Syria’s new realities require swift action

The recent killing of 14 members of the new Syrian government’s security force, and subsequent crackdowns, marks the end of its brief honeymoon period and the start of a new phase of greater uncertainty and instability reflecting the realities of Syria’s sectarian and political divisions. For skeptics, this clearly opens a new, and more bloody, chapter in Syria’s ongoing 14-year civil war.

In addition, the initial euphoria immediately following Assad’s downfall on December 7 has been further overshadowed by increasing protests, and accompanying curfews, by minorities demanding greater protection against attacks, intimidation and discrimination.

There is mounting pressure on Syria’s de facto leader, Ahmed al-Sharaa, and his Hayat Tahrir al-Sham (HTS)-led government to defy doubters’ expectations and deliver on promises of “inclusive and representative government,” particularly in light of past Al Qaeda affiliations, its continuing presence on international terrorism lists, and its strict Islamic rule over Syria’s Idlib province in the recent past.

Establishing basic internal security remains a key challenge for the new transitional government. It must be underpinned by creating a rudimentary level of public trust that requires careful nurturing over time. However, time is of the essence due to a limited window of opportunity to plant the seeds for long-term fruition.

To its credit, the HTS technically managed to unite most anti-Assad opposition forces into one army under a new ministry of defense. The US-backed and Kurdish-led Syrian Democratic Forces (SDF) did not join, although talks continue between both sides. The SDF currently controls approximately one-quarter of Syrian territory, primarily in the country’s east and northeast.

Although the new HTS-led alliance may not possess the manpower to exert control nationwide, its immediate priority is consolidating order in the areas technically under its control, primarily in western Syria. These include the major population centers, and surrounding areas, of Damascus, Aleppo, Homs and Hama and the coastal region of Latakia, the stronghold of the former Assad regime and its Alawite minority.

The establishment of “settlement centers” by the new government to demobilize, disarm and reintegrate former regime forces will not yield dividends without real political outreach. Many still remain armed due to fear of retribution. Preaching inclusion and representative government will not suffice unless accompanied by substantive action. There is real potential for former regime elements to morph into a destabilizing insurgency. Lessons loom large from the period following Saddam Hussein’s downfall in Iraq. Furthermore, the resurgence of an extremist Daesh-Islamic State presence in eastern Syria can only further complicate matters for the new transitional government in Damascus.

The more geopolitically complicated task remains Syria’s east and northeast where the years-long armed conflict is escalating between the SDF and Turkish-backed Syrian National Army (SNA). As the area lies beyond the domain of the transitional government, it needs to engage in a gradual diplomatic dance with all sides with the longer term objective of gaining control. The region’s oil fields can play a considerable role in helping to fund Syria’s eventual reconstruction.

Over time, the HTS has developed pragmatic relationships with both the SNA and SDF. However, it may soon be forced to make hard choices as the SNA-SDF rivalry pits two foreign powers critical to the transitional government’s future.

Overall, the HTS-led government’s longer term interests may lie with Turkey due to various factors, including geographic realities, broad ideological ties and greater economic dependence. In the years before Assad’s downfall, Turkey was the main security guarantor of the HTS-administered enclave in Syria’s Idlib province.

Turkey’s core interests remain the removal of Kurdish militants from Syria’s north and the eventual return of over three million Syrian war refugees, which has become a liability for Turkey’s President Recep Tayyip Erdogan and his ruling AK party.

However, Syria’s new HTS-led administration cannot risk completely alienating US interests at this stage. The HTS needs to be removed from the international terrorism list of many countries and the lifting of sanctions against Syria imposed during the Assad regime. US influence is indispensable to this process. Without it, Syria’s transitional government will struggle to obtain international economic support, particularly through international financial institutions.

Furthermore, without some basic degree of US, and broader European, support, the transitional government will struggle to achieve greater recognition and legitimacy in the international community and the accompanying diplomatic, political and economic benefits.

A core US interest throughout Syria’s civil war has been containing the threat of Daesh-Islamic State. Until now, the SDF has proved to be a reliable partner for the US in this task. Syria’s new transitional government may consider a more active role and upping its game in this endeavor, particularly if it is able to reach some form of accommodation with SDF forces.

In order to gain increasing European support, it should embark on a credible road map for the eventual return of many Syrian war refugees. The exact amount would be subject to negotiations in light of realities on the ground in Syria.

To earn greater goodwill of leading regional and international players, the new HTS-led administration’s pursuit of “inclusive and representative” government must go beyond rhetoric and translate into real action.

Many delegations from countries throughout the Middle East and beyond have descended upon Damascus in search of clarity, dialogue and guarantees and offers of greater cooperation and collaboration. Largely all have a vested in a secure and stable Syria and preventing the spillover of any form of internal armed conflict and its consequences.

Among the many recent visitors to Damascus, a top delegation from Iraq, including its intelligence chief, expressed serious concerns about potential threats emanating from Syria that could destabilize western Iraq’s Sunni-majority provinces that border Syria.

Due to facts on the ground, foreign powers have accepted the sober reality that presently there are no alternatives to dealing with the HTS-led government, despite its past terrorism affiliations and roots in extreme ideology. For its part, HTS and its allies need to be highly pragmatic and far less ideological in dealing with divergent interests, rapidly changing dynamics and competing forces in Syria, the broader region and beyond.

Marco Vicenzino is a global strategy advisor for international business and geopolitical expert. www.marcovicenzino.com