What Kurds fear and hope for in the 'new Syria'

Fresh off their stunning victory against President Bashar Al-Assad’s regime, the rebel group Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS) has established a caretaker government in Damascus and expressed long-term plans for the country, including drafting a constitution and eventually holding elections.

However, many minorities, including the Kurds, are concerned about their future in this rapidly transforming country.

Shortly after the HTS-led offensive swiftly captured Aleppo in late November, violent Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA) militiamen displaced thousands of Kurdish civilians west of the Euphrates River.

The SNA also clashed with the Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) - which controls much of northeast Syria and is the primary US ally against the Islamic State (IS) in Syria - in the city of Manbij.

After Assad’s fall, HTS leader Ahmed al-Sharaa, known until recently by his nom de guerre Abu Mohammed al-Jolani, sought to reassure all ethnicities and sects in Syria about their future. Calling Kurds an “integral part” of Syrian society, he said the country’s new defence ministry will “include Kurdish forces in its ranks”.

Al-Sharaa recently held a “preliminary meeting” with a senior SDF delegation “to lay the foundations for future dialogue” between them.

“I find the statements from the new authorities in Damascus to be ‘promising’ but not inherently ‘reassuring’,” Ceng Sagnic, chief of analysis at the geopolitical consultancy firm TAM-C Solutions, told The New Arab.

“These statements suggest that the interim revolutionary authority does not share the Turkish-backed SNA’s strategic anti-SDF policies, which can be seen as ‘promising’ in light of their stated goal of fostering stable relations with the West, particularly the US,” he said.

“However, these statements should still be approached with caution, as all groups in present-day Damascus come from a background of prioritising conflict over dialogue for more than a decade,” he said. “This makes the line between peace and war far thinner than it appears,” Sagnic added.

“Both the SDF and Damascus will need ongoing, civilised mentorship and guidance until the rule of law, rather than force, governs Damascus.”

Mohammed A. Salih, a Non-Resident Senior Fellow at the Foreign Policy Research Institute and an expert on Kurdish and regional affairs, views the statements from these new authorities as “vague and certainly not reassuring” for Kurds.

“There is no agreement as of now, and reaching one, in a best-case scenario, would most likely take time and lengthy negotiations,” Salih told TNA.

“But the fact that the SDF controls a large part of Syria and has the support of the US could help convince Damascus to enter into negotiations over the future status of Kurds in Syria.”

Syria’s Kurds have long advocated federalism. However, the HTS-appointed defence minister in the current caretaker government rejects it.

“While the concept of federalism is appealing, Syrian Kurds appear to understand that the first crucial step is achieving strong and legitimate representation of their region in Damascus - something Iraqi Kurds secured in Baghdad shortly after the fall of Saddam,” Sagnic said.

“Today, the most urgent need is constitutional guarantees for the Kurdish-controlled autonomous region by the new administration in Damascus, and it is likely that the SDF will seek this outcome as well.”

The Kurds began negotiating with the former Assad regime in 2018, but meetings and talks led nowhere, with Assad unwilling to make any meaningful concessions.

Sagnic noted a “stark contrast” between that long-ruling regime and the new authorities in Damascus.

“The Assad regime did not seek reconciliation with the US, as it was effectively held hostage by Russia, Iran, and Hezbollah - the so-called anti-West axis,” he said. “In contrast, the current interim government of Syria appears to be seeking normalisation with the US, which suggests that its policy toward Kurds must align with this goal,” Sagnic added.

“This equation positions the US as the guardian of the delicate balance of power and the probable architect of peace in Syria.”

So long as the US remains in Syria and safeguards the SDF against Turkey and Iran, Damascus will most likely “seek stable and cooperative relations” with the Kurds regardless of whether they have a “formal constitutional framework”.

Salih concurred with the importance of the US presence but cautioned that Kurds cannot take it for granted.

“A lack of unified Kurdish stance in Damascus will also undermine the Kurdish position in Syria, hence the need for an internal Kurdish agreement as a prerequisite to a stronger Kurdish hand in future Syria and designing the new political system of the country,” he said.

More generally, the analyst expects the authorities in Damascus will “try to drag their feet” when it comes to giving the Kurds any meaningful concessions. Furthermore, HTS may seek to bide its time to gradually “peel away” Arab-majority areas under SDF control, such as Deir Az-Zour and Raqqa.

Ultimately, Salih anticipates a “real possibility of clashes” between the SDF and Damascus if they cannot reach a workable agreement.

“The good news so far is both HTS and SDF have refrained from fighting each other, and this could be capitalised on to initiate a serious negotiation between the two sides,” he said.

“The future stability of Syria, the degree of US support for Kurds, Turkish role, and popular Syrian sentiment as well as the position and attitude of other minority groups in Syria will determine the degree to which Kurds and Damascus might be able to reach an agreement.”

Such a deal would require compromises from both sides.

“The fact that the Druze and Alawites are also worried about developments in Syria and expect a special status of sorts in the new Syria will give momentum to Kurdish demands for decentralisation and recognition of their rights as well,” Salih said.

Then there is the elephant in the room: Turkey.

“Turkey’s Syrian Kurdish policy is influenced by two key factors: the domestic element, which includes its future relations with the PKK and Erdogan’s desire to secure another term in office, and the role of the SNA in Syrian politics, particularly in Damascus,” Sagnic said.

“The domestic aspect is showing promising signs, as dialogue with PKK-linked groups has already restarted in Ankara.”

Turkey has long maintained that the Syrian Kurdish YPG, the main component of the multi-ethnic SDF, has inextricable ties to the PKK.

Turkey’s SNA proxies may be “compelled to settle for territorial gains” west of the Euphrates River for “the sake of a partnership” with Damascus.

“In my view, there is ample reason to believe that, if the US continues to safeguard the fragile truce between the SDF and Turkey, sustainable peace can be achieved along the Syrian-Turkish border once these two elements play their roles,” Sagnic said.

Salih believes reducing tensions west of the Euphrates could “help build confidence” but also noted that the “Syrian reality is complex with various actors exerting influence” in different areas.

In Aleppo, the Kurds deal primarily with HTS, which has demonstrated self-restraint and a willingness to engage with them. Conversely, the SNA has repeatedly clashed with the SDF in Manbij.

To the north, Salih also sees Turkey as a “major challenge” with which the Kurds will need to contend.

“Without an agreement between the SDF and Turkey, which depends very much on an agreement between Ankara and Turkey’s Kurdish movement, Kurds will run into major problems trying to get recognition from Damascus,” he said.

“Turkey has a great deal of leverage over HTS and new Syria, and it generally fears Kurdish gains in the region.”

In neighbouring Iraq, it took years for Turkey to accept the autonomous Kurdish region.

“This is an issue where constructive engagement from all sides, supported by the US and European powers, could bring about a breakthrough with benefits for all,” Salih said. “But it is admittedly a major challenge, though not undoable.”

Paul Iddon is a freelance journalist based in Erbil, Iraqi Kurdistan, who writes about Middle East affairs.

Follow him on Twitter: @pauliddon