moved.^

' Rohault, Physica, pars I, cap. X, sec. 2, p. 36; RohauU's System o f Natural Philo
sophy, trans. John Clarke (London, 1723), I, 39, n. 1.
200
IV
Newton, Galileo, and Plato
The year of grace 1692 marks an important date in the history of
Newtonianism: this is the year in which the Reverend Mr. Richard
Bentley,^ chaplain to the bishop of Worcester, addressed to the
famous author of the Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica
a series of questions concerning the most profound problems of
natural philosophy which the latter had neglected to treat - or had
avoided - in his work. The reason for Bentleys step was serious in
deed. It was especially serious for him owing to the great honor that
had befallen him of having to inaugurate the Boyle Lectures, which
had been established under a bequest of the great and pious Chris
tian philosopher, Robert Boyle.^ The Boyle Lecture, actually a
series of eight lecture-sermons given during one year, each in a
different London church, had to be, according to the wish of
their founder, devoted to the defense of the Christian religion and the
^ To be exact, since he did not become Doctor Divinitatis until 1696, Mr. Richard
Bentley, M.A. One of the greatest philologists of the age, Bentley (1662-1742) became
Master of Trinity College (Newtons college) in Cambridge University in 17CI0. It was
Bentley who, first on his own and then as enterpreneur (directing Roger Cotes), under
took the publication o f the second edition of the Principia. The standard biography is
James Henry Monk, The Life o f Richard Bentley, D.D. (London, 1830). The most re
cent study on Bentley is G. P. Goold, Richard Bentley: A Tercentenary Commemora
tion, Harvard Studies in Classical Philology, No. 67 (1963), pp. 285-302.
* Robert Boyle died on 30 December 1691 and left, according to his will, an income
of 50 per annum to reimburse the author of a series of lectures or sermons on the
proofs of the truths of the Christian religion. Bentleys lectures. Eight Sermons Preached
at the Honourable Robert Boyle Lecture in the First Year M D C X C II (London, 1693),
had a tremendous influence upon eighteenth-century apologetics. The first of these
lectures was intended to prove The folly of atheism and deism even with respect to
the present life, the second demonstrates that Matter and motion cannot think,
the third, fourth, and fifth present A confutation of atheism from the structure of the
human body, while the sixth, seventh, and eighth present A confutation of atheism
from the origin and frame of the world. These sermons were reprinted in Alexander
Dyce, ed., r/ie Works o f Richard Bentley, D.D. (London, 1836-1838), vol. III. This
collection went through at least nine editions in English and one in Latin (Berlin,
1696). Sermons seven and eight (preached at St. Mary-le-Bow on 7 November and 5
December 1692), which treat of cosmology, have been reproduced in facsimile in I. B.
Cohen, ed., Isaac Newton's Papers and Letters on Natural Philosophy (Cambridge,
Mass.: Harvard University Press, 1958), pp. 313-394, where they are preceded by a
very interesting essay, Bentley and Newton, by Perry Miller (pp. 271-278); a note
on the printing of Bentleys sermons appears on p. 23.
o
201
N E W T O N , G AL I L E O, AND PLATO
refutation of atheism, the ravages of which, especially the pernicious

influence of Thomas Hobbes, had placed true faith in danger. They
therefore had to demonstrate, among other things, that the new
science - that is to say, the mechanical philosophy of which Boyle
had been so firm an adherent and the heliocentric astronomy - which
had been assured a definitive victory over ancient views by Newtons
work, could not possibly lead to materialism, but on the contrary
offered a solid base for rejecting and confuting it.
What a glorious assignment! But also, what a difficult one! All the
more so since Bentley, a good theologian and an admirable philo
logist, was not prepared to deal with scientific questions. So, after
having tried to acquaint himself with the difficulties and to surmount
them by his own means, he decided to appeal to the master himself,
and to ask him whether or not the mathematical philosophy, and
particularly Newtonian cosmology, could do without the interven
tion of a creative God or whether on the contrary they implied such
intervention.
This proved to be a very happy inspiration, for Newton gave him
self with good grace to the request of the young theologian. The four
letters which Newton addressed to Bentley in response to his ques
tions - in which he explained how Bentley could, and also how he
could not, use the principles of modern science as foundations of a
natural theology - constitute one of the most precious and most
important documents for the study and interpretation of Newtonian
thought.^ As such, these letters merit and demand a long and detailed
commentary, which however I will not undertake here.^ I will limit
myself to the study of a curious position - in itself of minimal impor
tance - of this correspondence, namely, to the reference made by
Newton to Platonic cosmological theory.
The problem which, more than any other, seems to have preoccupied
Bentley was to know whether, supposing an initial uniform distribu
tion of matter in space,^ the system of the world could be produced
from it as a result of the action of purely natural causes and also
whether the motions of the planets, once created by God, could not
result from the action of gravitation alone. Newton replied as follows:
* Carefully preserved by Bentley, these letters were found among his papers by his
executor and published under the title Four Letters from Sir Isaac Newton to Dr. Bentley
(London, 1756). They were reprinted by S. Horsley in the edition of the Opera omnia
of Newton (London, 1782), vol. IV, and also reprinted (in facsimile, from the first
printing) with an excellent introduction by Perry Miller in Cohen, Newton's Papers and
Letters. It is in these letters that Newton enjoins Bentley not to ascribe to him the
notion that gravity is essential to matter (letter II, Horsley, Opera omnia, IV, 437;
Cohen, Newton's Papers and Letters, p. 298), and tells him that action at a distance of
one body upon another without mediation of something which is not material as if
gravity should be innate, inherent and essential to matter is an absurdity (letter
III, ibid., p. 438; p. 302).
It is to be noted that in the original printing, as well as in the edition of them by
Horsley, letters III and IV were interchanged. They were published in the correct
order in Bentley's Correspondence (London, 1892).
* I have done this, in part, in my From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe (Balti
more: Johns Hopkins Press, 1957).
202
I answer, that the Motions which the Planets now have could not spring
from any natural Cause alone, but were impressed by an intelligent Agent.
For since Comets descend into the Region of our Planets, and here move
all manner of ways, going sometimes the same way with the Planets, some
times the contrary way, and sometimes in cross ways, in Planes inclined
to the Plane of the Ecliptick, and at all kinds of Angles, tis plain that there
is no natural <3ause which could determine all the Planets, both primary
and secondary, to move the same way and in the same Plane, without any
considerable Variation: This must have been the Effect of Counsel. Nor is
there any natural Cause which could give the Planets those just Degrees
of Velocity, in Proportion to their Distances from the Sun, and other
central Bodies, which were requisite to make them move in such concentrick Orbs about those Bodies.^
It is certainly curious to note, we must observe in passing, that
Newtonian cosmology, which, with respect to those that preceded it,
represents a unification and an admirable simplification of the laws
that regulate the universe, does not diminish, but on the contrary in
creases, at least apparently, the accidental and irrational character of
the planetary system. In fact, for Kepler, for example, the dimensions
and the distances of the bodies which make up the solar system are
found to be determined by the action of structural archetypical
laws: as a consequence of which their motions, that is to say, the form
of their orbits and their speeds of revolution, are determined by
purely natural laws. Nothing of this sort is found in Newton. With
out doubt the distances, the speeds, and the shapes of the planet
ary orbits are for Newton linked together even more tightly than for
Kepler, whose three laws Newton reduced to a single one, the law
of attraction, from which they may be derived. On the other hand,
the given dimensions and distances of the bodies of the system of
the world are arbitrary: the planets could have been bigger or smaller,
and could have been placed nearer to or farther from the sun. They
could also have been moved more quickly or more slowly. They
* The official target of Bentleys attack is the materialism of Lucretius; in fact, it is
Hobbes and also Descartes.
Horslev, Opera omnia, IV, 431; Cohen, Newton's Papers and Letters, p. 284.
203
N E W T O N , GAL I L E O, AND PLATO
would then have described orbits very different from those which
they actually describe: circles, or very eccentric ellipses; they would
then not even have obeyed the same laws. As Newton explained the
matter to Bentley,
tons reasoning to be too feeble to upset the Cartesian teaching

which asserted that random movements of matter are spontane
ously transformed into ordered vortical motions and finally give
birth to the planetary systems as well as to comets. It is also pos
sible that Newtons conception of a Cause that was very well
skilled in Mechanicks and Geometry and that indulged in com
plicated computations to determine the masses, the distances, and
the speeds which he would have to give to the sun and to the planets
in order to produce our world, seemed to Bentley a little too anthro
pomorphic. However that may be, he turned to Newton once again,
and, among other things, probably asked Newton if it would not
have been possible for God to create the planets, for example the
earth, at a given distance from the sun, letting them somehow acquire
their orbital motions by purely natural means; namely by infusing
into them both a gravitating Energy towards the Sun, and a trans
verse Impulse of a just Quantity.^ Newton replied that there was no
value in this argument:
Had the Planets been as swift as Comets, in Proportion to their Distances

from the Sun (as they would have been, had their Motion been caused by
their Gravity, whereby the Matter, at the first Formation of the Planets,
might fall from the remotest Regions towards the Sun) they would not
move in concentrick Orbs, but in such eccentrick ones as the Comets
move in.^
It follows then that the distribution and the speeds of the planets
do not arise from a purely natural cause, such as the action of gravity,
and that
to make this System therefore, with all its Motions, required a Cause
which understood, and compared together, the Quantities of Matter in the
several Bodies of the Sun and Planets, and the gravitating Powers resulting
from thence; the several Distances of the primary Planets from the Sun,
and of the secondary ones from Saturn, Jupiter, and the Earth; and the
Velocities with which these Planets could revolve about those Quantities
of Matter in the central Bodies; and to compare and adjust all these Things
together, in so great a Variety of Bodies, argues that Cause to be not blind
and fortuitous, but very well skilled in Mechanicks and Geometry.^
Newtons reply does not seem to have satisfied Bentley, It may be

that he had not fully grasped the import of Newtons reasoning,
according to which matter subjected only to the law of gravity could
not engender the planetary system. Perhaps Bentley had judged New^ Letter I, Horsley, Opera omnia, IV, 431; Cohen, Newton's Papers and Letters,
p. 285.
* Ibid., pp. 431-432; pp. 286-287. Newton also explains to Bentley that if, originally,
matter were evenly scattered through space, it would be inconceivable that it should
divide itself into two sorts, and that Part of it, which is fit to compose a shining Body,
should fall down into one Mass and make a Sun, and the rest, which is fit to compose
an opaque Body, should coalesce, not in one great Body, like the shining Matter, but
into many little ones; or if the Sun at first were an opaque Body like the Planets, or the
Planets lucid Bodies like the Sun, how he alone should be changed into a shining Body,
whilst all they continue opaque, or all they be changed into opaque ones, whilst he
remain unchanged. All that, says Newton, I do not think explicable by meer natural
Causes, but am forced to ascribe it to the Counsel and Contrivance of a voluntary
Agent (p. 430; p. 282). To admit anything o f that kind is to fall into the Cartesian
hypothesis, and is plainly erroneous.
On the other hand, Newton does not appreciate Bentleys attempt to show the
teleology of the creation by the inclination of the axis of the earth, in which he sees
nothing extraordinary unless you will urge it as a Contrivance for Winter and
Summer (p. 433; p. 289). It is only a minor feature in the Harmony of the System which
was the Effect of Choice rather than Chance.
In his first letter he had evidently asked Newton whether the planets could not be
moved by the rays of the sun - the hypothesis of Borelli of which Bentley may have
had some knowledge - which Newton bluntly denied.
204
To the last Part of your Letter, I answer. First, that if the Earth (without
the Moon) were placed any where with its Center in the Orbis Magnus,
and stood still there without any Gravitation or Projection, and there at
once were infused into it, both a gravitating Energy towards the Sun, and a
transverse Impulse of a just Quantity moving it directly in a Tangent to
the Orbis Magnus', the Compounds of this Attraction and Projection would,
according to my Notion, cause a circular Revolution of the Earth about the
Sun. But the transverse Impulse must be a just Quantity; for if it be too
big or too little, it will cause the Earth to move in some other Line.
Secondly, I do not know any Power in Nature which would cause this
transverse Motion without the divine Arm.^
Newton obviously is right: there exists no natural force which

could in an instant confer on the earth (or on one of the planets) a
determined degree of tangential speed. The reason is at once simple
and general: no possible natural force can in an instant give a deter
mined degree of speed to any body whatsoever. Because this is
something that is naturally impossible, it is something that only a
supernatural agent may accomplish. But could not one avoid the
necessity of having to call in divine action, by letting the bodies in
question - the planets - acquire their speeds progressively rather
than instantaneously, by the action of their weights? To this,
Newton replies:
^ In his second letter, apparently lost.
^ Letter II, Horsley, Opera omnia, IV, 436 sq.; Cohen, Newton's Papers and Letters,
pp. 296 sq.
205
Blondel tells us somewhere in his Book of Bombs, that Plato affirms,

that the Motion of the Planets is such, as if they had all of them been created
by God in some Region very remote from our System, and let fall from
thence towards the Sun, and so soon as they arrived at their several Orbs,
their Motion of falling turned aside into a transverse one.^
tories. So much is affirmed by Blondel. Newton comments as

follows:
Newtons reference to Blondel is exact - and most curious. In the

latters work on V Art de jet ter les bombes, after having explained that
according to Galileo the acquisition of movement (or of speed) can
be made only progressively, Blondel tells u s:
For the rest, it is difficult to conceive that a moving body can at once
acquire a determined degree of speed, without having passed through all
the preceding degrees of less speed; one can thus judge for what reason the
ancients were persuaded that the sentiments of Plato partook of something
divine. This philosopher said on this subject that God, having perhaps
created the heavenly bodies in an identical place of rest, had then given
them the freedom to move in a straight line toward a single point (in the
manner in which heavy objects are carried toward the center of the earth)
to the point at which having in their descent passed through all the stages
of speed they will have acquired that of their destined state; after which he
would have converted this rectilinear and accelerated motion into circular
motion to make it equal and uniform, so that these bodies would be able
to preserve it infinitely.
That which is most admirable in this thought is that the proportions
which are found among the distances of the heavenly bodies, and the
differences in speed of their movements, are found to conform to the
results of this reasoning; and that it would not be absolutely impossible
to determine the location of this first place of rest, from which they all
would have begun their movement.^
The Platonic mechanism reported by Blondel was not exactly

the same as that which Nevidon had already discussed, and rejected,
in his first letter to Bentley. In the latter, the planets had been sup
posed to be subject to the action of gravity alone, but according to
Blondel their falling motion is found to be interrupted and deviated
before they have acquired the maximum speed that the attraction of
the sun could give them. Thus one is to suppose that at the moment
when this deviation occurs - or is made to occur - that is to say, at
the moment when, in their descent toward the sun, they arrive at
their orbits, they possess the proper speed, precisely that speed
which allows them to turn around the sun on their concentric trajec* Letter II, Horsley, Opera omnia, IV, 436; Cohen, Newton's Papers and Letters,
p. 297.
* L' Art de Jet ter les bombes, par Monsieur Blondel, Marechal de Camp aux Armees
du Roy (Amsterdam, 1683), troisieme partie, livre premier. Doctrine de Galilee sur
le mouvement, chap. VIII, p. 166; Suites admirables des proprietes du mouvement.
206
And this is true, supposing the gravitating Power of the Sun was double
at that Moment of Time in which they all arrive at their several Orbs; but
then the divine Power is here required in a double respect, namely, to turn
the descending Motions of the falling Planets into a side Motion, and at the
same time to double the attractive Power of the Sun. So then Gravity may
put the Planets into Motion, but without the divine Power it could never
put them into such a circulating Motion as they have about the Sun; and
therefore, for this, as well as other Reasons, I am compelled to ascribe
the Frame of this System to an intelligent Agent.^
The Platonic mechanism is then unworkable, and the assertion

of Blondel is false. How amusing it is to see Newton, by a refinement
of politeness, proclaim the assertion of Blondel to be true at the
moment when he demonstrates that it is n o t! The fact of the matter
is that the solar attraction confers on the planets, and this throughout
the whole distance of their fall, a motion too rapid for them to re
main on the circular orbits with the speeds acquired during their fall.
To counterbalance the centrifugal force which they would develop
in turning around the sun, and to prevent them from running off
along a tangent, there must be a force of attraction twice as great.
We may note in passing that this is rather curious.
Not less curious - from a totally different point of view, to be sure
- is the fact that Newton attributes his knowledge of the Platonic
theory only to Blondel. For this leads us to suppose that he ignored
the source on which Blondel himself had drawn, namely, Galileo.
Or, since Galileo expounds the Platonic conception in his Dialogo
as well as in his Discorsi, one is tempted to conclude therefrom
that Newton had never studied either of these works. That would
explain furthermore why Newton could, in good faith without doubt,
have attributed to the great Florentine the discovery of the law of
inertia - which he had not made - while passing entirely in silence
over Descartes, to whom we owe that law. It is also possible - such
things happen - that, having read Galileo in his youth, Newton
meanwhile had completely forgotten his presentation of the Pla
tonic conception, and thus did not recognize the source of Blondel.
Which of these two possibilities have we to admit? We must, for
the moment at least, reserve our judgment. After all, the name of
* Letter II, Horsley, Opera omnia, IV, 436 sq.; Cohen, Newton's Papers and
Letters, pp. 297 sq.
207
Galileo does appear in the fourth and last letter from Newton to
Bentley.
It is truly a pity that the letters from Bentley to Newton - save for
the third, which is preserved among Newtons papers - have been
lost without ever having been published and that, as a result, one
can do no more than reconstruct their contents from Newtons
replies. Having received Newtons letter,^ Bentley a month later (18
February 1692/3) sends Newton a hastily drawn resume of his
seventh lecture, containing a Confutation o f Atheism from the
Origin and Frame o f the World. In this third letter, the one that is
now in the Trinity College Library, Bentley assures Newton that
he does not hold gravity to be an innate property of matter,
that he did not ascribe that doctrine to Newton, and that if he
used this expression it was for brevitys sake.^ Indeed, he holds
that it is impossible that gravity should either be coeternal and

essential to matter or ever acquired by it in any natural way, which
is self evident if gravitation be true attraction. Nay, Bentley holds
that, according to Newton, whom he follows, universal gravitation
cannot be explained mechanically.
In the same letter Bentley informs Newton that as what you cite
from Blondel, I have read y* same in Hon. Fabris Astronomia Physica
and Galileos System^ but could not use it (a) because Galileo
obviously made a mistake in not recognizing that the force of gravity
and therefore the acceleration of falling bodies was not constant but
varied with the distance and {b) because he himself (Bentley) was
unable to make the necesssary calculations. Bentley recognizes, how
ever, that it would be a good argument for a divine power, as it is
more impossible that the planets would all be formed naturally
at the same time at various distances and that it would be a miracle
of miracles if they would naturally be formed at this distance in
different intervals of time that would enable them to arrive at their
present position at the same moment.
Having received Bentleys letter outline and having been reminded
by him that the passage of Plato is to be found in Galileo, Newton,
in his reply, comes back to this passage, which he subjects, once more,
to a severe criticism:
^ Newtons second letter, referring to Blondel, is dated from Trinity College, 17

January 1692/3. Newton followed this with a short letter to Bentley dated 11 February
1693, but in it he does not discuss the question of Blondel and Plato. Then on 18
February 1692/3 Bentley wrote again to Newton, being encouraged, as he said, by
Newtons unexpected and voluntary favour by the last post. Newton answered on
25 February 1692/3.
^ This letter is printed as part of Appendix X to David Brewster, Memoirs o f the
Life, Writings, and Discoveries o f Sir Isaac Newton (E6.mhwc^, 1855), II, 463-470.
Bentley asks Newton to examine an abstract and thread of my first unpublished ser
mon; and to acquaint me with what you find in it y* is not conformable to truth and
your hypothesis. My mind would be very much at ease, if I had that satisfaction,
before y discourses are out of my power. Following the outline, Bentley raises a
question about how the planets might acquire their transverse motions about the
sun: Now, therefore, suppose the planets to be formed in some higher regions, and
first descend toward the sun, wherby they would acquire their velocities; but then they
would have continued their descent to y sun unless a Divine power gave them a trans
verse motion against y vast impetus y* such great bodies must fall with; so yt on all
accounts theres a necessity of introducing a God. Then Bentley turns to the argu
ment that Newton raised from Blondel, remarking that he had already encountered it
in Fabris Astronomia physica and in Galileo: As to what you cite from Blondel, I
have read y same in Hon. Fabris Astronomia Physica, and Galilaeos System, p. 10
and 17, who adds, y by the velocity of Saturn, one may compute at what distance from
ysun it was formed, according to ydegrees of acceleration found out by himself in the
progression of odd numbers. (But he must surely have erred, not knowing w* you have
since shewn, y* yvelocity of descent as well as weight of bodies decreases as y square
of y distance increases,) and y there is y* proportion of y distances and velocities
of all yplanets quam proxime, as if they all dropt from y same hight. (But you seem
to reject this, saying, y the gravitation of y sun must be doubled at y very moment
they reach their orbs.) I confess I could make no use of ypassage of Galilaeo and Fabri,
because I could not calculate, so y* I said no more, but in general as above, and y
rather because I knew that there must be some given bights, from whence each of them
descending, might acquire their present velocities. But I own, y if I could understand
y thing, it would not be only ornamental to y discourse, but a great improvement of
y argument for a Divine power; for I think it more impossible y they should be all
formed naturally at y same y at various distances; and tis y miracle of all miracles
if they were naturally formed at such intervals of time, as all of them to arrive at their
respective orbs at y very same moment, which is necessary, if I rightly conceive your
meaning about doubling y suns attraction; for if Mercury fell first, and when he
208
As for the Passage of Plato, there is no common Place from whence all
the Planets being let fall, and descending with uniform and equal Gravities
(as Galileo supposes) would at their Arrival to their several Orbs acquire
their several Velocities, with which they now revolve in them. If we sup
pose the Gravity of all the Planets towards the Sun to be of such a Quantity
as it really is, and that the Motions of the Planets are turned upwards,
every Planet will ascend to twice its Height from the Sun. Saturn will
ascend till he be twice as high from the Sun as he is at present, and no
higher; Jupiter will ascend as high again as at present, that is, a little above
the Orb of Saturn', Mercury will ascend to twice his present Height, that is,
reached his own orb, y suns attraction was doubled. That continuing doubled, y
descents of y succeeding planets would be proportionably accelerated, which would
disturb y supposed proportion betwixt Mercuries velocity and theirs. (This letter is
reprinted in H. W. Turnbull and J. F. Scott, eds.. The Correspondence o f Isaac Newton
(Cambridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1959, III, 251 sq.) As Bentley
quotes pp. 10 and 17 of Galileos System, it seems to indicate that he used the second
Latin edition of the Dialogo Systema cosmicum, published by Johanne Antonius
Huguetan in Leiden in 1641. As for the Astronomia physica of Honore Fabri, I do
not know what work of Fabri he has in mind, as among the works of the latter there
is none bearing this title. Fabri deals indeed with astronomy in the fourth volume of
his Physica, id est scientia rerum corporearum (Leiden, 1669-1671), but the tractatits in which he does it {tractatus VIII) is called De corpore coelesti. Moreover, in this
tractatus, Fabri does not develop the Platonic theory.
209
to the Orb of Venus; and so of the rest; and then by falling down again
from the Places to which they ascended, they will arrive again at their
several Orbs with the same Velocities they had at first, and with which they
now revolve.
But if so soon as their Motions by which they revolve are turned up
wards, the gravitating Power of the Sun, by which their Ascent is perpe
tually retarded, be diminished by one half, they will now ascend perpe
tually, and all of them at all equal Distances from the Sun will be equally
swift. Mercury when he arrives at the Orb of Venus, will be as swift as
Venus; and he and Venus, when they arrive at the Orb of the Earth, will
be as swift as the Earth; and so of the rest. If they begin all of them to
ascend at once, and ascend in the same Line, they will constantly in
ascending become nearer and nearer together, and their Motions will con
stantly approach to an Equality, and become at length slower than any
Motion assignable. Suppose, therefore, that they ascended till they were
almost contiguous, and their Motions inconsiderably little, and that all
their Motions were at the same Moment of Time turned back again; or,
which comes almost to the same Thing, that they were only deprived of
their Motions, and let fall at that Time, they would all at once arrive at
their several Orbs, each with the Velocity it had at first; and if their
Motions were then turned Sideways, and at the same Time the gravitating
Power of the Sun doubled, that it might be strong enough to retain them in
their Orbs, they would revolve in them as before their Ascent. But if the
gravitating Power of the Sun was not doubled, they would go away from
their Orbs into the highest Heavens in parabolical Lines. These Things
follow from my Princ. Math. Lib. i. Prop. 33, 34, 36, 37.^
possibility of the planets acquiring, by falling toward the sun, the

speeds necessary to move around the sun as they actually d o ; he did
not go into details nor did he refer to the passage of Plato. ^
Without doubt he considered it useless to enter into any reasoning
of such difficulty; it is possible also that, an excellent philologist
though a bad mathematician, he knew that the theory which Newton,
placing his faith in Blondel, had presented as one of Platos could
not be found (at least as such) in Platos writings. Indeed, he knew
that it could be found, on the other hand, in the writings of Galileo,
and thus had indicated this to Newton.
If all the planets are let fall, and descend with uniform and
equal Gravities (as Galileo supposes), they cannot, Newton tells us,
all start out from the same position. We agree. We must, however,
make precise the sense of the expression descending with uniform
and equal Gravities. In effect, Newtons statement could be made to
say two very different things. The first is that, according to Galileo,
I do not know whether this second exposition by Newton was

clearer for Bentley than the first had been, nor whether he took the
pains to study Propositions 33, 34, 36, and 37 of the Principia to
understand the course of Newtons reasoning. Personally, I strongly
doubt it. As a matter of fact, in the seventh sermon or lecture of his
Confutation o f Atheism, devoted precisely to the demonstration of the
existence of God from the evidence of the structure of the solar
system, Bentley limited himself to affirming on the whole the im^ Letter III, Horsley, Opera omnia, IV, 440 sq.; Cohen, Newton's Papers and Letters,
pp. 306 sq. (Printed as letter III in the original edition and also by Horsley, this should
be letter IV according to dates.) Newton simplifies things a little. As a matter of fact,
as Newton himself remarked, the ascending movement of the planets will never cease
and they will never attain the common limit of their ascent; vice versa, leaving this
common limit they would never be able, in a finite time, to descend to the actual orbits
along which they now move. But as it is in general impossible that the planets could be
created in the same place, and therefore it could only be a question of places very near
to one another, Newton held that he had the right to substitute a proximity of place for
identical place, and to stop the rising motion before the planets had attained their
limit. The rest would follow automatically.
210
* In his seventh sermon, Bentley discussed the question of where the planets might
have been made. Bentley had approved the impossibility of a Supposition [that]
the Matter of the Chaos could never compose such divided and different Masses as the
Starrs and Planets of the present World. Then he changed his subject: But allowing
our Adversaries, that The Planets might be composed: yet however they could not pos
sibly acquire such Revolutions in Circular Orbs, or (which is all one to our present
purpose) in Ellipses very little Eccentric. For let them assign any place where the Planets
were formed. Was it nearer to the Sun, than the present distances are? But that is
notoriously absurd: for then they must have ascended from the place of their Formation,
against the essential property of mutual Attraction. Or were each formed in the same
Orbs, in which they now move? But then they must have moved from the Point of Rest,
in an horizontal Line without any inclination or descent. Now there is no natural
Cause, neither Innate Gravity nor Impulse of external Matter, that could beget such a
Motion. For Gravity alone must have carried them downwards to the Vicinity of the
Sun. And that the ambient Êther is too liquid and empty, to impell them horizontally
with that prodigious celerity, we have sufficiently proved before. Or were they made in
some higher regions of the Heavens; and from thence descended by their essential
Gravity, till they all arrived at their respective Orbs; each with its present degree of
Velocity, acquired by the fall? But then why did they not continue their descent, till
they were contiguous to the Sun; whither both Mutual Attraction and Impetus carried
them? What natural Agent could turn them aside, could impell them so strongly with a
transverse Sideblow against that tremendous Weight and Rapidity, when whole Worlds
are a falling? But though we should suppose, that by some cross attraction or other
they might acquire an obliquity of descent, so as to miss the body of the Sun, and to fall
on one side of it: then indeed the force of their Fall would carry them quite beyond it;
and so they might fetch a compass about it, and then return and ascend by the same
steps and degrees of Motion and Velocity, with which they descended before. Such an
eccentric Motion as this, much after the manner that Comets revolve about the Sun,
they might possibly acquire by their innate principle of Gravity: but circular Revolu
tions in concentric Orbs about the Sun or other central Body could in no-wise be
attaind without the power of the Divine Arm (Cohen, Newton's Papers and Letters,
pp. 345-347). It is worth noting that in this passage Bentley uses the term innate
gravity, and in his eighth sermon (p. 363) defines Gravitation toward the Sun as
a constant Energy infused into Matter by the Author of all things.
211
the action of gravity is everywhere uniform and constant and that,

as a consequence, bodies - all bodies, large and small, heavy and
light - fall everywhere with the same acceleration, no matter where
they are placed, whether far from or near to the earth (or, as it may
happen, from the sun), in other words, that the acceleration of free
fall due to gravity is a universal constant, having the same value every
where in the solar system. The second possibility is that, according
to Galileo, all bodies, and therefore also all planets, fall with the
same acceleration - whether that acceleration is constant or not - so
that, as a consequence, if they start from the same place, and fall
together through identical spaces, they will have at the same height
from the sun equal speeds; this assertion, far from implying any con
stancy of the acceleration, allows it to vary with the distance, as the
force of attraction does, and even allows the same variation with the
distance.
Which interpretation shall we give to the Newtonian formulation ?
That is to say: what sense do these words have in the mind of New
ton ? This is not an irrelevant question. Actually, the first interpreta
tion represents the Galilean theory of falling bodies truly and histori
cally. The second, on the contrary, is a later adaptation and actually
a misinterpretation. Thus the first implies a correct and precise
knowledge of the work of Galileo; the second does not imply that
at all. Now it seems clear that it is the second sense which Newton
adopts, in spite of Bentleys rather penetrating remarks on this sub
ject, because he uses it and deduces the consequences of it - for
example, that, if the orbital movement of the planets is turned up
wards, they will ascend to a height double their actual height
- which it is impossible to deduce from the authentic Galilean con
cept. Thus there seems to be confirmation of the hypothesis which 1
formulated earlier in this work, namely, that Newton had never
studied Galileo. And that if he had read Galileos works in his youth,
he had in the meanwhile forgotten what is to be found therein.^
Let us now turn to Galileo.
The. first mention of the Platonic theory of the fall of the
planets, or more exactly of their rectilinear motion prior to their cir-
cular motion, is to be found in the Dialogue Concerning the Two

Chief World Systems, first published in Florence in 1632. In the
course of the first day, Salviati, after having explained the struc
ture and respective roles of circular and rectilinear motion, addresses
himself to the subject as follows:
* It is this last hypothesis that proves to be the true one. Indeed, in the third
volume of The Correspondence o f Isaac Newton we find a MS by Newton from the
year 1665 or 1666 (pp. 46 sq.) proving without possibility of doubt that Newton had
read the Dialogo; in this MS Newton discusses - though without naming him - Gali
leos assertion that a falling body will traverse 100 braces (cubits) in 5 seconds (p. 219 of
212
We may therefore say that straight motion serves to transport materials

for the construction of a work; but this, once constructed, is to rest im
movable - or, if movable, is to move only circularly. Unless we wish to
say with Plato that these world bodies, after their creation and the establish
ment of the whole, were for a certain time set in straight motion by their
Maker. Then later, reaching certain definite places, they were set in rota
tion one by one, passing from straight to circular motion, and have ever
since been preserved and maintained in this. A sublime concept, and worthy
indeed of Plato, which I remember having heard discussed by our friend,
the Lincean Academician.^
The discussion of the Academician - which we have seen Blondel expound faithfully - concerns the impossibility of a body at rest
acquiring any degree of motion whatever without having passed
previously through all the degrees of speed - or of slowness - inter
mediate between the said degree and rest. From which it follows that,
in order to confer on a body at rest a certain degree of speed, nature
makes it move during a certain time in a rectilinear and accelerated
motion:
This assumed, let us suppose God to have created the planet Jupiter, for
example, upon which He had determined to confer such-and-such a velo
city, to be kept perpetually uniform forever after. We may say with Plato
that at the beginning He gave it a straight and accelerated motion; and
the original edition; p. 219 of the Salusbury translation; see Correspondence, III, 52,
note 2). In the same note the editor of the Correspondence mentions that Dr. Herivel
has pointed out to us that Newton himself in an early notebook (1661-1665) said
that according to Galilaeus an iron ball of 100 florentine [pounds] descends 100
braces Florentine or cubits . . . in 5" of an hower.
The Dialogo was translated into English by Thomas Salusbury under the title
Mathematical Collections and Translations (London: Printed by William Leybourn,
1661). The first part containing: The System of the World by Galileus Galileus Linceus.
Nearly all the edition perished in the great London fire; however, a copy has been
preserved in the library of Trinity College. Moreover, Newton could have read it in
Latin, all the more so as a Latin edition of the Dialogo Systema cosmicum was pub
lished in London (by Thomas Dicas) in 1663.
^ Galileo Galilei, Dialogo sopra i due massimi sistemi del mondo (edizione
nazionale), vol. VII, Giornata prima, p. 44; in English translation. Dialogue on the
Great World Systems, ed. Giorgio de Santillana (Chicago; University of Chicago Press,
1953), pp. 24-25, or Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief World Systems - Ptolemaic
and Copernican, trans. Stillman Drake (Berkeley and Los Angeles; University of Cali
fornia Press, 1953), p. 20.
213
N E W T O N , G AL I L E O, AND PLATO
later, when it had arrived at that degree of velocity, converted its straight
motion into circular motion whose speed thereafter was naturally uniform.^
to have been created in the same place, and there assigned tendencies of
motion, descending toward the center until they had acquired those de
grees of velocity which originally seemed good to the Divine mind. These
velocities being acquired, we lastly suppose that the globes were set in
rotation, each retaining in its orbit [cerchio] its predetermined velocity.
Now, at what altitude and distance from the sun would have been the
place where the said globes were first created, and could they all have been
created in the same place?
To make this investigation, we must take from the most skillful astro
nomers the sizes of the orbits in which the planets revolve, and likewise
the times of their revolutions. From these data we deduce how much faster
Jupiter (for example) moves than Saturn; and it being found (as in fact it
is) that Jupiter does move more swiftly, it is necessary that Jupiter, de
parting from the same height, descended more than Saturn - as we know
is actually the case, its orbit being inferior to that of Saturn. And going
still further one may determine, from the proportions of the two velocities
of Jupiter and Saturn and from the distance between their orbits, and from
the natural ratio of acceleration of natural motion, at what altitude and
distance from the center of their revolutions must have been the place from
which they originally departed. This place determined and agreed upon,
it is asked whether Mars, descending from there to its orbit, is found to
agree in size of orbit and velocity of motion with what is found by calcu
lation; and the same is done for the earth, Venus, and Mercury, the size of
whose orbits and the velocities of whose motions agree so closely with those
given by the computations that the matter is truly wonderful.^
Sagredo objects, however, that, since the gradations of speed and

slowness are infinite, it would not have been possible for nature to
have conferred all of these on the body of Jupiter, and that it would
therefore be more probable that the circular motion of the latter
would have been created instantaneously with the determined speed.
To this Salviati replies prudently:
I did not say, nor dare I, that it was impossible for Nature or for God
to confer [on the body of Jupiter] immediately that velocity which you
speak of. I do indeed say that defacto Nature does not do so - that the doing
of this would be something outside the course of nature, and therefore
miraculous.^
A few pages later on, Salviati explains that the downward motion either free fall or along an inclined plane - is a motion that is pro
duced and accelerates naturally and must therefore always precede
circular motion which, once acquired, continues perpetually with a
constant speed. To quote from Galileo, circular motion is never
acquired naturally without straight motion to precede it; but, being
once acquired, it will continue perpetually with uniform velocity.
Then Salviati returns to the concept of Plato and in order to embel
lish it says that to the illustration of this Platonic concept he will
add one particular observation of our academic friend which is
quite remarkable.
Let us suppose that among the decrees of the divine Architect was
the thought of creating in the universe those globes which we behold
continually revolving, and of establishing a center of their rotations in
which the sun was located immovably. Next, suppose all the said globes
^ Dialogo, p. 45; Santillana, pp. 25-26; Drake, p. 21.
* Ibid., p. 45; Santillana, p. 26; Drake, p. 21.
* Ibid., p. 53; Santillana, p. 34; Drake, p. 28. A marginal note reads: Circular
motion can never be acquired naturally without straight motion preceding it. It is
interesting to observe here that, for Galileo, the eternal continuation of circular move
ment, at least when it is a question of celestial phenomena, poses no problem. Move
ment along a straight line is presented essentially as a movement with variable speed
- accelerated of decelerated - while circular movement enjoys, on the contrary, all the
peculiarities of inertial movement; it is perpetually uniform. Also, when in and by
their descending motions the planets attain the speeds which God had assigned to
them, and their rectilinear motions are replaced by their circular motions, they can then
follow their circular paths eternally by themselves without - in contrast to the Newton
ian conception - the need of any force of attraction whatever to keep them in the neigh
borhood of the sun, and this because their motions do not give rise to any centrifugal
force. See my Etudes galildenes (Paris: Hermann, 1939), pp, 236 sq.
214
Sagredo does not fail to agree, saying, I have heard this idea with
extreme delight and if I did not believe that making these calculations
accurately would be a long and painful task, and perhaps one too
difficult for me to understand, I should ask to see them. Galileo
(Salviati) replies that the procedure is indeed long and difficult.
Furthermore, he says, I am not sure I could reconstruct it offhand.
Therefore we shall keep it for another time - a time which, alas,
will never come. Moreover, in place of alas should we not perhaps
say by good luck ? For these computations would have caused
Galileo great disappointment.
The comparison of the presentations - and above all the apprecia
tions - of the Platonic cosmology by Galileo and by Newton
allows us to see certain rather significant and curious differences be
tween these two men. Thus, for Newton, adopting this Platonic
cosmology produces no gain, that is to say, it does not result in any
economy of supernatural actions for God. It is rather the opposite
that is true. It is, in effect, as difficult to confer instantaneously a
* Ibid., pp. 53 sq.; Santillana, pp. 35-36; Drake, p. 29.
215
determined velocity upon a body as to change instantaneously the

direction of its movement. Neither of these operations is possible in
the natural order of things; in either case one must suppose a miracle.
Furthermore, the Platonic cosmology implies another miracle of
its own in addition to the preceding one, since in order that the
planets may retain their orbits, or even initially describe those orbits,
it is necessary that the force of attraction of the sun be doubled at the
very moment when a motion toward the side is substituted for the
downward motion.
It would seem that these considerations do not hold for Galileo,
and that according to him these two operations are not of the same
level; to confer motion on a body at rest is one thing, whereas to
change the direction - while preserving the speed - of a body already
in motion is another.^ The law of continuity must be invoked in one
case but not in the other. In one it is a question of producing some
thing new, but in the other there is merely a change which affects only
an accidental and superficial characteristic of motion without modi
fying its profound reality, and without producing something that has
not already been there. Furthermore, he reckons that the Platonic
cosmology does not demand any miracles beyond, properly under
stood, that of creation. As to the doubling of the force of attraction,
Galileo has no need of it whatsoever, since, first of all, for him the
sun does not attract the planets; instead they tend toward the sun in
virtue of an inclination which is characteristic of them and which
has its origin in their bodies and further - or even in the first place
- their circular movement around the sun does not engender centri
fugal forces, so that no force of attraction from the sun is necessary
to keep them in their orbits or to make them describe those orbits.
And this follows because for Galileo the circular motion of the planets,
which turn around a center without approaching or receding from it,
is a motion arising from the force of inertia.
Galileo seems to have attributed a certain importance, and even an

important certainty, to the resurrection of the Platonic cosmo
logy. Actually, he did not limit himself to an exposition of it by Salviati in the Dialogo. He returns to it in the Discorsi {Discourses and
Demonstrations Concerning Two New Sciences, published in 1638),
this time having Sagredo recall for the reader the marvelous agree
ment between the ideas of the Academician and those of Plato.
The occasion this time is a discussion of the motion - along a para
bola - of projectiles. Galileo explains that if the accelerated motion
of a body falling from a certain height, which he designates by the
term sublimity, is turned from a vertical line and made to move in a
direction perpendicular to it, along a horizontal line, the result will
be a parabola. This provokes the following discussion by Sagredo:
^ Galileo would probably have protested against the assertion that according to him
gravity is a tendency or inclination, and would have recalled the celebrated pas
sage in which he said that gravity is only a word, and no one knows - nor even has
need to know - what it is. It suffices to know how it acts, that is, how bodies fall. Now
it is just this refusal to attempt to make an explanation of gravity, or even to make a
theory, and its acceptance as a simple fact, which led Galileo - and the Galileans - to
conceive of it as something which belongs to bodies, and to attribute to it a constant
magnitude (and thus, to bodies, a constant acceleration) and even to continue to use as Galileo does in the passage which I have cited - expressions such as inclination
or desire.
* The change in direction, as in the case of the planets, is made instantly and without
the intervention of any force whatever.
216
Sagr. Allow me, please, to interrupt in order that I may point out the
beautiful agreement between this thought of the Author and the views of
Plato concerning the origin of the various uniform speeds with which the
heavenly bodies revolve. The latter chanced upon the idea that a body could
not pass from rest to any given speed and maintain it uniformly except by
passing through all the degrees of speed intermediate between the given
speed and rest. Plato thought that God, after having created the heavenly
bodies, assigned them the proper and uniform speeds with which they
were forever to revolve; and that He made them start from rest and move
over definite distances under a natural and rectilinear acceleration such as
governs the motion of terrestrial bodies. He added that once these bodies
had gained their proper and permanent speed, their rectilinear motion was
converted into a circular one, the only motion capable of maintaining uni
formity, a motion in which the body revolves without either receding from
or approaching its desired goal. This conception is truly worthy of Plato;
and it is to be all the more highly prized since its underlying principles
remained hidden until discovered by our Author who removed from them
the mask and poetical dress and set forth the idea in correct historical
perspective. In view of the fact that astronomical science furnishes us such
complete information concerning the size of the planetary orbits, the dis
tances of these bodies from their centers of revolution, and their velocities,
I cannot help thinking that our Author (to whom this idea of Plato was
not unknown) had some curiosity to discover whether or not a definite
sublimity might be assigned to each planet, such that, if it were to start
from rest at this particular height and to fall with naturally accelerated
motion along a straight line, and were later to change the speed thus
acquired into uniform motion, the size of its orbit and its period of revolu
tion would be those actually observed.
Salv. I think I remember his having told me that he once made the
computation and found a satisfactory correspondence with observation.
But he did not wish to speak of it, lest, in view of the odium which his many
P
217
new discoveries had already brought upon him, this might be adding fuel to
the fire. But if any one desires such information he can obtain it for himself
from the theory set forth in the present treatment. ^
Stop, if you please, because it seems to me that it is suitable to adorn this

thought by our Author by its conformity with the conception of Plato
concerning the determination of the different speeds of uniform revolution
of the celestial motions. [Fermate, in grazia, perche qui mi par che convenga adornar questo pensiero dell Autore . . .]
The resurrection, or the rediscovery, by Galileo of the sublime

conception of Plato provoked a rather lively curiosity among the
learned. It has also stirred up a certain skepticism, because no one
has actually been able to find a passage in which Plato described the
cosmological ideas attributed to him by Galileo.^
Even among modern scholars there has been no success in finding
either in Plato or in the writings of his successors the cosmological
doctrine in question.^ A passage in the Timaeus"^ - the only one that
can be invoked - discusses only the transformation by the demiurge
of chaos into cosmos; but it does not mention either the naturally
accelerated motion of planets or their fall in the direction of the
sun and their circular motion around the sun. Thus it has been neces
sary to submit to the evidence: however sublime it may be, the theory
in question is not in Plato.
On very close examination, furthermore, it appears that Galileo
himself does not affirm that he has simply discovered the Platonic
cosmology. Salviati in the Dialogo specifically says that he wishes to
adorn a Platonic concept (per adornare un concetto Platonico),
and in the Discorsi Sagredo actually says:
Galileo Galilei, Discorsi e dimostrazioni matematiche intorno due nuove scienze
(edizione nazionale), vol. VIII, Giornata quarta, pp. 283 sq.; in English translation.
Dialogues Concerning Two New Sciences, trans. Henry Crew and Alfonso de Salvio
(New York: Macmillan, 1914; Dover, n.d.), pp. 261-262.
^ Thus on 4 December 1644, Mersenne, who had not been able to find it either, wrote
to Peiresc to ask him to inquire of Gassendi or others si Platon dit ce que Galilee lui
fait dire dans ses Dialogues du mouvement de la Terre"', Correspondance du P. Marin
Mersenne, ed. Cornelius de Waard (Paris: Presses Universitaires de France, 1955),
IV, 403. Gassendi replied (p. 415) that il na pas de souvenance d en avoir rien leu
dans le text meme de Platon and faut que ce soit dans quelque autre autheur
ancien qui Iaye veu en d autres oeuvres de Platon de celles qui ne se trouvent plus.
Furthermore, Platonic or not, the conception expounded by Galileo was impossible
(as was quickly shown by Frenicle and Mersenne, who performed the calculations
which Galileo no doubt had neglected to make); see Harmonicarum libri (Paris, 1636),
tome I, Praefatio, prop. 2. The planets could not all start from the same place. That
the assertion of Galileo is false was confirmed 250 years later by M. P. Mansion:
Sur une opinion de Galilee relative a Iorigine commune des planetes, Annales de
la Sociite Scientifique de Bruxelles 18 (1894), 46, 90; see also the note of de Waard,
Correspondance de Mersenne, IV, 409.
* A. E. Taylor believed he had discovered the source in Eusebius, Praeparatio
evangelica, XV, but he was wrong. See Stephen Hobhouse, Isaac Newton and Jacob
Boehme, Philosophia 2 (1937), 36: Professor A. E. Taylor writes to me that this may
be a development by Blondel of a theory ascribed to Plato by Atticus, and preserved in
Eusebius, Praeparatio evangelica, XV.
^ Timaeus 30A.
218
In both books, we are told specifically that the Academician

had adorned, that is to say, embellished, developed, leaped to his
own conceptions from, the sublime idea of Plato. If Sagredo seems
so positive in his attribution to Plato of certain characteristic traits
of the doctrine, is he not saying that it was presented by Plato only
under a mask, as a poetic allegory, and that it is the Academician
who, in revealing the foundations about which Plato was silent
or ignorant, has transformed it into a scientific theory? Thus, speak
ing twice through the voice of a porte-parole, Galileo actually says
to us: I attribute this doctrine to Plato; but, as a matter of fact, it is
I who have invented it. Why then does he present it as Platonic?
Is it only to announce, at the very beginning of the Dialogo, that in
the great debate between Aristotle and his master Galileo has taken
the part of Plato ? Did he really believe he had found in Plato the
germ of the system which he had elaborated? Or was he only amused
to cloak an ingenious idea with a prestigious name and thus to pre
sent it as coming from a great philosopher - an ingenious idea which
he obviously believed but which was all the same a little too extrav
agant and by the same token a little too risky?
To these questions it is not easy to give a reply. Still more difficult
is it to know exactly what this conception represented for Galileo.
Was it a jest, a pleasantry,^ as according to him the circular
theory of the fall of heavy bodies on a rotating earth had been?
Or was it on the contrary a serious speculation (as, moreover, the
circular theory seems to have been^) for explaining the structure of
the planetary system - a theory that, without claiming to represent the
^ This was the opinion of Emil Strauss in his translation of the Dialogo: Dialog
iiber die beiden hauptsdchlichsten Weltsystem, das ptolemdische und das kopernikanische
(Leipzig, 1891), p. 499, n. 23; and see Galileos letter of 5 June 1637 to Pietro Carcavy,
ed. naz., VII, 89, where Galileo refers to his circular theory as un capriccio et una
bizzaria, doe iocularis quaedam audacia"', also see de Waard, Correspondance de
Mersenne, III, 572.
* On this theory, see de Waard, Correspondance de Mersenne, IV, 438 sq., App. II,
La Spirale de Galilee ; and also my De motu gravium naturaliter cadentium,
Transactions o f the American Philosophical Society 45 (1956), 333 sq. Santillana (pp.
181-182, note 57) and Drake (pp. 476-477) each discuss briefly Galileos circular
theory of free fall on a rotating earth. In a recent note on Galileos Attempt at a
Cosmogony, Isis 53 (1962), 460-464, S. Sambursky argues that Galileo may have
intended to imply that he had given a liberal interpretation to some passage in Plato.
219
manner in which things had actually happened, did not represent any
the less the manner in which they could have happened? I admit
freely that I lean toward this latter interpretation. How actually can
one otherwise explain the insistence with which Galileo presents it
and the extraordinary expression true history {verace istoria)
which he puts in the mouth of Sagredo ?
The objection will perhaps be raised that one really cannot under
stand how Galileo could have believed in the possibility of so unreal
a method as that which he had invented. And still less, certainly, in its
reality. Surely that would appear very improbable. Let us not forget,
however, that for the minds of the seventeenth century the frontier
between the believable and the unbelievable did not lie exactly where
it does for us. Did they not believe, the majority at least, in a finite
world bounded by the celestial vault outside of which there was
rigorously and absolutely nothing? Furthermore, did they not hold
that the world had been created at a given moment, and not very long
ago, in the past? Did not Newton himself believe that God had
placed the heavenly bodies at their proper distances from the sun
and that he had conferred upon them, later or at the same time, the
proper speeds which would be necessary for them to accomplish
their revolutions ? Why could Galileo not have believed that God had
- or, at least, that he could have - used the mechanism of falling?
Is this not a most elegant way, and the only natural one, to give to a
body a particular speed? Did not Galileo himself use it in his own
theory of projectiles when, as we have seen, in order to give his pro
jectiles a horizontal speed, he has them fall from a given height in
stead of giving them this speed directly? The term sublimity
itself which he uses - is it not revealing and significant?
It seems to me therefore that only one conclusion is possible. For
Galileo the Platonic cosmology is not a simple juvdog, like that of
the Timaeus, but a possible if not a true story.
V
An Unpublished Letter o f
Robert Hooke to Isaac Newton
Robert Hookes letter to Isaac Newton of 9 December 1679 forms a
part of a very interesting correspondence exchanged between the two
great scientists during the winter months of 1679-1680. This corre
spondence, which played an important, perhaps a decisive, role in the
development of Newtons thought,^ was discovered, some sixty
years ago, by W. W. Rouse Ball in the Library of Trinity College,
Cambridge, and was published by him in his precious Essay on
Newtons Principia.^ Unfortunately, the collection in Trinity College
was not complete, and contained only five of the seven letters written
by Newton and Hooke; the remaining two - namely, Hookes letter
to Newton of 9 December 1679 and Newtons reply of 13 December
1679 - were missing.
The latter turned up at a public sale at Messrs. Sotheby and Co.,
on 29 June 1904, and was acquired by the British Museum. It was
published, with an extremely careful and scholarly commentary, by
Professor Jean Pelseneer, in 1929.^
The former also appeared at a sale at Sothebys, in April 1918,
came into the possession of Dr. Erik Waller of Stockholm, and finally
was acquired by the Yale University Library, New Haven.^ With
the kind permission of the librarian, Mr. James T. Babb, I have been
enabled to print it here for the first time. Thus the gap that remained
* In his letter to Halley of 14 July 1686, Newton writes: This is true, that his letters
occasioned my finding the method of determining figures, which when I had tried in the
ellipsis, I threw the calculations by, being upon other studies. See W. W. Rouse Ball,
An Essay on Newton's" Principia" (London, 1893), p. 165.
* Rouse Ball, Essay, Appendix A: Correspondence between Hooke and Newton,
1679-1680, and memoranda relating thereto, pp. 139-153.
* Jean Pelseneer, Une Lettre inedite de Newton, Isis 12 (1929), 237-254; reprinted
in H. W. Turnbull and J. F. Scott, ed.. The Correspondence o f Isaac Newton (Cam
bridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1959), II, 307 sq.
* See Ernest Weil, Robert Hookes Letter of 9 December 1679 to Isaac Newton,
Nature 158 (1946), 135.
One passage only - I could add many other considerations consonant to my
220
221
LETTER OF ROBERT HOOKE TO ISAAC N E WT O N
Open even after Professor Pelseneers publication seems now to be

definitely closed.^
The relationship between Newton and Hooke was never friendly,
though it is only after the last - the third - clash, which followed the
publication of Newtons Principia, that it degenerated into a bitter
and burning hatred.^ The second clash occurred in 1679, and is the
subject matter of this paper. As for the first - and in many respects
the most important one - it took place at the very beginning of New
tons public career, in 1672, when Hooke produced a somewhat hasty
and rather sharp criticism of Newtons optical discoveries, announced
by him in his New Theory about Light and Colors,^ claiming, more
over, priority for the best part of them.^ It is natural that this un
expected attack, as well as the tone adopted by Hooke - already a
well-known man, the celebrated author of the very famous Micrographia^ - toward the obscure Cambridge professor could not fail to
theory of circular motions compounded by a direct motion and an attractive one to the
center . . . - has been preserved by Hooke himself (see his True state o f the Case and
Controversy between Sf Isaac Newton and Dr. Robert Hooke as to the Priority o f that
Noble Hypothesis o f Motion o f the Planets about the Sun as Their Center in Rouse Ball,
Essay, pp. 151 sq.). The contents of this letter, however, were not completely unknown,
since Hooke had read it to the Royal Society at their meeting on 4 December 1679,
and inserted a short report of it in the Minutes of the Society, which was published by
Thomas Birch, History o f the Royal Society (London, 1757), III, 512 sq.
* An entry in Hookes Journal, quoted by Pelseneer, Lettre inddite de Newton,
p. 238, seems to imply that there may have been two more letters; peut-Stre de simples
billets, says Professor Pelseneer. No trace has ever been found of them, nor have
they ever been mentioned by anybody, not even by Newton. Since the original writing
of this article, a memorandum by Hooke and some letters have been published in the
Royal Societys edition of The Correspondence o f Isaac Newton, as follows; vol. I:
memorandum by Hooke, 19 June 1672, pp. 195-197; **Hooke to Lord Brouncker, c.
June 1672, pp. 198-203; Hooke to Newton, 20 January 1675/6, pp. 412-413; Newton
to Hooke, 5 February 1675/6, pp. 416-417; Hooke to Oldenburg, 15 February 1671/2,
pp. 110-114; vol. II; Newton to Hooke, 18 December 1677, p. 239; Hooke to Newton,
24 December 1677, p. 240; *Newton to Hooke, 5 March 1677/8, p. 253; Newton to
Hooke, 18 May 1678, p. 264; Hooke to Newton, 25 May 1678, p. 265; *Newton to
Hooke, 8 June 1678, p. 266; Hooke to Newton, 24 November 1679, p. 297; Newton to
Hooke, 28 November 1679, p. 300; Hooke to Newton, 9 December 1679, p. 304; New
ton to Hooke, 13 December 1679, pp. 307-308; Hooke to Newton, 6 January 1679/80,
pp. 309-310; Hooke to Newton, 17 January 1679/80, pp. 312-313; Newton to Hooke,
3 December 1680, p. 314; *Hooke to Newton, 18 December 1680, p. 317; vol. Ill:
Aubrey and Hooke to Anthony a Wood, 15 September 1689, pp. 40-42. The asterisk
in each case indicates that the letter in question has not been previously published,
so far as can be ascertained. The new letter from Newton to Hooke, 5 March 1677/8,
is very short and deals only with Newtons controversy with Lucas concerning the
theory of light and colors. The one of 8 June 1678 is brief and merely acknowledges a
letter of Hooke, and replies to a question concerning the topography of the Fens; it
concludes by saying, If I can serve you at any time pray be free with S*' Your obliged
& humble Servant Is. Newton. The new letter from Hooke to Newton, 18 December
1680, is again brief and is unrelated to any Hooke-Newton controversy. Hookes
letter to Brouncker, c. June 1672, is related to the earlier controversy at the time of the
publication of Newtons theory of light and colors.
* It is well known that Newton obstinately refused to publish his Opticks during the
lifetime of Hooke. He therefore held back his manuscript, awaiting patiently and con
fidently the disappearance of his foe, and printed it in 1704, the year of Hookes death.
* Philosophical Transactions, No. 80, pp. 3075 sq., reproduced in I. B. Cohen, ed.,
Isaac Newton's Papers and Letters on Natural Philosophy (Cambridge, Massachusetts;
Harvard University Press, 1958), pp. 47 sq.
222
^ See Sir David Brewster, Memoirs o f the Life, Writings and Discoveries o f Sir Isaac
Newton (Edinburgh, 1855), I, 78-79; Louis Trenchard More, Isaac Newton, a Bio
graphy (New York: Scribner, 1934), pp. 82-89. As a matter of fact, Hookes criticism
was rather profitable to Newton; it made him improve his theory by incorporating
undulatory components into it. See T. J. Kuhn, Newtons Optical Papers, in Cohen,
Newtons Papers and Letters, pp. 27 sq.
* Micrographia: or some physiological descriptions o f minute bodies made by magni
fying glasses, with observations and inquiries thereupon by R. Hooke, Fellow of the
Royal Society (London, 1665). The Micrographia, a first-rate work of quite outstanding
importance, is characterized by the Dictionary o f National Biography as a book full
of ingenious ideas and singular anticipations. It contained the earliest investigation

of the fantastical colours of thin plates with a quasi-explanation by interference (p.
66), the first notice of the black spot in soap-bubbles, and a theory of light, as a very
short vibrative motion transverse to straight lines of propagation through a homo
geneous medium. Heat was defined as a property of a body arising from the motion
or agitation of its parts (p. 37), and the real nature of combustion was pointed out
(p. 103) in detail, eleven years before the publication of Mayows similar discovery.
Professor E. N. da C. Andrade, in his Wilkins Lecture, Robert Hooke, Proceedings
o f the Royal Society [A] 201 (1950), 445, says; The plates of the Micrographia are
beautiful in themselves but also record a number of fundamental discoveries . . .
Sachs, the historian of botany, puts Hooke with Malpighi, Grew and Leeuwenhoek as
endeavouring by earnest reflection to apply the powers of mind to the objects seen
with the assisted eye, to clear up the true nature of the microscopic objects, and to
explain the secrets of their constitution. The figures of the gnat, the flea and the louse
were long famous. But microscopic pictures and their discussion form but a small part
of the book. In it we find important theoretical discussions of the nature of light and
h e a t. . . further discussion of capillarity on the lines of his earlier tract [An attempt for
the explication o f the phenomena observable in an experiment published by the Honor
able Robert Boyle (London, 1661)]; experiments on the thermal expansion of solids and
liquids; shrewd speculations on tempering of metals; observations on crystal structure;

astronomical discussions, including attempts to form artificially craters like those of
the moon; and accounts of the magnitudes of stars, in which occurs the statement that
more powerful telescopes would discover fresh stars . . . Further, we must note that
the book contains a very full discussion of the colours of thin plates, such as flakes of
mica, air films between glasses, and bubbles not only of soapy water but of rosin and
several other substances. These observations were a cause of subsequent dispute
with Newton. The Micrographia gained Hooke considerable fame at home and abroad.
There have been three modem reprints of Hookes Micrographia: (1) in R. T. Gunther,
ed.. Early Science in Oxford (Oxford: Printed for the Subscribers, 1938), vol. XIII;
(2) a paperbound reprint of the above-cited reference, with preface by R. T. Gunther
(New York: Dover, 1961); (3) reproduction of the London edition of 1665, Historiae
naturalis classica, ed. J. Cramer and H. K. Swann (Weinheim: J. Cramer, 1961), vol.
XX. To these merits of Hooke could be added the kinetic theory of matter developed
by him in his Lectures de potentia restitutiva, or. O f the spring: Experiments on the
power o f springing bodies (London, 1678), reissued in the Lectiones Cutlerianae (Lon
don, 1679), and also the very ingenious theory of gravity based on this theory; see
Chapter III, Newton and Descartes, Appendix H, supra. Some publications relat
ing to Hooke which have appeared since this article was originally written are;
Louise D. Patterson, Pendulums of Wren and Hooke, Osiris 10 ((1952), 277-321;
The Royal Societys Standard Thermometer 1663-1709, Isis 44 (1953), 51-64;
Margaret Espinasse, Robert Hooke (London: Heinemann, 1956); Sir Geoffrey Keynes,
A Bibliography o f Dr. Robert Hooke (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1960); Jobs Lohne,
Newtons Proof of the Sine Law and His Mathematical Principles of Colors,
223
engender a deep resentment in Newtons proud and sensitive mind.^

The wounds inflicted in this long-drawn and heated polemic are
doubtless responsible for the nearly pathological aversion to all
publications, the nearly invincible resistance to being drawn out of
his shell, that Newton developed in his later years.
In the year 1675/6, when Newton presented to the Royal Society
his Hypothesis Explaining the Properties o f Light,^ the bitterness of
the polemic reached its climax; Hooke once more asserted that the
main part of Newtons work was contained in his Micrographia,
which Mr. Newton had only carried farther in some particulars.
Newton replied by pointing out Hookes indebtedness to Descartes
and others and his inability to apply exact measurement to the
problems of optics, especially to that of the colors in thin plates;
And this I hope may vindicate me from what Mr. Hooke has been pleased
to charge me with.^
He left me to find out and make such experiments about it, as might
inform me of the manner of the production of those colours, to ground an
hypothesis on; he having no further insight to it than this, that the colour
depended on some certain thickness of the plate; though what that thick
ness was at every colour, he confesses in his Micrography, he had attempted
in vain to learn; and therefore, seeing I was left to measure it myself,^ I
suppose he will allow me to make use of what I took the pains to find out.*
Archive for History o f Exact Sciences 1 (1961), 389-405; Richard S. Westfall, The
Development of Newtons Theory of Color, Isis 53 (1962), 339-358; Newtons
Reply to Hooke and the Theory of Colors, Isis 54 (1963), 82-96; Newton and His
Critics on the Nature of Colors, Archives Internationales d'Histoire des Sciences 15
(1962), 47-58.
' It made him abandon the project of his Lectiones opticae; see Correspondence, I,
146, Collins to Newton, and p. 161, Newton to Collins. On Newtons character, see
the paper of Professor Kuhn quoted in note 1, p. 223.
* Newton sent it to the Royal Society on 9 December 1675, expressly stating that he
did not want it to be published in the Transactions. See Birch, History o f the Royal
Society, III, 247-305, reproduced in Cohen, Newton's Papers and Letters, pp. 177-235.
In this paper (pp. 263 sq.; pp. 193 sq.) Newton studies, inter alia, the phenomena of
colors in thin plates and air laminae ( rings ) that, indeed, had been extensively
treated by Hooke in his Micrographia (Observ. IX, Of the Colours observable in
Muscovy Glass [mica] and other thin bodies, pp. 47-67) Hooke is therefore right in
claiming priority. On the other hand, Newton is right in pointing out that Hooke did
not, and could not, measure the thickness of these plates and laminae and left it to
him to do so.
* Birch, History o f the Royal Society, III, 269; Cohen, Newton's Papers and Letters,
p. 199.
* Newton did it by substituting - a stroke of genius - convex and planoconvex
lenses (object glasses) of known curvature pressed together for the thin plates of mica
and the like used by Hooke; the measure of the radii of the rings enabled him to cal
culate the corresponding distance separating the lenses. As for the hypothesis he
grounded on his experiments, it consisted - horribile dicta - in a combination of
Hookes undulatory theory of light and his own corpuscular conception. See F.
Rosenberger, Newton und seine physikalischen Prinzipien (Leipzig, 1895).
224
Yet, instead of meeting Newtons attack with a countercharge,

Hooke, though maintaining the superiority of his own theory over
that of his rival, quite unexpectedly made a step toward reconcilia
tion. Professor L. T. More assumes that pressure was put on Hooke to
appease the wounded feelings of the younger man,^ an assumption
that goes far toward explaining the otherwise unintelligible fact that
Hooke sent Newton a letter which Professor Pelseneer, who likewise
attributes it to pressure - on the part of Oldenburg - characterizes
as so courteous and so humble that it looks like a childs letter of
excuses.^
Sir [writes Hooke]^, The hearing a letter of yours read last week in the
meeting of the Royal Society, made me suspect that you might have been
some way or other misinformed concerning me; and this suspicion was the
more prevalent with me, when I called to mind the experience I have
formerly had of the like sinister practices. I have therefore taken the free
dom, which I hope I may be allowed in philosophical matters to acquaint
you of myself. First, that I doe noe ways approve of contention, or feuding
or proving in print, and shall be very unwillingly drawn to such kind of
warre. Next, that I have a mind very desirous of, and very ready to embrace
any truth that shall be discovered, though it may much thwart or contra
dict any opinions or notions I have formerly embraced as such. Thirdly,
that I do justly value your excellent disquisitions, and am extremely well
pleased to see those notions promoted and improved which I long since
began, but had not time to compleat. That I judge you have gone farther
in that affair much than I did, and that as I judge you cannot meet with
any subject more worthy your contemplation, so I believe the subject can
not meet with a fitter and more able person to enquire into it than yourself,
who are every way accomplished to compleat, rectify, and reform what were
the sentiments of my younger studies, which I designed to have done some
what at myself, if my other more troublesome employments would have
permitted, though I am sufficiently sensible it would have been with
^ Birch, History o f the Royal Society, III, 279; Cohen, Newton's Papers and Letters,
p. 209.
* See More, Isaac Newton, p. 175.
It seems to me more probable that this pressure was exerted not by Oldenburg, but
by Lord Brouncker; see Hookes letter to Brouncker of c. June 1672, Correspondence, I,
198 sq.
* See Jean Pelseneer, Lettres in6dites de Newton, Osiris 7 (1939). 541. On this
subject, see A. Rupert Hall and Marie Boas Hall, Why Blame Oldenburg? Isis 53
(1962), 482-491.
See Brewster, A/cffio/rj, I, 140-141; More, Isaac Newton, pp. 175-176; Correspon
dence, I, 412.
* An obvious hint at Oldenburg, and not an unjust one.
It is perfectly true that Hooke, who, as Curator of Experiments of the Royal
225
LETTER OF ROBERT HOOKE TO ISAAC NEWT ON
abilities much inferior to yours. Your design and mine are, I suppose,
both at the same thing, which is the discovery of truth, and I suppose
we can both endure to hear objections, so as they come not in the manner
of open hostility, and have minds equally inclined to yield to the plainest
deductions of reason from experiment. If, therefore, you will please to
correspond about such matters by private letters, I shall very gladly
embrace it; and when I shall have the happiness to peruse your excellent
discourse, (which I can as yet understand nothing more of by hearing it
cursorily read), I shall, if it be not ungrateful to you, send you freely my
objections, if I have any, or my concurrences, if I am convinced, which is
the more likely. This way of contending, I believe, to be the more philoso
phical of the two, for though I confess the collision of two hard-to-yield
contenders may produce light, [yet] if they be put together by the ears by
others hands and incentives, it will [produce rathjer ill concomitant heat.
which served for no other use but . . . kindle-cole. S, I hope you will
pardon this plainness of, your very affectionate humble serv*",
Society, was supposed to furnish the Society every day [they met once a week] with
three or four considerable experiments, never enjoyed the blessing of leisure of which
Newton, at least in his Cambridge years, had so large a share. Yet it was certainly
not only outward pressure that prevented Hooke from thinking out his extremely
numerous and original ideas; it was just as much, or even more, the inner pressure
of a feverish and ebullient mind. Let us quote once more the DNB:
The registers of the Royal Society testify to the eagerness with which Hooke hurried
from one inquiry to another with brilliant but inconclusive results. Among those which
early engaged his attention were the nature of the air, its function in respiration and
combustion, specific weights, the laws of falling bodies, the improvement of land-carri
age and diving bells, methods of telegraphy, and the relation of barometrical readings
to changes in the weather. He measured the vibrations of a pendulum two hundred feet
long attached to the steeple of St. Pauls; invented a useful machine for cutting the
teeth of watch-wheels; fixed the thermometrical zero at the freezing-point of water;
and ascertained (in July 1664) the number of vibrations corresponding to musical
notes. This characterization of Robert Hooke is not so very different from that of
Professor Andrade, who says ( Robert Hooke, p. 439): Probably the most inventive
man who ever lived, and one of the ablest experimenters, he had a most acute mind, and
made astonishingly correct conjectures, based on reason, in all branches of physics.
Physics, however, was far from being his only field: he is the founder of scientific
meteorology; as an astronomer he has observations of great significance to his credit;
he did fundamental work on combustion and respiration; he was one of the founders
of modern geology. And (p. 441) From now on [1660] we are to be confronted with
the difficulty of coping with the stream of inventions, notions, brilliant suggestions,
accurate observations, daring speculations and prophetic conjectures that poured
from Hookes fertile brain and contriving hands. It will be impossible even to mention
them all; to classify them will be difficult; in many cases, in view of the scanty record,
it will be hard to decide what exactly was done. Practically everything, however, will
bear witness to a truly extraordinary inventiveness and a truly modern outlook. Some
times Hooke is wrong, but he is wrong in a strictly scientific and not a medieval way.
Very often the ideas which he tumbled out in such profusion were taken by others;
sometimes his findings were reached quite independently by others, which Hooke
found hard to believe. At every stage we are witnessing the workings of a mind so active,
so fertile in expedients, so interrupted at every hour, at every endeavour, by the inrush
of new concepts, new projects, that it is hard to disentangle his doings. Newton said
that he made his discoveries by keeping the subject constantly before him and waiting
until the first dawnings opened little by little into the full light. This Hooke was quite
unable to do; he totally lacked Newtons powers of concentration. His mind was rest
less, continually disturbed by fresh ideas, but they were nearly all good and many were
of first importance.
226
R obert H ooke ^
1675/6
Newtons reply, likewise written, most probably, under pressure,
though very courteous and even conciliatory, is by no means as
meek and humble as Hookes letter. Quite the contrary: while re
cognizing the merits of his predecessors, Descartes and Hooke, even
calling them giants, he quite unmistakably insists on his own:
Dear Sir,
At the reading of your letter I was exceedingly pleased and satisfied
with your generous freedom, and think you have done what becomes a
true philosophical spirit. There is nothing which I desire to avoyde in
matters of philosophy more than contention, nor any kind of contention
more than one in print; and, therefore, I most gladly embrace your proposal
of a private correspondence. Whats done before many witnesses is seldom
without some further concerns than that for truth; but what passes be
tween friends in private, usually deserves the name of consultation rather
than contention; and so I hope it will prove between you and me. Your
animadversions will therefore be welcome to me; for though I was formerly
tyred of this subject by the frequent interruptions it caused to me, and have
not yet, nor I believe ever shall recover so much love for it as to delight in
spending time about it; yet to have at once in short the strongest objections
that may be made, I would really desire, and know no man better able to
furnish me with them than yourself. In this you will oblige me, and if there
be any thing else in my papers in which you apprehend I have assumed
too . . .
. . . If you please to reserve your sentiments of it for a private letter, I
hope you [will find that I] am not so much in love with philosophical
productions, but that I can make them yield. . . .
But, in the mean time, you defer too much to my ability in searching into
this subject. What Descartes did was a good step.^ You have added much
several ways, and especially in considering the colours of thin plates. If I
have seen farther, it is by standing on the shoulders of giants. But I make
no question you have divers very considerable experiments beside those
* This letter is addressed to my much esteemed friend, Mr. Isaak Newton, at his
chambers in Trinity College in Cambridge. Correspondence, I, 412 sq.
^ If one considers that Descartes established the law of refraction and gave a com
plete theory of the rainbow, one must confess that the praise bestowed on him by New
ton is not very lavish.
* As is pointed out by L. T. More, Isaac Newton, p. 177, n. 28, this celebrated saying,
which is usually quoted as being original with Newton and as expressing his magnani
mous modesty, is, as a matter of fact, a commonplace. It is used by Burton in his
Anatomy o f Melancholy as a quotation from Didacus Stella, In Luc. 10 tom. 2: Pigmaei
Gigantum humeris impositi plusquam ipsi gigantes vident.
227
you have published, and some, its very probable, the same with some of
those in my late papers.^
aloof attitude towards the Society till Hookes death relieved him from the
fear of his insinuations.^
This celebrated correspondence has been, since its publication,

greatly admired and praised by the historians and biographers of
Newton. Thus Brewster exclaims: These beautiful letters, emulous
of good feeling and lofty principle, throw some light on the character
and position of two of the greatest of our English philosophers.^
I must confess that I do not share this common admiration. Both
letters seem to me to be too full of rhetoric. The mutual praise
(though very carefully guarded by Newton) and the subtle distinction
between contention in public and friendly discussion in private (a
commonplace since Prodicos, or at least since Plato) give much
more the impression of conforming to a conventional pattern than
of following a free inspiration. Or, to quote Professor More: These
two letters have all the earmarks of an attempt towards a formal
reconciliation which had been urged by others, and recognised as
proper by themselves. Each of the writers expresses great admiration
for the others ability; each deprecates the public and partisan
discussion of their opinions; and each requests the other to criticise
rigourously his work, but to do it privately.^ - Neither, of course,
availed himself of the magnanimous and high-sounding invitation.
The official reconciliation did not heal the wounds inflicted by the
conflict. Bitterness and resentment on both sides, and especially on
Newtons, remained; to quote Professor More once more:
Yet, outwardly and formally, cordial, or at least courteous,

relations were re-established and, though no real scientific corre
spondence had followed the exchange of the letters of reconciliation,
still, as has been shown by Professor Pelseneer, in the years 1677-1688
Newton and Hooke actually exchanged a couple of (rather insigni
ficant) letters,2 Newton even went so far as to congratulate Hooke
on his election, after Oldenburgs death, to the secretaryship of the
Royal Society.^
Thus it was perfectly natural that, having been, two years later,
entrusted with holding and promoting the correspondence of the
Royal Society with its members as well as with foreign scientists,
Hooke, on 24 November 1679, addressed to Newton an invitation
to resume his former relations with the Royal Society, and to partici
pate in the exchange of scientific information with its members:
Two such men may indulge in general sentiments of a high and abstract
order, and use elaborate expressions of personal esteem; but there could
not be found two men, who were so temperamentally incapable to form a
lasting friendship. Both were suspicious and sensitively vain. In Hooke
these qualities showed themselves by wrathful explosions and by reiterated
accusations that he had been robbed of the fruits of his work; in Newton,
when opposed, they were equally apparent in a cold assumption of a dis
dain for fame and a silent retirement into his ivory tower. It is needless to
say that their correspondence was limited to official communications;
the embers of hostility still existed and needed only anew occasion to make
them blaze in public. They never forgave each other: Hooke continued to
claim that he had anticipated Newtons work, and Newton maintained his*
* See Brewster, Memoirs^ I, 141; More, Isaac Newton, 176; Correspondence, I, 416
sq. Newtons letter is dated Cambridge, 5 February 1675/6. The rest of this letter
deals with special optical questions of no interest in the present context.
^ See Brewster, Memoirs, I, 143.
* See More, Isaac Newton, p. 177.
228
Sir - Finding by our registers that you were pledged to correspond with
Mr. Oldenburg, and having also the happiness of receiving some letters
from you my self make me presume to trouble you with this present scribble
- Dr. Crews more urgent occasions having made him decline the holding
correspondence. And the Society hath devolved it on me. I hope therefore
that you will please to continue your former favours to the Society by
communicating what shall occur to you that is philosophical!, and for
retume, I shall be sure to acquaint you with what we shall receive consider
able from other parts or find out new here. And you may be assured that
whatever shall
soe communicated shall be noe otherwise further im
parted or disposed of than you yourself shall praescribe. I am not ignorant
that both heretofore, and not long since also, they have been some who
have indeavoured to misrepresent me to you, and possibly they or others
have not been wanting to doe the like to me,^ but difference in opinion if
such there be (especially in philosophical! matters where interest hath little
concerne) me thinks should not be the occasion of enmity - tis not with
me I am sure. For my part I shall take it as a great favour if you shall please
to communicate by letter your objections against any hypothesis or opinion
of mine; and particularly if you will let me know your thoughts of that of
compounding the celestiall motions of the planetts of a direct motion by the
* Isaac Newton, p. 177.
* See Pelseneer, Lettres incdites de Newton.
See Correspondence, II, 239; Pelseneer Lettres inedites de Newton, p. 542,
Newton to Hooke, 18 December 1677: I wish you much happiness in yo^ new
employmt & that the R. Society may flourish yet more by the labours of so able a
member. Hooke was elected secretary of the Royal Society on 25 October 1677.
* Once more a hint at Oldenburg.
229
tangent and an attractive motion towards the centrall body/ or what

objections you have against my hypothesis of the lawes or causes of springynesse.^
I have lately received from Paris a new hypothesis invented by Mo
Mallement de Messanges/
of the Sorbon, who desires much to have
what can be objected against it. He supposes then a center of this our vor
tex about which all the primary planets move in perfect circles, each of
them in his aequall spaces in aequall times. The next to it he places the
Sun; and about the Sun, Mercury as a satellit; the next Venus; the next the
earth, about which the Moon as a satellit; then Mars; then Jupiter and his
satellits; and Saturn with his. He supposes the Sun to make its revolution in
about half the time the earth makes its, and the plaine of it to be inclined
to the plaine of the ecliptick as much as the trepidation requires. He is not
precise in defining any thing, as reserving a liberty to himself to help him
out where objections might stick.
I am informed likewise from Paris that they are there about another
work, viz. of selling the longitude and latitude of the most considerable
places: the former of those by the eclipses of the satellites of Jupiter. M""
Picart and De la Hire travell, and Mo^ Cassini and Romer observe at
Paris. They have already found that Brest in Britaigne is 18 leagues nearer
Paris than all the mappes make it. I have written to a correspondent in
Deavonshire to see if we can doe somewhat of that kind here, and I should
be glad if by perpendicular observations, we could determine the difference
of latitude between London and Cambridge. If you know of any one that
will observe at Cambridge, I will procure it to be done here very exactly.
M' Collins shewed me a book he received from Paris of De la Hire con
taining first a new method of the conick sections^ and secondly a treatise
De locis solidis. I have not perused the book but M Collins commends it.
M"" Flamstead by some late perpendicular observations hath confirmed the
paralax of the orb of the earth.
But I fear I have too much trespassed, and therefore to put an end to
your further trouble I shall subscribe my self. Sir,
Your very humble Servant
Gresham College, Nov. 24. 1679
^ Hookes ideas on celestial mechanics were expounded at the end of his Attempt
to Prove the Motion o f the Earth by Observation (London, 1674). I quote the relevant
passage infra, p. 233.
Hooke deals with the laws of elasticity (springiness) in his Lectures de potentia
restitutiva.
Claude Mallemont (or Mallemans) de Messanges, professor of philosophy in the
College de Plessis. He published a Nouveau systdme du monde invent^ par M . Malle
mont de Messanges (Paris, 1678), followed by a Nouveau systim e du monde, par lequel,
sans excentriciti, trepidation et autres inventions d'astrologues on explique micaniquement tous lesphenomines (Paris, 1679); a Dissertation sur les comites, in 1681; and a
solution of the quadrature of the circle in 1686. All his writings are a tissue of absurdi
ties.
* Probably Philippe de la Hires Nouveaux ilim ents des sections coniques, les lieux
giometriques, la construction ou effection des Equations (Paris, 1679).
See Rouse Ball, Essay, pp. 139 sq.; More, Isaac Newton, pp. 220 sq.; Correspon
dence, II, 297.
230
LETTER OF ROBERT HOOKE TO ISAAC NEWT O N
Hookes letter barely needs a comment. Having been, as I have

already mentioned, newly entrusted with the correspondence of the
Royal Society, he is performing his duty - or playing his part in (a) informing Newton of his new appointment, (b) asking him,
in a very courteous and dignified way, to resume his scientific co
operation with the Society, and (c) giving to Newton news about the
recent developments in the field of science. Of course, one could ask
oneself why Hooke finds it necessary to inform Newton about the
obviously worthless hypothesis of Mallemont de Messanges.
Yet it is possible that its worthlessness was somewhat less striking in
1679 than it is now, or even only a hundred years later; the Philoso
phical Transactions are full of things as manifestly worthless and
absurd or even worse. Absurdity, as well as truth, is a daughter of
time.
On the other hand, we should ask ourselves why Hooke asks
Newton for a criticism of his work, quite particularly of his theory of
elasticity and his celestial mechanics. Does he really want to learn the
objections which Newton could formulate against them? This does
not seem very probable: Hooke bears criticism as badly as Newton
himself; to me it appears much more like a piece of rhetoric aimed
at convincing Newton of the sincerity of his friendly feelings and at
dissipating the apprehension and mistrust that Newton may still feel
against him. We may assume, too, that Hooke is trying to induce
Newton to acknowledge the value of his brilliant pioneer work in
these two fields of study that seemed to lie outside of Newtons own
preoccupations; Hooke did not - and could not - know that Newton
had been interested in celestial mechanics for some fifteen years
and that in this field, as in optics, Newton was already far ahead of
him. Finally, it is even not impossible that Hooke expected, or at least
hoped, that Newton would be able to bring his celestial mechanics
to a completion, that is, to work out mathematically the ratio of the
variation (as a function of the distance) of that attractive power of
which he was the first to assert the cosmic universality and funda
mental role.^
Hookes merits in the development of the theory of elasticity have
been recognized by history and rewarded by the naming of its car
dinal law: Hookes law; his contributions to celestial mechanics,
on the other hand, are so completely overshadowed by the work of
^ See my paper, La Gravitation universelle, de Kepler a Newton, Archives Inter
nationales d'Histoire des Sciences 4 (1951), 638-653.
231
Newton that it is nearly impossible for us to appreciate them justly

and to determine their value and importance in, and for, their own
time.^ In order to do so, we should compare Hookes attempts not
with Newtons achievements - there is between them no common
measure - but with those of his contemporaries, or immediate pre
decessors, for example, with those of Borelli.^
Such a comparison would show that in the very first paper - read
by Hooke before the Royal Society on 23 May 1666 - in which he
deals with the problems of planetary motions, a paper in which
Borellis influence is unmistakable, Hookes superiority is quite
obvious. The replacement of Borellis tendency or natural in
stinct of the planets to move toward the sun (or, in the case of the
satellites, toward their primary planet) by an attractive power of the
central body that draws the planets (or the satellites) to itself en
ables Hooke to make a decisive step, and to consider this attractive
power not as a constant force - like Borellis tendency or instinct
- but as a force which is some function of the distance. Hooke, it is
true, does not know the exact law of variation of this force. Yet we
must not overlook the fact that his conception is only incomplete
and no longer simply false, as was Borellis. In 1670, in his Cutlerian
Lectures^ Hooke seems to have taken a step further; a step of tremen
dous importance. The attractive power is now conceived not as a
special force (or set of forces) that binds the planets to the sun or the
satellites to their planet, but as a universal factor that binds all the
celestial bodies (at least those of our solar system) together, and that,
moreover, is identical with our terrestrial gravity.^
In 1674, in his Attempt to Prove the Motion o f the Earth by Obser
vation (London, 1674), pp. 27 sq., which, according to Hooke, re
produces the text, or the contents, of his 1670 lectures, and which
he says was read to the Royal Society in 1671, he announces
^ A very able and scholarly attempt to vindicate for Hooke a much more important
role in the development of celestial mechanics than is usually attributed to him has
been made recently by Miss L. D. Patterson, Hookes Gravitation Theory and Its
Influence on Newton, Isis 40 (1949), 327-341; 41 (1950), 32-45. Unfortunately, Miss
Patterson - who, in order to magnify Hooke (as a matter of fact, Hooke has been
rather badly treated by Newton-inspired historians) charges Newton with all the
capital sins, including plagiarism and falsification of documents - does not seem to me to
appreciate at its just value the difference between an idea and a theory. A much more
balanced and just account of Hookes scientific work - the best that we have today has been given by Andrade, Robert Hooke.
* See A. Amitage, Borells Hypothesis and the Rise of Celestial Mechanics,
Annals o f Science 6 (1952), 268-282, and my paper, La Mecanique celeste de Borelli,
Revue d'Histoire des Sciences 5 (1952), 101-138.
See Birch, History o f the Royal Society, II, 90; R. T. Gunther, The Life and Work
of Robert Hooke, Early Science in Oxford, VI, 245-266. In this paper Hooke (a)
sketched - and rejected - an explanation of the incurvation o f the planetary motions
by aethereal pressure, and (b) suggested that the inflecting of direct motion of a body
into a curve may be the result of an attractive property of the body placed in the
centre; whereby it continually endeavours to attract or draw it to itself. Hooke illu
strated his conception by an experiment with a conical pendulum which, depending on
the strength of the impetus (tangential) given to it, described circles or differently
oriented ellipses; see Chapter III, Newton and Descartes, Appendix H, supra.
232
a system of the world differing in many particulars from any yet known
answering in all things to the common rules of mechanical motions. This
depends upon three suppositions.
First, that all celestial bodies whatsoever have an attraction or a gravi
tating power towards their own centers, whereby they attract not only
their own parts, and keep them from flying from them, as they may
observe the earth to do, but that they do also attract all the other celestial
bodies that are within the sphere of this activity; and consequently that
not only the sun and moon have an influence upon the body and motion
of the earth; and the earth upon them, but that Mercury, Mars, Saturn and
Jupiter by their attractive power have a considerable influence upon its
motions, and in the same manner the corresponding attractive power of the
earth hath a considerable influence upon every one of their motions also.
The second supposition is this, that all bodies whatsoever that are put
into a direct and simple motion will so continue to move forward in a
straight line, till they are by some other effectual powers deflected and bent
into a motion describing a circle, ellipsis or some other more compound
curve line.
The third supposition is that these attractive powers are so much the
more powerful in operating by how much the nearer the body wrought
upon is to their own centers. Now what these several degrees are, I have
not yet experimentally verified;^ but it is a notion which, if fully prosecuted
^ Miss L. D. Patterson, Isis 40 (1949), 330, gives Hooke the credit for having dis
covered the inverse-square law as far back as 1664, though not having stated it ex
plicitly in his Micrographia, and the law of centrifugal force nearly at the same time,
in any case, prior to the experiments of 23 May 1666. In my opinion such is by no means
the case. See p. 183 and Chapter III. Let us not forget, however, that universal
attraction was asserted by Roberval already in 1644 in his Aristarchi Samii de mundi
systemate partibus et motibus ejusdem libellus (Paris, 1644), reissued by Mersenne in
his Cogitata physicomathematica (Paris, 1647), vol. III.
* Robert Hooke, Lectiones Cutlerianae, preface: I have begun with a Discourse
composed and read in Gresham College in the year 1670, when I designed to have
printed it, but was diverted by the advice of some Friends to stay the repeating the
Observation, rather than publish it upon the Experience of one Year only. But finding
that Sickness hath hitherto hindered me from repeating the tryals, and that some Years
Observations have already been lost by the first delay: I do rather hast it out now,
though imperfect, then detain it for a better compleating, hoping it may be at least a
Hint to others to prosecute and compleat the Observations, which I much long for.
* The sphere of activity of the attracting or gravitating power is thus considered by
Hooke as finite.
* In his letter to Newton of 6 January 1680, Hooke writes that Halley, when he
returned from S Helena, told me that his pendulum at the top of the hill went slower
than at the bottom and thus had solved me a query I had long desired to be answered
Q
233
LETTER OF ROBERT HOOKE TO ISAAC N EWT O N
as it ought to be will mightily assist the astronomer to reduce all the celes
tial motions to a certain rule which I doubt will never be done without it.
He that understands the nature of the circular pendulum and circular
motion^ will easily understand the whole ground of this principle and will
know where to find direction in nature for the true understanding thereof,
etc. This, I dare promise the undertaker, that he will find all the great
motions in the world to be influenced by this principle, and that the true
understanding thereof will be the true perfection of astronomy.
circular motion reveals some doubt about the value, in this case,
of purely experimental research.
I have said already and I want to repeat: it is only justice to recog
nize the outstanding value of Hookes vision and to defend him
against Newtons accusation of having only plagiarized from Borelli.^
And yet one can well understand Newtons outburst when, having
completely worked out the Principia, he was confronted with Hookes
claims:
The boldness and the clarity of Hookes thought and the depth of
his intuition are nothing less than admirable; the near similarity of
his world view with that of Newton is striking - Hooke certainly is
perfectly right in insisting on his priority. Yet it cannot be denied that
the lacuna which we discovered in his earlier work has not been
filled up: Hooke still does not know what the several degrees are
by which the attractive power varies with the distance. In 1678, when
he publishes his Cometa, he is as far from the solution of that problem
as in 1674,2 and that is probably why, feeling that he is unable to keep
his promise and to explain his system of the world, he simply
reissues, in 1679, his old Attempt under the new cover of Lectiones
Cutlerianae.
Did he still believe in the possibility of determining the law of
attraction experimentally ? In any case, when in the same year 1679
he finally found out the inverse-square law, he certainly did not do it
by experiment. It is even possible that his appeal to astronomers and
to those who understand the nature of the circular pendulum and
but wanted opportunity, and that was to know whether the gravity did actually de
crease at a greater height from the center. To examine this decrease of attraction I
have formerly made many experiments on Paules steeple and Westminster Abby, but
none that were fully satisfactory. See Rouse Ball, Essay, p. 148. Besides the experi
ments at St. Pauls and Westminster Abbey, Hooke also made experiments in a deep
mine at Banstead Downes; see Gunther, Early Science in Oxford, VI, 257.
' In spite of Miss L. D. Pattersons able defense of Hooke, A Reply to Professor
Koyrds Note on Robert Hooke, Isis 41 (1950), 304-305, 1 still believe, as I pointed
out in Note on Robert Hooke, Isis 41 (1950), 195, that it is not the conatus to de
scend but the conatus of returning to the centre in the plane of the motion - as,
besides, Miss Patterson states herself in her paper on Hookes gravitational theory,
Isis 40 (1949), 333, that Hooke assumes to be proportional to the sine of the vertex
angle, and that, therefore, he is not among those who understand the nature of the
circular pendulum and circular motion. See also Jobs Lohne, Hooke versus New
ton, Centaurus 7 (1960), 6-52.
* The assertions (in the DNB and elsewhere) that the inverse-square law is stated in
the Cometa are based on a misinterpretation of a passage in a letter of Newton to
Halley of 20 June 1686 (Rouse Ball, Essay, p. 157): I am almost confident by circum
stances, that Sir Chr. Wren knew the duplicate proportion when I gave him a visit;
and then Mr. Hooke (by his book Cometa written afterwards) will prove the last of us
three that knew it. Newton does not mean that the duplicate proportion is to be
found in the Cometa, but, on the contrary, that it does not appear even there.
By the means at his disposal it was utterly impossible.
234
Borell did something in it, and wrote modestly. He has done nothing,
and yet written in such a way, as if he knew and had sufficiently hinted
all but what remained to be determined by the drudgery of calculations
and observations, excusing himself from that labour by reason of his other
business, whereas he should rather have excused himself by reason of his
inability. For tis plain, by his words, he knew not how to go about it.
Now is not this very fine ? Mathematicians, that find out, settle, and do all
the business, must content themselves with being nothing but dry calcu
lators and drudges; and another, that does nothing but pretend and grasp
at all things,^ must carry away all the invention, as well of those that were
to follow him, as of those that went before.
If, as I am inclined to believe, Robert Hooke, in writing to Newton,

expected, or at least hoped, to start a friendly discussion, and to
obtain some help, the answer must have been deeply disappointing
^ Newton to Halley, 20 June 1686 (Rouse Ball, Essay, p. 159; Correspondence, II,
437): I cannot forbear, in stating the point of justice, to tell you further, that he has
published Borells hypothesis in his own name.
Newton is certainly more than unjust in not recognizing the amazing fecundity of
Hookes restless mind. Hooke is not a mere pretender and grasper ; if he was
nicknamed the universal claimant because there was scarcely a discovery made in
his time which he did not conceive himself entitled to claim {DNB) it was because his
mind was so prolific that he had really some reason to claim a great number of these
discoveries, or at least the ideas on which they were based. Yet, it was this very restless
ness, the inability of concentration, and therefore, of obtaining conclusive results, that
made him unacceptable to Newton. Newton, to speak with Professor Pelseneer, was a
classical mind and must have shuddered when reading Hooke's profession de foi
{Lectiones Cutlerianae, preface), where he explained that there is scarce one Subject
of millions that may be pitched upon, but to write an exact and compleat History
thereof, would require the whole time and attention of a mans life, and some thou
sands of Inventions and Observations to accomplish it: So on the other side no man is
able to say that he will compleat this or that Inquiry, whatever it be, (The greatest part
of Invention being but a luckey bitt of chance, for the most part not in our own power,
and like the wind, the Spirit of Invention bloweth where and when it listeth, and we
scarce know whence it came, or whether tis gone.) Twill be much better therefore to
imbrace the influences of Providence, and to be diligent in the inquiry of everything we
meet with. For we shall quickly find that the number of considerable Observations and
Inventions this way collected, will a hundred fold out-strip those that are found by
Design. No man butt hath some luckey hints and useful thoughts on this or that
Subject he is conversant about, the regarding and communicating of which, might be a
means to other Persons highly to improve them. See supra, p. 225, n. 7.
See Rouse Ball, Essay, p. 159; Correspondence, II, 438.
235
to him. It is even possible that it was this disappointment - and irrita

tion - that determined his subsequent behavior, namely, the fact
that, though he promised Newton to keep his correspondence to him
self, he immediately made it public by a reading at a meeting of the
Royal Society: both Newtons letter and his own answer. Most
probably, though he knew only too well - by experience - that New
ton, to quote the expression of Locke, was a man nicely to deal
with, he could not resist the temptation of publicly correcting and
thus humiliating his rival.
Indeed, Newtons answer to Hookes invitation to correspond
with him and the Royal Society, though by no means as harsh and
as forbidding as, some years later, in a letter to Halley, he pretended
it to be^ - quite on the contrary, it is, in form, extremely courteous
and urbane - aimed obviously at discouraging Hookes attempts.
It is quite clear that Newton does not want to resume his former re
lation with the Royal Society: perhaps less than ever, since it means
dealing with Hooke, whom he still dislikes and does not trust.^
Thus, in order to cut short all further approaches, he tells Hooke
that he has completely renounced philosophy and has never even
heard about Hookes theories of celestial motions; that he has no
time to lose in correspondence, though he is perfectly willing to
communicate in oral discourses with him - should they ever have
familiar converse. Still, being a well-bred man and, besides, a
Fellow of the Royal Society, Newton feels that he cannot give
Hookes request, made in the name of the Society, a purely negative
answer and, to sweeten the pill, he proposes to him a carefully
thought-out project of a very interesting experiment which should
enable one to prove the motion of the earth by observation.^ It is
in describing this experiment that Newton made the fateful blunder^

which occasioned the flare-up of his second polemic with Hooke
and finally led him to the elucidation of the inverse-square law of
universal gravitation.
Newtons letter to Hooke has been considered by all Newtons his
torians - even by such careful and critical ones as Professor Pelseneer
and Professor More - as an invaluable document about its authors
spiritual development. In my opinion it is by no means worthy of
such confidence. Newton - a suspicious and secret mind - had no
reason whatever to be sincere and candid with Hooke. Most prob
ably, he was not. Thus, all he says - even, or perhaps just, the famous
phrases in which he describes his aversion for science, though seem
ingly supported by comparable assertions in 1676 and confirmed by
his letters to Halley in 1686 - is not to be taken as gospel truth. It is,
of course, quite possible that, at the time when he received Hookes
letter, he was busy upon other things, and thought no farther
of philosophical matters than his letters put me up.^ He may have
been occupied with pure mathematics or chemical experiments, or with
theology, or even with something else, but it is impossible to admit
that this aloofness lasted long years and was as strong as he tells
Hooke. Indeed, some months before (in February 1679), he sends to
Locke a very elaborate paper, in which he develops - as a hypothesis
- a physical explanation of gravitation. Moreover he contradicts and
betrays himself: at the same moment when he tells Hooke (in the
letter of 28 November 1679) that he has shook hands with philo
sophy and that he has never so much as heard of Hookes hypo
thesis of compounding the celestial motions of the planets, of a direct
motion by the tangent to the curve (which means that he not only
has never heard of the famous pendulum experiments of 1666 but
also has never read his Attempt to Prove the Motion o f the Earth by
Observation of 1674 and of 1679), he informs him of having ordered
two pieces of metal for a reflecting tube and congratulates him on the
^ Newton to Halley, 20 June 1686, Rouse Ball, Essay, p. 157: In my answer to his
first letter I refused his correspondence, told him I had laid philosophy aside, sent him
only the experiment of projectiles (rather shortly hinted than carefully described),
in compliment to sweeten my answer, expected to hear no further from him.
According to Professor More, Isaac Newton, p. 297, Newton . . . with great
ingenuity, relieved his feelings of resentment for past injustice, and insinuated every
reason for making Hooke so angry that he would drop any further correspondence.
Though Newton calls it a fancy and, in his letter to Halley (quoted supra, n. 1),
pretends it to be rather shortly hinted than carefully described, it is, as Professor
Pelseneer rightly remarks ( Lettre in6dite de Newton, pp. 240 sq.), en ddpit de la
ndgligence de l expos6, un magnifique exemple de la conception d un probl^me scientifique chez Newton ; besides, adds he (p. 241, n. 11), cette negligence concerne
surtout la forme; au contraire, certains details de Iexperience proposee par Newton
r6v61ent un sens admirable de Iimportance relative des causes d erreurs dont Hooke
allait avoir a tenir compte au cours de Texperimentation, par exemple la dissymetrie
caus6e dans les couches d air du puits par la chute de la bille. I would go even further:
in mv opinion, Newton, in instructing Hooke about the manner in which the proposed
236
experiment is to be performed, and in analyzing the possible sources of error, wants to

give a lesson to Hooke, and to show him his own ability as an experimenter. More
over, he is, in a certain sense, reversing the roles: it is he, Newton, who gives the idea,
and Hooke who has the drudgery of finding out.
In describing the trajectory of a falling body, he told Hooke that it would be a
spiral.
Newton to Halley, 20 June 1686; Rouse Ball, Essay, p. 157; Correspondence, II,
436.
* Professor Pelseneer, Lettre inedite de Newton, suggests that he was studying
law.
237
confirmation by Flamsteed of the discovery o f the earths parallax

which Hooke announced in his book.^
Small wonder that Hooke did not believe him.^ It was not so much a
lack of affection for philosophy as a lack of affection for Hooke and fear o f being embroiled in discussions - that inspired Newton.
But let the reader judge for himself.
the philosophical world. And having thus shook hands with philosophy,
and being also at present taken of with other business, I hope it will not be
interpreted out of any unkindness to you or the R. Society that I am back
ward in engaging my self in these matters, though formerly I must acknow
ledge I was moved by other reasons^to decline, as much as M'' Oldenburgs
importunity and ways to engage me in disputes would permit, all corre
spondence with him about them. However I cannot but return my hearty
thanks for your thinking me worthy of so noble a commerce and in
order thereto francly imparting to me several things in your letter.
As to the hypothesis of Mons*' Mallemont, though it should not be true
yet if it would answer to phaenomena it would be very valuable by reason
of its simplicity. But how the orbits of all the primary planets but Mercury
can be reduced to so many concentric circles through each of which the
planet moves equal spaces in equal times (for thats the hypothesis if I
mistake not your description) I do not yet understand. The readiest way to
convince the world of this truth would be I conceive to set forth first in
some two of the planets, suppose Mars and earth, a specimen thereof stated
and determined in numbers.
I know no body in the University addicted to making astronomical obser
vations: and my own short sightedness and tenderness of health makes
me something unfit. Yet its likely I may sometime this winter when I have
more leisure than at present attempt what you propound for determining
the difference of latitude between Cambridge and London.
I am glad to hear that so considerable a discovery as you made of the
earths annual parallax is seconded by M Flamsteads observations.
In requital of this advertisement I shall communicate to you a fancy
of my own about discovering the earths diurnal motion. In order thereto
I will consider the earths diurnal motion alone, without the annual, that
having little influence on the experiment I shall here propound. Suppose
then, BDG represents the globe of the earth [see Fig. 3] carried round
once a day about its centre C from west to east according to the order of
the letters BDG ; and let /I be a heavy body suspended in the air, and mov
ing round with the earth so as perpetually to hang over the same point
thereof B. Then imagine this body A let fall, and its gravity will give it a
new motion towards the centre of the earth without diminishing the old
one from west to east. Whence the motion of this body from west to east,
by reason that before it fell it was more distant from the centre of the earth
than the parts of the earth at which it arrives in its fall, will be greater than
the motion from west to east of the parts of the earth at which the body
arrives in its fall; and therefore it will not descend the perpendicular AC,
but outrunning the parts of the earth will shoot forward to the east side
of the perpendicular describing in its fall a spiral line A DEC, quite con-
Sir,
I cannot but acknowledge my self every way by the kindness of your
letter tempted to concur with your desires in a philosophical correspon
dence. And heartily sorry I am that I am at present unfurnished with matter
answerable to your expectations - for I have been this last half year in
Lincolnshire cumbered with concerns amongst my relations till yesterday
when I returned hither; so that I have had no time to entertain philosophi
cal meditations, or so much as to study or mind any thing else but country
affairs. And before that, I had for some years last been endeavouring to
bend myself from philosophy to other studies in so much that I have long
grutched the time spent in that study unless it be perhaps at idle hours
sometimes for a diversion; which makes me almost wholy unacquainted
with what philosophers at London or abroad have of late been imployed
about. And perhaps you will incline the more to believe me when I tell
you that I did not, before the receipt of your last letter, so much as heare
(that I remember) of your hypothesis of compounding the celestial motions
of the planets, of a direct motion by the tangent to the curve, and of the
laws and causes of springyness, though these no doubt are well known to
^ See An Attempt to Prove the Motion o f the Earth by Observation, p. 25: Tis mani
fest then by the observations of July the Sixth and Ninth: and that of the One and
twentieth of October that there is a sensible parallax of the Earths Orb to the first Star
in the head of Draco, and consequently a confirmation of the Copernican System
against the Ptolomaick and Tychonic." It is difficult to admit that these assertions of
ignorance of Hookes work are anything else but irony.
* Hooke was perfectly right in disbelieving Newton, and in inserting before the last
paragraph of Newtons letter the words: he here pretends he knew not H s hypothe
sis. There seems to be very little doubt, if any, about the fact that Newton knew
Hookes hypothesis, as, besides the slip I have already pointed out, he quite de
finitely says so in his letter to Halley of 20 June 1686, where, protesting against Hookes
claim of having taught him the duplicate proportion, he adds, That by the same
reason he concludes me then ignorant of the rest of the duplicate proportion, he may
as well conclude me ignorant of the rest of that theory I had read before in his book
(Rouse Ball, Essay, p. 157); and That when Hugenius [in 1673] put out his Horol[ogium] Oscil[latorium]. . . I had then my eye upon comparing the forces of the planets
arising from their circular motion, and understood it; so that a while after, when Mr.
Hooke propounded the problem solemnly, in the end of his Attempt to prove the
Motion of the Earth, if I had not known the duplicate proportion before, I could not
but have found it now. In the postscript to this letter (p. 160) Newton writes: For
his extending the duplicate proportion down to the centre (which 1 do not) made him
correct me, and tell me the rest of his theory as a new thing to me, and now stand
upon it, that I had all from that his letter, notwithstanding that he had told it to all the
world before, and I had seen it in his printed books, all but the proportion.
Philosophy in the language of the seventeenth century includes natural science
iphilosophia naturalis), but not mathematics,
238
^ Newton believed himself to have been unfairly treated by the Royal Society in
general and by Hooke in particular.
* Professor Pelscneer comments on this passage as follows ( Lettre in6dite de New
ton, p. 240): Ces derniers mots expriment de fort heureuse fagon Iidee qui est a la
base de Ioeuvre newtonienne; la traduction dans le langage mathematique des faits
d experiences et le contrdle des hypotheses ainsi realist en toute surete.
239
9^
trary to the opinion of the vulgar who think that, if the earth moved, heavy
bodies in falling would be outrun by its parts and fall on the west side of the
perpendicular. The advance of the body from the perpendicular eastward
will in a descent of but twenty or thirty yards be very small, and yet I
am apt to think it may be enough to determine the matter of fact.
Suppose then in a very calm day a pistol bullet were let down by a silk
line from the top of a high building or well, the line going through a small
hole made in a plate of brass or tinn fastened to the top of the building
or well, and the bullet when let down almost to the bottom were setled
in water so as to cease from swinging, and then let down further
on an edge of steel lying north and south to try if the bullet in setling there
on will almost stand in aequilibrio but yet with some small propensity (the
smaller the better) decline to the west side of the steel as often as it is so
let down thereon. The steel being so placed underneath, suppose the bullet
be then drawn up to the top and let fall by cutting, clipping or burning the
line of silk, and if it fall constantly on the east side of the steel it will argue
the diurnall motion of the earth.^ But what the event will be I know not,
having never attempted to try it.If any body would think this worth their
trial, the best way in my opinion would be to try it in a high church or wide
steeple, the windows being first well stopped; for in a narrow well the bullet
possibly may be apt to receive a ply from the straitened air neare the sides
of the well, if in its fall it come nearer to one side than to another. It
would be convenient also that the water into which the bullet falls be a
yard or two deep or more, partly that the bullet may fall more gently on the
steel, partly that the motion which it has from west to east at its entering
into the water may by meanes of the longer time of descent through the
The reader may judge if these elaborate prescriptions are really rather hinted than
carefully described.
^ Newton, of course, cannot doubt his analysis of the movement of the falling body
and its outrunning the parts of the earth that are below it, and he does not need an
experiment in order to be certain of it; the only thing he can doubt is the possibility
of ascertaining this outrunning by experiment.
240
water, carry it on further eastward and so make the experiment more

manifest.
If I were not so unhappy as to be unacquainted with your hypothesis
abovementioned^ (as I am with almost all things which have of late been
done or attempted in philosophy) I should so far comply with your desire
as to send you what objections I could think of against them, if I could
think of any. And on the other hand I could with pleasure heare and an
swer any objections made against any notions of mine in a transient dis
course for a divertisment. But yet my affection to philosophy being worn
out, so that I am almost as little concerned about it as one tradesman uses
to be about another mans trade or a country man about learning, I must
acknowledge my self averse from spending that time in writing about
it which I think I can spend otherwise more to my own content and the
good of others: and I hope neither you nor any body els will blame me for
this aversness. To let you see that it is not out of any shyness, reservedness,
or distrust that I have of late and still do decline phi [losophi] call commerce
but only out of my applying my self to other things, I have communicated
to you the notion above set down (such as it is) concerning the descent of
heavy bodies for proving the motion of the earth; and shall be as ready to
communicate in oral discourse anything I know, if it shall ever be my hap
piness to have familiar convers frequently with you. And possibly if any
thing usefull to mankind occurs to me I may sometimes impart it to you by
letter. So wishing you all happiness and success in your endeavours, I rest.
Sir,
Your humble Servant
to command
Is. N ew ton
P.S. Mr. Cock has cast two pieces of metal for me in order to a further
attempt about the reflecting tube which I was the last year inclined to
by the instigation of some of our Fellows. If I do any thing you may expect
to hear from me. But I doubt the tool on which they were to be ground,
being in the keeping of one lately deceased who was to have wrought
the metals, is lost.
Cambridge.
Novemb. 28, 1679
Endorsed: For his ever Hon'* ffriend M' Robert Hooke at his Lodgings in
Gresham College in London^
The problem Newton is dealing with in the experiment he suggests
to Hooke, namely, the problem of the trajectory of a heavy body
falling to the earth, or to the center of the earth, has a very long and
* Newton rubs it in!
* . . . in a transient discourse for a divertisment, that is, not taking any serious
account of them. It was by no means what Hooke aimed at.
* As Newton lived in Cambridge and practically never went to London, the prob
ability of such a familiar converse was, obviously, not very great.
See Rouse Ball, Essay, pp. 141 sq.; Correspondence, II, 300 sq.; see also L. T.
More, Isaac Newton, pp. 223 sq.
241
intricate story - unfortunately too long and too intricate to be dealt

with here. Edmund Hoppe, in his History o f Physics} seeks the source
of the opinion of the vulgar who think that, if the earth moved,
heavy bodies in falling would be outrun by its parts and fall on the
west side of the perpendicular in Tycho Brahe, who in his De mundiaetherei recentioribusphenomenis (1588-1610) presented as the prin
cipal objection against the rotation of the earth the fact that a stone
falling on the west side of a tower would deviate to the west, for during
its fall the earth flees beneath it to the west. It is perfectly true that
Tycho Brahe used this argument as well as several others, based on
the same fundamental conception - that of the Aristotelian dynamics.
Yet he did not invent them, but only clothed them, sometimes, in
modern garb.^ As to the argument of the body falling from a tower,
it belongs to the stock in trade of the objections against the movement
of the earth and can be traced back to its discussion, and rejection,
by Ptolemy and, farther back, by Aristotle himself, who asserts
that, if the earth were moving, a stone thrown perpendicularly up
ward would never fall back on the place wherefrom it departed
because that place would, meanwhile, move away from beneath it.^
The Aristotelian (Ptolemaic, Tychonian) argument is by no means
stupid. Quite the contrary; on the basis of the Aristotelian dynamics,
or even, more exactly, on the basis of the Aristotelian conception of
motion, according to which the motion of a body, especially its
natural motion, is perfectly independent of, and not influenced
by, the motion of its point of origin we believe it to be the case in the
propagation of the rays of light - if is perfectly sound and even irre
futable. In order to disprove it, a new conception of motion (and
of space, physical reality, and so on) was needed, and before it had
been developed - by Galileo and Descartes - the attempts made
by the Copernicans to answer the argument in question were bound
to be weak and rather unconvincing.^ Copernicus, for instance,
asserted that, the circular motion of the earth being a natural
and not a violent one, it would be participated in by all the
earthly objects; Kepler explained that all the earthly bodies were
drawn from west to east by the same magnetical attractive power
or strains that drew them toward the earth.^ It is, therefore, hardly
surprising that the anti-Copernicans - and anti-Copernicanism was
by no means supported only by the condemnation of the heliocentric
system by the Roman church and restricted to Catholic countries^ continued to make use of the old objection throughout the seven
teenth century. Thus, among countless others, this objection is raised
by the celebrated author of the widely read, and very influential,
Almagestum novum, the Jesuit J. B. Riccioli.^
The Galilean New Science destroyed, of course, the very basis
of the Aristotelian reasoning. Yet, as a matter of fact, Galileo himself
did not give a correct solution of the problem. He asserted, indeed,
in his Dialogue on the Two Greatest World Systems, that, whether the
earth moved or stood still, all the phenomena that may happen
on it, with the sole exception of the tides (which he explained by a
combination of the effects of the earths diurnal and annual motions),
would take place in a perfectly identical manner. A rather sad con
clusion - it precluded the finding out of a physical proof of the
Copernican doctrine - which seemed unbelievable, and, besides, was
false. Moreover, in his deduction of the true (absolute) motion of
the falling body, as distinguished from its motion relative to the mov
ing earth (a question that every Copernican had to consider) he
made an error - which, it is true, he recognized later that he had
made - stating it to be circular}
The error of the Galilean solution was discovered by Mersenne,
who subjected it to a very searching criticism, and tried to devise a
better one. This, in turn, led to a very interesting discussion about the
trajectory of a falling body, a discussion in which Fermat took a
prominent part.
* See Edmund Hoppe, Histoire de la physique (Paris; Payot, 1928), p. 54.

See my tudes galileennes (Paris: Hermann, 1939), part III, Galilee et la loi
dinertie, pp. 22 sq.
See Aristotle, De coelo, I, 2: Physica, II, 1, and V, 2; Ptolemy, Almagest, I, 7.
* By far the best defense of the Copernican position, from the point of view of the
theory of impetus, was devised by Giordano Bruno; see my Etudes galileennes, part III,
pp. 1i sq.
242
* Ibid., pp. 26 sq.

* Even Isaac Barrow, Newtons master, was by no means sure of the verity of
the Copernican doctrine, and, on his deathbed, expressed the hope that he would learn
the truth in the other world. About the spread of Copernicanism in England, see F. R.
Johnson, Astronomical Thought in Renaissance England (Baltimore; Johns Hopkins
Press, 1937).
Johannes Baptista Riccioli, S.J., Almagestum novum (Bologna, 1651); Astronomia reformata (Bologna, 1665).
* See Dialogo . . . sopra i due massimi sistemi del mondo, in Le Opere di Galileo
Galilei (edizione nazionale, VII, pp. 190 sq.)
* See Marin Mersenne, Harmonices mundi (Paris, 1636); Harmonic universelle
(Paris, 1636); Cogitata physicomathematica (Paris, 1644).
* The very interesting discussions about the trajectory of a body falling onto a
rotating earth are unfortunately too intricate to be dealt with here. I have studied
this history in A Documentary History of the Problem of Fall from Kepler to
Newton, Transactions o f the American Philosophical Society, new series, 45 (1955),
329-355. Here I shall only mention that according to Fermat this trajectory will have
243
On the other hand, the partial acceptance of Galileos erroneous

theory by Riccioli induced the latter to present a new objection
against the motion of the earth, an objection that gave birth to a
heated polemic in Italy, of which polemic Newtons friend James
Gregory published a very carefully written report in the Philosophical
Transactions in 1668.^
Thus it is not particularly surprising that Newton too, perhaps as

early as when reading Gregorys paper, turned his attention to the
problem; nor is it astonishing that, having done so, he found the
true answer: a body falling from a high tower will not lag behind,
but outrun it, that is, fall not to the west but to the east of its
initial position.
the form of a spiral, and that this view was held also by Stephano degli Angeli (see next
note). Fermat developed his theory in a letter to Galileo which has remained unpub
lished. Yet, since he communicated it to Mersenne, Mersenne gave an account of it in
his Cogitata physicomathematica, pp. 57 sq., and even added to the text a drawing
(Fig. 4) which is not without some resemblance to that of Newton; in both of them, for
Now let us go back to Newton and to Hooke.

Upon receiving Newtons letter above discussed, Hooke immedi
ately presented it to the Royal Society. At its meeting on 4 December
1679,
Mr. Hooke produced and read a letter of Mr. Newton to himself, dated
28th November, 1679, containing his sentiments of Mons. Mallemonts
new hypothesis of the heavens; and also suggesting an experiment, whereby
to try, whether the earth moves with a diurnal motion or not, viz. by the
falling of a body from a considerable hight, which, he alledged, must fall
to the eastward of the perpendicular, if the earth moved.
This proposal of Mr. Newton was highly approved of by the Society;
instance, in spite of the fact that the deviation of the failing body from the perpendi
cular is to the east, the spiral is drawn from the right to the left. Newton may have been
acquainted with Fermats thesis and with Mersennes drawing.
^ An Account of a controversy betwixt Stephano de Angelis, professor of the
mathematics in Padua, and Joh. Baptista Riccioli, Jesuite; as it was communicated
out of their lately Printed Books by that learned mathematician, Mr. Jacob Gregory, a
Fellow of the R. Society, Philosophical Transactions o f the Royal Society I (1668),
693 sq. Gregory does not quote the titles of the books he is reporting about. It seems
worthwhile to reproduce them in full:
[i] Stefano degli Angeli: Considerationi sopra laforzajdi alcune raggionij fisicomattematichej addotte dal M. R. P.[Gio. Battista Riccioli della Compagnia di Giesil nel suo
Almagesto Nuovalet Astronomia Riformata contra il/Sistema Copernicanojespresse in
due dialogi da F.j Stefano degli AngelijVenetiano, Mattematico nello Studio di Padova,
Apreso Bartolo Bruni, Venetia 1667;
[ii] Michele Manfredi, replying to Angeli in the name of Riccioli, who did not want
to enter himself into the polemics, or, at least, to do it under his own name (according
to Carlos Sommervogel, S.J., Bibliothique de la Compagnie de Jesus [Brussels, Paris,
1895], VI, 1803, s.v. Riccioli, Manfredi is only a pseudonym of Riccioli):
Argomento fisicomattematicoldel padre Gio. Battista Riccioli Della Compagnia di
Giesulcontro il moto diurno della terra,/Confirmato di nuovo con Voccasione della Risposta alle Conside-/razioni sopro la Forza del dello Argomento, etc./Fatte dal M. R. Fr.
Stefano De gil Angeli,/Mattematico nello Studio di Padova,/All'Illustriss. Signore ilSig.
Co: Francesco Carlo Caprara,/Conte diPantano,/Confaloniere di Giustizia/delPopolo e
Commune di Bologna/: n Bologna, Per Emilio Maria, e Fratelli de Manolesi, 1668;
[iii] Angeli, defending himself against Manfredi, and counterattacking: Seconde/
considerationi/sopra la forza/dell' argomento fisico-mattematico/del M. Rev. P./Gio.
244
Battista Riccioli/della Compagnia di Gisii,/contra il moto diurno della terra,/spiegato

dal Sig. Michel Manfredi nelle sue ^'Risposte, e/Riflessioni sopra le prime Consideratione/di/F. Stefano degV Angeli/ Venetiano/Mattematico nello Studio di Padova"/
Espresse da guesti in due altri Dialoghi III, e. /K /Per Mattio Bolzetta de Cadorini, in
Padova, 1668.
Besides the books reported about by Gregory there are four others on the same sub
ject:
[iv] Risposta/di Gio: Alfonso/Borelli/Messinese Matematico della Studio di Pisa/Alle
considerazioni fatte sopra alcuni luoghi del suo/Libro della Forza della Percossa] Dell
R. P. F. Stefano De Gl. Angeli/Matematico nello Studio di Padova. AH' Illustrissimo,
e Dottissimo Sig./Michel Angelo Ricci. Messina, 29 Febraio, 1688;
[v] Terze/Considerationi/Sopra una lettera/Del Molto illustre, et eccelentissimo
Signor/Gio: Alfonso Borelli Messinese Mattematico nello Studio di Pisa/Scritta da Questi
in replica/Di a'cune dottrine incidamente tocche/Da Fra/Stefano degli Angeli/Venetiano/
Mattematico Nello Studio di Padova/ Nelle sue prime considerationi sopra la forza di
certo Argomento/contro il moto diurno Terra/Espresse da questo in un Dialogo/Quinto
in ordine. In Venetia M.DC.LXVIII, Apresso li Heredi Leni con licenza de Superiori;
[vi] Confermazione/d'una sentenza/del Signor/Gio Alfonso/Borelli M./Matematico
delio Studio di Pisa/di nuovo contradetta/Dal/M. R. P. Fra Stefano/de Gl' Angeli/
Matematico dello Studio di Padova/nelle sue terze considerazioni/Prodotta da/ Diego
Zerilli./ln Napoli, per Ludovico Cauallo, 1668;
[vii] Quarte/Considerationi/Sopra la Confermatone/D'una Sentenza dal Sig. Gio.
Alfonso Borelli M./Matematico nello Studio di Pisa/Prodotta da Diego Zerilli/contro
le terze Considerationi/Di Stefano degli Angeli/E sopra TApologia del M. R. P. Gio.
Battista Riccioli/Della Compagnia di Giesh/A favore d'un suo Argomento detto FisicoMatematico/Contro il sistema Copernicano/Espresse dal medesimo de gl' Angeli Venetiano
Matematico/nello Studio di Padova in due Dialoghi VI. e. VII. In Padova, Per Mattio
Cadorin detto Bolzetta, 1669, con Licenza de Superiori.
According to Sommervogel, Riccioli, the Apologia of R. P. G. B. Riccioli is the
same book as that of Manfredi quoted under [ii]. See my paper, Le De motu gravium
de Galilee, Revue d'Histoire des Sciences 13 (1960), 197-245.
245
and it was desired, that it might be tried as soon as could be with con
venience.^
to the south than the east. It was desired, that what was tryable in this
experiment might be done with the first opportunity.^
Newtons proposal was not only approved, but also discussed.

And nothing is more illuminating than this discussion; it shows us
the scientific climate, or, if one prefers, the level of the scientific
understanding - or lack of understanding - of even the best minds
of the time. Thus we read that
The problem whether by elliptoid Hooke meant an ellipse or

simply some kind of oval curve has always been a crux for the his
torians. The finding of Hookes letter to Newton at last enables us
to give a definitive answer to this vexed question: Hooke did not
mean the curve to be an ellipse.
To the second questio vexata, by what kind of reasoning Hooke
arrived at the conviction that the falling body - supposing, as always
had been done, no resistance in the medium - would describe a curve
closed upon itself, and thus assert, for the first time and in violent
opposition to the whole preceding tradition^ that a body falling onto
a moving earth will not arrive at its center, in contradistinction to
what would happen if the earth remained immobile, this letter, un
fortunately, gives us no information, and we are still reduced to
hypotheses.
It is nevertheless extremely interesting to see that Hooke, though
deploring Newtons desertion of philosophy, is more than skepti
cal about the reahty of this desertion. But, of course, the chief value
of this letter lies in its scientific part, as it gives us the first, though not
quite correct - but we cannot blame him for that - application to the
problem of the trajectory of falling bodies of Hookes theory of
compounding a curve by a direct [tangential] Motion and an attrac
tive one to the centre.
Hookes letter is dated 9 December 1679
Sir Christopher Wren supposed, that there might be something of this

kind tried by shooting a bullet upwards at a certain angle from the
perpendicular round every way, thereby to see whether the bullets so shot
would all fall in a perfect circle round the place, where the barrell was
placed. This barrell he desired might be fixed in a frame upon a plain foot,
and that foot placed upon a true plain every way, and the mouth of the
gun be almost in the same point over the plain which way soever shot.
Mr. Flamstead hereupon alledged, that it was an observation of the
gunners, that to make a ball fall into the mouth of the piece, it must
be shot at eighty-seven degrees; and that he knew the reason thereof; and
that it agreed with his theory: and that a ball shot perpendicularly would
never fall perpendicularly: and he mentioned the recoiling of a perpendi
cular jet of waters. But this was conceived to arise from some mistake of
the gunners, in not well taking notice of all circumstances; since a body
shot perpendicularly would also descend perpendicularly; and a body shot
at eighty-seven degrees would fall considerably distant from the place where
it was shot.
A week later, on 11 December 1679, Hooke once more deals with

Newtons letter. This time it is not the experiment, but Newtons
solution of the problem of the trajectory of the falling body that is in
question:
Upon the mentioning of Mr. Newtons letter, and the experiment pro
posed in it, Mr. Hooke read his answer to him upon that subject, wherein
he explained what the line described by a falling body must be supposed
to be, moved circularly by the diurnal motion of the earth, and perpen
dicularly by the power of gravity: and he shewed, that it would not be a
spiral line, as Mr. Newton seemed to suppose, but an excentrical elliptoid,
supposing no resistance in the medium: but supposing a resistance, it
would be an excentric ellipti-spiral, which, after many revolutions, would
rest at last in the centre: that the fall of the heavy body would not be
directly east, as Mr. Newton supposed: but to the south-east, and more*
* Minutes of the Royal Society, 4 December 1679; Birch, History o f the Royal
Society, III, pp. 512 sq.; Rouse Ball, Essay, p. 145.
* Ibid. The criticism of Wrens and Flamsteeds opinions is probably due to Hooke.
* Even Hooke, in spite of the fact that he had given to the principle of inertia a
pretty good formulation, falls into the error of considering the falling bullet as moved
circularly by the rotation of the earth.
246
For his much honoured freind Mr Isaac Newton Lucasion Professor at

Cambridge
S'
Your Deserting Philosophy in a time when soe many other Eminent

freinds have also left her (Steno, De Graft and now newly Signor Brorus
^ See Birch, History o f the Royal Society, III, p. 516; Rouse Ball, Essay, p. 146.
* See L. D. Patterson, Isis 41 (1950), 32 sq. and 42.
* Hooke to Newton, 9 December 1679, Correspondence, II, 304 sq. This letter was
published for the first time in the original version of this article, Isis 43 (1952), 329 sq.
* Even Borelli, who asserted that a planet gravitating toward the sun and animated
by a motion along the tangent will not fall into the sun but will move around it and
describe an ellipse, never asserted that a heavy body on the earth wilt behave in the
same manner.
* The problem that Hooke and Newton are dealing with is extremely difficult and
was solved only in 1835 by Coriolis.
In this letter only the superscription and the signature are in Hookes own hand
writing. The rest is written by an amanuensis, and a very bad and ignorant one. I am
reproducing it as faithfully as possible, without correcting either the spelling or the
punctuation, even where the words are obviously misspelled or make no sense.
247
Borellij Vivians^ and some others) Seems a little Unkind yet tis to be hoped
her allurements may sometimes make you (as well as them) alter your resolu
tions, though never soe Deleberately & positively made: for my one part I
confesse that I may tell you my opinion frankly. I doe not despare of you
at all for I find by your letter you doe sumetimes for your divert! sements
spend an Hower or soe, in conversing And I know that you that have soe
fully known those Dilights cannot chuse but sumetime have a hankering
after them and now and then Desire a tast of them, And I would never
wish any thing more from a Person of your ability: I hate Drudges or
Devotons* at any thing. Covetousness Slavery or Supersticon act them
and they produce nought but Molas or chymeras sume what with out life
or Sole. I wish I were as sure of your Correspondence and Communicating
as I am of your Yet remaining affection to Philosophy. However S' I must
thanke you for what I am sure of for that (they say) is one way to gett
more. Let this therefore assure you that I very much Value the great favor
& kindness of your Letter and more Especially for communicateing your
Notion about the Descent of heavy Bodys: tis certainly right & true soe far
as concerns the falling of the body Let fall from a great hight to the
Eastwards of the perpendicular and not to the westward of it as most
have hitherto Imagined. And in this opinion concurred S' Christopher
Wren S' John Hoskins M' Henshaw and most of those that were present
at our meeting on Thursday Last to whom I read soe much of your
letter (and not more) as conserned Monsieur Mallement and this Experi
ment. But as to the curve Line which you seem to suppose it to Desend
by (though that was not then at all Discoursed of) Vizt a kind of spirall
which after sume few revolutions Leave it in the Center of the Earth my
theory of circular motion makes me suppose it would be very differing
and nothing att all akin to a spirall but rather a kind Elleptueid. At least
if the falling Body were supposed in the plaine of the equinoxciale suppos
ing then y* earth were cast into two half globes in the plaine of the equinox
and those sides separated at a yard Distance or the lilke to make Vacuity
for the Desending Body and that the gravitation to the former Center re
mained as before and that the globe of the earth were supposed to move
with a Diurnall motion on its axis and that the falling body had the motion
of the superficial! parts of the earth from whence it was Lt fall Impressed
on it, I conceive the line in which this body would move would resemble
An Elleipse: for Instance Let ABDE [Fig. 5] represent the plaine of the
equinox litmited by the superficies of the earth: C the Center therof to
which the lines of Gravitation doe all tend. Let A represent the heavy
Body let fall at A and attracted towards C but Moved also by the Diurnall
Revolution of the earth from A towards BDE &c I conceive the curve
that will be described by this desending body A will be AFGH and that
the body A would never approach neerer the Center C then G were it not
for the Impediment of the medium as Air or the like but would continually
proceed to move round in the Line AFGHAFG &c But w[h]ere the
* I do not understand the meaning of Hookes assertion that Steno (Nicolaus

Stenonius), De Graft (doubtless Regnerus de GraaO, Signor Brorus, Borelli (J. A.
Borelli), and Vivians (Vincenzo Viviani) left philosophy. De Graaf, of course, did
when he died on 17 August 1673; Borelli died on 31 December 1679, but at the time
of Hookes letter he was still alive. Steno lived until 25 November 1686, and Viviani
until 22 September 1703; both were active until their deaths. As for Signor Brorus,
Hooke means the Italian alchemist Giuseppe Francesco Barri (Borro, Burrhus),
who was alive at the time (d. 1695). See Correspondence, II, p. 306, n. 5.
^ Devosons or Devotons. I do not know what is meant. Perhaps devotees.
248
Medium through which it moves has a power of impeding and destroying

its motion the curve in w** it would move would be some what like the
Line AIKLMNOP&c and after many resolutions would terminate in the
Center C. But if the Body litt [?] fall be not in the aquinochill plain as
here at London Ja 5r.32' the elleipsed will be made in a plain inclined to

the plaine of the Equinox: 51.32 soe that the fall of the Ball will not be
exactly east of the perpendicular but south East and indeed more to the
south then the east; as lett NLQS represent y* Meridian of London and
Q the equinox L London and PL the parrallel in w ^ it moves about the
R
249
Axis NS: the body let fall at L would desend in the plaine LC supposed
at Right angles with the plaine of that Meridion NLQSR and not in the
superficies of the cone pLC [Fig. 6] whose apex is C the Center of the
earth and whose base is the plaine of the parrallel circle PL.^ I could
adde many other conciderations which are consonant to my Theory of
Circular motions compounded by a Direct motion and an attractive one to
a Center. But I feare I have already trespassed to much upon your more
Usefull thoughts with these my impertinants yet I would desire you not
to look upon them as any provacations to alter your mind [to] more mature
and serious Resolutions. Goe on and Prosper and if you succed and by
any Freind Let me understand what you think fit to impart, any thing
from you will be Extremly Valued by
S'" Your very Humble Sarvant
Ro: H ooke
Gresham Colledg Dec. 9*** 1679
Small wonder, therefore, that Newtons answer should be as dry

and terse as a solicitors writ. He wants to make his blunder good
somehow and, at the same time, to teach Hooke a lesson, show him
his own error, tell him what, in the case imagined by him (a fall
through a void space which yields without resistance), the real path
of the falling body would be.
Newton admits that, if there is no resistance, the body in question
will not arrive at the center of the earth. But in that case, and con
trary to Hookes supposition, it will not describe a closed curve
resembling an ellipse but an open^ and very complicated one a curve which he, Newton, is able to determine, but Hooke is not.
Thus he writes:
Hookes letter to Newton is - or at least pretends to be - written

in an amiable and friendly spirit. But it was by no means in this
spirit that it was received by the latter: quite the contrary, it made
him exceedingly angry.^ After all, it is easy to understand Newtons
reaction; nobody, and Newton less than anybody, likes his blunders
to be pointed out to him, and corrected, even if the corrections are
based - at least partially - upon a misunderstanding. And Hooke
not only corrected Newton, but also exposed his blunder to the
Royal Society, that is, to the world,**^
It is interesting to note that Newton did not assert that the falling body will de
scribe a spiral on a cone. Hooke misunderstands him or, rather, reconstructs Newtons
views. He obviously believes Newton to hold a certain theory about the fall of heavy
bodies onto a rotating earth according to which these bodies will describe spirals, a
plane spiral when falling on the equator, and conical spirals when falling from a point
placed on some parallel. This theory, reported by Mersenne and Galileo, goes back to
John George Lochers Disquisitiones mathematicae (Ingolstadt, 1614). The Disquisitiones of Locher, having been held sub praesidio Christophori Scheineri, are usually
misquoted as a work of the latter.
* See Correspondence, II, 304.
Could scarce persuade myself to answer his second letter; did not answer his
third, reports Newton to Halley, 20 June 1686; Rouse Ball, Essay, p. 157; Correspon
dence, II, 436; this third by the way, was perhaps the most important of the lot;
it was the letter in which Hooke told Newton that the attraction always is in dupli
cate proportion to the distance from the center reciprocal!.
* From a formal point of view, Hookes actions were perfectly correct: he did not
read to the Royal Society the personal part of Newtons letter (about his estrange
ment from philosophy, etc.); as for the scientific part, it was addressed to Hooke as
the secretary of the Royal Society, and had to be presented to its members, as well as
the answer (scientific) that Hooke sent to Newton. Still, having repeatedly asked
Newton for a private correspondence and having assured him of secrecy, Hooke, in
making this correspondence public, certainly demonstrated a lack of tact. As for New
tons reaction, it is expressed in the following passage of the postscript of his letter to
Halley quoted in note 3: Should a man who thinks himself knowing, and loves to
show it in correcting and instructing others, come to you, when you are busy, and
notwithstanding your excuse press discourses upon you, and through his own mistakes
250
I agree w*** you y* y* body in o' latitude will fall more to y* south then
east if yheight it falls from be any thing great. And also that if its gravity
be supposed uniform it will not descend in a spiral to y* very center but
circulate w*^*^ an alternate ascent & descent made by its vis centrifuga &
gravity alternately overballancing one another. Yet I imagin y body
will not describe an Ellipsoeid but rather such a figure as is represented
b y A F O G H J K L [Fig. 7] etc.^
At the end of the letter, Newton, imitating Hookes manner,
concludes:
Your acute Letter having put me upon considering thus far y species
of this curve, I might add something about its description by points
quam proximo. But the thing being of no great moment I rather be[g] yo'
pardon for having troubled you thus far w* this second scribble wherin
correct you, and multiply discourses: and then make this use of it, to boast that he
taught you all he spake, and oblige you to acknowledge it, and cry out injury and
injustice if you do not; I believe you would think him a man of strange unsociable
temper. M*' Hookes letters in several respects abounded too much with that humour,
which Hevelius and other complain of.
* As a matter of fact, Newton does not say that the curve will be an open one; nor
does he say that it will be closed; he does not say anything about it. His very careful
drawing is made in such a way as to leave the question open.
* See Pelseneer, Lettre inedite de Newton; Correspondence, II, 307. This letter
is dated 13 December 1679.
* A moment of very great importance, because, as Newton himself later told Halley
(letter of 27 July 1686, Rouse Ball, Essay, p. 167; Correspondence, II, 447); His
correcting my spiral occasioned my finding the theorem, by which I afterwards
examined the ellipsis, and (letter of 14 July 1686, ibid., p. 165; p. 444): His letters
occasioned my finding the method of determining figures, which when I had tried in the
ellipsis, I threw the calculations by, being upon other studies; and so it rested for about
five years, till upon your request 1 sought for that paper; and not finding it, did it
again.
251
always is in duplicate proportion to the distance from the center

reciprocal!.^
Years later, on 27 May 1686, at the height of a new quarrel with
Hooke - the last one, the quarrel about the priority in the discovery
of the inverse-square law - Newton tried to explain (or to explain
away) his blunder in the following way or ways;
if you meet w*^** any thing inept or erroneous I hope you will pardon y
former & ylatter I submit & leave to yo*^ correction remaining S'"
Yo*^ very humble Servant
Is. N ew ton
Newtons solution is not quite correct - which, as a matter of fact,
is not surprising. The problem he deals with is very difficult,^ and
its solution implies the use of mathematical methods that Newton
probably did not possess at the time, perhaps not even later. Much
more surprising is the very problem Newton is treating - the problem
of a body submitted to a constant centripetal force. In other words,
Newton assumes, or at least seems to assume, that gravity is some
thing constant - an assumption that enabled Hooke to correct him
once more by pointing out that Newton misunderstood the question.
Your calculation of the curve described by a body attracted by an
aequall power at all distances from the center, such as that of a ball
rolling in an inverted concave cone, writes Hooke to Newton on
6 January 1680, is right,^ and the two auges will not unite by about
a third of a revolution: but my supposition is that the attraction
* See Pelseneer, Lettre in6dite de Newton, pp. 250 sq., for a discussion of the
problem and its solution.
* Ibid., p. 251: Hooke a done observe quon peut ramener au probleme traitd par
Newton I^tude du mouvement d un point pesant assujetti a se mouvoir sur un c6ne
de revolution, d axe vertical et de rayon CA, reposant sur la point en C. On salt que
cette equivalence des deux problemes est une consequence des equations intrinseques
du mouvement du point sur la surface conique. Si Ton songe que Hooke ne sest
probablement livre a aucun calcul, sa remarque donne une mesure exacte de la profondeur et de la surete de son intuition.
252
The summe of what past between

Hooke and me (to the best of my
remembrance) was this. He solliciting me for some philosophical! commu
nications or other I sent him this notion, that a falling body ought by
reason of the earths diurnall motion to advance eastward and not fall to
the west as the vulgar opinion is. And in the scheme wherein I explained this I
carelessly described the descent of the falling body in a spirall to the center
of the earth which is true in a resisting medium, such as our air is. M'
Hooke replyed it would not descend to the center but at a certaine limit
returne upwards againe. I then took the simplest case for computation,
which was that of gravity uniform in a medium not resisting - imagining
he had learned the limit from some computation, and for that end had
considered the simplest case first. And in this case I granted what he con
tended for, and stated the limit as nearly as I could. He replyed that gravity
was not uniform but increased in descent to the center in a reciprocal!
duplicate proportion of the distance from it, and thus the limit would be
otherwise than I had stated it, namely, at the end of every intire revolution,
and added that according to this duplicate proportion the motions of the
planets might be explained and their orbs defined.^
And in a letter of 20 June 1686 (which I have already and re

peatedly quoted) Newton adds that at the time of this correspon
dence he thought no further of philosophical matters than his letters
put me upon it, and therefore may be allowed not to have had my
thoughts of that kind about me so well at that time.^
Newtons explanations, to tell the truth, do not seem very con
vincing. It is hard to believe that, if he ever had had thoughts
about the problem, that is, if he had really thought out a theory
about the complete trajectory of the falling body, he could have for
gotten it so much as to form, on the spur of the moment, another and
quite a different one.
It is difficult to admit too that it was mere carelessness that made
* Hookes letter to Newton of 6 January 1680; Rouse Ball, Essay, p. 147; Corre
spondence, II, 309.
^ This is not quite true; the drawing is by no means careless and is backed by the
text.
Newton probably thought that Hooke was following Borelli, who, though admit
ting a constant power of gravity, believed that the resulting curve will be an ellipse.
* See Rouse Ball, Essay, p. 155; Correspondence, II, 433.
^ lbid.,p. 157; p. 436.
253
Newton describe (that is, draw) the descent of the falling body in a
spiral; the drawing only illustrates the text of the letter. A more care
ful one would, perhaps, add some spires to the line; it would not
have changed its essential nature. Besides, that the falling body would
describe a spiral in the interior of the earth was, as I have said, a
rather widely held belief. Moreover, as Newton himself points out,
for a resisting medium it is quite a correct one.
It seems to me, therefore, most probable that Newton never had
given many thoughts to the problem.^ It may have appeared to
him not only devoid of reality - bodies do not fall through the earth
- but also of no importance whatever (he tells us so himself). He
may even have felt that it lacks any (or, at least, any definite) mean
ing. How was the earth to be considered in this case - as a material
body that would differ from our earth only by being penetrable like
our air? In this case, the medium would oppose resistance. Or,
should all matter be thought away, leaving behind it pure space and
its former center? But in this case, why should the body go down to
ward it? The answer was quite clear for those who, like Fermat,
still believed that bodies seek the center of the earth, but for those
who did not and who believed that bodies were attracted by or
pushed toward the earth, the situation was quite different. They
had to find out how this attraction, whether a pull or a push, would
vary in the interior of the earth. And that was a problem that no
body could master, not even Newton, who, as he confesses to Halley,
held pretty uncertain views about it until 1685;^ thus he never
extended the duplicate proportion lower than to the superficies of
the earth, and before a certain demonstration I found the last year,
have suspected it did not reach accurately enough down so low. ^
* For the solution of the problem of the trajectory of a body falling to the earth
from a point placed above its surface - the problem he deals with in his first letter to
Hooke - he did not need such a theory. It is perfectly true that, as he says to Halley
(letter of 20 June 1686, postscript, ibid., p. 162; p. 440), In the small ascent and de
scent of projectiles above the earth, the variation of gravity is so inconsiderable, that
Mathematicians neglect it. Hence the vulgar hypothesis with them is uniform gravity.
Yet, of course, this did not entitle Newton to admit, as in his second letter to Hooke,
that gravitation was constant below the earths surface, down to the center of the
earth. And to say as Newton does, And why might not I, as a Mathematician, use it
frequently without thinking on the philosophy of the heavens, or believing it to be
philosophically true? does not explain or justify his procedure. Nor does it explain
away his blunder and thoughtlessness.
^ Ibid., pp. 156 sq.; pp. 435 sq.
* De motu (Rouse Ball, Essay, p. 56): Ex horologii oscillatorii motu tardiore in
cacumine mentis praealti quam in valle liquet etiam gravitatem ex aucta nostra a
terrae centre distantia diminui, sed qua proportione nondum observatum est.
Newton does not tell us why he suspected that the duplicate proportion did not
254
Newton was interested in gravity as a cosmic factor. He endea

vored to find a physical explanation of this force, because he never,
as well we know, believed in an attractive power. He did not
achieve his purpose. Indeed, he found out something else, namely,
the impossibility of doing it:^ a discovery of tremendous importance
(though usually not recognized as such) which liberated his mind to
transform attraction from a physical into a mathematical force.
As for terrestrial gravity, though he suspected, and even believed
in, its identity with the cosmic one, he never, before Hooke put it to
him, made it a subject of special study. As to terrestrial gravity, he
was even less sure than in the case of that gravity or attraction
which regulated the movements of the planets, that the inversesquare proportion which he deduced from Keplers third law was
anything more than a mere approximation. Nay, he was rather cer
tain that it was just th at: a mere approximation - because, as he tells
Halley, There is so strong an objection against the accurateness
of this proportion, that without my demonstrations, to which M**"
Hooke is yet a stranger, it cannot be believed by a judicious philo
sopher.^
reach accurately below the surface of the earth, but it seems to me possible to guess the
reasons: (a) the near parts of the earth could (and at first glance should) exert a greater
influence than those that are far away, and (6) a body which is in the atmosphere of the
earth is already, in a certain sense, beiow its surface.
^ He found that in order to explain attraction mechanically, as an action of the sur
rounding medium (aethereal push), he had to postulate an elastic aether; and this im
plied the postulation of a force of repulsion between the particles of the aether. Thus
attraction could be explained only by repulsion, that is, by something philosophically
just as bad.
* Letter to Halley, 20 June 1686, Rouse Ball, Essay, p. 158; Correspondence, II,
437. The importance of this passage has been pointed out by F. Cajori, Newtons
Twenty Years Delay in Announcing the Law of Gravitation, in Sir Isaac Newton, a
Bicentenary Evaluation o f His Work (Baltimore: Williams and Wilkins, 1928), p. 182.
Cajori drew from it the conclusion that before 1685 Newton suspected that the law
of inverse squares was a mere approximation to the truth. Newton thought, rather
reasonably, that the parts nearest to the falling body exerted a stronger attraction, and
that the mass of the earth could not be considered as concentrated in its center. He
once more does not tell us what the objection is, nor what demonstration he has
in mind; once more we are obliged to guess. I think that the reason why Newton felt
that his deduction of the inverse-square proportion from Keplers third law was valid
only quam proxime and not absolutely was that it had been made under the assump
tion that the orbits of the planets are circular, and not elliptic. Now, how could a pro
portion valid for circles be at the same time valid for eccentric ellipses? Should not the
trajectory, even if not circular, be at least one with the sun in the center, and not in a
focus of the orbits? It is obvious that these objections could be met only by a factual
demonstration that from attraction following the inverse-square law, compounded
with a direct motion by the tangent, there would result a motion in an ellipse, and
vice versa that such a motion implied an attraction inversely proportional to the square
of the distance and directed to one of the foci of the elliptic trajectory. It is this demon
stration which constitutes, according to Newton himself, his great discovery, and not
255
As for the inside of the earth, he only knew that the inverse-square
proportion could not be applied there. But he was not able - being
probably not sufficiently interested in the problem - to determine
what was the one that has to be applied. And it was only when Hooke
- erroneously - asserted that the inverse-square law was valid even
there (though at the same time acknowledging that he did not be
lieve it seriously), that Newton applied himself to solving the problem.
This he did, as we know, in 1685 when he found out (solving two
problems at the same time) that the inverse-square law had to be
applied primarily not to the wholes, but to the particles which com
pose them, and that the resulting (mathematical) attraction of a
spherical body, such as the earth, had to be computed as if its whole
mass was concentrated in its center.^ There was the surprising, but
nevertheless necessary and evident, result that a particle placed out
side of a sphere will be attracted by a force inversely proportional
to the square of its distance from the center,^ and a particle placed
inside a sphere will be attracted by a force proportional to its distance
from the center. Of these deliberations Newton tells us:
But in 1679, when proposing to Hooke an experimental proof of

the motion of the earth, he seems to have simply followed the lead of
the tradition in considering gravity as constant,^ and in assuming
that a heavy body, if it were not arrested by the earth, would finally
arrive at its center. Each of these two conceptions is strictly incom
patible with the other.
After I had found that the force of gravity towards a whole planet did
arise from and was compounded of the forces of gravity towards all its
parts, and towards every one part was in the inverse proportion of the
squares of the distances from the part, I was yet in doubt whether that
proportion inversely as the square of the distance did accurately hold, or
but nearly so, in the total force compounded of so many partial ones; for
it might be that the proportion which accurately enough took place in
greater distances should be wide of the truth near the surface of the planet,
where the distances of the panicles are unequal, and their situation dis
similar. But by the help of the Prop. LXXV and LXXVI, Book I, and their
Corollaries, I was at last satisfied of the truth of the Proposition, as it
now lies before us.
[From Book III, proposition VIII, Theorem VIII: In two spheres gravi
tating each towards the other, if the matter in places or all sides round about
and equidistantfrom the centres is similar, the weight of either sphere towards
the other will he inversely as the square o f the distance between their centres.]'^*
the invention of the inverse-square law as such - an easy thing since the work of Huy
gens and even earlier.
The decisive role played by this discovery was recognized by J. A. Adams and J. W.
L. Glaisher in 1887 (see Cajori, Newtons Twenty Years Delay, pp. 127 sq.), and
in 1927 by H. H. Turner (see Sir Isaac Newton, a Bicentenary Evaluation o f His Work,
p. 187), who points out that this result came as a complete surprise to Newton.
* Sir Isaac Newton's Mathematical Principles o f Natural Philosophy. Andrew Mottes
translation revised by Florian Cajori (Berkeley: University of California Press, 1947),
p. 199: Proposition LXXVI, Theorem XXXIV.
* Ibid., p. 196, Proposition LXXIII, Theorem XXXllI.
* Ibid., pp. 415 sq.
256
Let us now go back to Hooke. It cannot be denied that his attempt

to deal with the problem of the trajectory of the falling body is
extremely ingenious; the device of cutting the earth in two in order
to give to this body the space it needs for moving down toward the
center (and around it) is plainly brilliant; the endeavor to combine
the idea of attraction, inherited from Gilbert, Kepler, and Bacon,
with the principles of the Galilean mechanics, already announced in
the Attempt to Prove the Motion o f the Earth by Observation,^ and to
apply the resulting pattern not only to celestial but also to terrestrial
physics, points in the right direction. Once more we have to admire
Hookes depth of vision and energy of thought. Once more we are
obliged to recognize that he is unable to arrive at a precise, quantita
tive, mathematical solution. Once more, though at this time he is in
possession of the inverse-square law, he misses the point.
He does not recognize that, in the case imagined by him, the falling
body will describe not an elliptoid, that is, some kind of oval
curve, but an exact ellipse. This is all the more surprising since the
situation in which he places his heavy body (falling through a split
made through the equator of the earth) is very nearly similar to that
which he realized in his famous experiments performed before the
Royal Society on 23 May 1666. The imagined case leads to a result
exactly similar to that which, at that time, he believed the Royal
Society experiments to indicate: the power by which the body is
attracted toward the center is directly proportional to its distance
from that center.
It is rather strange that Hooke seems not to have recognized this
analogy. It is all the more strange since he knew (or, more precisely,
assumed) - as anyone who accepted the explanation of gravity by
* It is a strange paradox of history that the strongest supporters of this conception
were Galileo and the Galileans.
* See supra, p. 233.
Newton, therefore, is perfectly right in reproaching Hooke (letter to Halley, 20
June 1686, Rouse Ball, Essay, pp. 159 sq.; Correspondence,\\,A'i5 sq.) for extend
ing the inverse-square proportion down to the center of the earth.
257
attraction was bound to assume - that the attractive power was at its
maximum on the earths surface, and that it diminished above as
well as below it.^ He even tried, as we know, to determine the rate of
this diminishing by experiment.
One could argue, of course, that this analogy did not escape Hooke,
and that it was just because he had no means of ascertaining the
ratio of the variation of the force of attraction according to the dis
tance of the attracted body from the center of the earth - he could
not determine it theoretically and the experiments failed to give a
result^ - that he confined himself to stating in a vague manner that
the curve in question will be a kind of elliptoid, resembling an
ellipse, but not an ellipse. But in this case he would have had no rea
son to speak of an excentrical elliptoid ;^ moreover, he would not
be able to assert to Newton, as he did in his letter of 6 January 1680,
that his supposition is that the attraction always is in duplicate pro
portion to the distance from the center reciprocal!. Indeed, in his
device of cutting the earth in two in the plaine of the equinox he
supposed that the gravitation to the former center remained as
before.
One could assume, on the other hand, that, having discovered the
inverse-square law (as did everybody else) from Keplers third law,
and the law of centrifugal force - which, as Newton did not fail to
point out,^ was rather easy, this latter having been published by
Huygens in 1673 - Hooke transferred to his falling body the scheme
of motion prevailing in the skies. The mention of Kepler in the very
letter in which the inverse-square law is formulated by Hooke makes

this assumption by no means improbable.^ It is all the more probable
in that it would give an explanation also of Hookes avoidance of the
simple transfer of the astronomical scheme to terrestrial phenomena.
Indeed, in this same letter (an answer to Newtons letter of 13 Decem
ber 1679, published by Professor Pelseneer), he writes :
' See Cornells de Waards introduction to the supplementary volume of the Oeuvres
of Fermat (Paris: Gauthier-Villars, 1922).
* This was not Hookes fault. With the instruments at his disposal, a successful
direct measurement was impossible.
In the experiments of 23 May 1666, the ellipses described by the ball of the conical
pendulum were, of course, not eccentric.
^ In the postscript of his letter to Halley of 20 June 1686 (Rouse Ball, Essay, p. 160;
Correspondence, II, 438), Newton says that to find the inverse-square law from
Keplers third law was pretty easy and something that any mathematician could have
done (and told Hooke) five years before: For when Hugenius had told how to find
the force in all cases of circular motion, he has told em how to do it in this as well as in
all others.
In his Horologium oscillatorium of 1673 Huygens announced the laws of centrifugal
force (which he had possessed since 1659), but without giving their demonstrations a nasty trick played on his contemporaries, since it obliged them to find the proofs by
themselves. It is well known that Newton recognized Huygenss priority and that his
demonstrations - one of which he found, independently, in 1665-66 - are quite different
from those of Huygens. See J. W. Herivel, Sur les premieres recherches de Newton en
dynamique, Revue d'Histoire des Sciences 15 (1962), 106-140, especially pp. 117-129.
* Hooke to Newton, 6 January 1680 (Rouse Ball, E'js'ay, p. 147; Correspondence, 11,
309): My supposition is that the attraction always is in duplicate proportion to the
distance from the center reciprocal!, and consequently that the velocity will be in a sub-
258
What I mentioned in my last concerning the descent within the body of

the earth was but upon the supposall of such an attraction, not that I really
believe there is such an attraction to the very center of the earth, but on the
contrary I rather conceive that the more the body approaches the center
the lesse will it be urged by the attraction, possibly somewhat like the gravi
tation on a pendulum or a body moved in a concave sphere where the power
continually decreases the nearer the body inclines to a horizontal motion
which it hath when perpendicular under the point of suspension or in the
lowest point... But in the celestiall motions the sun, earth, or centrall body
are the cause of the attraction, and though they cannot be supposed mathe
matical! points yet they may be conceived as physicall, and the attraction
at a considerable distance may be computed according to the former pro
portion as from the very center.^
In the celestial motions, because of the great distance that separates

the attracted bodies, they can be conceived as points; but this is*
duplicate [proportion] to the attraction, and consequently as Kepler supposes recipro
cal! to the distance. Hooke does not recognize the error committed by Kepler, which
shows sufficiently well the very imperfect character of his theory of circular motion
compounded by a direct motion and an attractive one to the center and explains his
inability to solve the problem of deducing the elliptic trajectory from the inversesquare law of attraction. See Halleys letter to Newton of 29 June 1686 about Sir
Christopher Wrens challenge to Hooke (Rouse Ball, Essay, pp. 162 sq.; Correspon
dence, II, 441 sq.)
* It is to be mentioned, however, that Newton suggests another explanation of
Hookes discovery of the inverse-square law, not improbable either (letter to Halley,
20 June 1686, postscript: Rouse Ball, Essay, p. 160; Correspondence, II, 438): Nor
do I understand by what right he claims it [the inverse-square proportion] as his own;
for as Borell wrote, long before him, that by a tendency of the planets towards the sun,
like that of gravity or magnetism, the planets would move in ellipses, so Bullialdus
wrote that all force, respecting the sun as its centre, and depending on matter, must be
reciprocally in a duplicate ratio of the distance from the centre, and used that very
argument for it, by which you, sir, in the last Transactions, have proved this ratio in
gravity. Now if Mr. Hooke from this general proposition in Bullialdus, might learn
the proportion in gravity, why must this proportion here go for his invention?
The passage of Bullialdus (Ismael Bouillaud) which Newton evidently has in mind is
contained in his Astronomia philolaica (Paris, 1645), pp. 21 sq., and his explanation of
the origin of Hookes views on gravitation seems to be confirmed by a passage of the
Posthumous Works (London, 1705), p. 185 (dated 1682) where the inverse-square law of
gravitation is deduced from an analogy with the inverse-square law of the intensity of
illumination. I have to point out, however, that Bullialdus does not assert the inversesquare law of attraction, but uses the argument reported by Newton, adding to it,
moreover, the analogy between magnetic forces and light, as a refutation of Keplers
celestial mechanics.
^ Hooke to Newton, 6 January 1680, Rouse Ball, Essay, p. 147; Correspondence,
II, 309.
259
obviously impossible in the case of a terrestrial m otion/ even of such

an impossible motion as that of a body falling to the center of the
earth. In this case, the real variation of the attractive urge, which
becomes weaker and not stronger when the body approaches the
center, should be taken into account. How? Hooke does not know,
any more than he knows what the resulting line will actually be. It is
not an ellipse, of course, but something resembling it.
Yet it would be very interesting and even very useful (for astro
nomy as well as for navigation) to know it. And once more, in his
letter of 17 January 1680, Hooke urges Newton to solve the problem:
It now remains to know the proprietys of a curve line (not circular
nor concentricall) made by a centrall attractive power which makes the
velocitys of descent from the tangent line or equal! straight motion at all
distances in a duplicate proportion to the distances reciprocally taken.^
I doubt not that by your excellent method you will easily find out what
that curve must be, and its proprietys, and suggest a physicall reason of
this proportion.
I must confess that this appeal for help, backed by an honest and
straightforward admission of Newtons mathematical superiority,
should have met a better reception on Newtons part than it did.
Newton, indeed, solved the problem, but he never said a word about
it to Hooke.
^ As I have already pointed out, to discover that this was not impossible, but on the
contrary, necessarily true was one of the main achievements of Newton.
^ Hooke to Newton, 17 January 1680, Rouse Ball, Essay, p. 149; Correspondence,
II, 312 sq. Hooke, once more, repeats his error: an attractive power which con
forms to the inverse-square law will not make the velocitys of descent from the tan
gent line or equall straight motion at all distances in a duplicate proportion to the dis
tances reciprocally taken. Moreover, this proposition, if taken verbatim, implies the
proportionality of the velocity - and not of the acceleration - to the force acting on
the body.
* As we see, even in this pure case, Hooke does not suggest that the resulting curve
will be a conic section.
260
VI
Newtons Regulae Philosophandi
In an earlier article,^ I drew the attention of historians of Newton
to the differences, sometimes very important, between the texts of
the three editions of the Philosophiae natumlis principia mathematica,
and to the interest which a comparative analysis of these editions
might have.2 The study of Newtons manuscripts* - neglected until
only very recently - shows that the actual labor of Newton in pre
paring the successive editions of the Principia^ was actually much
greater than one might suppose from a mere comparison of the print
ed texts. This would be true even if such a comparison were com
plemented by the information given in the correspondence between
^ A. Koyre, Pour une edition critique des oeuvres de Newton, Revue d'Histoire
des Sciences 8 (1955), 19-37.
* Such a systematic analysis - surprisingly - has never yet been made. However, a
critical and variorum edition of Newtons Principia, prepared by I. Bernard Cohen and
myself, will soon be published.
* The history of Newtons manuscripts is very complex. He left them to his niece,
Catherine Conduitt, who in turn left them to her only daughter, Catherine, Viscountess
Lymington, who left them to her son, the second Earl of Portsmouth. The Portsmouth
family preserved the papers in their castle at Hurtsbourne Park. About 1872, after a fire
in their castle, the Portsmouth family decided to give the scientific papers to Cambridge
University but stipulated that the papers on theology, chronology, history, and alchemy
must be returned to Hurtsbourne. A commission, composed of H. R. Luard, G. G.
Stokes, J. C. Adams, and G. D. Liveing, was appointed to choose, classify, and de
scribe the manuscripts for Cambridge University. They discharged their task to the
general satisfaction, and published in 1888 a small book; A Catalogue o f the Portsmouth
Collection o f Books and Papers Written by or Belonging to Sir Isaac Newton, the Scien
tific Portion o f which has been Presented by the Earl o f Portsmouth to the University
o f Cambridge (Cambridge, 1888). Alas, despite the presence of distinguished scientists
on the commission, the publication of the Catalogue did not encourage the study of
Newtons manuscripts; even the opposite. Only in the last few years has this research
been undertaken, by I. B. Cohen, F. Manuel, A. R. and M. B. Hall, J. W. Herivel,
R. S. Westfall, D. T. Whiteside, H. W. Turnbull, J, F. Scott, and myself. Those manu
scripts which the Portsmouth family retained were sold at public auction in 1936.
Lord Keynes bought nearly half of them, and left them after his death (in 1946) to
Kings College, Cambridge.
* The Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica was published in 1687 under the
care of Edmond Halley; a second edition appeared in 1713, edited by Roger Cotes,
Newtons successor in his chair at Cambridge; and a third edition was published in
1726, edited by Henry Pemberton. Roger Cotes, who took his assignment as editor
very seriously, exchanged an extremely interesting correspondence with Newton (part
of which is, alas, lost). The surviving letters were published by J. Edleston, Correspon
dence o f Sir Isaac Newton and Professor Cotes (London, 1850).
261
Newton and Roger Cotes, Plumian Professor of Astronomy at

Cambridge, who prepared under Newtons direction the second
edition of the Principia.
Newtons manuscripts - thousands upon thousands of pages show a curious aspect of his mentality. He seems to have been in
capable of thinking without pen in hand, and even to have found
pleasure in the mere mechanical exercise of writing. Thus he copied
at length and in his own hand authors whom he had read,^ and even
copied his own writings.^ His manuscripts inform us equally of the
extreme care which he took in the redaction of his works: he writes,
crosses out, corrects, copies it all again, crosses out, recorrects . . .
and recopies. Having finished, he starts all over again: thus, he made
at least eight drafts of the Scholium generate for the second edition.
One of the most interesting examples of the evolution of the text
and of the thought of Newton is offered by the Regw/ae philosophandi,^
which are a succinct resume of the logical and epistemological views
of Newton, placed at the beginning of Book III of the Principia,
which bears the title De systemate mundi.
Let us note first of all that the expression Regulae philosophandi
appears only in the second and third editions of the Principia. In the
first, in a corresponding place, one finds a series of propositions,
nine in all, which are entitled Hypotheses. This is all the more curious,
given the hostility to hypotheses so often proclaimed by Newton
from the beginning of his scientific career, and given also that famous
slogan. Hypotheses non Jingo, to which frequently the whole New
tonian epistemology is reduced.^
The list of these hypotheses, to tell the truth, is not very logical
and can only be explained by the haste with which the Principia was
composed. They comprehend, in effect, two methodological hypo
theses (I and II), a hypothesis (III) that affirms the unity of mat
ter and the possibility of transforming any given body into any
A large portion of Newtons MSS contain citations from alchemical books.
* Thus, for example, he recopied five and six times his own theological MSS.
It is interesting to note that Andrew Motte, in his English translation of the Princi
pia - Sir Isaac Newton's Mathematical Principles o f Natural Philosophy and His
System o f the World (London, 1729) - translates this expression b y R u l e s of Reason
ing in Philosophy. And Mme. du Ch4telet, in her Principes mathimatiques de la
philosophie naturelle (Paris, 1757-1758), renders it: Regies quil faut suivre dans
Ietude de la physique.
* On the sense of this slogan, as well as on the sense of the term hypothesis, see
Chapter II, and also I. B. Cohen, Franklin and Newton (Philadelphia: The American
Philosophical Society, 1956), pp. 129 sq. and Appendix I, Newtons use of the word:
HYPOTHESIS, pp. 575-589.
262
n e w t o n s
r e g u l a e p h i l o s o p h a n d i
other,^ and six hypotheses concerning the structure of the solar sys
tem. One may easily understand why Newton did not maintain this
incongruous assemblage and why, in the second edition of his work,
he quite properly distributed these hypotheses into three classes.
At least this is what he did for those he kept: actually, the third, the
one that affirms the unity of matter, disappeared^ and was replaced
by something else. Furthermore, of the eight propositions remaining,
there is but one, Hypothesis IV (which affirms the immobility of
the center of the system of the world), that continues to be presented
as a hypothesis: it appears as Hypothesis I of the second and third
editions. The last six hypotheses concerning the structure of the
solar system are found in the later editions to have been promoted
to the rank of Phaenomena. And the original first two hypotheses,
which propose formal and general principles of the science of nature,
are from the second edition denominated Rules, rules of reason
ing, Regulae philosophandi. As such, they keep their numbers: I and
II. In the second edition, Newton adds a third rule; in the third and
last edition he adds a fourth rule. And he had, at a certain moment,
the intention of adding yet a fifth.
* Hyp. Ill: Corpus omne in alterius cujuscunque generis corpus transformari pone,
et qualitatem gradus omnes intermedios successive induere: Any body can be trans
formed into another, of whatever kind, and all the intermediate degrees of qualities can
be induced in it.
* The reason for this disappearance is not very clear. It may be that having affirmed
in the Queries of the Latin edition of his Opticks (in 1706) that God had in all prob
ability created in the beginning atoms of different shapes and masses - which implies
the nontransformability of one kind into another - Newton was obliged to suppress
his Hypothesis III, which affirms the contrary.
A hypothesis likewise appeared in Book II, Sec. IX, De motu circularifluidorum,"
of the Principia: HYPOTHESIS: Resistentiam, quae oritur ex defectu lubricitatis partiuem Fluidi, caeteris paribus, proportionalem esse velocitati, qua partes Fluidi separantur
ab invicem: The resistance arising from the want of lubricity in the parts of a fluid, is,
other things being equal, proportional to the velocity with which the parts of the fluid
are separated from one another.
In the second and third editions, it appears after Proposition X, Theorem X, of
Book III: Hyp. I: Centrum Systemates Mundo quiescere. Hoc ab omnibus concessum
est, dum alii Terram, alii Solem in centra quiescere contendant: Hypothesis I: That the
centre of the system of the world is immovable. This is acknowledged by all, while
some contend that the earth, others that the sun, is fixed in that centre. This hypo
thesis is all the more curious, since for Newton neither the earth nor the sun is im
mobile; but the immobility of the center of gravity of the solar system - in which New
ton seems to have believed - cannot effectively be demonstrated from phenomena, and
is therefore in this sense a hypothesis.
Hypothesis II of Book III of the Principia, which follows Lemma III of Proposition
XXXVII, says that if the earth were replaced by a ring turning on its own axis with a
diurnal motion and around the sun with an annual motion, the axis itself being in
clined to the plane of the ecliptic by an angle of 23
the precession of the equinoxes
would be the same whether the ring were liquid or rigid. This too was a proposition
which Newton believed to be true - he was right - but which he could not demonstrate.
263
We shall not, here, ocxûpy ourselves with the Phaenomena, ^

but merely with the Rules. The change of terminology is to be
explained, without doubt, by the increasing aversion of Newton to
hypotheses, as well as by a certain alteration in the sense in which
he used this expression.^ In the first edition of the Principia, he gave
it the traditional sense: a fundamental assumption or supposition
in a theory. Thus, in his unpublished treatise De motu^ he followed
the Definitiones of centripetal force, the force of a body, and the
force of resistance by a series of four hypotheses, which compre
hend among others the law of inertia and the law of the composition
of motions - hypotheses which, in the Principia, were to become
Axiomata seu leges motu (Axioms or laws of motion); similarly,
at the beginning of De systemate mundi (Book III of the Principia) he
listed the hypotheses, that is to say, the fundamental assumptions
of his cosmological system. Yet we must keep in mind, as I have
remarked above, that this list of hypotheses in which the general
principles of reasoning are found mixed up with empirical data could
not be a model of logical coherence.
Twenty or twenty-five years later,^ Newton no longer used the
term hypothesis in the sense of principle - nor in the sense of a
possible, or probable but not certain, explanation of phenomena (the
sense in which he had used this term since his youth). Now he would
use it in a much narrower sense, one that was clearly pejorative, of
a gratuitous assertion that was undemonstrable and extrascientific.
In short, henceforward a hypothesis is to be neither an axiom nor
even a conjecture, but a fiction. Thus he writes to Roger Cotes:
As in Geometry the word Hypothesis is not taken in so large a sense as to
include the Axiomes & Postulates, so in Experimental Philosophy it is not
See my study cited on p. 261, n. 1.
* See Professor Cohens study cited on p. 262, n. 4.
The short treatise De motu, the first version of Book I of the Principia, written in
late 1684 and early 1685, was published by S. P. Rigaud, Historical Essay on the First
Publication o f Newton's "Principia" (London: Oxford University Press, 1938), and
by W. W. Rouse Ball, An Essay on Newton's "Principia" (London, 1893).
^ In the Queries appended to the Latin edition of the Opticks (1706), the sense of the
term hypothesis is already the same as in the second and third editions of the
Principia.
In 1676, Newton sent the Royal Society a long treatise entitled. An Hypothesis
explaining the Properties o f Light, discoursed of in my several Papers. This treatise was
published by Thomas Birch, History o f the Royal Society o f London (London, 1757),
III, 248-305, and reprinted in facsimile in Isaac Newton's Papers and Letters on
Natural Philosophy, edited by I. Bernard Cohen (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard
University Press, 1958), pp. 178-235.
* The famous Hypotheses non fingo does not mean I do not make hypotheses, but
I do not feign hypotheses. See Chapter II.
264
n e w t o n s
regulae ph ilo so pha ndi
to be taken in so large a sense as to include the first Principles or Axiomes

w'"'' I call the laws of motion. These Principles are deduced from Phaenomena & made general by Induction: w'^ is the highest evidence that a
Proposition can have in this philosophy. And the word Hypothesis is here
used by me to signify only such a Proposition as is not a Phaenomenon nor
deduced from any Phaenomena but assumed or supposed w^ôut any
experimental proofs
And in order to render absolutely clear the sense which he attributes

to this expression, Newton enjoins Cotes to add at the end of the
next paragraph the following discussion:
For whatever is not deduced from the phenomena is to be called an
hypothesis; and hypotheses, whether metaphysical or physical, whether of
occult qualities or mechanical, have no place in experimental philosophy.
In this philosophy particular propositions are inferred from the phenomena,
and afterwards rendered general by induction. Thus it was that the impene
trability, the mobility, and the impulsive force of bodies, and the laws of
motion and of gravitation, were discovered. And to us it is enough that
gravity does really exist, and act according to the laws which we have
explained, and abundantly serves to account for all the motions of the
celestial bodies, and of our sea.^
Let us now consider the first two hypotheses or rules. In the

first edition of the Principia (Ej) they are presented as follows:
Hyp. I: Causas rerum naturalium non plures admitti debere, quam
quae et vera sunt et earum Phenomenis explicandis sufficiunt. Natura enim
simplex est et rerum causis superfluis non luxuriat.
Hyp. II: Ideoque effectuum naturalium ejusdem generis ejusdem sunt
causae.
Uti respirationis in Homine et in Bestia; descensus lapidis in Europa
et in America; Lucis in Igne culinari et in Sole; reflexionis lucis in Terra
et in Planetis.
Hyp. I ; We ought to admit no more causes of natural things than such
as are both true and sufficient to explain their appearances. For nature is
simple and does not luxuriate in superfluous causes of things.
Hyp. II. Therefore the causes of natural effects of the same kind are the
same.
Thus the respiration of man and of beasts; of the descent of stones in
1 See Edleston, Correspondence, pp. 154-155.
- Ibid., p. 155. This paragraph also appears in the General Scholium added to the
second edition of the Principia. As early as 1706, in Query 24 of the Latin edition of his
Opticks (Query 31 of the second [1717] and later English editions), Newton had written:
For hypotheses are not to be regarded in experimental Philosophy. And although the
arguing from Experiments and Observations by Induction be no Demonstration of
general Conclusions; yet it is the best way of arguing which the Nature of Things ad
mits of, and may be looked upon as so much the stronger, by how much the Induction
is more general.
s
265
Europe and in America; of the light in culinary fire and in the sun; of the
reflection of light on the earth and in the planets.
In the second edition of the Principia (Eg) Newton does not modify
the wording of Hypothesis I. In making it Regula I, however, he
amplifies his statement a little by placing in front of the formula
which expresses the fundamental principle of the simplicity of nature
a much more explicit statement:
Dicunt utique Philosophi: Natura nihil agit frustra, et frustra fit per
plura quod fieri potest per pauciora.
To this purpose the philosophers say: Nature does nothing in vain, and
it is in vain to do by more [means] that which can be done by fewer.
Eg has no further modification to the rule thus formulated.
As to Rule II, the second edition of the Principia reproduces with
out change the text of the first. But the third edition (Eg) introduces a
rather curious emendation. It reads from now on:
Ideoque effectum naturalium ejusdem generis eaedem assignandae sunt
causae, quatenus fieri potest.
And so to natural efifects of the same kind are assigned the same causes,
as far as they can be.
The last three words, quatenus fieri potest (as far as they can be)
are not to be found in Eg but only in Eg.
Newtons manuscript shows us that he did not arrive all at once
at the definitive redaction. He began by writing assumendae, then
he crossed it out and replaced it by assignandae. Then he added to the
formula of Ej and Eg the words: Nisi quatenus diversitas ex phaenomenis patefacta sit, hae causae phaenomenis explicandis sufficiant
( Unless their diversity be made manifest from phenomena, these
causes suffice to explain the phenomena). Then he crossed out the
words Nisi quatenus diversitas in order to substitute for them nisi
forte diversitas aliqua ( unless perhaps a certain diversity); then
he suppressed the entire phrase in order to replace it by nisi diversitas
aliqua ex phaenomenis patefacta sit (unless a certain diversity be
rendered manifest by the phenomena); after which he reduced to
naught this fruit of his efforts and wrote quatenus fieri potest (as
far as they can be).
I have already mentioned that in Eg the old Hypothesis III
disappeared to give place to a Rule, Regula III:
266
n e w t o n s
regulae ph ilo so ph a n d i
Qualitates corporum quae intend! et remitti nequeunt, quaeque corporibus omnis competunt in quibus experimenta instituere licet, pro
qualitatibus corporum universorum habendae sunt.
The qualities of bodies which admit neither intention nor remission [of
degrees], and which belong to all bodies on which one can make experi
ments, are to be taken as the qualities of all bodies whatsoever.
The polemic character of this rule, which opposes the empiricism of
the experimental philosophy to the apriorism of the Continental
philosophers (notably Descartes and Leibniz), is qualified by the
developments which Newton adds to it:
the qualities of bodies are known to us only by experiments . . . we are
certainly not to relinquish the evidence of experiments for the sake of dreams
and vain fictions of our own devising; nor ought we to recede from the
analogy of Nature, which is wont to be simple, and always consonant
to itself.
And it is just because nature is consonant to herself that we can
generalize the data of experience and attribute to all bodies the pro
perties that experience shows us in those which are within our reach.
The extension, hardness, impenetrability, mobility, and inertia of the
whole result from the extension, hardness, impenetrability, mobility, and
inertia of the parts; hence we conclude that all the smallest parts of all
bodies are also extended, and hard and impenetrable, and movable, and
endowed with the force of inertia. And this is the foundation of all philo
sophy.
Newton is absolutely clear: extension itself - in opposition to Des
cartes - is declared to be an empirical datum, as are duration and
impenetrability, which Descartes had not included in the essential
properties of bodies. Furthermore, atomism - once again in opposi
tion to Descartes (and also to Leibniz) - is proclaimed responsible
for experimental philosophy and the ultimate foundation of all
philosophy.
But there is even more. The end of the exposition tells us that, since
all the bodies encountered in our terrestrial experience gravitate
toward the earth, since the moon likewise gravitates toward the
earth and our sea gravitates toward the moon, and since all planets
gravitate toward one another and the comets gravitate toward the
sun, it is necessary for us to hold that all bodies mutually gravitate
toward one another and therefore to admit gravity as their univer
sal property.
267
This is an affirmation of an incalculable scope, and one which

could be understood - and was! - as including gravity among the
essential properties of bodies. But that is something that Newton
himself never did,^ And indeed, he concludes the discussion of Rule
III with the following lines:
Attamen gravitatem corporibus essentialem minime affirmo. Per vim
insitam intelligo solam vim inertiae. Haec immutabilis est. Gravitas recedendo a Terra diminuitur.^
Not that I affirm gravity to be essential to bodies. By their vis insita
I mean nothing but their inertia. This is immutable. Their gravity is dimi
nished as they recede from the earth.
The empirical assertions of Rule III - it would have been easy to

predict - did not convince the Continental philosophers. Quite the
contrary: their opposition to the natural philosophy of Newton
was found to be reinforced thereby. Thus in Eg Newton returned to
the charge, formulating in Regula IV the rule of conduct of empiri
cism, or the rule of prudence and of good sense, as follows:
In philosophia experimentali, propositiones ex phenomenis per inductionem collectae, non obstantibus contrariis hypothesibus, pro veris aut
accurate, aut quam proxime, haberi debent, donee alia occurrerint pheno
mena, per quae aut accuratiores reddantur, aut exceptionibus obnoxiae.
Hoc fieri debet ne argumentum inductions tollatur per hypotheses.
In experimental philosophy we are to look upon propositions inferred by
general induction from phenomena as accurately or very nearly true, not
withstanding any contrary hypotheses that may be imagined, till such time
as other phenomena occur, by which they may either be made more accur
ate, or liable to exceptions. This rule we must follow, that the argument of
induction may not be evaded by hypotheses.
In other words, in experimental philosophy one must stick to the

facts and hold only theories duly established by, and founded on
the facts, unless other facts contradict or restrict them. And if
the facts are contrary to philosophic and abstract hypotheses,
so much the worse for the latter. As Newton concludes:
Hoc fieri debet ne argumentum inductionis tollatur per hypotheses.
In 1717, in order to preclude any misunderstanding of his view, Newton wrote in
the preface to the second English edition of his Opticks: And to shew that I do not
take Gravity for an essential Property of Bodies, I have added one Question concerning
its Cause, chusing to propose it by way of a Question, because I am not yet satisfied
about it for want of Experiments.
* In effect, inertia is a function of the mass of a body; gravity, on the contrary, is a
function of attraction, the force of which varies with distance.
268
n e w t o n s
regulae ph ilo so ph a n d i
This must be done so that the argument founded on induction may not
be evaded by hypotheses.
Here again the manuscripts of Newton permit us to follow step

by step the elaboration of the text of Rule IV. We observe that, as
in the case of Rule II, each successive redaction makes the wording
stronger and tighter. Newton began with a rather long and argumen
tative text:
In Philosophia experimentali contra Propositiones ex Phaenomenis per
Inductionem collectas^ non sunt^ disputandum ab Hypothesibus. Nam si
argumenta ab Hypothesibus contra Inductiones admitterentur, argumenta Inductionum^ in quibus tota Philosophia experimentalis fundatur per
Hypotheses contrarias semper everti possent.^ Si Propositio aliqua per
Inductionem collecta nondum sit satis accurata corrigi debet, non per
hypotheses, sed per phaenomena naturae fusius et accuratius observata.
In experimental philosophy one is not to argue from hypotheses against
propositions drawn by induction from phenomena. For if arguments from
hypotheses are admitted against inductions, then the arguments of induc
tions on which all experimental philosophy is founded could always be
overthrown by contrary hypotheses. If a certain proposition drawn by
induction is not yet sufficiently precise, it must be corrected not by hypo
theses but by the phenomena of nature more fully and more accurately
observed.
On rereading this, Newton no doubt saw that the argumentative

style was out of place in a rule. Furthermore, he did not have to
* Newton originally wrote collecta.
After writing est, Newton wrote sunt above it (probably when he changed collecta
to collectas) without crossing out the est.
^ Newton originally wrote ab Hypothesibus admitterentur', and then, by means
of a caret, he inserted above the line the phrase contra Inductiones between Hypothesibus
and admitterentur.
^ It appears that Newton originally wrote argumenta ab Inductione; that he then
changed ab to ad; and then by crossing out ad and writing over the e in Inductione, made
the phrase finally stand argumenta Inductionum.
^ Newton originally wrote in quibus tota Philosophia experimentalis fundatur nihil
xalerent, sed per Hypotheses contrarias semper everti possent. He then changed the
comma after valerent to a period, crossed out sed, and replaced it by Nam, which he
inserted by means of a caret before per Hypotheses, so that the phrase read: in quibus
tota Philosophia experimentalis fundatur nihil valerent. Nam per Hypotheses contrarias
semper everti possent. Finally, he crossed out nihil valerent. Nam, leaving the wording
as we have printed it here.

Here Newton originally wrote: Si Propositiones per Inductionem collectae nondum
sint satis accuratae, corrigi debent. He then changed Propositiones to Propositio, in
serted aliqua after it by using a caret, and then by writing over the appropriate letters
changed the text to read as it now stands (that is, changed it from the plural to the
singular), perhaps because he balked at the idea of suggesting that a plural number of
his own propositions might not be sufficiently precise!
Originally observanda\ written over to read observata.
269
repeat what he had already said in Rule III. He started again and
wrote:
In Philosophia experimentali^ Hypotheses^ contra argumentum Inductionis non sunt audiendae sed Propositiones ex Phaenomenis per Inductionem collectae pro veris aut accurate aut quam proximo haberi debent^
donee alia occurrerint Phaenomena per quae aut accuratiores reddantur,
aut exceptionibus obnoxiae. Hoc fieri debet ne argumentum Inductionis
per Hypotheses tollatur.
In experimental philosophy hypotheses [raised] against the argument of
induction are not to be heard [i.e., taken into account] but propositions
drawn from phenomena are to be taken as either accurately or very nearly
true until other phenomena are produced by which either they are rendered
more accurate or subject to objections. This must be done so that the
argument of induction be not destroyed by hypotheses.
Thus we see the text take form. The phrases do not balance well.
The interdiction of listening to (taking account of) hypotheses is out
of place. Newton thus lets it drop, and transforms it into an inter
diction of making use of hypotheses to correct the imperfect results
of experience:
In Philosophia experimentali^ Propositiones ex Phaenomenis per Inductionem collectae pro veris aut accurate aut quam proxime haberi debent
donee alia occurrerint Phaenomena per quae aut accuratius reddantur aut
exceptionibus obnoxiae. Quae nondum sunt satis accuratae, hae per hypo
theses emendari non debent sed ad incudem revocari per phaenomena
naturae fusius et accuratius observandia. Argumenta ex Hypothesibus
contra argumentum Inductionis desumenda non sunt.
In experimental philosophy we are to look upon propositions inferred
by general induction from phenomena as accurately or very nearly true,
till such time as other phenomena occur, by which they may either be made
more accurate, or liable to exceptions. Those which are not yet sufficiently
precise must not be improved by hypotheses but must be revised by means
Newton originally wrote naturali, which he then crossed out and replaced by
experimentali.
^ The word Hypotheses was originally written following Inductiones, but it was then
crossed out and placed in its present position.
Newton originally wrote: In Philosophia experimentali, Propositiones ex Phaeno
menis per Inductionem collectae pro veris aut accurate aut quam proxime haberi debent,
which, using a caret to insert some words after collectae, he changed to read: In
Philosophia experimentali, Propositiones ex Phaenomenis per Inductionem collectae
non sunt per hypotheses corrigendae, sed hypotheses, sed pro veris . . . Then, by crossing
out the words just inserted, and inserting others after experimentali by means of a
caret, he made the sentence read ar it now stands.

* Newton originally began this passage with the word Propositiones, and then later
inserted by a caret the phrase In Philosophia experimentali.
The words Quae . . . observanda are crossed out in the MS.
* Newton originally wrote Hypotheses contra argumentum Inductiones nil valent,
and then changed the text to the present version.
270
n e w t o n s
regulae ph ilo so pha ndi
of the phenomena of nature more fully and accurately observed. Argu

ments from hypotheses against the argument of induction must not be
chosen.
To correct the results of experiments by hypotheses . . . This is

probably an allusion to the principles of conservation of Descartes,
and of Leibniz. But Newton no doubt considers that this is not the
place to speak of them. Furthermore, one must not melanger les
torchons et les serviettes, that is to say, the rules of reasoning and
the precepts concerning the technique of experiments. Thus he crosses
it all out and starts once more, taking up again the phrase which he
had rejected:
In Philosophia experimentali, Propositiones ex Phaenomenis per Induc
tionem collectae,^ non obstantibus Hypothesibus,^ pro veris aut accurate
quam proxime haberi debent, donee alia occurrerint Phaenomena per
quae aut accuratiores reddantur aut exceptionibus obnoxiae. Hoc fieri
debet ne argumentum Inductionis tollatur per Hypotheses.
And this, except for the addition of the word contrariis, is the version
which Newton printed.
The text of Eg contains only four rules. But the manuscripts show
us that Newton, becoming more and more anti-Cartesian,^ had pro
jected a fifth, in which he opposed his Lockian empiricism to the
innate ideas of the French philosopher. Actually, Descartes seemed
to him more and more to be the chief inspiration of his Continental
adversaries, who based themselves on hypotheses not only to re
ject the experimental philosophy which he was promoting but also
to accuse him of being only a vulgar sensationalist and of wishing, at
the same time, through his doctrine of universal gravitation, to rein^ Newton originally wrote: In Philosophia experimentali, [Hypotheses contra argu
mentum Inductionis non sunt audiendae, sed] Propositiones ex Phaenomenis per Induc
tionem collectae. Then by crossing out words he arrived at the present version.
* Newton originally wrote: Hypothesibus, contraijs, pro veris . . . , but he then
crossed out contraijs. The word contrariis appears in the printed version.
Newton originally placed the phrase per Hypotheses after Inductionis, but he then
crossed it out there and placed it at the end of the sentence. This passage has already
been translated, supra, p. 268.
* The sources of Newtonian anti-Cartesianism are many and diverse; indeed, one
can say that Cartesianism is opposed on all grounds: in physics, empiricism vs.
apriorism; in religion, Deus artifex vs. Dieu faignant. Indeed, for Newton and the New
tonians - the preface by Cotes to the second edition of the Principia expresses their sen
timents very clearly - the God of Descartes (and of Leibniz) is an absent God who does
not intervene in the mechanistic operations of nature, a mechanism which, thanks to the
law of conservation of motion (as of vis viva), is self-sufficient. They also accused Des
cartes (as Henry More had already done) of exiling God from the world. See my
From the Closed World to the Infinite Universe (Baltimore: Johns Hopkins Press, 1955).
271
troduce into science action-at-a-distance (magical action), which had

been properly proscribed by Cartesian mechanism.^
Reg. V: Pro hypothesibus habenda sunt quaecunque ex rebus ipsis vel
per sensus externos, vel per sensationem cogitationum internarum non
derivantur. Sentio utique quod Ego cogitem, id quod fieri nequiret nisi
simul sentirem quod ego sim. Sed non sentio quod Idea aliqua sit innata.
Et pro Phaenomenis habeo non solum quae per sensus quinque externos
nobis innotescunt, sed etiam quae in mentibus nostris^ intuemur cogitando:
Ut quod, Ego sum, ego credo, doleo, etc.^ Et quae ex phaenomenis nec
demonstrando nec per argumentum inductionis consequuntur, pro
Hypothesibus habeo.
Rule V : Whatever is not derived from things themselves, whether by the
external senses or by the sensation of internal thoughts, is to be taken for a
hypothesis. Thus I sense that I am thinking, which could not happen unless
at the same time I were to sense that I am. But I do not sense that any idea
whatever may be innate. And I do not take for a phenomenon only that
which is made known to us by the five external senses, but also that which
we contemplate in our minds when thinking; such as, I am, I believe, I
understand, I remember, I think, I wish, I am unwilling, I am thirsty, I
am hungry, I rejoice, I suffer, etc. And those things which neither can be
demonstrated from the phenomenon nor follow from it by the argument of
induction, I hold as hypotheses.
Newton does not seem to have pursued this attempt to carry the
anti-Cartesian polemic into the domain of pure philosophy. He did
not even recopy the page from which I have just quoted. Did he
reckon that where Locke had not succeeded he himself would have
few chances of gaining the victory? Or was he afraid to provoke his
adversaries and to stir up a controversy as long and as disagreeable
as that which he had recently had with Leibniz? For whatever reason,
he abandoned the project. Rule V has until now slept among his
papers. This rule is extremely interesting, since it offers us a confes
sion of purely philosophical faith on the part of Newton. It is, in fact,
the only one ever permitted himself by the author of the Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica.
* In Newtons MSS, there is a long critique of Cartesian cosmology (denial of the
void) as well as of the radical separation of spirit and matter. This MS (MS 4003) has
been published by A. R. Hall and Marie Boas Hall, Unpublished Scientific Papers of
Isaac Newton (Cambridge, England: University Press, 1962), pp. 89-156, and has been
studied by me in Chapter III, Newton and Descartes.
* Newton originally wrote mentis, then crossed it out and replaced it with cogitationum.
Newton originally wrote refiectendo after nostris, and then crossed it out.
* Newton originally wrote: Ut quod. Ego sum. Ego credo. Ego doleo, ego gandeo, ego
recorder, ego cogito. Ego volo, nolo, cogito, intelligo, sitio, esurio . . . Then by crossing
out words and rearranging he arrived at the present version.
272
VII
Attraction, Newton, and Cotes
In a well-known letter (18 February 1712/13), Roger Cotes drew
Newtons attention to Leibnizs attack on him published in the
Memoirs o f Literature of May 1712, and advised him not to leave it
unanswered,^ Cotes also raised an objection to Newtons theory of
attraction, or at least to the manner in which it was presented. Cotes
was surely aware of Newtons frequent and numerous assertions
that the term attraction was used by him as a perfectly neutral
one, promiscuously with others, and could be understood as mean
ing pressure or whatever else, but not what it seemed to mean. Even
so, Cotes found that Newtonian attraction implied the attribution of
attractive forces to bodies, and that Newton, tacitly, made that
hypothesis, or supposition.
In the letter I am referring to, Cotes submits to Newtons approval
an outline of the Preface to the Principia that he had been commis
sioned to write. He thinks that it will be proper, besides the account
of the Book and its improvements, to add something concerning
more particularly the manner of philosophising made use of and
wherein it differs from that of Descartes and others, that is, to
demonstrate from the phenomena of nature the principle it is based
on (the principle of universal gravity) and not merely to assert it.
The demonstration will be based (a) on the first law of motion (the
law of inertia) according to which moving bodies, if no force acts
upon them, move in a straight line, and {b) on the astronomical fact
that planets do not move in this way, but describe curves. They are,
therefore, acted upon by a force which may . . . not improperly
be called centripetal in respect to the revolving bodies, and attractive
in respect to the central ones. But, continues Cotes,
in the first corollary of this S**" Proposition [of Book III] I meet with a
difficulty, it lyes in these words [Et cum attractio omnis mutua sit].
I am persuaded they are then true when the Attraction may properly
* See J. Edleston, Correspondence o f Sir Isaac Newton and Professor Cotes (London,
1850), p. 153.
T
273
A T T R A C T I O N , N E W T O N , AND COTES
be so called, otherwise they may be false. ^ You will understand my mean

ing by an Example. Suppose two Globes A & B placed at a distance from
each other upon a Table, & that whilst y* Globe A remaines at rest the
Globe B is moved towards it by an invisible Hand; a by-stander who ob
serves this motion but not the cause of it, will say that y* Globe B does
certainly tend to the centre of y Globe A, & thereupon he may call
the force of the invisible hand the centripetal force oi B 8c the Attraction
of A since the effect appeares the same as if it did truly proceed from
a proper & real Attraction of A. But then I think he cannot by virtue of
this Axiom [Attractio omnis mutua est] conclude contrary to his sense
& Observation that the Globe A does also move towards the Globe B
8c will meet it at the common centre of Gravity of both bodies. This is
what stops me in the train of reasoning by which I would make out as
I said in a popular way Your 7*** Proposition of yin'* Book. I shall be
glad to have Your resolution of the difficulty, for such I take it to be. If
it appeares so to You also, I think it should be obviated in the last Sheet
of Your Book which is not yet printed off or by an Addendum to be printed
with y* Errata Table. For till this objection be cleared I would not under
take to answer any one who should assert that You do Hypothesim fingere,
I think You seem tacitly to make this supposition that yAttractive force
resides in the Central Body.^
damental law or axiom of motion, that of the equality of action

and reaction as it is explained already in the Principia.
Cotess objection was characterized by Edleston as an instance

of the temporary haze that may occasionally obstruct the highest
intellect. Even it if were so - which it is not - it would, in my opinion,
be a very good instance of the facility and naturalness with which
Newtons conception could be misinterpreted and misunderstood by
contemporaries. Thus it seems to me to be worth while to study the
case somewhat more closely.
Newtons reaction to Cotess difficulties is rather interesting.
He first enlightens Cotes about the meaning of the word hypo
thesis ; then he tells him that universal attraction is not a hypo
thesis but a truth established by induction, and that the mutual
and mutually equal attraction of bodies is a case of the third fun^ The fifth proposition of Book III of the Principia (p. 410) is as follows: That the
circumjovial planets gravitate towards Jupiter; the circumsaturnal towards Saturn;
the circumsolar towards the sun; and by the forces of their gravity are constantly
drawn off from rectilinear motions; and retained in curvilinear orbits. The proposi
tion itself explains that the forces upon which those revolutions depend . . . decrease
in the same proportion, and according to the same law, as the force of gravity does in
receding from the earth. Corollarium I reads: There is, therefore, a power of gravity
tending to all the planets; for, doubtless, Venus, Mercury, and the rest, are bodies of
the same sort with Jupiter and Saturn. And since all attraction (by Law III) is mutual,
Jupiter will therefore gravitate towards all his own satellites, Saturn towards his, the
earth towards the moon, and the sun towards all the primary planets.
* Correspondence, pp. 152 sq.
Ibid., p. 152, note: The difficulty raised by Cotes here affords an instance of the
temporary haze which may occasionally obscure the brightest intellects.
274
I had yo*" of Feb 18***, & the Difficulty you mention w** lies in these
words [Et cum Attractio omnis mutua sit] is removed by considering that
as in Geometry the word Hypothesis is not taken in so large a sense as to
include the Axiomes & Postulates, so in Experimental Philosophy it is not
to be taken in so large a sense as to include the first Principles or Axiomes
w** I call the laws of motion. These Principles are deduced from Phaenomena & made general by Induction: w** is the highest evidence that a
Proposition can have in this philosophy. And the word Hypothesis is here
used by me to signify only such a Proposition as is not Phaenomenon nor
deduced from any Phaenomena but assumed or supposed w^"* out any ex
perimental proof. Now the mutual & mutually equal attraction of bodies is
a branch of the third Law of motion & how this branch is deduced from
Phaenomena you may see in the end of the Corollaries of yLaws of Mo
tion, pag. 22. If a body attracts another body contiguous to it & is not
mutually attracted by the other; the attracted body will drive the other
before it & both will go away together w**" an accelerated motion in infini
tum, as it were by a self moving principle, contrary to yfirst law of motion,
whereas there is no such phaenomenon in all nature.^
The law of the equality of action and reaction - the so-called
third law - is formulated in the Principia as follows:
Law III. To every action there is always opposed an equal reaction: or,
the mutual actions of two bodies upon each other are always equal, and
directed to contrary parts.
Whatever draws or presses another is as much drawn or pressed by that
other. If you press a stone with your finger, the finger is also pressed by the
stone. If a horse draws a stone tied to a rope, the horse (if I may say so)
will be equally drawn back towards the stone; for the distended rope, by
the same endeavour to relax or unbend itself, will draw the horse as much
towards the stone as it does the stone towards the horse and will obstruct
the progress of the one as much as it advances that of the other. If a body
impinge upon another, and by its force change the motion of the other,
that body also (because of the equality of mutual pressure) will undergo an
equal change, in its own motion, towards the contrary part. The changes
made by these actions are equal, not in the velocities, but in the motions
of bodies; that is to say, if the bodies are not hindered by any other im
pediments. For, because the motions are equally changed, the changes
of velocities made towards contrary parts are inversely proportional to the
bodies.
^ Correspondence, pp. 154 sq.
* Mathematical Principles o f Natural Philosophy, Motte-Cajori translation (Berke
ley: University of California Press, 1946), pp. 13 sq. The Latin text of the first edition
is as follows (p. 13):
275
And in the Scholium to the Axioms or Laws Newton says:

In attractions I briefly demonstrate the thing after this manner. Suppose
an obstacle is interposed to hinder the meeting of any two bodies A, B,
attracting one the other: then if either body, as A, is more attracted to
ward the other body B, than the other body B is towards the first body A,
the obstacle will be more strongly urged by the pressure of the body A
than by the pressure of the body B, and therefore will not remain in equili
brium: but the stronger pressure will prevail, and will make the system of
the two bodies, together with the obstacle, to move directly towards the
parts on which B lies; and in free spaces, to go forward in infinitum with
a motion continually [perpetually] accelerated; which is absurd and con
trary to the first Law. For, by the first Law the system ought to continue
[persevere] in its state of rest, or of moving uniformly forwards in a right
line; and therefore the bodies must equally press the obstacle, and be equally
attracted one by the other. I made the experiment on the loadstone and iron.
If these, placed apart in proper vessels, are made to float by one another
in standing water, neither of them will propel the other; but by being
equally attracted, they will sustain each others pressure, and rest at last
n an equilibrium.^
As a matter of fact, Newton did not stop at that, and to the text
of the Principia to which he appealed he made some additions (it is
rather strange that it is not mentioned anywhere in his Correspond
ence with Cotes): to the text of the third law he added the statement:
This law takes place also in attractions as will be proved in the
next Scholium,'' and in the Scholium itself, after the paragraph I have
just quoted, he introduced the following one, in which he explained
that not only magnets and iron, but also the earth and its parts
mutually attract each other in full conformity with the third law;
Newtons answer to Cotes is thus simply (a) a statement that Cotes

misunderstood him and {b) a suggestion that he reread, or restudy,
the relevant texts of the Principia.*
LEX HI.
" Actioni contrariam semper & aequalem esse reactionem: sive corporum duorum
actiones in se mutuo semper esse aequales & in partes contrarias dirigi.
Quicquid premit vel trahit alterum, tantundem ab eo premitur vel trahitur. Si quis
lapidem digito premit, premitur & hujus digitus a lapide. Si equus lapidem funi alligatum trahit, retrahetur etiam & equus (ut ita dicam) aequaliter in lapidem: nam funis
utrinque distentus eodem relaxandi se conatu urgebit equum versus lapidem, ac lapi
dem versus equum; tantumque impediet progressum unius quantum promo vet progressum alterius. Si corpus aliquod in corpus aliud impingens, motum ejus vi sua
quomodocunque mutaverit, idem quoque vicissim in motu proprio eandem mutationem in partem contrariam vi alterius (ob aequalitatem pressionis mutuae) subibit.
His actionibus aequales fiunt mutationes, non velocitatum, sed motuum; scilicet in
corporibus non aliunde impeditis. Mutationes enim velocitatum, in contrarias itidem
partes factae, quia motus aequaliter mutantur, sunt corporibus reciproce proportionales.
* Ibid., p. 25; in Latin, first edition, pp. 23 sq.:
In Attractionibus rem sic breviter ostendo. Corporibus duobus quibusvis A. B.
se mutuo trahentibus, concipe obstaculum quodvis interponi quo congressus eorum
impediatur. Si corpus alterutrum A magis trahitur versus corpus alterum B, quam
illud alterum B in primum A, obstaculum magis urgebitur pressione corporis A quam
pressione corporis B; proindeque non manebit in aequilibrio. Praevalebit pressio
fortior, facietque ut systema corporum duorum & obstaculi moveatur in directum in
partes versus B, motuque in spatiis liberis semper accelerato abeat in infinitum. Quod
est absurdum & Legi primae contrarium. Nam per Legem primam debebit systema
perseverare in statu suo quiescendi vel movendi uniformiter in directum, proindeque
corpora aequaliter urgebunt obstaculum, & idcirco aequaliter trahentur in invicem.
Tentavi hoc in Magnete & Ferro. Si haec in vasculis propriis sese contingentibus seorsim posita, in aqua stagnante juxta fluitent; neutrum propellet alterum, sed aequalitate
attractionis utrinque sustinebunt conatus in se mutuos, ac tandem in aequilibrio
constituta quiescent.
276
So the gravitation between the Earth and its parts is mutual. Let the
Earth FI [Fig. 8] be cut by any plane EG into two parts EGF and EGI and
their weights one towards the other will be mutually equal. For if by an
other plane HK, parallel to the former EG, the greater part EGI is cut into
two parts EGKH and HKI, whereof HKI is equal to the part EFG, first
cut off, it is evident that the middle part EGKH will have no propension
by its proper weight towards either side, but will hang as it were, and rest in
an equilibrium between both. But the one extreme part HKI will with its
whole weight bear upon and press the middle part towards the other
extreme part EGF; and therefore the force with which EGI, the sum of the
parts HKI and EGKH, tends towards the third part EGF, is equal to the
weight of the part HKI, that is, to the weight of the third part EGF. And
therefore the weights of the two parts EGI and EGF one towards the other
are equal, as I was to prove. And indeed if those weights were not equal, the
whole Earth floating in the nonresisting ether would give way to the greater
weight, and, retiring from it, would be carried off in infinitum.^
* Motte-Cajori, p. 26; addition of the second edition (Cambridge, 1713), p. 22:
Sic etiam gravitas inter Terram & ejus partes, mutua est. Secetur Terra F I piano
quovis E G in partes duas E G F & E G I : & aequalia erunt harum pondera in se
mutuo. Nam si piano alio H K quod priori E G parallelum sit, pars major E G I
secetur in partes duas E G K H & H K I , quarum H K I aequalis sit parti prius abscis
sae E F G : manifestum est quod pars media E G K H pondere proprio in neutram
partium extremarum propendebit, sed inter utramque in aequilibrio, ut ita decam, suspendetur, & quiescet. Pars autem extrema H K I toto suo pondere incumbet in partem
277
He also changed somewhat the wording of Prop.

and added
to it a corollary in which the mutual character of the attraction is
once more reasserted (Cor. 3):
All the planets do gravitate towards one another by cor. 1 and 2. And
hence it is that Jupiter and Saturn when near their conjunction, by their
mutual attraction sensibly disturb each others motions. So the sun dis
turbs the motions of the moon; and both sun and moon disturb our sea
as we shall hereafter explain.^
Cotes did not reply to the admonition of Newton. Was he con

vinced? Did he recognize that he was wrong and that he had made
a blunder? I do not think so. At least not quite: I think that he be
came convinced that he was right, but that, nevertheless, he made a
blunder. Indeed, the reasoning of Cotes was perfectly correct (Edleston and others notwithstanding) and he was right to point out that
it is only if bodies act upon each other - in our case if they really
attract each other - that the law of equality of action and reaction
mediam, & urgebit illam in partem alteram extremam E O F ; ideoque vis qua partium
H K I & E G K . H summa E G I tendit versus partem tertiam E G F, aequalis est
ponderi partis H K I, id est ponderi partis tertiae E G F. Et propterea pondera par
tium duarum E G I, E G F in se mutuo sunt aequalia, uti volui ostendere. Et nisi
pondera ilia aequalia essent, Terra tota in libero aethere fluitans ponderi major!
cederet, & ab eo fugiendo abiret in infinitum.
^ Proposition V of Book III of the second edition (p. 365) is as follows:
Propositio V. Theorema V
^ Plane tas circumjoviales gravitate in Jo vent, Circumsaturnios in Saturnum, et Circumsolares in Salem, & vi gravitatis suae retrain semper a motibus rectilineis, & in Orbibus
curvilineis retineri.
Nam revolutiones Planetarum Circumjovialium circa Jovem, Circumsaturniorum

circa Saturnum, & Mercurii ac Veneris reliquorumque Circumsolarium circa Solem
sunt Phaenomena ejusdem generis cum revolutione Lunae circa Terram; & propterea
per Reg. 1 1 a causis ejusdem generis dependent: praesertim cum demonstratum sit
quod vires, a quibus revolutiones illae dependent, respiciant centra Jovis, Saturni ac
Solis, & recedendo a Jove, Saturno & Sole decrescant eadem ratione ac lege, qua vis
gravitatis decrescit in recessu a Terra.
Carol. 1. Gravitas igitur datur in Planetas universes. Nam Venerem, Mercurium,
caeterosque esse corpora ejusdem generis cum Jove & Saturno, nemo dubitat. Et cum
attractio omnis (per motus Legem tertiam) mutua sit, Jupiter in Satellites suos omnes,
Saturnus in suos, Terraque in Lunam, et Sol in Planetas omnes primarios gravitabit.
Carol. 2, Gravitatem, quae Planetam unumquemque respicit, esse reciproce ut
quadratum distantiae locorum ab ipsius centre.
Carol. 3. Graves sunt Planetae omnes in se mutuo per Corel. 1 et 2. Et hinc Jupiter
& Saturnus prope conjunctionem se invicem attrahendo, sensibiliter perturbant motus
mutuos, Sol perturbat motus Lunares, Sol & Luna perturbant Mare nostrum, ut in
sequentibus explicabitur.
* Ibid., p. 365; Motte-Cajori, p. 410. In his own interleaved copy of the Principia
Newton had written, Graves sunt Planetae omnes in se mutuo per corol. 1 et 2.
Omnis enim attractio mutua est per motus legem tertiam. In the printed text the
omnis enim . . . is left out. Indeed it only repeats what has already been stated in cor. 1.
278
A T T RA C T I O N , N E W T O N , AND COTES
can be applied to them.^ He was also right in suggesting that New

tons whole reasoning is based upon this presupposition: of course,
if a body pulls or draws (the Latin text says trahit) another it is
also, and as strongly, drawn or pulled by it.^ But if a body is only
pushed toward another? The action and reaction take place between
the pushing body and the pushed one, and not between this latter
and the body toward which it is pushed. Their reaction is not
mutual.
That is exactly what Cotes objects to in Newton.
Let us elaborate his reasoning; let us assume, for instance, that
planets are deflected from their rectilinear path and forced to move
in curved lines not by a force that ties them to the sun (as a stone
whirled in a sling is dragged back by the sling) but by an outside
pressure, be it a hand, or the pressure of a Cartesian, or Huygenian,
vortex, or by the rush toward it of aethereal particles, or by the con
tinuous place shifting of grosser and more tenuous particles of the
aether,^ or, finally, by the action of an elastic aether of which the
density (and therefore the pressure) increases with the distance from
the sun (the hypothesis of Query XXI of the 2nd English edition
of the Opticks of 1717): the planets will be pushed toward the sun;
but the sun will not be pushed toward the planets. Thus somebody
could, indeed, say that the planets are attracted by the sun (as
Leibniz did in his Tentamen de motuum coelestium causis). But he
would certainly be wrong to assume that this attraction would be
mutual. All the more so as, in the case of such - or analogous mechanisms, we could, as Huygens has shown, dispense with the
sun altogether.
^ The third law is somewhat tricky in its application and we must be careful not to
extend it beyond its limits: dynamics (in common life action, and even attraction, are,
alas, as often as not unilateral), and not forgetting that, stricto sensu, it implies either
contiguity or immediate action at a distance. Indeed, in an action through a medium it
takes place only between the contiguous parts of this medium and not between the
objects (bodies) acting and acted upon.
* Even in this case, if the body is pushed not directly, but, say, by a stick, or pulled by
a string, the application of the law is not immediate.
See Newtons Hypothesis explaining the Properties of Light, discoursed of in
my several Papers of 1675, T. Birch, The History o f the Royal Society o f London
(London, 1757), III, 250 sq., reprinted in I. B. Cohen, Isaac Newton's Papers and Letters
on Natural Philosophy (Cambridge, Massachusetts: Harvard University Press, 1958),
pp. 180 sq.
See the letter to Boyle of 28 February 1678/9, Cohen, Newton's Papers and
Letters, pp. 250 sq.; C o r r e s p o n d e n c e , sq., and letter to Halley, 27 July 1686,
Correspondence, II, 446 sq.
See his Discours sur la cause de la pesanteur, published as an appendix to his
Traite de la lumiire (Leiden, 1690), Oeuvres completes, vol. XXL
279
Newton tells us that he had made experiments with magnets and

iron, and thus demonstrated that the law of equality of action and
reaction is valid in the case of magnetic attraction. From this he can
rightly conclude that magnets really act upon iron or, in Cotess
terms, that we have here a case of attraction properly so called.
This, indeed, is extremely important: it excludes from the field of
magnetism the kind of unilateral action, which was thought possible
even by Gilbert and Kepler, by which the terrestrial magnet attracted
iron without being attracted by it, or the sun attracted and repulsed
planets without being affected itself by this action.
As a matter of fact Newton could have asserted that this attrac
tion was mutual - and equal - even without having performed his
experiment: we can hardly assume that a magnet drags a piece of
iron toward itself without at the same time tending toward that
piece of iron. On the other hand, it is just the unilateral character of
this tending that is excluded by the subjection of magnetism to the
third law.
The case of the earth alleged in the second edition of the Principia
is already somewhat more difficult. Of course, if the earth holds to
gether by attracting its parts, this gravitation will not be a uni
lateral action or a tendency of these parts toward the whole, but a
mutual action: and the earth and its parts will have gravity or
weight toward each other. But from the fact that the earth (a)
does hold together and {b) does not run away into space with everincreasing speed, we can hardly conclude that it is really held together
by such an attraction. Could it not be pressed together by an external
action?
As for the planets, their case is obviously completely different;
we do not even know whether they are really attracting each other
- attraction, according to Newtons repeated assertions, may be
really pressure, or whatever else - we only know that they are sub
jected to centripetal forces. To assert that these forces are mutual,
because omnis attractio is such and obeys the third law is, obviously,
to beg the question, or, even worse, to commit a petitio principii.
Yet we can hardly ascribe to Newton such an elementary fallacy:
we have, therefore, to try to explain his reasoning in some other way.
But the only way to do it - at least so it seems to me - is to admit
that for Newton attraction, all the pseudo positivistic and agnostic
talk notwithstanding, was a real force (though not a mechanical and
perhaps not even a physical one) by which bodies really acted upon
280
each other (though not immediately through a void, but by means of

an immaterial link or medium), and that this force was somehow
located in, or connected with, these bodies and was also dependent
on, or proportional to, their masses. In other words, as Cotes put it,
this attraction was properly so called.
The only error that Cotes committed was to assume that this con
ception was an (unconscious or tacit) hypothesis made by Newton
in order to permit him to subject that attraction to the provisions
of the third law, whereas for Newton - as he tells Cotes, and as he
tells also in the third Regula philosophandi of the second edition of
the Principia^ as well as in the Scholium generale of the same - attrac
tion is an experimentally or, better, empirically ascertained and de
monstrated fact (of which only the cause is unknown) and by no
means a hypothesis.
Cotes seems to have understood it perfectly well: he blundered
in treating attraction as a supposition. Thus he became con
vinced, or confirmed in his conviction, that attraction was, as a
matter of fact, a property of body, and even a primordial one.
Accordingly, he said so in his preface. At first he even overshot the
mark and wrote that gravity (attractive power) was an essential
property of body. This was an obvious error^ for which he was taken
to task by Clarke, to whom he submitted the draft of his preface.^
He answered that he did not mean essential to be taken in the full
sense of the term; he only wanted to indicate that, as we do not know
what matter really is, we may ascribe to it all kinds of properties,
namely, all those that, by experience, we learn it possesses:
Sir: I return you my thanks for Your corrections of the Preface, &
particularly for Your advice in relation to that place where I seemd to
assert Gravity to be Essential to Bodies. I am fully of Your mind that it
would have furnishd matter for Cavilling and therefore I struck it out
immediately upon D ' Cannons mentioning Your Objection to me, & so
it never was printed. My design in that passage was not to assert Gravity
to be essential to Matter, but rather to assert that we are ignorant of the
Essential properties of Matter fe that in respect to our Knowledge Gravity
may possibly lay as fair a claim to that Title as the other Propertys which
^ It is rather clear that, as long as one remains a partisan of atomism and mechani
cal philosophy, that is, as long as"one considers matter to be nothing else than some
thing that entirely and adequately fills space, it is impossible to include forces
- repulsive any more than attractive - in the essence of body, which is then fully deter
mined by extension, impenetrability, hardness, mobility, and inertia. Or, if one pre
fers, the only force that can be included in it is the (pseudo) force of inertia.
^ Clarkes letter has not been preserved and one can only infer its contents from
Cotess answer.
281
I mentiond. For I understand by Essential Propertys such propertys with

out which no other belonging to the same substance can exist: and I would
not undertake to prove that it were impossible for any of the other Pro
pertys of Bodies to exist without even Extension (Cambridge, June 25,
1713).!
Whereupon he corrected his text, and, like Dr. Cheyne some years
before,2 stated that attractive power was a primordial property of
body: Inter primarias qualitates corporum universorum vel Gravitas
habebit locum., vel Extensio, Mobilitas et Impenetrabilitas non
habebit.
See Edieston, Correspondence, p. 158. Newton shared this view, which, by the way,
was the traditional one. Thus, in the General Scholium (an addition to the second edi
tion of the Principia) he wrote (p. 546 of the Motte-Cajori translation): What the real
substance of anything is we know not. In bodies we see only their figures and colours,
we hear only the sounds, we touch only their curved surfaces, we smell only the smells,
and taste the savours; but their inward substances are not to be known either by our
senses; or by any reflex act of our minds. In the unpublished drafts of this passage
he went even further; see A. R. Hall and M. B. Hall, Unpublished Scientific Papers o f
Sir Isaac Newton in the Portsmouth Collection, Cambridge University Library (Cam
bridge, England: Cambridge University Press, 1962), pp. 356 sq.: Substantias rerum
non cognoscimus. Nullas habemus earum ideas. Ex phenomenis colligimus earum
proprietates solas & ex proprietatibus quod sint substantiae. Corpora se mutuo
non penetrare colligimus ex solis phaenomenis: substantias diversi generis se
mutuo non penetrare ex phaenomenis minime constat. Et quod ex phaenominis
minime colligitur temere affirmari non debet.
Ex phaenomenis cognoscimus proprietates rerum & ex proprietatibus colligimus
res ipsas extare easque vocamus substantias sed ideas substantiarum non magis
habemus quam caecus ideas colorum . . .
Ideas habemus attributorum ejus sed quid sit rei alicujus substantia minime cogno
scimus.
* Dr. George Cheyne, Philosophical Principles o f Religion; Natural and Reveal'd
(London, 1715-1716), p. 41: "Attraction or Gravitation is not essential to Matter but
seems rather an original Impress which continues in it by virtue of the Omnipotent
Activity, in the Divine Nature of which it is a Copy or Image in the low Degree suitable
to a gross creature and so may be now reckond among the primary Qualities of
Matter, without which, as it is now constituted Matter cannot be. Dr. Cheyne
added (p. 42) that it could not be explained mechanically. See also J. Rohault, System
o f Natural Philosophy, illustrated with Dr. Samuel Clarke's Notes', taken mostly out
o f Sir Isaac Newton's Philosophy (London, 1723), II, 96 (part II, chap. XXVllI, note
12): Gravity or the weight of Bodies is not any accidental Effect of motion or of any
very subtile Matter, but an original and general Law of all Matter impressed upon it by
God, and maintained in it perpetually by some efficient Power, which penetrates the
solid Substance of it Wherefore we aught no more to inquire how Bodies gravitate
than how Bodies began first to be moved. Hence it follows, that there is really a Vacuum
in Nature.
Index
Absolutes, 104-113
Action and reaction, equality of, 66,
274-281
Adams, John Couch, 26
Aether: Leibnizs view of, 130-131;
Toricellis view of, 127; and
vibrations, 46-47,64,94,161,184
DAlembert, Jean Le Rond, 17
Algarotti, Francesco, 18
Antimotion. See Resistance
Archimedes, 32, 118
Aristotle, 8, 93, 118, 196, 242
Artillery, 6
Astronomy, 6, 97-111, 182-183; in
Principia, 30-31; Ptolemaic,
33-34
Atoms, 12; analysis of, 19, 22-23;
Leibnizs denial of, 140-141
Attempt to Prove the Motion of the
Earth by Observation (Hooke),
60, 233, 234, 237, 257
Attraction, 4, 13, 17, 56-65, 152157,273-282; Cotes objection to
Newtons theory of, 273-282;
defined, 150-151; Gassendi on,
176-179; Leibnizs rejection of,
139-148; Newtons laws of, 1516; Rohault and Clarke on,
176-179; see also Gravity
Babb, James T., 221
Bacon, Francis, 5, 39, 40, 257
Baliani, Giovanni-Battista, 69
Ballistics, 6
Barrow, Isaac, 11
Bassols, Jean de, 196
Bentley, Richard, 39, 149, 201-211
Bergson, Henri, 17
Bernoulli, Daniel, 14
Blondel, Francois, 206-207, 209,
211,213
Body, defined, 83
Bonnet, Nicolas, 196
Borelli, Alphonse, 123, 232, 235
Bossuet, Jacques Benigne, 82
Bourgeoisie, 5
Boyle Lectures, 201
Boyle, Robert, 12, 38, 40, 42, 113,
152, 201
Brewster, David, 223nl, 228
Bruno, Giordano, 192, 197
Cajori, Florian, 27
Calculus, 4
Cassini, Giovanni Domenico, 230
Cavalieri, Bonaventura, 11,68n3,69
Celestial gravitation, 4
Celestial mechanics, 124, 230, 231235
Celestial motion, 38, 116; Keplers
laws of, 8, 15, 125; see also
Planets; Solar system
Centrifugal force, 65, 84, 116,
119-126, 131-132, 134, 183;
also Vortex
Centripetal force, 64, 65, 116, 118,
120, 126, 134, 150-151, 153-154,
252, 264, 273-274, 280
Chatelet, Mme. du, 36
Cheyne, George, 39, 52, 282; on
attraction, 156, 158, 160
Circular (curved) motion, 67, 73,
76, 116, 170-172, 243; of fluids,
29, 97-98; and Huygens experi
ment, 119-120, 183; see also
Planets; Vortex theory
283
282
I NDEX
I NDEX
Diurnal motion of earth, 239-245,

Clairaut, Alexis Claude, 17, 33
253
Clarke, Samuel, 37, 144, 156, 159,
166, 167-168, 281; on attraction, Divine immutability, 73, 75-76
170-172; on motion, space, and Dulher, Fatio de, 116
Duns Scotus, John, 195, 197
place, 198-200
Collins, Anthony, 230
Colors: Newtons theory of, 40- Edleston, J., 26, 274
52; spectral, Hookes theory Einstein, Albert, 54
Elasticity, 230, 231, 238; Hookes
of, 3
law of, 231
Cometa (Hooke), 234
Ellipticity, 116, 137, 180, 182, 247,
Comets, 111, 182
257-258
Comte, Auguste, 64
Confutation o f Atheism (Bentley), Empiricism, Newtonian, 16-17, 19,
95, 158; and hypotheses, 40;
149, 167, 208, 210
rules of conduct of, 268-272
Conical pendulum (Hooke), 181
Connection and integration. See Energy, concept of, 65
Epicurus, 12
Law of attraction
Conservation: of motion, laws of, Essay on Newtons Principia (Rouse
Ball), 221
67-69, 72, 75; in nature, Carte
Euclid, 32
sian view, 69-82, 99, 271
Euler, Leonhard, 17, 18
Conti, Abbe, 144
Copernicus, Nicolaus, 8, 30, 31, 33, Experiments, role of, 19, 40-52; to
Descartes, 56; to Gassendi, 176;
34, 59, 118, 125, 173, 176, 243
to Newton, 56
Cosmology, 6-7, 9, 56, 97-104,203,
264; Cartesian, 65; Platonic, Extension and matter, 16, 159-160,
162, 267; Descartes theory of,
202-220; see also Astronomy,
82-94, 122; and void space,
Universe
164-169
Cosmotheoros (Huygens), 123
Cotes, Roger, 16, 26, 94; and Fabri, Honore, 209
attraction, 273-282; and Prin- Fabricius, David, 174, 175
cipia, 29, 31, 37-38, 40, 142-143, Falling bodies concept, 174-175,
158-160, 262
176-177; Galileos presentation
of, 211-220; trajectory, 240-260
Dawson, William, & Son Ltd., Faraday, Michael, 178
27-28
Fermat, Pierre, 11, 53, 243, 254
Democritus, 12
Firearms, development of, 6
Desaguliers, J. T., 17
Flamstead, John, 230, 239, 246
Descartes, Rene, 4, 5, 9, 12, 13, 22, Fluids, motion of, 29, 96-98
26, 69, 189, 224, 228; and hypo Fontenelle, Bernard le Bovier de,
thesis, 34, 36, 39,45; and infinite,
57, 58, 60, 147-148
192-194, 197; and Newton, 53- Force, Newtons definition of, 189,
114, 271-272
264
Dialogue Concerning the Two Chief Fraser, A. C., 155
World Systems (Galileo), 213Galileo, 4, 8-9, 12, 26, 33, 53, 65,
220, 243
66, 67, 118, 152, 176, 185-186,
Diderot, Denis, 22
189, 207-209, 243; trial of, 81;
Diffraction. See Light
see also Galileo-Plato problem
Discourse on the Cause o f Gravity
Galileo-Plato problem, 206-220
(Huygens), 117, 118
Gassendi, Petri, 12, 60, 68, 69, 189; Horsley, Samuel, 26

on attraction and gravity, 176- Huygens, Christian, 11, 14, 18, 26,
39, 43, 53, 57, 63, 97, 183, 188,
179; and horizontal motion,
258; and universal attraction,
185-187
116-123, 137-138, 153
General Scholium of Principia,
16n3,25,29, 31, 51, 110, 142, 157 Hypotheses, 16, 25, 29-40, 45-52,
n o , 152, 262-270; mechanical,
Geometry, 10, 53nl, 61; in nature,
39,45, 51 ; metaphysical, 38,113;
7; in space, 6-7
Newtons criticism of Descartess,
Gilbert, William, 58, 173, 257, 280
95-96
Global effect, 19
Hypothesis Explaining the Properties
sGravesande, W. J., 17
o f Light, 149, 224
Gravity, 4, 38, 51, 109-110, 152,
267; and aethereal pressure, 161;
Clarke on, 171-172; controversy Immobility of center of world,
39-40, 263
concerning, 57-58; Copernicus
Immutability,
divine, 73, 75-76
and Kepler on, 173-175; as
cosmic factor, 255; as essential Impact, Descartess rules of, 77-79
property of matter, 149-163,268, Impedimentum, 188-189
280-281; Gassendi on, 176-179; Impenetrability, as property of
matter, 16, 38, 83, 110, 158, 160
Hooke on, 180-184; Huygens
theory of, 116-124; Leibnizs Impulse, 151, 153; see also Attrac
tion; Gravity
theory of, 124-137; Rohault on,
171; terrestrial, 4, 116, 233, 255, Inertia: Descartess principle of,
65-79; Gassendis principle of,
257-258, 276-282
176; Newtons definition of, 189;
Gregorius of Rimini, 196
Newtons
law of, 66, 79, 273; as
Gregory, David, 124
property of matter, 110, 158;
Gregory, James, 244-2tWalliss acceptance of, 188
Grimaldi, Francesco Maria, 48
Infinity, 7, 86-88; Descartes on,
192-194; and God, 195-197; see
Hall, Rupert, 82
also
Cosmology; Universe
Halley, Edmund, 18, 130, 133, 183,
Inverse-square law of attraction,
236, 237, 254
15-16,20,116,133,136,158,183,
Hardness, as property of matter,
234-235, 253, 256
n o , 162
Harmonic circulation (Leibniz), Kant, Immanuel, 64
128-137, 138, 142
Keill, John, 16
Hartsoeker, N., 140-141, 143
Kepler, Johannes, 8, 15, 17, 30, 33,
Herival, John, 82
35, 39, 53, 65, 66, 125, 176, 203,
Hire, Philippe de la, 230
242-243, 257, 258-259, 280; and
Hobbes, Thomas, 22, 202
area law, 128-129; and attraction,
Holkot, Robert, 196
58-59,118,173-175; and infinity,
Hooke, Robert, 3,11,12,42,43,44,
196
97, 113, 130, 133, 152; and
attraction, 60, 162, 180-184, Lagrange, Joseph, 17
233-235; conflicts of, with New Laplace, Pierre, 17, 18, 21, 38, 40,
64
ton, 221-260; and hypotheses,
36, 44-45, 52, 188-189; and Law of areas, Kepler, 128-129
Law of attraction, 15, 20; see also
theory of elasticity, 231
Inverse-square law
Hoppe, Edmund, 242
284
285
I NDEX
Laws: of celestial motions, Kepler,

8, 15, 125; of conservation,
Descartes, 69-82,271; of motion,
4, 10, 66, 264, 273; of universal
gravitation, 183
Leibniz, Gottfried W., 4, 14, 21, 53,
59, 63, 76; and hypothesis, 36,
39, 52; philosophical criticism of
attraction by, 139-148, 273; and
universal attraction, 124-138;
and void, 166-167
Light, 43, 44, 46-49, 63, 122, 161;
decomposition of, 3; materiality
of, 45; see also Colors; Optics
Linus, Franciscus, 43
Locke, John, 18, 23; on attraction,
154-155
Lucretius, 12
I NDEX
Micrographia (Hooke), 44, 45, 223,

224
Mobility, as property of matter, 16,
38, no, 158, 160
Moles (mass), 174-175, 177

Momentum, 65, 188
Monde (Descartes), 70, 74, 76, 78,
79, 81
More, Henry, 87, 89, 94, 166
More, L. T., 225, 228, 237
Motion, 8-10, 12, 65, 66-68, 188191; absolute, 105-107; Aris
totelian, 242; Descartess concept
of, 65, 69-82; diurnal, of earth,
239-245, 253; laws of conserva
tion of, 67-69, 72, 75; of light,
45; Newtons laws of, 66, 83-95,
113, 274-275; rectilinear, 68-70,
73, 76, 84, 96, 185-191, 233;
relativistic concept of, 79-82, 84,
105; and space and place, 198200; and state of rest, 188-191;
status of, 9-10, 66-70, 76; and
vortex theory, 63-65, 97-111,
117-120, 124; see also Circular
motion; Paracentric motion
Motte, Andrew, 25, 27, 36
Mouy, P., 115
Movement, Newtons definition of,
83
Musschenbroek, Petrus, 17
Mysticism, \9-, see also Occult
Mach, Ernst, 17, 64, 163

Maclaurin, Colin, 16, 18
Magnetism, 58, 173; Gassendis
analogy of gravity and, 177-179;
see also Attraction
Malebranch, Nicolas, 76, 140
Mass, 16, 177; of earth, 174
Mathematical forces, 151, 153
Mathematical Principles of Natural
Philosophy. See Principia
Mathematics, 4-13; and attraction,
16-17; and belief in creation,
113-114; and Newtonian science,
19-20
Matter, 8-9,12,16-17; corpuscular Napoleon, 21
structure of, 13,162-163; proper Nature: mathematization of, 7-13,
ties of, 16, 38, 83, 110, 149-163;
20, 43, 95; medieval scientific
unity of, 262
concept of, 12, 21-22; meta
Maupertuis, P. L., 17, 162-163
physical approach to, 6; law of
Memoirs o f Literature (Leibniz),
conservation in, 69-82; rules of
140, 273
simplicity of, 265-267
Memoires de Trevoux (Leibniz), 140 Navigation, 6
Mersenne, Marin, 63, 243
New Theory about Light and Colors,
Messanges, Claude Mallemont de,
154, 222
230, 231, 239, 245
Newton, Isaac, 4-5, 12-13, 19-24;
Metaphysics, and Newtonian
aversion of, to publications, 224;
science, 6,20-22,38-39,111-114;
and Bentley, 201-220; and Cotes,
see also Astronomy; Cosmology;
273-282; and Descartes, 53-114;
Theology
early works of, 40-52; and
Meyronne, Frangois de, 196
Hooke, 221-260; hypotheses non
286
sendis theory of, 178; Hookes

theory of, 180-184, 232-235;
Huygens theory of, 116-122;
Leibniz on, 125-136; Mallemonts hypothesis, 239
Plato, 10, 32, 93, 202-211; see also
Galileo-Plato problem
Plenitude, Leibnizs principle of,
166-167
Pope, Alexander, 18-19
Principia, 11, 18, 25, 26-32, 35, 37,
40, 65, 95, 261-272; see also
General Scholium; Regulae philo
sophandi
Principles of Philosophy (Descartes),
65, 74
Prism, 3n2, 8nl, 40-42
Projectiles, parabolic motion of,
217-218
Propositions, 33; see also Hypo
theses
Psychology, atomic, 23
Ptolemy, 33, 34, 125, 242
Newton, Isaac (cont.)

Jingo, 16,25,29,35-36,39,51-52,
110, 262; laws of motion, 66, 79,
213-281; and metaphysics, 2021; natural philosophy of, 4, 54,
268
Newtonian synthesis, significance
of, 3-24
Newtonianism: acceptance of, 1819; and Bentley, 201-211; and
metaphysics, 20-21; opposition
to, 16-17, 115-138
Nicolaus of Cusa, 185, 196-197
Occult, 38-39, 56; and attraction,
139-148
Oldenburg, Henry, 40, 41, 46, 225,
229, 239
Opticks, 25, 27, 31, 37, 49, 95, 156;
Queries to, 50-52
Optics, 40-52, 96; Hooke-Newton
controversy over, 222-223, 224228, 231
Osiander, Andreas, 33
Quantum mechanics, 54
Panmathematism, 12
Paracentric motion, 130-131, 138
Pardies, Ignatius Gaston, 43
Pascal, Blaise, 11, 37, 53
Pelseneer, Jean, 221, 222, 229, 237
Pemberton, H,, 16, 18, 28
Pendulum, 181
Perrin, Jean, 95
Phenomena, and hypothesis, 37;
see also Regulae philosophandi
Philosophy: Cartesian, 54-65; cor
puscular, 12-15, 19; experi
mental, 17, 18, 25, 37-38, 113,
264-265; experimental, rules of
conduct of, 266-272; Newtons
rejection of, 236-239, 247
Physicomathematics, 10-11
Picard, Jean, 230
Place: -continuum, 7; Descartess
concept of, 80-81; motion, space
and, 10, 198-200; Newtons defi
nition of, 83, 105
Planets, 15,30,84,98-103,203-220,
239-242, 249-252, 280-282 ;'Gas-
Rainbow, 3
Ramus, Petrus, 35
Rectilinear motion. See Motion,
rectilinear
Reflection. See Light; Optics
Refraction. See Optics
Regis, Pierre-Sylvain, 115
Regulae philosophandi, 18, 19, 3031, 110, 158, 261-272
Relativistic concept of motion
(Descartes), 79-81, 84-85
Relativistic mechanics, 54
Resistance, 73, 77-78, 95, 190, 264;
see also Impedimentum
Rest, 9-10, 77, 188-191; Newtons
definition of, 83
Riccioli, J. B., 243, 244
Rignaud, S. P., 26
Roberval, Gilles, 12, 59, 118, 143,
162
Rohault, Jacques, 165, 198-200; on
attraction, 170-172
Romer, Olaus, 230
287
I NDEX
Rosenberger, .,11
Rouse Ball, W. W., 26-27, 221
Royal Society, 40, 45, 46, 224, 229,
231, 236
Rule of conduct, of empiricism,
268-272
Saint Anselm, 192, 197
Saint Thomas, 192, 195, 196
Science: experimental, 6, 19; New
tonian vs. Cartesian, 55-114;
seventeenth-century revolution
in, 4-24
Smith, Adam, 22
Sociology, 23
Solar system, 40, 98-104, 107-108,
111,120-138; and divine agent,
201-220; Hookes concept of,
181-183, 233-234; see also
Planets; Universe
Sotheby and Company, 241
Space: absolute, 104-105, 107;
geometrization of, 6-7, 13, 165169; motion and place, 198-200;
Newtons concept of, 86-96; see
also Vacuum; Void
Spectrum, elongation of, 42; see
also Colors
Spinoza, Baruch, 11
Status of motion, 9-10, 66-70, 76
Substance, and property, 159
System o f Natural Philosophy
(Rohault), 198
System o f the World (Laplace), 18
System of the World, The,
Principia, 29, 103, 107, 115
Tentamen (Leibniz), 124, 125, 133137, 139, 142, 279
Theology, 201-220; and Descartes,
288
80-81; and the infinite, 192-197;

and Newton, 88-94, 111-114
Thomists, 192
Time, absolute, 103-104
Trajectory: of falling body, 11,
238-242,243,246; of planets, 183
Tycho Brahe, 34, 125, 175, 242
Universe: Descartess concept of,
70-75, 81, 85-88; God and,
12-13, 19, 21-22, 38-39, 84,
89-94,111,154-155; seventeenthcentury concept of, 5-16, 20
Universal attraction. See Gravity
Vacuum, 95, 111, 122, 161, 164165; and plenum theory, 166167; see also Space; Void
Varignon, Pierre, 63
View o f Sir Isaac Newtons Philo
sophy (Pemberton), 18
Void, concept of, 13-14, 57, 85-90;
and extension, 164-169; Gas
sendis view of, 178-179
Voltaire, Frangois, 14, 17, 18, 20,
55, 167-168; on Cartesians, 6061, 62
Vortex: Cartesian theory of, 63-65;
Huygens theory of, 117-120,
124; Leibnizs views on, 125-130;
Newtons rejection of theory of,
97-111; Rohault on, 171
Waller, Erik, 221
Wallis, John, 11, 152, 188
Ward, Seth, 40
Waste Book, 189
Whitehead, Alfred North, 3, 50
Wren, Christopher, 130, 133, 183,
246

Newtonian Studies - Alexandre Koyre

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ALEXANDRE KOYRE

CH APM A N & HALL

First published in 1965

Lecture, University of Chicago, November 3,1948; pub

Originally published as LHypothese et Iexperience

Study based on a Horblit Lecture on the History of

Huygens and Leibniz on Universal Attraction

Read at the IXth International Congress of History of

AN U N PU B L IS H E D LETTER OF ROBERT HOOKE TO

Published in Isis 43 (1952), 312-337.

Published in Archives Internationales d'Histoire des

Published in Archives Internationales d'Histoire des

The following collection of Newtonian Studies comprises essays

between Newton and Descartes. For instance, I do not study the

Professor Koyre died in Paris on 28 April 1964. Prior to his death,

THE S I G N I F I C A N C E OF THE NEWTONIAN SYNTHESIS

formulation - though not the discovery - of the fundamental laws

explanation as a decomposition (and recomposition) of white light into its colored

* See my Galileo and the Scientific Revolution of the Seventeenth Century,

THE S I G N I F I C A N CE OF THE N E W T O N I A N SYNTHESIS

tions: it is clear that the growth of modern science presupposes that

of the homogeneous and abstract - however now considered as

* Geometrization of space implies necessarily its infinitization: we cannot assign

THE S I G N I F I C A N CE OF THE N E W T O N I A N SYNTHESIS

^ Sidereus nuncius (Venice, 1610).

THE S I G N I F I C A N C E OF THE N E W T O N I A N SYNTHESIS

more than ever - opposed to each other, but their opposition be

even as presenting a spatial image of the structural relations ex

* Zeuthen, Die Geschichte der Mathematik im XVI. und XVII. Jahrhundert; L.

THE S I G N I F I C A N CE OF THE N E W T O N I A N SYNTHESIS

matical structure and determination of being, but by the Lucretian,

^ On Newtons conception of space, see Leon Bloch, La Philosophie de Newton

THE S I G N I F I C A N CE OF THE N EWT ON I A N SYNTHESIS

The void... action through the void.,. action at a distance (attrac

THE S I G N I F I C A N CE OF THE N E W T O N I A N SYNTHESIS

mathematical simplicity of the Newtonian law (the inverse-square

Newton did not admit action at a distance. Yet, as Maupertuis

THE S I G N I F I C A N C E OF THE N E WT O N I A N SYNTHESIS

Nature and natures laws lay hid in night;

Pope could not know indeed that

THE S IG N IF IC A N C E OF THE N EW T O N IA N SYNTHESIS

* Newton, Mathematical Principles o f Natural Philosophy, Book I, Theorem IV,

THE S I G N I F I C A N C E OF THE N EWT ON I A N SYNTHESIS

struction that up to our times proved to be so successful in physics,^

Newtons hostility to hypotheses is a matter of common knowledge.

Let US, therefore, begin looking at the material difficulties. First of

(1687)^ at last makes it less difficult for a comparison to be made of the

Most editions of the Principia have an index (prepared by Cotes

^ Philosophiae naturalis principia mathematica (London, 1687; reproduced in facsi

Now if, encouraged by finding these two hypotheses in a place

(Latin) edition of the Principia, we will find the same hypotheses in

Hyp. I : We are to admit no more causes of natural things, than such

Hypotheses V to IX introduce astronomical data, such as: the

^ For these transformations see Chapter VI, Newtons Regulae Philosophandi.

hypothesibus motuum coelestium a se constitutis^ he presented these

various types of hypothetical resistant media. But the good New

explains to us at the very beginning of his Astronomia nova, the

One may well understand that Petrus R am u s-in the face of

jingo he meant I do not feign, but so great a hold was gained by

on, means for Newton something that cannot be proved. Accord