The disastrous decisions on Cyprus
The declassification of archival material on the Greek junta-inspired coup in Cyprus and the subsequent Turkish invasion in July and August 1974 by the National Intelligence Service (EYP) is a big step in the right direction. These documents are made available to research on the 50th anniversary of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus: The release includes all the bulletins from the two-month period during which the invasion unfolded.
As the head of EYP, Themistoklis Demiris, says in a note accompanying the files, this path may be followed for the declassification of other documents of the service. It should be noted that there are few countries in the world – including the Western world – that make such documents available to the public and researchers.
The material now made public by EYP offers important evidence for that critical period. The first element: It is rather obvious that the then-called Central Intelligence Agency (KYP) itself was not aware of the junta’s planning for the July 15, 1974 coup against the then president of the Republic of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios.
Those documents, which are addressed to the leadership of the Greek armed forces (and therefore it is inconceivable that they were written with the aim of misleading the recipients), are compiled with the given assumption that Makarios would remain in power. No intelligence service would mislead the armed forces on purpose, especially considering the prospect of being refuted in the next few hours, when the coup against Makarios started to unfold.
However, this is an extremely interesting element of how the junta’s Brigadier General Dimitrios Ioannidis and his men acted (and understood – or didn’t – the world around them). Perhaps we shouldn’t be surprised if they kept KYP in the dark. As experienced conspirators, they seem to have wanted the smallest possible circle of people to know about their plan, so as to preserve the advantage of surprise, so crucial to creating a fait accompli. They had learned well the business of coups that create just that – a fait accompli. As a preparation for a new coup, their actions sound reasonable.
But it was disastrous for the case of Cyprus in 1974. If key security services were kept uninformed, this element is completely absurd, as the coup against Makarios threatened to provoke a Turkish invasion of Cyprus and a Greek-Turkish war, with an Aegean that remained unprotected. The tragic and absolute lack of preparation for war on the part of the Ioannidis plotters thus becomes even more evident.
It is rather obvious that the then-called Central Intelligence Agency was not aware of the junta’s planning for the July 15, 1974 coup against the president of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios
In other words, the junta knew how to stage coups. But it didn’t know how to manage a war.
The same conclusion arises from the fact that the KYP bulletins, in the days before the Turkish invasion, adequately described Turkey’s war preparations. However, the warnings were not heeded by Ioannidis. These documents confirm a key finding of Alexis Papachelas’ – Kathimerini’s executive editor – research (in the book “A Dark Room”) namely that the warnings were there but were ignored by Ioannidis, who stubbornly refused to accept reality and let the country prepare for a conflict that was now clearly coming.
Once again, the fatal inability of the junta to understand the dynamics of war (and not just coups) became apparent. This time, it happened just two days before the Turkish invasion.
The availability of these documents to research adds important material to our attempt to piece together the overall picture. This is a valuable resource. But as with any historical source, it is up to us to use it creatively, with knowledge and care, for some national reflection.
Evanthis Hatzivassiliou is professor (post-war history) at the Department of History and Archaeology of the University of Athens, and the secretary-general of the Hellenic Parliament Foundation for Parliamentarism and Democracy.
