Why Russia is moving military assets from Syria to Libya

On 18 December, US officials revealed that Russia was moving sophisticated weaponry from its military bases in Syria to facilities in eastern Libya.

Russia has reportedly transferred S-300 and S-400 air defence systems to Libya alongside approximately 1,000 military personnel.

These troops were drawn from the Fifth Corps and 25th Special Tanks Division, which supported Syrian President Bashar Al-Assad, and were transferred via Ilyushin aircraft to avoid the Black Sea.

Russia’s transit of military assets from Syria to Libya reflects its commitment to creating an alternative logistical path for its African operations.

Moscow may not need to rely on this route, as its bases in Syria remain operational, but it serves as a valuable hedge against a breakdown in its relationship with the new Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led government.

Despite political risks associated with Libya’s still unsettled power balance, Russia is confident that a more robust military presence in the country will expand its long-term leverage.

A history of Russia's military presence in Libya

While the recent enlargement of Russia’s military foothold in Libya is linked to Assad’s fall, it is essential to place this development into its broader historical and geopolitical context.

Since Russia agreed to cancel Libya’s $4.5 billion Cold War-era debt to Russia in April 2008, the Kremlin has eyed its Mediterranean coast as a strategically valuable base location. During his October 2008 visit to Russia, Colonel Muammar al-Gaddafi expressed interest in the development of a Russian naval base in Benghazi.

As Libya descended into political chaos after Gaddafi’s overthrow in 2011, Russia established the al-Kadim base east of Benghazi and al-Jufra facility near Libya’s Mediterranean coast. These facilities supported its Wagner Group-led military intervention on Libya National Army (LNA) strongman Khalifa Haftar’s behalf and served as logistical hubs for Russian military operations in Sudan and Mali.

While Russia drew down personnel and air defence systems from Syria after its full-scale invasion of Ukraine commenced in February 2022, its military presence in Libya was largely unaffected by wartime constraints.

Since the Russian Defence Ministry dispatched its first delegation to eastern Libya in August 2023 and Haftar’s reciprocal visit to Moscow in September 2023, Russia has intensified its pursuit of a coastal military installation deal. Russia has also modernised the runways of its airbases and dispatched 1,800 new military personnel to Libya in the spring of this year.

During his June 2024 meeting with Haftar in Benghazi, Russian Deputy Defence Minister Yunus-Bek Yevkurov vowed to enhance the LNA’s military capabilities.

Given these trends, the expansion of Russia’s military presence in Libya is not mere compensation for Syria. “Russia’s moves in Libya aren’t about replacing Syria - they’re about adapting and expanding their strategic footprint,” Anas El-Gomati, the director of the Tripoli-based Sadeq Institute, told The New Arab.

The enduring lack of centralised authority and ongoing instability, which was evidenced by the recent escalation of hostilities in the northwestern Libyan city of Zawiya, is fuelling Russia’s growing presence in Libya.

How Assad's fall impacted Russia's presence in Libya

Despite fears that Russia would immediately lose access to its Syrian bases after Assad’s fall, the worst-case scenario has not transpired. On 26 December, a Russian Air Force An-124 jet travelled to and from Syria’s Khmeimim Air Base to Al-Jufra. This flight was Russia’s first since Assad’s ouster and shortly preceded HTS’s reassurances of its commitment to maintaining cooperation with Russia.

Military analyst Yury Lyamin highlighted Libya’s strategic value, as it was already a refuelling hub for Russian forces in Mali and Burkina Faso and argued that the deployment of S-300s and S-400s would provide additional cover for Russian jets entering the Sahel.

“While Tobruk can’t match Tartous’s naval depth or Khmeimim’s air capabilities, it offers something potentially more valuable - shorter routes into the Sahel and closer proximity to NATO’s southern flank,” El-Gomati told The New Arab.

When asked about Russia’s tactical considerations, Tarek Megerisi, a senior policy fellow at the European Council on Foreign Relations, told The New Arab that the distance between southern Russia to Libya was not much more than from Moscow to Khmeimim. Sochi also serves as a convenient resting spot for Russian military infrastructure transiting to Libya.

Despite these advantages, some Russian commentators have expressed concern about the costs associated with relying on Libyan facilities. Although Russian Ministry of Emergency Situations jets regularly fly over Libya to Mali, the path for military equipment is more arduous.

The Rybar Telegram channel contended that Russia would only be able to transit empty cargo planes without refuelling, and heavier weaponry would need to be transferred with the aid of ships. These logistical hurdles could cause the cost of Russia’s military operations in Africa to skyrocket and reduce their profitability for the Russian state.

Political risks are another factor that reduces Russia’s ability to rely on Libya as a logistical hub. Fyodor Lukyanov, the editor of Russia in Global Affairs, warned that Libya lacks a figure that can wield the kind of power that Assad was able to do in Syria before his ouster. Lukyanov argued that this lack of centralised authority would prevent a stable network of bases from being constructed in Libya.

Due to the challenges associated with stable basing in Libya and the stagnant progress of Russia’s Red Sea basing aspirations in Sudan, the Kremlin is doing all it can to secure continued access to its Syrian facilities. Russia’s steps towards de-listing HTS as a terrorist group should be placed into this context.

The impact of Russia's new military deployments in Libya

Russia’s growing military presence in eastern Libya has provoked fierce backlash in Tripoli. Government of National Unity (GNU) Prime Minister Abdulhamid Dbeibah summoned the Russian Ambassador to Libya and castigated the Kremlin’s warnings against its citizens travelling to Libya.

In a thinly veiled shot at Russia, Dbeibah warned that “any party that enters Libya without permission or agreement will be fought” and insisted that Libya only allows foreign forces to enter on official training missions.

Dbeibah’s fiery rhetoric was largely dismissed in Moscow as bluster. The Rybar Telegram channel accused Dbeibeh of invoking the Russian threat to secure patronage from Western countries. As Chechnya’s leader Ramzan Kadyrov maintains a deep personal network in Libya and Dbeibah discussed economic cooperation with Russia after Haftar broached basing rights with Putin last year, the Kremlin is confident that its bridges in Tripoli are not burnt.

But even if Russia finds it can no longer strike a balance between Libya’s rival governments, it still has cards to play. Expanded Russian support for Haftar could convince him to escalate militarily against the western Libyan authorities, which almost transpired in September, or give him expanded bargaining power in future UN-backed negotiations on Libya’s political future.

Buoyed by large-scale Russian backing, Haftar’s leverage could even extend to the appointment of his preferred candidate as Libya’s new prime minister.

Russia can count on collaboration from regional powers in the Middle East. “Turkey plays a key role in shoring up Russia’s access to critical oil smuggling routes in Libya and has struck many deals of its own with Haftar and the eastern Libyan authorities,” Megerisi told The New Arab.

“The United Arab Emirates also has outsourced much of its role in Libya to Russia, as it transformed from relying on hard power since 2020 to a high-stakes diplomatic role.”

Russia’s understanding attitude towards Turkey’s military intervention against the Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) and burgeoning strategic partnership with the UAE will only strengthen these partnerships.

The US’s disengagement from Libya, which could increase after President-elect Donald Trump’s inauguration if history is any guide, will further work against any constraints on Russia’s collusion with regional powers.

Assad’s ouster has raised Libya’s importance for Russia’s foreign policy. This increased profile will likely be detrimental to Libya’s hopes to break out of its endless cycle of political turmoil.

Dr Samuel Ramani is an Associate Fellow at the Royal United Services Institute (RUSI) think tank and the CEO of Pangea Geopolitical Risk. Samuel is the author of two recent books on Russian foreign policy: Russia in Africa and Putin's War on Ukraine, and is a regular commentator on Middle East affairs for the BBC, Sky News, Al Jazeera, and CNN International

Follow him on Twitter: @SamRamani2