There is also the famous SNAFU Principle, popular among adherents of Discordianism, which paraphrased for context goes like this: managers who brandish guns at their subordinates are only told what people assume will not provoke them to start shooting.

This is a big problem for any organization where managers are actually brandishing real guns.

Interesting that terrorist group recruitment and management is compared to Wal-Mart management.

The discussion on the terrorists’ “office politics” (along with their info on the incredible incompetency of the Bush administration) was the most interesting part to me of the 911 Commission’s report. There was quite a lot of detail on that in the book–seemingly mundane (if they weren’t terrorists), but fascinating (since they were).

Terrorist leaders also face a stubborn human resources problem: Their talent pool is inherently unstable. Terrorists are obliged to seek out recruits who are predisposed to violence — that is to say, young men with a chip on their shoulder. Unsurprisingly, these recruits are not usually disposed to following orders or recognizing authority figures. Terrorist managers can craft meticulous long-term strategies, but those are of little use if the people tasked with carrying them out want to make a name for themselves right now.

I don’t buy this characterization. The analogy I’d draw is to gang recruitment. Gangs target disaffected kids that are looking for some direction and validation. These kids generally aren’t violent by nature but become violent later in order to affirm their commitment to their gang.

The same thing is probably true in the world of terror groups. I suspect terror groups target similar individuals, and then slowly indoctrinate the them until the individuals are primed to act. Which isn’t to say that this is easy to do, but the problems this process presents are different from the one’s expressed in the article. Their most difficult tasks may be finding enough candidates and convincing them to act.

It’s certainly possible for groups to recruit the wrong kind of individuals (i.e. violent ones) due to poor management or to desperation caused by candidate shortages and then encounter the problems that are described in the article. As Marcos El Malo notes, shortages do occur, and sometimes that forces the group’s hand. But it’s not clear that a candidate pool “predisposed to violence” is an endemic problem for most groups.

@Gweihir

“….significantly reduces employee dedication maintenance effort…”

That phrase could garner you a nomination for a Golden Dilbert Award, if there was one.

@ Marcos El Malo,

… terrorist groups in the South Pacific are relying on headhunters to replace the pool of executive candidates

I don’t know if I should laugh or wince at that…

Terror organization management shortages are a regional issue. Regions experiencing shortages due to attrition in whatever form need to examine the strategies of other regions that are more successful. For example, terrorist groups in the South Pacific are relying on headhunters to replace the pool of executive candidates.

I saw this earlier today and wondered if a policy of killing the leaders actually reduced or increased acts of terrorism. Does killing a terror-manager mean that his underlings are more or less likely to commit acts of random terrorism?

Jacob Shapiro has been writing on AQ’s organisational pathology since at least 2008. See also http://themonkeycage.org/2008/02/11/accounting_for_terrorism/ .

How sad! All that CIA help and they still can’t get it rolling…