RFC 5746
Transport Layer Security (TLS) Renegotiation Indication Extension, February 2010
- File formats:
- Status:
- PROPOSED STANDARD
- Updates:
- RFC 5246, RFC 4366, RFC 4347, RFC 4346, RFC 2246
- Authors:
- E. Rescorla
M. Ray
S. Dispensa
N. Oskov - Stream:
- IETF
- Source:
- tls (sec)
Cite this RFC: TXT | XML | BibTeX
DOI: https://doi.org/10.17487/RFC5746
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Abstract
Secure Socket Layer (SSL) and Transport Layer Security (TLS) renegotiation are vulnerable to an attack in which the attacker forms a TLS connection with the target server, injects content of his choice, and then splices in a new TLS connection from a client. The server treats the client's initial TLS handshake as a renegotiation and thus believes that the initial data transmitted by the attacker is from the same entity as the subsequent client data. This specification defines a TLS extension to cryptographically tie renegotiations to the TLS connections they are being performed over, thus preventing this attack. [STANDARDS-TRACK]
For the definition of Status, see RFC 2026.
For the definition of Stream, see RFC 8729.